Karlen v. Saleeb

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Karlen v. Saleeb

GERARD KARLEN ET AL. v. HANY
SALEEB ET AL.
(AC 47573)
Alvord, Wilson and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff G appealed from the trial court’s judgment, rendered following
a hearing held pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v.
Barclay & Stubbs, Inc. (225 Conn. 804), granting the defendants’ motion to
enforce a settlement agreement that had been reached between the parties
in the underlying action. G claimed that the court improperly determined
that the parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement. Held:

The trial court’s conclusion that the parties had reached a legally enforce-
able settlement agreement was legally and logically correct, as that court’s
finding that G had agreed to the clear and unambiguous terms set forth in
the settlement agreement was supported by the evidence in the record and,
therefore, was not clearly erroneous.

Argued September 9, 2025—officially released March 31, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Hon. Edward
T. Krumeich II, judge trial referee, granted the defen-
dants’ motion to enforce a settlement agreement and ren-
dered judgment thereon, from which the named plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Gerard Karlen, self-represented, the appellant (named
plaintiff).
Keith R. Ainsworth, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

SHELDON, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Gerard
Karlen,1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court,
rendered after a hearing pursuant to Audubon Parking
1
Carla Karlen, who is married to Gerard Karlen, is also a plaintiff in
the underlying action but is not a party to this appeal. We therefore
refer in this opinion to Gerard Karlen as the plaintiff, to Gerard Karlen
Karlen v. Saleeb

Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc.,
225 Conn. 804, 811–12, 626 A.2d 729 (1993) (Audubon),2
upon the granting of a motion filed by the defendants,
Hany Saleeb and Marianne Saleeb, to enforce a settle-
ment agreement between themselves and the plaintiffs
in the underlying action. On appeal, the plaintiff claims
that the court improperly determined that the parties
had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history, obtained
from our review of the record and the court’s memoran-
dum of decision, inform our review of the issues in this
appeal. Since 1994, the plaintiffs have resided in a home
located at 10 Pheasant Lane in Westport.3 The defendants
own abutting property located at 11 Pheasant Lane in
Westport. In 2021, the plaintiffs brought the underly-
ing action against the defendants, seeking damages on
several theories of liability based upon allegations that,
“beginning on or about 2013 and continuing to date,”
the defendants have “stalked and harassed” the plain-
tiffs and their family members in several ways. In their
second revised complaint,4 the plaintiffs alleged, more
specifically, that one or both of the defendants had been
and Carla Karlen collectively as the plaintiffs, and to Carla Karlen
individually by name where appropriate.
The plaintiff, by his own acknowledgment, is “a former attorney with
many years of practice in New York State.”
2
“An Audubon hearing is conducted to decide whether the terms of a
settlement agreement are sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to
be enforceable as a matter of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Bay Advance, LLC v. Halajian, 236 Conn. App. 228, 230 n.2, 347 A.3d
1207 (2025); see also Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v.
Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., supra, 225 Conn. 811–12.
3
Carla Karlen is the alleged owner of the 10 Pheasant Lane property.
4
When the plaintiffs filed their original complaint on November 4,
2021, they both were self-represented parties. On May 17, 2022, Attor-
ney Josephine Smalls Miller filed an appearance for Carla Karlen, and
on August 25, 2023, Miller filed the second revised complaint on Carla
Karlen’s behalf. On October 12, 2023, the plaintiff filed a statement
adopting Carla Karlen’s second revised complaint. Although the state-
ment did not restate the text of Carla Karlen’s second revised complaint,
the parties and the court later treated Carla Karlen’s second revised
complaint as the operative pleading of both plaintiffs.
Karlen v. Saleeb

