State v. Lopez

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State v. Lopez

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSE
ANTONIO LOPEZ
(AC 48118)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Moll, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of various crimes, including assault of public
safety personnel, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed that the
trial court improperly violated his right to self-representation under the sixth
amendment to the United States constitution when it denied his motion to
represent himself. Held:

The trial court did not violate the defendant’s right to self-representation
in denying his motion, as the defendant’s request during the hearing on
the motion was not clear and unequivocal because he vacillated between
his request for self-representation and for new counsel, his statements to
the court were intertwined with various requests that were unrelated to or
contradictory to his motion, and the hearing culminated in the defendant
agreeing to proceed with new counsel.

Argued November 17, 2025—officially released January 20, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information in two cases charging the
defendant, in the first case, with two counts of the crime
of assault of public safety personnel and with one count of
the crime of assault in the first degree, and in the second
case with the crime of evasion of responsibility in the
operation of a motor vehicle, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, geographical
area number fourteen, and transferred to the judicial
district of New Britain; thereafter, the court, Keegan,
J., denied the defendant’s motion to proceed in a self-
represented capacity; subsequently, the cases were tried
to the jury before Pelosi, J.; verdicts and judgments of
guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (defendant).
State v. Lopez

Myah Bassett, certified legal intern, with whom were
Meryl R. Gersz, assistant state’s attorney, and, on the
brief, Christian A. Watson, state’s attorney, and David
Clifton, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appel-
lee (state).

Opinion

ELGO, J. The defendant, Jose Antonio Lopez, appeals
from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury
trial, of one count of assault in the first degree in viola-
tion of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1),1 two counts of
assault of public safety personnel in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1),2 and one count of eva-
sion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle
in violation of General Statutes § 14-224 (b) (1).3 On
appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improp-
erly violated his right to self-representation under the
sixth amendment to the United States constitution.4
We disagree and affirm the judgments of the court.
1
General Statutes § 53a-59 provides in relevant part: “(a) A person
is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause
serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such
person . . . .”
2
General Statutes § 53a-167c provides in relevant part: “(a) A person
is guilty of assault of public safety . . . personnel when, with intent to
prevent a reasonably identifiable [public safety personnel] from perform-
ing his or her duties, and while such [public safety personnel] is acting
in the performance of his or her duties, (1) such person causes physical
injury to such [public safety personnel] . . . .”
3
General Statutes § 14-224 provides in relevant part: “(b) (1) Each
operator of a motor vehicle who is knowingly involved in an accident
which causes serious physical injury . . . to any other person shall at
once stop and render such assistance as may be needed and shall give
such operator’s name, address and operator’s license number and regis-
tration to the person injured or to any officer or witness to the serious
physical injury to person. . . .”
4
The defendant also claims that he did not waive his right to self-
representation by proceeding to trial with newly appointed counsel and
that the court’s denial of his right to self-representation constituted
structural error. In light of our conclusion that the defendant did not
clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self-representation, we
need not address those alternative claims. See State v. Benson, 235
Conn. App. 594, 602 n.12, 346 A.3d 55 (2025).
State v. Lopez

The facts underlying the defendant’s arrest are not in
dispute. On March 2, 2020, the defendant entered the
Superior Court in Manchester in response to an arrest
warrant for violation of probation for crimes unrelated to
this appeal. Judicial Marshal Michael West directed the
defendant to wait outside the probation intake office win-
dow for his probation officer. West turned away briefly,
and the defendant exited the courthouse through an emer-
gency exit. West and another judicial marshal, Martin
Brown, followed the defendant to the parking lot. The
defendant entered and started his vehicle and was sitting
in the driver’s seat when West approached. West spoke
with the defendant and encouraged him to return to the
court to speak with a probation officer. The defendant
ignored him and drove away, striking both West and
Brown with his vehicle. The defendant subsequently was
arrested and charged with one count of assault in the first
degree, two counts of assault of public safety personnel,
and one count of evading responsibility in the operation
of a motor vehicle.
On August 5, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to
proceed in a self-represented capacity. On September 17,
2021, the court held a hearing regarding the defendant’s
motion. At the hearing, defense counsel stated, “[the
defendant] simply wants to represent himself. He wants
me to act as a standby counsel.” After a brief discussion,
the court ultimately rescheduled the hearing because
the prosecutor assigned to the case was unavailable. On
September 30, 2021, the court held a hearing regarding
the defendant’s motion. At the hearing, Attorney Den-
nis McMahon represented the defendant and Attorney
Christian Watson represented the state. The following
colloquy occurred:
“The Court: . . . The first thing I need to know from
you . . . is whether or not you understand that you have
State v. Lopez

