Krausman v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.

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Krausman v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.

DONNA KRAUSMAN v. LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY
(AC 46782)
Elgo, Moll and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff insured appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defen-
dant insurance company on her amended complaint alleging a violation of
the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance dispute concerning
underinsured motorist benefits. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improp-
erly granted the defendant’s motion to bifurcate and stay discovery. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion
to bifurcate and stay discovery, as the court reasonably could have concluded
that bifurcation of the claims served interests of convenience and judicial
efficiency and may have negated the need to litigate certain other issues.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion
for an order of compliance with her discovery requests, as the defendant
eventually filed a notice of compliance and the plaintiff did not allege any
prejudice resulting from the defendant’s delay in complying with her discov-
ery requests.

This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that the trial
court erred with respect to certain legal and factual determinations, as the
plaintiff failed to furnish an adequate record for review.

The trial court applied a proper legal standard in ruling on the counts of
the plaintiff’s complaint alleging that the defendant failed to act in good
faith pursuant to a provision of CUTPA and that it acted in bad faith in
violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the court
reasonably could have concluded, in light of the evidence and the related
findings of fact, that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating
that the defendant had acted in bad faith.

Argued October 29, 2024—officially released October 28, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover underinsured motorist benefits
allegedly due pursuant to an automobile insurance pol-
icy issued by the defendant, and for other relief, brought
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Krausman v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-
Norwalk, where the court, Jacobs, J., granted the defen-
dant’s motion to bifurcate; thereafter, the underinsured
motorist claim was referred to an arbitrator, who issued
a decision for the plaintiff; subsequently, the court,
Jacobs, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment
in accordance with the arbitrator’s award; thereafter,
the court, Hernandez, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion
for an order of compliance; subsequently, the court,
Krumeich, J., granted in part the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed an amended
complaint; thereafter, the case was tried to the court,
Hon. Charles T. Lee, judge trial referee; judgment for
the defendant on the amended complaint, from which
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Steven A. Landis, with whom, on the brief, was Alan
Scott Pickel, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Kevin P. Polansky, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The plaintiff, Donna Krausman, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court in this insurance
coverage dispute. The plaintiff claims that the court
improperly (1) granted a motion to bifurcate and stay
discovery filed by the defendant, Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Company, (2) denied her motion for an order of
compliance, and (3) rendered judgment in favor of the
defendant on counts three and four of the operative
complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The facts of the underlying automobile accident are
not in dispute. On April 14, 2015, the plaintiff was
operating a vehicle insured by the defendant. At the
intersection of Fifth Street and Gregory Boulevard in
Norwalk, a vehicle operated by Anne Neilson collided
with the plaintiff’s vehicle, causing physical injury to
the plaintiff.
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Neilson’s automobile insurance policy provided
$50,000 in coverage for bodily injury. After the plaintiff
made a claim against Neilson, Neilson’s insurer paid
the plaintiff $50,000, the full amount available under
Neilson’s policy.
The plaintiff’s insurance policy with the defendant
provided $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage.
On May 1, 2015, the plaintiff, through her attorney,
advised the defendant of a potential underinsured
motorist claim. After she recovered the full amount
available under Neilson’s policy, the plaintiff notified
the defendant on October 26, 2016, that she would be
pursuing an underinsured motorist claim. At that time,
she provided the defendant with copies of her medical
records and bills, verification of Neilson’s policy limits,
a copy of the settlement check from Neilson’s insurer,
and an affidavit verifying that Neilson had no other
insurance. Those materials indicated, inter alia, that the
plaintiff had incurred $17,138.52 in medical expenses
as a result of the April 14, 2015 automobile accident.
On December 7, 2016, the defendant’s claim adjuster
completed her initial evaluation of the plaintiff’s claim
and concluded that its value was at least $11,500 less
than the $50,000 tendered by Neilson’s insurer.1 For
that reason, the adjuster concluded that the plaintiff’s
underinsured motorist coverage was not triggered. The
adjuster subsequently called the plaintiff’s attorney on
two occasions to request additional medical records
and left voice messages requesting a response. The
plaintiff’s attorney did not respond to those communica-
tions.
The plaintiff commenced the present action against
the defendant on January 12, 2017.2 Her complaint con-
tained three counts. In count one, the plaintiff alleged
As the court noted in its memorandum of decision, the plaintiff ‘‘did not
1

challenge this calculation at trial or in [her] posttrial memoranda.’’
2
As the court found in its memorandum of decision, ‘‘[p]rior to initiation
of the lawsuit . . . [the defendant] did not advise the plaintiff of its position
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Krausman v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.

breach of contract, claiming that she was entitled to
underinsured motorist benefits from the defendant. In
counts two and three, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had engaged in unfair and deceptive insur-
ance practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair
Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA), General Statutes
§ 38a-815 et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et
seq., respectively.
