Dushay v. Southern Connecticut Hockey League, LLC

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Dushay v. Southern Connecticut Hockey League, LLC

PAUL DUSHAY ET AL. v. SOUTHERN CONNECTICUT
HOCKEY LEAGUE, LLC, ET AL.
(AC 46788)
Alvord, Suarez and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment rendered after it
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on his negligence
claim relating to injuries he sustained during a hockey practice at an ice
rink owned and operated by W Co. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the
court improperly concluded that the defendant did not owe him a duty of
care to ensure that his hockey team’s practices were safe. Held:

The trial court correctly determined that there was no genuine issue of
material fact that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care, as
there was no evidence presented indicating that the defendant reasonably
could have foreseen the plaintiff’s injuries.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s claim, there was no genuine issue of material fact
as to whether W Co. was acting as the defendant’s agent or apparent agent
during the practice when the plaintiff was injured, as the plaintiff did not
present any evidence beyond mere assertions and conclusory statements
that W Co. was acting as the defendant’s agent with respect to practices
and no reasonable juror could find actual or apparent agency under the
circumstances of this case.

Argued February 3—officially released August 26, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sus-
tained as a result of the defendants’ alleged negligence,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Fairfield, where Connor Dushay
was substituted as the plaintiff; thereafter, the court,
Saadi, J., granted the named defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon,
from which the substitute plaintiff appealed to this
court; subsequently, the complaint was withdrawn as
to the defendant Wonderland of Ice Associates, Inc.
Affirmed.
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Dushay v. Southern Connecticut Hockey League, LLC

Michael E. Skiber, for the appellant (substitute plain-
tiff).
Nathan S. Rosadini, for the appellee (named defen-
dant).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The plaintiff Connor Dushay1 appeals
from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court
in favor of the defendant Southern Connecticut Hockey
League, LLC,2 on his claim of negligence relating to
injuries he sustained during a hockey practice. On
appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the court improperly
concluded that the defendant did not owe him a duty
of care, and (2) there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Wonderland of Ice Associates, Inc.
(Wonderland), was acting as the defendant’s agent or
apparent agent, or with apparent authority, at the time
of the incident in question. We affirm the judgment of
the court.
The following facts, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff, and procedural history are relevant
to this appeal. The defendant is a for-profit hockey
league that offers divisions for youth athletes. In
exchange for a registration fee, the defendant organizes
and schedules ice time with local ice rinks for league
games. Between April and June, 2018, the defendant
held a spring league for high school age players (2018
1
Connor Dushay was a minor at the time this action was commenced.
Accordingly, his parents, the plaintiffs Paul Dushay and Ruth Dushay (par-
ents), commenced this action as next friends on his behalf. After he reached
the age of majority, the trial court granted the parents’ motion to substitute
Connor Dushay as the plaintiff. For clarity, all references in this opinion to
the plaintiff are to Connor Dushay.
2
Wonderland of Ice Associates, Inc. (Wonderland), was also named as a
defendant in this action. The plaintiff withdrew his claim against Wonder-
land, which is not participating in this appeal. Accordingly, we refer in this
opinion to Southern Connecticut Hockey League, LLC, as the defendant and
to Wonderland by name.
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spring season). A flyer created by the defendant adver-
tising the 2018 spring season stated that it would include
a ‘‘[ten] game season plus playoffs.’’ The flyer does
not state that practices are included in the 2018 spring
season. Games for the 2018 spring season took place
at local ice rinks in southern Connecticut, including
Wonderland, which posted the defendant’s flyer on its
premises. The defendant and Wonderland entered into
a written agreement with respect to the usage of Won-
derland’s facilities for 2018 spring season games. When
its ice rink is not otherwise rented, Wonderland offers
‘‘ice time’’ to local players.
The plaintiff registered as a participant for the 2018
spring season. The plaintiff’s team, the Jesuits, played
their home games at Wonderland during the 2018 spring
season. Wonderland offered the Jesuits ice time, or
‘‘open ice,’’ when its ice rink was not otherwise rented.
On May 7, 2018, a group of Jesuits players, including
the plaintiff, was at Wonderland, making use of ‘‘open
ice’’ time. No coaches or other officials were present.
