Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS,
TRUSTEE v. KEVIN R. BURKE ET AL.
(AC 47889)
Elgo, Wilson and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant property owners appealed from the trial court’s judgment
granting the plaintiff bank’s application for execution of ejectment and from
the court’s denial of their motion for judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for
money damages under the mortgage note. This court, in a prior appeal,
affirmed the trial court’s judgment of strict foreclosure, and, thereafter, the
trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for order to set new law days. Prior
to the running of the law days, the court denied the defendants’ motion to
open the judgment and extend the law days. On appeal, the defendants
claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the plaintiff’s applica-
tion for execution of ejectment on the ground that their objection thereto
was moot. Held:

This court rejected the plaintiff’s challenge to this court’s subject matter
jurisdiction over the appeal, as the law day set by the trial court was rendered
ineffective by the automatic appellate stay that arose after the denial of the
plaintiff’s motion to open and, therefore, title to the property had not passed
irrevocably to the plaintiff and the appeal was not moot.

The trial court abused its discretion in relying on the scheduled law day to
conclude that the defendants’ objection to the application for execution of
ejectment was moot, as the court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to open
gave rise to an automatic appellate stay, which rendered the scheduled law
day ineffective, and therefore title had not yet vested in the plaintiff. This
court declined to review the merits of the defendants’ claim that the trial
court improperly denied their motion for judgment on the plaintiff’s
claim for money damages under the mortgage note, the defendants having
failed to provide this court with an adequate record for review.

Argued June 2—officially released September 16, 2025

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop-
erty owned by the named defendant et al., and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Fairfield, where the case was tried to the court,
Cordani, J.; judgment of strict foreclosure, from which
the named defendant et al., appealed to this court, Moll,
Clark and DiPentima, Js., which affirmed the trial
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

court’s judgment; thereafter, the court, Cirello, J.,
granted the plaintiff’s motion for order to set new law
days; subsequently, the court, Cirello, J., denied the
motion of the named defendant et al. to open the judg-
ment and extend the law days; thereafter, the court,
Cirello, J., granted the plaintiff’s application for execu-
tion of ejectment, and the named defendant et al.
appealed to this court; subsequently, the court, Regan,
J., denied the motion of the named defendant et al.
for judgment on the promissory note, and the named
defendant et al. filed an amended appeal. Reversed;
judgment directed; further proceedings.
Thomas P. Willcutts, for the appellants (named
defendant et al.).
Victoria L. Forcella, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

WILSON, J. The defendants Kevin R. Burke and
Maura Lee Wahlberg1 bring this amended appeal from
the trial court’s granting of the application for execution
of ejectment brought by the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank
Trust Company Americas, as Trustee for Residential
Accredit Loans, Inc., Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-QA10, and its denial
of the defendants’ motion for judgment on the plaintiff’s
claim under the mortgage note, seeking money dam-
ages. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court
improperly (1) granted the plaintiff’s application for
execution of ejectment on the ground that their objec-
tion thereto was moot and (2) denied their motion for
judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for a deficiency judg-
ment under the mortgage note. We reverse the judgment
of the trial court and remand the case with direction
to vacate the execution of ejectment, to make a new
1
Ridge Homeowners Association, Inc., and MorEquity, Inc., were also
named as defendants but are not participating in this appeal. Our references
in this opinion to the defendants are to Burke and Wahlberg.
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

finding as to the appraisal of the property, to make a
new finding as to the amount of the debt, to set new
law days, and for other proceedings according to law.
See Wahba v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 349 Conn.
483, 316 A.3d 338 (2024).

