McGee v. 456 Sackett WDS Associates, LLC

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McGee v. 456 Sackett WDS Associates, LLC

SAMUEL MCGEE v. 456 SACKETT WDS
ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET AL.
(AC 47253)
Seeley, Westbrook and Norcott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment rendered after it
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his complaint,
which alleged that he fell and was injured when he stepped on a defective
wooden floorboard at the defendants’ property, which had been leased to
a tenant. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly deter-
mined that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the
defendants were in possession or control of the area where the plaintiff
allegedly was injured. Held:

The trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment, as there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff’s
alleged injury occurred in an area of the leased property over which the
defendants did not have possession or control and which the tenant was
responsible for maintaining and repairing.

This court did not need to address the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that
the trial court improperly relied on evidence outside of the lease, as the
clear and unambiguous language of the lease itself was sufficient to demon-
strate that the defendants did not have possession or control of the area
where the plaintiff allegedly was injured.

The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly found facts and miscon-
strued the lease in determining that the area where he allegedly fell was
not part of the structure or foundation of the premises was unavailing, as the
documents the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment did not relate directly to whether the defendants
retained possession or control of the relevant area of the property and, thus,
did not demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute concerning possession
or control.
Argued April 22—officially released August 12, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sus-
tained as a result of the defendants’ alleged negligence,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of New Haven, where the court,
Wilson, J., granted the defendants’ motion for summary
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McGee v. 456 Sackett WDS Associates, LLC

judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Michael S. Taylor, with whom, on the brief, was Cor-
rinne A. Burlingham, for the appellant (plaintiff).
James E. Wildes, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The plaintiff, Samuel McGee, appeals
from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court
in favor of the defendants, 456 Sackett WDS Associates,
LLC (Sackett, LLC), and Elm City Industrial Properties,
Inc. (Elm City), in this premises liability action arising
out of an incident in which the plaintiff allegedly was
injured due to a defective wooden floorboard on prop-
erty owned by the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff
claims that the court improperly determined that no
genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the
defendants were in possession or control of the area
of the property where the plaintiff allegedly was injured.
We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The following facts, as alleged in the complaint or
as otherwise undisputed in the record and viewed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmov-
ing party, and procedural history are relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff commenced this
action by way of a two count complaint on April 21,
2022, setting forth claims of negligence against each of
the defendants. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged
that, on or about May 23, 2020, he was a ‘‘business
invitee’’ at a warehouse located at 456 Sackett Point
Road in North Haven (property) when he was injured
after stepping on a defective wooden floorboard and
falling. The plaintiff alleged that the property was
owned, managed or leased by the defendants, who had,
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McGee v. 456 Sackett WDS Associates, LLC

or should have had, notice and knowledge of the condi-
tion that caused his injury but neglected to remedy it.
The plaintiff further alleged that, as a result of his fall,
he suffered various physical injuries and incurred, and
may continue to incur, medical expenses, a loss of
income and earning capacity, and a loss of the ability
to perform his usual occupational duties. On July 14,
2022, the defendants filed an answer and asserted, as
a special defense, that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries
were caused by his own negligence. That same day, the
plaintiff replied to the defendants’ answer and denied
each allegation contained in the special defense.
On September 23, 2022, the defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment as to both counts of the com-
plaint, and a supporting memorandum of law, in which
they claimed that no genuine issues of material fact
existed and that they were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Specifically, the defendants argued that
they were not liable to the plaintiff as a matter of law
because there was no genuine issue of material fact
that they did not have possession or control of the
property where the plaintiff allegedly was injured, and,
therefore, they did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the
defendants submitted, inter alia, an affidavit of Stephen
DiCapua, a member of Sackett, LLC. DiCapua averred
in his affidavit, inter alia, that he and Elm City are
members of Sackett, LLC; Sackett, LLC, has owned the
property since February, 2017; Sackett, LLC, has no
responsibility for maintaining or repairing the area
where the plaintiff allegedly was injured; and, pursuant
to the terms of a lease agreement covering the property,
Sackett, LLC, is the landlord and United Parcel Service,
Inc. (UPS), is the tenant of the property, and the respon-
sibility for maintaining and repairing the area where
the plaintiff allegedly was injured belonged to UPS as
the tenant.
