Stanford v. Nogiec

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Stanford v. Nogiec

LIAM STANFORD ET AL. v.
CLAYTON NOGIEC ET AL.
(AC 47116)
Moll, Suarez and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the defendant
rental car company’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ com-
plaint alleging, inter alia, negligent entrustment. N, whose driver’s license
was subject to an ignition interlock device restriction, rented a motor vehicle
from the defendant and, later that same day, while driving the vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, struck the plaintiff L, a pedestrian.
The plaintiffs claimed that the court improperly concluded that the defendant
did not have a duty to determine whether N’s driver’s license was subject
to restrictions before renting him a vehicle. Held:

The trial court properly determined that the defendant did not have a duty
pursuant to the statute (§ 14-153) governing the renting of motor vehicles
to use an online database to confirm whether N’s license was subject to
any restrictions, as the plain language and legislative history of § 14-153
indicated that the defendant was required only to inspect N’s physical driver’s
license card to confirm that it was facially valid and unexpired.

The trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment, as the defendant’s employee who rented the motor vehicle to N
submitted an affidavit in which he averred that, before renting the vehicle,
he had inspected N’s driver’s license and confirmed that it was facially valid
and unexpired, and, because the plaintiffs did not present any evidence to
the contrary regarding that issue of fact in opposing summary judgment,
no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant fulfilled
its duties pursuant to § 14-153.

This court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, the defen-
dant did not have an affirmative common-law duty to inspect N’s driver’s
license using an online database in the absence of readily apparent facts
providing a reason to suspect that a prospective renter has any limitation
on his ability to drive, and, thus, no genuine issues of material fact existed
and the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
plaintiffs’ negligent entrustment claims.
Argued March 26—officially released July 22, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sus-
tained by the named plaintiff as a result of the named
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Stanford v. Nogiec

defendant’s alleged negligence, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Hartford, where the complaint was withdrawn as to the
named defendant; thereafter, the court, Sicilian, J.,
granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the
defendant EAN Holdings, LLC, and rendered judgment
thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Michael S. Taylor, with whom were Brendon P. Lev-
esque and, on the brief, Corinne A. Burlingham, for
the appellants (plaintiffs).
Jenna M. Scoville, with whom were Scott T. Garosshen
and, on the brief, Linda L. Morkan and Yelena Akim,
for the appellee (defendant EAN Holdings, LLC).
Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. In this personal injury action arising
out of an accident involving a driver of a rental car
and a pedestrian, the plaintiffs, Hope Stanford, Sarah
Stanford, and Liam Stanford, individually and as next
friend for his two minor children, appeal from the trial
court’s rendering of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant EAN Holdings, LLC, also known as Enter-
prise Rental Car.1 The plaintiffs claim that the court
improperly concluded that the defendant did not have
a duty to determine whether the driver’s license of a
renter of a motor vehicle was subject to restrictions
before renting him a vehicle. We disagree and, accord-
ingly, affirm the judgment of the court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The
1
The plaintiffs’ complaint additionally named the driver of the rental
vehicle, Clayton Nogiec, as a defendant, but the action was withdrawn
as to him following the plaintiffs’ acceptance of his offer of compromise.
Accordingly, all references to the defendant herein are to EAN Holdings,
LLC, also known as Enterprise Rental Car.
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defendant and CAMRAC, LLC (CAMRAC), are affiliates
‘‘engaged in the auto rental or leasing business.’’ On
August 24, 2019, Clayton Nogiec rented a motor vehicle
through CAMRAC.2 Before renting the motor vehicle to
Nogiec, an employee looked at his driver’s license and
confirmed that it was ‘‘facially valid, contained no
restrictions on its face, and was unexpired.’’ Addition-
ally, the employee observed that Nogiec ‘‘did not dem-
onstrate any signs of mental or physical impairment,
or any other unfitness to operate a motor vehicle.’’ At
the time that Nogiec rented the vehicle, the defendant
was unaware that ‘‘[he] was prohibited from operating
a vehicle that did not have an ignition interlock device3
installed.’’4 (Footnote added.) The motor vehicle rented
by Nogiec, which was owned either by CAMRAC or by
the defendant, did not have an ignition interlock device.
