Raymond v. Briere

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Raymond v. Briere

AMANDA L. RAYMOND v. JUSTIN K. BRIERE
(AC 47512)
Clark, Seeley and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment awarding the defendant
primary physical custody of the parties’ minor child, M. She claimed, inter
alia, that the court erred by admitting evidence of her conduct related to her
efforts to research and report alleged criminal activity to law enforcement,
specifically, testimony from multiple people that the plaintiff had become
fixated with, inter alia, human trafficking and cyberstalking and that those
beliefs and her related conduct were affecting M. Held:

The trial court properly considered evidence of the plaintiff’s actions in
reaching its decision that it was in M’s best interest for the defendant to
maintain primary physical custody, as, pursuant to the statute (§ 46b-56)
pertaining to the issuance of custody orders, the court focused on the
plaintiff’s conduct and how that conduct impacted her ability to provide
proper care for M.

This court declined to reverse the trial court’s judgment pursuant to the
plain error doctrine on the basis of the plaintiff’s unpreserved claim of
judicial bias, as the plaintiff did not file a motion to disqualify in the trial court
and did not establish that the trial court acted in a biased or partial manner.

The trial court improperly ordered the plaintiff to undergo a psychological
evaluation and comply with any treatment requirements resulting from such
evaluation as part of its final custody order, as, pursuant to statute (§ 46b-
6), the court’s authority to issue such an order was limited to pending
matters; accordingly, the judgment was reversed in part and the order to
undergo a psychological evaluation was vacated.
Argued September 10—officially released December 9, 2025

Procedural History

Application for custody of the parties’ minor child,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of New London, where the defen-
dant filed a cross complaint; thereafter, the case was
tried to the court, Spallone, J.; subsequently, the court,
Spallone, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion for a continu-
ance; judgment awarding the parties joint legal custody
of the minor child and awarding the defendant primary
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Raymond v. Briere

physical custody of the minor child, from which the
plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part; order
vacated.

Amanda L. Raymond, self-represented, the appellant
(plaintiff).
Lori N. Bartinik, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

CLARK, J. In this custody dispute, the self-repre-
sented plaintiff, Amanda L. Raymond, appeals from the
judgment of the trial court awarding the defendant,
Justin K. Briere, primary physical custody of their minor
child, M. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
(1) erred by admitting evidence of the plaintiff’s conduct
related to her efforts to research and report alleged
criminal activity to law enforcement, (2) violated her
right to a fair trial by exhibiting bias in favor of the
defendant, and (3) erred by ordering her to undergo a
psychological evaluation and to comply with any treat-
ment recommendations made in connection with such
evaluation. We agree with the plaintiff that the court
erred in ordering her to undergo a psychological evalua-
tion but disagree with the plaintiff’s remaining claims.
We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court in
part and vacate the order requiring her to undergo a
psychological evaluation. We affirm the judgment in all
other respects.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. The parties, who were never mar-
ried, are the parents of M, a daughter born in May, 2016.
The parties lived together from the time of M’s birth
until they separated early in 2022. The plaintiff also had
three other children from a previous relationship who
lived with the parties during this time. Beginning some-
time in March or April, 2019, the plaintiff became
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Raymond v. Briere

