Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

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Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

BENJAMIN LIGERI v. WHITE ROAD
CAPITAL, LLC, SERIES 168814
ET AL.
(AC 48077)
Elgo, Clark and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting, on standing
grounds, motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. He claimed, inter alia,
that the court improperly concluded that he lacked standing to prosecute the
underyling action because he was not a party to the contracts that formed
the basis of the action. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s request
for an evidentiary hearing in accordance with Standard Tallow Corp. v.
Jowdy (190 Conn. 48), as the plaintiff never claimed before the court that
any disputed issues of fact needed to be resolved with respect to whether he
was a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the disputes alleged in
the complaint.

The trial court properly dismissed the action as to all defendants with respect
to the count of the plaintiff’s complaint seeking a declaratory judgment, as
the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was the proper party to request the
declaratory relief sought because that request arose entirely out of contracts
between a nonparty, C Co., and the defendants, the plaintiff was not a party
to those contracts, and, although, he was an individual guarantor of C Co.’s
performance obligations, that status was not sufficient to confer standing
on the plaintiff in his individual capacity.

The trial court improperly dismissed three counts of the plaintiff’s complaint
directed against the defendant A Co. that sound in tortious interference with
business expectancies, negligent misrepresentation, and a violation of the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (§ 42-110a et seq.), as the allegations
made in support of those counts, namely, that A Co.’s unauthorized or illegal
actions resulted in the freezing of the plaintiff’s personal PayPal account,
demonstrated that he arguably had some direct and personal interest in
those causes of action.

Argued September 15, 2025—officially released March 10, 2026

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment as
to the rights and remedies of parties to certain accounts
receivable factoring agreements, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New London, where the court, Spallone, J., denied the
plaintiff’s motion for an evidentiary hearing; thereafter,
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

the court, Spallone, J., granted the defendants’ motions
to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part;
further proceedings.
Edward E. Bona, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Jared M. Alfin, with whom, on the brief, was Forrest
A. Noirot, for the appellee (named defendant).
Gary J. Greene, with whom, on the brief, was Christo-
pher Ryan Boy, for the appellee (defendant The Fund-
works, LLC).

Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The plaintiff, Benjamin Ligeri,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting,
on standing grounds, motions to dismiss filed by the
defendants, White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814,
doing business as GFE Holdings (White Road); The Fund-
works, LLC (Fundworks); and Advance Servicing, Inc.
(Advance).1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
improperly (1) granted the defendants’ motions to dis-
miss without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in
accordance with Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190
Conn. 48, 56, 459 A.2d 503 (1983), and (2) concluded that
the plaintiff lacked standing to prosecute the underlying
action because he was not a party to the contracts that
formed the basis of the action. We agree with the plain-
tiff that the court improperly dismissed the action with
respect to counts two, three and four of the complaint
directed solely against Advance and remand for further
proceedings on those counts; we otherwise affirm the
judgment of the trial court.2
The following procedural history and facts, as alleged
in the operative complaint or necessarily implied by
1
Advance did not file a brief with this court or otherwise participate
in the present appeal.
2
The plaintiff also raises as a third claim that the court improperly
determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render the declar-
atory judgment sought by the plaintiff in count one of the complaint.
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