While on the ice, one of the plaintiff’s teammates began
to bully the plaintiff. The bullying culminated in the
plaintiff’s teammate sticking his hockey stick inside one
of the plaintiff’s skates and pulling his feet out from
under him. The plaintiff fell, fracturing the tibia and
fibula of his right leg.
On April 16, 2020, the present action was commenced.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff’s injuries were
caused by the defendant’s negligence for, inter alia,
failing ‘‘to provide adequate supervision during practice
sessions,’’ ‘‘to ensure that practice sessions would be
held in a safe manner,’’ and ‘‘to otherwise exercise a
reasonable degree of care with respect to practice ses-
sions.’’ The defendant filed an answer and advanced
three special defenses, including that any injuries sus-
tained by the plaintiff were caused by the negligence
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of other individuals or entities ‘‘over which [it] had no
control.’’ On November 14, 2022, the defendant filed a
motion for summary judgment and an accompanying
memorandum of law, arguing that it did not owe the
plaintiff a duty of care when he was injured at the
practice because the defendant’s league did not include
practices.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the
defendant provided the court with documentary exhib-
its, including excerpts of deposition testimony from the
plaintiff and his father, Paul Dushay; an affidavit of
Daniel DiLauro, the owner of the defendant; and the
flyer created by the defendant advertising the 2018
spring season.3 In his affidavit, DiLauro averred that
the defendant does not ‘‘own, maintain, control, and/
or possess any ice rinks or ice skating facilities’’; ‘‘[n]o
additional ice time or team practices were included in
the registration and entry fee with the [defendant] for
the 2018 spring league season’’; ‘‘[a]t no point did the
[defendant] ever schedule, offer, provide, and/or super-
vise any additional ice time or team practices for [the
plaintiff] or his hockey team at Wonderland . . . [on]
or around [the date of the plaintiff’s injury]’’; and ‘‘[a]ny
additional team practices or ‘stick-times’ the plaintiff
claims he participated in were at the discretion of the
local rinks and were completely distinct and separate
from the [defendant] and the [ten] game season.’’ More-
over, the spring 2018 season flyer makes no mention
of team practices.
3
We note that, in the appendices to their principal appellate briefs, the
parties have included pages of certain deposition testimony that were not
included in the exhibits before the trial court when it ruled on the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. We decline to consider any evidence that
was not included in the parties’ written submissions before the trial court.
See, e.g., Fiorelli v. Gorsky, 120 Conn. App. 298, 307 n.3, 991 A.2d 1105
(evidence that was not before trial court when it decided motion for summary
judgment will not be considered on appeal), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 933,
10 A.3d 517 (2010).
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On May 22, 2023, the plaintiff filed an opposition to
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In his
memorandum of law, the plaintiff contended that he
presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find that the defendant owed him a duty of
care as a matter of law or, alternatively, that Wonder-
land had acted as the defendant’s agent or apparent
agent. In support thereof, the plaintiff submitted as
exhibits (1) excerpts of deposition testimony from the
plaintiff; John Ferguson, a hockey director for Wonder-
land; John Dilley, a volunteer who organized the Jesuits
team for the 2018 spring season; and DiLauro, (2) the
agreement between the defendant and Wonderland con-
cerning the 2018 spring season, and (3) certain email
correspondence. Section 1.1 of the written agreement
between the defendant and Wonderland provides that
Wonderland will provide ‘‘[i]ce time, for games . . .
per the submission by [the defendant] . . . . Addi-
tional ice [slots] may be scheduled by written submis-
sion, based on availability.’’ (Emphasis added.)
On August 7, 2023, the court issued a memorandum of
decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. The court noted that it was undisputed that
the ice rink where the plaintiff was injured was owned
and operated by Wonderland. The court rejected the
plaintiff’s arguments that the 2018 spring season included
practices on the basis of the flyer and the written agree-
ment, each of which only referenced games. The court
determined that there was ‘‘no evidence in the record
that [could] reasonably support a conclusion that the
defendant . . . had the right to possess the rink at
issue, [that it] had the ability to control the playing
conditions, or that [it] had made any representations
to that effect.’’ As to the plaintiff’s claim of negligent
supervision, the court noted that there was no reason-
able basis for the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant
was responsible for supervising hockey practices at
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Wonderland’s ice rink. The court also rejected the plain-
tiff’s agency argument, stating that there was ‘‘no evi-
dence or allegation beyond the plaintiff’s mere conclu-
sory assertions of an agency relationship between [the
defendant] and [Wonderland],’’ and, therefore, no rea-
sonable fact finder could determine that an agency rela-
tionship existed as to the practice at which the plaintiff
was injured. The court concluded that the defendant
met its burden of ‘‘showing the nonexistence of any
issue of material facts as to whether it owed a duty
of care to the plaintiff.’’ The court therefore rendered
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. This
appeal followed.
