Afonso v. Torres

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Afonso v. Torres

ANNETTE AFONSO v. ISAIAH TORRES
(AC 47580)
Cradle, C. J., and Westbrook and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendant
after the granting of his motion for summary judgment with respect to the
plaintiff’s claims asserted pursuant to the dog bite statute (§ 22-357) and
common-law negligence. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court
improperly rendered summary judgment despite the existence of genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the defendant was the keeper of the dog
in question as required for liability under § 22-357. Held:

The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant with
respect to the plaintiff’s claim pursuant to § 22-357 because there was no
genuine issue of material fact regarding the defendant’s status as the keeper
of the dog, as the defendant’s limited actions of bringing the dog outside
and securing the dog to his leash, at the request of the dog’s owner who was
present on the property at the time, did not establish that the defendant
exercised control over the dog in a manner similar to that which would
ordinarily be exerted by the owner.

The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant with
respect to the plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim, or with respect to
a premises liability claim if her allegations were so construed, because the
plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the defendant owed her a duty
of care, as the defendant was not liable for injuries that were inflicted by a
dog that was not owned or kept by him and that occurred on a public street.

Argued October 10, 2025—officially released April 14, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen-
dant’s alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury,
where the court, Parkinson, J., granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment
thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Brendan K. Nelligan, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Ashley A. Noel, for the appellee (defendant).
Afonso v. Torres

Opinion

WILSON, J. The plaintiff, Annette Afonso, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion
for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Isaiah
Torres, in this action asserting claims pursuant to Gen-
eral Statutes § 22-357, commonly known as the dog bite
statute, and common-law negligence. On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in concluding
that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist with
respect to whether, as to the statutory claim, the defen-
dant was the keeper of the dog in question and whether,
as to the negligence claim, the defendant did not owe a
duty of care to the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The following undisputed facts, viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and procedural history,
are necessary for our resolution of this appeal. The defen-
dant owned property located at 30 Emilie Avenue in
Oakville. On March 19, 2021, the defendant’s mother
and her dog, Sticky, a pit bull, were visiting the defen-
dant at the Emilie Avenue property. On that date, the
plaintiff was lawfully walking on Emilie Avenue when
she was attacked by Sticky in the street in front of the
defendant’s home.1 The defendant did not own Sticky.
Prior to the incident, at the request of his mother, the
defendant had let Sticky outside and secured Sticky’s
collar to a tether on the deck at the side of the house.2
In August, 2021, the plaintiff commenced the pres-
ent action seeking damages as a result of the injuries
she sustained in the incident. In count one, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant “owned, kept, harbored, and/
or controlled” Sticky and, therefore, was liable pursuant
to § 22-357.3 In count two, the plaintiff alleged that her
1
The parties do not dispute that the dog that bit the plaintiff was
Sticky.
2
The defendant also let another dog, a twelve pound chihuahua named
Chicco, outside.
3
General Statutes § 22-357 (b) provides in relevant part: “If any dog
does any damage to either the body or property of any person, the owner,
keeper, or both, shall be liable for the amount of such damage, except
Afonso v. Torres

injuries were caused by the negligence and carelessness
of the defendant in several enumerated ways.4 On Feb-
ruary 2, 2022, the defendant filed an answer in which
he denied that he “owned, kept, harbored, and/or con-
trolled” Sticky as alleged in count one and the allegations
of negligence in count two.
On May 17, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment with an accompanying memorandum of
law. As to count one, the defendant argued that he was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because a genuine
issue of material fact did not exist regarding whether he
was the owner or keeper of Sticky under § 22-357. As to
count two, the defendant argued that, under the facts
of this case, he owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.
The defendant attached his own affidavit to the memo-
randum of law. In this affidavit, the defendant averred
that, on the date of the incident, he was not the owner
of Sticky, “was not responsible for maintaining and/or
controlling” Sticky, and “was not feeding, giving water
to, exercising, sheltering and/or otherwise caring for”
Sticky in substitution for that which would ordinarily be
exerted by the owner in possession of Sticky. The defen-
dant further averred that, on the date of the incident, he
when such damage has been occasioned to the body or property of a person
who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass
or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog. . . .”
Although § 22-357 (b) was the subject of an amendment in 2024; see
Public Acts 2024, No. 24-108, § 40; that amendment has no bearing on
this appeal. For simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
4
The plaintiff alleged that her injuries were caused by the defendant’s
negligence or carelessness in that he “caused, allowed, or permitted those
lawfully making use of the public road to be exposed to the dog, which he
knew or should have known presented a danger to those lawfully upon
the premises, such as the plaintiff”; “failed to properly restrain the dog
to avoid injury to those making use of the public road”; “failed to warn
the plaintiff of the presence of the unleashed dog”; “caused or allowed
said dog to roam about the premises unrestrained and unmonitored,
even though he knew or should have known of the danger this posed”;
“failed to prevent said dog from attacking the plaintiff”; “failed to take
reasonable steps so as to control the dog”; “failed to keep and maintain
the premises in a reasonably safe condition”; and “failed to remove the
dog from the premises, even though he knew or should have known of
the danger said dog posed.”
Afonso v. Torres

