In re Austin C.

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In re Austin C.

IN RE AUSTIN C.*
(AC 48481)
Cradle, C. J., and Westbrook and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed from the trial court’s judgment terminating
her parental rights with respect to her minor child. The mother claimed,
inter alia, that the court improperly determined that the Department of
Children and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her
child. Held:

The trial court reasonably could have concluded, on the basis of the evidence
presented at trial, that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify
the respondent mother with the child, as the department provided the mother
with supervised visitation and therapeutic family time, made referrals for
parenting education, and made reasonable efforts to engage the mother in
mental health and substance abuse treatments, and the mother repeatedly
refused to engage with the department by, inter alia, refusing to sign releases
that would have allowed the department to communicate with her health
care providers and to make referrals for specific services.
Argued September 2—officially released October 22, 2025**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Bridgeport, Juvenile
Matters, where the case was tried to the court, Skyers,
J.; judgment terminating the respondents’ parental
rights, from which the respondent mother appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent mother).
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** October 22, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Austin C.

Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and
Jessica Morse, assistant attorney general, for the appel-
lee (petitioner).
Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. The respondent mother, Fatima C.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, terminating her parental rights with
respect to her minor child, Austin C. (Austin).1 On
appeal, the respondent claims that the court erred in
determining that the Department of Children and Fami-
lies (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify
her with Austin. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm
the judgment of the trial court.2
The following facts, which the court found by clear
and convincing evidence, and procedural history are
relevant to this appeal. The department first became
involved with Austin on November 22, 2022, just a few
days after his premature birth, when it received a report
from a medical professional at St. Vincent’s Medical
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of the respondent Alvin
D., the father of Austin. He has not appealed from the termination of his
parental rights. Accordingly, all references to the respondent in this opinion
are to Fatima C. only.
2
The respondent also claims that the court erred in finding that she was
unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts offered by the
department. Because we conclude that the court properly found that the
department made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with Austin,
we need not address the respondent’s challenge to the court’s determination
that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts. See In re
Corey C., 198 Conn. App. 41, 66, 232 A.3d 1237 (‘‘[T]he [petitioner] must
prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that [the department] has
made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwill-
ing or unable to benefit from the reunification efforts. [General Statutes §]
17a-112 (j) clearly provides that the [petitioner] is not required to prove both
circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory
element.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert.
denied, 335 Conn. 930, 236 A.3d 217 (2020).
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In re Austin C.

