Bay Advance, LLC v. Halajian

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Bay Advance, LLC v. Halajian

BAY ADVANCE, LLC v. BARRY STUART HALAJIAN
(AC 47341)
Cradle, C. J., and Moll and Palmer, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the plain-
tiff’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement and awarding the plaintiff
$50,000. The defendant claimed that the court, in granting the motion,
improperly determined that the parties had reached an enforceable settle-
ment agreement. Held:

The appeal was not moot despite full satisfaction of the judgment, as this
court could afford the defendant practical relief by ordering restitution.

The trial court reasonably determined that there was no dispute that the
parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement, as certain emails
exchanged between the parties’ counsel reflected that the parties had agreed
to a settlement pursuant to the terms set forth in a draft settlement agree-
ment, and, during a hearing held pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates
Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc. (225 Conn. 804), the defendant’s
counsel acknowledged that the parties had entered into a settlement agree-
ment as set forth in the draft agreement.
Argued September 11—officially released November 4, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for breach of contract,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the
defendant filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the court,
Hon. John F. Kavanewsky, Jr., judge trial referee,
granted the plaintiff’s motion to enforce a settlement
agreement and rendered judgment thereon, from which
the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Barry Stuart Halajian, self-represented, filed a brief
as the appellant (defendant).
Jared M. Alfin, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The self-represented defendant, Barry Stu-
art Halajian, doing business as Industrial Electric Com-
pany, appeals from the judgment of the trial court grant-
ing a motion to enforce a settlement agreement filed
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by the plaintiff, Bay Advance, LLC. On appeal, the defen-
dant claims that the court improperly determined that
the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement
agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. On June 14, 2023, the plaintiff
commenced the present action against the defendant.
In its one count complaint asserting a breach of contract
claim, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed
to make required payments to it pursuant to a commer-
cial contract that the parties had executed concerning
future business receivables.1 On July 20, 2023, the defen-
dant, through counsel, filed an answer, a special defense
alleging unconscionability, and a one count counter-
claim alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.
On July 21, 2023, the plaintiff filed a reply denying the
defendant’s special defense and an answer denying the
allegations of the counterclaim.
On August 29, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion to
enforce an alleged settlement agreement that had been
reached between the parties (motion to enforce). On
September 6, 2023, the defendant filed an objection. On
December 15, 2023, the plaintiff filed a reply memoran-
dum.
On December 18, 2023, following an Audubon hear-
ing,2 the trial court, Hon. John F. Kavanewsky, Jr.,
1
In conjunction with the present action, the plaintiff’s attorney issued a
writ for an ex parte prejudgment remedy to attach $85,940 of the defendant’s
assets on the basis that the parties’ commercial contract contains a prejudg-
ment remedy waiver clause. See General Statutes § 52-278f. The return of
service filed with the trial court reflects that a state marshal garnished
$85,940 of the defendant’s assets in the hands or possession of JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A.
2
‘‘An Audubon hearing is conducted to decide whether the terms of a
settlement agreement are sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to be
enforceable as a matter of law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 307
White Street Realty, LLC v. Beaver Brook Group, LLC, 216 Conn. App. 750,
757 n.5, 286 A.3d 467 (2022); see also Audubon Parking Associates Ltd.
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judge trial referee, granted the motion to enforce and
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the
defendant in the amount of $50,000, the settlement
amount sought by the plaintiff. On January 4, 2024,
the defendant filed a motion to reargue, to which the
plaintiff filed an objection on January 5, 2024. On Janu-
ary 19, 2024, the court denied the defendant’s motion
to reargue. This appeal followed. Additional procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
I
Before analyzing the merits of this appeal, we prelimi-
narily address the plaintiff’s claim that this appeal is
moot because, during a period when this appeal had
been dismissed and not yet restored to the docket, the
judgment was satisfied in full. We conclude that this
appeal is not moot.
‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be
determined as a threshold matter because it implicates
[this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . The
fundamental principles underpinning the mootness doc-
trine are well settled. We begin with the four part test
for justiciability . . . . Because courts are established
to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed con-
troversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must
be justiciable. Justiciability requires (1) that there be
an actual controversy between or among the parties to
the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be
adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be
capable of being adjudicated by the judicial power . . .
and (4) that the determination of the controversy will
result in practical relief to the complainant. . . .
‘‘[I]t is not the province of appellate courts to decide
moot questions, disconnected from the granting of
Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 811–12, 626 A.2d
729 (1993).
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actual relief or from the determination of which no
practical relief can follow. . . . In determining moot-
ness, the dispositive question is whether a successful
appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any
way.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mar-
sala, 204 Conn. App. 571, 575–76, 254 A.3d 358, cert.
denied, 336 Conn. 951, 251 A.3d 617 (2021).

The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of the plaintiff’s mootness claim.
On February 8, 2024, the defendant, representing him-
self, filed this appeal. On March 12, 2024, this appeal
was dismissed as a result of the defendant’s failure to
file the preliminary papers required pursuant to Practice
Book § 63-4. That same day, the plaintiff filed with the
trial court (1) a notice that this appeal had been dis-
missed and (2) an application for a financial institution
execution in the amount of $50,105—comprising the
$50,000 amount that the trial court awarded the plaintiff
plus a $105 application fee—directed to the defendant.
The defendant did not file a response to the application.
On April 16, 2024, the financial institution execution
was issued.

On April 19, 2024, the defendant filed with this court
a motion for reconsideration of the March 12, 2024
dismissal order, requesting that this court restore this
appeal to the docket and grant him an extension of
time to file the preliminary papers required pursuant
to Practice Book § 63-4. On April 24 and 25, 2024, the
defendant filed several documents in an apparent effort
to comply with § 63-4. On May 6, 2024, this court issued
an order providing in relevant part that the defendant’s
motion for reconsideration was ‘‘[g]ranted, provided
that the [defendant] files a notice of appeal transcript
order form with section two filled out by the official
court reporter with an estimated date of delivery or a
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certification of completion, on or before May 16, 2024.’’3
On May 16, 2024, the defendant filed an appeal tran-
script order form in compliance with this court’s May
6, 2024 order. That same day, this court issued an order
restoring this appeal to the docket.
Meanwhile, on May 15, 2024, one day prior to the
issuance of the May 16, 2024 order restoring this appeal
to the docket, the plaintiff filed with the trial court a
return reflecting that the financial institution execution
had been satisfied in full. Specifically, the return pro-
vided that, on May 12, 2024, a state marshal had remitted
to the plaintiff a check in the amount of $50,105.
On May 23, 2024, the plaintiff filed with this court a
motion to dismiss this appeal as (1) moot on the basis
of the fully satisfied financial institution execution and
(2) frivolous. On June 7, 2024, the defendant filed an
opposition. On September 4, 2024, this court denied
the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss this appeal without
prejudice to the parties arguing the mootness issue in
their appellate briefs.
In its appellate brief, the plaintiff asserts that this
appeal is moot because there is no practical relief that
we could afford the defendant following the full satis-
faction of the financial institution execution.4 We dis-
agree.
‘‘Our case law . . . indicates that the filing of a satis-
faction of judgment does not render appeals moot
because of the possibility of restitution or reimburse-
ment.’’ Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Cornelius, 131 Conn.
App. 216, 220, 26 A.3d 700, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 946,
30 A.3d 1 (2011); see also Preisner v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 203 Conn. 407, 414–15, 525 A.2d 83 (1987)
3
On April 25, 2024, the defendant filed an incomplete appeal transcript
order form.
4
The defendant did not address the mootness issue in his principal appel-
late brief, and he neither filed a reply brief nor appeared for oral argument.