The following facts and procedural history relevant
to the resolution of this appeal are taken from this
court’s decision in the defendants’ appeal from the trial
court’s judgment of strict foreclosure in Deutsche Bank
Trust Co. Americas v. Burke, 218 Conn. App. 542, 292
A.3d 81, cert. denied, 347 Conn. 904, 297 A.3d 567 (2023).
‘‘On or about March 4, 2005, Burke executed and deliv-
ered a note for a loan in the principal amount of
$1,500,000 to a predecessor in interest to the plaintiff.
The loan was used to refinance certain real property
in Fairfield. On or about March 4, 2005, the defendants
executed and delivered a mortgage on the property,
which secured the indebtedness under the note, to the
plaintiff’s predecessor in interest. The mortgage was
recorded in the Fairfield land records on March 10,
2005. In October, 2008, the note was modified at the
defendants’ request to reflect a new principal balance
of $1,545,133.75. The mortgage was assigned to the
plaintiff, and that assignment was recorded in the Fair-
field land records on June 25, 2009. The note was
endorsed and delivered to the plaintiff prior to the initia-
tion of the present action and has remained in the pos-
session of the plaintiff. The defendants failed to make
the January, 2009 payment due under the note and failed
to make any subsequent payments. The plaintiff acceler-
ated the mortgage debt sometime in 2009 and, in May,
2009, filed a foreclosure action on the note and mort-
gage. That prior action was dismissed for dormancy
on May 8, 2014. The plaintiff commenced the present
foreclosure action on July 3, 2017. The value of the
property at the time of trial was $590,000, and the debt
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

was $2,752,982.71; there was no equity in the property.’’
(Footnote omitted.) Id., 543–44.
In its original complaint and amended complaint, the
plaintiff sought a ‘‘[d]eficiency judgment against the
makers of, or obligors on, the note described herein,
and/or their estate, if deceased (unless same has been
precluded by virtue of a bankruptcy filing) . . . .’’
Nothing in the record indicates that the plaintiff with-
drew, waived or abandoned its claim seeking a defi-
ciency judgment. In their answer and special defenses,
the defendants, pursuant to General Statutes § 42a-3-
118 (a), raised a statute of limitations defense to the
plaintiff’s claim for a deficiency judgment. The defen-
dants also raised counterclaims against the plaintiff in
which they alleged breach of contract and the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, and
violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
(CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.
On August 2, 2021, following a trial, the trial court,
Cordani, J., rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure
and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the
defendants’ counterclaims. The court set the first law
day as October 11, 2021.2 The court, however, deferred
issuing a decision on the defendants’ statute of limita-
tions defense to the plaintiff’s claim for deficiency judg-
ment. The court determined that the defendants had
failed to prove their remaining special defenses of
laches, equitable estoppel, and unclean hands.
On February 21, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for
order to set new law days and, on March 18, 2024, the
trial court, Cirello, J., granted the motion, opened the
judgment of strict foreclosure and set new law days to
commence on April 23, 2024. On April 10, 2024, the
2
Although the court originally ordered the law days to commence on
October 11, 2021, it issued a corrected judgment on August 9, 2021, ordering
the law days to commence on October 12, 2021.
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

defendants filed a motion to open judgment to extend
the April 23, 2024 law day and, on that same date,
filed a ‘‘Motion for Judgment on Promissory Note.’’ The
defendants’ motion to open was their first and only
motion to open.3 In its motion for judgment on the note,
the defendants argued that any action on the note was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations pursuant
to § 42a-3-118 (a).
On April 18, 2024, the trial court, Cirello, J., denied
the defendants’ motion to open and stated in its order
that ‘‘the motion to open will not be heard before the
law day.’’ On June 5, 2024, the plaintiff filed an applica-
tion for execution of ejectment asserting that title was
transferred to it on April 26, 2024. The defendants
objected to the application for execution of ejectment
and argued that it should be denied because the trial
court’s April 18, 2024 denial of their motion to open
created an automatic appellate stay, which prevented
the law day from running on April 23, 2024. On July 19,
2024, the court, Cirello, J., overruled the defendants’
objection and issued an order holding that the law day
had passed, title had vested in the plaintiff, and, there-
fore, the execution of ejectment could proceed. On
August 7, 2024, the defendants filed an appeal challeng-
ing the trial court’s July 19, 2024 order. On September
5, 2024, the trial court, Regan, J., denied the defendants’
April 10, 2024 motion for judgment, and, on September
20, 2024, the defendants filed an amended appeal to
3
We note that, as this was the defendants’ first motion to open, Practice
Book § 61-11 did not apply. Practice Book § 61-11 (g) provides in relevant
part: ‘‘In any action for foreclosure in which the owner of the equity has
filed, and the court has denied, at least two prior motions to open or other
similar motion, no automatic stay shall arise upon the court’s denial of any
subsequent contested motion by that party, unless the party certifies under
oath, in an affidavit accompanying the motion, that the motion was filed
for good cause arising after the court’s ruling on the party’s most recent
motion. Such affidavit shall recite the specific facts relied on in support of
the moving party’s claim of good cause. . . .’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