surveilling them, blocking their driveway, interfering
with and disparaging them to contractors and delivery
persons who came into their neighborhood, and disrupt-
ing their utility services. The plaintiffs further alleged
that the defendants and their guests had trespassed on
their property. On February 1, 2024, the court, Hon.
Edward T. Krumeich II, judge trial referee, granted in
part the defendants’ motion to strike all counts of the
plaintiffs’ second revised complaint in the underlying
action, as filed by Carla Karlen and later adopted by the
plaintiff; see footnote 4 of this opinion; leaving pending
only those counts pleading claims of negligent infliction
of emotional distress and defamation.
On February 27, 2024, the defendants filed a motion to
enforce a settlement agreement that allegedly had been
reached between the parties in the underlying action. In
that motion, the defendants alleged as follows. During
a February 7, 2024 trial management conference before
Judge Krumeich in Stamford, the parties “developed a
conceptual model for a settlement of two pending cases”
between the parties, namely, the underlying action,
which was then pending in Stamford, and an “ancillary
case” brought by the defendants against the plaintiffs in
the judicial district of Fairfield, which was then pending
in Bridgeport (Bridgeport action).5 Although a proposed
“written agreement on specific settlement terms which
included both cases” had been drafted following the
February 7 conference, the parties ultimately deter-
mined that they would not be able to settle the Bridgeport
action. For that reason, the plaintiffs offered to settle
the underlying “Stamford case on its own,” whereupon
the proposed written agreement to settle both cases
was modified “by both parties until a final settlement
agreement was reached.” Thereafter, during a follow-up
status conference in the Bridgeport action on February
23, 2024, in which the parties had agreed to report to
5
The Bridgeport action related to the plaintiffs’ construction of a wall
that the defendants claimed impairs their right of way to a cul-de-sac
near their property. The defendants sought, in the Bridgeport action,
to have the plaintiffs remove the wall.
Karlen v. Saleeb

the court on the progress of their settlement negotia-
tions in the two cases, the parties informed the court,
Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, “that,
while the parties had agreed to settle the Stamford case,
the Bridgeport case would need to be tried. The court
polled both plaintiffs who agreed that this was an accu-
rate report of the status.” On that basis, the defendants
alleged in their motion to enforce settlement agreement
that the underlying action had been “reported to the
court as settled.”
The defendants attached to their motion to enforce
settlement agreement two exhibits: (1) a document enti-
tled “Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement,” which
each defendant had signed on February 25, 2024;6 and
(2) copies of emails that had been exchanged between
counsel for the defendants, Keith R. Ainsworth, and
counsel for Carla Karlen, Josephine Smalls Miller; see
footnote 4 of this opinion; with electronic copies to the
plaintiff, that documented the parties’ settlement dis-
cussions that led up to the final drafting of the “Mutual
Release and Settlement Agreement,” in redline, prior to
the February 23, 2024 status conference.
On March 11, 2024, the plaintiff filed an objection
to the defendants’ motion to enforce settlement agree-
ment, in which he asserted that he had never agreed to
settle the underlying action without also settling the
Bridgeport action. He claimed in the objection that he
had always “understood that [the parties] were working
towards a global settlement of all matters at issue in
both cases and that the settlement of both actions was
the condition precedent to the settlement of each such
action.” Therefore, although the plaintiff acknowledged
that, during the February 23, 2024 status conference,
Ainsworth had in fact “summarized where the parties
were,” he disputed as “not . . . accurate” the defendants’
allegations that Ainsworth had advised Judge Povodator
6
The word “DRAFT” is imprinted at the very top of page 1 of the
“Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement” and also on page 4, obscur-
ing the defendants’ signatures.
Karlen v. Saleeb