increasingly fixated on issues related to human traffick-
ing and cyberstalking. Eventually, the plaintiff became
convinced that she was being targeted because she had
gathered evidence that high-ranking government offi-
cials were involved in human trafficking and that those
officials created the COVID-19 pandemic to distract
attention from their illegal activities. The trial court
found that, ‘‘during the period leading up to the parties’
separation and after, [the plaintiff] spent a great deal of
time researching these issues and taking certain actions
based on her research. The [plaintiff’s] actions included,
but were not limited to, not leaving the house for long
periods of time, conducting research late into the night
and sleeping late the next morning, painting the walls
of the house with paint designed to disrupt attempts to
interfere with or capture private information conveyed
through wireless means, attempting to protect her elec-
tronic devices from intrusion or hacking through vari-
ous means, attempting to create a Faraday room1 and
wearing a metal object to further disrupt electronic
intrusion. Further, the [plaintiff] was engaged in
research and frequent communication with law enforce-
ment and others regarding her concerns about human
trafficking, and, in particular, her concern that she
might be the target of human traffickers.’’ (Footnote
added.)
1
Named after scientist Michael Faraday, a ‘‘Faraday room’’ or ‘‘Faraday
cage’’ is an enclosure made of material that shields the interior from electro-
magnetic radiation, thereby preventing objects within the enclosure from
sending or receiving electromagnetic transmissions. See F. Fungsang, ‘‘U.S.
E-Passports: ETA August 2006: Recent Changes Provide Additional Protec-
tion for Biometric Information Contained in U.S. Electronic Passports,’’ 2
I/S: A Journal of Law & Policy for the Information Society 521, 535 (2006);
see also S. R. Carter III, ‘‘The Sound of Silence: Why and How the FCC
Should Permit Private Property Owners to Jam Cell Phones,’’ 28 Rutgers
Computer & Tech. L.J. 343, 361 (2002) (‘‘A Faraday Cage is a metal grid
that blocks a conductor’s electric charge. Thus, the electric charge remains
on the outer surface of the cage and no electrostatic field is present within
the cage. Hence, cell phones within the cage cannot send or receive their
signals.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)).
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On April 27, 2022, the plaintiff filed an application
for custody, in which she sought primary physical cus-
tody of M and requested that the court enter an order
establishing a visitation schedule. On the same date,
the plaintiff also filed an application for an emergency
ex parte order of custody (ex parte application) pursu-
ant to General Statutes § 46b-56f (a).2 The plaintiff’s ex
parte application sought substantially the same relief
with respect to custody and visitation as her underlying
custody application, but also requested, inter alia, that
the court order the defendant ‘‘not [to] withhold [M]
from [the plaintiff]’’ and to grant the plaintiff ‘‘[f]inal
decision-making authority . . . since [the defendant]
has refused to respond and facilitate access with [the
plaintiff] and siblings, has refused to return [M] to the
home she has known for almost [six] years, and is
unwilling to make rational, non-emotional decisions
that affect [M’s] emotional well-being and foster her
relationships with her immediate family.’’ In support of
her ex parte application, the plaintiff alleged that the
parties previously had agreed to share physical custody
but that the defendant failed to return M to the plaintiff’s
home in accordance with that agreement, would not
tell the plaintiff when he intended to do so, and refused
to communicate with her regarding custody issues.
Later that day, the defendant filed a competing ex
parte application seeking temporary sole legal and phys-
ical custody of M.3 In support of his application, the
defendant alleged that the plaintiff ‘‘suffered from delu-
sions and paranoia since October, 2019,’’ regarding her
2
General Statutes § 46b-56f (a) provides: ‘‘Any person seeking custody of
a minor child pursuant to section 46b-56 or pursuant to an action brought
under section 46b-40 may make an application to the Superior Court for an
emergency ex parte order of custody when such person believes an immedi-
ate and present risk of physical danger or psychological harm to the
child exists.’’
3
Although the trial court docket indicates that the defendant’s ex parte
application was filed on April 28, 2022, both the application and the court’s
initial order on that application are dated April 27, 2022.
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fixation with human trafficking and cyberstalking, and
that those delusions ‘‘have significantly worsened over
the last two years . . . .’’ The defendant further alleged
that M was ‘‘becoming convinced that [she was] being
stalked and hacked and that an electronic frequency
gun [was] being pointed at the house to harm [her]’’
and that he was ‘‘concerned that [M] [was] not safe in
[the plaintiff’s] care due to this increasingly bizarre
behavior.’’ In addition to temporary sole legal and physi-
cal custody, the defendant requested that the plaintiff
be required to undergo a psychiatric evaluation and
that her visitation with M be supervised ‘‘unless and
until [her] mental health concerns are properly
addressed.’’
On April 27, 2022, the court, Spallone, J., granted