those allegations, are relevant to this appeal. See May
v. Coffey, 291 Conn. 106, 108, 967 A.2d 495 (2009). The
plaintiff is a resident of Voluntown and the owner and
principal of Central Concepts, Inc. (Central), a Rhode
Island corporation. Central is a third-party logistics pro-
vider for Amazon, Inc. (Amazon), and relies on Amazon
for its revenue. In his capacity as principal for Central,
the plaintiff executed certain “accounts receivables fac-
toring contracts” (contracts) with each of the defen-
dants, all nonresident business entities.3 Pursuant to
the contracts, the defendants agreed to make up-front
payments to Central in exchange for Central’s future
receivables from Amazon.4 The plaintiff, in his individual
capacity, also executed personal guaranties of Central’s
contractual obligations.
The plaintiff commenced the underlying action in
August, 2023. The operative amended complaint con-
tains four counts. Count one is directed at all three of
the defendants and seeks a declaratory judgment. Spe-
cifically, the plaintiff asked the court to declare that no
sums are due from Central to the defendants under the
parties’ contracts, and that no executions of any judg-
ments obtained against Central may issue in Connecticut
unless and until Central receives funds that it claims
Given our conclusion that the plaintiff lacked standing with respect to
count one, it is unnecessary for us to address that claim.
3
White Road is a New York limited liability company, Fundworks
is a California limited liability company, and Advance is a company
incorporated in New Jersey.
4
The complaint is not a model of clarity with respect to the precise
nature of the business relationships between the various parties. Accord-
ing to the complaint, “once products [were] sold through [Amazon’s]
platform, [Amazon would decide] what its fees [were] for storage, inven-
tory and listing through its platform, after which it [would] disperse
money to Central’s account with Webster Bank.” According to the
plaintiff, each of Central’s accounts receivables factoring contracts
with the defendants provide that the defendants are not due any pro-
ceeds or sums under the contracts until Amazon first places funds into
Central’s bank account. Moreover, the plaintiff alleges that Amazon
started destroying inventory belonging to the plaintiff and Central and
withholding funds by refusing to deposit funds due to Central into its
bank account.
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

are due to it from Amazon.5 Counts two, three and four
were directed against Advance only and sound in, respec-
tively, tortious interference with business expectancies,
negligent misrepresentation, and a violation of the Con-
necticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General
Statutes § 42-110a et seq. All three of the counts against
Advance relied in part on allegations that Advance had
frozen the plaintiff’s individual PayPal account without
authorization to do so.
The defendants each filed motions to dismiss the opera-
tive complaint, in which they argued, inter alia, that
Central, and not the plaintiff in his individual capacity,
is the real party in interest with respect to any and all
of the harms alleged in the operative complaint and,
therefore, the plaintiff in his individual capacity lacked
standing to bring the action. The motions to dismiss also
raised whether Connecticut was a proper forum in which
to bring the action in light of a forum selection clause
in the contracts and whether the court had personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants.
In response, the plaintiff first filed a motion for order
in which he requested that the court hold an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy,
supra, 190 Conn. 48, to address a number of issues rel-
evant to whether the court could exercise jurisdiction
over the defendants pursuant to the state’s long arm
statute, General Statutes § 52-59b, and whether Con-
necticut was the proper forum in which to bring the
5
The plaintiff argues in his appellant’s brief that “[a]ll three of the
defendants had both threatened and begun to take actions against the
plaintiff in this forum to collect on debts owed by [Central], declaring
Central in breach of its respective agreements with them and assert-
ing funds to be immediately due from the plaintiff.” The only action
described in the record is a civil action that Advance apparently com-
menced in May, 2023, not “in this forum,” but in the state of New York
(New York case). In the New York case, Advance raised claims that
Central had defaulted on its contractual obligations with Advance and
that the plaintiff had defaulted on his guaranty of Central’s perfor-
mance. The plaintiff and Central purportedly filed a motion to dismiss
the New York case on the ground of alleged improper service of process,
but the record does not reflect the present status of the New York case.
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