that “the parties had agreed to settle the Stamford case
but that the Bridgeport action would need to be tried,”
and that the court had “polled both plaintiffs” thereafter,
and they had both agreed with Ainsworth’s representa-
tions. The plaintiff contended that any statements made
to Judge Povodator during the status conference were
merely “summaries of the attempts of the parties to reach
a global settlement so that all disputes were settled”
and that “[n]either of the plaintiffs believed that the
sine [qua] non of a global settlement had been reached.
Accordingly, the conditions upon which the settlement
in this action was based had not occurred.”
Thereafter, on March 18, 2024, the defendants filed
an answer and special defenses to the second revised
complaint and a “motion for judgment on [the] stricken
counts” of the second revised complaint, which the plain-
tiffs had not repleaded, “in order to close the pleadings”
in advance of the April 2, 2024 trial date then scheduled
in the underlying action. The plaintiffs did not oppose
that motion.
On April 1, 2024, while the motion for judgment was
still pending, Judge Krumeich held an Audubon hearing
“to determine whether the parties reached an enforce-
able settlement agreement on February 23, 2024.” See
footnote 2 of this opinion. Both plaintiffs and Ainsworth
testified at the hearing, and three exhibits were admit-
ted into evidence: (1) a copy of the “Mutual Release and
Settlement Agreement” that each defendant had signed
on February 25, 2024, which had been attached to the
motion to enforce settlement agreement; (2) copies of
the emails exchanged between Ainsworth and Miller,
with copies to the plaintiff, that also had been attached
to the motion to enforce settlement agreement; and (3)
the entire transcript of the February 23, 2024 status
conference before Judge Povodator.
On April 2, 2024, upon reviewing the documentary
evidence submitted at the Audubon hearing, “including
the transcript of the status conference in which the settle-
ment was reported, and after assessing the credibility of
Karlen v. Saleeb

the testimony presented [at the hearing] by the witnesses,
the court conclude[d] [that] an enforceable settlement
agreement was reached by the parties as of the status
conference held [on February 23, 2024] before Judge
Povodator on another case between the same parties in
Bridgeport.” It therefore issued an order granting the
motion to enforce settlement agreement in the underly-
ing action. In that order, the court explained that “Judge
Povodator had attempted to mediate a global settlement”
during a conference held earlier in the month and that
“the status conference on February 23, 2024, was for
the parties to report the progress of the negotiations.”
In that follow-up status conference, the court stated,
“counsel and the [plaintiff] reported the Stamford case
had been settled. A draft settlement agreement had been
circulated and agreed upon before the conference and only
a minor modification agreed to by all was made after the
conference.” As for plaintiff Gerard Karlen, in particu-
lar, the court found that he “was privy to the negotia-
tion and the circulated agreement, and he affirmed the
statement by [Ainsworth] to Judge [Povodator] that ‘. . .
we have a resolution to the Stamford case. . . . We have
come to a final agreement. . . . We were going back on
some very minor language in the Stamford case.’ ” The
court therefore “found not credible the testimony of [the
plaintiffs] that they did not review and accept the terms
of the ‘finalized’ agreement signed by the [defendants]
and would not agree to settle the Stamford action without
settlement of the Bridgeport action.”
The court ultimately determined that the “Mutual
Release and Settlement Agreement” attached to the
motion to enforce settlement agreement, which it
described as “[t]he written draft agreement signed by
the [defendants] but not by the [plaintiffs] and delivered
to [Miller] and to [the plaintiff] contained the terms and
conditions agreed to by the parties, is clear and unam-
biguous and therefore [ordered that that agreement be]
summarily enforced under the principles announced in
[Audubon].” This appeal by the plaintiff followed. See
Karlen v. Saleeb

footnote 1 of this opinion. Additional facts and proce-
dural history will be set forth as necessary.
We begin by stating the relevant standard of review
and legal principles that govern our review. “In Audubon,
our Supreme Court shaped a procedure by which a trial
court could summarily enforce a settlement agreement
to settle litigation. Audubon Parking Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., supra, 225 Conn.
812. The court held that a trial court may summarily
enforce a settlement agreement within the framework of
the original lawsuit as a matter of law when the parties
do not dispute the terms of the agreement. . . . Id.
“In coming to this conclusion, the court in Audubon
relied on federal precedent, specifically that [a] trial court
has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settle-
ment agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the
agreement are clear and unambiguous. . . . Agreements
that end lawsuits are contracts, sometimes enforceable
in a subsequent suit, but in many situations enforceable
by entry of a judgment in the original suit. A court’s
authority to enforce a settlement by entry of judgment in
the underlying action is especially clear where the settle-
ment is reported to the court during the course of a trial
or other significant courtroom proceedings.” (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinity
v. US Bancorp, 212 Conn. App. 791, 815, 277 A.3d 200
(2022). For the purpose of this rule, significant court-
room proceedings other than a trial in the underlying
action at which a court is empowered to render judgment
to enforce a settlement agreement presented to it by
the parties to that action have been held to include both
pretrial conferences in the action; see, e.g., McCook v.
Whitebirch Construction, LLC, 117 Conn. App. 320, 323,
330, 978 A.2d 1150 (2009) (settlement agreement was
properly enforced where, “[a]t the conclusion of [a second
pretrial] conference, counsel for [the parties] reported
to the court . . . that a global settlement agreement had
been reached in all three cases . . . [and] followed up
with a letter memorializing the agreement” (footnote
Karlen v. Saleeb

