Alers v. Bemer

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Alers v. Bemer

ANTONIO ALERS v. BRUCE J. BEMER
(AC 47607)
Moll, Seeley and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff on
the complaint and on the defendant’s counterclaim, both alleging breach of
contract. The parties had previously executed a settlement agreement that
required the defendant to make two payments to the plaintiff and included
nondisparagement and confidentiality clauses. Shortly after the defendant
made the first payment, the plaintiff’s attorney, F, made posts on his law
firm’s website and Facebook page regarding the parties’ settlement. After
discovering F’s posts, the defendant did not make the second payment to
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff filed an action for breach of contract. The
defendant, alleging that F’s posts breached the terms of the settlement
agreement and he was therefore excused from making the second payment
to the plaintiff under the agreement, filed a counterclaim. On appeal, the
defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly found that F was not
acting as an agent of the plaintiff when he disclosed confidential information
stemming from and relating to the settlement agreement on his law firm’s
website and Facebook page. Held:
The trial court’s finding that the defendant failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that F was acting as the plaintiff’s agent when he made the
online publications was not clearly erroneous, as the record contained no
evidence that F acted at the plaintiff’s request, for the plaintiff’s benefit or
in furtherance of the business for which the plaintiff had retained him, and,
therefore, the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff was liable for F’s conduct
in breaching the terms of the settlement agreement failed.

Argued December 4, 2025—officially released May 12, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for breach of contract,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Hartford and transferred to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury,
Complex Litigation Docket, where the defendant filed a
counterclaim; thereafter, the case was tried to the court,
Bellis, J.; judgment for the plaintiff on the complaint and
on the counterclaim, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Corinne Burlingham, with whom were Brendon P.
Levesque and, on the brief, Michael S. Taylor and Eric
P. Anderson, for the appellant (defendant).
Alers v. Bemer

Hide Inga, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant, Bruce J. Bemer, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of
the plaintiff, Antonio Alers, in this action for breach of
a settlement agreement entered into between the parties.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improp-
erly (1) failed to find that the plaintiff’s attorney, Kevin
C. Ferry, was bound by confidentiality and nondisparage-
ment provisions in the settlement agreement, and (2)
found that Attorney Ferry was not acting as an agent of
the plaintiff when he disclosed confidential information
stemming from and relating to the settlement agreement
on his law firm’s website and Facebook page. We affirm
the judgment of the court.
In a joint stipulation of facts, the parties stipulated to
the following facts. “In April 2017, the plaintiff . . . sued
the defendant . . . alleging, inter alia, that the defendant
sexually abused him when he was a minor causing him
to suffer physical and emotional injuries (underlying
action). . . . The plaintiff was represented by Attorney
. . . Ferry in the underlying action. . . . On October 7,
2019, the defendant and the plaintiff agreed to settle the
underlying action following private mediation. . . . On
October 16, 2019, the parties entered into a confidential
settlement agreement (settlement agreement). . . . The
settlement agreement contains a confidentiality provi-
sion, which provides: ‘The fact of this settlement and the
terms of this [s]ettlement [a]greement are confidential.
The [p]arties acknowledge that the confidentiality of
this [s]ettlement [a]greement is a material term and
the [p]arties would not have executed and entered into
this [s]ettlement [a]greement without an unequivocal
commitment by all [p]arties to keep the terms of this
[s]ettlement [a]greement confidential. The [p]arties shall
not disclose or cause to be disclosed any of the terms of
this [s]ettlement [a]greement, directly or indirectly,
orally or in writing, to any person or entity whatsoever
Alers v. Bemer

