Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

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Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

LISETTE BOUCHARD v. COMMISSIONER
OF MOTOR VEHICLES
(AC 48061)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the Superior Court’s judgment dismissing her
administrative appeal from the defendant’s decision to suspend her motor
vehicle operator’s license. She claimed that the court improperly rejected
her claim that a Department of Motor Vehicles’ hearing officer improperly
admitted into evidence at the administrative hearing an A-44 form because
it was not transmitted to the department within three business days of the
incident, as required by statute ((Rev. to 2023) § 14-227b (c)). Held:

This court concluded that the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal
was not improper on the alternative ground that the plaintiff’s evidentiary
claim regarding the transmittal requirement of § 14-227b (c) was unpre-
served, as the factual question of whether the arresting officer complied
with the transmittal requirement of § 14-227b (c) was neither presented to
nor decided by the hearing officer, and, even if the claim had been preserved,
the record was inadequate to review the merits of the plaintiff’s claim as the
hearing officer never made any findings with respect to that factual issue.

Argued December 10, 2025—officially released April 14, 2026

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision by the defendant suspend-
ing the plaintiff’s license to operate a motor vehicle,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New London and transferred to the judicial district of
New Britain, where the case was tried to the court, Hon.
Henry S. Cohn, judge trial referee; judgment dismiss-
ing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Drzislav Coric, with whom was Brandon H. Marley,
for the appellant (plaintiff).
Brian Tetreault, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, for the appellee (defendant).
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

Opinion

ELGO, J. The plaintiff, Lisette Bouchard, appeals from
the judgment of the Superior Court rendered in favor
of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
dismissing her administrative appeal from the decision
of the defendant to suspend her motor vehicle operator’s
license. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court
improperly rejected her claim that the hearing officer
improperly admitted an A-44 form1 into evidence at
the administrative hearing because it was not transmit-
ted to the Department of Motor Vehicles (department)
within three business days of the incident, as required
by General Statutes (Rev. to 2023) § 14-227b (c).2 We
affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The following facts, as set forth in the court’s memo-
randum of decision, and procedural history are relevant
to our resolution of this appeal. “On July 31, 2023, the
plaintiff was operating her white 2020 Jeep Compass
motor vehicle northbound on Route 85 in Montville at
approximately 10:29 p.m. State Trooper Noah Blanch-
ette was patrolling said roadway and . . . observed the
plaintiff’s vehicle traveling in front of a line of two
other vehicles . . . . He further observed the plaintiff’s
[vehicle] suddenly and for no apparent reason abruptly
stop in the middle of Route 85, causing the two other
vehicles to take evasive maneuvers to avoid striking
the [plaintiff’s vehicle]. In light thereof, [Blanchette]
activated his overhead lights and directed the plaintiff
to the side of the road.
“Upon reaching her vehicle, Blanchette immediately
detected the odor of alcohol emanating from the vehi-
cle, and found that the plaintiff’s speech was slow and
slurred, her eyes red/glassy and her pupils dilated. [The
1
“The A-44 form is used by the police to report an arrest related to
operating a motor vehicle under the influence and the results of any
sobriety tests administered or the refusal to submit to such tests.”
Roy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 67 Conn. App. 394, 396 n.3,
786 A.2d 1279 (2001).
2
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 14-227b in this opinion
are to the 2023 revision of the statute.
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

plaintiff] acknowledged having been at a restaurant for
dinner though denied drinking alcohol at first. Blanchette
again noted the odor of alcohol on her breath when she
exited the vehicle and, when she was again asked about
having consumed alcohol, given her consistently slow and
slurred speech and the odor of alcohol, she ‘just stared
at [Blanchette] and didn’t respond.’
“Blanchette next administered a field sobriety test
. . . which the plaintiff failed. She swayed side to side
throughout and could not keep her head still and began
to cry when reminded only to keep her eyes on the offi-
cer’s finger during the nystagmus testing. She failed
to maintain heel-to-toe steps during the walk/turn test
and repeatedly stepped off the line. Finally, during the
one-legged standing test, she nearly fell over imme-
diately and then kept putting her foot down despite
being reminded to keep her leg raised. As a result of
the officer’s observations prior to the [sobriety test]
and the plaintiff’s failure of [that test], she was placed
under arrest at approximately 10:43 p.m. for [operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence] in violation
of General Statutes § 14-227a.
“While being transported to the police station, [the
plaintiff] told Blanchette that her ‘“ex-husband is a spe-
cial kind of person so I know what to say” regarding her
consuming alcoholic beverages.’ When she was expressly
asked to provide an alcohol Breathalyzer sample she
‘verbally stated [that] she was going to refuse to [take]
a breath test [stating that] “my husband is in the sys-
tem,” ’ which refusal was witnessed by [State] Trooper
[Edward] Kieltyka.”
On August 10, 2023, the defendant notified the plain-
tiff that her license to operate a motor vehicle was being
suspended for a period of forty-five days. The plaintiff
availed herself of her right to contest that suspension
and a department hearing officer held an administrative
hearing pursuant to § 14-227b on September 15, 2023.3
3
As our Supreme Court has explained, license suspension hearings
“are strictly limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