omitted)), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 932, 987 A.2d 1029
(2010); and posttrial settlement conferences while an
appeal in that action is still pending. See, e.g., Worth
v. Picard, 233 Conn. App. 38, 42–47, 338 A.3d 1195
(2025) (settlement agreement arrived at during appel-
late preargument conferences was properly enforced by
another judge after Audubon hearing).
The critical question the trial court must answer when
ruling on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement
reported to it at any stage of the proceedings before it
in an underlying action is whether the terms of agree-
ment to which all parties agree are clear and unambigu-
ous. See Kinity v. US Bancorp, supra, 212 Conn. App.
816 (“[g]enerally, [a] trial court has the inherent power
to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as mat-
ter of law [only] when the terms of the agreement are
clear and unambiguous . . . and when the parties do not
dispute the terms of the agreement” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). To make this determination, the
court is empowered to make factual findings as to any
disputes arising in connection with the motion because,
as our Supreme Court explained in Ackerman v. Sobol
Family Partnership, LLP, 298 Conn. 495, 535, 4 A.3d
288 (2010), a motion to enforce a settlement agreement
is equitable in nature, and, thus, a court may “use its
equitable powers to resolve [any such factual] dispute[s]
without a jury.”
As this court has stated previously, “[a] settlement
agreement is a contract among the parties. . . . In order to
form a binding and enforceable contract, there must exist
an offer and an acceptance based on a mutual understand-
ing by the parties . . . . The mutual understanding must
manifest itself by a mutual assent between the parties. .
. . In other words, [i]n order for an enforceable contract
to exist, the court must find that the parties’ minds had
truly met.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bay
Advance, LLC v. Halajian, 236 Conn. App. 228, 235,
347 A.3d 1207 (2025). “Furthermore, [p]arties are bound
Karlen v. Saleeb

to the terms of a contract even though it is not signed if
their assent is otherwise indicated. . . .
“When a party challenges the trial court’s legal con-
clusion that the agreement was summarily enforceable,
we must determine whether that conclusion is legally
and logically correct and whether [it finds] support in
the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . . In
addition, to the extent that the [party’s] claim implicates
the court’s factual findings, our review is limited to
deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous.
. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed. . . . In making
this determination, every reasonable presumption must
be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 235–36.
In support of his claim that the court improperly
enforced the settlement agreement, the plaintiff argues
that several of the factual findings upon which the court
based its decision to do so were clearly erroneous. He
claims, more particularly, that the court “incorrectly
determined” that (1) the attorneys and he reported to
Judge Povodator that the underlying action had been
settled; (2) a draft settlement agreement had been cir-
culated and agreed upon before the February 23, 2024
status conference and that only a minor modification,
that had been “agreed to by all,” was made thereafter;
(3) the written “Mutual Release and Settlement Agree-
ment” that the defendants signed on February 25, 2024
“reflected the parties’ agreement on the terms and con-
ditions agreed to before the status conference as well as
the ‘minor terms’ finalized shortly thereafter,” and that
it “contained the terms and conditions agreed to . . . and
is clear and unambiguous”; (4) the plaintiffs’ testimony
was not credible; and (5) “there was ‘a meeting of the
minds’ and all material terms and conditions were agreed
to by the parties,” and thus the “Mutual Release and
Karlen v. Saleeb