We begin our review of the summary judgment ren-
dered by the trial court by setting forth our well estab-
lished standard of review. ‘‘The standards governing
our review of a court’s decision to grant a defendant’s
motion for summary judgment are well settled. Practice
Book § [17-49] provides that summary judgment shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and
any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In decid-
ing a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. . . . The party seeking summary
judgment has the burden of showing the absence of
any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under appli-
cable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a
judgment as a matter of law . . . and [only on such a
showing] the party opposing such a motion must pro-
vide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the exis-
tence of a genuine issue of material fact. . . . [I]ssue-
finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to
the procedure. . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as
the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. . . . [Its] function is not to decide issues of
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material fact, but rather to determine whether any such
issues exist. . . . Our review of the decision to grant
a motion for summary judgment is plenary. . . . We
therefore must decide whether the court’s conclusions
were legally and logically correct and find support in the
record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge
v. Hospital of Central Connecticut, 230 Conn. App. 666,
670, 330 A.3d 604 (2025).
‘‘[T]ypically [d]emonstrating a genuine issue requires
a showing of evidentiary facts or substantial evidence
outside the pleadings from which material facts alleged
in the pleadings can be warrantably inferred. . . .
Moreover, [t]o establish the existence of a material fact,
it is not enough for the party opposing summary judg-
ment merely to assert the existence of a disputed issue.
. . . Such assertions are insufficient regardless of
whether they are contained in a complaint or a brief.
. . . Further, unadmitted allegations in the pleadings
do not constitute proof of the existence of a genuine
issue as to any material fact. . . . Mere statements of
legal conclusions . . . and bald assertions, without
more, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material
fact capable of defeating summary judgment.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gough v. Saint Peter’s Epis-
copal Church, 143 Conn. App. 719, 728–29, 70 A.3d
190 (2013).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
concluded that the defendant did not owe him a duty
of care. Specifically, he argues that the evidence in the
record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
as the nonmoving party, raised a dispute as to whether
the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care to ensure
that the Jesuits’ ‘‘team practices’’ during the 2018 spring
season were safe.4 We disagree.
4
The plaintiff also asserts that the trial court applied an incorrect legal
standard relating to the issue of the defendant’s duty. Specifically, he argues
that the court did not specifically analyze the foreseeability or the public
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‘‘[A] cause of action in negligence is comprised of
four elements: duty; breach of that duty; causation;
and actual injury. . . . Duty is a legal conclusion about
relationships between individuals, made after the fact,
and imperative to a negligence cause of action. The
nature of the duty, and the specific persons to whom
it is owed, are determined by the circumstances sur-
rounding the conduct of the individual.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Roux v. Coffey, 230 Conn. App.
130, 139, 330 A.3d 253, cert. denied, 351 Conn. 915, 331
A.3d 1217 (2025).
‘‘Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible
of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial
in the ordinary manner. . . . Nevertheless, [t]he issue
of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appro-
priate matter for summary judgment because the ques-
tion is one of law. . . . The existence of a duty is a
question of law and only if such a duty is found to
exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the
defendant violated that duty in the particular situation
policy prongs of a duty analysis. The defendant counters that, ‘‘[d]espite
not saying the word ‘foreseeable,’ the court evaluated whether the [defen-
dant] knew and/or had control over the hockey practice in question . . .
[and] acknowledged that there was ‘not a modicum of evidence in the record
to serve as a reasonable basis for the plaintiff’s claims that the [defendant]
was responsible for supervising the hockey practices . . . .’’ A fair reading
of the court’s memorandum of decision leads us to conclude that the court
implicitly found that it was not foreseeable that an ordinary person in the
defendant’s position would have foreseen the harm that resulted in the
present case. See, e.g., Berman v. Berman, 203 Conn. App. 300, 311, 248
A.3d 49 (2021) (fair reading of court’s memorandum of decision revealed
that court implicitly found substantial change in circumstances).