a constitutional right to be represented in these cases by
an attorney?
“The Defendant: I do, Your Honor.
“The Court: And you are telling me today [that] you
want to represent yourself. Is that correct?
“The Defendant: Yes. And if you could allow me to
explain why briefly, Your Honor?
“The Court: Actually, what I have to do is ask you a
series of questions and hopefully that will become appar-
ent during this series of questions. All right?
“The Defendant: Okay.
“The Court: Thank you.
“The Defendant: Your Honor, I believe I have addi-
tional questions related to the case. I’m pretty much sure
will not intervene with your professionalism as a judge.
“The Court: I’m a little confused. I’m not sure what
you are saying.
“The Defendant: I have questions that—obviously,
I know you are not allowed to give me legal advice, and
not pertaining to any legal advice.
“The Court: That’s correct.
“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, before we continue
on, as I’m still his attorney, my firm advised him not to
discuss.
“The Defendant: No. I don’t want you as my attorney
anymore. I don’t even want you as my standby counsel
anymore.”
The court then asked the defendant a series of questions
regarding his education, background and trial experi-
ence, the charges he faced, the maximum penalties, and
the state’s burden of proof. The defendant answered all
the questions and stated that he understood the charges,
penalties, and the state’s burden of proof. The defen-
dant added that the charges were based on statements
State v. Lopez

he made to detectives during their investigation. The
court continued:
“The Court: . . . [W]e are really getting off the path
that we need to be on right now. So, if you could just
stick with me. . . . [D]uring a trial, there are motions that
are going to be filed. And there are going to be motions
that if you don’t handle them properly, you could have
adverse consequences. . . . Just because you represent
yourself doesn’t mean the judge . . . tells you what to
do. Do you understand that?
“The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor. But if I could get
a new attorney appointed . . . to me then that would
resolve the issue.
“The Court: Wait a minute. I thought you wanted to
represent yourself. Now you are telling me this is . . .
just about you want[ing] a new attorney?
“The Defendant: Okay. I’ll stick to representing myself,
Your Honor. I’ll stick to that. I mean, it makes sense.
The case is based on what I told the detectives during
the investigation. Now, if I was a juror in this case—
“The Court: . . . [N]obody gets the chance to be a juror
on their own case.”
The defendant clarified that he would like to speak on
his own behalf at trial to explain certain self-incrimi-
nating statements he made to the police detectives, and
not have those statements be explained through defense
counsel. The court said that the defendant could do so
by testifying at his own trial, which did not require him
to represent himself. The defendant responded that he
would not like to take the stand at trial, as he worried
that the prosecution would attack his credibility.
The court continued its canvass, questioning whether
the defendant was familiar with the rules of procedure
and evidence that govern criminal cases. The defendant
explained that he was familiar with both procedural and
evidentiary rules through reading the Connecticut Prac-
tice Book and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court
State v. Lopez

noted that the federal rules were not applicable in state
court, and the defendant stated that the federal rules
gave him “a general idea.” The court then continued its
canvass:
“The Court: All right. That’s what you think. Okay. Do
you understand that the rules of procedure and the rules
of evidence apply even when the defendant represents
himself without the assistance of counsel?
“The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
“The Court: Do you understand that the court cannot
give you legal advice in conducting your defense?
“The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
“The Court: Do you understand that what you say and
do during a trial can affect the outcome of an appeal or
other postconviction remedy in the event that you are
found guilty?
“The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
“The Court: Do you understand that a competent,
trained attorney possesses the skill and training to defend
and protect your rights, to address the issues, to under-
stand the strengths and weaknesses in the prosecution’s
case, to make the appropriate objections to evidence,
and to preserve the record in the event of conviction for
purposes of appeal and otherwise?
“The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
“The Court: Do you feel . . . that you have the training,
experience, and skill?
“The Defendant: Your Honor, I would agree that an
attorney in any event on any day can do a far better job
than I can. But what do you do when you are appointed
counsel that’s already conflicted and has a conflict of
interest that you are guilty? . . .
“The Court: Okay. Then what you do is you come to
the court, and you say, I’m having a conflict with my
State v. Lopez

