Housing Authority v. Cyr

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Housing Authority v. Cyr

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE TOWN OF
MANCHESTER v. BRANDON
CYR ET AL.
(AC 47023)
Elgo, Moll and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff housing authority appealed from the trial court’s judgment
dismissing its summary process action against the defendant tenant. The
plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly dismissed the action
after concluding that the pretermination notice, also known as a Kapa
notice, and the notice to quit were both invalid and, therefore, that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Held:

The trial court improperly determined that the Kapa notice sent to the
defendant was invalid on the basis that the notice alleged conduct constitut-
ing serious nuisance that had occurred one year prior to its issuance, as
there was no time requirement contained in the language of the statute
(§ 47a-15) governing the form of a Kapa notice.

The trial court improperly determined that the Kapa notice sent to the
defendant was invalid because it failed to refer to specific provisions of the
lease or the statutory sections that had been violated as a result of the
conduct alleged in the notice, as such specificity was not required pursuant
to § 47a-15 or our case law and the notice identified eight specific instances
of conduct by the defendant that constituted violations of the lease, the
plaintiff’s rules and regulations, and his obligations as a tenant pursuant to
statute (§ 47a-11), and amounted to a nuisance, which was sufficient to
inform the defendant and protect against premature, discriminatory, or
arbitrary eviction.

The trial court improperly determined that the notice to quit was invalid or
defective and, therefore, deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction,
as the notice sufficiently tracked the language of the relevant statute (§ 47a-
23 (a) and (b)) and informed the defendant of the reasons for the notice
to quit by setting forth specific instances of his conduct.

The trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the
defendant’s alternative argument that the plaintiff, which the defendant
asserts was a federally subsidized landlord and was required to provide
notices that complied with the requirements of the applicable federal statute
(42 U.S.C. § 1437d (l)) and regulation (24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (l) (3)), failed to
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Housing Authority v. Cyr
provide sufficient information to the defendant regarding grievance proce-
dures, as he provided no authority to support his claim that, as a result of
this alleged insufficiency in the notices, the notices were invalid.
Argued October 8, 2024—officially released August 26, 2025

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Housing Ses-
sion, where the court, Esperance-Smith, J., granted
the named defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered
judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to
this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Michael S. Wrona, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Sally R. Zanger, for the appellee (named defendant).
Opinion

HARPER, J. In this summary process action, the
plaintiff, the Housing Authority of the town of Manches-
ter, appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered
by the trial court in favor of the defendant Brandon Cyr.1
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss after con-
cluding that the pretermination notice and notice to
quit were invalid and that, therefore, it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the summary process action.
The defendant disagrees and further contends, for the
first time on appeal and as an alternative ground for
affirming the judgment of the trial court, that the preter-
mination notice and notice to quit did not comply with
federal notice requirements, and, therefore, the court
1
The plaintiff’s complaint also named a John Doe defendant and a Jane
Doe defendant (Doe defendants). Counts three and four of the complaint
are directed against the Doe defendants, alleging that they never had a right
or privilege to occupy the property leased to the defendant Brandon Cyr,
or, in the alternative, that the Doe defendants once had such a right or
privilege, but it has since terminated. The Doe defendants were nonappearing
parties before the trial court and are not participating in this appeal. Accord-
ingly, we refer in this opinion to Brandon Cyr as the defendant.
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lacked subject matter jurisdiction.2 We conclude that
the court improperly dismissed this summary process
action.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our review. On February 5, 2018, the plaintiff
leased the property located at 56-F House Drive in Man-
chester (premises) to the defendant.3 On March 5, 2023,
the plaintiff sent the defendant a pretermination notice
(Kapa notice)4 notifying him of conduct constituting a
2
As a matter of appellate procedure, we note that the defendant did not
preserve this claim for review by filing a preliminary statement of issues in
accordance with our rules of practice. Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1) provides
in relevant part: ‘‘If any appellee wishes to: (A) present for review alternative
grounds upon which the judgment may be affirmed; (B) present for review
adverse rulings or decisions of the court which should be considered on
appeal in the event the appellant is awarded a new trial; or (C) claim that
a new trial rather than a directed judgment should be ordered if the appellant
is successful on the appeal, that appellee shall file a preliminary statement
of issues within twenty days from the filing of the appellant’s preliminary
statement of the issues.’’ See generally State v. Martin M., 143 Conn. App.
140, 151, 70 A.3d 135 (this court may, but is not required to, review alternative
ground for affirmance not raised in accordance with rules of practice so
long as appellant will not be prejudiced), cert. denied, 309 Conn. 919, 70
A.3d 41 (2013).
Despite the defendant’s noncompliance with our rules of practice, we
will review his alternative ground for affirmance because it implicates the
subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court and, therefore, may be raised
at any time. See, e.g., North Branford Citizens Against Bulk Propane Storage
v. North Branford, 230 Conn. App. 335, 341 n.5, 330 A.3d 196 (2025); Robinson
v. V. D., 229 Conn. App. 316, 325, 328 A.3d 198 (2024); Milford Redevelop-
ment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593, 602, 325 A.3d
971 (2024), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 902, 329 A.3d 239 (2025).
3
We note that the record in this case does not contain the lease executed
by the parties.
4
A Kapa notice refers to the form of pretermination notice that is required
under General Statutes § 47a-15, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘Prior to
the commencement of a summary process action, except in [certain cases]
. . . the landlord shall deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the
acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement
shall terminate upon a date not less than fifteen days after receipt of the
notice. If such breach can be remedied by repair by the tenant or payment
of damages by the tenant to the landlord, and such breach is not so remedied
within such fifteen-day period, the rental agreement shall terminate except
that (1) if the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages and
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serious nuisance pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-
15,5 nuisance pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-32,6
violations of a tenant’s statutory obligations pursuant
to General Statutes § 47a-11,7 violations of the lease
and/or the plaintiff’s rules and regulations, and/or a
the tenant adequately remedies the breach within such fifteen-day period,
the rental agreement shall not terminate . . . .’’ See Kapa Associates v.
Flores, 35 Conn. Supp. 274, 277–79, 408 A.2d 22 (1979).