Moreover, on our plenary review, for the reasons explained subsequently
in this opinion, we agree with the court’s conclusions as a matter of law.
See, e.g., Jarmie v. Troncale, 306 Conn. 578, 583–84, 50 A.3d 802 (2012)
(concluding, after conducting common-law duty analysis, that trial court
correctly concluded that plaintiff did not adequately allege common-law
duty of care in case in which plaintiff asserted that trial court should have
undertaken ‘‘particularized examination’’ of foreseeability and public pol-
icy prongs).
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at hand. . . . [Our Supreme Court has] stated that the
test for the existence of a legal duty of care entails (1)
a determination of whether an ordinary person in the
defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew
or should have known, would anticipate that harm of
the general nature of that suffered was likely to result,
and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy
analysis, of whether the defendant’s responsibility for
[his] negligent conduct should extend to the particular
consequences or particular plaintiff in the case. . . .
The first part of the test invokes the question of foresee-
ability, and the second part invokes the question of
policy.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Streifel v. Bulkley, 195 Conn.
App. 294, 304–305, 224 A.3d 539, cert. denied, 335 Conn.
911, 228 A.3d 375 (2020).
‘‘Although it has been said that no universal test for
[duty] ever has been formulated . . . our threshold
inquiry has always been whether the specific harm
alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defen-
dant. The ultimate test of the existence of the duty to
use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may
result if it is not exercised. . . . By that is not meant
that one charged with negligence must be found actually
to have foreseen the probability of harm or that the
particular injury which resulted was foreseeable, but
the test is, would the ordinary [person] in the defen-
dant’s position, knowing what he knew or should have
known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of
that suffered was likely to result . . . .’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Jarmie v. Troncale, 306 Conn. 578,
590, 50 A.3d 802 (2012).
The crux of the present appeal is whether the defen-
dant owed a duty to the plaintiff. The dispositive issue,
therefore, is whether the specific harm alleged by the
plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant. ‘‘The first
inquiry in the two-pronged test for the existence of a
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legal duty requires determining whether an ordinary
person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the
defendants knew or should have known, would antici-
pate that harm of the general nature of that suffered
was likely to result.’’ Gough v. Saint Peter’s Episcopal
Church, supra, 143 Conn. App. 730; see also id., 729–30
(‘‘[t]he ultimate test of the existence of the duty to use
care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if
it is not exercised’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
With these principles in mind, we turn to the evidence
presented to the trial court for consideration in ruling
on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. A
review of the undisputed evidence demonstrates that
the defendant established that it did not possess or
control Wonderland’s ice rink, where the May 7, 2018
practice at issue took place, and that there was no
evidence presented that the defendant was involved
in or had any knowledge of the practice such that it
reasonably could have foreseen the plaintiff’s injuries.
The defendant offered evidence through DiLauro’s
affidavit that it contracts with local rinks to conduct
league games, that the defendant did not possess or
control Wonderland’s ice rink, the premises where the
injury occurred, and that ‘‘[n]o additional ice time or
team practices were included in the registration and
entry fee . . . .’’ It is undisputed that the plaintiff’s
injuries did not occur during a game. The defendant
also submitted the flyer that it created for the 2018
spring season that explicitly states that the registration
fee includes a ‘‘[ten] game season plus playoffs.’’ The
burden then shifted to the plaintiff to dispute that evi-
dence. As previously noted, in support of his opposition,
the plaintiff submitted the agreement between Wonder-
land and the defendant, deposition testimony of various
witnesses, and email correspondence in an attempt to
establish that there was a genuine issue of material fact
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that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to ensure
that coaches supervised ‘‘team practice sessions . . . .’’
After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the court
concluded that the defendant met its burden of showing
the nonexistence of any material facts as to whether it
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. The court rejected
the plaintiff’s argument that there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the 2018 spring season
included practices. Although the plaintiff pointed to an
email that Paul Dushay had sent to Dilley in which
he indicated that he believed that the defendant was
responsible for supervising practices,5 the court rejected
that statement as ‘‘no more than a mere assertion of
thought without a modicum of supporting evidence in
the record . . . .’’6

Applying the governing legal principles to the facts
of the present case, we conclude that the defendant
did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care. Specifically,
the plaintiff did not establish a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the defendant knew or should have
known that the plaintiff was attending a May 7, 2018
practice at which he could have been injured. The evi-
dence, instead, established unequivocally that the 2018
spring season included only games, and not practices.