the plaintiff’s ex parte application in substantial part,
ordering that the parties share temporary legal and
physical custody and that M reside primarily with the
plaintiff, and setting a visitation schedule in accordance
with the plaintiff’s request. On the same date, the court
denied the defendant’s ex parte application on the basis
that it had ‘‘granted another order on [April 27, 2022],
which maintains shared physical custody.’’ The court
scheduled a hearing on both ex parte applications for
May 10, 2022.
The hearing on the parties’ ex parte applications com-
menced on May 10, 2022. On that date, the court permit-
ted the defendant to present his witnesses first because
the defendant had subpoenaed witnesses to testify that
day. The defendant presented the testimony of Erica
McCormick, an employee of the Department of Children
and Families (department); Scott Raymond, the plain-
tiff’s father; and Lucie Raymond, the plaintiff’s step-
mother. McCormick testified that she met with the
plaintiff after the defendant called the department’s
Careline on April 28, 2022, to report his concerns regard-
ing the plaintiff’s mental health. On the basis of her
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discussion with the plaintiff, McCormick referred the
case to Ursula Moreshead, a clinical social worker for
the department who was scheduled to meet with the
plaintiff the following week to assess whether the plain-
tiff had untreated mental health needs that may impact
M. Scott Raymond and Lucie Raymond both testified as
to their concerns about the plaintiff’s increasing fixation
with issues related to human trafficking and cyberstalk-
ing and the impact it was having on M.4 After the conclu-
sion of Lucie Raymond’s testimony, the court stated
that the matter would have to be continued to a future
date. Prior to adjourning for the day, the court heard
argument from the parties on the ex parte applications
and then modified the ex parte order to grant the defen-
dant temporary physical custody of M and to require
that the plaintiff’s visitation with M ‘‘shall be at the
discretion of the [defendant], supervised by a family
member.’’
On June 8, 2022, the court held a continued hearing on
the parties’ ex parte applications, at which Moreshead
testified concerning her assessment of the plaintiff.
Moreshead recommended that the plaintiff undergo a
psychiatric evaluation because her hypervigilance was
at ‘‘a very heightened level’’ and was ‘‘impacting her
functioning,’’ and it was ‘‘important to tease out . . .
whether it’s a result of a long-term chronic, complex
trauma . . . [and] whether it’s a major mental illness.’’
Moreshead further testified that, regardless of whether
the plaintiff’s beliefs about stalking and human traffick-
ing were true, those beliefs were ‘‘dictat[ing] her line
4
Scott Raymond testified that the plaintiff had become consumed by her
belief that the government was stalking her, that she refused to leave her
house unattended because she believed that someone would break in to steal
the evidence she gathered about human trafficking, and that she believed
that her cousin in Australia had been murdered by the people she was
investigating because they found out that the plaintiff was talking about
their illegal activities. Lucie Raymond testified that the plaintiff’s children
started adopting some of the plaintiff’s beliefs, including refusing to use
their tablets because they believed their house was under surveillance.
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of thinking,’’ and that her fixation with those issues
‘‘may impact [her children’s] ability to cope with life’s
stressors’’ and ‘‘their ability to cope with life as they
get older.’’ The plaintiff began her cross-examination
of Moreshead but was unable to complete it before the
court adjourned for the day. The court continued the
matter and left in place the modified ex parte order it
had entered on May 10, 2022.
A third hearing date on the parties’ ex parte applica-
tions was scheduled for July 5, 2022. At that hearing,
the defendant requested that, to avoid having to repeat
the presentation of evidence, the court combine the
hearing on the ex parte applications with the trial on
the merits of the underlying custody application and
that the court enter new temporary custody orders on
the underlying application. The court granted that
request over the plaintiff’s objection and, prior to
adjourning for the day, entered a modified temporary
custody order granting the defendant temporary sole
physical and legal custody and requiring that the plain-
tiff’s visitation with M be supervised by a third-party
agency.
The court heard four additional days of evidence over
the next fifteen months, with the evidentiary portion
of the trial concluding on October 10, 2023. In the
interim, the court twice entered modified temporary
custody orders, both times expanding the plaintiff’s cus-
todial and visitation rights. First, on January 12, 2023,
the court modified its prior order by granting the parties
joint legal custody of M, removing the requirement that
the plaintiff’s visitation be supervised, and granting the
plaintiff visitation with M two weekday evenings per
week as well as Saturday from 11 a.m. until 7 p.m. On
March 28, 2023, the court again modified its temporary
custody order to grant the plaintiff visitation with M
from Friday evening to Saturday evening, in addition
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to the two weekday evenings per week set forth in the
prior order.