was not exercising dominion and control over Sticky and
that, on that date, Sticky was not living on his property.
Finally, the defendant averred that, on the date of the
incident, Sticky’s owner was present at the property and
that, at the time of the incident, he had no knowledge of
any vicious propensities of Sticky.
On August 25, 2023, the plaintiff filed an objection
to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The
plaintiff also filed a memorandum of law in opposition
to the motion in which she argued that genuine issues of
material fact existed concerning the defendant’s status
as a keeper of Sticky, his knowledge of Sticky’s vicious
propensities, and his actions securing Sticky. In support
of her objection, the plaintiff submitted the affidavits
of two of the defendant’s neighbors regarding dogs that
they had previously observed on the defendant’s prop-
erty as well as excerpts from the defendant’s deposition
testimony. The court heard argument on the defendant’s
motion on March 18, 2024. On April 9, 2024, the trial
court rendered its decision granting the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment as to both counts of the
complaint. The plaintiff then filed the present appeal.
Before addressing the plaintiff’s claims on appeal, we
first set forth the applicable standard of review. “Practice
Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any
other proof submitted show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A party moving
for summary judgment is held to a strict standard. . . .
To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing
that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes
any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue
of material fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the
movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the opponent. . . . When documents submit-
ted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail
to establish that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit
Afonso v. Torres

documents establishing the existence of such an issue. . .
. Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the
opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates
the existence of some disputed factual issue. . . . It is not
enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert
the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions
of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of
a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence
properly presented to the court under Practice Book §
[17-45]. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to
grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Herrera v. Meadow
Hill, Inc., 217 Conn. App. 671, 680, 290 A.3d 377 (2023).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in find-
ing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that
the defendant was the keeper of Sticky under § 22-357.5
We disagree.
As previously noted, § 22-357 (b) provides in relevant
part: “If any dog does any damage to either the body or
property of any person, the owner, keeper, or both, shall
be liable for the amount of such damage, except when
such damage has been occasioned to the body or property
of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained,
was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing,
tormenting or abusing such dog. . . .” General Statutes §
22-327 (6) defines “[k]eeper” as “any person, other than
the owner, harboring or having in his possession any dog
. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Section 22-357 “imposes strict
liability on the . . . keeper of a dog for harm caused by the
dog, with limited exceptions.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Houghtaling v. Benevides, 217 Conn. App.
754, 761, 290 A.3d 429, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 924,
295 A.3d 418 (2023). “[T]he determination of whether
the [defendant] was a keeper is a question of fact . . . .”
(Citation omitted.) Murphy v. Buonato, 42 Conn. App.
5
The plaintiff makes no claim that the defendant was the owner of
Sticky.
Afonso v. Torres