5
The record indicates that Paul Dushay sent an email to Dilley after the
incident in question, stating: ‘‘[L]ast week at an unsupervised uncoached
practice involving horseplay, [the plaintiff] suffered a compound fracture
to his leg requiring major surgery to repair. I thought this league had adult
supervision, I guess I was wrong.’’
6
We note that the plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly focused
‘‘on the ownership or physical control of the premises in question, without
crediting the plaintiff’s argument that the control of the premises was not
determinative because the plaintiff alleged a claim of negligence and that
[the defendant] had a duty [to supervise the practice] . . . .’’ This argument
ignores that the court explicitly analyzed the plaintiff’s negligent supervision
claim and stated that the plaintiff did not provide anything more than a
mere assertion in support of his claim that the defendant ‘‘was responsible
for supervising the hockey practices at [Wonderland’s] ice rink.’’
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Without any evidence indicating that the defendant rea-
sonably could have foreseen the harm that was caused,
the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant owed a duty
to supervise the practice must fail.
The only evidence in the record that the plaintiff has
pointed to that relates to practices is Paul Dushay’s
email and deposition testimony, which reflect his belief
that the defendant’s 2018 spring season included prac-
tices.7 We agree with the trial court that this conclusory
assertion was not enough to create a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to this issue, in light of the
clear evidence in the record revealing that practices
were not included. See, e.g., Bisson v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 184 Conn. App. 619, 626, 195 A.3d 707 (2018)
(‘‘[m]ere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to
establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore,
cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court
[in support of a motion for summary judgment]’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
The plaintiff argues that the court did not review
the evidence in the light most favorable to him and
‘‘improperly made findings concerning disputed mate-
rial facts.’’ The plaintiff lists several facts that he claims
created genuine issues of material fact as to the defen-
dant’s duty of care. In so doing, the plaintiff makes various
conclusory assertions as to alleged factual issues, with-
out referring to any evidence in support of those asser-
tions. See, e.g., Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC v.
White Eagle Society of Brotherly Help, Inc., Group 315,
Polish National Alliance, 351 Conn. 722, 731, 333 A.3d
508 (2025) (‘‘[i]t is not enough . . . for the opposing
party merely to assert the existence of . . . a disputed
issue’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Agosto v.
7
To the extent that Paul Dushay testified that he believed he saw ‘‘a
poster at [Wonderland’s ice rink] saying that [the defendant’s league
included] practices and games,’’ there is no such poster in the record before
this court.
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Premier Maintenance, Inc., 185 Conn. App. 559, 569–
70, 197 A.3d 938 (2018) (‘‘a party may not rely on mere
speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the
facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
The plaintiff first points to the undisputed fact that
the defendant organized the 2018 spring season. That
fact, however, does not create any dispute as to the
scope of the 2018 spring season and whether it included
practices. The plaintiff also states that his injuries
‘‘occurred in the course of [the defendant’s] 2018 spring
league season.’’ Although it is true that the incident
occurred on May 7, 2018, during the same time frame
as the 2018 spring season, that does not necessarily
bring the practice at which the plaintiff was injured
within the scope of risk that the defendant should rea-
sonably have foreseen. Likewise, the plaintiff asserts
that his injuries occurred at a team practice, again with-
out referring to any evidence that practices were
included in the 2018 spring season.
The plaintiff also relies on the defendant’s flyer adver-
tising the 2018 spring season in support of his assertion
that his injuries ‘‘occurred during one of the Jesuits’
team practices at [Wonderland’s ice rink], a rink fea-
tured and designated by [the defendant]’’ in the flyer.
The flyer, however, is clear: the 2018 spring season
included a ‘‘ten game season plus playoffs.’’ Nothing in
the flyer states that practices were included in a team’s
registration fee. The flyer explicitly states that the regis-
tration fee is ‘‘$3,250 per team: [ten] games plus playoffs
with [b]est of [t]hree [s]eries [f]inals.’’ This evidence,
therefore, supports, rather than contradicts, the court’s
conclusion that the 2018 spring season did not include
practices.
The agreement between the defendant and Wonder-
land is equally clear. Wonderland agreed to provide ice
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time ‘‘for games’’ to the defendant for the 2018 spring
season. Although the agreement states that additional
ice slots ‘‘may be scheduled by written submission,’’ no
such additional written submissions are in the record.