On February 6, 2024, the court issued a final order
on the plaintiff’s application. The court awarded the
parties joint legal custody of M but ordered that ‘‘[the
defendant] shall have primary physical custody . . .
and his residence shall be deemed [M’s] primary resi-
dence for school purposes.’’ The court also entered an
order establishing a visitation schedule for the plaintiff
and setting forth the parties’ respective visitation rights
during holidays and vacations. The court further
ordered that ‘‘[the plaintiff] shall undergo a psychologi-
cal evaluation by a psychiatrist, approved by [the defen-
dant] (but not chosen by him . . . ) and shall be
responsible for the cost incurred. . . . [The plaintiff]
shall follow the recommendations for treatment made
by the mental health professional and shall remain
engaged in her current mental health treatment as long
as clinically indicated.’’ The court also ordered that
‘‘[t]he parties shall in all cases attempt joint decision
making, however, if there is an impasse the [defendant]
shall have final decision-making authority until further
order of this court. This order is entered without preju-
dice to being revisited by the court should the [plaintiff]
comply with the order regarding a psychological evalua-
tion . . . .’’ Finally, the court noted that, ‘‘in reviewing
the evidence available at trial . . . on more than one
occasion in speaking to the [department] the [defen-
dant] expressed an interest in returning to the prior
split physical custody arrangement. Based upon all the
evidence the court has received, the court believes that
this would be a reasonable goal for the parties to strive
for provided [that the plaintiff] receives the appropriate
psychological evaluation and, if necessary, treatment.’’
This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
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I
We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial
court erred by considering evidence of the plaintiff’s
conduct related to her efforts to research and report
human trafficking and cyberstalking. Although the pre-
cise nature of the plaintiff’s claim is difficult to discern,
the plaintiff appears to be arguing that it was improper
for the court to consider such evidence because her
right to report criminal activity is protected by federal
law and that the court did not have jurisdiction to adju-
dicate the validity of her allegations regarding human
trafficking and cyberstalking because those allegations
involve federal crimes that can only be adjudicated by
a federal court. We disagree.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this claim. The defendant claimed in his ex parte
application and during trial on the underlying custody
application that he should be granted primary physical
custody of M and final decision-making authority
because the plaintiff’s fixation with human trafficking
and cyberstalking interfered with her ability to make
sound decisions regarding’s M’s care. In support of that
claim, the defendant presented evidence concerning the
plaintiff’s conduct with respect to those issues and the
effects that her conduct had on her parenting abilities.
He testified that the plaintiff’s fixation with such issues
began on October 9, 2019. That night, the plaintiff
handed the defendant a note stating that she had discov-
ered a post on the website Craigslist indicating that
someone was trying to kill their family. After the defen-
dant refused to wake the children up and leave their
home, the plaintiff took her computer and cell phone,
went to their neighbor’s house, and asked the neighbor
to drive her to the police station. The neighbor instead
called the police so that the plaintiff could report her
allegations, but, when the officers arrived, the plaintiff
became combative and refused to talk to the officers
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because she believed they were imposters. The police
brought the plaintiff to the hospital for a psychiatric
evaluation, and she was released the next day.
The defendant presented evidence that the plaintiff’s
behavior became increasingly disruptive after that inci-
dent. He testified that the plaintiff believed that the
police and the government were involved in human
trafficking and that she was being targeted because of
her research into that issue. He further testified that
the plaintiff believed that the individuals allegedly
involved in human trafficking were trying to gain access
to her electronic devices and that there were directed
energy weapons5 targeting their home. He also pre-
sented evidence that the plaintiff took steps to prevent
unwanted electromagnetic signals from entering their
home, including by covering the windows in cardboard
wrapped in tin foil, painting the walls with expensive
metallic paint, wrapping her cell phone in tin foil and
keeping it in the refrigerator, and wearing a pot on her
head while she slept.
The defendant also presented evidence concerning
the effect that the plaintiff’s behavior had on M. For
example, he testified that, during the period of time
just before the plaintiff filed the custody application,
the plaintiff was homeschooling the children but would
spend so much time focusing on human trafficking and
5
‘‘Directed energy weapons . . . are a type of electromagnetic or particle
technology which use energy, as opposed to a physical projectile, to strike
a target.’’ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, ‘‘Directed
Energy Weapons: A New Look at an ‘Old’ Technology,’’ (May 12, 2022),
available at https://unidir.org/directed-energy-weapons-a-new-look-at-an-