On April 17, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to
bifurcate, in which it sought to stay the litigation as to
the CUIPA and CUTPA counts until after count one,
the underinsured motorist claim, had been resolved. By
order dated June 24, 2017, the court granted that
motion. The court subsequently referred count one to
an arbitrator pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549u.3
See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mottolese, 261 Conn.
521, 529, 803 A.2d 311 (2002) (explaining that § 52-549u
et seq. established ‘‘nonbinding arbitration program’’
for certain civil actions).
On January 17, 2018, the arbitrator issued a decision
in which he found in favor of the plaintiff on her underin-
sured motorist claim and awarded her $19,500 in dam-
ages. When the defendant declined to demand a trial
de novo on that claim, the arbitrator’s decision became
a judgment of the court pursuant to General Statutes
(Rev. to 2017) § 52-549z.4
regarding her claim or its value. It did not send a customary ‘ample coverage’
letter and did not make an offer to resolve the plaintiff’s claim.’’
3
General Statutes § 52-549u provides in relevant part that ‘‘the court, in
its discretion, may refer to an arbitrator, for proceedings authorized pursuant
to this chapter, any civil action in which in the discretion of the court, the
reasonable expectation of a judgment is less than fifty thousand dollars
exclusive of legal interest and costs and in which a claim for a trial by jury
and a certificate of closed pleadings have been filed. . . .’’
4
General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 52-549z provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
A decision of the arbitrator shall become a judgment of the court if no
appeal from the arbitrator’s decision by way of a demand for a trial de novo
is filed in accordance with subsection (d) of this section. . . .
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In June, 2018, the plaintiff served the defendant with
postjudgment interrogatories pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 52-351b, seeking discovery on the defendant’s
assets. On July 12, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for
an order of compliance, claiming that the defendant
had ‘‘failed to respond’’ to those interrogatories. The
defendant filed an objection to that motion for compli-
ance, in which it averred that it had raised a timely
objection to the interrogatories with the plaintiff ‘‘on
the ground that no final judgment had issued in the
case.’’ On August 16, 2018, the plaintiff filed a second
motion for an order of compliance; the defendant filed
a notice of compliance with the plaintiff’s discovery
requests eleven days later. On September 6, 2018, the
plaintiff filed a third motion for an order of compliance
‘‘regarding the defendant’s late objections and failure
to fully and fairly answer’’ her discovery requests, to
which the defendant objected. Following a hearing, the
court sustained that objection and denied the plaintiff’s
motion for an order of compliance.
On November 1, 2018, the plaintiff filed an appeal
with this court, challenging the propriety of the court’s
denial of her motion for an order of compliance. In
response, the defendant argued that the appeal should
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because a final judgment had not yet been rendered on
all counts of the plaintiff’s complaint. This court agreed
with the defendant and, in a decision released on Febru-
ary 11, 2020, concluded that ‘‘the [trial] court’s ruling
was an interlocutory discovery order in an ongoing civil
action that is not immediately appealable because it
neither terminated a separate and distinct proceeding
nor deprived the plaintiff of a presently held statutory
or constitutional right that would be irretrievably lost
‘‘(d) An appeal by way of a demand for a trial de novo must be filed with
the court clerk within twenty days after the deposit of the arbitrator’s
decision in the United States mail, as evidenced by the postmark . . . .’’
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in the absence of immediate appellate review.’’ Kraus-
man v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 195 Conn. App. 682,
684, 227 A.3d 91 (2020). This court further concluded
that, ‘‘[b]ecause the appeal was taken prior to the court
rendering a final judgment on all counts of the plaintiff’s
complaint, the appeal is premature and jurisdictionally
defective.’’ Id., 695. This court thus dismissed the plain-
tiff’s appeal. Id.
While that appeal was pending, the trial court issued
its decision on a motion for summary judgment that
the defendant filed on the CUIPA and CUTPA counts
of the plaintiff’s complaint. The court first concluded
that CUIPA does not authorize a private cause of action
and, accordingly, rendered summary judgment in favor
of the defendant on the second count of the complaint.
The court denied the motion for summary judgment
with respect to the CUTPA count, concluding that the
defendant had not demonstrated that no genuine issues
of material fact exist as to whether it had engaged in
improper business practices.
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on Novem-
ber 15, 2021, which is the operative complaint in this
case. That complaint included revisions to the CUTPA
claim set forth in count three and a fourth count that
alleged a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. In response, the defendant filed an
answer and several special defenses. In those special
defenses, the defendant alleged, inter alia, that it had
not paid the $19,500 arbitration award on the first count
of the complaint ‘‘because such award is not a final,
payable judgment.’’ The defendant further alleged that
its legal counsel had advised ‘‘that [the defendant]
should not pay the arbitrator’s award until such time
as it became a payable judgment of the court,’’ empha-
sizing that it had articulated that position in its commu-
nications with the plaintiff’s counsel and its pleadings
before the court.