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As further support for their motion for summary judg-
ment, the defendants submitted (1) the May 30, 1985
lease agreement between the landlord, Jacob M. Kaplan
in his capacity as trustee,1 and the tenant, UPS, (2) an
amendment to the lease dated December 29, 1986, (3)
a letter on behalf of UPS dated November 9, 1994, indi-
cating a willingness to renew the lease, (4) an amend-
ment to the lease dated April 17, 1998, (5) an amendment
to the lease dated May 31, 2006, (6) an amendment to
the lease dated November 17, 2015, (7) an assignment
and assumption of leases and security deposits dated
February 1, 2017,2 (8) excerpts from the plaintiff’s depo-
sition and (9) photographs of the area where the plain-
tiff allegedly was injured.
The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants’
motion for summary judgment on February 1, 2023. In
his objection, the plaintiff argued that ‘‘the terms of the
lease, when read as a whole, create a shared responsibil-
ity for repairs on the premises . . . [and] [t]herefore,
th[e] [c]ourt [could not] conclude as a matter of law,
that one party had exclusive control and possession of
the premises . . . .’’ In support of his objection, the
plaintiff submitted a photograph of the area where he
allegedly was injured, excerpts from the deposition of
DiCapua, and an Occupational Safety and Health
Administration injury and illness incident report form
(OSHA incident report) completed by the plaintiff con-
cerning his injury. The defendants thereafter filed a
reply to the plaintiff’s objection, arguing that the evi-
dence submitted by the plaintiff did not establish that
the lease creates a shared responsibility between land-
lord and tenant to repair the property and attaching
1
Kaplan executed the lease agreement in his capacity as trustee of four
different trusts that possessed ownership interests in the property.
2
The assignment and assumption of leases and security deposits document
was executed by Kaplan’s successor in interest to the lease and Sackett,
LLC. Pursuant to this document, Sackett, LLC, assumed all of the obligations
of being the landlord with respect to the property.
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excerpts from a deposition of Michael Mols3 and an
affidavit of Ericka Lyons Golia.4
On December 12, 2023, the trial court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and issued
a memorandum of decision setting forth its reasoning.
In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded,
on the basis of the plain language of the lease and the
other documentary evidence submitted by the defen-
dants in support of their motion for summary judgment,
that the defendants had met their burden of establishing
3
In the deposition excerpts provided by the defendants, Mols testified,
inter alia, that he is employed as a building and systems engineering manager
for UPS, his responsibilities in that position include maintaining UPS facili-
ties and making sure equipment at the facilities is ‘‘running and safe,’’ and
he is familiar with the UPS facility located at the property, had visited it
several times and recognized the area depicted in photographs of where
the plaintiff allegedly was injured. He further testified that the photographs
of the area show a ‘‘conveyor [belt] . . . [a]nd the platform . . . [that] the
employees will be working on. There would be a package car backed up
to that—that wooden piece. We call that a ‘wooden bumper,’ a dock bumper,
essentially. The package cars back up to that . . . [a]nd there’s a conveyor
belt . . . to carry the packages from that conveyor and load it into the
package car.’’ Mols also testified that the photograph of the area depicts ‘‘a
concrete pad that the employees work from. . . . The conveyor belt runs
parallel with that platform, and then we have package cars backed up to
the platform. So [the employees are] pulling packages off of that [conveyor]
belt and loading them onto the package car.’’ Mols testified that UPS occa-
sionally has to make repairs to or replace the ‘‘wooden bumper,’’ due to
‘‘wear and tear’’ caused by UPS ‘‘package cars’’ and ‘‘the boots of the [UPS]
employees,’’ and that, in such an event, an outside contractor would be
hired to do so, the landlord would not be involved and it would be considered
an ‘‘internal UPS repair’’ because ‘‘[i]t’s UPS equipment,’’ the ‘‘wooden
bumper,’’ ‘‘[t]he concrete [platform], the floor, everything in this picture,
[is] [UPS’s] responsibility for maintenance. . . . It’s my job.’’
