Chacho v. Lister

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Chacho v. Lister

JOHN CHACHO, JR. v. CARA LISTER
(AC 48234)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying his applica-
tion for visitation with his minor child and his motion to open the judgment.
He claimed, inter alia, that the court’s rulings were improper and sought to
have the case remanded to the trial court for a hearing. Held:
The appeal was dismissed as moot, as there was no practical relief that this
court could afford the plaintiff because, after his appeal had been filed, the
challenged rulings had been superseded by orders of the trial court that were
issued in a separate custody action brought by the defendant in which the
plaintiff was pursuing his requests for visitation.

Argued December 3, 2025—officially released March 10, 2026

Procedural History

Application for visitation with the parties’ minor
child, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, where the
court, Boni-Vendola, J., rendered judgment denying the
application; thereafter, the court, Figueroa-Laskos, J.,
denied the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment, and
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
John Chacho, Jr., self-represented, the appellant
(plaintiff).

Opinion

ALVORD, J. The self-represented plaintiff, John Cha-
cho, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court in
this action against the defendant, Cara Lister, seeking
visitation with their minor child. On appeal, the plaintiff
claims that the court improperly denied both his applica-
tion for visitation with the child and his motion to open
the judgment.1 We dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal.
1
Although the plaintiff’s arguments are difficult to decipher from his
appellate brief, we have distilled them into the aforementioned claims. To
the extent that the plaintiff seeks to raise a due process claim, any such
claim is inadequately briefed. Although we “allow the [plaintiff] some
Chacho v. Lister

The following procedural history is relevant to this
appeal. In May, 2024, the plaintiff filed in the judicial
district of Ansonia-Milford an application for visitation
with the parties’ minor child, who was born in 2019. On
July 11, 2024, the court, Boni-Vendola, J., held a hearing
on the plaintiff’s application for visitation, for which the
plaintiff appeared in person.2 At the start of the hear-
ing, the court, noting the defendant’s absence, discussed
the possibility that the defendant did not receive notice
and asked the plaintiff if he had her correct address to
effectuate abode service. The plaintiff responded that he
did not have an address for her. He then indicated that
he was incarcerated at the time of the child’s birth and
was incarcerated currently but was out on parole for an
unspecified time in 2020. He further responded that, at
about the time he was released on parole, he had his only
interaction with the child through a video call and that
he has made numerous attempts to contact the child but
believed that the defendant had impeded those efforts.
The court stated: “I have to have [the defendant] in
court to make a finding. I have to have some testimony
that it’s in the best interest of this child. At this point
in time, [the child] doesn’t know you at all.” The court
concluded the hearing by stating, “I’m going to have to
deny this without prejudice, which means you could file
it again, okay, not based on any change in circumstances.
You can file it again, if you have a better address for her,
if she gets in-hand service, and I get her in front of this
latitude as a self-represented litigant,” his cursory assertions without
any substantive argument or analysis render his brief “inadequate for
us to conduct any meaningful review . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) D. K. v. D. F., 235 Conn. App. 59, 78, 344 A.3d 564 (2025).
Additionally, we note that the defendant did not file an appellate brief.
On July 8, 2025, this court ordered that this appeal shall be considered
on the basis of the appellant’s brief and, if applicable, the appendix,
the record, as defined by Practice Book § 60-4, and oral argument by
the plaintiff.
2
Because the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time of the hearing,
he filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum
requesting that he be transported to the proceeding by the Department
of Correction, which the court granted.
Chacho v. Lister

court. So, at this point in time, I’m going to deny your
application without prejudice.”
That same day, the court issued a written order deny-
ing the request for video visits and in-person visits in
the location where the plaintiff was then incarcerated,
concluding: “The court does not find that allowing visita-
tion between the plaintiff and the child would be in the
child’s best interest at this time. The plaintiff’s visitation
application is denied without prejudice.” Additionally,
the record reveals that the next day, July 12, 2024,
without any apparent explanation, notice was sent by the
Superior Court clerk’s office to the plaintiff in the form
of a JDNO indicating that the court “entered a judgment
of dismissal in the . . . action . . . for failure to prosecute
said action with reasonable diligence, ([Practice Book §]
14-3).”3 The notice further provided in relevant part:
“Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such
cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction,
a motion to open judgment of dismissal must be filed
within four months succeeding the date on which notice
was sent ([Practice Book §] 17-4).”
The plaintiff then filed a motion to open the judgment.
On October 21, 2024, both parties appeared before the
court, Figueroa-Laskos, J., on the motion. The plaintiff
asserted that he “had to reopen the judgment because
[the court, Boni-Vendola, J.] . . . wanted me to serve
3
“The designation ‘JDNO’ is a standard notation used to indicate
that a judicial notice of a decision or order has been sent by the clerk’s
office to all parties of record. Such a notation raises a presumption that
notice was sent and received in the absence of a finding to the contrary.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) LendingHome Funding Corp. v.
REI Holdings, LLC, 227 Conn. App. 786, 789 n.4, 324 A.3d 152 (2024),
cert. denied, 351 Conn. 905, 330 A.3d 133 (2025).
Additionally, Practice Book § 14-3 (a) provides: “If a party shall fail
to prosecute an action with reasonable diligence, the judicial authority
may, after hearing, on motion by any party to the action pursuant to
Section 11-1, or on its own motion, render a judgment dismissing the
action with costs. At least two weeks’ notice shall be required except
in cases appearing on an assignment list for final adjudication. Judg-
ment files shall not be drawn except where an appeal is taken or where
any party so requests.”
Chacho v. Lister