To the extent that the plaintiff argues that the agreement
does not contain a provision specifically excluding
practices, we decline to read additional language into
the agreement. ‘‘In interpreting a contract courts cannot
add new or different terms.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Brown v. Brown, 199 Conn. App. 134, 150,
235 A.3d 555 (2020).

The plaintiff asserts that the facts that Wonderland
collected fees for the 2018 spring season and made ice
time available to players who were also participating
in the league create genuine issues of material fact that
‘‘[the defendant] knew or should have known that [the]
Jesuits team would have team practices at [Wonder-
land’s ice rink].’’ The fact that Wonderland collected
fees for the defendant may have been relevant to their
relationship within the scope of the 2018 spring season,
but, as stated previously, the 2018 spring season
included only games. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not
submitted any evidence indicating that the defendant
was involved in any way with Wonderland’s offering
ice time to players when its rink was not otherwise
reserved. Although the plaintiff refers to an email from
DiLauro that he claims demonstrates DiLauro’s aware-
ness that Dilley was involved with the Jesuits, our
review of the email in question reveals that it, too,
explicitly related to games. DiLauro’s email stated: ‘‘I
would appreciate if everyone who committed to the
team can make an effort and attend the remaining
games on your schedule.’’ (Emphasis added.) As the
court noted, Dilley testified in his deposition that he
coordinated practices ‘‘on behalf of Wonderland
. . . .’’
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Although the plaintiff asserts that he was entitled to
have the issue of foreseeability decided by a jury, we
conclude that reasonable minds could not differ as to
whether the harm inflicted in the present case was
foreseeable to the defendant. ‘‘Many harms are quite
literally foreseeable . . . [but] liability attaches only
for reasonably foreseeable consequences.’’ (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gough
v. Saint Peter’s Episcopal Church, supra, 143 Conn.
App. 731. Moreover, ‘‘[t]he fundamental purpose of sum-
mary judgment is preventing unnecessary trials. . . .
If a plaintiff is unable to present sufficient evidence in
support of an essential element of his cause of action
at trial, he cannot prevail as a matter of law.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Hassiem v. O & G Indus-
tries, Inc., 197 Conn. App. 631, 636, 232 A.3d 1139, cert.
denied, 335 Conn. 928, 235 A.3d 525 (2020). We therefore
conclude that the harm that the plaintiff’s teammate8
intentionally inflicted on him was not reasonably fore-
seeable and that the defendant satisfied its burden of
showing that it was ‘‘quite clear what the truth is, and
that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of
any genuine issue of material fact.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Agosto v. Premier Maintenance, supra,
185 Conn. App. 568–69. Accordingly, the court correctly
determined that there was no genuine issue of material
fact that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty
of care.9
8
In light of our conclusion that the defendant did not owe a duty of care
with respect to practices, we need not address the defendant’s argument
that it was not liable for the intentional conduct of the plaintiff’s teammate
in the absence of a ‘‘special relationship of custody or control . . . .’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.)
9
Because we determine that there is no duty of care on the basis of our
conclusion that the harm was not reasonably foreseeable, it is not necessary
to analyze the second prong of the test by undertaking a public policy
analysis. See, e.g., Gough v. Saint Peter’s Episcopal Church, supra, 143
Conn. App. 732 n.7.
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II
The plaintiff next claims that there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Wonderland was
acting as the defendant’s agent or apparent agent10 at
the time of the practice in question.11 Specifically, the
plaintiff argues that there was evidence in the record
on the basis of which a reasonable jury could find that
Wonderland was acting as the defendant’s agent with
regard to the 2018 spring season and that the court
failed to view the record in the light most favorable
to him in determining that there was no such agency
relationship with respect to practices. We disagree.
‘‘Three elements are required to show the existence
of an agency relationship: (1) a manifestation by the
principal that the agent will act for him; (2) acceptance
by the agent of the undertaking; and (3) an understand-
ing between the parties that the principal will be in
control of the undertaking. . . . Although stated as a
three part test, [our Supreme Court] has also acknowl-
edged there are various factors to be considered in
assessing whether [an agency] relationship exists [that]
include: whether the alleged principal has the right to
direct and control the work of the agent; whether the
agent is engaged in a distinct occupation; whether the
principal or the agent supplies the instrumentalities,
10
The plaintiff’s appellate brief relies on the doctrines of apparent agency
and apparent authority interchangeably. We note that these are distinct
doctrines; see Cefaratti v. Aranow, 321 Conn. 593, 601 n.6, 141 A.3d 752
(2016); and that the plaintiff did not raise, and the trial court did not address,
the issue of apparent authority. To the extent the plaintiff claims for the
first time on appeal that there was a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to whether Wonderland acted with the apparent authority of the
defendant, we decline to address that unpreserved claim.