4
The affidavit of Lyons Golia stated, inter alia, that she is employed as
a building manager for UPS and worked at the UPS facility located at the
property, that a photograph of the area where the plaintiff allegedly was
injured depicts ‘‘a wooden bumper attached to a platform that includes a
. . . conveyor [belt],’’ and that UPS, not the landlord, maintained those
items. Her affidavit further stated that, if or when it is determined that the
‘‘wooden bumper’’ depicted in the photograph needs to be ‘‘repaired or
replaced,’’ UPS would not ask the landlord to make the repair or pay for it
but would hire a contractor to do so.
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that there was no genuine issue of material fact that
they did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff because
they did not possess or control the area of the property
where he allegedly was injured, and that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff
. . . [then] failed to demonstrate through competent
evidence that there is a genuine issue of material fact
as to who possessed and controlled the subject area.’’
This appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, we set forth our standard
of review. ‘‘The standard of review of motions for sum-
mary judgment is well settled. Practice Book § 17-49
provides that summary judgment shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof
submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion
for summary judgment, the trial court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. . . . The courts are in entire agreement that the
moving party . . . has the burden of showing the
absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts
. . . . When documents submitted in support of a
motion for summary judgment fail to establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving
party has no obligation to submit documents establish-
ing the existence of such an issue. . . . Once the mov-
ing party has met its burden, however, the [nonmoving]
party must present evidence that demonstrates the exis-
tence of some disputed factual issue. . . . A material
fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the
result of a case. . . .
‘‘It is not enough for the moving party merely to assert
the absence of any disputed factual issue; the moving
party is required to bring forward . . . evidentiary
facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings to
show the absence of any material dispute. . . . A party
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seeking summary judgment has the considerable bur-
den of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue
of material fact because litigants ordinarily have a con-
stitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a
[jury] . . . .
‘‘On appeal [w]e must decide whether the trial court
erred in determining that there was no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . Because
the trial court rendered judgment for the [defendants]
as a matter of law, our review is plenary . . . . In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, [i]ssue find-
ing, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the
procedure. . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the
trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment. . . . [Its] function is not to decide issues of mate-
rial fact, but rather to determine whether any such
issues exist.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Tran v. Woodworth, 225 Conn. App.
514, 523–25, 317 A.3d 117 (2024).
We next turn to the well settled law of negligence
and premises liability relevant to the present case. ‘‘In
a negligence action, the plaintiff must meet all of the
essential elements of the tort in order to prevail. These
elements are: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and
actual injury. . . . The general rule regarding premises
liability in the landlord-tenant context is that landlords
owe a duty of reasonable care as to those parts of the
property over which they have retained control. . . .
[L]andlords [however] generally [do] not have a duty
to keep in repair any portion of the premises leased to
and in the exclusive possession and control of the ten-
ant. . . . [L]iability for injuries caused by defective
premises . . . does not depend on who holds legal title,
but rather on who has possession and control of the
property. . . . Thus, the dispositive issue in deciding
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whether a duty exists is whether the [defendant] has
any right to possession and control of the property. . . .
‘‘Retention of control is essentially a matter of inten-
tion to be determined in the light of all the significant
circumstances. . . . The word control has no legal or
technical meaning distinct from that given in its popular
acceptation . . . and refers to the power or authority
to manage, superintend, direct or oversee. . . . Unless
it is definitely expressed in the lease, the circumstances
of the particular case determine whether the lessor has
reserved control of the premises or whether they were
under the exclusive dominion of the tenant, and it
becomes a question of fact and is a matter of intention
in the light of all the significant and attendant facts
which bear on the issue. . . . Although questions of
fact ordinarily are not decided on summary judgment,
if the issue of control is expressed definitively in the
lease, it becomes, in effect, a question of law.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v.