[the defendant] in hand. I served her at her last known
address, and then I had to reopen the judgment because
she dismissed it without prejudice.” The court, Figueroa-
Laskos, J., noted that the record “indicates that there
was a hearing, and your visitation complaint was denied
on the merits.”4 When the court asked if the defendant
had anything to add, she stated that she had not lived
in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford for two years
and that she had an action pending in another judicial
district, Bridgeport, in which she was seeking sole legal
custody of the minor child. The court stated that the file
did not reflect activity in a Bridgeport case and proceeded
to deny the motion to open the judgment. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court
improperly denied his application for visitation and
motion to open the judgment, and asks this court to
“[r]emand [the] case back to the trial court so that a
fair and unbiased hearing be conducted and the proper
procedures be followed in the application for visitation
. . . .” Despite the JDNO notice sent to the plaintiff by
the clerk’s office erroneously informing him that his case
had been dismissed and the confusion that ensued there-
after, under the particular circumstances presented, we
conclude that there is no practical relief that this court
can afford the plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff’s
appeal is moot.
“Mootness implicates [the] court’s subject matter juris-
diction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve. .
. . It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an
actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate
jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to
decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting
of actual relief or from the determination of which no
practical relief can follow. . . . An actual controversy
must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but
also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When,
4
The court did not acknowledge the judgment of dismissal for failure
to prosecute sent by the clerk’s office in the JDNO notice.
Chacho v. Lister

during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred
that preclude an appellate court from granting any prac-
tical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case
has become moot.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Shear v. Shear, 235 Conn. App. 769, 772, 347 A.3d 290
(2025).
A review of the docket for the Bridgeport custody
action reveals the following history that is relevant to
this appeal. On November 19, 2024, the defendant filed in
the judicial district of Bridgeport a custody application
seeking, among other orders, sole legal custody of the
parties’ minor child.5 On March 19, 2025, both parties
were present for a case evaluation hearing, following
which the court, M. Moore, J., issued an order awarding
the defendant sole legal custody and awarded no visita-
tion to the plaintiff but provided that the plaintiff “may
write letters and/or send cards to the minor child.” The
plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to file an appeal chal-
lenging the custody order.
The plaintiff continued litigating his requests for
visitation in the Bridgeport custody action by filing post-
judgment motions for modification of custody orders,
including one in which he sought, inter alia, visitation
with the child. On November 13, 2025, the court, Dembo,
J., after a hearing on these motions, issued an order
referring the matter to the Family Relations Office of the
Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch
5
We take judicial notice of the defendant’s custody application and
the subsequent orders pertaining to that application. See, e.g., State
v. Santiago, 142 Conn. App. 582, 592 n.12, 64 A.3d 832 (“[i]t is well
established that this court can take judicial notice of facts contained
in the files of the Superior Court” (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 309 Conn. 911, 69 A.3d 307 (2013).
The defendant’s appearance form lists Norwalk as her town of resi-
dence. For actions in which both the plaintiff and the defendant are
residents of this state, General Statutes § 51-345 (a) (3) (E) provides:
“If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of Darien,
Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, Weston, Westport or
Wilton, the action may be made returnable at the option of the plain-
tiff to either the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk or the judicial
district of Bridgeport.”
Chacho v. Lister

(family relations) “for an issue focused evaluation to
determine if phone calls and/or visits between the child
and the incarcerated father are appropriate and in the
child’s best interest.” It further ordered the parties to
cooperate with family relations, as that office “will look
into/review any [Department of Children and Families’]
records, police complaints/records, the child’s medical/
mental health condition, speak with both parents and
such other collaterals as they deem appropriate to fulfil
this task.” The court set February 20, 2026, as the date
to report back to ascertain the status of the family rela-
tions evaluation.
At oral argument before this court on December 3,
2025, the plaintiff, in response to an inquiry regarding
the Bridgeport custody action, acknowledged that family
relations was conducting an evaluation and that he was
participating in that evaluation for purposes of seeking
visitation with the child. The plaintiff did not argue that
the Bridgeport action was not progressing or that any
procedures were unfair or improper.
In this appeal, the plaintiff’s request for relief seeks
to have his case remanded so that he can be afforded a
hearing and that “proper procedures be followed in the
application for visitation . . . .” Since the filing of this
appeal, however, he has participated in a hearing concern-
ing his request for visitation in the Bridgeport court. He
acknowledged at oral argument that the family relations
evaluation is ongoing and he is participating. By holding
a hearing within the context of postjudgment litigation
through which the plaintiff seeks visitation with the
child, the Bridgeport court is affording the plaintiff the
relief that he seeks in this appeal. Therefore, we conclude
that there is no practical relief that this court can award
by addressing his claims challenging the judgment issued
by the court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford
and, thus, the appeal is moot.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.