except such information as may be minimally required
for accomplishment of the purposes of this [s]ettlement
[a]greement, or for insurance, financial accounting, audit
or financial statement purposes, litigation processing,
information preservation, for the preparation of state
and federal income tax returns, and as otherwise required
by legal compulsion. If any [p]arty or such [p]arty’s
attorneys is/are served with a subpoena or court order
requiring production of this [s]ettlement [a]greement,
unless prohibited by law, that [p]arty shall immediately
(and in no event more than three (3) business days after
receipt of such process) notify in writing and provide
the other [p]arty with a copy of the subpoena or court
order before disclosing any terms of this [s]ettlement
[a]greement.
“ ‘For purposes of this [s]ection . . . notice shall be pro-
vided by mail and [email] as follows: For [the plaintiff],
[Attorney] Ferry . . . . For [the defendant]: [Attorney]
Ryan P. Barry . . . . Notwithstanding the above, if asked
about the outcome of the [p]roposed [a]ction, a [p]arty
may respond by stating the matter was resolved.’ . . .
“The settlement agreement contains a nondisparage-
ment provision, which provides: ‘The [p]arties agree that
they shall not make or cause to be made any disparaging
statements to any person or the public or government
agency which impugns the reputation, character, brand,
name or integrity of any other [p]arty, or the quality of
their products, services, or business practices, except
good faith truthful statements made in compliance
with legal reporting requirements or in response to a
court order or the written directive of a government
agency.’ . . .
“The terms of the settlement agreement contemplated
the defendant to make two payments to the plaintiff.
. . . The first payment was made in a timely manner. .
. . On November 15, 2019, the plaintiff withdrew the
underlying action. . . . On January 8, 2020 . . . [Attorney]
Ferry . . . published an article on his [law firm’s (Ferry
Law)] website titled, ‘Bruce Bemer—settles all fifteen
Alers v. Bemer

lawsuits pending against him.’ . . . The article stated
that, ‘[a]pproximately fifteen different lawsuits were
filed against . . . Bemer within the last two years, all
surrounding allegations of sexual abuse against young
men, most of [whom] were minors at the time. Upon
information and belief, all fifteen lawsuits have now
settled, with confidential terms and amounts for each
of the lawsuits.
“ ‘It is uncertain what prompted . . . Bemer to settle all
of the pending lawsuits against him. Some may theorize
it was fear of facing another bad court outcome like the
criminal conviction he recently faced out of Danbury
Superior Court this summer. That conviction is currently
up on appeal and . . . Bemer remains out on a [$750,000]
appeal bond. Others say it is to avoid the continued nega-
tive publicity surrounding these lawsuits. Perhaps it was
done in order to remove the prejudgment attachments
lodged against his assets to be able to secure a judgment
rendered following trial. A settlement gives . . . Bemer
some control over his assets, including seeking removal
of some or all of the attachment[s].
“ ‘[Ferry Law] represented three out of the fifteen
victims bringing claims against . . . Bemer. All three
matters have now settled. The amounts and terms remain
confidential. However, each victim can feel some satis-
faction that . . . Bemer has been punished criminally and
compensated his victims. [Ferry Law] recently filed a new
case against . . . Bemer and urges victims to continue
coming forward.’ . . .
“On January 10, 2020, Attorney Ferry, on his [law]
firm’s Facebook page, posted a link to the above article
that included a photo of the defendant and the title of
the article: ‘Bruce Bemer—settles all fifteen lawsuits
pending against him—Ferry Law Connecticut Personal
Injury Lawyers.’ This post contained the following: ‘A
victim of sexual assault who was a minor when assaulted
has the right to proceed under a fictitious name to avoid
public exposure. The only person who should be ashamed
is the creepy looking guy below. Call us if this man abused
you. We will make it right.’ . . .
Alers v. Bemer

“The second payment [under the settlement agreement]
was due April 30, 2020. . . . The defendant discovered
the [previously referenced website article and Facebook
posting] prior to the date the second payment was due. .
. . After discovery of the publications, Attorney Barry
informed Attorney Ferry that the defendant would not
be making the second settlement payment. . . . The defen-
dant did not tender the second payment to the plaintiff.
. . . Prior to the second settlement payment coming due,
said payment was placed in a separate interest-bearing
account. Ever since, the payment has been kept in said
account. . . . On April 27, 2020, the plaintiff moved in the
underlying action to restore the case to the docket or, in
the event that the case was still on the docket, to extend
the time to withdraw until August 1, 2020. . . . On May
7, 2020, the defendant objected to the motion to restore.
. . . On December 30, 2020, the court, Welch, J., denied
the motion to restore. . . . The plaintiff appealed, and the
Appellate Court rejected all [of] the plaintiff’s claims.1
. . . After the appeal was decided, the plaintiff retained
new counsel. . . . In August 2020, the plaintiff initiated
this action, suing the defendant for breach of contract.”
(Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote added.)
In a third amended complaint filed on January 30,
2023, the plaintiff, in a single count, set forth a claim for
breach of contract, alleging that the defendant breached
the settlement agreement by failing to make the required
second payment. On August 11, 2023, the defendant filed
an answer and a counterclaim for breach of contract, in
which he alleged that the plaintiff, through Attorney
Ferry, disclosed confidential information in violation of
the confidentiality provision of the settlement agreement
and that, as a result of that breach of a material term of
the settlement agreement, the defendant was excused
from “any and all performance owed to the plaintiff . . . .”
The defendant also alleged that he suffered damages
as a result of the plaintiff’s breach of the settlement
agreement.
1
See Doe v. Bemer, 215 Conn. App. 504, 283 A.3d 1074 (2022).
Alers v. Bemer