5
General Statutes § 47a-15 provides in relevant part: ‘‘For the purposes
of this section, ‘serious nuisance’ means (A) inflicting bodily harm upon
another tenant or the landlord or threatening to inflict such harm with the
present ability to effect the harm and under circumstances which would
lead a reasonable person to believe that such threat will be carried out, (B)
substantial and wilful destruction of part of the dwelling unit or premises,
(C) conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety
of other tenants or the landlord, or (D) using the premises or allowing the
premises to be used for prostitution or the illegal sale of drugs or, in the
case of a housing authority, using any area within fifteen hundred feet of
any housing authority property in which the tenant resides for the illegal
sale of drugs. . . .’’ See also Suburban Greater Hartford Realty Manage-
ment Corp. v. Edwards, 123 Conn. App. 295, 300, 1 A.3d 1138 (2010) (serious
nuisance may be committed in one of four ways).
6
General Statutes § 47a-32 provides: ‘‘In any action of summary process
based upon nuisance, that term shall be taken to include, but shall not be
limited to, any conduct which interferes substantially with the comfort or
safety of other tenants or occupants of the same or adjacent buildings or
structures.’’
7
General Statutes § 47a-11 provides: ‘‘A tenant shall: (a) Comply with all
obligations primarily imposed upon tenants by applicable provisions of any
building, housing or fire code materially affecting health and safety; (b)
keep such part of the premises that he occupies and uses as clean and safe
as the condition of the premises permit; (c) remove from his dwelling unit
all ashes, garbage, rubbish and other waste in a clean and safe manner to
the place provided by the landlord pursuant to subdivision (5) of subsection
(a) of section 47a-7; (d) keep all plumbing fixtures and appliances in the
dwelling unit or used by the tenant as clean as the condition of each such
fixture or appliance permits; (e) use all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heat-
ing, ventilating, air conditioning and other facilities and appliances, including
elevators, in the premises in a reasonable manner; (f) not wilfully or negli-
gently destroy, deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the premises
or permit any other person to do so; (g) conduct himself and require other
persons on the premises with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner
that will not disturb his neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of the premises or
constitute a nuisance, as defined in section 47a-32, or a serious nuisance,
as defined in section 47a-15; and (h) if judgment has entered against a
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failure to require other persons on the premises with
the defendant’s consent to conduct themselves in a
manner that will not disturb the neighbors’ peaceful
enjoyment of the premises or commit violations of the
lease. The conduct set forth in the March, 2023 Kapa
notice was alleged to have occurred in 2022 and
included: (1) the defendant’s June, 2022 arrest for
breach of the peace in the second degree, use of drug
paraphernalia, and assault in the third degree; (2) the
defendant’s use of illegal narcotics in the premises,
which resulted in his near overdose; (3) the defendant’s
permitting another individual to consume narcotics in
the premises; (4) the defendant’s March, 2022 threaten-
ing statement to a neighbor; (5) the defendant’s con-
duct, and his granting permission to those in the prem-
ises with his consent, to act in a manner that would
disturb his neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment or constitute
violations of the lease; (6) the defendant’s permitting
unauthorized occupants to reside in the premises; (7)
the defendant’s September, 2022 arrest for breach of
the peace in the second degree and threatening in the
second degree; and (8) the defendant’s November, 2022
arrest for violating the condition of release in the first
degree. The Kapa notice further provided that, assum-
ing such violations were subject to cure,8 the defendant
was required to do so by March 28, 2023.9 Thereafter,
member of the tenant’s household pursuant to subsection (c) of section
47a-26h for serious nuisance by using the premises for the illegal sale of
drugs, not permit such person to resume occupancy of the dwelling unit,
except with the consent of the landlord.’’
8
We note that not all alleged violations are subject to cure. See, e.g.,
Housing Authority v. Harris, 225 Conn. 600, 606, 625 A.2d 816 (1993)
(‘‘[a]lthough removing the person who sold drugs from the apartment will
eliminate the cause of the nuisance, it cannot eliminate any effects of the
drug sale that have already occurred’’); Housing Authority v. Brown, 129
Conn. App. 313, 321–22, 19 A.3d 252 (2011) (legislature did not intend to
create ability to ‘‘repair’’ drug related criminal activity with respect to
§ 47a-15).
9
See footnote 5 of this opinion.
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on April 18, 2023, the plaintiff served the defendant
with a notice to quit possession for conduct in violation
of the lease agreement, the plaintiff’s rules and regula-
tions, and the defendant’s statutory obligations as a
tenant pursuant to § 47a-11, as well as for conduct con-
stituting a nuisance pursuant to § 47a-32, and/or serious
nuisance pursuant to § 47a-15. The notice to quit reas-
serted the eight instances of conduct that had been
listed in the Kapa notice as the reasons for the termina-
tion of the lease, and added the following: (1) the defen-
dant’s (and others on the premises with his consent)
breaking of windows that occurred most recently in
April, 2023; (2) the defendant’s April, 2023 threat to
harm his neighbor physically; (3) the use of the premises
by John Doe and Jane Doe, who once may have had
the right or privilege to so do, but such right or privilege
has terminated; and (4) the use of the premises by John
Doe and Jane Doe who never had the right or privilege
to do so. The notice to quit also contained the following
language: ‘‘The tenant has the following: (a) the right
to reply to this [notice to quit]; (b) the right to inspect
the file; and (c) the right to a grievance, if appro-
priate. . . .’’
The defendant did not quit possession. The plaintiff
then served the defendant with a summary process
summons and complaint on June 16, 2023, seeking imme-
diate possession of the premises. Three of the five
counts were directed against the defendant10 and
alleged violations of a tenant’s responsibilities pursuant
to § 47a-11, lease violations, and nuisance.
On July 31, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, along with a memorandum of
law. See Practice Book § 10-30.11 Specifically, he argued
10
Counts three and four of the complaint were directed against the Doe
defendants. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
11
Practice Book § 10-30 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A motion to dismiss
shall be used to assert: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . .’’