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A five day court trial followed, and both parties filed
posttrial briefs. In its subsequent memorandum of deci-
sion, the court found that the plaintiff had not estab-
lished a CUIPA violation and, thus, could not prevail
on the CUTPA claim set forth in count three of the
operative complaint. See Artie’s Auto Body, Inc. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 317 Conn. 602, 624, 119 A.3d
1139 (2015) (‘‘a plaintiff cannot bring a CUTPA claim
alleging an unfair insurance practice unless the practice
violates CUIPA’’). The court then rejected the breach
of good faith and fair dealing claim contained in count
four, finding that the defendant had not acted in bad
faith.5
On May 24, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion to rear-
gue. The court granted that motion and held a hearing
on July 20, 2023. By order dated July 26, 2023, the court
made a technical correction to one statement in its
memorandum of decision and rejected all other argu-
ments advanced by the plaintiff.6 This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
granted the motion to bifurcate and stay discovery filed
by the defendant. We disagree.
It is well established that the trial court is vested
with discretion to bifurcate a civil trial. ‘‘Pursuant to
General Statutes § 52-2057 and Practice Book § 15-1,8
5
The court also noted that, ‘‘[b]ecause the court has found that the plaintiff
has failed to prevail under either count three or count four, it does not
address the special defenses pleaded by [the defendant].’’
6
In its order on the plaintiff’s motion to reargue, the court noted that it
had ‘‘incorrectly stated [in its memorandum of decision] that . . . the testi-
mony of one of the lead claim handlers . . . was contained in a deposition
transcript that was not admitted in evidence. In fact, [that] evidence . . .
came in as evidence at trial.’’
7
‘‘General Statutes § 52-205 provides: ‘In all cases, whether entered upon
the docket as jury cases or court cases, the court may order that one or
more of the issues joined be tried before the others.’ ’’ Barry v. Quality
Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 449 n.21, 820 A.2d 258 (2003).
8
‘‘Practice Book § 15-1 [provides]: ‘In all cases, whether entered upon the
docket as jury cases or court cases, the judicial authority may order that
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the trial court may order that one or more issues that are
joined be tried before the others. The interests served by
bifurcated trials are convenience, negation of prejudice
and judicial efficiency. . . . Bifurcation may be appro-
priate in cases in which litigation of one issue may
obviate the need to litigate another issue. . . . The
bifurcation of trial proceedings lies solely within the
discretion of the trial court.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote
altered; footnote in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263
Conn. 424, 448–49, 820 A.2d 258 (2003). When a trial
court exercises its discretion to bifurcate a civil trial,
‘‘appellate review is limited to a determination of
whether this discretion has been abused. . . . In
reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discre-
tion [in bifurcating certain issues at trial] the unques-
tioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of
the trial court and every reasonable presumption should
be given in favor of its correctness; the ultimate issue
is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it
did . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Saczynski v. Saczynski, 109 Conn. App. 426,
428, 951 A.2d 670 (2008).
On our review of the record, we cannot say that the
court abused its discretion in the present case. The
court reasonably could have determined that bifurca-
tion of the breach of contract claim from the CUTPA
and breach of good faith and fair dealing claims served
interests of convenience and judicial efficiency and may
have negated the need to litigate other issues related
to whether the defendant acted in bad faith in handling
one or more of the issues joined be tried before the others. [Where the
pleadings in an action present issues both of law and of fact, the issues of
law must be tried first, unless the judicial authority otherwise directs. If
some, but not all, of the issues in a cause are put to the jury, the remaining
issue or issues shall be tried first, unless the judicial authority otherwise
directs].’ ’’ Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 449 n.22,
820 A.2d 258 (2003).
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the plaintiff’s claim. See, e.g., Dorfman v. Smith, 342
Conn. 582, 588, 271 A.3d 53 (2022) (trial court bifurcated
trial on breach of contract claim regarding underinsured
motorist benefits ‘‘from the extracontractual claims’’);
Hunte v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 68 Conn. App. 534,
536, 792 A.2d 132 (2002) (trial court bifurcated trial
on breach of contract claim for underinsured motorist
benefits ‘‘from the trial of the bad faith and CUTPA and
CUIPA claims’’); Falcone v. American Commerce Ins.
Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Nor-
walk, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 24, 2015)
(61 Conn. L. Rptr. 150, 151) (concluding that bifurcation
was in interest of convenience and judicial efficiency
and noting that ‘‘[r]esolution of the plaintiffs’ claim for
breach of contract may well be dispositive of their claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing’’). In this case, bifurcation permitted the
court to refer the breach of contract count regarding
the defendant’s liability for underinsured motorist pay-
ments to an arbitrator pursuant to § 52-549u. The record
indicates that the arbitrator promptly issued his deci-
sion five days after the arbitration hearing, as the plain-
tiff acknowledged in her February 23, 2018 motion for
judgment.