Settlement Agreement” did not have to be signed by the
plaintiffs to be enforceable against them as a matter of
law.7 The plaintiff maintains, to the contrary, that there
existed a “dual settlement contingency,” namely, “that
the settlement of each individual action was required for
the settlement of both actions, and that neither action
would be deemed settled unless settlement of the other
action occurred.” Because this alleged “dual settlement
contingency” had not been satisfied, the plaintiff argues
that a separate settlement of the underlying action was
impossible and that the court “was incorrect in finding
that an enforceable stipulation [as to the underlying
action alone] had been entered into between the parties
. . . .” We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history,
which are supported by the testimony given and the
exhibits admitted into evidence at the Audubon hearing,
are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff’s claim.
At the beginning of the February 23, 2024 status con-
ference, Judge Povodator explained that “[t]his is a
follow-up to a session we had . . . [on February] 16th . . .
exactly a week ago; and there were some discussions about
possible ways to make everybody not too unhappy while
resolving this case. . . . And so, my question is whether
there’s been any further progress in that regard . . . .”
Ainsworth spoke first, on behalf of the defendants, who
were the plaintiffs in the Bridgeport action, and the
following colloquy between counsel, the plaintiff, and
the court ensued:
“[Ainsworth]: Thank you, Your Honor. Okay. So, we
have had additional communications on a settlement,
and we actually made some progress. I believe we actu-
ally have a resolution—we have good news and bad news.
7
We note that Carla Karlen, through counsel, did file an objection
to the motion to enforce settlement agreement on April 1, 2024, just
prior to the Audubon hearing. As stated previously in this opinion,
however, Carla Karlen is not a party to this appeal. See footnote 1 of
this opinion. Thus, although some of the plaintiff’s arguments refer
to “the plaintiffs” collectively, we consider those claims only as to the
plaintiff personally.
Karlen v. Saleeb

We have a resolution to the Stamford case but not the
Bridgeport case.
“The Court: Okay.
“[Ainsworth]: And we just this afternoon sort of—I
think came to a final draft, and I’ll let Attorney Miller
sort of confirm that. We were going back on some very
minor language in the settlement agreement for the
Stamford case. The Bridgeport case we ran into an imped-
iment to settlement where the parties just disagree on
the possibility for a compromise.
“The Court: All right. Anything from the defense side,
first Ms. Miller?
“[Miller]: I would say that that is an accurate assess-
ment of where we are. We’re just at an impasse with
regard to a central issue in [the Bridgeport action], and
that is the existence of the wall. My client is not in agree-
ment with taking down the wall, and we have not heard
any real counters from the plaintiffs . . . . But I think
we’re at an impasse in this particular case.
“The Court: Mr. Karlen . . . I want to make sure you
have an opportunity to say I agree, disagree, whatever.
“[The Plaintiff]: . . . Yes. . . . That is exactly where
we are.”
Following the initial conference with Judge Povoda-
tor on February 16, 2024, there had been an exchange of
several emails by and between Ainsworth and Miller, with
electronic copies to the plaintiff, which led to an agree-
ment to settle only the underlying action and made clear
that that separate agreement would be reported to the
court at the follow-up status conference on February 23,
2024. Specifically, on February 19, 2024, Ainsworth sent
an email to Miller and the plaintiff, stating: “Attached
is the settlement agreement including the list of items
the [defendants] should refrain from with some edits.”
Miller responded by sending a reply email to Ainsworth,
with a copy to the plaintiff, in which she stated: “It
would have made review easier if you had done this in
Karlen v. Saleeb