239, 242, 679 A.2d 411 (1996), aff’d, 241 Conn. 319,
696 A.2d 320 (1997).
“To harbor a dog is to afford lodging, shelter or refuge
to it.” Falby v. Zarembski, 221 Conn. 14, 19, 602 A.2d 1
(1992). “[P]ossession [of a dog] cannot be fairly construed
as anything short of the exercise of dominion and control
similar to and in substitution for that which ordinarily
would be exerted by the owner in possession. . . . [A]
person will not be deemed to be a keeper of a dog under
§ 22-357 unless that person exercises control over the
dog in a manner similar to that which would ordinarily
be exerted by the owner. . . . In other words, a nonowner
of a dog cannot be held strictly liable for damage done
by the dog to another in the absence of evidence that the
nonowner was responsible for maintaining and control-
ling the dog at the time the damage was done. . . . [S]uch
proof generally will consist of evidence that the nonowner
was feeding, giving water to, exercising, sheltering or
otherwise caring for the dog when the incident occurred.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Houghtaling v. Benevides, supra, 217 Conn. App. 762.
According to the plaintiff, the evidence presented in
support of and in opposition to the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment created a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact regarding the defendant’s status as the keeper
of Sticky. The plaintiff relies on the excerpts from the
defendant’s deposition, in which the defendant indicated
that Sticky was frequently at his house and that, on the
date in question, he let Sticky out of the house at his
mother’s request, securing Sticky’s collar to a tether
that he had installed on the deck at the side of the house.
The plaintiff also relies on the affidavits of Claudette
Adams and Dale Gillette, the defendant’s neighbors,
regarding the dogs that they had observed previously on
the defendant’s property. Specifically, Adams averred
that, for several years prior to March, 2021, she observed
that a large dog and a small dog were “always in the front
yard, tied to a lead” and that both dogs were “very scary
and aggressive.” After this incident, Adams saw only
Afonso v. Torres

one dog on the property. Gillette averred that, prior to
March, 2021, he observed two dogs that he believed were
pit bulls on the defendant’s property and that these dogs
were “extremely aggressive and very scary.”
According to the plaintiff, this evidence establishes
that Sticky had lived on the defendant’s property for
years before the incident and is “indisputable evidence
that the defendant harbored” Sticky. We disagree with
the plaintiff that this evidence creates a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the defendant was the
keeper of Sticky, as neither affiant identified either dog
as being Sticky. Moreover, neither affiant described the
physical appearance of the dogs they had observed with
such particularity that a finder of fact reasonably could
conclude that one or both affiants had observed Sticky
on the defendant’s property. In fact, Adams’ affidavit
indicates that there was one large dog and one small dog
on the property while Gillette’s affidavit indicates that
there were two pit bulls on the property. Gillette further
averred that, although he was not certain, he believed
that the owners of the property “started off having just
one dog but then got more as time went on” and that he
“[didn’t] know exactly how many dogs they had living
there at one time.”
Moreover, even if one of the dogs referenced in these
affidavits was Sticky, neither Adams nor Gillette iden-
tified Sticky as being on the defendant’s property on
the date in question. Similarly, although the defendant
testified that Sticky was frequently at his house prior to
the incident on March 19, 2021, this fact is not probative
as to whether the defendant was the keeper of Sticky at
the time of this incident. See Houghtaling v. Benevides,
supra, 217 Conn. App. 762 (“a nonowner of a dog can-
not be held strictly liable for damage done by the dog to
another in the absence of evidence that the nonowner
was responsible for maintaining and controlling the
dog at the time the damage was done” (emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The plaintiff further contends, however, that the
defendant was the keeper of Sticky because he had exerted
Afonso v. Torres

control over him at the time of the attack. Specifically,
the plaintiff points to the fact that the defendant physi-
cally had removed Sticky from the house and secured
him to his leash prior to the incident and then retrieved
Sticky after the incident. The plaintiff cites Houghta-
ling v. Benevides, supra, 217 Conn. App. 754, in support
of her contention that the defendant was the keeper of
Sticky under these circumstances. We disagree that by
bringing Sticky outside and securing him to his leash, at
the request of his mother who was present, and by retriev-
ing Sticky after the incident, the defendant became the
keeper of Sticky.
In Houghtaling v. Benevides, supra, 217 Conn. App.
756, the plaintiff borrowed a vehicle from the defendant
in Colchester to attend a meeting in Norwich and agreed
to take the defendant’s dog with her in the car. Id.6 No one
else was in the car with the plaintiff and the dog, and the
dog was leashed while riding in the car. Id. The plaintiff
left the dog in the car while attending her meeting. Id.
When the plaintiff returned to the car after her meeting,
she partially opened the door, and “the dog, still leashed,
jumped from the car and ran in different directions.” Id.
The dog’s leash became wrapped around the plaintiff’s
legs, and she fell to the ground, sustaining injuries. Id.
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant
pursuant to § 22-357, seeking to recover for her injuries.
Id., 755. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff was
a keeper of the dog at the time of the incident and, there-
fore, was barred from recovery pursuant to § 22-357. Id.,
759. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the court erred
in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material
fact that she was a keeper of the dog at the time of the
incident. Id., 760–61. The plaintiff contended that, at
most, she had temporary physical custody of the dog. Id.,
761. This court disagreed with the plaintiff, stating, in
6
Although there were two defendants in Houghtaling v. Benevides,
supra, 217 Conn. App. 756, for simplicity, we refer to the singular
defendant when describing the facts of that case in this opinion.
Afonso v. Torres