attorney. And then the court determines whether or not
another attorney should be appointed for you. Have you
ever had another attorney before Mr. McMahon?
“The Defendant: I have not, Your Honor.
“The Court: Do you maybe want to file a new motion?
Do you really want to represent yourself? This is not a
game. You could face ninety years [of incarceration]. Do
you really want to represent yourself or do you want to
work with another attorney?
“The Defendant: I’m going to work with another attor-
ney.
“The Court: Then tell me that up front . . . .”
The court then explained to the defendant that he may
not like what his new attorney has to say and encour-
aged the defendant to sit with his new attorney’s advice
regarding the strength of his case and trial strategy. The
court asked whether McMahon believed the attorney-cli-
ent relationship had broken down, and McMahon said he
would defer to the court’s decision on whether to assign
the defendant new counsel. The defendant asked whether
he had a right to obtain copies of the documents in his
case, to which the court responded that he had a right
to review them with his attorney. When the defendant
then asked about his right to a speedy trial, the following
colloquy occurred:
“The Court: Do you think your brand new attorney is
going to want to do a speedy trial? I mean, I know you
want to. But do you think a brand new attorney who
doesn’t know anything about your case is going to want
to do a speedy trial? And yes, we are doing trials.
“The Defendant: Speedy trials?
“The Court: Oh, yes, sir.
State v. Lopez

“The Defendant: Okay. So, I would like to represent
myself and go to speedy trial.
“The Court: No. No. No. No. This is not a Chinese menu
that you pick and choose what you want. You told me you
wanted a new attorney. I’m getting a new attorney. You
want a speedy trial, you could stick with [defense coun-
sel]. He knows your case. But based on what I’ve heard,
you do not have the competence and the training and
experience to represent yourself in a criminal case with
these serious charges. You do not. So, I am not going to
let you represent yourself. I am denying that motion. . . .
“The Defendant: So, what have I said or done to make
you feel . . . that I am not competent to represent myself?
“The Court: Because you don’t possess the legal train-
ing and experience. You’ve never been in a trial before.
You don’t know anything about trials.
“The Defendant: I know how it goes. I go. The prosecu-
tion goes.
“The Court: No, it’s not that easy . . . . All right. . . .
[I]t’s now ten after eleven. I have a roomful of people here.
I’ve denied your motion to self-represent. I’ve asked all
of the questions. Now, if you want a new attorney, I’m
happy to appoint you a new attorney. If you want to stay
with [defense counsel], Attorney McMahon will continue
to work with you if that’s what you want: a speedy trial.
“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I do believe now that
it’s probably [for] the best if he does get another attorney.
“The Court: Okay. All right. Very good.
“The Defendant: Why can I not get a speedy trial, Your
Honor? Why can I not?
“The Court: First of all, you don’t have an attorney.
I need to appoint you an attorney. Second of all, that
attorney is going to need time to get up to speed on your
files to be able to understand the nature of the evidence
State v. Lopez

against you, to talk with you, to do whatever investiga-
tion you want done.
“The Defendant: That sounds reasonable. That sounds
reasonable giving it a second thought.
“The Court: Thank you.”
The court denied the defendant’s motion to proceed
in a self-represented capacity. The defendant then pro-
ceeded to trial with his new attorney and the defendant
“neither made additional requests to represent himself
nor expressed any dissatisfaction with his new attorney.”
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted on
all counts. On April 17, 2024, the court sentenced the
defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty-five
years of incarceration, five of them mandatory, and five
years of special parole. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims the court deprived
him of his right to self-representation when it denied
his clear and unequivocal request to represent himself.
Because we conclude that the defendant’s request was
not clear and unequivocal, we disagree.
The sixth amendment, as made applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States constitution, provides in rele-
vant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense.” U.S. Const., amend. VI. “[T]he sixth amend-
ment embodies a right to self-representation and that a
defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional
right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily
and intelligently elects to do so.” (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Flanagan,
293 Conn. 406, 417, 978 A.2d 64 (2009).
“It is well established that [t]he right to counsel and the
right to self-representation present mutually exclusive
alternatives. A criminal defendant has a constitution-
ally protected interest in each, but since the two rights
cannot be exercised simultaneously, a defendant must
State v. Lopez