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(‘‘[i]f a judgment has been satisfied before it is reversed
. . . the law raises an obligation in the party to the
record, who has received the benefit of the erroneous
judgment, to make restitution to the other party for
what he has lost’’ (internal quotation marks omitted));
Long Manor Owners’ Assn., Inc. v. Alungbe, 218 Conn.
App. 415, 419–20 n.5, 292 A.3d 85 (assuming arguendo
that judgment had been satisfied, this court concluded
that appeal was not moot because this court, as relief,
could order restitution), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 909,
303 A.3d 10 (2023); Lynn v. Bosco, 182 Conn. App. 200,
213 n.15, 189 A.3d 601 (2018) (concluding that appeal
was not moot despite claimed satisfaction of judgment
when this court, as relief, could order restitution). In
the present case, were we to agree with the defendant
on the merits of this appeal and reverse the court’s
judgment granting the motion to enforce, thereby vacat-
ing its award of $50,000 to the plaintiff, restitution would
be a viable remedy. Accordingly, we conclude that this
appeal has not been rendered moot as a result of the
return of the fully satisfied financial institution execu-
tion.5
II
We now turn to the merits of this appeal. The defen-
dant claims that the trial court, in granting the motion
to enforce, improperly determined that the parties
reached an enforceable settlement agreement. We dis-
agree.
We begin by setting forth the following applicable
legal principles and standard of review. ‘‘A trial court
5
In support of its mootness claim, the plaintiff argues that there was no
appellate stay in effect either when the financial institution execution was
issued or when it was returned fully satisfied. Whether the plaintiff properly
executed on the judgment is not at issue in this appeal; rather, the relevant
question is whether the ensuing satisfaction of the judgment has rendered
this appeal moot, which we answer in the negative.
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has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settle-
ment agreement as a matter of law when the terms of
the agreement are clear and unambiguous. . . . Agree-
ments that end lawsuits are contracts, sometimes
enforceable in a subsequent suit, but in many situations
enforceable by entry of a judgment in the original suit.
. . . Summary enforcement is not only essential to the
efficient use of judicial resources, but also preserves
the integrity of settlement as a meaningful way to
resolve legal disputes. When parties agree to settle a
case, they are effectively contracting for the right to
avoid a trial. . . . Nevertheless, the right to enforce
summarily a settlement agreement is not unbounded.
The key element with regard to the settlement agree-
ment in [Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership
v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 812, 626 A.2d
729 (1993) (Audubon)] . . . [was] that there [was] no
factual dispute as to the terms of the accord. Generally,
[a] trial court has the inherent power to enforce sum-
marily a settlement agreement as a matter of law [only]
when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambig-
uous . . . and when the parties do not dispute the
terms of the agreement. . . . The rule of Audubon
effects a delicate balance between concerns of judicial
economy on the one hand and a party’s constitutional
rights to a jury and to a trial on the other hand. . . .
To use the Audubon power outside of its proper context
is to deny a party these fundamental rights and would
work a manifest injustice. . . .
‘‘A settlement agreement is a contract among the
parties. . . . In order to form a binding and enforceable
contract, there must exist an offer and an acceptance
based on a mutual understanding by the parties . . . .
The mutual understanding must manifest itself by a
mutual assent between the parties. . . . In other
words, [i]n order for an enforceable contract to exist,
the court must find that the parties’ minds had truly met.
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. . . If there has been a misunderstanding between the
parties, or a misapprehension by one or both so that
their minds have never met, no contract has been
entered into by them and the court will not make for
them a contract which they themselves did not make.
. . . Meeting of the minds is defined as mutual agree-
ment and assent of two parties to contract to substance
and terms. It is an agreement reached by the parties to
a contract and expressed therein, or as the equivalent
of mutual assent or mutual obligation. . . . This defini-
tion refers to fundamental misunderstandings between
the parties as to what are the essential elements or
subjects of the contract. It refers to the terms of the
contract, not to the power of one party to execute a
contract as the agent of another. . . .