relevant part: “First, the plaintiff voluntarily agreed
to take the dog with her to her . . . appointment in the
car that she borrowed from [the defendant]. Second, the
plaintiff had sole possession of the dog—no one else was
in the car with the plaintiff and the dog. Thus, it was clear
that the plaintiff was charged with the responsibility and
care of the dog during the time that the plaintiff had the
dog with her. Third, the plaintiff exercised control over
the dog’s actions from the moment that she took the dog
in [the defendant’s] car to the moment she was injured.
Finally, the plaintiff transported the dog away from
the owner, driving the dog from Colchester to Norwich;
although the dog was in the owner’s car, the plaintiff
was in possession of both the car and the dog at a location
away from the owner’s property. Accordingly, we agree
with the trial court that there existed no genuine issue
of material fact that the plaintiff was a keeper of the dog
at the time of the incident.” Id., 766. In so holding, this
court noted that “[t]he fact that the plaintiff may have
been in charge of the dog for only the duration of the
outing . . . in no way diminished her position of control
over the dog at the time of the incident.” Id.
The plaintiff contends that, if the actions in Houghta-
ling were sufficient to confer upon the plaintiff in that
case the status of keeper, the actions of the defendant in
the present case similarly establish that the defendant
was the keeper of Sticky at the time of the incident. We
disagree. Unlike the plaintiff in Houghtaling, who had
sole possession of the dog at the time of the incident for
which damages were sought, the evidence in the present
case, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
indicates that the defendant’s mother, the owner of
Sticky, was present on the defendant’s property at the
time of the incident and had asked the defendant to let
Sticky outside. In response to this request, the defendant
brought Sticky outside and attached Sticky’s collar to
the tether. Under these circumstances, in which Sticky’s
actual owner, the defendant’s mother, was present in the
house when the defendant let Sticky outside, we cannot
say that the defendant “exercise[d] control over the dog
Afonso v. Torres

in a manner similar to that which would ordinarily be
exerted by the owner.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 762.
In addition to Houghtaling v. Benevides, supra,
217 Conn. App. 762, prior Supreme Court precedent
construing the term “keeper” supports our conclusion
that the defendant was not the keeper of his mother’s
dog because he brought the dog outside at his mother’s
request. In Hancock v. Finch, 126 Conn. 121, 122, 9
A.2d 811 (1939), the defendants owned three dogs that
were kept in a kennel and runway behind their house.
The plaintiff agreed to feed and provide water for the
three dogs for five days while the defendants traveled.
Id. The plaintiff was instructed “not to let the dogs out
of the runway.” Id. On the second day, while the plain-
tiff was preparing the dogs’ food, he let the dogs out,
and the dogs attacked and injured both the plaintiff
and his wife. Id. Our Supreme Court stated that the
plaintiff did not have possession of the dogs, in that he
did not exert dominion and control similar to that which
ordinarily would be exerted by the owner. Id., 123. The
court reasoned that “[t]o subject one in the position of
this plaintiff, having the temporary custody of a dog, to
the heavy liability imposed by the statute would be to go
far beyond its apparent object.” Id.
In Falby v. Zarembski, supra, 221 Conn. 14, 16–18, our
Supreme Court considered whether sufficient evidence
had been presented at trial to establish that the defendant
remodeling company was liable as a keeper of a dog who
was owned by an employee of the remodeling company and
brought to the work site by that employee. The employee
had received permission from the company’s president
to bring the dog with him to the various sites where he
would be working, and he frequently did so, allowing the
dog to run loose at the sites. Id., 17. On one such occa-
sion, the dog attacked a postal carrier delivering mail
to a home at which the company was working. Id. On
appeal, following the jury verdict returned in favor of
the plaintiff postal carrier, our Supreme Court concluded
Afonso v. Torres