Postal Holdings, LLC, 199 Conn. App. 312, 318–19, 235
A.3d 674, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 969, 240 A.3d 285
(2020). Accordingly, ‘‘[w]e have held that when parts
of a premises or a property are leased to and in the
exclusive possession and control of the tenant, the land-
lord does not owe a duty of reasonable care because
in that instance, the landlord does not have possession
or control of the property.’’ Raczkowski v. McFarlane,
195 Conn. App. 402, 414, 225 A.3d 305 (2020).
The essence of the plaintiff’s claim on appeal is that
the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment
in favor of the defendants and determined that no genu-
ine issues of material fact existed. The plaintiff’s argu-
ment in support of this claim has two main components.
The first relates to the issue of control and possession
of the premises. In connection therewith, the plaintiff
asserts that the court ‘‘applied the wrong standard to
its analysis’’ when determining which party retained
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possession and control of the property under the lease,
as the court, after finding that the language of the lease
was clear and unambiguous, considered the lease
together with the affidavit of Lyons Golia and Mols’
deposition testimony, instead of considering only the
lease. The plaintiff also asserts that the court errone-
ously interpreted the lease because certain lease provi-
sions demonstrate that the defendants reserved control
of the area of the property where the plaintiff was
injured. The second component of the plaintiff’s argu-
ment concerns the area of the premises where the
alleged defective condition existed. In this respect, the
plaintiff contends that the court improperly found facts
and misconstrued the relevant terms of the lease when
it determined that the defective area where the plaintiff
allegedly fell was not part of the structure or foundation
of the premises.5 Specifically, the plaintiff contends that
the defendants failed to present evidence affirmatively
demonstrating that the wooden floorboard at issue is
not a structural part of the property, for which the
defendants are responsible pursuant to the lease, and
that he submitted evidence in opposition to the motion
for summary judgment on this issue that does give rise
to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
wooden floorboard is considered a structural part of
the property. The plaintiff also contends that the court
improperly made a factual finding that the defect was
not structural. We are not persuaded.
We first consider whether the defendants met their
initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine
issues of material fact, which would entitle them to
judgment as a matter of law. See Tran v. Woodworth,
5
We note that, whether the defective area where the plaintiff allegedly was
injured was part of the structure or foundation of the premises necessarily
involves an examination of the language of the lease; therefore, although
the plaintiff raises separate arguments concerning possession and control
and the structural nature of the area where he allegedly fell, we address
them together.
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supra, 225 Conn. App. 523–25. The complaint alleges
that the plaintiff was ‘‘injured as he was walking . . .
on or near a loading dock’’ by a ‘‘defective . . . wooden
floorboard’’ located on the property. In support of their
motion for summary judgment, the defendants argued
that, ‘‘[u]nder the lease, UPS has always been responsi-
ble for maintaining and repairing’’ the relevant area of
the property, and the defendants submitted, inter alia,
the lease agreement and a series of related documents
showing that UPS is a tenant at the property, which is
owned by the defendants.
‘‘In construing a written lease, which constitutes a
written contract, three elementary principles must be
kept constantly in mind: (1) The intention of the parties
is controlling and must be gathered from the language
of the lease in the light of the circumstances sur-
rounding the parties at the execution of the instrument;
(2) the language must be given its ordinary meaning
unless a technical or special meaning is clearly
intended; (3) the lease must be construed as a whole
and in such a manner as to give effect to every provision,
if reasonably possible. . . . A determination of con-
tractual intent ordinarily presents a question of fact for
the ultimate fact finder, although where the language
is clear and unambiguous, it becomes a question of law
for the court. . . . Furthermore, when the language of
the [lease] is clear and unambiguous, [it] is to be given
effect according to its terms. A court will not torture
words to import ambiguity [when] the ordinary meaning
leaves no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly, any
ambiguity in a [lease] must emanate from the language
used in the [lease] rather than from one party’s subjec-
tive perception of [its] terms.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Postal Holdings,
LLC, supra, 199 Conn. App. 323–24.