In its decision to grant the motion to bifurcate and
stay discovery, the court also noted that the resolution
of the first count of the operative complaint may obviate
the need to litigate another issue. Although the arbitra-
tor ultimately concluded that the defendant was, in fact,
liable for $19,500 in underinsured motorist damages, if
the arbitrator instead had concluded that Neilson was
not underinsured or that the plaintiff had not sustained
damages that triggered her underinsured motorist cov-
erage with the defendant, such a conclusion may well
have obviated the need to litigate other issues regarding
whether the defendant acted in bad faith in handling
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her underinsured motorist claim. For all of those rea-
sons, and mindful of our obligation to make every rea-
sonable presumption in favor of the correctness of the
court’s exercise of its discretion; see Saczynski v. Sac-
zynski, supra, 109 Conn. App. 428; we conclude that
the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
motion to bifurcate and stay discovery filed by the
defendant.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
denied her motion for an order of compliance with her
discovery requests. We do not agree.
At the outset, we note that ‘‘[t]he granting or denial
of a discovery request rests in the sound discretion of
the court.’’ Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn.
48, 57, 459 A.2d 503 (1983). ‘‘Judicial discretion is always
a legal discretion, exercised according to the recognized
principles of equity. . . . The action of the trial court
is not to be disturbed unless it abused its legal discre-
tion, and [i]n determining this the unquestioned rule is
that great weight is due to the action of the trial court
and every reasonable presumption should be given in
favor of its correctness. . . . In determining whether
there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue
is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it
did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parisi v. Par-
isi, 315 Conn. 370, 386, 107 A.3d 920 (2015).
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. On January 17, 2018, the arbitrator issued a deci-
sion in which he found in favor of the plaintiff on her
underinsured motorist claim and awarded her $19,500
in damages. That decision became a judgment of the
court pursuant to § 52-549z when the defendant did not
demand a trial de novo on that claim. In June, 2018,
the plaintiff served the defendant with postjudgment
interrogatories pursuant to § 52-351b. It is undisputed
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that other counts of the plaintiff’s complaint remained
pending at that time.
On July 12, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for an
order of compliance, claiming that the defendant had
‘‘failed to respond’’ to those interrogatories. The defen-
dant filed an objection to that motion for compliance,
in which it averred that it had raised a timely objection
to the interrogatories ‘‘on the ground that no final judg-
ment had issued in the case.’’ Attached as an exhibit
to that objection was an email dated July 9, 2018, from
the defendant’s counsel to the plaintiff’s counsel, which
states in relevant part: ‘‘[The defendant] hereby objects
to [the] [p]laintiff’s Post-Judgment Remedy Interrogato-
ries. [The defendant] disputes [the plaintiff’s] assertion
that [a] final judgment has entered in this matter.’’ The
defendant also claimed that the plaintiff’s postjudgment
interrogatories, which sought discovery on the defen-
dant’s assets, were ‘‘inherently frivolous,’’ as ‘‘[t]here is
simply no good faith basis for the plaintiff to believe
that [the defendant] lacks sufficient assets to pay the
arbitrator’s award of $19,500 as to count one of the
complaint.’’
On July 27, 2018, the plaintiff filed a reply to the
defendant’s objection, in which she argued, inter alia,
that a final judgment ‘‘is not required’’ for the service
of postjudgment interrogatories. On August 8, 2018, the
plaintiff filed a request for argument on her motion for
an order of compliance, in which she stated that the
motion ‘‘involves issues of law and statutory interpreta-
tion with respect to when a judgment can be collected
upon in a bifurcated matter that will likely require fur-
ther elaboration and inquiry by the court’’ and that
‘‘[t]here exists no case law on point.’’
On August 16, 2018, the plaintiff filed a second motion
for an order of compliance. In that motion, the plaintiff
averred that she had consented to a thirty day extension
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to her previous discovery request ‘‘making [the defen-
dant’s] answers . . . due no later than . . . August 15,
2018.’’ Because the defendant had not complied with
that deadline, the plaintiff requested, among other
things, the entry of a default against the defendant and
an award of costs and attorney’s fees in her favor. On
August 27, 2018, the defendant filed a notice of compli-
ance with the plaintiff’s discovery requests. At that time,
the defendant filed separate responses to the plaintiff’s
interrogatories and her request for the production of
documents.
On September 6, 2018, the plaintiff filed a third motion
for an order of compliance ‘‘regarding the defendant’s
late objections and failure to fully and fairly answer’’
her discovery requests. One week later, the plaintiff
filed another request for argument, stating in relevant
part that her motion ‘‘involves [an] issue of law as to
what costs a party can claim after the entrance of a
judgment after an arbitration award in a bifurcated case.