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that the notice to quit did not comply with General
Statutes § 47a-23 (b) because it lacked sufficient infor-
mation to allow him to prepare a defense. The defendant
further contended that the notice to quit did ‘‘not state
which of the alleged behaviors or incidents alleged is
a violation of each statutory provision cited . . . [and
did] not state which lease provision is alleged to have
been violated.’’ Finally, the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss concluded by stating that, because the notice to
quit did not advise him sufficiently to prepare a defense,
it was invalid, and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdic-
tion.
On August 10, 2023, the plaintiff filed an objection
to the defendant’s motion to dismiss. It asserted that
it was not pursuing the summary process action on
the ground of serious nuisance. The plaintiff further
countered that the notice to quit provided the defendant
with sufficient information to allow him to defend
against the action, and, therefore, it was valid. The
defendant filed a response to the plaintiff’s objection
four days later. The court, Esperance-Smith, J., heard
argument on the defendant’s motion on August 15,
2023.12
On October 18, 2023, the court issued its memoran-
dum of decision granting the defendant’s motion to
dismiss. It began its analysis by summarizing the posi-
tions of the parties as follows: ‘‘As it relates to the lease
violation claim[s], the defendant argues that the lease
agreement includes a list of acceptable reasons for ter-
mination of a public housing tenant’s lease and that the
notice to quit and the pretermination notice do not
specify or clarify the lease provisions that are alleged
to be violated sufficiently enough to allow the defendant
12
At this hearing, the plaintiff repeated the representation in its objection
to the defendant’s motion to dismiss that it was not pursuing the summary
process action on the basis of a serious nuisance.
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to prepare a defense. The defendant further argues that
the statutory language that was included in the notice
to quit alleging grounds of violation of §§ 47a-11 and
47a-32 do not provide separate and distinct reasons for
the tenant and does not set out the factual basis for
the reasons. Therefore, according to the defendant, [the
language of the notice to quit] makes it difficult for the
defendant to decipher which provisions of the lease
and statute are being invoked for which alleged incident
or behavior. The plaintiff contends that the notice to
quit provided detailed, specific, and sufficient informa-
tion to allow the defendant to defend against the action,
as required by statute.’’
After setting forth the relevant legal principles, the
court addressed the parties’ arguments. First, it granted
the motion to dismiss to the extent that the plaintiff
had alleged serious nuisance due to the ambiguity in
the complaint regarding such claim. The court then
turned to the issue of the claims pertaining to nuisance
and violations of the lease. It explained that the Kapa
notice set forth conduct that began in April, 2022, and
occurred throughout that year. The court reasoned:
‘‘The Kapa notice is intended to give the defendant
notice of a defect and provide the defendant with fifteen
days to cure the alleged defect, but if the acts upon
which [it is] based occurred a year prior, the [Kapa]
notice is improper. In the notice to quit . . . there is
no supplemental [Kapa] notice which includes these
events with an opportunity for the defendant to cure.’’
The court further determined that ‘‘[t]he notice to quit
fails to provide sufficient detail for the defendant to be
apprised of what portions of the lease the defendant was
in violation of or which of the many possible breaches
of tenant obligations that are listed in the referenced
statute that the plaintiff is proceeding on. The notice
to quit must be carefully constructed so as to specify
which counts the plaintiff is basing its summary process
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action on. Additionally, a clear and concise pretermina-
tion notice must be sent to the defendant describing
the violations alleged as well as providing the [defen-
dant] with the opportunity to cure. The plaintiff failed
to serve a valid notice to quit that provided sufficient
specificity to allow the defendant to prepare a defense
to the summary process action.’’ (Emphasis added.)
For these reasons, the court granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss the summary process complaint.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for reargument
and for clarification. It argued that the court improperly
imposed an obligation to cite specific provisions in the
lease that had been violated and that such a requirement
is absent from the applicable statutes and case law.
Additionally, the plaintiff contended that the court
improperly engaged in a ‘‘hypertechnical dissection of
the wording’’ of the notice to quit. Further, the plaintiff
claimed that the conduct set forth in the Kapa notice
was criminal in nature, and thus not subject to cure,
and therefore it was irrelevant that the defendant was
not provided an opportunity to cure. The defendant
filed an objection to the motion to reargue and for
clarification. On November 20, 2023, the court denied
the plaintiff’s motion without further discussion. This
appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff principally claims that the court improp-
erly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss its sum-
mary process action after concluding that the Kapa
notice and the notice to quit were invalid. First, the
plaintiff argues that the court improperly determined
that the Kapa notice was invalid because it alleged
conduct that had occurred one year prior to its issuance.
Second, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly
concluded that the Kapa notice was invalid because it
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did not refer to specific provisions of the lease or statu-
tory sections that had been violated as a result of the
conduct alleged in these notices.13 Finally, the plaintiff
asserts that the court also improperly determined that
the notice to quit was insufficient due to a lack of
specificity. We agree with the plaintiff that the court,
in granting the motion to dismiss, improperly concluded
that the Kapa notice and notice to quit were invalid.
The following legal principles are relevant to our
resolution of this claim. ‘‘A motion to dismiss . . .
properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially
asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law
and fact state a cause of action that should be heard
by the court. . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia,
whether, on the face of the record, the court is without
jurisdiction. . . . A claim that a court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during
the proceedings, including on appeal. . . . There is no
doubt that the Superior Court is authorized to hear
summary process cases . . . . The jurisdiction of the
Superior Court in summary process actions, however,
is subject to [certain] condition[s] precedent. . . .
[B]efore a landlord may pursue its statutory remedy
of summary process . . . the landlord must prove its
compliance with all the applicable preconditions set by
state and federal law for the termination of a lease. . . .
When a defendant is a tenant of federally subsidized
housing, federal law must be followed in addition to
state law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partner-
ship v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593, 602–603, 325 A.3d
971 (2024), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 902, 329 A.3d 239
(2025); see also Housing Authority v. Stevens, 209
13
In its appellate brief, the plaintiff also argues that the court improperly
granted the motion to dismiss after engaging in a hypertechnical dissection
of the notices. We need not address this claim given our resolution in favor
of the plaintiff.
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Conn. App. 569, 577, 267 A.3d 927, cert. denied, 343
Conn. 907, 273 A.3d 234 (2022); Housing Authority
v. Rogriguez, 178 Conn. App. 120, 126–27, 174 A.3d
844 (2017).