Center (St. Vincent’s) that the respondent presented as
psychotic and did not recognize Austin as her child. The
respondent ‘‘believed that her child had been switched
with another child . . . [and] refused to sign hospital
documents relating to the child.’’ The respondent
received a mental health evaluation and was admitted
to St. Vincent’s for psychiatric treatment. The medical
providers at St. Vincent’s recommended that she attend
outpatient mental health treatment upon her release,
but the respondent declined.
On December 6, 2022, the petitioner filed a motion
for an ex parte order of temporary custody (OTC) and
a neglect petition on Austin’s behalf. The court, Maro-
nich, J., granted the OTC and ordered preliminary spe-
cific steps to facilitate the return of Austin to the respon-
dent that same day. Following a hearing on December
9, 2022, which the respondent did not attend, the court
sustained the OTC. After another hearing, on October
26, 2023, the court, Skyers, J., approved a permanency
plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. On
November 29, 2023, the court, Maronich, J., adjudicated
Austin neglected and committed him to the care and
custody of the petitioner. The court also ordered final
specific steps addressing, among other things, the
respondent’s issues with mental health, substance
abuse, intimate partner violence (IPV), parenting skills,
housing, and employment. The respondent further
agreed to be more communicative with the department
by signing releases and providing information. On
March 20, 2024, the petitioner filed a petition for the
termination of the respondent’s parental rights, alleging
that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to General
Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).
On December 19, 2024, following a trial, the court,
Skyers, J., issued a memorandum of decision terminat-
ing the respondent’s parental rights as to Austin. The
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court first noted that Austin was born prematurely and
has received intensive medical care from birth. As a
result of his numerous medical conditions, Austin was
assessed to be ‘‘medically complex level one’’ and has
‘‘several medical appointments each month with vari-
ous providers.’’ The trial court then addressed the
respondent’s history prior to and since the department’s
initial involvement with Austin. The court made the
following relevant findings, by clear and convincing
evidence, regarding the respondent. ‘‘The respondent
. . . is twenty-four years old . . . . Her medical
records indicate that she was previously diagnosed with
major depressive disorder . . . post-traumatic stress
syndrome . . . [and] bipolar disorder and was hospi-
talized at Yale New Haven Hospital five years earlier
due to a suicide attempt. When asked, the respondent
. . . denies any diagnosis other than depression. . . .
‘‘The respondent . . . has a history of involvement
with the criminal justice system . . . . During that
time, she had pending criminal charges, including disor-
derly conduct, risk of injury to a child, larceny, criminal
trespass, interfering with/resisting an officer and viola-
tion of a protective order. . . . On April 24, 2024, the
respondent . . . was charged with violation of a pro-
tective order against the paternal grandmother. At the
time of trial, she still had a pending criminal case. The
respondent . . . has continued to be involved in the
criminal justice system and has been the subject of
additional arrests and charges . . . .
‘‘The respondent . . . did not have stable housing
and reported that she was either homeless, or living
with friends, and would not provide [the department]
with any information specifying where she was living.
In July, 2024, she provided [the department] with an
address of her temporary residence. She subsequently
obtained housing in a shelter and testified that she
obtained employment as an advocate for youth at the
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housing collective. However, no evidence was pre-
sented [at trial] that confirmed her employment. . . .
‘‘[The department] initially requested releases for the
respondent . . . to sign, so that the department could
give referrals for services and other treatments, but the
respondent . . . refused to sign the releases. On May
2, 2023, [the department] referred her to Parenting Sup-
port Services (PSS); however, she declined the service.
[The department] attempted to refer the respondent
. . . for a substance abuse/mental health evaluation,
however, she declined that referral as well. In April,
2023, the respondent . . . was ordered by the criminal
court to engage in a substance abuse program. On May
8, 2023, she began services with Project Reward to
address her substance abuse issues. She engaged in an
intensive outpatient program (IOP) with Project
Reward. The program further recommended that she
attend a psychiatric evaluation for medication, but she
declined. She was incarcerated [from] July [until Octo-
ber, 2023].
‘‘In January, 2024, the respondent . . . completed
her intake at parenting education with St. Joseph’s [Par-
enting Center (St. Joseph’s)] and subsequently com-
pleted that program. . . . In April, 2024, she eventually
signed a release that allowed [the department] to com-
municate with St. Vincent’s. The respondent . . .
reported that she completed the IOP for mental health
at St. Vincent’s. Despite its requests, [the department]
never received any medical records regarding the treat-
ment from the provider or from the respondent . . . .
‘‘The relationship between the respondent parents
has been very contentious. There was previously a full
no contact protective order in place between them.
Despite the binding protective order, however, they
continued to communicate . . . . [The department]
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had concerns regarding the [respondent’s] . . . parent-
ing, mental health, substance abuse of cocaine and mari-
juana, and her homelessness. The respondent . . . has
not kept [the department] informed of her whereabouts
and residence. [The department] attempted to refer her
to a substance abuse/mental health evaluation, but she
declined. She also refused to sign releases that would
enable [the department] to make referrals for other
supportive services. [The department] offered the
respondent . . . weekly supervised visitation at its
Norwalk office. Her visit times were changed to accom-
modate her schedule and were then supervised by Shat-
tering Glass Ceilings. Nevertheless, she continued to
miss visits. Most recently, the respondent . . . has
done well in attending visits.

‘‘During the pendency of this matter, the respondent
. . . has not gained any insight as to how her untreated
mental health has impacted her ability to parent and
take care of her son. Furthermore, she has not made
any significant progress in making her mental health a
priority, as evidenced by her continuous refusal to sign
releases or participate in the limited referrals that she
received.’’