old-technology/ (last visited November 26, 2025). Directed energy weapons
include high-powered lasers and high-powered microwave systems that can
be used to cause temporary or permanent damage to human and electronic
targets. See id.; see also Congressional Research Service, ‘‘Defense Primer:
Directed-Energy Weapons,’’ (updated November 4, 2024), available at https://
www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11882/IF11882.12.pdf
(last visited November 26, 2025).
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cyberstalking that the children ‘‘would tend to them-
selves on very regular occasions.’’ He further testified
that M had made statements indicating that she was
starting to adopt the plaintiff’s beliefs, including com-
plaining that she was hearing high-pitched noises from
‘‘directed energy weapons that [were] being blasted
at [the plaintiff’s] house’’ and repeating the plaintiff’s
claims ‘‘that the police and the government are involved
in . . . cyberstalking and human trafficking . . . .’’
The defendant also testified that, approximately one
year after the parties separated, M became so fearful
of sleeping in her own room that she cried to the point
of vomiting. When the defendant asked why she was
so scared, M said that the plaintiff had told her that the
defendant’s home was not safe.6
‘‘[A] court of this state has jurisdiction to make an
initial child custody determination if . . . [t]his state
is the home state of the child on the date of the com-
mencement of the child custody proceeding . . . .’’
General Statutes § 46b-115k (a) (1). ‘‘Orders regarding
the custody and care of minor children . . . are gov-
erned by [General Statutes] § 46b-56, which grants the
court broad discretion in crafting such orders.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) N. R. v. M. P., 227 Conn.
App. 698, 714, 323 A.3d 1142 (2024). Section 46b-56 (a)
provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[i]n any controversy
before the Superior Court as to the custody or care of
minor children . . . the court may make or modify any
6
The defendant also presented testimony from other witnesses that further
supported his contention that the plaintiff’s fixation with human trafficking
and cyberstalking affected M. Debra Sharron, the defendant’s mother, with
whom the defendant lived from the time of the parties’ separation through
the time of trial, testified that M complained about hearing ‘‘loud squealing
noises . . . [and that] she thinks it has something to do with the hacking
. . . [that] was going on with [the plaintiff].’’ In addition, Scott Raymond
and Lucie Raymond both testified that they had heard the plaintiff’s children
repeating some of the plaintiff’s claims about cyberstalking. See footnote
4 of this opinion.
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proper order regarding the custody, care, education,
visitation and support of the children if it has jurisdic-
tion . . . . Subject to the provisions of section 46b-
56a, the court may assign parental responsibility for
raising the child to the parents jointly, or may award
custody to either parent or to a third party, according
to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and
subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems
equitable. . . .’’ Subsection (b) of § 46b-56 provides in
relevant part that, ‘‘[i]n making or modifying any order
as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the rights
and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered
and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve
the best interests of the child and provide the child with
the active and consistent involvement of both parents
commensurate with their abilities and interests. . . .’’
Finally, ‘‘[§] 46b-56 (c) directs the court, when making
any order regarding the custody, care, education, visita-
tion and support of children, to consider the best inter-
ests of the child, and in doing so [the court] may con-
sider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of
[seventeen enumerated] factors7 . . . .’’ (Footnote in
7
‘‘In determining the best interests of the child, the court looks to the
factors enumerated in § 46b-56 (c): ‘(1) The physical and emotional safety
of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental needs of the child; (3)
the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the
needs of the child; (4) any relevant and material information obtained from
the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (5) the wishes
of the child’s parents as to custody; (6) the past and current interaction and
relationship of the child with each parent, the child’s siblings and any other
person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (7)
the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such
continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent
as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (8) any manip-
ulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the
child in the parents’ dispute; (9) the ability of each parent to be actively
involved in the life of the child; (10) the child’s adjustment to his or her
home, school and community environments; (11) the length of time that the
child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability
of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may
consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s family home
pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (12) the stability
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Raymond v. Briere

