State v. Velazquez

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State v. Velazquez

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.
STANLEY VELAZQUEZ
(AC 47335)
Cradle, C. J., and Westbrook and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crimes of
possession with intent to sell more than one ounce of heroin, possession with
intent to sell more than one-half ounce of cocaine, and criminal possession of
a firearm, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the trial court improperly
denied his motion to suppress certain evidence because the search warrant
application and affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the search of
his apartment and the seizure of property therein. Held:
The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, as the
search warrant affidavit set forth information given to the affiant police
officers by a confidential informant that provided substantial evidence from
which the issuing judge could have determined, on the basis of the totality
of the circumstances, that a finding of probable cause was warranted.
There was nothing in the trial court’s decision denying the motion to sup-
press that indicated that it improperly considered evidence outside the four
corners of the search warrant, as, despite the defendant’s claim, there was
no indication that the court considered the testimony of one of the affiant
police officers in determining whether the warrant established probable cause.

Argued October 10, 2025—officially released January 13, 2026

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crimes
of possession with intent to sell more than one ounce of
heroin, possession with intent to sell more than one-half
ounce of cocaine, and criminal possession of a firearm,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Fairfield, geographical area number two, where the
court, E. Richards, J., denied the defendant’s motion
to suppress certain evidence; thereafter, the defendant
was presented to the court, Dayton, J., on a conditional
plea of nolo contendere; judgment of guilty in accordance
with the plea, from which the defendant appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
John R. Gulash, with whom was Alec C. Gulash, for
the appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state’s
State v. Velazquez

attorney, and C. Robert Satti, Jr., former supervisory
assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. Following a conditional plea of nolo con-
tendere, entered pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a,1
the defendant, Stanley Velazquez, appeals from the
judgment of conviction of possession with intent to sell
more than one ounce of heroin in violation of General
Statutes § 21a-278 (a) (1) (A) (i), possession with intent
to sell more than one-half ounce of cocaine in violation
of § 21a-278 (a) (1) (A) (ii), and criminal possession of a
firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2019)
§ 53a-217 (a) (1). The defendant entered his conditional
plea after the court denied his motion to suppress evi-
dence seized following the execution of a search warrant
at an apartment in which he resided. On appeal, the
defendant claims that the court improperly denied his
motion to suppress because the search warrant applica-
tion and affidavit failed to establish probable cause for
the search of his apartment and the seizure of property
therein. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On July 2,
2019, Officers Michael Paoletti and Doug Bepko (affiants)
of the Bridgeport Police Department submitted an appli-
cation for a search warrant, including a supporting affi-
davit, requesting authorization to search the defendant’s
residence in Stratford for firearms and ammunition.
The first two paragraphs of the accompanying affidavit
1
General Statutes § 54-94a provides in relevant part: “When a defen-
dant, prior to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere
conditional on the right to take an appeal from the court’s denial of the
defendant’s motion to suppress . . . the defendant after the imposi-
tion of sentence may file an appeal within the time prescribed by law
provided a trial court has determined that a ruling on such motion to
suppress . . . would be dispositive of the case. The issue to be considered
in such an appeal shall be limited to whether it was proper for the court
to have denied the motion to suppress . . . . A plea of nolo contendere
by a defendant under this section shall not constitute a waiver by the
defendant of nonjurisdictional defects in the criminal prosecution.”
State v. Velazquez

identify the affiants and recite their professional quali-
fications. In the affidavit, the affiants averred: “Dur-
ing the month[s] of June and July, 2019 . . . Paoletti
received information from a confidential informant
. . . who purported to have personal knowledge that an
associate of his, known to the [confidential informant]
as Frankie [also known as (aka)] ‘King Polo,’ was selling
quantities of cocaine from his [second] floor residence,
located at 2136 Barnum Ave[nue] [in] Stratford . . . . The
[confidential informant] further advised that Frankie aka
‘King Polo’ would drive to and from his residence, mak-
ing drug/narcotics deliveries to his customers in a gray
Ford F-150 bearing [Connecticut] registration AL-01506
along with a white Lexus within the city of Bridgeport.
Furthermore, Frankie aka ‘King Polo’ is known to carry
a firearm on his person, along with storing a quantity of
cocaine on his person. The [confidential informant] knows
of this information from having purchased narcotics
from Frankie aka ‘King Polo’ within the past year. This
[confidential informant] has provided drug information
in the past, which has been corroborated and found to be
true accurate [and] credible and furthermore has led to
multiple arrests and the seizure of narcotics, and drug
proceeds.
“A mugshot photograph from the files of the Bridge-
port Police Department of [the defendant] was obtained
and shown to the [confidential informant] for identifica-
tion purposes. The [confidential informant] viewed the
photograph and positively identified the male in the
photograph as the same person known to him/her as
Frankie aka ‘King Polo.’ . . .
“Within thirty days of authoring said affidavit . . .
Paoletti received further information from the [confi-
dential informant] that [the defendant] was physically
observed in possession of one firearm located within
his residence at 2136 Barnum Ave[nue], [second] floor
apartment, in Stratford . . . . The [confidential infor-
mant] further advised that [the defendant] resides at
this location and stores his firearm within his bedroom
State v. Velazquez