include the September 5, 2024 ruling of the trial court.4
Both rulings are the subject of the present appeal. Addi-
tional facts and procedural history will be set forth as
necessary.
I
Before we address the defendants’ claims on appeal,
we must first address a jurisdictional argument raised
by the plaintiff, that this appeal is moot because title
to the subject property has passed irrevocably to the
plaintiff. We are not persuaded.
‘‘The question of mootness implicates our subject
matter jurisdiction. It is a [well settled] general rule that
the existence of an actual controversy is an essential
requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province
of appellate courts to decide moot questions, discon-
nected from the granting of actual relief or from the
determination of which no practical relief can follow.
. . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the
time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pen-
dency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency
of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an
appellate court from granting any practical relief
through its disposition of the merits, a case has become
moot. . . . Mootness implicates this court’s subject
matter jurisdiction, raising a question of law over which
we exercise plenary review.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, National Assn.
v. Fitzpatrick, 206 Conn. App. 509, 512–13, 260 A.3d
1240 (2021). As this court has observed, ‘‘[i]f the law
days pass before appellate review of the defendant’s
claims can occur, the appeal will likely become moot
4
On August 19, 2024, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the defendants’ initial
appeal ‘‘on the basis that [it] is untimely and [because this appeal is moot,
as] title has vested absolutely in the plaintiff . . . .’’ On September 26, 2024,
the plaintiff also moved to dismiss the defendants’ amended appeal. This
court denied both motions to dismiss on October 2, 2024.
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

because title has passed irrevocably and an appeals
court may not grant the defendant any further relief
except in rare circumstances.’’ U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.
v. O’Brien, 231 Conn. App. 779, 787, 334 A.3d 558 (2025).
For the reasons that we discuss in part II of this
opinion we conclude that the law day set by the trial
court was rendered ineffective by the automatic appel-
late stay, and therefore title to the subject property has
not passed irrevocably to the plaintiff. We therefore
reject the plaintiff’s challenge to this court’s subject
matter jurisdiction over the appeal.
II
Next, we consider the defendants’ claim that the
court improperly granted the plaintiff’s application for
execution of ejectment on the ground that their objec-
tion thereto was moot. We agree with the defendants
that, in granting the motion, the court erroneously relied
on the April 23, 2024 law day to conclude that title had
passed irrevocably to the plaintiff.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and
relevant legal principles that guide our resolution of the
defendants’ appeal. ‘‘A foreclosure action is an equitable
proceeding. . . . The determination of what equity
requires is a matter for the discretion of the trial court.
. . . In determining whether the trial court has abused
its discretion, we must make every reasonable presump-
tion in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Our
review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal discretion
vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the
trial court correctly applied the law and could reason-
ably have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Owen, 88 Conn. App. 806, 811–12, 873 A.2d 1003, cert.
denied, 275 Conn. 902, 882 A.2d 670 (2005).
In evaluating the court’s exercise of its discretion, we
must focus on the legal correctness of its determination
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