The plaintiff contends that ‘‘the trial court acknowl-
edged that, where the language of the lease is clear
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and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be
determined by the terms of the contract alone’’; see 19
Perry Street, LLC v. Unionville Water Co., 294 Conn.
611, 622–23, 987 A.2d 1009 (2010); but that the court,
nevertheless, ‘‘relied on evidence outside the suppos-
edly clear terms of the contract in reaching its conclu-
sions about the contract’s meaning.’’ In light of our
plenary review of the court’s decision, we need not
address the merits of this argument because we con-
clude that the language of the lease is clear and unam-
biguous and, by itself, is sufficient to demonstrate that
the defendants did not have possession and control of
the area where the plaintiff allegedly was injured. See
White v. Latimer Point Condominium Assn., Inc., 191
Conn. App. 767, 775, 216 A.3d 830 (2019) (recognizing
that ‘‘[w]hen the facts underlying a claim on appeal are
not in dispute and that claim is subject to plenary
review, the precise legal analysis undertaken by the
trial court is not essential to the reviewing court’s con-
sideration of the issue on appeal’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The plain language of the lease between the defen-
dants and UPS definitively expresses that possession
and control of the relevant area of the property is vested
in the tenant. In particular, paragraph 6 of the lease,
titled ‘‘Repairs and Maintenance of the Property,’’ pro-
vides in relevant part: ‘‘It is expressly understood that
the [l]andlord is only responsible for repairs to the
structural part of the [d]emised [p]remises which shall
include the roof, the utility lines to the point of entry to
the building, the foundation and the bearing columns
unless the conditions necessitating the repairs to such
structural parts shall have been caused by the [t]enant,
its agents or servants.’’ (Emphasis added.) The plain-
tiff’s complaint does not allege that he was injured by
a defect that existed on a ‘‘structural part’’ of the prop-
erty that the defendants were responsible for repairing
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and maintaining, which the lease defines as including
the property’s ‘‘roof’’ and ‘‘foundation,’’ as well as cer-
tain ‘‘utility lines’’ and ‘‘bearing columns’’ on the prop-
erty. Instead, the plaintiff alleges only that he was
injured ‘‘as he was walking . . . on or near a loading
dock’’ by a ‘‘defective, rotting, and splintering wooden
floorboard . . . .’’6
Our determination that the defendants did not have
possession or control of the area of the property where
the plaintiff allegedly was injured also is supported
by paragraph 5 of the lease, titled ‘‘Alterations.’’ As
previously stated, the plaintiff’s complaint alleges that
he was ‘‘injured as he was walking . . . on or near a
loading dock,’’ and paragraph 5 of the lease provides
in relevant part: ‘‘[A]t the end of the initial term or
renewal terms, or in the event of termination . . . the
[t]enant shall at its own cost and expense, remove the
conveyor belts together with the docks utilized in the
conveyor belt system installed on the [d]emised [p]rem-
ises by the [t]enant . . . . [The] [t]enant shall have the
right to remove all of its trade fixtures and equipment
at any time during the term of this [l]ease.’’7 (Emphasis
6
The plaintiff’s argument that the trial court improperly made a factual
finding that the defective wooden plank was not ‘‘ ‘structural’ ’’ is unavailing.
First, we do not agree that such a determination amounts to a factual finding,
as it stemmed from the court’s interpretation of the clear language of the
lease, and, when contract language is clear and unambiguous, its interpreta-
tion is a question of law for the court. See, e.g., Cohen v. Postal Holdings,
LLC, supra, 199 Conn. App. 323–24. Moreover, in our plenary review of the
court’s decision, we have determined, as a matter of law, on the basis of
the clear and unambiguous language of the lease, that the alleged defective
condition of the premises did not exist on a structural part of the
demised premises.