revision marking mode so that I could more readily see
your changes. With that said, on behalf of my client
[Carla Karlen], she WILL NOT AGREE to any removal
of any portion of the wall. We will therefore consider a
nonglobal settlement if your clients [insist] upon that.
We will need to treat the [two] cases separately as we
continue to believe that your client’s position regarding
the wall/fence case is not a reasonable compromise.”
(Emphasis in original.)
Thereafter, on February 23, 2024, at 9:01 a.m., prior to
the follow-up status conference, Miller sent an email with
an attachment to Ainsworth and the plaintiff bearing
the subject line “KARLEN V SALEEB—SETTLEMENT
AGREEEMNT RE-DRAFT.” In the email, she wrote:
“Attorney Ainsworth, here is what I believe should be
our last edits to the settlement agreement on the Stamford
case only. Let me know if your clients agree. It is [in]
revision marking mode to facilitate [any] last edits from
your client.” (Emphasis added.) Ainsworth responded at
11:30 a.m., in a reply email addressed to “Atty Miller
and Mr. Karlen,” stating: “I discussed it with my clients
and made two clarifications, the only one of real sub-
stance being that the release does not include the pending
Bridgeport case. If this works, we should finalize and be
able to report it at the status conference.” At 12:54 p.m.,
Miller, in turn, sent a reply email to Ainsworth, with an
electronic copy to the plaintiff, stating: “One further
edit is required that was missed. That is, we are NOT
agreeing to withdraw counterclaims in the Bridgeport
action, to the extent of those remaining.” (Emphasis in
original.) Ainsworth responded at 1:06 p.m., in a reply
email sent to Miller and the plaintiff, that he had “made
the edit in redline.”
Later that afternoon, at 4:01 p.m., following the status
conference with Judge Povodator at which the settle-
ment of the underlying action was reported,8 Ainsworth
sent a further email to Miller, with an electronic copy to
8
The record reflects that the status conference started at 3 p.m. and
concluded before the court proceeded with “another matter at 3:30” p.m.
Karlen v. Saleeb

the plaintiff, to which he attached a document entitled
“Settlement Agreement 02-23-24 (clean).docx.” In that
email, Ainsworth wrote: “Here is the clean version of
the last redline with all changes accepted. If each party
signs, we can exchange the signed versions and report the
matter to the [Stamford] JD and terminate the action.”
Miller responded by email on February 25, 2024, at 9:47
a.m., stating: “I have finalized the document and for-
warded to my client for final signature. Counterpart
signatures should be acceptable.” At 10:28 a.m. that
morning, Ainsworth sent a responsive email to Miller,
with an electronic copy to the plaintiff, stating: “Same
on this end. I will email a pdf which is to be held in escrow
until all parties have signed. We should notify the court
as soon as the signatures have been made.” By a reply
email to Ainsworth with a copy to the plaintiff, Miller
responded: “OK. Thanks.”
On February 26, 2024, according to the motion to
enforce settlement agreement, Miller sent another email,
presumably to Ainsworth and the plaintiff, stating: “I
have been informed a short while ago that my client
[Carla Karlen] has decided not to settle on these terms.
Without agreement to resolve the fence issue, there is
no reason to think there will be good faith compliance by
your clients.”9 The defendants filed the motion to enforce
settlement agreement the following day.
During the Audubon hearing, Ainsworth testified
that the parties initially had been “discussing a global
settlement of both actions” but “[t]hat process failed.
In other words, the parties agreed to settle one case,
the Stamford case, but not the Bridgeport case because
we came to an impasse on the material terms of how it
would be settled.” He further identified the “Mutual
Release and Settlement Agreement” signed by the defen-
dants on February 25, 2024, and testified that it is “the
settlement agreement in this matter.” He explained
9
Although it does not appear that the actual February 26, 2024 email
was made part of the record, the propriety of the defendants’ represen-
tation in this regard has not been challenged on appeal.
Karlen v. Saleeb