that, at the time that it granted the plaintiff’s application
for execution of ejectment, title had passed irrevocably
to the plaintiff. ‘‘ ‘Because the principal issue on appeal
concerns questions of law, namely, subject matter juris-
diction and the scope of the appellate stay provisions
in the rules of practice, our review is plenary.’ Wells
Fargo Bank of Minnesota, N.A. v. Morgan, 98 Conn.
App. 72, 78, 909 A.2d 526 (2006); see also Chamerda v.
Opie, 185 Conn. App. 627, 637–38, 197 A.3d 982 (‘A
determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law. When . . . the trial
court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary
and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally
and logically correct and find support in the facts that
appear in the record.’ . . . ), cert. denied, 330 Conn.
953, 197 A.3d 893 (2018); Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 87 Conn.
App. 257, 269, 865 A.2d 488 (‘[w]e are required to inter-
pret the scope of [the] rules of practice; accordingly,
we are presented with a question of law over which
our review is plenary’), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 916, 871
A.2d 372 (2005).’’ Lending Home Funding Corp. v. REI
Holdings, LLC, 214 Conn. App. 703, 710–11, 281 A.3d
1 (2022).
The defendants argue that the court’s April 18, 2024
denial of their motion to open was an appealable order,
giving rise to a twenty day automatic appellate stay
which rendered the law day set for April 23, 2024, inef-
fective, and as such, title did not pass to the plaintiff by
operation of the April 23, 2024 law day. The defendants
argue, therefore, that the court erred when it deter-
mined that title had passed and granted the plaintiff’s
application to eject the defendants from their property.
The plaintiff argues that title had passed at the time
the court granted its application and therefore the
defendants lacked the requisite standing to appeal as
they no longer held any legal title interest in the property
that was the subject of the underlying foreclosure action.
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

The plaintiff argues therefore that the court did not
abuse its discretion when it permitted the ejectment to
proceed. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the
defendants that the court’s denial of the defendants’
motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure trig-
gered the twenty day automatic stay, thereby rendering
the April 23, 2024 law day ineffective, and, therefore,
title had not passed at the time the court granted the
application for execution of ejectment.
As previously discussed, in Burke, this court upheld
the trial court’s judgment of strict foreclosure in favor
of the plaintiff. Thereafter, on February 21, 2024, the
plaintiff filed a motion to open to set a new law day.
On March 18, 2024, the court granted the motion, reen-
tered the judgment of strict foreclosure and reset the
law day for April 23, 2024. On April 10, 2024, before the
law day had passed, the defendants, for the first time,
filed a motion to open the judgment of strict foreclo-
sure, and, on April 18, 2024, the court denied the motion
to open stating that ‘‘the motion to open will not be
heard before the law day.’’5
On June 5, 2024, the plaintiff filed an application for
execution of ejectment and, on July 19, 2024, the court
granted that application, stating: ‘‘[T]he law day passed.
5
In its appellate brief, the plaintiff erroneously argues that the court
‘‘recognized that the defendants’ motion to open would not be heard prior
to vesting and thus denied the defendants’ motion to open . . . not on its
merits but rather on its inability to be heard prior to vesting due to the
defendants’ failure to timely file the motion to open . . . .’’ The court did
not deny the motion to open after the law days ran but rather denied the
motion prior to the running of the law days. Specifically, the court stated
that ‘‘the motion to open will not be heard before the law day.’’ Accordingly,
when the court denied the defendants’ motion to open before the law days
ran, it created an automatic appellate stay, and it did not matter that the
court did not hear argument on the motion or place it on the short calendar
before denying the motion to open. See Countrywide Home Loans Servic-
ing, L.P. v. Peterson, 171 Conn. App. 842, 845–47, 158 A.3d 405 (2017)
(holding that appeal was not moot because trial court summarily denied
defendant’s motion to open on law day without motion being placed on
short calendar).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