original; internal quotation marks omitted.) N. R. v. M.
P., supra, 715. Among the factors that the court may
consider are ‘‘[t]he physical and emotional safety of
the child’’; General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) (1); and ‘‘the
mental and physical health of all individuals involved,
except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent
or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative
of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement
is not in the best interests of the child . . . .’’ General
Statutes § 46b-56 (c) (13).
‘‘In reaching a decision as to what is in the best
interests of a child, the court is vested with broad discre-
tion and its ruling will be reversed only upon a showing
that some legal principle or right has been violated or
that the discretion has been abused. . . . As our
Supreme Court recently reiterated, [t]he authority to
exercise the judicial discretion [authorized by § 46b-56]
. . . is not conferred [on] [the state’s appellate courts],
but [on] the trial court, and . . . we are not privileged
to usurp that authority or to substitute ourselves for
the trial court. . . . A mere difference of opinion or
judgment cannot justify our intervention. Nothing short
of a conviction that the action of the trial court is one
[that] discloses a clear abuse of discretion can warrant
our interference.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
N. R. v. M. P., supra, 227 Conn. App. 716.
of the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both; (13) the mental and
physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a
proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be
determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not
in the best interests of the child; (14) the child’s cultural background; (15)
the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence,
as defined in section 46b-1, has occurred between the parents or between
a parent and another individual or the child; (16) whether the child or a
sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively
in section 46b-120; and (17) whether the party satisfactorily completed
participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to sec-
tion 46b-69b.’ General Statutes § 46b-56 (c).’’ N. R. v. M. P., supra, 227 Conn.
App. 715 n.15.
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In the present case, the court had jurisdiction to enter
child custody orders pursuant to § 46b-115k (a) (1)
because the plaintiff, the defendant, and M all resided
in Connecticut as of the commencement date of this
action. In entering such orders, § 46b-56 directed the
court to ‘‘(b) . . . enter orders . . . that serve the best
interests of [M] and provide [M] with the active and
consistent involvement of both parents commensurate
with their abilities and interests,’’ and authorized the
court to take into account ‘‘(c) . . . (1) [t]he physical
and emotional safety of the child’’ and ‘‘(13) the mental
and physical health of all individuals involved . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) Evidence of actions taken by the
plaintiff as a result of her beliefs regarding human traf-
ficking and cyberstalking was relevant to the court’s
determination as to the custodial arrangement that
would serve the best interests of M. The plaintiff cites
no authority for her claim that it was improper for
the court to consider that evidence merely because
jurisdiction over a hypothetical future prosecution aris-
ing from the alleged human trafficking and cyberstalk-
ing activity is vested in another court. Contrary to the
plaintiff’s contention, the court did not ‘‘decide the
validity of [her] allegations of human trafficking,’’ and
nothing in the court’s decision would prevent a future
prosecution based on those allegations. Rather, the
court properly focused on the plaintiff’s conduct and
how that conduct impacted her ability to provide proper
care for M. As Moreshead testified, regardless of
whether the plaintiff’s beliefs about human trafficking
and cyberstalking were true, the actions she took as a
result of those beliefs had the potential to impact M’s
development. The court properly considered evidence
of the plaintiff’s actions in reaching its decision that it
was in M’s best interest for the defendant to maintain
primary physical custody.
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II
We next address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial
court deprived her of her right to a fair trial by exhibiting
bias in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff contends
that various rulings by the court demonstrated that the
court was biased against her and that those rulings
‘‘show advocacy for the represented defense for which
no [self-represented] litigant could fairly defend or over-
come, violating due process rights to an impartial judi-
ciary.’’ We disagree with the plaintiff’s claim.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this claim. On March 31, 2023, the court issued
a notice indicating that the next trial date—the seventh
day of evidence—would be held on May 5, 2023. On
April 25, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion styled as a
‘‘motion for extension of time to file a motion to recuse/
disqualify,’’ in which she requested ‘‘an extension of
time to file [a motion to disqualify] to May 1, 2023
. . . .’’ The court, Shluger, J., granted the plaintiff’s
motion.8 On May 3, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion for
a continuance of the May 5, 2023 trial date, in which
she indicated that she had intended to file a motion to
disqualify Judge Spallone by May 1, but was unable to
do so because of a family illness. The court, Spallone,
J., granted her motion. The plaintiff, however, did not
file a motion to disqualify, and, on September 21, 2023,
the court issued a notice indicating that the trial would
resume on October 10, 2023.
At the outset of the October 10, 2023 hearing, the
plaintiff stated that, before resuming evidence, she
wanted ‘‘to address numerous areas of professional mis-
conduct’’ and ‘‘biased rulings’’ but that she was not
8
It is not clear why the plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to
file a motion to disqualify. Our review of the record indicates that the plaintiff
had not previously notified the trial court that she intended to file a motion
to disqualify, and it does not appear that the court ever imposed a deadline
to file such a motion.
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prepared at that time. The plaintiff further stated that
she wanted to address those issues on the record
because, ‘‘in order for [the issues] to be addressed on
appeal, they would have to be addressed in the trial
court.’’ The defendant objected, arguing that the case
had been continued for six months to give the plaintiff
the opportunity to file a motion to disqualify and that
delaying the matter further would cause undue preju-
dice to the defendant. The court declined to continue
the matter, noting that the plaintiff had been given
ample opportunity to file a motion to disqualify and
would have the right to appeal after final judgment
entered if she ‘‘[felt] like the court for some reason has
made other errors or not been impartial . . . .’’9 The
parties completed their presentation of evidence and
presented closing argument that day, and the court indi-
cated that it would issue a written ruling in due course.
The plaintiff did not file a motion to disqualify after the
close of evidence, and, on February 6, 2024, the court
issued a final order on the custody application.10

