CourtListener 10850279

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Olson v. Freedom of Information Commission

MATTHEW OLSON v. FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION COMMISSION
(AC 48010)
Alvord, Seeley and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the Superior Court’s judgment dismissing his
administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of
Information Commission. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court
improperly concluded that he was a vexatious requester pursuant to statute
((Rev. to 2021) § 1-206 (b) (5), as amended by Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June,
2021, No. 21-2, § 148). Held:

The Superior Court properly determined that the commission did not misin-
terpret the meaning of “vexatious requester” under § 1-206 (b) (5) and that
the term “vexatious requester” in § 1-206 (b) (5) was not unconstitutionally
vague as applied to the plaintiff.

The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to review, as
inadequately briefed, the plaintiff’s claim that the commission’s applica-
tion of § 1-206 (b) (5) resulted in viewpoint discrimination in violation of
article first, § 5, of the Connecticut constitution, as the plaintiff failed to
provide analysis applying the legal authority set forth in his brief to the
facts of this case.

Argued March 10—officially released April 21, 2026

Procedural History

Administrative appeal from the decision of the defen-
dant, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of New Britain, where the court, Budzik, J., granted
the city of Stamford’s motion to intervene as a defendant;
thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Budzik, J.;
judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Cameron L. Atkinson, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Danielle L. McGee, commission counsel, with whom,
on the brief, was Colleen M. Murphy, for the appellee
(defendant).
Joseph W. McQuade, with whom, on the brief, was
Kenneth Weinstock, for the appellee (intervening defen-
dant).
Olson v. Freedom of Information Commission

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Matthew Olson, appeals
from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing
his administrative appeal from the final decision of the
defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission
(commission), in which the commission determined,
inter alia, that the plaintiff is a vexatious requester
pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 1-206 (b)
(5), as amended by Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2021,
No. 21-2, § 148 (Spec. Sess. P.A. 21-2).1 On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the Superior Court improperly (1)
1
General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 1-206 (b) (5), as amended by Spec.
Sess. P.A. 21-2, which became effective July 1, 2021, provides: “Not-
withstanding any provision of this subsection, a public agency may
petition the commission for relief from a requester that the public
agency alleges is a vexatious requester. Such petition shall be sworn
under penalty of false statement, as provided in section 53a-157b,
and shall detail the conduct which the agency alleges demonstrates a
vexatious history of requests, including, but not limited to: (A) The
number of requests filed and the total number of pending requests; (B)
the scope of the requests; (C) the nature, content, language or subject
matter of the requests; (D) the nature, content, language or subject
matter of other oral and written communications to the agency from
the requester; and (E) a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse
of the right to access information under the Freedom of Information
Act or an interference with the operation of the agency. Upon receipt
of such petition, the executive director of the commission shall review
the petition and determine whether it warrants a hearing. If the execu-
tive director determines that a hearing is not warranted, the executive
director shall recommend that the commission deny the petition without
a hearing. The commission shall vote at its next regular meeting after
such recommendation to accept or reject such recommendation and,
after such meeting, shall issue a written explanation of the reasons for
such acceptance or rejection. If the executive director determines that
a hearing is warranted, the commission shall serve upon all parties, by
certified or registered mail or electronic transmission, a copy of such
petition together with any other notice or order of the commission.
The commission shall, after due notice to the parties, hear and either
grant or deny the petition within one year after its filing. Upon a grant
of such petition, the commission may provide appropriate relief com-
mensurate with the vexatious conduct, including, but not limited to,
an order that the agency need not comply with future requests from
the vexatious requester for a specified period of time, but not to exceed
one year. Any party aggrieved by the commission’s granting of such
petition may apply to the superior court for the judicial district of New
Olson v. Freedom of Information Commission