There was no appellate stay in effect when the plaintiff
filed its motion for execution of ejectment.’’ The court
determined that because the law day had passed, title
had vested in the plaintiff, and once title vested, a
motion to open or any similar motion, such as the defen-
dants’ objection to the application for ejectment, ‘‘must
be dismissed as moot because there is no practical
relief that the court can provide.’’ The court therefore
ruled that the execution of ejectment could proceed.
This court has previously set forth the principles that
guide our analysis: ‘‘The opening of judgments of strict
foreclosure is governed by [General Statutes] § 49-15,
which provides in relevant part: Any judgment foreclos-
ing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at
the discretion of the court rendering the judgment, upon
the written motion of any person having an interest
in the judgment and for cause shown, be opened and
modified . . . provided no such judgment shall be
opened after the title has become absolute in any
encumbrancer . . . .
‘‘In Connecticut, a mortgagee has legal title to the
mortgaged property and the mortgagor has equitable
title, also called the equity of redemption. . . . The
equity of redemption gives the mortgagor the right to
redeem the legal title previously conveyed by per-
forming whatever conditions are specified in the mort-
gage, the most important of which is usually the pay-
ment of money. . . . Under our law, an action for strict
foreclosure is brought by a mortgagee who, holding
legal title, seeks not to enforce a forfeiture but rather to
foreclose an equity of redemption unless the mortgagor
satisfies the debt on or before his law day. . . . Accord-
ingly, [if] a foreclosure decree has become absolute by
the passing of the law days, the outstanding rights of
redemption have been cut off and the title has become
unconditional in the plaintiff, with a consequent and
accompanying right to possession. . . . Thus, once the
law day passes and title vests in the [plaintiff], no practi-
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

cal relief is available [p]rovided that this vesting has
occurred pursuant to an authorized exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the trial court . . . . In other words, ’’ 49-15 (a)
(1) . . . generally prohibits mortgagors from obtaining
practical relief after the passage of the law days and,
as a result, [renders] . . . postvesting motions to open
a judgment . . . moot. . . .
‘‘On the other hand, it is well established that law
days that are set forth in a judgment of strict foreclosure
can have no legal effect if an appellate stay is in effect
because to give them legal effect would result in an
extinguishment of the right of redemption pending
appeal. . . . [S]ee . . . Continental Capital Corp. v.
Lazarte, 57 Conn. App. 271, 273–74, 749 A.2d 646 (2000)
(Law days are ineffective while the appeal period is
pending. To conclude otherwise would be tantamount
to depriving a party of judicial review and, therefore,
of due process of law.).
‘‘In the context of strict foreclosure, our Supreme
Court in Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sulli-
van, [216 Conn. 341, 579 A.2d 1054 (1990)], addressed
the issue of whether a motion to open, filed pursuant
to Practice Book (1978–97) § 4009, the predecessor of
Practice Book § 63-1,6 operated to toll the automatic
6
Practice Book § 63-1 provides in relevant part:
‘‘(a) Unless a different time period is provided by statute, an appeal must
be filed within twenty days of the date notice of the judgment or decision
is given. The appeal period may be extended if permitted by Section 66-1
(a). If circumstances give rise to a new appeal period as provided in subsec-
tion (c) of this rule, such new period may be similarly extended as long as
no extension of the original appeal period was obtained. . . .
‘‘(c) If a motion is filed within the appeal period that, if granted, would
render the judgment, decision or acceptance of the verdict ineffective, either
a new twenty day period or applicable statutory time period for filing the
appeal shall begin on the day that notice of the ruling is given on the last
such outstanding motion, except as provided for additur or remittitur in the
next paragraph. . . .
‘‘Motions that, if granted, would render a judgment, decision or acceptance
of the verdict ineffective include, but are not limited to, motions that seek:
the opening or setting aside of the judgment . . . .’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

stay period until that motion was decided. In so doing,
the court in Sullivan distinguished between motions
to open that are timely filed within the twenty day
appellate period following the court’s judgment of strict
foreclosure and those that are untimely filed. See id.,
348–50. When a motion is filed after the expiration of
the twenty day appellate stay period, the motion must
be heard, and not merely filed, prior to the vesting of
title, for the court to retain jurisdiction over the motion.
Id., 349–50. By contrast, when a motion is filed within
the appellate stay period, the filing of the motion
extends the stay period until that motion is decided,
even when a law day is scheduled to run before the
court has an opportunity to resolve the motion. Id.,
346–47; 349–50; see also Continental Capital Corp. v.
Lazarte, supra, 57 Conn. App. 273 ([l]aw days in a strict
foreclosure cannot run if a motion to open is filed during
the appeal period but is yet to be ruled on). Stated
otherwise, the timely filing of a motion to open, pursu-
ant to Practice Book § 63-1, activate[s] the automatic
stay under [Practice Book § 61-11] until that motion is
decided; Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sulli-
van, supra, 346; rendering any redemption . . . vio-
lative of the automatic stay, and any title derived
through such stayed proceedings . . . subject to defea-
sance. . . . Id., 349. Accordingly, it is well settled that,
when a motion to open is timely filed within the twenty
day appeal period following the court’s judgment of
strict foreclosure, any law day scheduled before the
motion is decided has no effect, and the court retains
jurisdiction to decide the motion. See id., 346–47,
349–50; see also Continental Capital Corp. v. Lazarte,
supra, 273–74.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis altered;
footnote added; footnotes omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Lending Home Funding Corp. v. REI
Holdings, LLC, supra, 214 Conn. App. 711–14. ‘‘[L]aw
days are ineffective pending the stay because to treat
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