choose between them. When the right to have compe-
tent counsel ceases as the result of a sufficient waiver,
the right of self-representation begins. . . . Put another
way, a defendant properly exercises his right to self-
representation by knowingly and intelligently waiving
his right to representation by counsel. . . .
“State and federal courts consistently have discussed
the right to self-representation in terms of invoking or
asserting it . . . and have concluded that there can be
no infringement of the right to self-representation in
the absence of a defendant’s proper assertion of that
right. . . . The threshold requirement that the defendant
clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to proceed
[as a self-represented party] is one of many safeguards
of the fundamental right to counsel. . . . Accordingly,
[t]he constitutional right of self-representation depends
. . . upon its invocation by the defendant in a clear and
unequivocal manner. . . . In the absence of a clear and
unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation,
a trial court has no independent obligation to inquire
into the defendant’s interest in representing himself
. . . . Conversely, once there has been an unequivocal
request for self-representation, a court must under-
take an inquiry [pursuant to Practice Book § 44-3], on
the record, to inform the defendant of the risks of self-
representation and to permit him to make a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. . . . The inquiry
mandated by . . . § 44-3 is designed to ensure the knowing
and intelligent waiver of counsel that constitutionally is
required.” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Trice, 235 Conn. App. 203, 241–42,
345 A.3d 433, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 927, 346 A.3d
512 (2025).
“Although a clear and unequivocal request is required,
there is no standard form it must take. [A] defendant
does not need to recite some talismanic formula hoping
to open the eyes and ears of the court to [that] request.
Insofar as the desire to proceed [as a self-represented
party] is concerned, [a defendant] must do no more than
State v. Lopez

state his request, either orally or in writing, unambigu-
ously to the court so that no reasonable person can say
that the request was not made. . . . Moreover, it is gen-
erally incumbent upon the courts to elicit that elevated
degree of clarity through a detailed inquiry. That is, the
triggering statement in a defendant’s attempt to waive
his right to counsel need not be punctilious; rather, the
dialogue between the court and the defendant must result
in a clear and unequivocal statement. . . .
“Finally, in conducting our review, we are cognizant
that the context of [a] reference to self-representation is
important in determining whether the reference itself
was a clear invocation of the right to self-representation.
. . . The inquiry is fact intensive and should be based
on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
request . . . which may include, inter alia, whether the
request was for hybrid representation . . . or merely for
the appointment of standby or advisory counsel . . . the
trial court’s response to a request . . . whether a defendant
has consistently vacillated in his request . . . and whether
a request is the result of an emotional outburst . . . .
“When a defendant’s assertion of the right to self-
representation is not clear and unequivocal, recognition
of the right becomes a matter entrusted to the exercise
of discretion by the trial court. . . . In the exercise of that
discretion, the trial court must weigh into the balance
its obligation to indulge in every reasonable presump-
tion against waiver of the right to counsel.” (Citation
omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Paschal, 207 Conn. App. 328, 334–35,
262 A.3d 893, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 902, 263 A.3d 387
(2021), cert. denied, U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 1395, 212 L.
Ed. 2d 341 (2022).
The defendant asserted his right to self-representation
in both his August 5, 2021 motion and at the begin-
ning of the hearing on that motion. During the court’s
canvass of the defendant, however, he vacillated on
this request numerous times. He first vacillated when,
in response to the court’s question, he said that a new
State v. Lopez

attorney would resolve his issue. The court paused its
canvass and questioned whether he wanted to represent
himself or whether he wanted a new attorney, and the
defendant vacillated again and said that he would proceed
in a self-represented capacity. The court continued its
canvass, and the defendant admitted that an attorney
would be better equipped to handle his trial. He then
stated that he would “work with another attorney.” The
defendant vacillated twice more, asserting his right to
self-representation and, finally, agreeing to have new
counsel appointed.
The defendant also intertwined his statements concern-
ing self-representation with other requests. Notably,
the defendant seemed to conflate his right to self-repre-
sentation with the right to testify on his own behalf at
trial. The defendant, likewise, intertwined his right to
self-representation with his right to a speedy trial. At
the hearing regarding his right to self-representation,
he also requested that he be able to review all the docu-
ments regarding his criminal trial.
It is clear from our careful review of the transcript
of the September 30, 2021 hearing that the defendant
vacillated between his request for self-representation and
for new counsel approximately five times. At the end of
that hearing, the defendant agreed to proceed with new
counsel and agreed with the court that the decision was
“reasonable.” Furthermore, the defendant’s statements
concerning self-representation were intertwined with
various requests that were unrelated or contradictory,
including a request for new counsel, a request to testify
on his own behalf, a request for speedy trial, and a request
to review documents relating to his criminal trial. Thus,
on the basis of our careful review of the entire dialogue
between the court and the defendant, we conclude that
the defendant did not clearly and unequivocally assert
his right to self-representation. See State v. Paschal,
supra, 207 Conn. App. 341 (concluding that defendant’s
intertwined requests concerning self-representation and
new counsel did not constitute clear and unequivocal
State v. Lopez

assertion of right to self-representation); Quint v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 99 Conn. App. 395, 404–405,
913 A.2d 1120 (2007) (defendant’s “vacillation between
the options of proceeding [as a self-represented party] or
with counsel” does not “constitute a clear and unequivo-
cal invocation of the right to self-representation”).
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.