The parties initially requested that the court decide
the matter on the basis of cross motions for summary
judgment and the joint stipulation of facts and exhibits
attached to it, which included the settlement agreement
and copies of the online postings of Attorney Ferry.
On December 4, 2023, the court heard argument from
the parties. At that proceeding, the court informed
the parties that it would adjudicate the matter on the
basis of argument, the joint stipulation of facts with
attached exhibits, and postargument briefs, rather than
the motions for summary judgment. Both parties filed
postargument briefs on January 10, 2024.
In a memorandum of decision dated April 11, 2024,
the court found in favor of the plaintiff on his breach
of contract claim and with respect to the defendant’s
counterclaim. The court set forth the parties’ positions
and the central issue of the case as follows: “The defen-
dant argues that the plaintiff breached the settlement
agreement when Attorney Ferry published the terms of
the settlement agreement and publicly disparaged the
defendant on his [law firm’s] website and Facebook page,
thereby discharging the defendant from any further
duty to perform. In response, the plaintiff argues that
Attorney Ferry was not a party to the settlement agree-
ment, nor did he intend to be bound by the confidentiality
and/or nondisparagement provisions of the settlement
agreement, so he could not have breached the contract.
Therefore, the plaintiff argues, the defendant breached
the settlement agreement by failing to make the second
payment when it became due. The heart of this case
centers around whether the acts of a party’s attorney
can be attributed to that party in breaching a settlement
agreement, therefore discharging a defendant from any
further duty to perform under the contract.”
The court first addressed whether Attorney Ferry was
bound by the provisions of the settlement agreement. In
concluding that he was not so bound, the court stated
that Attorney Ferry was not named as a party to the
settlement agreement, the language of which was “clear
Alers v. Bemer

that the parties to the contract [were] [the plaintiff] and
[the defendant].” The court also stated that the fact that
Attorney Ferry signed the settlement agreement under
the notation “Approved as to Form and Agreed as to
Paragraph Nine”2 “[did] not, by itself, bind him to the
entirety of the contract.” Rather, the court reasoned
that such language in contracts has been interpreted
as meaning that “counsel has read the document, [that
the document] embodies the parties’ agreement, and
[that] counsel perceives no impediment to his client sign-
ing it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thus, the
court determined that Attorney Ferry “only approved
the settlement agreement as to form and agreed to be
bound by paragraph nine,” not by the confidentiality
and nondisparagement provisions, which did not contain
similar language.
The court stated further: “Even if the language of
the confidentiality and nondisparagement provisions in
the present case purported to bind the parties’ counsel
to the provisions, the defendant is not suing Attorney
Ferry for breach of contract, but rather, the defendant’s
counterclaim essentially seeks to attribute Attorney
Ferry’s alleged breach of the settlement agreement to the
plaintiff, alleging that the plaintiff breached the contract
through the actions of Attorney Ferry. Accordingly,
for Attorney Ferry’s alleged breach of the settlement
agreement to be attributable to the plaintiff, Attorney
2
Paragraph nine of the settlement agreement is titled “Representa-
tions by Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel” and provides: “By executing
this [s]ettlement [a]greement, [the] [p]laintiff’s [c]ounsel represent
and warrant that: Other than [the] [p]laintiff and [the] [p]laintiff’s
[c]ounsel, there are no other persons or entities having any interest in
the [s]ettlement [a]mount. To the extent that there are any such other
persons, including experts, consultants, [cocounsel], referring attorneys
or any entities representing [the] [p]laintiff or having any interest in
the [attorney’s] fees or litigation costs incurred in connection with
the settlement on behalf of [the] [p]laintiff, any such interest shall be
satisfied entirely and completely by [the] [p]laintiff. If any such person
seeks recovery from [the defendant] of any amount supposedly due as
a result of this settlement, [the] [p]laintiff shall defend, indemnify
and hold [the defendant] harmless from and against any such claims,
including [attorney’s] fees and costs.”
Alers v. Bemer