This case has a unique procedural history that requires
further explanation before the court.’’ On September
28, 2018, the defendant filed an objection to the plain-
tiff’s third motion for an order of compliance, in which
it argued that (1) it had furnished the ‘‘entire claims
file for [the plaintiff’s] claim’’ to the plaintiff; (2) the
plaintiff’s request for documents ‘‘are vague, overbroad,
and seek highly confidential and protected materials
from innumerable private individuals who are not a
party to this lawsuit’’; (3) the information sought in
certain interrogatories was ‘‘contained and identified
in the documents’’ already produced by the defendant;
and (4) the defendant ‘‘previously objected to the plain-
tiff’s discovery requests and the plaintiff has neither
alleged nor shown any prejudice from the allegedly
untimely objections.’’
The court subsequently held a hearing on the plain-
tiff’s motion for an order of compliance with her discov-
ery requests. Following that hearing, the court sustained
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the defendant’s objections and denied the plaintiff’s
motion. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
abused its discretion in doing so.
The record before us indicates that, although the
defendant did not respond to the plaintiff’s discovery
requests by the August 15, 2018 deadline, it responded
to those requests and filed a notice of compliance there-
with eleven days later on August 27, 2018. At the hearing
on the plaintiff’s motion for an order of compliance,
the defendant’s counsel emphasized that the defendant
had objected to the plaintiff’s initial discovery request.
In response to questions from the trial court, counsel
also confirmed that the defendant had filed a notice of
compliance and had ‘‘produced the entire claims file in
this case.’’ The plaintiff has not alleged, before the trial
court or this court, that any prejudice resulted from
the defendant’s eleven day delay in complying with her
discovery requests.9 Furthermore, the primary basis of
the defendant’s July 26, 2018 objection to the plaintiff’s
postjudgment interrogatories was that ‘‘there is no final
judgment in this case,’’ a proposition that this court
ultimately concluded was correct. See Krausman v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 195 Conn. App. 695. In
light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s
motion for an order of compliance and sustaining the
defendant’s objection thereto.10
9
When the defendant filed its notice of compliance with the plaintiff’s
discovery requests, the pleadings had not closed and more than seven months
remained until the discovery deadline ordered by the court.
10
In her principal appellate brief, the plaintiff notes that, pursuant to
Practice Book § 13-14, the court is authorized to enter ‘‘(1) [a]n order of
compliance; (2) [t]he award to the discovering party of the costs of the
motion, including a reasonable attorney’s fee; (3) [t]he entry of an order
that the matters regarding which the discovery was sought or other desig-
nated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action
in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; (4) [t]he entry
of an order prohibiting the party who has failed to comply from introducing
designated matters in evidence; (5) [a]n order of dismissal, nonsuit or
default.’’ She then contends that ‘‘[n]one of the aforementioned relief permit-
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Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiff contends
that the court improperly limited the scope of discovery
in ruling on her motion for an order of compliance, we
disagree. At the hearing on that motion, the defendant’s
counsel maintained that the plaintiff sought the com-
plete files of unidentified third parties who had made
claims for underinsured motorist benefits against the
defendant, which were protected from disclosure under
the Connecticut Insurance Information and Privacy Pro-
tection Act, General Statutes § 38a-975 et seq.11 As coun-
sel stated, the plaintiff requested ‘‘the entire claims file
of every single underinsured, uninsured motorist vehi-
cle claim that’s been made against [the defendant]
. . . .’’ Noting that the plaintiff had baldly alleged that
the defendant had engaged in a general business prac-
tice but had not alleged any specific facts to substantiate
ted the [court] to completely ignore [her] August 16, 2018 motion for [an]
order of compliance and allow the defendant’s late filed objections.’’
The plaintiff misunderstands that rule of practice. As this court has
explained, Practice Book § 13-14 ‘‘provides sanctions for failure to answer
interrogatories, which the court may order upon motion as the ends of
justice require. These orders may vary in severity from entry of a nonsuit
or default or judgment of dismissal to an award of costs of the motion,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee. . . . Decisions on the entry of such
sanctions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Magana v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 164 Conn. App. 729, 733, 138 A.3d 966 (2016). Section 13-14 thus
authorizes, but does not require, the court to impose any sanction out-
lined therein.
11
In her interrogatories, the plaintiff sought discovery on not only the
handling of her claim, but those of unidentified third parties. More specifi-
cally, she requested the following from the defendant:
‘‘Your complete file with respect to any and all claims in Connecticut
meeting the following criteria:
‘‘a. In which a lawsuit was initiated by an insured of [the defendant]
against [the defendant].
‘‘b. In which the underlying tortfeasor’s claim settled prior to litigation
being commenced.
‘‘c. In which a demand was made by an insured of [the defendant] to [the
defendant] prior to the initiation of a lawsuit against [the defendant].
‘‘d. In which the accident occurred from January 1, 2010, to the present.