7
The plaintiff argues that the following language in paragraph 5 of the
lease gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to possession or control:
‘‘[The] [t]enant shall have the right to make non-structural and structural
alterations and improvements (other than to the exterior walls, roof, founda-
tions or bearing columns) which do not impair or weaken the existing
improvements without [the] [l]andlord’s prior written consent. [The] [t]enant
shall provide [the] [l]andlord with written notice of any substantial structural
repairs made by [the] [t]enant to the [d]emised [p]remises. Except as afore-
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McGee v. 456 Sackett WDS Associates, LLC

added.) Thus, given the allegations of the plaintiff’s
complaint and the plain language of the lease, there is
no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff’s
alleged injury occurred on a loading dock that was
installed on the property by UPS, over which the defen-
dants did not have possession or control.
The plaintiff argues that paragraph 148 of the lease
gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to the
issue of possession or control. Paragraph 14, however,
grants the defendants a right of entry only for the pur-
poses of inspecting, showing or making repairs, alter-
ations or improvements to the property, and our
said, [the] [t]enant shall make no alterations, or improvements in or to the
[d]emised [p]remises without [the] [l]andlord’s prior written consent, which
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed.’’ We reject this argu-
ment.
The portion of paragraph 5 on which the plaintiff relies indicates that the
tenant retains control over ‘‘non-structural and structural’’ areas of the
property for the purpose of making alterations and improvements, and
that the landlord’s written consent is required to undertake ‘‘substantial’’
structural repairs. It does not create an ambiguity as to whether the defen-
dants retained possession or control over the relevant area of the property, as
the plaintiff did not allege in his complaint or submit documentary evidence
establishing that his alleged injury occurred on a structural area of the
property, or that repairing the defective wooden floorboard would have
constituted a substantial structural repair for which the written consent of
the landlord would have been needed. See Fiorelli v. Gorsky, 120 Conn.
App. 298, 309, 991 A.2d 1105 (affirming summary judgment on ground that
defendants did not retain possession or control of leased premises when
plaintiffs ‘‘merely referred to sections of the contract under which the lessor
needed the [landlord’s] approval prior to taking some action’’), cert. denied,
298 Conn. 933, 10 A.3d 517 (2010); see also Margarita O. v. Fernando I.,
231 Conn. App. 190, 206, 333 A.3d 530 (‘‘the mere fact that the parties
advance different interpretations of the [contract] language in question does
not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)), cert. denied, 352 Conn. 904, 335 A.3d 845 (2025).
8
Paragraph 14, titled ‘‘Landlord’s Right of Entry,’’ provides in relevant
part: ‘‘[The] [l]andlord or [the] [l]andlord’s agents shall have the right to
enter the [d]emised [p]remises during normal business hours upon reason-
able notice to examine the same, and to show them to prospective purchasers
or mortgagees of the [d]emised [p]remises, and to make such repairs, alter-
ations, improvements or additions as [the] [l]andlord may deem necessary
or desirable . . . .’’
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McGee v. 456 Sackett WDS Associates, LLC

Supreme Court has held that, under a similar lease
provision, a landlord does ‘‘not reserve control . . . of
the premises leased . . . .’’ Monarch Accounting Sup-
plies, Inc. v. Prezioso, 170 Conn. 659, 665, 368 A.2d 6
(1976);9 accord Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 454,
15 N.E.2d 476 (1938) (‘‘[t]he reservation of a right in
the lessor to enter upon the premises for various pur-
poses and to ‘make repairs and alterations if he should
elect so to do,’ imports no . . . reservation of con-
trol’’); Dill v. Lahr, 194 App. Div. 3d 1473, 1475, 148
N.Y.S.3d 582 (2021) (recognizing ‘‘general principle’’
that landlord’s ‘‘reservation of the rights to visit or to
inspect the premises and to approve certain alterations,
additions, or improvements . . . does not by itself
establish the requisite degree of control to support the
imposition of liability’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Similarly, paragraph 14 grants the landlord only
a reversionary interest in the property, and the plaintiff
has not presented any documentary evidence demon-
strating that the defendants previously had repaired the
defective wooden floorboard that allegedly injured him.
As such, the defendants’ right of entry under paragraph
14 does not give rise to a genuine issue of material fact
as to control or possession of the premises.