At the outset of that hearing, the plaintiff’s attorney
objected to the admission of an A-44 form4 into evidence
on three grounds. First, he claimed that the A-44 form
“does not comply with [§ 14-227b (c)] in that Section H
[of the A-44 form] is not filled out.” Second, he claimed
that the A-44 form lacked an indicia of reliability because
it did not specify the particular manner by which the
plaintiff refused to be tested.5 Third, he claimed that the
A-44 form should not be admitted because the chemical
alcohol test printout attached to the A-44 form indicated
“hardware error” rather than “refusal.” The hearing
officer overruled that objection. The plaintiff’s attor-
ney then indicated that he had nothing further, and the
administrative hearing thereupon concluded.
In a subsequent decision dated September 20, 2023,
the defendant, through the hearing officer, found that
(1) Blanchette had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff
for a violation specified in § 14-227b, (2) the plaintiff was
placed under arrest, (3) the plaintiff refused to submit to
a chemical alcohol test, and (4) the plaintiff was operating
the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operat-
ing a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
any drug or both; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such
person . . . submit to [a] test or analysis, commenced within two hours
of the time of operation, [which] . . . indicated that such person had
an elevated blood alcohol content; and (4) was such person operating
the motor vehicle. If the hearing officer finds affirmatively on all four
issues, the hearing officer must uphold the [defendant’s] suspension of
the person’s license.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Do v. Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles, 330 Conn. 651, 658–59, 200 A.3d 681 (2019);
see also Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 252 Conn. 38, 46, 743 A.2d 1110 (1999)
(“[w]e . . . have held repeatedly that the plain language of the statute
expressly and narrowly limits the scope of the license suspension hear-
ing to the four issues enumerated in the statute”).
4
The A-44 form was prepared by Blanchette and was accompanied by a
chemical alcohol test printout and Blanchette’s five page investigation
report detailing the events that transpired on July 31, 2023.
5
Section H of the A-44 form contains two boxes, which state “test/
evaluation refused verbally” and “test/evaluation refused by conduct.”
It then allows the arresting officer to specify whether the motor vehicle
operator refused to submit to a chemical test, a drug influence evalu-
ation, or both.
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