that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the
remodeling company was the keeper of the dog under §
22-357. Id., 17, 19. In support of its conclusion, the court
stated that “[t]here was no evidence that [the company]
fed, watered, housed or otherwise cared for the dog” or
“exercised any form of control over the actions of the
dog.” Id., 19.
Finally, in Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist
Church, 286 Conn. 152, 154, 943 A.2d 391 (2008), the
defendant church appealed following a jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, arguing that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support a finding that the defendant
was a keeper of a dog that was owned by the defendant’s
employee and kept at the parish house where the employee
lived. This court agreed with the defendant’s claim and
reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that
the defendant was not the keeper of the dog because it
“did not exercise sufficient control over the dog.” Id.,
157–58. Following certification, our Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of this court, noting that it was
“not free to construe the term ‘keeper’ so broadly as
to include persons authorized to exercise only limited
dominion and control over a dog.” Id., 163. The court
further stated that “ownership of the premises where
a dog lives, unaccompanied by any evidence of caretak-
ing of the dog or actual control over its actions . . . is
not enough to hold a landlord or other property owner
strictly liable for damage caused by the dog. This is true
whether the dog’s owner is a live-in employee, a tenant
or merely a friend of the landlord.” (Citation omitted;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 163–64. Because there was no evidence that the
defendant church had exerted control over the dog “in
a manner similar to that of an owner,” the court deter-
mined that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the
defendant was a keeper of the dog. Id., 164–65.
Applying the principles articulated in our appellate
case law to the present case, we disagree with the plaintiff
that the defendant’s limited action of bringing Sticky
Afonso v. Torres

outside and securing him to his leash, at the request of
his mother who was present on the property, established
that the defendant “exercise[d] control over the dog
in a manner similar to that which would ordinarily be
exerted by the owner”; (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) Houghtaling v. Benevides, supra, 217 Conn. App.
762; thereby conferring upon the defendant the status
of keeper of Sticky under § 22-357. On the contrary, we
conclude that the facts as presented, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not establish a
genuine issue of material fact that the defendant was the
keeper of Sticky. The court, therefore, properly granted
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to
count one of the plaintiff’s complaint.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the trial court erred in
holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact
concerning her allegation of common-law negligence
because there was evidence of Sticky’s aggressive ten-
dencies toward others and the defendant’s failure to
secure Sticky. According to the plaintiff, the evidence
“established that there was a genuine issue of [material]
fact regarding whether the defendant [had] failed to
secure a known aggressive and vicious dog when putting
[Sticky] outside, thus resulting in [the dog] attacking
the plaintiff.” We disagree.
We initially note that, in her principal appellate brief,
the plaintiff contended that her allegations “concerned
common-law negligence rather than a strict premises
liability case . . . .” She then argued, based on principles
of premises liability, that the defendant may be liable
for injuries caused by a dog, even where those injuries
occur off premises. In her reply brief, the plaintiff argued
that, “[w]hether cast as common-law negligence . . . or
as premises liability allegations, the evidence presented
demonstrated that the defendant had an aggressive pit
bull dog on his property, that he had undertaken to secure
it, and failed to do so.” We conclude that the plaintiff
cannot prevail whether her complaint is construed as
Afonso v. Torres

alleging a claim of common-law negligence or a claim of
premises liability.7
A
We first consider the claim as it relates to the plaintiff’s
allegations of common-law negligence. “In a negligence
action, the plaintiff must meet all of the essential ele-
ments of the tort in order to prevail. These elements are:
duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury.
. . . [T]he existence of a duty of care is a prerequisite to
a finding of negligence . . . . The existence of a duty is a
question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist
does the trier of fact then determine whether the defen-
dant [breached] that duty in the particular situation at
hand. . . . If a court determines, as a matter of law, that
a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff can-
not recover in negligence from the defendant.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Aviles v. Barnhill, 217 Conn.
App. 435, 444, 289 A.3d 224 (2023).
“At common law, only an owner or keeper of a domes-
tic animal owed a duty of reasonable care to others. . . .
Simply stated, to be liable, one must have control of the
animal. Under the common law of this state, it has been
held that liability for injuries committed by a vicious
animal is grounded in negligence. . . . It is the duty of
the owner of such an animal, having knowledge of its
vicious propensities, to give notice of the propensities or
to restrain the animal, and that failure to do so is negli-
gence that makes the owner liable for its consequences.”
(Citations omitted.) Stokes v. Lyddy, 75 Conn. App. 252,
265, 815 A.2d 263 (2003).
In Stokes v. Lyddy, supra, 75 Conn. App. 254, a dog
owned by the defendants’ tenant escaped the premises
and attacked the plaintiff as she walked along a public
sidewalk near the leased premises. The plaintiff brought
an action against the defendants based on a theory of
7
During oral argument on this appeal, the court asked counsel for the
plaintiff if count two of the plaintiff’s complaint alleged a common-law
negligence claim or a premises liability claim. Counsel for the plaintiff
responded that it could be construed as alleging both.
Afonso v. Torres