that the document Miller had finalized and forwarded
to her client for final signature, per her 9:47 a.m. email
on February 25, 2024, was the version the defendants
had signed and that he had put a draft sticker over their
signatures and transmitted the settlement agreement
to the plaintiff and Miller thereafter.10 The “Mutual
Release and Settlement Agreement” was admitted into
evidence without objection.
According to that agreement, the plaintiffs were to
withdraw the underlying action in exchange for the
defendants’ agreement to refrain from certain actions
that were delineated and described in eleven separately
numbered paragraphs set forth therein. Moreover, there
was to be a mutual release by and among the parties that
expressly did not apply to the Bridgeport action.
We conclude that this evidentiary backdrop provides
support for each factual finding about which the plaintiff
complains, thereby defeating his arguments that any of
the challenged findings are clearly erroneous.11 See Bay
Advance, LLC v. Halajian, supra, 236 Conn. App. 236.
Indeed, the transcript from the February 23, 2024 status
conference plainly reveals that (1) Ainsworth advised
Judge Povodator that “[w]e have a resolution to the
Stamford case but not the Bridgeport case,” “we just
. . . came to a final draft” and “were going back on some
very minor language in the settlement agreement for
10
Ainsworth testified that he utilized the draft stamp in an abundance
of caution because, “[w]ith an unrepresented party, I didn’t feel com-
fortable giving the document in escrow. What I wanted to show is my
clients have signed, we’re ready to go.”
11
In reaching this conclusion, we limit our consideration to the five
challenged findings we listed previously in this opinion. That list derives
from the seven allegedly incorrect determinations by the court that
the plaintiff identifies at the beginning of the argument section of his
appellate brief. To the extent the plaintiff argues in his brief that Miller
did not have apparent authority to act on his behalf, and did not so act,
we note that the court made no findings on those claims. With respect
to the portion of the plaintiff’s argument section of his brief that bears
the title “No Escrow,” it is inadequately briefed. Accordingly, we deem
that claim to be abandoned and do not reach its merits. See, e.g., Worth
v. Picard, supra, 233 Conn. App. 41–42 n.7.
Karlen v. Saleeb

the Stamford case”; (2) Miller agreed with Ainsworth;
and (3) when Judge Povodator gave him the “opportu-
nity to say I agree [or] disagree” with what Ainsworth
had represented and Miller had confirmed, the plaintiff
stated unequivocally, on his own behalf: “Yes. . . . That
is exactly where we are.” This evidence directly supports
the court’s finding that “[t]he counsel and pro se party
reported the Stamford case had been settled.”12
Although the plaintiff testified at the Audubon hear-
ing that, when he made this statement to Judge Povoda-
tor, he meant only that “the basis of an agreement was
reached in Stamford, but not in Bridgeport,” that he
“never intended to settle the Stamford case without a
settlement of the Bridgeport case,” and that he did not see
the emails and “latest drafts of the documents that were
going back and forth” before or immediately after the
12
Throughout his brief to this court, the plaintiff perseverates on the
fact that the “statements” regarding settlement were made “in a status
conference in a different case” and suggests that, because of this, they
were improperly relied on by the court to assess whether there had been
a reported settlement of the underlying action. As previously noted in
this opinion, however, “[a] court’s authority to enforce a settlement
by entry of judgment . . . is especially clear where the settlement is
reported to the court during the course of a trial or other significant
courtroom proceedings”; (emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted) Kinity v. US Bancorp, supra, 212 Conn. App. 815;
and a status conference is a significant courtroom proceeding in which
an enforceable report of settlement can be made. See, e.g., McCook v.
Whitebirch Construction, LLC, supra,117 Conn. App. 323, 330. The fact
that the status conference in which the settlement of the underlying
action was reported occurred in a related proceeding by and among the
same parties does not change this conclusion, particularly where the
discussions at that conference involved the facts and circumstances of,
and reported extensive attempts to settle, both actions. See, e.g., Acker-
man v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP, supra, 298 Conn. 499–507, 530
(settlement agreement, arrived at following court-ordered mediation
sessions before neutral and detached judge and discussions among par-
ties thereafter, was properly enforced by another judge after Audubon
hearing). Indeed, even though the settlement of the underlying action
was reported in a status conference held in the related proceeding, the
agreement itself was enforced “within the framework of the original
lawsuit,” as contemplated by our Supreme Court in Audubon. Audubon
Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., supra,
225 Conn. 812.
Karlen v. Saleeb