which is the second floor bedroom, left hand side as one
enters through the kitchen. The [confidential informant]
described the firearm as follows: Firearm #1: black semi-
auto firearm.
“A criminal background check for [the defendant]
revealed that he is a convicted felon . . . having been
charged and convicted of [a]ssault in the [f]irst [d]egree,
[a]ssault in the [s]econd [d]egree, [s]ale of [i]llegal drugs,
[s]ale of [n]arcotics, [v]iolation of probation, [f]ailure to
appear in the first degree, [p]ossession of [n]arcotics and
[c]arrying a pistol without a permit. . . .
“2136 Barnum Ave[nue], [second] floor apartment,
Stratford . . . is described as a tan with white trim, mul-
tifamily residence located on Barnum Ave[nue] between
Otis Street and Light Street. The [second] floor apart-
ment is located on the [second] floor and accessed from
steps leading to the lone entry door, which leads inside
a common way. The [second] floor apartment is accessed
within the common area.” The search and seizure warrant
was signed by a judge of the Superior Court the same day.
The police executed the warrant on July 3, 2019, and
seized, inter alia, four loaded firearms, ammunition, nar-
cotics and narcotics paraphernalia. The state thereafter
charged the defendant by way of a long form informa-
tion with possession with intent to sell more than one
ounce of heroin in violation of § 21a-278 (a) (1) (A) (i),
possession with intent to sell more than one-half ounce
of cocaine in violation of § 21a-278 (a) (1) (A) (ii), and
criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General
Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-217 (a) (1).
On October 20, 2020, the defendant filed a motion
to suppress all evidence seized during the search of his
residence on July 3, 2019, on the ground that the search
warrant application “failed to establish a sufficient basis
for probable cause within the ‘four corners’ of the search
warrant . . . .” Specifically, the defendant argued, inter
alia, that “[t]he affidavit in support of the application
for the search warrant is wholly devoid of the legally
State v. Velazquez

required basis of the [confidential] informant’s knowl-
edge of the information regarding [the] alleged posses-
sion of a weapon by the defendant . . . .” On November
13, 2020, the court, E. Richards, J., held an evidentiary
hearing regarding the defendant’s standing to challenge
the search and also heard oral argument on the motion
to suppress.
On November 18, 2020, the court issued a memo-
randum of decision wherein it first concluded that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the residence at 2136 Barnum Avenue and, therefore,
had standing to contest the search warrant. The court
next addressed the merits of the motion to suppress. The
court began its analysis by “examining the veracity of the
[confidential informant] as articulated within the four
corners of the warrant.” The court recounted that the
affiants averred that “the [confidential informant] had
been used in the past and had provided information which
had led to [the] arrests of those involved.” The court
explained that “information from the Bridgeport police
that the [confidential informant] had provided reliable
information in the past that had led to multiple arrests
is an important factor in establishing the confidential
informant’s reliability.” The court further explained
that “the warrant affidavit provided that the [confiden-
tial informant] had seen the defendant in possession of
a firearm in the apartment within a month prior to the
. . . signing [of the warrant].” The court noted that the
confidential informant identified the specific type of
firearm that the defendant kept, where the defendant
stored it, provided the floor plan to the premises on
Barnum Avenue and directed the affiants as to how to
reach the defendant’s bedroom. The court found that,
“[i]n this regard, the [confidential informant], who has
an intimate knowledge of the defendant’s floor plan, indi-
cates [that] he had personally purchased narcotics from
the defendant in the past and had seen the defendant in
possession of a semiautomatic pistol within thirty days
of the . . . signing [of the warrant]. This information is
enough for the issuing [judge] to reasonably infer that
State v. Velazquez