Additionally, we note that, ‘‘[w]hen a . . . court
decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial
motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of
the complaint in their most favorable light. . . . In this
regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in
the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied
from the allegations, construing them in a manner most
favorable to the pleader. . . . The motion to dismiss
. . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes
the existing record and must be decided upon that
alone. . . . In undertaking this review, we are mindful
of the well established notion that, in determining
whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every
presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Center
for Advanced Technology, Inc. v. Bolton Works, LLC,
191 Conn. App. 842, 845, 216 A.3d 813, cert. denied, 333
Conn. 930, 218 A.3d 69 (2019).
Next, we briefly summarize the principles relating to
a summary process action. ‘‘[S]ummary process is a
special statutory procedure designed to provide an
expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to
obtain possession of leased premises without suffering
the delay, loss and expense to which, under the com-
mon-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants
wrongfully holding over their terms. . . . Summary
process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final
determination. . . . Therefore, the statutes relating to
summary process must be narrowly construed and
strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Housing Authority v. Stevens, supra, 209 Conn. App.
575; see also Sullivan v. Lazzari, 135 Conn. App. 831,
836 n.5, 43 A.3d 750 (relief available in summary process
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action is possession of premises), cert. denied, 305
Conn. 925, 47 A.3d 884 (2012); Oxford House at Yale
v. Gilligan, 125 Conn. App. 464, 471, 10 A.3d 52 (2010)
(summary process aimed at deciding simple question
of who is entitled to possession). Guided by these prin-
ciples, we turn to the specific arguments raised by the
plaintiff in this appeal.
A
The plaintiff first argues that the court improperly
determined that the Kapa notice was invalid because
it alleged conduct that had occurred one year prior to
its issuance. The defendant counters that the March 5,
2023 Kapa notice contained ‘‘ ‘stale’ allegations’’ per-
taining to conduct that had occurred in 2022, and, there-
fore, the court properly concluded that the Kapa notice
in the present matter did not satisfy the requirements
of § 47a-15. We agree with the plaintiff.
As an initial matter, we identify the relevant legal
principles pertaining to a Kapa notice. ‘‘Pursuant to
§ 47a-15, before a landlord may proceed with a summary
process action, except in those situations specifically
excluded, the landlord must first deliver a [Kapa] notice
to the tenant specifying the alleged violations and offer
the tenant a . . . period to remedy. . . . The legisla-
tive purpose [of a Kapa notice] is to discourage sum-
mary evictions against first offenders . . . . Section
47a-15 is separate from and preliminary to the main-
tenance of a summary process action pursuant to . . .
§ 47a-23. . . .
‘‘The text of § 47a-15 is clear and unambiguous: Prior
to the commencement of a summary process action
. . . the landlord shall deliver a written notice to the
tenant specifying the acts or omissions constituting the
breach and that the rental agreement shall terminate
upon a date not less than fifteen days after receipt of
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the notice. . . . [I]f substantially the same act or omis-
sion for which notice was given recurs within six
months, the landlord may terminate the rental agree-
ment in accordance with the provisions of [§§] 47a-
23 to 47a-23b, inclusive.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing
Authority v. Rodriguez, 178 Conn. App. 120, 126–27,
174 A.3d 844 (2017); see also Marrinan v. Hamer, 5
Conn. App. 101, 104, 497 A.2d 67 (1985) (statute creates
reconciliation period to allow errant tenants to remedy
their first miscue). The Kapa notice has been described
as a precondition to the right to serve a notice to quit.
Bridgeport v. Barbour-Daniel Electronics, Inc., 16
Conn. App. 574, 593, 548 A.2d 744 (Borden, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 209 Conn. 826, 552 A.2d 432
(1988); see also Housing Authority v. Harris, 225 Conn.
600, 605, 625 A.2d 816 (1993). Simply stated, a Kapa
notice ‘‘must be sufficient to apprise the tenant of the
information the tenant needs to protect herself against
premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. . . .
To further this salutary purpose, the notice require-
ments of § 47a-15 must be construed strictly.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Har-
ris, supra, 605; see also St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative
v. Johnson, 124 Conn. App. 728, 735, 6 A.3d 1168 (2010),
cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906, 12 A.3d 1002 (2011).
Resolving whether the trial court properly deter-
mined that a proper evaluation of a Kapa violation
includes a consideration of whether the allegations
were stale, we must engage in statutory interpretation.
‘‘[I]ssues of statutory interpretation constitute ques-
tions of law over which the court’s review is plenary.
The process of statutory interpretation involves the
determination of the meaning of the statutory language
as applied to the facts of the case, including the question
of whether the language does so apply. . . . When con-
struing a statute, [the court’s] fundamental objective is
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to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of
the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to deter-
mine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statu-
tory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Commissioner of Public Health v. Col-
andrea, 221 Conn. App. 631, 654, 302 A.3d 370 (2023),
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 932, 306 A.3d 474 (2024); see
also Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v. Widow(er),
Heir(s) and/or Creditors of the Estate of Beryl E. Row-
land, 231 Conn. App. 761, 770, 334 A.3d 1054 (2025);
HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez, 68 Conn.
App. 638, 647, 792 A.2d 165 (2002).
Section 47a-15 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Prior to the
commencement of a summary process action, except
in the case in which the landlord elects to proceed
under sections 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, to evict
based on nonpayment of rent, on conduct by the tenant
which constitutes a serious nuisance or on a violation
of subsection (h) of section 47a-11, if there is a material
noncompliance with section 47a-11 which materially
affects the health and safety of the other tenants or
materially affects the physical condition of the prem-
ises, or if there is a material noncompliance by the
tenant with the rental agreement or a material noncom-
pliance with the rules and regulations adopted in accor-
dance with section 47a-9, and the landlord chooses to
evict based on such noncompliance, the landlord shall
deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts
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or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental
agreement shall terminate upon a date not less than
fifteen days after receipt of the notice. If such breach
can be remedied by repair by the tenant or payment of
damages by the tenant to the landlord, and such breach
is not so remedied within such fifteen-day period, the
rental agreement shall terminate except that (1) if the
breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of dam-
ages and the tenant adequately remedies the breach
within such fifteen-day period, the rental agreement
shall not terminate; or (2) if substantially the same act
or omission for which notice was given recurs within
six months, the landlord may terminate the rental agree-
ment in accordance with the provisions of sections 47a-
23 to 47a-23b, inclusive. . . .’’