the motor vehicle.6 Accordingly, the defendant ordered
the suspension of the plaintiff’s license for forty-five days
and required an ignition interlock device to be installed
and maintained in her vehicle for one year.
From that decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Supe-
rior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. In her
complaint, the plaintiff reiterated the three grounds of
objection advanced by her attorney at the administrative
hearing.7 For those three reasons, the plaintiff claimed
that the hearing officer improperly admitted the A-44
form into evidence. The plaintiff further alleged that,
without the A-44 form and accompanying materials,
the defendant “did not put forth substantial evidence
to suspend [her] license.”
Seven months later, the plaintiff filed a brief with the
court, in which she again reiterated the three grounds
of objection she advanced at the administrative hearing.
In that brief, the plaintiff raised an “additional” claim
of noncompliance with § 14-227b (c). Specifically, the
plaintiff claimed that Blanchette failed to comply with
the requirement of § 14-227b (c) that he mail or otherwise
transmit the A-44 form to the department within three
business days. The defendant filed a brief in response, in
which it argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s untimely
transmittal claim was unpreserved, as she failed to raise
it at the administrative hearing.
The court conducted a hearing on September 3, 2024.
In its subsequent memorandum of decision, the court
6
The hearing officer further noted, as a subordinate finding, that “the
[plaintiff] refused to provide assent to the [chemical alcohol] test. [She]
verbally stated she was going to refuse to take a breath test and provided
her reason of, ‘[m]y husband is in the system.’ This is nonresponsive to
the officer’s request to take the Breathalyzer [test].”
7
Specifically, the plaintiff averred that “(a) [t]he A-44 form fails to
contain such information prescribed by the [defendant]; (b) [t]he A-44
form failed [to] comply with the statute, wherein the subscribing officer
who allegedly witnessed the refusal, failed to indicate the information
prescribed by the [defendant]; and (c) [t]he chemical analysis fails to
comply with the statute in that the chemical analysis receipt stated
‘hardware error’ rather than ‘refusal.’ ”
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the hearing officer
had improperly admitted the A-44 form into evidence
and concluded that substantial evidence existed to sup-
port the decision to suspend her license.8 The court thus
dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, and this appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, we note the standard of
review applicable to our review of administrative deci-
sions. “[J]udicial review of the [defendant’s] action is
governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure
Act [General Statutes §§ 4-166 through 4-189], and the
scope of that review is very restricted. . . . [R]eview of
an administrative agency decision requires a court to
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the
administrative record to support the agency’s findings of
basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those
facts are reasonable. . . . Neither this court nor the trial
court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment
for that of the administrative agency on the weight of
the evidence or questions of fact. . . . Our ultimate duty
is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether
the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbi-
trarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Winsor v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, 101 Conn. App. 674, 679–80, 922 A.2d
330 (2007).
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly admitted the A-44 form into evidence due to Blanch-
ette’s alleged failure to comply with the requirement of
8
In so doing, the court declined to rule on the defendant’s contention
that the plaintiff’s claim regarding the transmittal requirement of
§ 14-227b (c) was unpreserved. Instead, the court stated in relevant
part: “[T]he plaintiff argues that the local police did not comply with
the [transmittal requirement of] § 14-227b (c). . . . Here the report
was completed within two days. The record shows that the report was
transmitted to the [department] and was stamped . . . as received in
eight business days. The record is silent on when the police report was
transmitted by mail or otherwise. The fact that the report was received
by the [department] after the three day deadline to transmit does not
prove that § 14-227b (c) was not complied with. The plaintiff has failed
to prove that the police did not timely mail or transmit the report after
its completion.”
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

§ 14-227b (c) that he mail or otherwise transmit it to the
department within three business days.9 In response, the
defendant contends that we should decline to review the
plaintiff’s claim, as it was never raised at the September
15, 2023 administrative hearing. We agree with the
defendant.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. It is undisputed that the A-44 form in question
was signed by Blanchette on August 2, 2023, two business
days after the plaintiff’s arrest. It also is undisputed that
the department stamped that document as “received”
on August 8, 2023, six business days after her arrest.
No further evidence was adduced at the administrative
hearing regarding when or how that A-44 form was
transmitted to the department. See Marshall v. Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles, 348 Conn. 778, 781 n.2,
311 A.3d 704 (2024) (§ 14-227b (c) “provides that the
police report may be mailed or electronically transmit-
ted” to department).
Although the face of the A-44 form indicates that
it was marked “received” by the department six busi-
ness days after the plaintiff’s arrest, the plaintiff, in
objecting to its admission at the September 15, 2023
administrative hearing, did not raise any claim regarding
Blanchette’s compliance with the three day transmittal
requirement of § 14-227b (c). As the appellate courts of
this state repeatedly have observed, plaintiffs are not
entitled to appellate review of issues that they failed
to distinctly raise at the administrative hearing.10 See,
9
General Statutes (Rev. to 2023) § 14-227b (c) provides in relevant
part: “If the person arrested refuses to submit to such test . . . the police
officer, acting on behalf of the [defendant], shall immediately revoke
and take possession of the motor vehicle operator’s license . . . . The
police officer shall prepare a report of the incident and shall mail or
otherwise transmit in accordance with this subsection the report and
a copy of the results of any chemical test to the [department] within
three business days. . . .”
10
“The requirement that the claim be raised distinctly means that
it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the [administrative
hearing officer] the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.
. . . [It must] alert the [hearing officer] to the specific deficiency now
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