‘‘A contract is not made so long as, in the contempla-
tion of the parties, something remains to be done to
establish the contractual relation. The law does not
. . . regard an arrangement as completed which the
parties regard as incomplete. . . . In construing the
agreement . . . the decisive question is the intent of
the parties as expressed. . . . The intention is to be
determined from the language used, the circumstances,
the motives of the parties and the purposes which they
sought to accomplish. . . . Furthermore, [p]arties are
bound to the terms of a contract even though it is not
signed if their assent is otherwise indicated. . . .
‘‘[When] the general terms on which the parties indis-
putably had agreed . . . included all the terms that
were essential to an enforceable agreement . . .
[u]nder the modern law of contract . . . the parties
. . . may reach a binding agreement even if some of
the terms of that agreement are still indefinite. . . .
The test of disputation . . . must be applied to the
parties at the time they entered into the alleged settle-
ment. To hold otherwise would prevent any motion to
enforce a settlement from ever being granted. . . .
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‘‘When a party challenges the trial court’s legal con-
clusion that the agreement was summarily enforceable,
we must determine whether that conclusion is legally
and logically correct and whether [it finds] support in
the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . .
In addition, to the extent that the [party’s] claim impli-
cates the court’s factual findings, our review is limited
to deciding whether such findings were clearly errone-
ous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when
there is no evidence in the record to support it . . .
or when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. . . . In making this determination, every
reasonable presumption must be given in favor of the
trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Worth v. Picard, 233 Conn. App.
38, 47–50, 338 A.3d 1195 (2025).

The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of the defendant’s claim. In the
motion to enforce, the plaintiff represented that (1) on
or about August 18, 2023, the defendant’s trial counsel
contacted the plaintiff’s counsel to convey a settlement
offer pursuant to which (a) the defendant would pay
the plaintiff $50,000, (b) the present action would be
settled, and (c) the defendant would withdraw a federal
action that he had filed in California; see Halajian v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., United States District
Court, Docket No. 2:23-cv-1522 (E.D. Cal.) (California
action); which named as defendants, among others, (i)
Hassett & George, P.C. (law firm), the law firm repre-
senting the plaintiff in the present action, and (ii) James
Trudell, an attorney employed by the law firm, (2) after
consulting with the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s counsel noti-
fied the defendant’s trial counsel that the plaintiff
accepted the settlement offer and, additionally,
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requested that the defendant refrain from serving pro-
cess with respect to the California action, if process
had not yet been served, (3) the plaintiff’s counsel
drafted and submitted proposed settlement documents
to the defendant’s trial counsel, who provided them to
the defendant, and (4) the defendant’s trial counsel
subsequently informed the plaintiff’s counsel that the
defendant had ‘‘ ‘changed his mind’ ’’ and refused to
honor the settlement agreement. (Emphasis omitted.)
The plaintiff argued that its request that the California
action not be served ‘‘was not a condition precedent
to the [settlement] agreement, but rather an instruction
to the defendant since there was now a settlement in
place.’’ The plaintiff maintained that ‘‘all the material
terms of the settlement agreement [were] clearly and
unambiguously present . . . .’’

In his objection to the motion to enforce, the defen-
dant represented that (1) on or about August 18, 2023,
the defendant’s trial counsel contacted the plaintiff’s
counsel to offer to settle the present action for $50,000,
(2) the plaintiff’s counsel responded that the plaintiff
accepted the offer on the condition that the defendant
agreed (a) not to serve process vis-à-vis the California
action on the law firm or Attorney Trudell, or to termi-
nate any pending service, and (b) to withdraw the Cali-
fornia action as to the law firm and Attorney Trudell, (3)
the defendant rejected the plaintiff’s ‘‘verbal [condition]
precedent,’’ did not withdraw the California action, and
subsequently served process on the law firm and Attor-
ney Trudell in the California action, and (4) the plain-
tiff’s counsel submitted proposed settlement docu-
ments to the defendant’s trial counsel after the
defendant had rejected the plaintiff’s ‘‘verbal [condi-
tion] precedent . . . .’’ The defendant maintained that
‘‘[t]here was never a settlement agreement containing
clear and unambiguous terms between the parties, and
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additionally, [the plaintiff’s] counsel made a counterof-
fer, which was indisputably rejected by [the defen-
dant].’’