In light of the foregoing findings, the court concluded
that the petitioner had demonstrated by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the department made reasonable
efforts to reunify the respondent with Austin and that
the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
the reunification efforts. The court found that the
respondent’s ‘‘situation has not improved since the
child’s removal’’ and, ‘‘[b]ased on her issues of mental
health, substance abuse, and failure to benefit from
counseling services, the respondent . . . will never be
consistently available to her child.’’ The court therefore
found that it was in Austin’s best interest to terminate
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the respondent’s parental rights.3 This appeal followed.
Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth
as necessary.
The respondent claims that the court erred in finding
that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify
her with Austin. The respondent argues that the depart-
ment ‘‘did not offer the specific services required by
the respondent in order to facilitate reunification
. . . .’’ The respondent further argues that the depart-
ment’s reunification efforts were more limited than the
court concluded and that the petitioner rushed her case,
thereby not making referrals for essential services.4 We
are not persuaded.
‘‘Section 17a-112 (j) (1) requires that before terminat-
ing parental rights, the court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that the department has made rea-
sonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the
child with the parent, unless the court finds in this
proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to
benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding
is not required if the court has determined at a hearing
. . . that such efforts are not appropriate . . . . Thus,
the department may meet its burden concerning reunifi-
cation in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made
3
The respondent also filed a motion for permanent transfer of custody
and guardianship to the maternal grandmother. The respondent does not
appeal from the court’s denial of that motion.
4
The respondent also claims that General Statutes §§ 17a-111b and 17a-
112 (j), as applied, violate the equal protection clauses of the federal and
state constitutions. She argues that ‘‘the statutory interplay’’ between the
statutes ‘‘allows for an impermissible end run around the clear and convinc-
ing evidentiary standard required, as a matter of due process, in all termina-
tion hearings.’’ The respondent’s counsel recognized, however, that ‘‘this
court properly did not reach this claim in previous appeals and should not
reach it in this appeal.’’ See In re Jadiel B., 228 Conn. App. 290, 295–96 n.6,
324 A.3d 211 (declining to review identical constitutional challenge because
court expressly found, on basis of clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent was unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts),
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 921, 325 A.3d 217 (2024).
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such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable
or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3)
by a previous judicial determination that such efforts
were not appropriate. . . . [I]n determining whether
the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify
a parent and a child . . . the court is required in the
adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis
of events preceding the date on which the termination
petition was filed. . . . This court has consistently held
that the court, [w]hen making its reasonable efforts
determination . . . is limited to considering only those
facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or
the most recent amendment to the petition . . . .
‘‘The reasonableness of the department’s efforts must
be assessed in the context of each case. The word
reasonable is the linchpin on which the department’s
efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be
adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of
proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts
is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal
act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]ea-
sonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not
everything possible. . . . [R]easonableness is an objec-
tive standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have
been proven depends on the careful consideration of
the circumstances of each individual case. . . .
‘‘Our review of the court’s reasonable efforts determi-
nation is subject to the evidentiary sufficiency standard
of review . . . that is, whether the trial court could
have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that
the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to
justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . In so doing, we
construe the evidence in a manner most favorable to
sustaining the judgment of the trial court and will not
disturb the court’s subordinate factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
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quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylie P., 218 Conn.
App. 85, 95–96, 291 A.3d 158, cert. denied, 346 Conn.
926, 295 A.3d 419 (2023).
Here, the court reasonably could have concluded, on
the basis of the evidence presented at trial, that the
department made reasonable efforts to reunify the
respondent with Austin. First, the department provided
the respondent with supervised visitation and therapeu-
tic family time. On multiple occasions from November,
2022, to April, 2023, the department requested that the
respondent sign releases of information. When she did
sign releases, the department referred the respondent
to supervised visitation with Austin at the department’s
offices. The department adjusted visitation times to
accommodate the respondent’s schedule. She fre-
quently missed visits. During the respondent’s period
of incarceration, from July to October, 2023, the depart-
ment offered visitation to the respondent, but she
declined it. Upon the respondent’s release, the depart-
ment continued to provide visitation. The department
later made a referral to Shattering Glass Ceilings to
supervise visits with Austin, but the respondent contin-
ued to miss visits. The department engaged the respon-
dent in visitation through the time of trial.
The department also provided the respondent with
referrals for parenting education. On May 2, 2023, after
the respondent signed the necessary releases, the
department referred her to PSS. PSS contacted the
respondent, but she declined the service. In January,
2024, the department again encouraged the respondent
to engage in parenting services. The respondent began
a program with St. Joseph’s in February, 2024, and the
department continued to monitor her progress.
The department also made reasonable efforts to
engage the respondent in mental health and substance
abuse treatments. The department encouraged the
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respondent to engage in its mental health and substance
abuse programming, including by referring her for an
evaluation. It also requested that the respondent sign
releases for referrals and for communicating with
existing providers, such as St. Vincent’s, where she had
been hospitalized for psychiatric treatment following
Austin’s birth. The respondent eventually signed a
release, after the termination petition had been filed,
allowing the department to communicate with St. Vin-
cent’s and claimed that she had completed an IOP for
mental health there, but the department never received
any medical records regarding this treatment. In the
few other instances that she did provide the department
with the necessary releases and information, the depart-
ment collaborated with those service providers. For
example, it monitored the respondent’s progress at
Project Reward and encouraged her to fully engage
in the program’s recommended psychiatric evaluation.
The respondent declined that evaluation.
Despite the foregoing recitation of the reunification
efforts undertaken by the department, the respondent
contends that the department’s efforts were unreason-
able, in that the department ‘‘did not refer the respon-
dent to substance abuse treatment, mental health treat-
ment, or counseling surrounding interpersonal violence.’’
The respondent’s argument is belied by the record.
Moreover, it ignores the principle that the department
must make a reasonable effort to reunify, not every
possible effort. See, e.g., In re Kylie P., supra, 218 Conn.
App. 96.
Furthermore, the court found, and the record reflects,
that, despite the respondent’s purported commitment
to engage with the department, she repeatedly refused
to do so. The respondent refused to inform the depart-
ment ‘‘of her whereabouts and residence. . . . She also
refused to sign releases that would enable [the depart-
ment] to make referrals for other supportive services.’’
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In re Austin C.