The text of § 47a-15 does not address the time frame
in which a Kapa notice must be served on a tenant
with respect to the alleged conduct that was the basis
for the termination of the lease. ‘‘It is our duty to inter-
pret statutes as they are written. . . . Courts cannot,
by construction, read into statutes provisions which are
not clearly stated. . . . The legislature is quite aware
of how to use language when it wants to express its
intent to qualify or limit the operation of a statute.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fetscher,
162 Conn. App. 145, 152, 130 A.3d 892 (2015), cert.
denied, 321 Conn. 904, 138 A.3d 280 (2016); see Thomas
v. Dept. of Developmental Services, 297 Conn. 391, 412,
999 A.2d 682 (2010) (courts are not in business of writing
statutes, as that is province of legislature, and role of
courts is to interpret statutes as written); Glanz v. Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles, 210 Conn. App. 515, 524,
270 A.3d 766 (2022) (intent of drafters of statutes
derived from words used); see also State v. Obas, 320
Conn. 426, 437–38, 130 A.3d 252 (2016) (Supreme Court
rejected state’s argument that ignored absence of tem-
poral limitation in statutory text and engrafted such
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limitation into statute); Lamar v. Boehringer Ingelheim
Corp., 138 Conn. App. 826, 835, 54 A.3d 1040 (this court
is constrained to read statute as written and may not
read into clearly expressed legislation provisions that
do not find expression in its words), cert. denied, 307
Conn. 943, 56 A.3d 951 (2012).
The trial court did not cite to any authority for its
conclusion that, ‘‘if the acts upon which [the Kapa
notice] is based occurred a year prior, the [Kapa] notice
is improper.’’ In their respective briefs to this court, the
parties have not provided us with any binding authority
regarding this conclusion made by the trial court. We
conclude, therefore, that the court improperly inserted
a time requirement into § 47a-15 that is not contained
in the statutory language. See, e.g., Housing Authority
v. Martin, 95 Conn. App. 802, 813–14, 898 A.2d 245
(§ 47a-15 requires only that landlord deliver Kapa
notice and that notice state that breach is not remedia-
ble; there is no statutory requirement that landlord fur-
ther allege that continuing violation exists), cert.
denied, 280 Conn. 904, 907 A.2d 90 (2006). Accordingly,
we disagree with the conclusion of the trial court that
such a requirement exists and that the Kapa notice in
this case was invalid.
B
Next, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly
concluded that the Kapa notice was invalid because it
failed to refer to specific provisions of the lease or
statutory sections that had been violated as a result of
the conduct alleged in the notice. We agree and con-
clude that, contrary to the arguments of the defendant,
such specificity is not required pursuant to the statutory
language or our case law.
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court
explained that, in a summary process case, the Kapa
notice must be specific enough to allow the tenant to
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recognize the violations and to either cure or defend
against them. It stated further that ‘‘a clear and concise
[Kapa] notice must be sent to the defendant describing
the violations alleged as well as providing the defendant
with the opportunity to cure.’’ It would appear, there-
fore, that the court implicitly determined that the Kapa
notice in the present case lacked sufficient specificity
as part of its conclusion that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s summary process action.
In Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn.
128, 520 A.2d 173 (1987), our Supreme Court addressed
the standards by which to test the adequacy of notices
sent to a defendant in a summary process action, includ-
ing a Kapa notice. Id., 142–43. Specifically, it explained
that, ‘‘[i]n order to demonstrate its compliance with the
notices required for a proper termination, a landlord
must show that the notices given to the tenant apprised
her of the information a tenant needs to protect herself
against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary evic-
tion.’’ Id., 143. To further this salutary purpose, the
requirements of § 47a-15 must be construed strictly;
however, strict construction does not require ritualistic
compliance with statutory or regulatory mandates. Id.,
143–44. It further noted that ‘‘judicial appraisal [of the
sufficiency of a Kapa notice] must reflect the purpose
that [such a notice was] meant to serve . . . [and] not
every deviation from the strict requirements of either
statutes or regulations warrants dismissal of an action
for summary process. When good cause for termination
of a lease has clearly been shown, and when notices
of termination have been sent in strict compliance with
statutory timetables, a landlord should not be precluded
from pursuing summary eviction proceedings because
of hypertechnical dissection of the wording of the
notices that he has sent.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 145;
see also Josephine Towers, L.P. v. Kelly, 199 Conn.
App. 829, 839–40, 238 A.3d 732 (§ 47a-15 requirements
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were met where notice set forth violations of rental
agreement, house rules and regulations, and material
noncompliance with statutory obligations), cert.
denied, 335 Conn. 966, 240 A.3d 281 (2020).
Additionally, this court has stated that the text of
§ 47a-15 clearly and unambiguously provides that the
Kapa notice must specify, inter alia, the acts and omis-
sions constituting the breach of the lease agreement.
Housing Authority v. Rodriguez, supra, 178 Conn. App.
127. Neither the text of § 47a-15 nor the relevant case
law imposes a requirement that the Kapa notice must
set forth the precise statutory or lease violations based
on the improper conduct alleged.
In the present case, the March, 2023 Kapa notice
identified eight specific instances of conduct by the
defendant—including his arrests, his use of illegal nar-
cotics, his allowance of the use of narcotics on the
premises, his threats made to a neighbor, and his allow-
ance of unauthorized occupants to reside in the prem-
ises—that constituted violations of the lease, the plain-
tiff’s rules and regulations, and his statutory obligations
as a tenant, and amounted to a nuisance. We conclude
that this Kapa notice was sufficient to inform the defen-
dant and protect against premature, discriminatory, or
arbitrary eviction. See Housing Authority v. DeRoche,
112 Conn. App. 355, 362, 962 A.2d 904 (2009); see also
Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v.