common-law negligence, alleging that the defendants
had a duty to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe
condition, free from defects, and to exercise reasonable
diligence in correcting known defects. Id., 254–55. The
plaintiff in Stokes contended that “the defendants had
a duty to warn her of the dog’s dangerous propensities
and to take corrective action as necessary to prevent
her from being harmed by the [tenant’s] dog.” Id., 255.
The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, concluding, as a matter of law, that the
defendants did not owe a duty to the plaintiff. Id., 256.
On appeal, the plaintiff in Stokes argued that, as a mat-
ter of public policy, the common-law duty of a keeper or
owner of a dog should be extended to those who are not
owners or keepers. Id., 265. After reviewing the case law
of this state as well as other jurisdictions, in addition to
the relevant public policy considerations related to the
existence of a duty, this court declined to extend the
common-law duty of care to nonowners or nonkeepers.
Id., 279. As the defendant in the present case was not
the owner or keeper of Sticky, we conclude, pursuant
to Stokes v. Lyddy, supra, 75 Conn. App. 279, that the
plaintiff cannot prevail on her claim that the defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff under principles of
common-law negligence.
B
We next consider the plaintiff’s allegations in the
context of a premises liability claim. “The general rule
is that a landlord has a duty reasonably to maintain
property over which he exercises control. . . . That duty
serves to protect entrants (invitees, licensees, trespass-
ers) and tenants. . . . The duty does not, however, extend
to uncontrolled land such as neighboring property or
public lands.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aviles
v. Barnhill, supra, 217 Conn. App. 444.8
8
Although the present case does not involve the duty of a landlord,
we nonetheless find the cases decided in this context to be persuasive
regarding our resolution of this claim. We also note that the limitation
on common-law liability to owners and keepers for dog bites “does not
extend to abrogating the common-law duty of landlords to keep common
Afonso v. Torres

In Stokes v. Lyddy, supra, 75 Conn. App. 254, the
plaintiff argued, in part, that the defendant landlord
should be liable for a dog attack that occurred on a public
sidewalk near leased premises because the landlord had
a duty under general principles of premises liability to
maintain the public property in a reasonably safe man-
ner. Id., 259–60. This court disagreed, stating, “The
plaintiff admits that the attack occurred away from the
leased property. Likewise, the plaintiff fails to provide
evidence that the attack occurred within any common
area under the defendants’ control. The plaintiff admits
that the attack occurred away from the leased property,
on a public sidewalk. Additionally, the plaintiff fails to
provide evidence that the attack occurred within any
common area under the defendants’ control. Therefore,
under the theory of premises liability—that a landlord
has a duty to maintain property he controls in a reason-
ably safe manner—the defendants owed no duty to the
plaintiff.” Id., 261–62.
In Giacalone v. Housing Authority, 306 Conn. 399,
401, 51 A.3d 352 (2012), our Supreme Court consid-
ered “whether a landlord may be held liable, under a
common-law theory of premises liability, for injuries
sustained by a tenant after being bitten by a dog owned
by a fellow tenant and kept on premises owned by the
common landlord, when the landlord knew of the dog’s
dangerous propensities, but did not have direct care of,
or control over, the dog.” The court stated that, “[a]s
a matter of well settled common law, [i]t is, of course,
the duty of a landlord to use reasonable care to keep in a
reasonably safe condition the parts of the premises over
which he reserves control”; (internal quotation marks
omitted) id., 407; and that, “[b]y the same reasoning,
a landlord, in exercising the closely analogous duty to
alleviate dangerous conditions in areas of a premises over
which it retains control, must take reasonable steps to
alleviate the dangerous condition created by the presence
of a dog with known vicious tendencies in the common
areas reasonably safe, including from dangerous dogs.” Giacalone v.
Housing Authority, 306 Conn. 399, 409 n.4, 51 A.3d 352 (2012).
Afonso v. Torres