the confidential informant was a close associate of the
defendant. In addition, the information that the [confi-
dential informant] purchased narcotics from the defen-
dant in the past, is a declaration against penal interest
which would further boost the reliability and veracity
of the [confidential informant] in the eyes of the issuing
[judge].” The court found that “the information sup-
plied by the confidential informant that he had seen the
defendant, who is a convicted felon, physically possess a
firearm provided a substantial factual basis from which
the issuing [judge] reasonably could have inferred that
a firearm would be found at the apartment.” The court
therefore concluded that “the information provided in
the [search warrant] affidavit, considering the totality
of the circumstances contained therein, establishe[d]
probable cause to search the defendant’s apartment.”
Accordingly, the court denied the motion to suppress.
The court, Dayton, J., thereafter made a finding that
the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress was
dispositive of the case, and the defendant entered a writ-
ten, conditional plea of nolo contendere to possession
with intent to sell more than one ounce of heroin in vio-
lation of § 21a-278 (a) (1) (A) (i), possession with intent
to sell more than one-half ounce of cocaine in violation
of § 21a-278 (a) (1) (A) (ii), and criminal possession of a
firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2019)
§ 53a-217 (a) (1), conditioned on his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress. In accordance with
the plea agreement, the defendant was sentenced to a
total effective sentence of twenty years of incarceration,
execution suspended after ten years, followed by five
years of probation. This appeal followed.
The defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the court
improperly denied his motion to suppress because the
information provided in the search warrant affidavit
was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search
of the residence. The following legal principles govern
our resolution of this claim. “When reviewing the trial
court’s denial of a motion to suppress, the standard of
State v. Velazquez

review to be applied depends on whether the challenge
asserted on appeal is to the factual basis of the trial
court’s decision or to its legal conclusions. . . . Where . . .
the trial court has drawn conclusions of law, our review
is plenary, and we must decide whether those conclusions
are legally and logically correct in light of the findings
of fact. . . . Whether the trial court properly found that
the facts submitted were enough to support a finding of
probable cause is a question of law. . . . Accordingly, [o]ur
review of the question of whether an affidavit in support
of an application for a search [and seizure] warrant pro-
vides probable cause for the issuance of the warrant is
plenary. . . . Because this issue implicates a defendant’s
constitutional rights . . . we engage in a careful exami-
nation of the record to ensure that the court’s decision
was supported by substantial evidence. . . .
“Both the fourth amendment to the United States
constitution and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut
constitution prescribe that a search warrant shall issue
only upon a showing of probable cause. Probable cause to
search exists if . . . (1) there is probable cause to believe
that the particular items sought to be seized are con-
nected with criminal activity or will assist in a particular
apprehension or conviction . . . and (2) there is probable
cause to believe that the items sought to be seized will be
found in the place to be searched. . . . Although [p]roof
of probable cause requires less than proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence . . . [f]indings of probable cause
do not lend themselves to any uniform formula because
probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assess-
ment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules. . . . Consequently, [i]n determining the existence of
probable cause to search, the issuing [judge] assesses all
of the information set forth in the warrant affidavit and
should make a practical, nontechnical decision whether .
. . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place. . . . The
State v. Velazquez

determination of probable cause is reached by applying
a totality of the circumstances test. . . .
“[Our Supreme Court] has recognized that because of
our constitutional preference for a judicial determination
of probable cause, and mindful of the fact that [r]eason-
able minds may disagree as to whether a particular [set
of facts] establishes probable cause . . . we evaluate the
information contained in the affidavit in the light most
favorable to upholding the issuing judge’s probable cause
finding. . . . We therefore review the issuance of a war-
rant with deference to the reasonable inferences that the
issuing judge could have and did draw. . . . In evaluating
whether the warrant was predicated on probable cause,
a reviewing court may consider only the information
set forth in the four corners of the affidavit that was
presented to the issuing judge and the reasonable infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom. . . .
“If a search warrant affidavit is based on information
provided to the police by a confidential informant, the
issuing judge should examine the affidavit to determine
whether it adequately describes both the factual basis of
the informant’s knowledge and the basis on which the
police have determined that the information is reliable.
If the warrant affidavit fails to state in specific terms
how the informant gained his knowledge or why the
police believe the information to be trustworthy, how-
ever, the [judge] can also consider all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit to determine whether, despite
these deficiencies, other objective indicia of reliability
reasonably establish that probable cause to search exists.
In making this determination, the [judge] is entitled to
draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented. .
. . Therefore, although no single factor is dispositive,
the veracity or reliability and basis of knowledge of [the
informant] are highly relevant in the issuing judge’s
analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” (Citations
omitted; emphasis in original; footnotes omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hamilton, 232
State v. Velazquez