Glicklin, supra, 228 Conn. App. 612 (Kapa notice pro-
vided information necessary for defendant to defend
herself against possible eviction and thus was valid).
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court’s conclusion
regarding the sufficiency of the Kapa notice was
improper.
C
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
concluded that the notice to quit was insufficient and,
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therefore, the summary process complaint was subject
to dismissal. Specifically, it argues that the court erred
in its conclusion that the ‘‘notice to quit fails to provide
sufficient detail for the defendant to be apprised of
what portions of the lease the defendant was in violation
of’’ because the relevant statute and case law do not
contain such a requirement of specificity. We agree.
As an initial matter, we note that, ‘‘[b]efore the [trial]
court can entertain a summary process action and evict
a tenant, the owner of the land must previously have
served the tenant with notice to quit. . . . As a condi-
tion precedent to a summary process action, proper
notice to quit [pursuant to § 47a-23] is a jurisdictional
necessity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Subur-
ban Greater Hartford Realty Management Corp. v.
Edwards, 123 Conn. App. 295, 299, 1 A.3d 1138 (2010);
see also St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson,
supra, 124 Conn. App. 734. Simply stated, there is no
subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of a valid
notice to quit. Wilkes v. Thomson, 155 Conn. App. 278,
281, 109 A.3d 543 (2015). Finally, we note that the notice
to quit terminates the lease between the parties. Towers
v. Kelly, supra, 199 Conn. App. 837; see also Waterbury
Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers–Northeast, Inc.,
292 Conn. 459, 466, 974 A.2d 626 (2009); St. Paul’s Flax
Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, supra, 735.
In his motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that
the plaintiff listed ‘‘specific allegations of actions . . .
taken . . . by the defendant’’ in its notice to quit rather
than setting forth ‘‘the reason or reasons for the notice
to quit possession or occupancy using the statutory
language or words of similar import . . . .’’ He further
contends that the notice to quit fails to identify which
allegations of improper behavior amount to a violation
of the statutory provision cited, nor does it state which
lease provisions are alleged to have been violated. In
conclusion, the defendant claimed that, ‘‘[b]ecause the
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notice to quit did not advise [him] sufficiently of the
reasons for the action in order to permit him to prepare
a defense, it is invalid.’’ In granting the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the court reasoned: ‘‘The notice to
quit fails to provide sufficient detail for the defendant
to be apprised of what portions of the lease the defen-
dant was in violation of or which of the many possible
breaches of tenant obligations that are listed in the
referenced statute that the plaintiff is proceeding on.
The notice to quit must be carefully constructed so
as to specify which counts the plaintiff is basing its
summary process action on. . . . The plaintiff failed
to serve a valid notice to quit that provided sufficient
specificity to allow the defendant to prepare a defense
to the summary process action.’’ ‘‘Summary process
actions are governed by § 47a-23 (a), which provides
in relevant part: When the owner or lessor . . . desires
to obtain possession or occupancy of any land or build-
ing, any apartment in any building, [or] any dwelling
unit . . . and (1) when a rental agreement or lease of
such property, whether in writing or by parol, termi-
nates for any of the following reasons: (A) By lapse of
time; (B) by reason of any expressed stipulation therein;
(C) violation of the rental agreement or lease or of any
rules or regulations adopted in accordance with section
47a-9 or 21-70 . . . (E) nonpayment of rent when due
for commercial property; (F) violation of section 47a-
11 . . . such owner or lessor . . . shall give notice to
each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occu-
pancy of such land, building, apartment or dwelling
unit . . . .
‘‘Section 47a-23 (b) specifies the type of notice
required when serving a notice to quit: The notice shall
be in writing substantially in the following form: I (or
we) hereby give you notice that you are to quit posses-
sion or occupancy of the (land, building, apartment or
dwelling unit, or of any trailer or any land upon which
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a trailer is used or stands, as the case may be), now
occupied by you at (here insert the address, including
apartment number or other designation, as applicable),
on or before the (here insert the date) for the following
reason (here insert the reason or reasons for the notice
to quit possession or occupancy using the statutory
language or words of similar import, also the date and
place of signing notice).’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Break-
fast & Things!!! LLC, 133 Conn. App. 1, 17–18, 33 A.3d
848 (2012).

In the present case, the April, 2023 notice to quit
specified twelve instances of conduct by the defendant,
or individuals in the premises acting with his consent,
that ‘‘was done in violation of [the defendant’s] [l]ease
[a]greement, the [h]ousing [a]uthority’s [r]ules and
[r]egulations, constitutes a violation of your statutory
obligations as a tenant pursuant to General Statutes
§ 47a-11, constitutes a nuisance pursuant to General
Statutes § 42a-32 and/or serious nuisance pursuant to
General Statutes § 47a-15.’’ Our law recognizes that the
notice to quit generally is considered adequate when
the language of that notice tracks the language of § 47a-
23 (a). Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!! LLC,
supra, 133 Conn. App. 18; see also Sullivan v. Lazzari,
supra, 135 Conn. App. 840; Thomas E. Golden Realty
Co. v. Society for Savings, 31 Conn. App. 575, 580, 626
A.2d 788 (1993). In the present case, the plaintiff’s notice
to quit generally tracked the statutory language. The
defendant argued, and the trial court agreed, that the
notice to quit failed to provide sufficient detail to inform
the defendant of the specific lease provisions and/or
statutory sections on which the plaintiff was proceeding
with respect to its efforts to end the lease and regain
possession of the premises. We disagree, however, that
our law requires such specificity.
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In Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!! LLC,
supra, 133 Conn. App. 1, the defendant claimed that the
notice to quit had failed to sufficiently apprise it of the
specific lease violations alleged by the plaintiff. Id., 15.
The trial court determined that it was ‘‘plausible’’ that
the defendant did not know all of the purported lease
violations that the plaintiff would ultimately claim in
its complaint, and, therefore, the notice to quit was
invalid. Id., 16. As a result of this conclusion, the trial
court dismissed the counts of the complaint based on
the claimed lease violations. Id.