Later that same day, Nogiec was driving the rental vehi-
cle when he struck the plaintiff Liam Stanford, a pedes-
trian. Police officers conducted a field sobriety test,
which Nogiec failed, and subsequently arrested him for
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol or drugs in violation of General Statutes
§ 14-227a.
On April 23, 2020, the plaintiffs commenced the pres-
ent action. Their complaint sets forth the following
2
The court determined that ‘‘[the defendant] has not satisfied its burden
to demonstrate the absence of genuine disputes of material facts as to
whether and how it was involved in or responsible for the transaction
by which Nogiec rented the vehicle that he was driving when he struck
Liam Stanford.’’
3
‘‘Ignition interlock device means a device installed in a motor vehicle
that measures the blood alcohol content of the operator and disallows the
mechanical operation of such motor vehicle until the blood alcohol content
of such operator is less than twenty-five thousandths of one per cent.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) General Statutes § 14-227j (a).
4
The record does not reflect why Nogiec’s driver’s license was subject
to an ignition interlock device requirement, but it is undisputed that his
license was subject to such requirement at the time that he rented the vehi-
cle.
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causes of action against the defendant: (1) vicarious
liability, (2) negligent rental and/or entrustment, (3)
loss of consortium, and (4) bystander emotional dis-
tress. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendant
owned and rented the motor vehicle that Nogiec was
driving at the time of the incident and that the ‘‘defen-
dant knew, or should have known, that renting, leasing
or providing motor vehicles to person[s], customers or
drivers who have suspended licenses and/or are
required to have ignition interlock devices in their vehi-
cles was unsafe and could reasonably anticipate that
such person, customer or driver could cause injury to
another.’’ The defendant filed an answer and a special
defense in which it alleged that ‘‘[a] rental car owner
or affiliate cannot be held vicariously liable for harm
to persons or property that arises out of the use, opera-
tion or possession of a rented motor vehicle during the
period of rental.’’
The defendant thereafter moved for summary judg-
ment on all claims against it. It argued, inter alia, that
the plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claims were barred by
49 U.S.C. § 30106, commonly known as the Graves
Amendment,5 and that it was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the remainder of the plaintiffs’ claims
because rental car companies do not have a duty to
investigate the driver’s license status, motor vehicle
history, or criminal history. The plaintiffs filed an oppo-
sition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
5
The Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, provides in relevant part:
‘‘(a) An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person
(or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State
or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle
(or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results
or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the
period of the rental or lease, if—(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)
is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner
(or an affiliate of the owner). . . .’’
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Following oral argument, the court, Sicilian, J.,
issued a memorandum of decision in which it rendered
summary judgment in favor of the defendant on all
counts. In its memorandum, the court stated that the
plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant ‘‘fall squarely
within the scope of the Graves Amendment and are
preempted unless an exception to the preemption
applies . . . [such as] where the lessor commits inde-
pendent acts of negligence . . . . The plaintiffs’ only
claims of independent negligence on the part of [the
defendant] are their claims that [the defendant] was
negligent in renting or entrusting the subject vehicle to
Nogiec. . . . If those claims fail, then the claims for
vicarious liability must also fail. In short, [the defen-
dant’s] motion for summary judgment as to all counts
turns on whether it is entitled to summary judgment
on its claims of negligent entrustment.’’6
In addressing the plaintiffs’ negligent entrustment
claims, the court stated: ‘‘The plaintiffs’ [negligent
entrustment] claim rests on the proposition that [the
defendant] had a duty to investigate the status of
Nogiec’s license and therefore should have known that
his license was restricted. The plaintiffs’ argument is
inconsistent with the weight of authority holding that
. . . a rental car company has no duty to do anything
more than [assess] the facial validity of a renter’s license
and [compare] the signature on the license to that on
the contract, as required by General Statutes § 14-153
. . . . The court concludes that there are no disputed
issues of material fact regarding [the defendant’s] lack
6
The plaintiffs’ claims of loss of consortium and bystander emotional
distress are derivative causes of action that rise and fall with the validity
of their negligent entrustment claims. See Gilman v. Shames, 189 Conn.