Practice Book § 1-23 provides in relevant part that
‘‘[a] motion to disqualify a judicial authority shall be in
writing and shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting
9
The court granted the plaintiff a short recess to print and prepare exhibits
that she intended to present that day and her proposed custody orders.
10
On October 20, 2023, the plaintiff filed a ‘‘motion for extension of time
to file a motion for mistrial or new trial,’’ in which she indicated that she
intended to file a motion for mistrial or new trial ‘‘in accordance with
[Practice Book] §§ 16-35, 17-4A, and 40-5 . . . .’’ The plaintiff further indi-
cated that the motion would ‘‘address numerous procedural errors and
misconduct’’ that ‘‘render[ed] the trial unfair, bias[ed], and prejudicial,’’ and
requested that the court extend the time to file such motion to November
20, 2023. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion ‘‘without prejudice as the
court has not yet issued a decision on the merits.’’ We note that §§ 16-
35 and 17-4A govern postjudgment motions in civil jury and court trials,
respectively, and require such motions to be filed after the court accepts a
jury verdict or renders judgment in a court trial. Section 40-5 pertains to
the remedies available in criminal proceedings when a party fails to comply
with the rules of discovery.
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Raymond v. Briere

forth the facts relied upon to show the grounds for
disqualification and a certificate of the counsel of
record that the motion is made in good faith. . . .’’
‘‘Claims alleging judicial bias should be raised at trial
by a motion for disqualification or the claim will be
deemed to be waived. . . . A party’s failure to raise a
claim of disqualification at trial has been characterized
as the functional equivalent of consenting to the judge’s
presence at trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Burns v. Quinnipiac University, 120 Conn. App. 311,
316, 991 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 906, 995 A.2d
634 (2010). Nevertheless, ‘‘[b]ecause an accusation of
judicial bias or prejudice strikes at the very core of
judicial integrity and tends to undermine public confi-
dence in the established judiciary . . . we . . . have
reviewed unpreserved claims of judicial bias under the
plain error doctrine. . . . Plain error exists only in truly
extraordinary situations where the existence of the
error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integ-
rity of and public confidence in the judicial proceed-
ings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 317; see
also Emerick v. Emerick, 170 Conn. App. 368, 374, 154
A.3d 1069 (addressing judicial bias claim despite party’s
failure to file written motion), cert. denied, 327 Conn.
922, 171 A.3d 60 (2017); McGuire v. McGuire, 102 Conn.
App. 79, 83–84, 924 A.2d 886 (2007) (reviewing unpre-
served judicial bias claim under plain error doctrine
despite appellant’s failure to request plain error review).
‘‘Canon 3 (c) (1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides in relevant part: ‘A judge should disqualify
himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including
but not limited to instances where: (A) the judge has
a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. . . .’
The plaintiff is not required to demonstrate actual bias
in order to prevail on a claim of a violation of that
canon. The plaintiff will meet his burden if he can prove
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that the conduct in question gave rise to a reasonable
appearance of impropriety.’’ McGuire v. McGuire, supra,
102 Conn. App. 84.
‘‘In assessing a claim of judicial bias, we are mindful
that adverse rulings, alone, provide an insufficient basis
for finding bias even when those rulings may be errone-
ous. . . . [O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis
of facts introduced or events occurring in the course
of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do
not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion
unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antago-
nism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus,
judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are
critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel,
the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a
bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they
reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial
source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair
judgment impossible.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Johnson, 203 Conn.
App. 405, 414, 248 A.3d 796 (2021).
In support of her judicial bias claim, the plaintiff
identifies various adverse procedural and evidentiary
rulings that, she claims, ‘‘[show] a high degree of favorit-
ism for the defense, or opposition to the plaintiff, that
would make it impossible for a fair trial.’’ The plaintiff
also contends that the temporary custody orders
entered by the court during the pendency of the pro-
ceedings, pursuant to which the defendant maintained
primary physical custody of M, ‘‘gave another unfair
procedural advantage to the defense, contrary to the
statutory and constitutional rights of the plaintiff
. . . .’’ The plaintiff, however, does not identify any
statements by the court or other actions that reasonably
may be interpreted as demonstrating ‘‘a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism’’ on the part of the trial court.
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(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. John-
son, supra, 203 Conn. App. 414. To the contrary, our
thorough review of the record indicates that the court
properly considered the arguments and objections
raised by the parties and entered rulings in a fair and