11
We note that the plaintiff’s complaint does not allege an agency relation-
ship or a claim of vicarious liability, and the issue of agency was first raised
in his opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Because
the trial court addressed the plaintiff’s argument, and the defendant has not
argued that it is not properly before us, we address this claim.
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tools, and the place of work; and the method of paying
the agent. . . . In addition, [a]n essential ingredient of
agency is that the agent is doing something at the behest
and for the benefit of the principal.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Bank of America, N.A. v. Gonzalez,
187 Conn. App. 511, 516–17, 202 A.3d 1092 (2019).
Although we agree with the plaintiff that agency is ordi-
narily a question of fact, ‘‘when no reasonable fact
finder could find that an agency relationship existed
. . . then the issue of agency becomes a legal question.’’
(Citation omitted.) Yale University v. Out of the Box,
LLC, 118 Conn. App. 800, 807 n.5, 990 A.2d 869 (2010).
Apparent agency may be established in tort cases
in one of two ways. ‘‘First, the plaintiff may establish
apparent agency by proving that: (1) the principal held
itself out as providing certain services; (2) the plaintiff
selected the principal on the basis of its representations;
and (3) the plaintiff relied on the principal to select
the specific person who performed the services that
resulted in the harm complained of by the plaintiff.
Second, the plaintiff may establish apparent agency in
a tort action . . . by establishing that: (1) the principal
held the apparent agent or employee out to the public
as possessing the authority to engage in the conduct
at issue, or knowingly permitted the apparent agent or
employee to act as having such authority; (2) the plain-
tiff knew of these acts by the principal, and actually
and reasonably believed that the agent or employee or
apparent agent or employee possessed the necessary
authority . . . and (3) the plaintiff detrimentally relied
on the principal’s acts, i.e., the plaintiff would not have
dealt with the tortfeasor if the plaintiff had known that
the tortfeasor was not the principal’s agent or
employee.’’ (Citation omitted.) Cefaratti v. Aranow, 321
Conn. 593, 624–25, 141 A.3d 752 (2016). With respect
to the second standard, our Supreme Court has ‘‘empha-
size[d] that this standard is narrow, and . . . that it
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will be only in the rare tort action that the plaintiff will
be able to establish the elements of apparent agency
by proving detrimental reliance.’’ Id., 625.
Our review of the evidence in the record reveals that
there is no genuine issue of material fact that Wonder-
land was not acting as the defendant’s agent or apparent
agent with respect to practices. As we stated in part I
of this opinion, the court correctly concluded that there
was no genuine issue of material fact that practices
were not included in the defendant’s 2018 spring season.
The only evidence in the record regarding practices
reveals that these sessions were offered as ‘‘ice time’’
by Wonderland to players and/or their parents. Dilley
testified in his deposition that Wonderland would
‘‘[d]irectly’’ reach out to him to schedule ice time if the
Jesuits wanted to practice. Ferguson similarly testified
that he would offer ice time to local players ‘‘[i]f [he]
had it available.’’ None of the witnesses affiliated with
Wonderland or the defendant, therefore, provided any
evidence that the defendant was involved in any way
with or made aware of practice sessions. Upon our
plenary review, we conclude that any evidence of a
relationship between the defendant and Wonderland,
including the written agreement that explicitly defined
the scope of that relationship, applied only to 2018
spring season games. There is no evidence in the record
that the defendant manifested an intention that Wonder-
land would host practices on behalf of the defendant,
as required to establish an agency relationship with
respect to practices. Nor is there evidence that the
defendant either held itself out as providing practices
in connection with the 2018 spring season or held Won-
derland out as having the authority to host such prac-
tices on the defendant’s behalf, as required to establish
apparent agency.