She likewise declined to engage in recommended ser-
vices, like PSS, a psychiatric evaluation, and a sub-
stance abuse and mental health evaluation with the
department.
This court has observed that ‘‘releases not only permit
the department in the referral process to share confi-
dential information to service providers appropriate to
the parenting needs of the respondents, the ongoing
communication that releases permit between the
department and providers allows the department not
only to monitor progress but to assess and adjust ser-
vices as circumstances require.’’ In re Deboras S., 220
Conn. App. 1, 25, 296 A.3d 842 (2023). ‘‘[A] respondent’s
failure to sign releases authorizing the department to
give or to receive information about her treatment
[makes] it impossible for the department to procure
rehabilitative services.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 24. Furthermore, ‘‘the department is not
required to continue to provide reasonable efforts to a
parent when the parent refuses to participate or engage
in any of those efforts.’’ In re Kyara H., 147 Conn. App.
855, 873, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86
A.3d 468 (2014). Although the defendant offered the
respondent many resources in furtherance of her reuni-
fication with Austin, its efforts were hindered by the
respondent’s refusal to sign releases that would allow
the department to communicate with existing providers
and to make referrals for specific services.5 Thus, the
5
For example, the respondent contends that the lack of a specific IPV
referral undermined the court’s reasonable efforts determination. The
respondent concedes that the department deferred a referral for IPV until
she completed mental health and substance abuse treatment. The respondent
does not claim that the treatment plan was unreasonable. Rather, she argues
that she met those prerequisites, but the department failed to credit her for
programs she engaged in externally to the department, such as Project
Reward and St. Vincent’s. The court explicitly found, however, and the
record supports, that the respondent ‘‘made minimal progress addressing her
mental health and substance abuse issues’’ and never completed substance
abuse treatment. Thus, as the petitioner aptly asserts, ‘‘[t]he opportunity to
make an IPV referral . . . never presented itself.’’
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respondent’s characterization of the department’s
efforts as ‘‘limited’’ or in ‘‘haste’’ is misplaced.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the respondent’s
claim that the court erred in determining that the depart-
ment made reasonable efforts to reunify her with Aus-
tin.6 Accordingly, the respondent’s challenge to the ter-
mination of her parental rights fails.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

To the extent that the respondent is referencing programming and treat-
ments she engaged in or signed referrals for after the petition for termination
of parental rights was filed, the court was ‘‘limited to making its assessment
on the basis of facts preceding the filing of the petition for termination of
parental rights . . . .’’ In re Cameron W., 194 Conn. App. 633, 645–46, 221
A.3d 885 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 918, 222 A.3d 103 (2020). For
example, she did not sign a release allowing the department to communicate
with St. Vincent’s until April, 2024, the month after the petition was filed.
Thus, the court could not credit her participation in those services.
6
The respondent argues that, ‘‘[b]ecause there was a permanency plan
hearing where the trial court approved a permanency plan other than reunifi-
cation, it would seem that any challenge to the trial court’s decision regarding
reasonable efforts would result in a mootness problem for the respondent
. . . [in that] [t]his court, even if it agreed that the trial court erred in
determining that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify, would
be unable to afford the respondent relief . . . .’’ Because we conclude that
the trial court did not err in finding that the petitioner made reasonable
efforts to reunify the respondent with Austin, we need not address this argu-
ment.