Conn. App. 809, 815–18, 337 A.3d 1152, cert. denied,
352 Conn. 958, 336 A.3d 1249 (2025).
The defendant asserts two arguments in support of his
challenge to the sufficiency of the warrant. He argues
that the search warrant affidavit did not contain suffi-
cient detail to establish probable cause and that the trial
court improperly went beyond the four corners of the
affidavit in assessing its sufficiency. We address each of
these arguments in turn with the foregoing principles
in mind.
I
The defendant first argues, as he did before the trial
court, that the search warrant affidavit does not con-
tain sufficient information to establish the basis for
the confidential informant’s knowledge regarding the
defendant’s possession of a firearm. He contends that
“[t]he affidavit in this case, devoid of any meaningful
detail, failed to provide [a] fundamental basis for credit-
ing the [confidential informant’s] tip or the [confidential
informant’s] basis of knowledge.” We disagree.
As noted herein, when considering the adequacy of a
probable cause determination, we employ a totality of
the circumstances test. Here, the confidential informant
was known to the affiants and had provided informa-
tion in the past that had led to arrests and convictions.
It is well settled that “an informant’s record of pro-
viding information that led to arrests and seizures of
contraband is sufficient to establish the reliability of
the informant.” State v. Smith, 257 Conn. 216, 224,
777 A.2d 182 (2001). The confidential informant also
admitted, against his or her penal interest, to purchasing
drugs from the defendant. The information provided by
the confidential informant as to the defendant’s illegal
activities of selling drugs and possessing weapons was
consistent with the defendant’s criminal history, as set
forth in the affidavit, of having been charged with the
illegal sale of narcotics and carrying a pistol without a
permit. These factors, especially taken together, provided
State v. Velazquez

strong evidence of the informant’s reliability. See State
v. Griffin, 339 Conn. 631, 647 n.9, 262 A.3d 44 (2021)
(recognizing that “declarations against penal interest by
the informant-declarant” and “the reputation and past
criminal behavior of the suspect” are two “of the most
common factors used to evaluate the reliability of an
informant’s tip” (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 873, 211 L. Ed. 2d
575 (2022). The confidential informant was an associate
of the defendant who had the opportunity to observe the
defendant’s illegal activities. The confidential informant
told Paoletti that he or she had purchased drugs from
the defendant and that the defendant was selling cocaine
from his residence. The confidential informant provided
a detailed description of the floor plan of the defendant’s
residence, indicating that the defendant’s bedroom was
on the second floor of the residence, on the “left hand
side as one enters through the kitchen.” Based on the
confidential informant’s familiarity with the layout of
the defendant’s residence, it was reasonable to infer that
he or she had been inside the residence. The confidential
informant also identified the specific type of firearm that
the defendant had in his possession.
The defendant argues that the statement in the affi-
davit indicating that the defendant “was physically
observed in possession of one firearm located within
his residence” could not reasonably be based on the con-
fidential informant’s personal knowledge or personal
observation because the statement was “exclusively in
the passive voice . . . .” Although the inference that the
confidential informant personally observed the defendant
with a firearm would have been better supported by an
affirmative statement by the affiants, “we do not require
affiants to invoke ‘formulaic phrases’ in a search warrant
affidavit.” State v. DeFusco, 224 Conn. 627, 644, 620
A.2d 746 (1993). Our Supreme Court has explained that
“we abjure applying hypertechnical, exacting scrutiny of
the grammar and usage in an affidavit in favor of a rea-
sonable interpretation of information set forth within the
four corners of the affidavit in the light most favorable
State v. Velazquez

to the issuing judge’s determination of probable cause.”
State v. Holley, 324 Conn. 344, 358 n.11, 152 A.3d 532
(2016). On the basis of all of the circumstances set forth
in the affidavit, particularly the confidential informant’s
familiarity with the defendant’s illegal activities and
the layout of his residence and his or her knowledge of
the specific type of firearm in the defendant’s posses-
sion, the issuing judge reasonably could have inferred
that the confidential informant physically observed the
defendant in possession of the firearm.2
Having reviewed the warrant affidavit in the light
most favorable to upholding the issuing judge’s probable
cause determination, we conclude that it established a
2
In support of his claim that the affiants’ use of the passive voice
rendered it unreasonable for the issuing judge to infer that the confi-
dential informant personally observed the defendant in possession of
a firearm, the defendant relies heavily on State v. Duntz, 223 Conn.
207, 613 A.2d 224 (1992). In Duntz, the affiants referred to “several
independent sources of information” and attributed to those sources
certain information. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 217.
The affiants also averred that “another source of information (since
the [victim’s] Homicide) who due to sincere fear of [the defendant]
would not document any information or provide testimony, but stated
to State Police Investigators that [the defendant] was observed in the
possession of a 9 MM Automatic Pistol.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 219. Our Supreme Court held that there was nothing in
the warrant affidavit that would allow the issuing judge reasonably to
infer that the police sources had personally observed the defendant in
possession of a firearm or to indicate the sources’ basis of knowledge.
Id., 218. In so holding, the court distinguished the facts in that case
from those presented in State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 594 A.2d 917
(1991), noting that “the warrant affidavit [in Barton] failed to state
explicitly whether the informant personally had observed the facts that
he had reported” but “[t]here, we looked to the other facts contained in
the affidavit itself and concluded that the affidavit provided a substan-
tial basis for the [judge’s] inference that the informant was reporting
events that he had personally observed.” (Emphasis in original; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Duntz, supra, 217–18. Similar
to the warrant affidavit in Barton, the warrant affidavit in this case
provided a substantial basis for the issuing judge’s inference that the
confidential informant personally observed the defendant in possession
of a firearm. The defendant’s reliance on Duntz is misplaced in that the
affidavit in Duntz was devoid of any basis upon which the reliability of
the informants could have been assessed. As we have discussed, that
is not the case here.
State v. Velazquez