The plaintiff points to several pieces of evidence in
the record in an attempt to establish a genuine issue
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of material fact as to actual or apparent agency. Specifi-
cally, he points to the agreement between the defendant
and Wonderland; however, that agreement specifically
references only games. See part I of this opinion. There
also was evidence that Wonderland posted the defen-
dant’s flyer at its premises and that Ferguson, the
hockey director at Wonderland, collected entry fees for
the defendant’s 2018 spring season. This evidence could
have constituted evidence of an agency relationship for
games within the scope of the 2018 spring season but
not for unofficial practices that were not included
therein. The plaintiff also points to the deposition testi-
mony of Paul Dushay, in which he stated that he
believed that the participation fee included practices
and games, and that Ferguson was an agent of the
defendant. The court concluded, however, and we
agree, that the plaintiff did not present any evidence
beyond mere assertions and conclusory statements that
Wonderland was acting as an agent for the defendant
with respect to practices. Such assertions do not supply
the factual predicate necessary to create a genuine issue
of material fact. See, e.g., Bisson v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., supra, 184 Conn. App. 641 (‘‘when opposing parties
tell two different contradictory stories, one of which is
contradicted by [the] record so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, [the] court should not adopt that ver-
sion of [the] facts’’); Yancey v. Connecticut Life & Casu-
alty Ins. Co., 68 Conn. App. 556, 561, 791 A.2d 719
(2002) (vague generalizations may not supply factual
predicate to raise genuine issue of material fact). The
plaintiff offered no evidence that the defendant held
out Wonderland as having authority to hold official
league ‘‘practices,’’ particularly when such practices
were not included in the 2018 spring season. See, e.g.,
Hallas v. Boehmke & Dobosz, Inc., 239 Conn. 658, 674–
75, 686 A.2d 491 (1997) (concluding that no reasonable
juror could find agency relationship when there was
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no evidence that alleged principal held out agent to
plaintiffs as having authority to bind it). To the extent
that the plaintiff subjectively believed that an agency
relationship existed, the belief was not reasonable
based on the other evidence presented.12 See 1
Restatement (Third), Agency § 2.05, comment (c), p.
146 (2006) (‘‘[t]he operative question is whether a rea-
sonable person in the position of the third party would
believe such an agent, as the actor appears to be, to
have authority to do a particular act’’).
The plaintiff also argues that the practices were con-
ducted ‘‘for the benefit of [the defendant’s] 2018 spring
league team, the Jesuits team, and for the benefit of
the league, which also is relevant to the question of
agency.’’ It is true that ‘‘[a]n essential ingredient of
agency is that the agent is doing something at the behest
and for the benefit of the principal.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Wesley v. Schaller Subaru, Inc., 277
Conn. 526, 543, 893 A.2d 389 (2006). In the present case,
however, there is no evidence that the practices were
scheduled or held at the behest of, or for the benefit
of, the defendant. See, e.g., Beckenstein v. Potter &
Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 120, 138, 464 A.2d 6 (1983) (trial
court correctly determined that there was insufficient
evidence to establish agency relationship when there
was no evidence that agent was working for benefit of
principal). Ferguson testified that Wonderland offered
ice time to local players free of charge. Only Wonder-
land was involved in the scheduling of open ice time
12
We also reject the plaintiff’s arguments that the defendant’s flyer and
the agreement between Wonderland and the defendant ‘‘did not expressly
advise parents or interested youth that 2018 spring league team practices
were excluded.’’ These arguments essentially ask us to impose an affirmative
duty on the defendant, by mere implication, for an injury that occurred
outside the scope of the defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff. We
decline to do so. See 2 Restatement (Third), Torts § 40, p. 39 (2012) (‘‘[a]n
actor in a special relationship with another owes the other a duty of reason-
able care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship’’
(emphasis added)).
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for practices. To the extent that the plaintiff argues that
the practices, apart from any pecuniary benefit, would
enhance the skills of the 2018 spring season partici-
pants, thereby benefitting the defendant, such an indi-
rect benefit is insufficient to hold the defendant liable.
To conclude otherwise could lead to absurd results.
For example, under the plaintiff’s conception, a pickup
practice held at a local park by team members would
be sufficient to hold a sports league liable for injuries
at the practice, even if the practice was not part of
official league activities, merely because the practice
improved the players’ skills and, as a result, enhanced
the level of play during games.
Therefore, we conclude that no reasonable juror
could find actual or apparent agency in these circum-
stances. Accordingly, we reject the plaintiff’s second
claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.