On appeal, this court reached a contrary conclusion
on the basis that the notice to quit sufficiently apprised
the defendant of the alleged lease violations because
it tracked the statutory language of § 47a-23 (a) and
(b). Id. Specifically, we noted that the notice to quit
contained language that informed the defendant to quit
possession or occupancy for violations of the lease,
which is one of the bases set forth in the relevant statu-
tory framework. Id., 18; see General Statutes § 47a-23
(a) (1) (C). Furthermore, the language in the notice
to quit regarding violations of the lease tracked the
language of § 47a-23 (b). Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Break-
fast & Things!!! LLC, supra, 133 Conn. App. 18. This
court further concluded: ‘‘Although the notice to quit
did not lay out specifically the alleged lease violations,
the notice tracked the statutory language . . . .
Because the notice to quit adequately met the require-
ments of § 47a-23, the court improperly dismissed count
one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’’ (Footnote
omitted.) Id., 19–20.
The plaintiff’s notice to quit in the present case, like
the notice to quit in Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast &
Things!!! LLC, supra, 133 Conn. App. 1, tracked the
statutory language and generally informed the defen-
dant of the reasons for the notice to quit and the termi-
nation of the lease between the parties. It therefore
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was not defective so as to deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction. The requirement imposed on the plaintiff
by the court in this matter simply is not found in the
statutory language or our case law. The notice to quit
set forth specific instances of conduct by the defendant,
such as his assorted arrests, his use of illegal narcotics,
his allowing others to consume narcotics, his threats
to a neighbor, and his allowing unauthorized occupants
to reside in the premises. Furthermore, the notice to
quit also generally informed the defendant that such
conduct was done in violation of the lease agreement,
the rules and regulations of the plaintiff, his statutory
obligations as a tenant pursuant to § 47a-11, and consti-
tuted a nuisance. It is not required that the plaintiff
identify the specific lease provisions or statutes that
such conduct violated. See General Statutes § 47a-15.
It is ‘‘inconceivable’’ that the defendant was not aware
of the conduct that formed the basis of the termination
of his lease. Southland Corp. v. Vernon, 1 Conn. App.
439, 452–53, 473 A.3d 318 (1984). Accordingly, we con-
clude that the court improperly determined that the
notice to quit was invalid or defective.
II
The defendant claims, as an alternative ground for
affirming the judgment of the trial court, that the plain-
tiff’s notices did not comply with federal notice require-
ments, and, as a result, the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. Specifically, he argues that the plaintiff’s
notices were insufficient under federal law because
they informed the defendant only that he was entitled
to a grievance hearing if such a proceeding was appro-
priate. We are not persuaded.
‘‘When a defendant is a tenant of federally subsidized
housing, federal law must be followed in addition to
state law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milford
Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin,
supra, 228 Conn. App. 603; see also Presidential Village,
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LLC v. Perkins, 332 Conn. 45, 56, 209 A.3d 616 (2019).
‘‘Under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (l)14 and 24 C.F.R.
14
Section 1437d (l) of title 42 of the United States Code provides in relevant
part: ‘‘Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . . (4) require
the public housing agency to give adequate written notice of termination
of the lease which shall not be less than—
‘‘(A) a reasonable period of time, but not to exceed 30 days—
‘‘(i) if the health or safety of other tenants, public housing agency employ-
ees, or persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises is threat-
ened; or
‘‘(ii) in the event of any drug-related or violent criminal activity or any
felony conviction;
‘‘(B) 14 days in the case of nonpayment of rent; and
‘‘(C) 30 days in any other case, except that if a State or local law provides
for a shorter period of time, such shorter period shall apply;
‘‘(5) require that the public housing agency may not terminate the tenancy
except for serious or repeated violation of the terms or conditions of the
lease or for other good cause;
‘‘(6) provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety,
or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-
related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public
housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other
person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy;
‘‘(7) specify that with respect to any notice of eviction or termination,
notwithstanding any State law, a public housing tenant shall be informed
of the opportunity, prior to any hearing or trial, to examine any relevant
documents, records, or regulations directly related to the eviction or termina-
tion;
‘‘[8] provide that any occupancy in violation of section 13661 (b) of this
title (relating to ineligibility of illegal drug users and alcohol abusers) or
the furnishing of any false or misleading information pursuant to section
13662 of this title (relating to termination of tenancy and assistance for
illegal drug users and alcohol abusers) shall be cause for termination of
tenancy; [and]
‘‘(9) provide that it shall be cause for immediate termination of the tenancy
of a public housing tenant if such tenant—
‘‘(A) is fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after
conviction, under the laws of the place from which the individual flees, for
a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, which is a felony under the laws of
the place from which the individual flees . . . or
‘‘[B] is violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under Federal
or State law.
‘‘For purposes of paragraph [6], the term ‘drug-related criminal activity’
means the illegal manufacture, sale, distribution, use, or possession with
intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or use, of a controlled substance (as
defined in section 802 of Title 21).’’ (Footnotes omitted.)
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§ 966.4 (l) (3), a landlord is required to issue a preter-
15

mination notice before commencing a summary process
action.’’ (Footnotes added.) Housing Authority v. Mar-
tin, supra, 95 Conn. App. 808.
In his brief to this court, the defendant asserts, with-
out citation to the record, that the plaintiff is a federally
subsidized landlord. He then states that the plaintiff is
therefore required to comply with the requirements of
42 U.S.C. § 1437 (l) and 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (l) (3). Pursuant
to this federal authority, the defendant contends that
the plaintiff was required to notify him of his right to
a grievance hearing in accordance with the plaintiff’s
grievance procedures when such a hearing is required.
See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (l) (3) (ii) (2023). Additionally, he
argues that, if such a hearing was not required and the
defendant had decided to exclude a grievance concern-
ing termination of the lease under its procedures, then
15
Section 966.4 (3) of title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides
in relevant part: ‘‘(iii) A notice to vacate which is required by State or local
law may be combined with, or run concurrently with, a notice of lease
termination under paragraph (l) (3) (i) of this section.
‘‘(iv) When the [public housing authority (PHA)] is required to afford
the tenant the opportunity for a hearing under the PHA grievance procedure
for a grievance concerning the lease termination (see § 966.51 (a) (1)), the
tenancy shall not terminate (even if any notice to vacate under State or
local law has expired) until the time for the tenant to request a grievance
hearing has expired, and (if a hearing was timely requested by the tenant)
the grievance process has been completed.