them otherwise would carry out the judgment in viola-
tion of the stay.’’ RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View
Associates, 278 Conn. 672, 683–84, 899 A.2d 586 (2006).
Here, the defendants filed their motion to open the
judgment of foreclosure after the expiration of the
twenty day appellate stay that arose from the court’s
March 18, 2024 ruling opening the judgment for the
purpose of setting new law days. However, the motion
to reopen was denied before the law days ran and before
title in the subject property vested irrevocably in the
plaintiff. When the court denied the defendants’ motion
to open before the law days ran, that ruling gave rise
to an automatic appellate stay, rendering the April 23,
2024 law day ineffective. Accordingly, the court abused
its discretion when it erroneously relied on that law
day to conclude that title had passed and granted the
application for execution of ejectment.
III
The defendants’ second claim is that the court
improperly denied their motion for judgment on the
plaintiff’s claim under the mortgage note. We lack an
adequate record of the factual and legal basis of the
court’s ruling. However, in light of our resolution of the
claim addressed in part II of this opinion, it is unneces-
sary for us to reach the merits of this claim.
The following procedural history is relevant to this
claim. On April 10, 2024, the defendants filed a motion
for judgment on the promissory note. In their motion,
the defendants argued that they were seeking a formal
adjudication of their statute of limitations defense to
the plaintiffs’ claim at law for money damages and a
deficiency judgment as the plaintiff had specifically
pleaded in its prayer for relief. The defendants argued
that a formal ruling on the plaintiff’s claim for money
damages under the note was material to the parties’
dispute because of its potential impact upon the parties’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

respective federal tax rights and liabilities. The defen-
dants argued that the trial court, Cordani, J., made all
the requisite factual findings to find in favor of the
defendants on their statute of limitations defense on
the subject note and had simply deferred ruling on the
issue because the plaintiff was not ‘‘currently seeking
a deficiency judgment.’’ The defendants therefore
claimed that the issue was not moot and requested the
trial court, Regan, J., to grant their motion and render
judgment in their favor. The plaintiff did not file an
objection to the motion for judgment. On September 5,
2024, the trial court, Regan, J., denied the motion. The
court’s ruling states: ‘‘DENIED. Per oral record.’’ The
defendants have appealed from the court’s denial.
The defendants argue that the trial court, Regan, J.,
erred in failing to enter judgment in their favor as to
the plaintiff’s claim at law for money damages under
the note, erroneously concluding that the claim was
moot. The defendants raise essentially the same argu-
ments raised in their motion for judgment. More specifi-
cally, the defendants claim that, because the trial court,
Cordani, J., in his decision rendering judgment of strict
foreclosure, found the requisite facts to rule in favor
of the defendants on their statute of limitations defense
directed to the plaintiff’s claim for money damages
under the note, and because Judge Cordani specifically
referenced the applicable statute of limitations in his
decision, Judge Regan erred in denying the motion for
judgment based on mootness. The defendants further
argue that the plaintiff represented to this court in
Burke that it is required to issue a 1099-C tax form
relative to forgiveness of debt under the note, creating
tax liability for the defendants in the event there is a
deficiency, as has already been determined in the
court’s judgment of strict foreclosure. The defendants
argue that because Judge Cordani, in his ruling, specifi-
cally cited to the controlling statute of limitations under
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