Consequently, by submitting the lease in support of
their motion for summary judgment, the defendants
met their initial burden of demonstrating the lack of
any genuine issues of material fact that would preclude
9
In Monarch Accounting Supplies, Inc., a lease provision gave the land-
lord ‘‘ ‘the right to enter into and upon said premises, or any part thereof,
at all reasonable hours for the purpose of examining the same, or making
such repairs or alterations therein as may be necessary for the safety and
preservation thereof.’ ’’ Monarch Accounting Supplies, Inc. v. Prezioso,
supra, 170 Conn. 664. Our Supreme Court rejected the argument that, on
the basis of this lease provision, the landlord retained control of the leased
premises because ‘‘the provisions for repair and the limited nature of the
[landlord’s] right to enter only admit of a reversionary interest in the [land-
lord].’’ Id., 664–65.
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judgment as a matter of law. See Ready v. New Canaan,
232 Conn. App. 487, 493, 336 A.3d 1252 (2025) (‘‘[t]o
satisfy his burden [on summary judgment] the movant
must make a showing that it is quite clear what the
truth is’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). For that
reason, we next must determine whether the documen-
tary evidence submitted by the plaintiff in opposition
to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment gives
rise to a genuine issue of material fact. See Tran v.
Woodworth, supra, 225 Conn. App. 523–25. The plaintiff
argues that his evidentiary submissions demonstrate
that the defect at issue existed on a ‘‘structural part’’
of the property, namely, its foundation. We are not
persuaded.
The evidence the plaintiff presented in opposition to
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment con-
sisted of a photograph of the area where he allegedly
was injured, excerpts from DiCapua’s deposition pur-
portedly demonstrating that the defendants had con-
structive notice of the relevant defect, and the OSHA
incident report completed by the plaintiff concerning
his injury. These documentary submissions, however,
do not relate directly to whether the defendants
retained possession or control of the relevant area of
the property. For instance, the photograph submitted
by the plaintiff, in and of itself, does not establish that
the defect was part of a ‘‘structural part’’ of the property
for which the defendants were responsible. Moreover,
even if we assume that the OSHA incident report prop-
erly can be considered,10 it merely describes the
‘‘object’’ that harmed the plaintiff as a ‘‘platform’’ and,
10
The defendants argue that the OSHA incident report should not be
considered because it is inadmissible, unauthenticated hearsay. See, e.g.,
United Cleaning & Restoration, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A., 225 Conn.
App. 702, 725 n.13, 317 A.3d 2 (2024) (‘‘[i]t is well settled that any evidence
considered in connection with a motion for summary judgment must be
admissible’’ (emphasis in original)).
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like DiCapua’s deposition testimony, does not demon-
strate the existence of a factual dispute concerning
possession or control. See Forestier v. Bridgeport, 223
Conn. App. 298, 331–32, 308 A.3d 102 (2024) (‘‘in order
to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment
by raising a genuine issue of material fact, the opposing
party cannot rely solely on allegations that contradict
those offered by the moving party . . . such allega-
tions must be supported by counteraffidavits or other
documentary submissions that controvert the evidence
offered in support of summary judgment’’ (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); Atkinson v. Santore, 135 Conn.
App. 76, 84, 41 A.3d 1095 (‘‘Demonstrating a genuine
issue of material fact requires a showing of evidentiary
facts or substantial evidence outside the pleadings from
which material facts alleged in the pleadings can be
warrantably inferred. . . . An inference that is based
on speculation and is unsupported by the evidence is
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)),
cert. denied, 305 Conn. 909, 44 A.3d 184 (2012).

In summary, given the allegations in the plaintiff’s
complaint and the plain language of the lease, we con-
clude that the lease definitively vests control and pos-
session of the area of the property at issue with the
tenant. See Cohen v. Postal Holdings, LLC, supra, 199
Conn. App. 323–24. The trial court, therefore, properly
determined that the defendants had met their burden
of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact concerning their lack of possession and
control over the area where the plaintiff allegedly was
injured, and the plaintiff, in turn, failed to demonstrate
the existence of such a factual dispute. Thus, the defen-
dants did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care and are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly,
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the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.