‘‘The names and claim numbers for all of the claimants from January,
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that claim, the defendant’s counsel argued that her dis-
covery request was overbroad and improper. See Jour-
nal Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn.
673, 681, 804 A.2d 823 (2002) (‘‘Discovery is confined
to facts material to the plaintiff’s cause of action and
does not afford an open invitation to delve into the
defendant’s affairs. . . . A plaintiff must be able to
demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that
the information sought is both material and necessary
to his action. . . . A plaintiff should describe with such
details as may be reasonably available the material he
seeks . . . and should not be allowed to indulge a hope
that a thorough ransacking of any information and mate-
rial which the defendant may possess would turn up
evidence helpful to [his] case.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)); Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 28 Conn.
App. 660, 672, 613 A.2d 838 (1992) (‘‘[F]or a plaintiff to
allege CUIPA and CUTPA violations successfully the
plaintiff must allege more than a singular failure to
settle a plaintiff’s claim fairly. The plaintiff must allege
that the defendant has committed the alleged wrongful
acts with such frequency as to indicate a general busi-
ness practice. . . . [The plaintiff] makes no allegations
that the defendant has similarly failed to settle similar
claims presented by other claimants . . . .’’).
In its order on the defendant’s objection to the plain-
tiff’s motion, the court stated: ‘‘Based upon the argu-
ments and representations of counsel for the defendant,
the defendant’s objection to the plaintiff’s motion and
request for discovery is sustained.’’12 On our review
2013, through the present wherein [the defendant] took the same position in
processing those claims as it did with the claim that is subject to this lawsuit.’’
12
We note that the court granted a motion for reargument on that ruling.
On May 13, 2019, the plaintiff filed a request to have that reargument adjudi-
cated. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for reassignment of the outstand-
ing discovery disputes pursuant to Practice Book § 11-19 (b). The court
granted that motion and ordered as follows: ‘‘The case is reassigned to
Judge Krumeich. The parties must reclaim the subject motion [to adjudicate
the pending discovery motions].’’ The plaintiff did not subsequently reclaim
her motion at any time.
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of the record, we conclude that the plaintiff has not
demonstrated that the court abused its discretion in
that regard.13
III
The plaintiff claims that the court improperly ren-
dered judgment in favor of the defendant on counts
three and four of the operative complaint, which alleged
a CUTPA violation and a breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. She contends that the
court erred with respect to three factual determina-
tions. The plaintiff further claims that the court’s legal
determinations, which were predicated on the factual
findings set forth in its memorandum of decision, were
improper. We decline to reach the merits of all but one
of these claims because the plaintiff has failed to furnish
this court with an adequate record for review.
A
Challenges to the factual determinations of the trial
court require us to review the entirety of the record
before the court. It is axiomatic that ‘‘[a] finding of fact
will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in
view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) MJM Landscaping,
Inc. v. Lorant, 268 Conn. 429, 436, 845 A.2d 382 (2004).
‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
13
Days after the court denied her motion for an order of compliance and
sustained the defendant’s objection thereto, the plaintiff filed a request to
file an amended complaint, which the court granted. In her October 9, 2018
amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged in relevant part that the defendant
‘‘has engaged in a similar manner as to demonstrate a general business
practice that is in violation of [CUTPA], including but not limited to, the
foregoing underinsured/uninsured motorist claims’’ and then specified five
civil actions against the defendant and their corresponding docket numbers.
Her operative complaint filed on November 15, 2021, similarly specifies
eight such civil actions with particularity.
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court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Powell-Ferri v. Ferri, 326 Conn. 457, 464, 165 A.3d 1124
(2017). ‘‘Our authority, when reviewing the findings of
a judge, is circumscribed by the deference we must
give to decisions of the trier of fact, who is usually in
a superior position to appraise and weigh the evidence.
. . . The question for [an appellate] court . . . is not
whether it would have made the findings the trial court
did, but whether in view of the evidence and pleadings
in the whole record it is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) MJM Landscaping, Inc.
v. Lorant, supra, 437; accord Stutz v. Shepard, 279
Conn. 115, 126, 901 A.2d 33 (2006) (‘‘in light of the
demanding ‘clearly erroneous’ standard . . . the reso-
lution of each of the plaintiff’s claims requires an exami-
nation of the entire record’’).
‘‘A determination regarding whether the court’s find-
ing was clearly erroneous requires that we review all
of the evidence presented to the trial court, including
the testimony of the witnesses. Thus, the transcript of
the trial is necessary on appeal in order to properly
evaluate whether the evidence presented to the trial
court supports the court’s [factual findings].’’ J. M. v.
E. M., 216 Conn. App. 814, 821, 286 A.3d 929 (2022);
see also Harrigan v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co.,
214 Conn. App. 787, 803 n.6, 282 A.3d 495 (appellant
bears ‘‘burden to provide this court with adequate
record on which to decide issues on appeal, which
includes necessary transcripts’’), cert. denied, 345
Conn. 964, 285 A.3d 388 (2022).