e.g., Direct Energy Services, LLC v. Public Utilities
Regulatory Authority, 347 Conn. 101, 147, 296 A.3d
795 (2023) (“an appellate tribunal is not required to
consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised during
the administrative proceeding”); Ferraro v. Ridgefield
European Motors, Inc., 313 Conn. 735, 759, 99 A.3d
1114 (2014) (requirement that party must distinctly
raise claim at trial to obtain appellate review “applies
to appeals from administrative proceedings as well”);
Dragan v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 223
Conn. 618, 632, 613 A.2d 739 (1992) (“[a] party to an
administrative proceeding cannot be allowed to partici-
pate fully at hearings and then, on appeal, raise claims
that were not asserted”); Finkenstein v. Administra-
tor, Unemployment Compensation Act, 192 Conn. 104,
114, 470 A.2d 1196 (1984) (“we will not set aside an
agency’s determination upon a ground not theretofore
fairly presented for its consideration”); O’Rourke v.
Dept. of Labor, 210 Conn. App. 836, 854, 271 A.3d 700
(2022) (“[t]he failure to raise [a] claim . . . at the time of
the [administrative] hearing precludes [a party] from
raising the issue on appeal” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Ives v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 192
Conn. App. 587, 605, 218 A.3d 72 (2019) (declining to
address claim “because it was not raised by the plaintiff
in the administrative hearing below”); Adams v. Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial
district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S
(March 7, 2017) (reprinted at 182 Conn. App. 169, 176,
189 A.3d 629) (“[a] plaintiff cannot raise issues on appeal
that he failed to present to the hearing officer below”),
aff’d, 182 Conn. App. 165, 189 A.3d 629, cert. denied,
330 Conn. 940, 195 A.3d 1134 (2018); see also Blake v.
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial
claimed on appeal.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, 198 Conn. 386, 396, 503 A.2d
576 (1986); see also Connecticut Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Dept. of
Consumer Protection, Liquor Control Commission, 237 Conn. App. 1, 20,
350 A.3d 1142 (2025) (“[t]o merit consideration [in an administrative
appeal], an issue must be distinctly raised [before the hearing officer],
not just briefly suggested” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S
(July 25, 2019) (declining to review plaintiff’s claim
“that the police failed to mail a copy of his report to [the
department] within three business days as provided by
. . . § 14-227b (c)” because that claim “was not raised
before the hearing officer and is therefore not properly
before the court”).
At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s
counsel conceded that the plaintiff did not raise any claim
regarding Blanchette’s compliance with the transmit-
tal requirement of § 14-227b (c) at the September 15,
2023 administrative hearing. That claim, therefore, is
unpreserved.
In her principal appellate brief with this court, the
plaintiff made no mention of the fact that she did not
object to the admission of the A-44 form on the ground
that Blanchette failed to comply with the transmittal
requirement of § 14-227b (c). Instead, she argued the
merits of that unpreserved evidentiary claim. In his
appellate brief, the defendant argued, as a threshold
issue, that the plaintiff’s evidentiary claim should not
be reviewed, as it was not raised at the September 15,
2023 administrative hearing. The plaintiff thereafter did
not file a reply brief with this court, which would have
permitted her to “respond directly and succinctly” to
the defendant’s contention. See Practice Book § 67-5A.
At oral argument, the plaintiff nonetheless advanced
two reasons why this court should review her unpreserved
evidentiary claim. Those arguments are improper, as they
were not set forth in the plaintiff’s appellate brief. See
J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC, 309 Conn.
307, 328 n.20, 71 A.3d 492 (2013) (“it is well settled
that arguments cannot be raised for the first time at
oral argument”).
The plaintiff’s arguments also are unavailing. She first
posits that her failure to preserve her claim that Blanch-
ette failed to comply with the transmittal requirement of
§ 14-227b (c) should be excused because that claim arose
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

subsequent to the September 15, 2023 administrative
hearing. We disagree. At all relevant times, General
Statutes (Rev. to 2023) § 14-227b (c) provided in relevant
part that the police officer who prepared the A-44 form
“shall mail or otherwise transmit [it] . . . to the [depart-
ment] within three business days. . . .” That statutory
requirement was not a new one, but rather has existed
for decades. See, e.g., Lee v. DelPonte, Superior Court,
judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 295208 (Sep-
tember 20, 1990) (2 Conn. L. Rptr. 480, 481) (§ 14-227b
(c) required police officer to mail report to department
within three business days). The claim that Blanchette
did not comply with that statutory requirement thus
was ripe at the time of the administrative hearing.11
11
The fact that our Supreme Court, in Marshall v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, supra, 348 Conn. 795, clarified that the transmittal
requirement of § 14-227b (c) is mandatory, rather than directory, has
little bearing on whether the plaintiff could have objected to the admis-
sion of the A-44 form at the administrative hearing due to Blanchette’s
alleged noncompliance with the transmittal requirement of § 14-227b
(c). That statutory requirement existed long before the September
15, 2023 administrative hearing, which explains why counsel for the
plaintiff in Marshall objected on that very basis at an administrative
hearing held in 2019. See id., 784 (“[a]t the [August 9, 2019 admin-
istrative] hearing, the plaintiff’s attorney objected to the admission
of the report on the ground that it was not prepared and mailed to
the department within three business days, as required by § 14-227b
(c)”); see also Massalski v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Superior
Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S
(November 26, 2019) (plaintiff claimed “the A-44 should not have been
admitted into evidence because it was not submitted to the [defendant]
within three business days as provided for in § 14-227b (c)”); Havican
v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial district of
Danbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (February 28, 1996) (plaintiff
claimed “that the hearing officer was in error because the police failed
to send the original of the report to the [department] in accordance
with the provisions of . . . § 14-227b (c)”); Scruton v. Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New
Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (February 8, 1995)
(13 Conn. L. Rptr. 478, 478) (plaintiff objected to admission of A-44
form at administrative hearing on ground that police failed to comply
with transmittal requirement of § 14-227b (c)).
Moreover, even if we were to conclude otherwise, the plaintiff has not
offered any analysis as to why Marshall, which was decided on April
9, 2024, should have retroactive effect on an administrative decision
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