substantial factual basis to justify the finding of prob-
able cause. The warrant affidavit sets forth information
given to the affiants by a confidential informant that
provides substantial evidence from which the issuing
judge could have determined, on the basis of the totality
of the circumstances, that a finding of probable cause
was warranted.
II
The defendant also argues that the court improperly
considered evidence outside the four corners of the war-
rant in considering whether there had been probable cause
for the search of the premises on Barnum Avenue. At the
November 13, 2020 hearing on the motion to suppress,
the defendant presented the testimony of Paoletti in sup-
port of his position that he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the apartment at Barnum Avenue. At the
conclusion of Paoletti’s testimony, the court inquired:
“I just had one question of this witness regarding his
drafting of the warrant. Officer Paoletti, looking at the
warrant, you indicate that you got information from a
[confidential informant] that [the defendant] was physi-
cally observed in possession of a firearm. Was it your
understanding that the [confidential informant] person-
ally saw that?” Paoletti responded affirmatively. Defense
counsel objected and the following colloquy ensued:
“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor . . . I would object to
eliciting evidence that goes beyond the warrant that’s
not within the—
“The Court: No. I’m just asking what’s in the warrant.
The warrant . . . says . . . that within thirty days of offer-
ing said affidavit, affiant Paoletti received information,
further information from the [confidential informant]
that [the defendant] was physically observed in pos-
session of that firearm located within his residence at
[2136] Barnum Ave., the second floor apartment. My
question—this is one of the affiants, and my question to
that affiant . . . was it his understanding since he offered
State v. Velazquez

this warrant that the [confidential informant] personally
saw . . . [the defendant].
“[Defense Counsel]: —[A]nd I would object because his
understanding isn’t the question. It’s really going to be
the understanding as to what would be communicated
to a judge, not what was arguably . . . his impression or
arguably communicated and failed to disclose to a judge.
“The Court: Okay.
“[Defense Counsel]: So, I would . . . object to the elicita-
tion of evidence through him that wouldn’t be relevant
to the ultimate finding that the court’s going to be asked
to make.
“The Court: All right.”
The court asked the prosecutor if he had anything to
add, and the prosecutor responded, “I think the court can
ask the question, Your Honor.” The court then repeated
its question to Paoletti, to which Paoletti responded,
“Yes. That was my understanding, sir.”
The defendant argues that “[i]t was on this improper
basis that the trial court based its decision, this improper
single question and affirmative response.” The defendant
contends that the court’s inquiry demonstrated that
it considered evidence outside the four corners of the
search warrant when considering whether the warrant
established probable cause for the search. We disagree.
Despite the court’s inquiry at the hearing, there is noth-
ing in the court’s decision indicating that it considered
Paoletti’s testimony in considering the adequacy of the
warrant. As noted herein, it would have been improper
for the court to consider information outside the four
corners of the warrant in determining whether it estab-
lished probable cause. See State v. Hamilton, supra,
232 Conn. App. 817 (reviewing court may consider only
information set forth in four corners of affidavit that
was presented to issuing judge and reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom). Despite the court’s inquiry
of Paoletti as to his understanding of the information
State v. Velazquez

contained in the warrant affidavit, the court commenced
its probable cause analysis by expressly stating that it was
“examining the veracity of the [confidential informant]
as articulated within the four corners of the warrant.”
Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s argument that
the trial court improperly considered evidence outside
the four corners of the affidavit in sustaining the prob-
able cause determination.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.