status conference at which the settlement was reported,
the court found that this testimony was “not credible . .
. .” Indeed, the court expressly rejected the plaintiff’s
testimony that he “did not review and accept the terms
of the ‘finalized’ agreement signed by the [defendants]
and would not agree to settle the Stamford action without
settlement of the Bridgeport action” but found, to the
contrary, that “[t]he signed draft reflected the parties’
agreement on the terms and conditions agreed to before
the status conference . . . .”
“[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that
the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of
witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to their testi-
mony. . . . The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or
in part, the testimony offered by either party. . . . That
determination of credibility is a function of the trial
court.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Heritage Square, LLC v. Eoanou, 61 Conn.
App. 329, 333, 764 A.2d 199 (2001). It is well settled
that “ ‘[q]uestions of whether to believe or to disbelieve a
competent witness are beyond our review’ ”; Connecticut
Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Dept. of Consumer Protec-
tion, Liquor Control Commission, 237 Conn. App. 1,
14, A.3d (2025); and we defer to the court’s credibility
determinations and findings made in relation thereto.
See, e.g., id., 15.
Finally, the court found that the settlement agree-
ment to which the plaintiff agreed13 was “clear and
13
Although the plaintiff did not sign the settlement agreement, it
is well settled in Connecticut that “[p]arties are bound to the terms
of a contract even though it is not signed if their assent is otherwise
indicated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bay Advance, LLC
v. Halajian, supra, 236 Conn. App. 235. In the present case, there is
evidence in the record that (1) the plaintiff agreed with Ainsworth’s
report to Judge Povodator that the underlying action had been settled,
separate and apart from the Bridgeport action, and that a final draft of
the terms reflecting the settlement of the underlying action had been
agreed on prior to the conference with only an agreed on change that had
been made in redline left to be accepted, and (2) the agreement to settle
the underlying action, which the defendants signed and the plaintiff
received following the conference, “reflected the parties’ agreement
Karlen v. Saleeb

unambiguous . . . .” See Audubon Parking Associates
Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., supra, 225
Conn. 811 (“[a] trial court has the inherent power to
enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a matter
of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and
unambiguous”). Although the plaintiff contends that
the court incorrectly determined that “[t]he written
draft agreement signed by the [defendants] but not by
the [plaintiffs] and delivered to counsel for Carla Karlen
and to Gerard Karlen contained the terms and conditions
agreed to by the parties and is clear and unambiguous,”
and maintains that there was “[n]o [a]greement that
[m]eets [the Audubon] [s]tandards,” he presents no argu-
ment in support of these assertions that the settlement
agreement the court enforced is not clear and unambigu-
ous. Thus, we deem any such claim in this regard to be
abandoned as inadequately briefed.14 See, e.g., Worth v.
Picard, supra, 233 Conn. App. 41–42 n.7.
For these reasons, we conclude that the court’s finding
that the plaintiff agreed to the clear and unambiguous
terms set forth in the “Mutual Release and Settlement
on the terms and conditions agreed to before the status conference” as
the court found. In other words, when the plaintiff confirmed that the
representations Ainsworth had made to Judge Povodator regarding the
separate settlement of the underlying action were true, he knew what
the terms of the settlement were and he was manifesting his assent
thereto. See Bay Advance, LLC v. Halajian, supra, 235. As such, there
is evidence to support the court’s finding that there had been a “ ‘meeting
of the minds’ ” by that point and the court’s conclusion that the writ-
ten “agreement need not be signed [by the plaintiff] to be enforceable”
against him is therefore legally and logically correct. See id., 235–36.
14
We note, nonetheless, that the “Mutual Release and Settlement
Agreement” unambiguously established that the plaintiffs were to
withdraw the underlying action in exchange for the defendants’ agree-
ment to refrain from certain actions that were delineated and described
in eleven separately numbered paragraphs therein. See SMDV 1, LLC
v. 459-461 Pacific Street, LLC, 233 Conn. App. 599, 609, 341 A.3d 304
(“[W]e accord the language employed in the contract a rational construc-
tion based on its common, natural and ordinary meaning and usage as
applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . . [If] the language is
unambiguous, we must give the contract effect according to its terms.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 353 Conn. 919, 345
A.3d 808 (2025).
Karlen v. Saleeb

Agreement” was not clearly erroneous and that the
court’s conclusion that the parties had reached a legally
enforceable settlement agreement, which it enforced,
was legally and logically correct.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.