Ferry must have been acting under a form of agency
theory on behalf of the plaintiff.” As the court reasoned:
“In the present case, the parties agreed to have this
matter decided on [the basis of] the joint stipulation of
facts and exhibits. There is no evidence in the record to
support a claim that Attorney Ferry was acting as the
plaintiff’s agent with respect to the postings. The joint
stipulation of facts only includes a statement that ‘[t]he
plaintiff was represented by Attorney . . . Ferry in the
underlying action.’ Connecticut courts have recognized
that, ‘[t]he general rule is that the acts of an attorney
are imputed to a client when they are performed in the
furtherance of the business for which the attorney has
been retained.’ . . . Here, there is no evidence in the
record with respect to whether Attorney Ferry was act-
ing in furtherance of the business for which he had been
retained, or whether Attorney Ferry was acting with
actual or apparent authority when the posts were pub-
lished to Attorney Ferry’s website and Facebook pages.
Therefore, the defendant has failed to meet his burden
of establishing that Attorney Ferry was acting as the
plaintiff’s agent with actual or apparent authority when
he published the posts, as required for Attorney Ferry’s
actions to be attributed to the plaintiff . . . .” (Citations
omitted; emphasis in original.)
In analyzing the parties’ breach of contract claims,
the court concluded: “It is undisputed that the settle-
ment agreement was validly formed. Under the settle-
ment agreement, the plaintiff was obligated to withdraw
the complaint against the defendant in the underlying
action, withdraw the appeal, and provide the defendant’s
counsel with a complete and correct W-9 form. It is not
in dispute that the plaintiff satisfied these obligations
and the plaintiff performed under the settlement agree-
ment. The defendant’s obligations under the settlement
agreement included paying a confidential sum of money
to the plaintiff in two payments. The first payment was
to be made to the plaintiff within thirty days of the
granting of [a] motion to modify the prejudgment rem-
edy. It is undisputed that the defendant made the first
Alers v. Bemer

payment in a timely manner. The second payment was
to be made by April 30, 2020. It is also undisputed that
the defendant did not make the second payment to the
plaintiff and that the payment remains outstanding.
Lastly, the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the
defendant’s nonpayment, namely, the loss of the second
payment owed to him under the settlement agreement.
“Simply put, the plaintiff prevails on his breach of
contract claim, as the settlement agreement was validly
formed, the plaintiff performed under the contract, the
defendant breached the contract, and the plaintiff suf-
fered damages as a result. The defendant cannot prevail
on his breach of contract counterclaim, as he breached
the settlement agreement by failing to make the second
payment [and] was not excused by the actions of Attor-
ney Ferry.” From the judgment rendered thereon, this
appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant challenges the court’s deci-
sion on two grounds, namely, that the court improperly
(1) failed to find that Attorney Ferry was bound by the
confidentiality and nondisparagement provisions in
the settlement agreement, and (2) found that Attorney
Ferry was not acting as an agent of the plaintiff when he
disclosed the confidential information from the settle-
ment agreement on his law firm’s website and Facebook
page. The plaintiff counters by arguing, first, that the
court correctly found that the settlement agreement
was not binding on Attorney Ferry and, second, that,
even if Attorney Ferry were bound by the language of
the confidentiality and nondisparagement provisions in
the settlement agreement and breached them through
his Facebook and website postings, Attorney Ferry’s
actions could not be attributed to the plaintiff because
there was no evidence that Attorney Ferry was acting
as the plaintiff’s agent when he made the postings. We
agree with the plaintiff’s latter argument and, thus,
need not address the defendant’s first claim on appeal—
whether Attorney Ferry was bound by the confidential-
ity and nondisparagement provisions of the settlement
Alers v. Bemer