areas of the property.” Id., 408. In so holding, the court
noted that “a vicious dog may qualify as a dangerous
condition under the traditional, common use of this term
because this court has long recognized that a landlord’s
common-law obligation to alleviate known dangers exists
independent of the specific source of that danger.” Id.
The court stated that “[w]hat defines the landlord’s duty
is the obligation to take reasonable measures to ensure
that the space over which it exercises dominion is safe
from dangers, and a landlord may incur liability by fail-
ing to do so.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.
Notwithstanding this precedent, the plaintiff contends
that Giacalone broadened the scope of a nonowner’s
liability for injuries caused by a dog, even when those
injuries occur off premises, because, in that case, the
plaintiff was injured by the dog while “ ‘at or near’ ”
the defendant’s premises. In Aviles v. Barnhill, supra,
217 Conn. App. 435, which involved a claim of negli-
gence against the defendant landlord arising from an
off premises attack by a dog owned by one of its tenants,
the plaintiffs similarly argued that “a property owner’s
duty under premises liability . . . does not evaporate if
that harm crosses the property’s boundary line.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 446–47. In Aviles,
however, this court rejected the plaintiff’s contention,
stating in part: “The court [in Giacalone] made clear that
it is the property lines, and the potential harms within
them, that define a landlord’s duty. Thus, contrary to
the plaintiffs’ . . . claim, Giacalone did not expand a
property owner’s duty beyond the property’s boundary
line.” Id., 449. This court later acknowledged that “our
appellate precedent continuously has maintained that
premises liability does not extend beyond the property
line within the context of off premises dog attacks.” Id.,
453. This authority undermines the plaintiff’s argument
in the present case.
The cases cited by the plaintiff in support of her con-
tention that a landowner is liable for injuries that occur
on a public highway abutting his or her property do not
Afonso v. Torres

involve dogs and, therefore, are readily distinguishable
from the present case.9 Similarly, we find unavailing
the plaintiff’s contention that §§ 290 and 324A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts support the imposition of
a duty on the defendant under the circumstances of this
case. The plaintiff relies on § 290 for the proposition that
the defendant is charged with customary knowledge of
the habits of animals such as dogs.10 As to § 324A, the
plaintiff contends that, to the extent the defendant was
merely rendering a gratuitous service for the owner of
the dog at the time of the attack, he was charged with
exercising reasonable care to protect his undertaking.11
The plaintiff, however, has not explained how either
§ 290 or § 324A imposes a duty on the defendant, the
nonowner and nonkeeper of Sticky, under the circum-
stances of this case and in light of the case law set forth
in this opinion. We, therefore, do not agree that these
sections provide support for the imposition of a duty on
the defendant in the present case or give us reason to
depart from binding precedent.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, whether
the complaint is construed as alleging common-law
9
See, e.g., Smith v. Greenwich, 278 Conn. 428, 431, 899 A.2d 563
(2006) (slip and fall on public sidewalk); Cyr v. VKB, LLC, 194 Conn.
App. 871, 874, 222 A.3d 965 (2019) (slip and fall on public sidewalk);
Gambardella v. Kaoud, 38 Conn. App. 355, 356, 660 A.2d 877 (1995)
(slip and fall; alleging defect in sidewalk).
10
Section 290 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides in rel-
evant part: “For the purpose of determining whether the actor should
recognize that his conduct involves a risk, he is required to know . . .
the qualities and habits of human beings and animals and the qualities,
characteristics and capacities of things and forces in so far as they are
matters of common knowledge at the time and in the community . . . .”
2 Restatement (Second), Torts, Negligence § 290, p. 47 (1965).
11
Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: “One
who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person
for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care
to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care
increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a
duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered
because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertak-
ing.” 2 Restatement (Second), Torts, Negligence § 324A, p. 142 (1965).
Afonso v. Torres

negligence or premises liability, the plaintiff cannot pre-
vail on her claim that the defendant is liable for injuries
that were inflicted by a dog that was not owned or kept
by the defendant and that occurred on a public street.
The trial court, therefore, properly rendered summary
judgment on count two of the plaintiff’s complaint.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.