App. 736, 747–48, 208 A.3d 1279 (2019) (‘‘Like a loss of consortium claim,
a claim for bystander emotional distress is a derivat[ive] claim. . . . Conse-
quently, it cannot be brought as a freestanding claim where there is no valid
underlying predicate action.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.)).
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of actual or constructive knowledge that Nogiec was
prohibited from operating a motor vehicle without an
ignition interlock device or was otherwise incompetent
to operate a motor vehicle. Therefore, [the defendant] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs’
claims for negligent entrustment. . . . [The defen-
dant’s] motion for summary judgment on all the counts
of the plaintiffs’ complaint against [the defendant] is
granted.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) This appeal followed.
As a threshold matter, we set forth the relevant stan-
dard that governs our review of a court’s decision to
grant a motion for summary judgment. ‘‘Practice Book
§ 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be ren-
dered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other
proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. A party moving for
summary judgment is held to a strict standard. . . . To
satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing
that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes
any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue
of material fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the
movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the opponent. . . . When documents sub-
mitted in support of a motion for summary judgment
fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit
documents establishing the existence of such an issue.
. . . Once the moving party has met its burden, how-
ever, the opposing party must present evidence that
demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual
issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing
party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed
issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to
establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore,
cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court
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under Practice Book § [17-45]. . . . Our review of the
trial court’s decision to grant [a] motion for summary
judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Belevich v. Renaissance I, LLC, 207 Conn. App.
119, 124, 261 A.3d 1 (2021). ‘‘We therefore must decide
whether the court’s conclusions were legally and logi-
cally correct and find support in the record.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Adams v. Aircraft Spruce &
Specialty Co., 215 Conn. App. 428, 441, 283 A.3d 42,
cert. denied, 345 Conn. 970, 286 A.3d 448 (2022).
We now turn to the plaintiffs’ claims on appeal. The
plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded
that the defendant did not have a duty to determine
whether Nogiec’s license was subject to an ignition
interlock device requirement before renting him a vehi-
cle. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the defendant
had a duty to use an online database to confirm the
status of Nogiec’s license pursuant to (1) § 14-153 and/
or (2) the common law. We address each argument
in turn.
I
We first consider the plaintiffs’ argument that the
defendant ‘‘had a duty under . . . § 14-153 to inspect
the validity of Nogiec’s license using an online data-
base’’7 and to confirm ‘‘that the proffered license is not
suspended or otherwise limited . . . .’’ The defendant
7
In connection with their opposition to the defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of Lloyd D. Rae, an
expert in the automobile rental business, which provides in relevant part
that the defendant had access to ‘‘commercially or publicly available services
to confirm the license status of Nogiec prior to renting a motor vehicle to
Nogiec including the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles Credential
Verification website which is a free service [and/or] [the] [LexisNexis] web-
site of which they are subscribers.’’ The plaintiffs contend that whether
such sources are available to car rental companies for the purpose of con-
firming the status of a driver’s license is a question of fact that they would
bear the burden of proving at trial.
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counters that § 14-153 does not require car rental com-
panies to search online databases to confirm the validity
or status of a renter’s license. Rather, the defendant
contends that the statute required it only to inspect
Nogiec’s physical driver’s license card to confirm its
facial validity. We agree with the defendant that § 14-
153 did not require it to search an online database or
other sources to confirm the status of Nogiec’s driver’s
license.
Whether § 14-153 imposes a duty on car rental compa-
nies to search online databases to confirm the validity
or status of a prospective renter’s driver’s license is a
question of statutory interpretation. ‘‘When construing
a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain
and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.
. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a rea-
soned manner, the meaning of the statutory language
as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the ques-
tion of whether the language actually does apply. . . .