determined that the commission did not misconstrue
the term “vexatious requester” pursuant to § 1-206 (b)
(5), (2) concluded that the term “vexatious requester” in
§ 1-206 (b) (5) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to
the plaintiff, and (3) declined to review, as inadequately
briefed, the plaintiff’s viewpoint discrimination claim
raised pursuant to article first, § 5, of the Connecticut
constitution. We disagree and affirm the judgment of
the Superior Court.
The following facts, either as set forth in the final
decision of the commission or undisputed in the record,
and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of
this appeal. On or about July 24, 2019, a police officer
with the Stamford Police Department (department)
questioned the plaintiff at his residence regarding a
vehicle that was parked on an adjacent public roadway
and instructed the plaintiff to move his vehicle. As a
result of that interaction, the plaintiff, in an effort to
determine who had contacted the police about his vehicle,
filed numerous requests under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., with
the intervening defendant, the city of Stamford (city),
seeking information from various city departments so
that the caller could be “ ‘prosecuted to the fullest extent
of the law.’ ” The plaintiff also sent numerous emails to
various city officials in which he alleged that he had been
threatened and harassed by members of the department,
requested related records pursuant to the act, and made a
number of accusations of racial discrimination and inten-
tional misconduct against city officials. Between July
24, 2019, and November 5, 2021, the plaintiff made at
least thirty-two requests with various city departments,
which oftentimes were expansive and detailed in nature,
Britain, within fifteen days of the commission meeting at which such
petition was granted, for an order reversing the commission’s decision.”
Our references in this opinion to § 1-206 (b) (5) are to the 2021 revi-
sion of the statute, as amended by Spec. Sess. P.A. 21-2. We note that
the statute has since been amended and what had been subdivision (5)
is now subdivision (6). See Public Acts 2023, No. 23-200, § 1; Public
Acts 2024, No. 24-108, § 32.
Olson v. Freedom of Information Commission

making compliance with the requests time-consuming
and burdensome.
As a result, on November 30, 2021, the city and its
public officials filed with the commission a petition for
relief from a vexatious requester pursuant to § 1-206 (b)
(5). The matter was heard before the commission on vari-
ous dates, at which time the parties presented testimony,
argument and exhibits. In a detailed and thorough final
decision, the commission outlined the extensive requests
filed by the plaintiff, including their scope, nature and
content, as well as a pattern of conduct by the plaintiff,
which the commission found to be abusive of the process
for seeking information under the act. The commis-
sion found the plaintiff to be a vexatious requester and
granted the petition for relief filed by the city and its
officials. The commission ordered that the city and its
departments and officials did not need to comply with any
public records requests submitted by the plaintiff for a
period of one year from the date of notice of its decision
and for the plaintiff to “cease from engaging in similar
vexatious conduct” as it had found in its decision.
The plaintiff subsequently appealed to the Superior
Court, challenging the final decision of the commis-
sion on three grounds, namely, that (1) the commission
misinterpreted the statutory meaning of “vexatious
requester” under § 1-206 (b) (5); (2) the term “vexatious
requester” under § 1-206 (b) (5) is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to the plaintiff; and (3) the commission’s
application of § 1-206 (b) (5) resulted in unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination in violation of article first, § 5,
of the Connecticut constitution. In an order dated August
30, 2024, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiff’s
appeal. The court analyzed and rejected the plaintiff’s
first two claims, and it declined to review the plain-
tiff’s third claim on the ground that it was inadequately
briefed. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the Superior Court’s
decision disposing of all three of his claims. We agree
with the court’s thoughtful analysis of the first two
Olson v. Freedom of Information Commission