In its reply memorandum, the plaintiff iterated that
the parties reached a settlement agreement, the terms
of which did not include a condition precedent. The
plaintiff appended three exhibits to the reply memoran-
dum, including (1) emails exchanged between counsel
on August 18, 2023 (August 18, 2023 emails), and (2)
a written, unsigned draft settlement agreement (draft
agreement).6
The August 18, 2023 emails consisted of four emails.
In the first email, sent by the plaintiff’s counsel at 2:08
p.m., the plaintiff’s counsel requested that the defen-
dant’s trial counsel ‘‘confirm our discussion earlier’’ and
execute the attached draft agreement.
In the second email, sent by the plaintiff’s counsel
at 3:45 p.m., the plaintiff’s counsel ‘‘memorialize[d] what
transpired’’ earlier in the day, stating in relevant part
that (1) the defendant’s trial counsel contacted the
plaintiff’s counsel to offer to settle the present action
and to ‘‘settle/withdraw/dismiss the [California action]’’
for $50,000, (2) the plaintiff’s counsel conveyed to the
defendant’s trial counsel via telephone that the plaintiff
accepted the settlement offer, whereby counsel ‘‘agreed
that [they] had a settlement agreement as stated above
and [the plaintiff’s counsel] would draft up the agree-
ment,’’ (3) the plaintiff’s counsel prepared and submit-
ted the draft agreement to the defendant’s trial counsel,
and (4) when the plaintiff’s counsel called the defen-
dant’s trial counsel later in the day to follow up, the
6
The third exhibit was a copy of a decision in an unrelated federal action
involving the defendant. See United States v. Halajian, Docket No. 1:14-
cr-00208-SAB, 2015 WL 7292299 (E.D. Cal. November 19, 2015), aff’d, 671
Fed. Appx. 629 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 581 U.S. 919, 137 S. Ct. 1607,
197 L. Ed. 2d 709 (2017).
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defendant’s trial counsel ‘‘indicated . . . for the first
time that [the defendant] had changed his mind and
[had withdrawn] his settlement offer . . . after the set-
tlement was agreed to and after all of the settlement
documents were prepared.’’ The plaintiff’s counsel fur-
ther stated that ‘‘there was no question that [counsel]
had an agreement as of this morning as [the defendant’s
trial counsel] agreed . . . during [a] phone call this
afternoon.’’
In the third email, sent by the defendant’s trial coun-
sel at 4:23 p.m., the defendant’s trial counsel ‘‘memorial-
ize[d] the entire substance of [the] settlement discus-
sion,’’ stating in relevant part that (1) the defendant’s
trial counsel was prepared to testify under oath that
the plaintiff’s counsel had conveyed that the plaintiff’s
acceptance of the defendant’s settlement offer ‘‘was
only conditional upon [the defendant] not serving [pro-
cess on the] law firm or [Attorney] Trudell [in the Cali-
fornia action],’’7 (2) the defendant did not terminate
service of process on the law firm or Attorney Trudell,
such that ‘‘there was never any performance of the
condition precedent as required by [the defendant] for
acceptance’’ and, therefore, there was no acceptance of
the defendant’s settlement offer, and (3) the defendant’s
trial counsel disputed that the ‘‘oral settlement offer’’
was enforceable.
In the fourth email, sent by the plaintiff’s counsel at
4:34 p.m., the plaintiff’s counsel stated in relevant part:
‘‘We ha[d] [a] deal as evidenced by your email . . . .