agreement. That is, even if we were to determine that
the court’s finding that Attorney Ferry was not bound
by the confidentiality and nondisparagement provisions
of the settlement agreement is clearly erroneous, we,
nonetheless, must affirm the judgment due to the lack
of evidence demonstrating that Attorney Ferry was act-
ing as the plaintiff’s agent and, thus, that any alleged
breach of the settlement agreement by Attorney Ferry
could be attributed to the plaintiff.
The following legal principles and standard of review
govern our resolution of this appeal. We begin with the
basic principle that “[a]n attorney’s actions can bind his
client . . . .” (Citation omitted.) DeMattia v. Mauro, 86
Conn. App. 1, 9 n.4, 860 A.2d 262 (2004). “[T]he relation-
ship between attorneys and their clients is one of agency.
Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP, [298 Conn.
495, 509, 4 A.3d 288 (2010)]; see also 1 Restatement
(Third), [Agency] § 1.01, comment (c) [p. 19 (2006)]. ‘The
general rule is that the acts of an attorney are imputed
to a client when they are performed in the furtherance of
the business for which the attorney has been retained.’
Allen v. Nissley, 184 Conn. 539, 542–43, 440 A.2d 231
(1981).” Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. Chung
Family Realty Partnership, LLC, 125 Conn. App. 678,
702–703, 10 A.3d 61 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn.
914, 13 A.3d 1100 (2011).
“It is well settled that [t]he nature and extent of an
agent’s authority is a question of fact for the trier . . . .
Accordingly, [appellate courts] review the trial court’s
findings with regard to agency and an agent’s apparent
authority under the clearly erroneous standard.
“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is
the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and deter-
mine credibility, we give great deference to its findings.
. . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine
Alers v. Bemer

the record to determine whether the [court] could have
reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . .
Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . . in
favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . .
“With respect to the governing legal principles, it
is a general rule of agency law that the principal in an
agency relationship is bound by, and liable for, the acts
in which his agent engages with authority from the prin-
cipal, and within the scope of the agent’s employment.
. . . An agent’s authority may be actual or apparent. . . .
Actual authority exists when [an agent’s] action [is]
expressly authorized . . . or . . . although not authorized,
[is] subsequently ratified by the [principal]. . . . In con-
trast, [a]pparent authority is that semblance of authority
which a principal, through his own acts or inadverten-
ces, causes or allows third persons to believe his agent
possesses. . . . Consequently, apparent authority is to be
determined, not by the agent’s own acts, but by the acts
of the agent’s principal. . . . Ackerman v. Sobol Family
Partnership, LLP, [supra, 298 Conn. 507–508] . . . .”
(Citation omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Hadji v. Snow, 232 Conn. App. 829,
839–41, 339 A.3d 1168, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 902,
341 A.3d 958 (2025); see also LeBlanc v. New England
Raceway, LLC, 116 Conn. App. 267, 275, 976 A.2d 750
(2009) (“Significantly, our case law provides that author-
ity to perform services on behalf of a principal does not
automatically confer either actual or apparent authority
to bind the principal in other respects. . . . In particular,
[a] principal is bound to contracts executed by an agent
only if it is within the agent’s authority to contract on
behalf of that principal . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.)).
“The issue of apparent authority is one of fact, requir-
ing the trier of fact to evaluate the conduct of the parties
in light of all the surrounding circumstances. . . . Only in
the clearest of circumstances, where no other conclusion
could reasonably be reached, is the trier’s determination
of fact to be disturbed. . . .
Alers v. Bemer