claims and its determination that the commission did not
misinterpret the meaning of “vexatious requester” under
§ 1-206 (b) (5) and that the term “vexatious requester” in
§ 1-206 (b) (5) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied
to the plaintiff.2 Following our review of the record, the
parties’ briefs and arguments, and the Superior Court’s
decision, we conclude that the court properly resolved
these claims and that it would serve no useful purpose
to repeat the court’s discussion in its decision here. See
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335 Conn.
474, 479–80, 239 A.3d 288 (2020).
We also agree with the court’s decision declining to
review the plaintiff’s third claim as inadequately briefed,
which warrants a brief explanation. As we have stated,
the plaintiff’s third claim alleged that the commission’s
application of § 1-206 (b) (5) resulted in viewpoint dis-
crimination in violation of article first, § 5, of the Con-
necticut constitution. The court, after citing the well
established principle that parties “must clearly and fully
set forth their arguments in their briefs . . . [and] may
not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the
relationship between the facts of the case and the law
cited”; (internal quotation marks omitted); determined
that the plaintiff’s third claim was inadequately briefed
2
In reaching its determination that the term “vexatious requester” in
§ 1-206 (b) (5) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the plaintiff,
the court adopted the analysis and reasoning of its decision in Godbout
v. Freedom of Information Commission, Superior Court, judicial district
of New Britain, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (February 16, 2024),
which has since been affirmed by this court. See Godbout v. Freedom
of Information Commission, 235 Conn. App. 908, 344 A.3d 328 (2025).
We note that, although the trial court in Godbout determined that
§ 1-206 (b) (3) was not unconstitutionally vague; see Godbout v. Free-
dom of Information Commission, supra, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S;
subdivision (3), which concerns the determination of whether holding
a hearing on a complaint would constitute an injustice or abuse of the
commission process, has similar language to that of subdivision (5) in
that both require the commission to consider similar factors, such as
whether the complaint is cumulative or repetitive, the nature and lan-
guage of communications with officials of the agency to which a request
for information is made, and any pattern of conduct that would amount
to an abuse of the right to access information under the act. See General
Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 1-206 (b) (3) and (5).
Olson v. Freedom of Information Commission

and declined to review it because the plaintiff “cited
only general Connecticut constitutional law that was
admittedly from a ‘slightly different context’ . . . . [The
plaintiff] cited no substantive law whatsoever that was
directly applicable to his argument that § 1-206 (b) (5) is
improper viewpoint discrimination under article first,
§ 5, of the Connecticut constitution.” (Citation omitted.)
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that his briefing on
this claim, which was approximately six pages in length,
presented legal authorities and analysis, as well as “a
comprehensive argument from the administrative record
in support of his constitutional argument.” He argues
further that, because this claim involved an issue of first
impression, the court improperly required him “to point
to ‘directly applicable’ ‘substantive law.’ ” He contends
that, “[i]f the trial court is correct that what [he] submit-
ted constitutes inadequate briefing, [then his counsel]
candidly does not know how any member of the bar can
confidently raise constitutional issues of first impression
in Connecticut courts and have a reasonable expectation
that they will be decided.”
Our review of the plaintiff’s brief to the Superior Court
(trial brief) in support of this claim demonstrates that
the plaintiff did set forth legal authority that he asserted
governed his claim raised pursuant to article first, § 5, of
the Connecticut constitution, which provides: “No law
shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of
speech or of the press.” The plaintiff, citing Leydon v.
Greenwich, 257 Conn. 318, 348, 777 A.2d 552 (2001),
asserted in his trial brief that “[t]he Connecticut Supreme
Court has adopted a ‘compatibility’ test for analyzing
claims under [article first, § 5, of the state constitution]”
and that “ ‘the crucial question is whether the manner
of expression is basically incompatible with the normal
activity of a particular place at a particular time.’ ”3 The
3
The issue before our Supreme Court in Leydon, which was one of
first impression, was “whether a municipality constitutionally may
restrict access to a municipal park to its residents and their guests.”
Leydon v. Greenwich, supra, 257 Conn. 320. The court concluded that
“such a restriction is prohibited by the first amendment to the United
Olson v. Freedom of Information Commission