The withdrawal of the actions was something to be
performed as part of the settlement as noted in the
[draft] agreement—you simply indicated that you would
talk to [the defendant] about not having [the California
action] served if it had not been done already. However,
7
As we iterate later in this opinion, no testimony was offered during the
Audubon hearing.
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we had a deal which is why I did the [draft] agreement.
We agreed on all the material terms. Moreover, [the
plaintiff] was the party that ‘accepted’ the offer that
you made when you call[ed] me to convey the [$50,000]
offer. Acceptance was done on our end, when I called
you to accept [the defendant’s $50,000] offer today, not
the other way around. You and I both know we had a
deal and [the defendant] changed his mind after the
fact as you admitted today . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted.)
The draft agreement contained terms providing, inter
alia, that (1) the defendant would pay the plaintiff
$50,000 and (2) the parties agreed that the settlement
agreement would ‘‘completely [resolve] any and all
claims between the [p]arties that were asserted, or that
could have been asserted, against any of the [p]arties
named in the [present] [a]ction or relating to or arising
out of the [parties’ commercial] [c]ontract, as well as
claims asserted [against] parties to the California
[a]ction . . . . In addition, upon the execution of th[e]
[settlement] agreement, [the defendant] shall within
[three] business days withdraw or dismiss any and all
lawsuits filed against the parties to th[e] [settlement]
agreement as well as [certain nonparties] that [were]
reportedly filed in California that relates to or arises
out of the [parties’ commercial] [c]ontract . . . .’’ The
draft agreement made no mention of service of process
with regard to the California action.
At the outset of the Audubon hearing, the court asked
counsel whether they wanted to offer evidence or to
have the court decide the motion to enforce ‘‘on the
basis of what is in the record and the argument [at the
hearing].’’ Counsel agreed to present argument on the
motion to enforce and to rely on the record, including
the August 18, 2023 emails and the draft agreement,
without submitting evidence.
Additionally, during the Audubon hearing, the court
asked counsel to specify what in the record the court
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should consider in determining the terms of the settle-
ment agreement. The plaintiff’s counsel argued that the
settlement agreement’s terms were delineated in the
draft agreement. The plaintiff’s counsel further argued
that, as the August 18, 2023 emails reflected, he emailed
the draft agreement to the defendant’s trial counsel,
who, in his response email, did not dispute the terms
set forth in the draft agreement but, rather, asserted
that there was a condition precedent concerning the
California action that had not been satisfied. The follow-
ing colloquy then occurred between the court and the
defendant’s trial counsel:
‘‘The Court: So [the defendant’s trial counsel], I’m
just going to flip it back to you. If you do agree that,
okay, the settlement agreement is X, but judge, [the]
plaintiff loses [its] argument because [the settlement
agreement] wasn’t complete, it didn’t contain material
terms, et cetera, et cetera.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Trial Counsel]: Yeah, I would go
with the latter, Your Honor. . . . I’m not going to say
that [the plaintiff’s counsel is] wrong in that the amount
of money is the same—I mean, I would argue that not
every term in [the draft] agreement was discussed. I
probably should have had that in my possession . . .
at some point. So, I think that the argument would be
there may be a discrepancy between the phone call
[between counsel] and the [draft agreement].’’
In its decision granting the motion to enforce, after
referencing the motion, the defendant’s objection, and
the plaintiff’s reply memorandum, the court stated that,
‘‘in arriving at its decision, [the court] consider[ed] care-
fully the full positions of the parties, including the argu-
ments of the attorneys at the [Audubon] hearing . . . .
At the [Audubon] hearing, counsel for the parties did
not disagree on what the purported [settlement] agree-
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ment consisted of, but only whether or not the [settle-
ment] agreement (1) was clear and unambiguous, and
(2) . . . contained a certain condition precedent [relat-
ing to the California action], which had not occurred.