‘‘(v) When the PHA is not required to afford the tenant the opportunity
for a hearing under the PHA administrative grievance procedure for a
grievance concerning the lease termination (see § 966.51 (a) (2)), and
the PHA has decided to exclude such grievance from the PHA grievance
procedure, the notice of lease termination under paragraph (l) (3) (i) of
this section shall: (A) State that the tenant is not entitled to a grievance
hearing on the termination. (B) Specify the judicial eviction procedure to
be used by the PHA for eviction of the tenant, and state that [Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)] has determined that this eviction
procedure provides the opportunity for a hearing in court that contains
the basic elements of due process as defined in HUD regulations. (C) State
whether the eviction is for a criminal activity as described in § 966.51 (a)
(2) (i) (A) or for a drug-related criminal activity as described in § 966.51
(a) (2) (i) (B).’’ (Emphasis added.)
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the notices were required to (1) notify the defendant
that he is not entitled to a grievance hearing, (2) specify
the judicial eviction procedure to be used and state
that the federal government has determined that this
procedure provides the opportunity for a hearing in
court that contains the basic elements of due process
as defined in this context, and (3) state whether the
eviction was for criminal activity or drug related crimi-
nal activity. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (l) (3) (v) (C) (2023).
For the first time on appeal, the defendant claims that
the plaintiff’s notices failed to meet the requirements
of federal law. Specifically, he notes that the notices
merely informed him, inter alia, of his right to reply
and the right to a grievance hearing, if appropriate.16
Essentially, the defendant contends that the informa-
tion regarding a grievance hearing contained in the
plaintiff’s notices was insufficient by merely stating that
he was entitled to a grievance hearing, if appropriate.
The defendant further contends that he was not required
to show prejudice, and, as a result of the plaintiff’s
failure to comply with federal statutory and regulatory
requirements, the notices were invalid and the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the summary pro-
cess action.
In its reply brief, the plaintiff counters that the defen-
dant ‘‘essentially argues that any minor deviation from
24 C.F.R. § 966.4 must automatically lead to a dis-
missal.’’ It further contends that this argument is con-
trary to our law, citing Jefferson Garden Associates v.
16
In the present case, the Kapa notice contained the following information:
‘‘The tenant has the following: (a) the right to reply to this [n]otice and (b)
the right to a grievance hearing, if appropriate, and (c) the right to inspect
the findings. The [l]ease cannot terminate until after the cure date referenced
above.’’ The notice to quit provided the defendant with the following informa-
tion: ‘‘The tenant has the following: (a) the right to reply to this [n]otice;
(b) the right to inspect the file; and (c) the right to a grievance, if appropriate.
The [l]ease cannot terminate until the grievance deadline has passed or the
grievance, if requested, has been conducted.’’
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Greene, supra, 202 Conn. 128, and Housing Authority
v. Curtis, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury,
Docket No. SP-05-12308 (March 27, 2006) (41 Conn. L.
Rptr. 129) (court concluded that tenant’s claim that
landlord failed to include specific language from federal
regulation constituted hypertechnical attack that
exalted form over substance and determined that notice
complied with said regulation despite minor deviation).
Our Supreme Court has emphasized that, with regard
to both state and federal law, a landlord, in demonstra-
ting its compliance with the notices required to proceed
with a summary process action, must show that the
notices apprised the tenant of the information needed to
protect against premature, discriminatory, or arbitrary
eviction. Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra,
202 Conn. 143 (citing Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236,
1241 (4th Cir. 1973), and Anderson v. Denny, 365 F.
Supp. 1254, 1260 (W.D. Va. 1973)). Ritualistic compli-
ance with statutory or regulatory mandates is not
required. Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra,
144. It further explained: ‘‘For such tenants [of federally
subsidized housing], despite a recognition that a loss
of federally subsidized housing implicates due process
rights under the fifth amendment to the United States
constitution, federal law has moved away from requir-
ing either a special federal forum or special federal
forms. Federal courts have concluded that a tenant’s
right to fair adjudication of good cause for the termina-
tion of his tenancy can be vindicated by recourse to
the normal judicial process of state court eviction pro-
cedures.’’ Id.
Given this development, our Supreme Court con-
cluded that judicial evaluation of compliance with both
federal and state requirements for notices regarding the
termination of a lease must reflect the purpose that
these notices were meant to serve. Id., 145. ‘‘As we
have held in other contexts, in which regulatory and
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Housing Authority v. Cyr

constitutional rights were also implicated . . . not
every deviation from the strict requirements of either
statutes or regulations warrants dismissal of an
action for summary process. When good cause for ter-
mination of a lease has clearly been shown, and when
notices of termination have been sent in strict compli-
ance with statutory timetables, a landlord should not
be precluded from pursuing summary eviction pro-
ceedings because of hypertechnical dissection of the
wording of the notices that he has sent.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; emphasis added.) Id.
In the present case, the reasons underlying the termi-
nation of the lease contained in the plaintiff’s notices
constituted good cause for terminating the lease. See
id., 145–46. The defendant does not argue to the con-
trary. Instead, he baldly asserts that the notices were
insufficient with respect to the information contained
therein regarding the matter of a grievance hearing. He
has not provided us any authority to support his claim
that, as a result of this claimed deficiency regarding
the availability of a grievance hearing, the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the summary process
action.17 In light of our Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra, 202 Conn.
128, and the general presumption in favor of jurisdic-
tion, we conclude that the plaintiff’s lack of strict com-
pliance in this matter did not render its notices defective
so as to deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
17
We note that a landlord’s failure to comply with the federal statutory
requirements has been held to be enforceable in other procedural contexts.
See Poole v. Housing Authority, 202 F. Supp. 3d 617, 623–25 (W.D. La.
2016) (failure to comply with federal housing statutes resulted in summary
judgment rendered in favor of tenant); see also Samuels v. District of
Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 193–98 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (private enforcement of
housing statute and regulations available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Conway
v. Housing Authority, 239 F. Supp. 2d 593, 597–99 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (noting
that Congress intended to give public housing tenant right to enforce griev-
ance procedures through private right of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.