action. In that motion, the plaintiff did not claim that
there were any disputed issues of fact relevant to the
issue of the plaintiff’s standing to bring the action. The
court, Spallone, J., denied the motion for order without
comment.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a memorandum in
opposition to the motions to dismiss, attaching an affi-
davit by the plaintiff. Similar to the plaintiff’s motion
for order, the plaintiff’s opposition only addressed the
defendants’ assertions in the motion to dismiss sug-
gesting that Connecticut was not the proper venue for
the action and that the court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendants. The plaintiff did not address
the arguments in the motions to dismiss that he lacked
standing to maintain the action.
The court conducted a hearing on the motions to
dismiss on April 1, 2024. On July 23, 2024, the court
granted the motions and rendered judgment dismissing
the action. In its order, the court agreed with the defen-
dants that the plaintiff was not the proper party to bring
the action. Moreover, because it granted the motions
to dismiss on standing grounds, the court elected not
to address the other grounds raised in the defendants’
motions to dismiss. The court explained that the plain-
tiff had brought the action in his individual capacity as
a guarantor of Central, and Central was not a party to
the action. Relying on the reasoning in several Superior
Court cases that had addressed the issue of guarantors
and standing, the court concluded that the plaintiff
lacked standing to assert claims that legally belonged
to Central, and, in the absence of allegations in the com-
plaint tending to demonstrate some direct and personal
injury to the plaintiff that was separate and distinct from
Central, the plaintiff lacked standing, and the action
must be dismissed.6
The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue and for recon-
sideration and also filed a motion for extension of time
6
Judge Spallone’s order stated in relevant part: “The issue of guaran-
tors and standing has been taken up in several Superior Court cases. As
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

to file an appeal. The defendants opposed the plaintiff’s
motion to reargue and for reconsideration, which the
court denied without comment. The plaintiff timely filed
the present appeal.
Before addressing the plaintiff’s claims, we set forth
governing legal principles, including our standard of
review. Practice Book § 10-30 (a) provides in relevant
part that “[a] motion to dismiss shall be used to assert
. . . lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . .” It
Judge Pierson held in Fischer v. People’s United Bank, N.A., Superior
Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, [Docket No.
CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S] (August 3, 2021), [aff’d in part, 216 Conn. App.
426, 285 A.3d 421 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 904, 287 A.3d 136
(2023)]: Guarantors may not recover affirmatively on the debtor’s claims,
usually because they lack standing, in the absence of damages that are
independent from those suffered by the principal . . . . 38 Am. Jur. 2d,
Guaranty § 88 (May 2021 Update). Put another way, [i]n order to assert
an affirmative claim against a lender, a guarantor must establish that he
suffered a direct injury as a result of the lender’s alleged breach against
the principal, which is independent from and not merely derivative of
the resulting injury suffered by the principal. . . . Performance Electric,
Inc. v. CIB Bank, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1040, 864 N.E.2d 779 (2007).
“Judge Pierson went on to note that this position on the standing of
guarantors has generally been adopted by our courts: Connecticut courts
have adopted this view. For example, in Beerwald v. Hearth Manage-
ment, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No.
CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (June 1, 2015), it was alleged that the defendants
coerced [one of the named plaintiffs] into executing a guarantee agree-
ment on behalf of [the other plaintiff]. The defendants moved to dismiss
the claims brought by the plaintiff guarantor, on the grounds that she
lacked standing because she has failed to allege that she has sustained
a direct injury. . . . [The guarantor] is merely seeking to recover for
[the other plaintiff’s] alleged injuries. In the absence of a direct and
personal injury, the defendants argue, the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over [the guarantor’s] claims. Id. The Beerwald court agreed
with the defendants, citing 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Guaranty § 98 (2015), and
Miller v. U.S. Bank of Washington, N.A., 72 Wn. App. 416, 865 P.2d
536 (1994), inter alia, for the principle that a guarantor lacks stand-
ing to assert rights on behalf of a principal debtor. Accord Peterson v.
Parillo, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No.
CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (December 8, 2005) (a guarantor may not recover
affirmatively on the claims of the principal debtor [quoting Miller v.
U.S. Bank of Washington, N.A., supra, 424]).
“The court finds Judge Pierson’s analysis above and the cases cited
therein persuasive. The defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