In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes
§ 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute
itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after
examining such text and considering such relationship,
the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratex-
tual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and
unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance
to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding
its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to
implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation
and [common-law] principles governing the same gen-
eral subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commis-
sion, 338 Conn. 310, 320–21, 258 A.3d 1 (2021). ‘‘[I]ssues
of statutory construction raise questions of law, over
which we exercise plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation
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marks omitted.) Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Ham-
den, 202 Conn. App. 467, 476, 246 A.3d 513 (2021), aff’d,
345 Conn. 76, 282 A.3d 1253 (2022).
We begin with the text of the statute. Section 14-153
provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person, firm or corpora-
tion which rents a motor vehicle . . . shall inspect or
cause to be inspected the motor vehicle operator’s
license of the person initially operating such motor
vehicle, shall compare the signature on such license
with that of the alleged licensee written in his presence
and shall keep and retain for a period of one year a
record of the name of such licensee, the number of his
license and the date of issue thereof, the registration
number of the motor vehicle so rented and the mileage
reading displayed by the odometer of such vehicle at
the time such vehicle leaves and returns to the lessor’s
place of business . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The rele-
vant statutory scheme does not provide any definitions
relating to the phrase ‘‘inspect . . . the motor vehicle
operator’s license . . . .’’ General Statutes § 14-153.
‘‘In the absence of a definition of terms in the statute
itself, [w]e may presume . . . that the legislature
intended [a word] to have its ordinary meaning in the
English language, as gleaned from the context of its
use. . . . Under such circumstances, it is appropriate
to look to the common understanding of the term as
expressed in a dictionary.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commis-
sion, supra, 338 Conn. 322. ‘‘Dictionaries in print at the
time of the statute’s enactment are the most instructive.
. . . [L]ater editions also can be instructive, particu-
larly those from the time when a statute is revised
but retains the language at issue.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) 9 Pettipaug, LLC v.
Planning & Zoning Commission, 349 Conn. 268, 280,
316 A.3d 318 (2024).
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The plaintiffs assert that ‘‘[w]hether [the defendant]
owed a duty to determine whether Nogiec was subject
to an [ignition interlock device] requirement under . . .
§ 14-153 centers on the meaning of the word ‘inspect’
in this statute.’’ At the time of the statute’s enactment,
Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English
Language defined the term ‘‘inspect’’ in relevant part
as ‘‘[t]o look upon; to view closely and critically . . .
to examine; scrutinize [or] investigate.’’ Webster’s New
International Dictionary of the English Language (4th
Ed. 1931) p. 1117. When the legislature last amended
the statute in 1987, the statute retained the language at
issue, but the dictionary defined ‘‘inspect’’ as ‘‘to view
closely in critical appraisal,’’ to ‘‘look over,’’ or ‘‘to exam-
ine officially.’’ Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Diction-
ary (1986) p. 626. The parties dispute whether ‘‘inspect,’’
as used in the statute, requires a car rental company
to look at a prospective renter’s driver’s license and
examine its facial validity or to investigate the validity
of such license using outside sources. Because the defi-
nition at the time of enactment included ‘‘to investi-
gate,’’ but the definition at the time of amendment did
not, the dictionary definitions reasonably could be read
to support both parties’ interpretations. The term
‘‘inspect’’ is, therefore, ambiguous because it ‘‘is suscep-
tible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pizzoferrato v.
Community Renewal Team, Inc., 211 Conn. App. 458,
462, 272 A.3d 1145 (2022). Accordingly, we look to other
parts of the statute, as well as the legislative history and
circumstances surrounding the statute’s enactment, for
guidance.
The subject of the statute’s inspection requirement
is the ‘‘motor vehicle operator’s license’’ and, therefore,
we consider the term ‘‘inspect’’ in light of the term
‘‘license,’’ as used in § 14-153. The plaintiffs argue that
the term ‘‘license’’ refers to the renter’s authority to
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Stanford v. Nogiec

operate a motor vehicle and, therefore, car rental com-
panies must confirm that a prospective renter’s driver’s
license is valid and free from restrictions. The defen-
dant, however, argues that the term ‘‘license,’’ as used
in the statute, merely refers to a prospective renter’s
physical driver’s license card. Webster’s New Interna-
tional Dictionary of the English Language contempora-
neously defined the term ‘‘license’’ in relevant part as
the ‘‘[a]uthority or . . . permission given to do some-
thing (specified) . . . ; also, the document embodying
such permission . . . .’’ Webster’s New International
Dictionary of the English Language, supra, p. 1244. The
context provided by the text of the statute, in conjunc-
tion with the foregoing definitions, suggests that the
term ‘‘license’’ refers to the physical license ‘‘docu-
ment,’’ rather than the abstract ‘‘permission’’ to operate
a motor vehicle.