This court ‘‘does not presume error on the part of
the trial court; error must be demonstrated by an appel-
lant on the basis of an adequate record.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Lucarelli v. Freedom of Informa-
tion Commission, 136 Conn. App. 405, 410, 46 A.3d
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937, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 907, 53 A.3d 222 (2012).
‘‘[An appellant] has the burden of providing this court
with a record from which this court can review any
alleged claims of error. . . . Practice Book § 61-10 (a)
provides: It is the responsibility of the appellant to pro-
vide an adequate record for review. . . . The general
purpose of [the relevant] rules of practice . . . [requir-
ing the appellant to provide a sufficient record] is to
ensure that there is a trial court record that is adequate
for an informed appellate review of the various claims
presented by the parties. . . . It is not an appropriate
function of this court, when presented with an inade-
quate record, to speculate as to the reasoning of the
trial court or to presume error from a silent record.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
J. M. v. E. M., supra, 216 Conn. App. 821–22.
The trial in the present case took place over the
course of five days on March 15, 16, 17 and 30, and
July 19, 2022. The plaintiff neither ordered nor filed
transcripts of those proceedings in accordance with
Practice Book § 63-8. In its memorandum of decision,
the trial court enumerated fifty-four detailed findings
of fact with respect to the third count of the plaintiff’s
complaint and made additional findings regarding the
fourth count alleging breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Those findings are the
predicate to the court’s legal conclusions on those
counts.
In the appendix to her principal appellate brief, the
plaintiff provided excerpts from the testimony of one
witness at trial—Dierdre Botelho, a claims handler with
the defendant.14 Those self-selected excerpts do not
provide this court with a complete record to evaluate
14
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the plaintiff pre-
sented the testimony of four individuals at trial and that the defendant
presented the testimony of Botelho and the deposition testimony of Karianne
Mendez, a claims adjuster with the defendant.
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the factual findings made by the trial court. As this
court recently observed, ‘‘[i]n connection with a claim
that requires this court to review the evidence presented
at trial, we do not merely rely on an appellant’s charac-
terization of the evidence or review only the portions
of the evidence on which it relies. Instead, we must
consider the evidence as a whole, including evidence
of a testimonial nature. In the absence of a complete
transcript, we would have to resort to speculation to
resolve [the appellant’s challenge to the factual findings
of the trial court].’’ Meineke Bristol, LLC v. Premier
Auto, LLC, 227 Conn. App. 64, 74–75, 319 A.3d 826
(2024); see also J. C.-S. v. J. G., 230 Conn. App. 651,
654, 331 A.3d 175 (declining to review merits of claims
because appellant ‘‘has not provided this court . . .
with a complete transcript of the hearing, opting instead
to provide only self-selected excerpts’’), cert. denied,
351 Conn. 924, 333 A.3d 795 (2025); American Tax
Funding, LLC v. First Eagle Corp., 196 Conn. App. 298,
309, 229 A.3d 1218 (concluding that appellant ‘‘has not
met its burden of providing an adequate record for
review’’ of challenge to court’s factual findings because
‘‘it has not provided us with transcripts’’), cert. denied,
335 Conn. 942, 237 A.3d 729 (2020); R & P Realty Co.
v. Peerless Indemnity Ins. Co., 193 Conn. App. 374,
380, 219 A.3d 429 (2019) (‘‘[i]n the absence of transcripts
of the entire trial, we cannot evaluate the plaintiffs’
arguments in support of their appellate claim without
resorting to speculation’’ (emphasis added)); Stanley
v. Commissioner of Correction, 164 Conn. App. 244,
255 n.7, 134 A.3d 253 (concluding that record ‘‘plainly
is inadequate to review’’ claim of factual error because
‘‘the petitioner has not filed any transcripts from his
criminal trial’’), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 913, 136 A.3d
1274 (2016); Crelan v. Crelan, 124 Conn. App. 567, 571, 5
A.3d 572 (2010) (‘‘[T]he record is inadequate for review
because we have not been provided with a transcript
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of the trial. . . . Our role is not to guess at possibilities,
but to review claims based on a complete factual record
developed by a trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)); Calo-Turner v. Turner, 83 Conn. App. 53,
56–57, 847 A.2d 1085 (2004) (declining to review chal-
lenge to factual determination because appellant failed
to provide ‘‘a complete transcript of the trial proceed-
ings’’). The plaintiff’s failure to provide this court with
an adequate record precludes meaningful review of her
challenge to the court’s factual determinations.