plaintiff also cited to State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345,
655 A.2d 737 (1995), for the proposition that, under
our state constitution, governments may regulate con-
duct but not viewpoints. Id., 390. The plaintiff further
provided an overview of the commission’s decision and
the bases for its determination that the plaintiff was a
vexatious requester and asserted that the commission
improperly failed to apply the compatibility test set
forth in Leydon in reaching its determination, in that
“[i]t conducted no analysis of whether [the plaintiff’s]
protests, remonstrances, and expression of opinions to
[city officials] [were] compatible with the means that
he chose to contact [city officials] to proffer both his
[freedom of information] requests and his opinions.”
In light of the fact that the plaintiff’s claim raised an
issue of first impression, the plaintiff was restricted in
his ability to cite to case law that was “directly applicable
to his argument,” which the court cited as a basis for
determining that the claim was inadequately briefed.
The plaintiff did cite legal authority in his brief that he
claimed was applicable to his viewpoint discrimination
claim. Even if we assume, without deciding, that such
authority was relevant to his claim, we, nevertheless,
cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in
declining to review the claim as inadequately briefed
given that the plaintiff failed to provide analysis apply-
ing the compatibility test set forth in the case law he
provided to the facts of this case. See State v. Buhl, 321
Conn. 688, 724–25, 138 A.3d 868 (2016) (determining
that abuse of discretion standard is appropriate standard
“in reviewing a trial court’s decision not to review a
claim because it was inadequately briefed, when the trial
States constitution and article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut
constitution.” (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 320–21. In examining the
issue under our state constitution, which the court noted “provides
greater protection for expressive activity than that provided by the first
amendment to the federal constitution”; id., 347; the court applied the
compatibility test, explaining that, “[u]nder that standard, the state
cannot restrict a person’s access to public property unless that person
intends to engage in expressive activity that is ‘basically incompatible’
with the customary use of the property at the time in question.” Id., 348.
Olson v. Freedom of Information Commission

court was sitting in an appellate capacity,” and that the
standard is “deferential” one); see also Sanchez v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 203 Conn. App. 752, 760–61,
250 A.3d 731 (“[i]t is axiomatic that [w]e may affirm a
proper result of the trial court for a different reason”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 336
Conn. 946, 251 A.3d 77 (2021); Tyson v. Commissioner
of Correction, 155 Conn. App. 96, 105 n.4, 109 A.3d 510
(“That the court relied on a wrong theory does not render
the judgment erroneous. We can sustain a right decision
although it may have been placed on a wrong ground.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 315
Conn. 931, 110 A.3d 432 (2015).
Although the plaintiff argued in his trial brief that
the commission “conducted no analysis of whether [the
plaintiff’s] protests, remonstrances, and expression of
opinions to [city officials] [were] compatible with the
means that he chose to contact [city officials] to prof-
fer both his [freedom of information] requests and his
opinions,” the plaintiff did not apply the law cited and
provide an analysis of how his “protests, remonstrances,
and expression of opinions” were “[compatible] with
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Leydon v.
Greenwich, supra, 257 Conn. 348. Instead, he essentially
contested the commission’s findings regarding his con-
duct, contending that he “did nothing more than” submit
freedom of information requests, which, he asserted in
a single conclusory sentence, was “entirely compatible
with the means to contact public officials and the right
to express one’s opinion to them.”
“Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly. . . . [P]arties must analyze [the]
relationship between [the] facts of [the] case and [the]
applicable law . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Probate Appeal of Barbera,
236 Conn. App. 640, 642 n.2, 349 A.3d 340 (2025); see
also Chacho v. Lister, 237 Conn. App. 806, 806–807 n.1,
Olson v. Freedom of Information Commission

A.3d (2026) (conclusory assertions without sub-
stantive argument or legal analysis rendered brief inad-
equate to review); State v. Errol J., 199 Conn. App. 800,
807 n.3, 237 A.3d 747 (brief was inadequate when it
included “relevant law without any further application
to the facts of the case”), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 962,
239 A.3d 1213 (2020); State v. Navarro, 172 Conn. App.
472, 477 n.1, 160 A.3d 1116 (declining to review due
process claim as inadequately briefed when defendant
did not analyze relationship between law cited and facts
of his case), cert. denied, 326 Conn. 910, 164 A.3d 681
(2017); Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enter-
prises Ltd. Partnership, 157 Conn. App. 139, 180, 117
A.3d 876 (failure to analyze asserted legal principle or
to explain relationship between facts asserted and law
cited rendered briefing inadequate), cert. denied, 318
Conn. 902, 122 A.3d 631 (2015), and cert. denied, 318
Conn. 902, 123 A.3d 882 (2015).
Mindful of the deference afforded to trial courts under
the abuse of discretion standard; see State v. Buhl, supra,
321 Conn. 724–25; see also Hallock v. Hallock, 228
Conn. App. 81, 86, 324 A.3d 193 (2024) (under abuse
of discretion standard, every reasonable presumption
should be given in favor of correctness of trial court’s
decision); we cannot conclude that the court abused its
broad discretion in declining to review this claim.
The judgment is affirmed.