impartial manner based on the merits of the arguments
presented. ‘‘The fact that the plaintiff strongly disagrees
with the substance of the court’s rulings does not make
those rulings evidence of bias.’’ Burns v. Quinnipiac
University, supra, 120 Conn. App. 317. Moreover, we
reiterate that reversal under the plain error doctrine is
reserved for the rare circumstance in which ‘‘the alleged
error is both so clear and so harmful that it affects the
fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the
judicial proceedings.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) State v. Diaz, 348 Conn. 750,
763, 311 A.3d 714 (2024). Because the plaintiff has not
established that the trial court acted in a biased or
partial manner, we conclude that reversal under the
plain error doctrine is not warranted.
III
The plaintiff’s final claim is that the court erred by
ordering her to undergo a psychological evaluation and
to comply with any recommendations for treatment
included in the evaluation. The defendant acknowl-
edges that the court’s order requiring the plaintiff to
undergo a psychological evaluation was ‘‘arguably
improper’’ but argues that the proper remedy is to
vacate that portion of the court’s final custody order
while leaving the rest of the order intact. We agree that
the court improperly ordered the plaintiff to undergo
a postjudgment psychological evaluation and that the
proper remedy is to vacate that portion of the final
custody order.11
11
In her appellate brief, the plaintiff’s primary argument with respect to
this claim is that the court’s order for her to undergo a psychological evalua-
tion and comply with treatment recommendations violates the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Because we conclude that
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The court’s authority to order a party to undergo a
psychological evaluation is governed by General Stat-
utes §§ 46b-3 and 46b-6. Section 46b-6 provides in rele-
vant part: ‘‘In any pending family relations matter the
court or any judge may cause an investigation to be
made with respect to any circumstance of the matter
which may be helpful or material or relevant to a proper
disposition of the case. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Sec-
tion 46b-3 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘For the pur-
poses of any investigation or pretrial conference the
judge presiding at any family relations session may
employ the services of any . . . physician, psycholo-
gist, psychiatrist or family counselor. . . .’’
‘‘In accordance with the plain language of § 46b-6
. . . it is well settled that the court’s authority to order
such an evaluation is restricted to pending matters to
assist in the disposition of the issues presented therein.’’
(Emphasis in original.) Lehane v. Murray, 215 Conn.
App. 305, 319, 283 A.3d 62 (2022); see also Janik v.
Janik, 61 Conn. App. 175, 180, 763 A.2d 65 (2000), cert.
denied, 255 Conn. 940, 768 A.2d 949 (2001); Savage v.
Savage, 25 Conn. App. 693, 700–701, 596 A.2d 23 (1991).
As we explained in Janik, ‘‘§§ 46b-6 and 46b-3, refer to
pending family relations matters only and, moreover
. . . the utility of such evaluations lies in their ability
to shed light on the facts of a particular case so that it
may be disposed of properly. . . . Once a case has
been disposed of by the rendition of a final judgment
and there is nothing further pending [as was the case
here] there is no longer a reason for ordering an ongoing
evaluation.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Janik v. Janik,
supra, 179.
the trial court lacked statutory authority to order the plaintiff to undergo
a psychological evaluation and treatment after it made a final custody deter-
mination, we need not address the plaintiff’s contention that the court’s
order violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.
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In the present case, the trial court ordered the plain-
tiff to undergo a psychological evaluation as part of its
final custody order. The court did not order the plaintiff
to undergo that evaluation to determine which custodial
arrangement was in the best interest of M or otherwise
to aid in the court’s disposition of the case. Although
the provision of the order granting the defendant final
decision-making authority stated that it was ‘‘entered
without prejudice to [being] revisited by the court
should the [plaintiff] comply with the order regarding
a psychological evaluation,’’ it is undisputed that the
order constituted a final custody award. Moreover,
because the court’s order was a final judgment on the
parties’ competing custody applications and not an
interim order pending final disposition, the ‘‘without
prejudice’’ provision in the court’s order can only be
construed as a recognition by the court of the plaintiff’s
statutory right to move for modification of the final
custody order pursuant to § 46b-56. See, e.g., Lynch v.
Lynch, 135 Conn. App. 40, 56, 43 A.3d 667 (2012) (‘‘[t]he
court . . . retains continuing jurisdiction to modify
final orders for . . . the care, custody and visitation
of minor children, subject to proof of certain conditions
as provided in . . . [§] 46b-56’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court erred in ordering the plaintiff to undergo a
postjudgment psychological evaluation. As a result, that
aspect of the court’s custody order must be vacated.
See Lehane v. Murray, supra, 215 Conn. App. 321–22;
Janik v. Janik, supra, 61 Conn. App. 180.
The judgment is reversed only as to the order requir-
ing the plaintiff to undergo a psychological evaluation
and comply with any treatment recommendations
resulting from such evaluation and that order is vacated;
the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.