Moreover, the particular nature of the plaintiff’s
claims of factual error presents an additional impedi-
ment to our review. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that
the court erroneously (1) ‘‘failed to find that the defen-
dant admitted that the value of [her] claim increased
because a lawsuit was initiated,’’ (2) ‘‘failed to find the
fact that when the defendant evaluated [her] claim in
November, 2017, it had the same information available
to it in November, 2016,’’ and (3) ‘‘failed to find facts
relative to the defendant’s own claim handling guide-
lines.’’ The plaintiff nevertheless did not file a motion
for articulation with the trial court or a motion for
review with this court, as permitted by Practice Book
§§ 60-5 and 60-7.
As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘[i]t is axiom-
atic that [a]n appellate tribunal cannot render a decision
without first fully understanding the disposition being
appealed. . . . Our role is not to guess at possibilities,
but to review claims based on a complete factual record
developed by a trial court. . . . Without the necessary
factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court
. . . any decision made by us respecting [the petition-
er’s claims] would be entirely speculative.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dickinson
v. Mullaney, 284 Conn. 673, 681, 937 A.2d 667 (2007).
‘‘Where an appellant claims that a trial court failed to
make a necessary ruling, [i]t is the responsibility of the
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appellant to provide an adequate record for review.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Silver v. Statewide
Grievance Committee, 42 Conn. App. 229, 234, 679 A.2d
392 (1996), appeal dismissed, 242 Conn. 186, 699 A.2d
151 (1997). For that reason, when an appellant has not
provided this court with an adequate record for review,
‘‘we assume that the trial court acted properly.’’ Id.,
235. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s failure to secure an
articulation from the trial court as to the factual findings
that it allegedly failed to make further impedes our
ability to meaningfully review those claims.
B
The lack of an adequate record to review the factual
findings of the trial court also precludes our review of
all but one of the plaintiff’s challenges to the court’s
legal determinations. The court’s conclusions that the
plaintiff failed to prove a violation of General Statutes
§ 38a-816 (6) (D), (F) or (G), and that she failed to prove
that the defendant violated the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing claim are intertwined with,
and predicated upon, detailed findings of fact set forth
in the court’s memorandum of decision. Our conclusion
that the record is inadequate to review the propriety
of those factual findings prevents us from reviewing
those claims of legal error.
The record is adequate to review the plaintiff’s claim
that the court improperly shifted the burden to the
plaintiff on the defendant’s advice of counsel defense.
Our review of that question of law is plenary. See Hart-
ford v. CBV Parking Hartford, LLC, 330 Conn. 200, 214,
192 A.3d 406 (2018) (whether trial court applied proper
legal standard is subject to plenary review on appeal).
Although the defendant asserted advice of counsel
as a special defense, the record indicates that the court
did not decide whether that special defense applied in
the present case. In its memorandum of decision, the
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court specifically stated: ‘‘Because the court has found
that the plaintiff has failed to prevail under either count
three or count four, it does not address the special
defenses pleaded by the defendant.’’

In civil actions like the present one, ‘‘[t]he general
burden of proof . . . is on the plaintiff, who must prove
all the essential allegations of the complaint.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Success, Inc. v. Curcio, 160
Conn. App. 153, 179, 124 A.3d 563, cert. denied, 319
Conn. 952, 125 A.3d 531 (2015). To determine whether
the plaintiff met her burden of establishing that the
defendant failed to act in good faith pursuant to § 38a-
816 (6) (F) or that it acted in bad faith in violation of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the
court necessarily considered all of the testimonial and
documentary evidence adduced at trial, including evi-
dence that the defendant’s claim handlers had been
advised by its legal counsel that a final judgment was
lacking despite the fact that the arbitrator’s award on
count one became a judgment of the court in 2018. In
light of that evidence and the related findings of fact
set forth in the court’s memorandum of decision,15 the
court reasonably could conclude that the plaintiff did
15
Among other things, the court found that the defendant ‘‘never dis-
claimed coverage with respect to the plaintiff’s claim for underinsured
motorist coverage,’’ that the defendant’s claim handler called the plaintiff’s
attorney on two occasions in December, 2016, to request additional medical
records and left voice messages requesting a response, but the plaintiff’s
attorney did not respond to those communications, that the plaintiff took
more than four months to respond to the defendant’s discovery requests,
that the defendant believed a final judgment was lacking in 2018, despite
the arbitrator’s award, that ‘‘the Appellate Court [subsequently] confirmed
that the judgment [on the arbitrator’s award] was not a final judgment,’’ and
that the increase in the defendant’s valuation of the plaintiff’s underinsured
motorist claim following the commencement of this action was attributable
to both the fact that the plaintiff ‘‘was continuing to treat, and the defendant
continued to receive medical bills after commencement of the litigation’’
and the fact that the defendant ‘‘received an assessment of permanence for
the plaintiff’s injuries’’ in the fall of 2017.
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not satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the defen-
dant had acted in bad faith. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court did not apply an improper legal standard
in ruling on counts three and four of the operative
complaint.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.