Although the plaintiff objected to the admission of the
A-44 form at that hearing on three distinct grounds, she
did not raise any claim regarding Blanchette’s alleged
noncompliance with the transmittal requirement of §
14-227b (c).
At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s
counsel acknowledged that the preservation requirement
exists to prevent trial by ambuscade. See, e.g., Grant v.
Commissioner of Correction, 345 Conn. 683, 701, 287
A.3d 124 (2022). He nonetheless argued that this well
established precept has little application in the context
of license suspension hearings, reasoning that, because
there is no opposing counsel who could “respond” to
objections raised by plaintiffs at those administrative
hearings, there can be no ambush. We do not agree.
The plaintiff overlooks the fact that “the sina qua non”
of the preservation requirement “is fair notice to the trial
court”; State v. Jorge P., 308 Conn. 740, 753, 66 A.3d
869 (2013); as well as to the opposing party. See State
v. Bennett, 324 Conn. 744, 761, 155 A.3d 188 (2017).
The preservation requirement and the corresponding
duty of counsel to distinctly set forth the specific ground
of objection “are not simply formalities. They serve to
alert the trial court to potential error while there is still
time for the court to act. . . . Assigning error to [the trial
court’s] rulings on the basis of objections never raised at
trial unfairly subjects the court and the opposing party
to trial by ambush.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Ramon A. G., 336 Conn. 386, 395, 246 A.3d 481
(2020); see also State v. Qayyum, 344 Conn. 302, 310,
279 A.3d 172 (2022) (“In order to preserve an evidentiary
that became a final judgment six months earlier on September 20, 2023,
pursuant to General Statutes § 4-180 (c). Although the defendant in his
appellate brief provided a detailed discussion of the three factors outlined
in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106–107, 92 S. Ct. 349, 30
L. Ed. 2d 296 (1971), and adopted by our Supreme Court to determine
whether a common-law decision shall be applied retroactively; see State
v. Harrell, 199 Conn. 255, 267–68, 506 A.2d 1041 (1986); the plaintiff
has not provided this court with any argument or analysis thereof by
way of a reply brief or at oral argument before this court.
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

ruling for review, trial counsel must object properly. . . .
In objecting to evidence, counsel must properly articulate
the basis of the objection so as to apprise the trial court of
the precise nature of the objection and its real purpose,
in order to form an adequate basis for a reviewable rul-
ing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Suffield Bank
v. Berman, 228 Conn. 766, 785, 639 A.2d 1033 (1994)
(noting that our Supreme Court “has expressly decried
. . . ‘trial by ambush’ techniques”).
Had the plaintiff objected to the admission of the A-44
form on the ground that Blanchette failed to comply with
the transmittal requirement of § 14-227b (c), the hearing
officer would have had the opportunity to continue the
administrative hearing to procure the officer’s testimony
and avoid the alleged evidentiary error of which the plain-
tiff now complains. See Prendergast v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, 172 Conn. App. 545, 554–56, 160 A.3d
1087 (2017) (hearing officer did not abuse his discretion
or violate plaintiff’s right to due process by continuing
administrative hearing to secure officer’s testimony);
Gomes v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Superior
Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-
XX-XXXXXXX-S (May 29, 2025) (after plaintiff objected
to admission of A-44 form at administrative hearing “on
the ground that the reports had not been transmitted
[to the department] within three days,” hearing officer
continued hearing to secure testimony of arresting offi-
cer); Adams v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra,
Superior Court, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (“[i]f the
plaintiff had raised this claim before the hearing officer,
the hearing officer could have continued the hearing to
subpoena the officer”). The hearing officer also would
have been alerted to the plaintiff’s concern that the A-44
form had not been transmitted to the department within
three business days and would have had the opportunity
to make specific factual findings on that issue.
Lastly, we note that at no time did the plaintiff request
leave from the Superior Court to present additional evi-
dence before the hearing officer on the factual question
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