The terms of the [settlement] agreement were set forth
in [the draft] agreement, which the defendant later uni-
laterally chose not to bind himself to. . . . The court
has examined the [draft] agreement, and finds that its
terms were clear [and] unambiguous, and [that it] con-
tained all essential terms. Further, [the draft agreement]
did not state or contemplate any condition precedent
remaining to be satisfied.’’ The court further stated that
‘‘it is important to note that counsel waived the presen-
tation of sworn testimony at the [Audubon] hearing.’’

The defendant asserts that the court improperly
determined that the parties reached an enforceable set-
tlement agreement. The defendant maintains that the
record, in particular the August 18, 2023 emails, demon-
strated that a dispute existed between the parties as to
the settlement terms, and, therefore, the parties did not
reach a settlement agreement for the court to enforce
summarily pursuant to Audubon. We are not persuaded.

Preliminarily, we iterate, as the court noted in its
decision, that the parties waived their right to offer
sworn testimony at the Audubon hearing. Thus, the only
evidence in the record vis-à-vis the motion to enforce
comprised (1) the August 18, 2023 emails and (2) the
draft agreement. In his appellate brief, the defendant
repeatedly relies on representations made by his trial
counsel in his opposition to the motion to enforce;
however, insofar as the defendant views these represen-
tations to be part of the evidentiary record, it is well
settled that such representations are not evidence. See,
e.g., Norberg-Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 162 Conn. App. 661,
670, 133 A.3d 482 (2016) (‘‘[t]his court, as well as our
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Supreme Court, repeatedly has stated that representa-
tions of counsel are not evidence’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
On the basis of the record, we conclude that the court
reasonably determined that there was no dispute that
the parties reached a settlement agreement as deline-
ated in the draft agreement. First, the August 18, 2023
emails support this determination.8 The emails sent by
the plaintiff’s counsel reflected that the parties agreed
to a settlement pursuant to the terms set forth in the
draft agreement, which required the withdrawal of the
California action but did not contain a condition prece-
dent regarding service of process vis-à-vis the California
action. The single email sent by the defendant’s trial
counsel reflected that the defendant did not raise con-
cerns as to the terms contained in the draft agreement;
instead, the defendant’s sole issue revolved around the
defendant’s position that the parties had contemplated
a condition precedent with respect to service of process
in the California action, which was not satisfied. It is
well settled that weighing conflicting evidence is within
the exclusive province of the trial court. See M. W. v.
G. C., 232 Conn. App. 677, 683–84, 337 A.3d 758 (2025)
(‘‘The trial court, as trier of fact, determine[s] who and
what to believe and the weight to be accorded the
evidence. The sifting and weighing of evidence is pecu-
liarly the function of the trier.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)); see also Hudson City Savings Bank
v. Hellman, 234 Conn. App. 45, 66, A.3d (2025)
8
Although the court’s decision does not mention the August 18, 2023
emails expressly, the decision references the plaintiff’s reply memorandum
to which the August 18, 2023 emails were appended. Additionally, during
the Audubon hearing, (1) the court stated that it had reviewed the motion
to enforce, the defendant’s objection, and the reply memorandum, and (2)
counsel relied on the August 18, 2023 emails during argument. Moreover,
‘‘we are entitled to presume that the trial court acted properly and considered
all the evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Diaz v. Manchester
Memorial Hospital, 161 Conn. App. 787, 795, 130 A.3d 868 (2015).
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(‘‘[The court] is free to juxtapose conflicting versions
of events and determine which is more credible. . . .
It is the [finder of fact’s] exclusive province to weigh
the conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility
of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
Here, the court was free to accept the events regarding
the formation of the settlement agreement as detailed
in the emails from the plaintiff’s counsel and to reject
the defendant’s conflicting version of those events in
the email from his trial counsel, and we will not disturb
on appeal the court’s resolution of that conflict.