§ 42a-3-118 (a),7 and because he specifically found that
the plaintiff had accelerated on the note in 2009, Judge
Regan should have ruled in the defendants’ favor on
the motion for judgment, finding that the plaintiff’s defi-
ciency claim was time barred rather than finding that
the issue was moot.
The plaintiff argues that Judge Regan did not err in
denying the motion for judgment and correctly deter-
mined that the defendants’ motion was moot.8 The plain-
tiff argues that there was no pending action to collect
on the note at the time the defendants filed their motion
for judgment, and it had not filed a motion for deficiency
judgment in accordance with Practice Book § 23-19.9
The plaintiff further argues that at the time Judge Regan
issued his decision on the defendants’ motion for judg-
ment, there was nothing pending in the underlying
action that would constitute an attempt to collect on
the note. Relying on its interpretation of the procedural
7
General Statutes § 42a-3-118 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘an action
to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time
must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in
the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated
due date.’’
8
To the extent the plaintiff is arguing that the defendants’ motion for
judgment was moot because title had passed, this court has addressed this
issue in part II of this opinion and has determined that title had not passed
because an automatic stay was triggered when the court denied the defen-
dants’ motion to open, thereby rendering the April 23, 2024 law day ineffec-
tive.
9
Practice Book § 23-19 (a) provides: ‘‘Whenever a deficiency judgment is
claimed in a foreclosure action, the party claiming such judgment shall file
with the clerk of the court within the time limited by statute a written
motion setting forth the facts relied on as the basis for the judgment, which
motion shall be placed on the short calendar for an evidentiary hearing.
Such hearing shall be held not less than fifteen days following the filing of
the motion, except as the judicial authority may otherwise order. At such
hearing the judicial authority shall hear the evidence, establish a valuation
for the mortgaged property and shall render judgment for the plaintiff for
the difference, if any, between such valuation and the plaintiff’s claim. The
plaintiff in any further action upon the debt, note or obligation, shall recover
only the amount of such judgment.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

posture of the case, the plaintiff argues that it had
affirmatively waived any claim for a deficiency judg-
ment. The plaintiff also argues that the claims raised
in the defendants’ motion for judgment were moot and
could not survive because there was not a pending
action on the note or a motion pending to seek a defi-
ciency judgment.
The record reflects that the plaintiff in both its origi-
nal complaint and amended complaint sought money
damages and a deficiency judgment. Judge Cordani in
his August, 2021 memorandum of decision found that
the plaintiff had accelerated on the note some time in
2009 and referenced the applicable statute of limitations
regarding the plaintiff’s claim for a deficiency judgment;
however, he deferred any decision on the plaintiff’s
claim and the defendants’ statute of limitations defense
to such claim. The court stated in its decision that,
‘‘[w]hile the special defense of the statute of limitations
may apply to the enforcement of the note directly or
in any deficiency judgment, the statute of limitations
as provided for in [§ 42a-3-118 (a)] does not impact the
entry of a judgment of foreclosure. Section 42a-3-118
(a) is a statute of limitations that applies to bringing
an action to force payment on a note, providing: ‘Except
as provided in subsection (e), an action to enforce the
obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite
time must be commenced within six years after the
. . . accelerated due date.’ . . .
‘‘The foregoing statute of limitations does not extin-
guish the debt, but instead potentially bars the remedy
of bringing an action to collect on the note. This is not
an action at law to collect on the note but is instead
an equitable foreclosure action seeking foreclosure of
the mortgage.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omit-
ted.)
Judge Cordani noted at footnote 7 of his decision that
‘‘[t]he plaintiff confirmed on the record of the hearing
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