“The issue of apparent authority is . . . to be deter-
mined based on two criteria. . . . First, it must appear
from the principal’s conduct that the principal held the
agent out as possessing sufficient authority to embrace
the act in question, or knowingly permitted [the agent]
to act as having such authority. . . . Second, the party
dealing with the agent must have, acting in good faith,
reasonably believed, under all the circumstances, that the
agent had the necessary authority to bind the principal
to the agent’s action.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Hadji v. Snow, supra, 232 Conn. App. 841. “The
burden of proving agency is on the party asserting its
existence.” Lee v. Duncan, 88 Conn. App. 319, 324, 870
A.2d 1, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 902, 876 A.2d 12 (2005).
In the present case, we cannot conclude that the court’s
finding that the defendant did not meet his burden of
proving that Attorney Ferry was acting as an agent
of the plaintiff at the time he published the posts is
clearly erroneous. See generally Woodbridge Crossing
Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Ferguson, 229 Conn. App.
99, 104, 325 A.3d 1205 (2024) (trial court’s finding that
plaintiff did not sustain burden of proof was not clearly
erroneous). “The existence of an agency relationship is
a question of fact . . . which may be established by cir-
cumstantial evidence based upon an examination of the
situation of the parties, their acts and other relevant
information.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank
of America, N.A. v. Gonzalez, 187 Conn. App. 511, 516,
202 A.3d 1092 (2019). On the basis of our review of the
record in the present case, we agree with the court that
the defendant did not produce evidence to establish that
Attorney Ferry was acting as an agent of the plaintiff, or
that he was acting with the plaintiff’s apparent author-
ity, when he published the posts at issue.
As we have stated, “apparent authority is to be deter-
mined, not by the agent’s own acts, but by the acts of the
agent’s principal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP, supra,
298 Conn. 508. The record in the present case is devoid
Alers v. Bemer

of any evidence concerning actions by the plaintiff rela-
tive to Attorney Ferry’s online posts. For example, the
defendant did not present evidence showing that the
plaintiff directed or embraced the posts, that he know-
ingly permitted or encouraged Attorney Ferry to divulge
the confidential information in the posts, or that the
plaintiff even had knowledge of them.
Additionally, “[a]n essential ingredient of agency is
that the agent is doing something at the behest and for the
benefit of the principal.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Dushay v. Southern Connecticut Hockey League,
LLC, 234 Conn. App. 609, 625, 344 A.3d 175 (2025). As
we have indicated, “acts of an attorney are imputed to
a client when they are performed in the furtherance of
the business for which the attorney has been retained.”3
3
The defendant contends that, because “agency relationships between
clients and attorneys are complicated . . . it is appropriate to consider
rules outside of ordinary agency rules.” In support of this contention,
the defendant relies on Yale University v. Out of the Box, LLC, 118 Conn.
App. 800, 808, 990 A.2d 869 (2010), and asserts that “the decision in
Yale University makes clear [that] the general rules regarding agents
and apparent authority become more complicated when the agent is a
lawyer who has settled a case for his or her client. . . . Thus, the general
rule to which the trial court cites, which is that ‘the acts of an attorney
are imputed to a client when they are performed in the furtherance of
the business for which the attorney has been retained’ [Allen v. Niss-
ley, supra, 184 Conn. 542–43] is not necessarily as straightforward
and dispositive as the trial court asserts it is.” We conclude that the
defendant’s reliance on Yale University is misplaced. That case involved
the issue of whether an attorney had apparent authority to enter into a
settlement agreement on behalf of the plaintiff, his client, and to bind
the plaintiff to the terms of that agreement. Yale University v. Out
of the Box, LLC, supra, 802. The present case, by contrast, involves
conduct by Attorney Ferry in posting advertisements to his law firm’s
website and Facebook page, which occurred after the parties entered
into their settlement agreement, and the issue of whether, in doing so,
Attorney Ferry was acting as an agent of the plaintiff; there is no dispute
involving the representation provided by Attorney Ferry in connection
with the settlement agreement entered into between the plaintiff and
the defendant, or the validity of that agreement. Moreover, in Yale
University, this court, in affirming the trial court’s finding of apparent
authority, noted that “this is not a case in which the court found appar-
ent authority simply as a result of retaining a lawyer and having him
negotiate on behalf of a client.” Id., 810. In the present case, however,
Alers v. Bemer