of whether Blanchette complied with the transmittal
requirement of § 14-227b (c). See General Statutes §
4-183 (h); Wakefield v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
90 Conn. App. 441, 443, 877 A.2d 1 (remand pursuant to
§ 4-183 (h) permits party to present additional evidence
before agency upon demonstration that “additional evi-
dence is material and that there are good reasons for the
failure to present it in the proceeding before the agency”),
cert. denied, 275 Conn. 931, 883 A.2d 1253 (2005). The
plaintiff also did not ask the Superior Court to remand
the matter to the hearing officer for further factual
findings on that issue. See, e.g., Modzelewski’s Towing
& Storage, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 353
Conn. 486, 494, 342 A.3d 224 (2025) (Superior Court
remanded case to hearing officer for additional factual
determinations); Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
330 Conn. 651, 663, 200 A.3d 681 (2019) (Superior Court
“remanded the case to the hearing officer for an articula-
tion” concerning unresolved factual issue); Southbury
Driving Academy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket
No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (June 18, 2014) (Superior Court
“granted the plaintiff’s motion for a remand and articula-
tion of the hearing officer’s decision” and hearing officer
subsequently “issued a supplemental decision”).
For that reason, even if we were to conclude that the
plaintiff had preserved her claim regarding Blanch-
ette’s compliance with the transmittal requirement of
§ 14-227b (c), the record before us would be inadequate
to review the merits of that claim, as the hearing officer
in this case never made any findings with respect to that
factual issue. In a license suspension hearing, the hearing
officer is the finder of fact. See Schallenkamp v. Del-
Ponte, 229 Conn. 31, 41, 639 A.2d 1018 (1994) (“it is the
administrative hearing officer’s function to determine
issues of fact” at hearing held pursuant to § 14-227b).
Accordingly, the Superior Court, in an appeal from a
decision of the hearing officer in a license suspension
hearing, cannot assume “the role of fact finder” without
exceeding “the limited scope of judicial review authorized
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

by” the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General
Statutes § 4-166 et seq. Wolf v. Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, 70 Conn. App. 76, 85, 797 A.2d 567 (2002);
accord Do v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra,
330 Conn. 668 (court in administrative appeal cannot
substitute its own judgment for that of hearing officer
on questions of fact); Pizzo v. Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, 62 Conn. App. 571, 578, 771 A.2d 273 (2001)
(“the determination of factual issues [is a matter] within
the province of the administrative agency” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). In addition, the present case
is not one in which the record unequivocally indicates
that the arresting officer failed to comply with the three
day transmittal requirement of § 14-227b (c). Contra
Marshall v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 348
Conn. 794 (record indicated that “the arresting officer
did not complete the report until he signed and dated it
five business days after the plaintiff’s arrest”). Because
the factual question of whether Blanchette complied
with the transmittal requirement of § 14-227b (c) was
neither presented to nor decided by the hearing officer,
the record before us is inadequate to review the substance
of the plaintiff’s claim.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the plain-
tiff failed to preserve her evidentiary claim regarding
the transmittal requirement of § 14-227b (c) before the
hearing officer. That claim, therefore, was not properly
before the Superior Court. See Ferraro v. Ridgefield
European Motors, Inc., supra, 313 Conn. 759; Finken-
stein v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation
Act, supra, 192 Conn. 114; Adams v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-
XX-XXXXXXX-S. Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s
dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal was not improper.12
12
As this court has observed, “we may affirm a trial court’s decision
that reaches the right result, albeit for [a different] reason.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Stevens v. Khalily, 220 Conn. App. 634,
644, 298 A.3d 1254, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 915, 303 A.3d 260 (2023);
see also South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, Local 1480,
Council 15, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 41 Conn. App. 649, 656, 677 A.2d 464
(“we may affirm a correct result of the trial court for reasons different
Bouchard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

from those stated by the trial court”), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 926, 683
A.2d 22 (1996).