in this matter on July 7, 2021, that it is not currently
seeking a deficiency judgment. In determining the
amount of the debt for purposes of this decision, which
does not include any decision on a deficiency, the
court has not considered equitable factors that may
have arisen in connection with the delay that may
impact a deficiency judgment, because the court makes
no decision concerning a deficiency judgment at this
point. The court has also not considered the impact, if
any, of the statute of limitations on the collectability
of the debt under the note itself because such a decision
is not required at this point since the plaintiff is cur-
rently only seeking an equitable judgment of foreclo-
sure.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Judge Cordani further noted at footnote 9 that ‘‘[t]he
plaintiff represented that it is not currently seeking a
deficiency judgment or money damages. The court does
not at this time decide the impact, if any, of § 42a-
3-118 (a) on the collectability of the note or on the
appropriateness of any future requested deficiency
judgment.’’ (Emphasis added.) Thus, the record clearly
reflects that Judge Cordani, in his August, 2021 decision,
deferred considering any deficiency claim ‘‘because
such a decision [was] not required at [that] point since
the plaintiff [was] currently only seeking an equitable
judgment of foreclosure.’’ It is clear from the record
that Judge Cordani’s decision to defer ruling on the
defendants’ statute of limitations defense in response
to the plaintiff’s claim for a deficiency judgment was
not based on mootness grounds but, rather, because
the plaintiff was not at that time seeking a deficiency
judgment.
In this appeal, both parties, citing Judge Cordani’s
decision, however, argue that Judge Regan denied the
motion based on mootness grounds. Judge Regan, how-
ever, denied the motion without providing a written
basis for his decision and simply stated in his decision:
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

‘‘DENIED. Per oral record.’’ The record before this court
is devoid as to the basis for his decision, as no record
of Judge Regan’s oral decision was submitted by the
parties to this appeal.
Although both parties have represented to this court
that Judge Regan denied the motion for judgment on
mootness grounds, we do not presume the basis of the
court’s ruling. Likewise, ‘‘[t]his court does not presume
error on the part of the trial court; error must be demon-
strated by an appellant on the basis of an adequate
record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lucarelli
v. Freedom of Information Commission, 136 Conn.
App. 405, 410, 46 A.3d 937, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 907,
53 A.3d 222 (2012). As the appellants, the defendants
bore the burden of providing this court with an adequate
record to review their claim on appeal. See Practice
Book § 61-10.10
Although the defendants have failed to provide this
court with an adequate record with respect to the ruling
at issue, that lack of a record does not end our discus-
sion of the present claim. In part II of this opinion, we
concluded that title to the subject property had not
passed irrevocably to the plaintiff because the court’s
denial of the defendants’ motion to open had triggered
the automatic stay, rendering the April 23, 2024 law day
ineffective. Because our resolution of that claim leads
us to reverse the judgment of the trial court granting
the application for execution of ejectment and to
remand the case, among other things, for the purpose
of setting new law days,11 the redemption period has
10
Practice Book § 61-10 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) It is the responsibil-
ity of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review. The appellant
shall determine whether the entire record is complete, correct and otherwise
perfected for presentation on appeal. . . .’’
11
In accordance with Wahba v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 349
Conn. 513, in addition to setting new law days, the case is remanded for a
new finding as to the appraisal of the property and as to the amount of
the debt.
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke

not yet expired. Accordingly, if during the remand pro-
ceeding the plaintiff wishes to pursue its rights in accor-
dance with Practice Book § 23-19 and General Statutes
§ 49-14 (a), it can do so by filing a motion for deficiency
judgment in accordance with the statute, after which
the defendants’ motion for judgment can be heard.12
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to vacate the execution of ejectment, to
make a new finding as to the appraisal of the property,
to make a new finding as to the amount of the debt, to
set new law days, and for other proceedings according
to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

12
General Statutes § 49-14 (a) provides: ‘‘At any time within thirty days
after the time limited for redemption has expired, any party to a mortgage
foreclosure may file a motion seeking a deficiency judgment. Such motion
shall be placed on the short calendar for an evidentiary hearing. Such hearing
shall be held not less than fifteen days following the filing of the motion,
except as the court may otherwise order. At such hearing the court shall
hear the evidence, establish a valuation for the mortgaged property and
shall render judgment for the plaintiff for the difference, if any, between
such valuation and the plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff in any further action
upon the debt, note or obligation, shall recover only the amount of such
judgment.’’