is axiomatic that “a plaintiff must have standing for the
court to have [subject matter] jurisdiction. Standing is
the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One
cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court
unless he has . . . some real interest in the cause of action,
or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject
matter of the controversy. . . . The standing require-
ment is designed to ensure that courts and parties are
not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable
interests and that judicial decisions which may affect
the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with
each view fairly and vigorously represented.” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Community
Collaborative of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Ganim, 241 Conn.
546, 552–53, 698 A.2d 245 (1997). Because the issue of
standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it is a
proper ground for the granting of a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30 (a). “[I]t is the burden
of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in
his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that
he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the
dispute.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) North
Branford Citizens Against Bulk Propane Storage v.
North Branford, 230 Conn. App. 335, 341, 330 A.3d
196 (2025). “Because a determination regarding the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of
law, our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 342.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with
Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, supra, 190 Conn. 56.
Because the plaintiff failed to raise and demonstrate to
the trial court that a determination regarding his stand-
ing to bring the underlying action was dependent on the
court’s resolution of any critical factual disputes, we
disagree with the plaintiff that the court was required to
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

hold an evidentiary hearing before granting the motions
to dismiss.
“Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to [Practice Book
§ 10-30] may encounter different situations, depend-
ing on the status of the record in the case. . . . [If] a
trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a
pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint
alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint
in their most favorable light. . . . In this regard, a court
must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint,
including those facts necessarily implied from the alle-
gations, construing them in a manner most favorable
to the pleader. . . .
“In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undis-
puted facts established by affidavits submitted in support
of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed
evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial
notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the
jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary
undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the
validity of the allegations of the complaint. . . . Rather,
those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them
by the [supplementary undisputed facts]. . . . If affida-
vits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a
defendant’s motion to dismiss conclusively establish
that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to
undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . .
or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action
without further proceedings. . . . If, however, the defen-
dant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff’s
jurisdictional allegations . . . or only evidence that fails
to call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff
need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to
support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional
allegations therein. . . .
“Finally, where a jurisdictional determination is depen-
dent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it
cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

of an evidentiary hearing . . . because a court cannot
make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding based on
memoranda and documents submitted by the parties.”
(Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Cuozzo v. Orange, 315 Conn. 606,
615–17, 109 A.3d 903 (2015). An evidentiary hearing
to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts is sometimes
referred to as a Standard Tallow hearing after our
Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Tallow Corp. v.
Jowdy, supra, 190 Conn. 48, which held, in part, that
whenever resolution of disputed “issues of fact are nec-
essary to the determination of a court’s jurisdiction,
due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in
which an opportunity is provided to present evidence
and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.” Id., 56. “[I]t
is the plaintiff’s burden both to request an evidentiary
hearing and to present evidence that establishes disputed
factual allegations in support of an evidentiary hear-
ing,” and, if the plaintiff fails to do either, the court
properly may decide the motion to dismiss on the basis
of the pleadings and any affidavits provided. Walshon v.
Ballon Stoll Bader & Nadler, P.C., 121 Conn. App. 366,
371, 996 A.2d 1195 (2010). “We review the denial of a
request for an evidentiary hearing under the abuse of
discretion standard.” St. Denis-Lima v. St. Denis, 190
Conn. App. 296, 303, 212 A.3d 242, cert. denied, 333
Conn. 910, 215 A.3d 734 (2019).
In his motion seeking an evidentiary hearing, the plain-
tiff stated that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to
resolve properly whether (1) with respect to count one,
the defendants had “reached into this jurisdiction” in
such a fashion as to trigger § 52-59b, the state’s long arm
statute, and (2) with respect to the remaining counts,
whether Advance had committed one of the alleged torts
against the plaintiff “from without the state” using
computers and computer networks or whether Advance
expected or reasonably should have expected its actions
to have consequences in Connecticut. The plaintiff did
not argue in any respect that any disputed facts existed
pertaining to whether he had a direct and personal inter-
est in the litigation and, thus, had standing to bring the
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