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Landmark Invest-
ment Group, LLC v. Chung Family Realty Partnership,
LLC, supra, 125 Conn. App. 703. The record in the pres-
ent case similarly is bereft of evidence demonstrating
that Attorney Ferry’s online postings were done as part
of his representation of the plaintiff. There is nothing
in the parties’ stipulation of facts demonstrating that
Attorney Ferry’s postings were done at the behest or for
the benefit of the plaintiff, nor could the postings be con-
sidered to be in furtherance of the business for which the
plaintiff had retained Attorney Ferry, namely, to provide
legal representation in connection with the plaintiff’s
civil action against the defendant, which already had
concluded and settled before the postings were made.
The defendant appears to be contending that, because
the attorney-client relationship between Attorney Ferry
and the plaintiff had not terminated prior to Attorney
Ferry’s online postings, it reasonably could be assumed
that Attorney Ferry was acting as the plaintiff’s agent
when he published the posts.4 The defendant, however,
the defendant, in effect, argues that the trial court should have found
that Attorney Ferry was acting as the plaintiff’s agent simply because
they had a lawyer-client relationship, regardless of whether Attorney
Ferry’s postings were connected to or in furtherance of that relation-
ship. See footnote 4 of this opinion.
4
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant asserts: “Given the
facts of this particular case, the defendant had reason to believe that
. . . Attorney Ferry was acting as the plaintiff’s agent in the postings on
his [law] firm’s website and Facebook page based on the course of dealing
between Attorney Ferry and the defendant’s counsel. Attorney Ferry
was counsel for the plaintiff prior to the execution of the [settlement]
agreement. Attorney Ferry was counsel for the plaintiff during the
execution of the agreement and was one of only four individuals (other
than the judge) who was aware of the contents of, and actually signed,
the agreement, in part or in whole. The agreement provided for two
payments to be made to the plaintiff by the defendant. Attorney Ferry
continued to represent the plaintiff prior to the defendant’s tender of
the first payment, and his representation of the plaintiff was expected
to continue until full payment was made. . . . The parties thus did not
contemplate [that] Attorney Ferry’s representation of the plaintiff
would terminate once the agreement was signed and executed. Attorney
Ferry’s publications additionally referred to the fact of the agreement
and referenced that each alleged victim, a class which included the
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fails to recognize that, for Attorney Ferry’s conduct to
be imputed to the plaintiff, it must have been done at
the plaintiff’s request or for the plaintiff’s benefit, or
in furtherance of the business for which the plaintiff
had retained Attorney Ferry. The record contains no
such evidence to that effect. Rather, it appears that the
postings were done by Attorney Ferry in an effort to
solicit business for his law firm. Indeed, in his principal
appellate brief, the defendant refers to the postings as
“advertisements . . . .” The fact that Attorney Ferry
still represented the plaintiff at the time he published
the posts does not, by itself, establish that, in doing so,
Attorney Ferry was acting as an agent of the plaintiff.
See generally Acheson v. White, 195 Conn. 211, 213 n.4,
487 A.2d 197 (1985) (“[a]n attorney who is authorized
to represent a client in litigation does not automatically
have either implied or apparent authority to settle or
otherwise to compromise the client’s cause of action”);
see also Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP,
supra, 298 Conn. 510 (same).
Accordingly, the court’s finding that the defendant
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that Attor-
ney Ferry was acting as the plaintiff’s agent when he
made the online publications is not clearly erroneous.
Therefore, the defendant’s claim that “the plaintiff is
liable for his agent’s conduct in breaching the terms of
the [settlement] agreement” fails.5
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
plaintiff, should feel satisfaction that compensation was furnished
by the defendant to the alleged victims. Attorney Ferry thus was an
agent when the agreement was negotiated, when it was signed, when
he learned about the confidential information it contained, and when
he decided to disseminate that information while the settlement was
only partially consummated.” (Footnotes omitted.)
5
We note that the defendant does not challenge the court’s findings
that “the settlement agreement was validly formed, the plaintiff per-
formed under the contract, the defendant breached the contract, and
the plaintiff suffered damages as a result.” Rather, his claims on appeal
challenging the judgment are predicated on his contentions that his
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obligation to make the required second payment under the settlement
agreement was excused due to the breach of the settlement agreement
by Attorney Ferry, who was acting as the plaintiff’s agent, and that
the plaintiff was liable for that breach. Because we have rejected these
contentions, we need not examine further the court’s findings in sup-
port of its determination that the defendant breached the settlement
agreement.