Second, the transcript of the Audubon hearing
reflects an acknowledgement by the defendant’s trial
counsel that the parties entered into a settlement agree-
ment as set forth in the draft agreement. During the
Audubon hearing, the defendant’s trial counsel did not
challenge the statement by the plaintiff’s counsel that
the draft agreement reflected a settlement agreement
reached by the parties; rather, when asked by the court
regarding his position on the purported settlement
agreement, the defendant’s trial counsel responded that
the draft agreement contained terms not discussed pre-
viously by counsel and that there was a ‘‘discrepancy’’
between the terms laid out in the draft agreement and
the terms discussed by counsel via telephone. In other
words, these statements reflect that the defendant’s
trial counsel did not dispute the existence of a settle-
ment agreement but maintained that the draft agree-
ment did not accurately reflect the terms of the settle-
ment.9 The court rejected this argument, determining
that (1) the draft agreement ‘‘contained all essential
terms,’’ (2) the terms of the draft agreement were ‘‘clear
[and] unambiguous,’’ and (3) there was no condition
9
During the Audubon hearing, the defendant’s trial counsel made isolated
statements that (1) ‘‘[the parties] clearly have a dispute as to what took
place [during counsel’s settlement discussions]’’ and (2) ‘‘[the defendant is]
saying that the [settlement] agreement never happened [because] [t]here
was never a meeting of the minds due to the condition that [the plaintiff’s
counsel] set forth.’’ As we conclude, however, on the basis of the record,
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precedent included in the terms of the draft agreement.
With the exception of the court’s determination that
the draft agreement did not set forth a condition prece-
dent, the defendant raises no cognizable claim on
appeal challenging the court’s analysis vis-à-vis the draft
agreement, and, therefore, we need not discuss it fur-
ther.10
the court reasonably determined that there was no dispute that the parties
reached a settlement agreement.
10
Although the defendant’s appellate brief is not clear on this point, the
defendant appears to assert that the court improperly determined that the
draft agreement did not contain a condition precedent, citing provisions in
the draft agreement requiring him to release his claims with respect to the
California action. Insofar as the defendant properly has raised such an
assertion, it is untenable because we construe the release of claims vis-à-
vis the California action to be a duty to be performed pursuant to the
settlement agreement, rather than a condition precedent. See Electrical
Contractors, Inc. v. 50 Morgan Hospitality Group, LLC, 211 Conn. App. 724,
735–36, 273 A.3d 726 (2022) (‘‘It is well settled that [a] condition precedent
is a fact or event which the parties intend must exist or take place before
there is a right to performance. . . . A condition is distinguished from a
promise in that it creates no right or duty in and of itself but is merely a
limiting or modifying factor. . . . If the condition is not fulfilled, the right
to enforce the contract does not come into existence.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)).
Insofar as the defendant has attempted to raise other claims challenging
the court’s determination that the draft agreement contained all essential
terms and that the terms in the draft agreement were clear and unambiguous,
he has not provided any substantive legal analysis, and, therefore, any such
claims are abandoned as inadequately briefed. See Randolph v. Mambrino,
216 Conn. App. 126, 152, 284 A.3d 645 (2022) (‘‘[A]lthough we allow [self-
represented] litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides
no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law . . . and [w]e repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not
required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court
through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract asser-
tion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues
but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive
discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . .
For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of
error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth
their arguments in their briefs.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.)).
Finally, the defendant appears to claim that the court violated his right
to a jury trial in resolving factual issues in connection with the motion to
enforce. In short, this claim has no merit. See Ackerman v. Sobol Family
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The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Partnership, LLP, 298 Conn. 495, 535, 4 A.3d 288 (2010) (motion to enforce
settlement agreement was ‘‘essentially equitable in nature’’ and, therefore,
trial court was entitled to resolve factual dispute without jury); see also
Kinity v. US Bancorp, 212 Conn. App. 791, 816–17, 277 A.3d 200 (2022)
(‘‘[i]n [Ackerman], our Supreme Court extended Audubon to permit the
[trial] court to resolve issues of fact raised in connection with a motion to
enforce a settlement agreement’’).