action.7 Moreover, as the defendant Fundworks aptly
argues in its brief with respect to count one of the com-
plaint, the complaint was “completely and utterly devoid
of any factual allegations that the trial court could rea-
sonably view as a claim of harm suffered by the plaintiff
. . . at the hands of [the defendants] . . . [and] [a]bsent a
pleading stating a claim of actual harm, there [was] no
basis for a Standard Tallow hearing to occur.”
It bears repeating that the trial court strictly limited its
ruling on the motions to dismiss to the issue of whether
the plaintiff was the proper party to assert the claims
alleged in the complaint. The court did not reach the
defendants’ additional arguments regarding choice of
law, improper venue, or whether the court had personal
jurisdiction over the defendants under the applicable
long arm statute. Because the plaintiff never claimed
before the trial court that any disputed issues of fact
needed to be resolved with respect to whether he was a
proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the disputes
alleged in the complaint, we cannot conclude that the
court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff’s
request for an evidentiary hearing.
II
The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly con-
cluded that the plaintiff, who is a guarantor of Central’s
obligations under its contracts with the defendants but
not a party to those contracts, lacked standing to bring
the underlying action. Although we conclude that the
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he has standing
to pursue the declaratory relief sought in count one of
the complaint, we agree that he has alleged facts demon-
strating some potential personal interest in the causes
of action brought against Advance as alleged in counts
two, three, and four of the operative complaint. Accord-
ingly, the court should not have dismissed those counts
on standing grounds.
7
In his appellant’s brief, the plaintiff himself describes his motion
for an evidentiary hearing as having sought “to address the issues of
whether the defendants acted tortiously in this state.”
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

A
We first address whether the plaintiff had standing
to prosecute count one of the complaint, which sought
a declaratory judgment. We agree with the trial court
that he does not.
“It is a basic principle of our law . . . that the [plaintiff]
must have standing in order for a court to have jurisdic-
tion to render a declaratory judgment. . . . A party pursu-
ing declaratory relief must therefore demonstrate, as in
ordinary actions, a justiciable right in the controversy
sought to be resolved, that is, contract, property or per-
sonal rights . . . as such will be affected by the [court’s]
decision . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) North Branford Citizens Against Bulk
Propane Storage v. North Branford, supra, 230 Conn.
App. 342. “When standing is put in issue, the question
is whether the person whose standing is challenged is
a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue
. . . . Standing requires no more than a colorable claim
of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes . . . standing
by allegations of injury. Similarly, standing exists to
attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests. . . .
Standing is established by showing that the party claim-
ing it is authorized . . . to bring an action . . . .” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) World Business Lenders, LLC
v. 526-528 North Main Street, LLC, 197 Conn. App.
269, 274, 231 A.3d 386 (2020). “[I]f the injuries claimed
by the plaintiff are remote, indirect or derivative with
respect to the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff is not
the proper party to assert them and lacks standing to do
so. Where, for example, the harms asserted to have been
suffered directly by a plaintiff are in reality derivative
of injuries to a third party, the injuries are not direct but
are indirect, and the plaintiff has no standing to assert
them.” Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313,
347–48, 780 A.2d 98 (2001).
In the present case, count one of the complaint seeks
a declaration as to each defendant that no sums are due
and owing from Central under the parties’ contracts and
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

no executions of any judgments obtained against Cen-
tral may issue in Connecticut until Central receives the
funds it contends it is due from Amazon. In other words,
the request for declaratory relief arises entirely out of
the contracts between Central and the defendants. It is
undisputed that the plaintiff in his individual capacity
is not a party to those contracts. Although the plaintiff
is an individual guarantor of Central’s performance
obligations, as the trial court determined, that status
is not enough to confer standing on the plaintiff in his
individual capacity to prosecute claims arising out of
the contracts. “A guarantee . . . is a contract, in which
a party, sometimes referred to as a secondary obligor,
contracts to fulfill an obligation upon the default of the
principal obligor. . . . Our Supreme Court has recognized
the general principle that a guarantee agreement is a
separate and distinct obligation from that of the . . . other
obligation. . . . [A] guarantor’s liability does not arise
from the . . . other obligation secured by the [principal
obligor’s contract]; rather, it flows from the separate
and distinct obligation incurred under the guarantee
contract.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) World
Business Lenders, LLC v. 526-528 North Main Street,
LLC, supra, 197 Conn. App. 275.
Moreover, although the plaintiff is the owner and
principal of Central, he filed this action solely in his own
name, i.e., in his individual capacity. Corporations are
separate and distinct legal entities; see Commissioner
of Environmental Protection v. State Five Industrial
Park, Inc., 304 Conn. 128, 139, 37 A.3d 724 (2012); and,
because the plaintiff is not an attorney, he cannot repre-
sent Central in this action. See Expressway Associates
II v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp. of Connecticut, 34 Conn.
App. 543, 546–47, 642 A.2d 62 (“A corporation may
not appear by an officer of the corporation who is not an
attorney. . . . This is so, despite the fact that the officer
may be the principal shareholder of that corporation.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)),
cert. denied, 230 Conn. 915, 645 A.2d 1018 (1994).
Furthermore, it is well established that a shareholder
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

may not bring an action in his individual capacity seek-
ing to recover for an injury to the corporation. See May
v. Coffey, 291 Conn. 106, 115, 967 A.2d 495 (2009)
(“[a] shareholder—even the sole shareholder—does not
have standing to assert claims alleging wrongs to the
corporation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
plaintiff has offered no explanation why he did not have
the present action brought on behalf of Central rather
than commencing it in his name.
On the basis of our review of the record and briefs, we
conclude that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that
he is the proper party to request the declaratory relief
sought in count one of the complaint. Accordingly, the
court properly dismissed the action as to all defendants
with respect to count one.
B
We next consider whether the plaintiff had standing
to pursue counts two, three and four of the complaint,
which were directed only against Advance. We agree
with the plaintiff that the allegations made in support
of these counts demonstrate that the plaintiff arguably
has some direct and personal interest in these causes of
action. Accordingly, we conclude that the court improp-
erly dismissed counts two, three and four on standing
grounds.
As previously stated, counts two, three, and four of the
complaint are directed against Advance only, and sound
in, respectively, tortious interference with business
expectancies, negligent misrepresentation, and a viola-
tion of CUTPA. Among the factual allegations that the
plaintiff makes in support of these counts is that Advance
took unauthorized or illegal actions that resulted in the
freezing of his personal PayPal account. In other words,
the plaintiff alleges that he was directly and personally
injured by Advance’s actions. We note that Advance
did not file an appellee’s brief on appeal disputing the
plaintiff’s arguments regarding his standing to pursue
the counts directed solely against it. Assuming, as we
Ligeri v. White Road Capital, LLC, Series 168814

must, that the plaintiff’s allegations are true, Advance
interfered with the plaintiff’s personal finances related
to running his business. Accordingly, we are convinced
that the plaintiff has made a colorable claim of direct
injuries to himself individually and that the allegations
are sufficient to demonstrate standing to prosecute the
counts of the complaint directed against Advance alone.8
See Bernblum v. Grove Collaborative, LLC, 211 Conn.
App. 742, 760–61, 761 n.13, 274 A.3d 165 (holding
plaintiff business owner lacked standing in individual
capacity to prosecute counts related to contracts in which
his business, but not himself individually, was party, but
plaintiff’s allegations in complaint posed colorable claim
of direct injuries to plaintiff individually sufficient to
withstand standing challenge with respect to certain
tort counts), cert. denied, 343 Conn. 925, 275 A.3d 626
(2022). Accordingly, we conclude that the court improp-
erly granted Advance’s motion to dismiss with respect
to counts two, three and four of the complaint.
The judgment is reversed with respect to counts two,
three, and four of the operative complaint and the case
is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with
law on those counts; the judgment is affirmed in all other
respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

8
Our conclusion regarding standing should not be misconstrued as
taking any position regarding the relative merits of these counts includ-
ing whether, as a whole, the allegations state a claim on which relief
may be granted.