Section 14-153 uses the term ‘‘license’’ three times:
anyone who rents a motor vehicle ‘‘shall inspect . . .
the motor vehicle operator’s license of the person ini-
tially operating such motor vehicle, shall compare the
signature on such license with that of the alleged
licensee written in his presence and shall keep and
retain . . . a record of . . . the number of his license
and the date of issue thereof . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
‘‘It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that
[when] the same words are used in a statute two or more
times they will ordinarily be given the same meaning
in each instance . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information
Commission, 298 Conn. 703, 727, 6 A.3d 763 (2010).
The latter two uses of the term ‘‘license’’ in § 14-153
unambiguously refer to the signature, number, and issu-
ance date on the physical driver’s license card. Although
the first use of the term could be read as referring to
the authority to operate a motor vehicle, the statute
as a whole does not present any indication that the
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‘‘legislature would have intended that the same term
be given a different meaning in different parts of the
statute.’’ Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Informa-
tion Commission, supra, 728. This is especially true in
light of the statute’s use of the phrase ‘‘such license,’’
which indicates that the preceding use of ‘‘license’’ has
the same meaning. (Emphasis added.) General Statutes
§ 14-153; see also Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of
Information Commission, supra, 728. Thus, the stat-
ute’s inspection requirement—like the signature, num-
ber, and issuance date requirements—must also refer
to the physical driver’s license card presented by the
prospective renter, rather than to the renter’s abstract
authority to operate a motor vehicle.
Turning to the legislative history of § 14-153, the plain-
tiffs argue that the legislature intended § 14-153 to
require car rental companies to ascertain the status of
a prospective renter’s driver’s license. In support of this
argument, they point to the portion of the legislative
history showing that House Bill No. 642, 1931 Sess., was
originally entitled ‘‘Renting Motor Vehicle to Unlicensed
Person.’’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,
Motor Vehicles, 1931 Sess., p. 156. They additionally
point to the following statement given at the Joint Stand-
ing Committee hearing on the substitute bill, entitled
‘‘An Act concerning the Renting of Motor Vehicles’’:
‘‘[Substitute House Bill No. 642] makes it necessary for
the person or corporations renting automobiles under
the so-called ‘U-Drive’ plan to ascertain from the lessee
whether or not he is a properly licensed operator before
allowing him to operate his car on the highway. The
Committee feels that this is a safety measure for the
protection of the public and therefore recommends the
passage of the Bill.’’ (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint
Standing Committee Hearings, supra, p. 190. The defen-
dant, however, argues that ‘‘the statute was targeted at
catching drivers who had no license at all . . . .’’ In
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support of its argument, the defendant directs us to the
stated purpose of House Bill No. 642, as expressed at
the Joint Standing Committee Hearing on the original
bill: ‘‘The purpose of the Bill is to make it possible . . .
through identification to make sure that [the prospec-
tive renter] has a license . . . [and require] [t]he per-
son who rents the vehicle to ascertain whether [the
prospective renter] has a license.’’ Conn. Joint Standing
Committee Hearings, supra, p. 157.
Although the plaintiffs point to one instance in which
the legislature expressed that a renter should be ‘‘prop-
erly licensed,’’ the legislature’s intended meaning of that
phrase is vague because ‘‘properly’’ could mean a valid,
unrestricted license, or it could mean that the renter
obtained a license by proper means. The plaintiffs do
not direct our attention to any portions of the legislative
history that show that the legislature intended car rental
companies to use outside sources to investigate the
status of a renter’s license. To the contrary, the stated
purpose indicates that car rental companies need only
use a prospective renter’s identification to ensure that
such renter has a driver’s license. In light of that stated
purpose, as well as our determination that the statute’s
use of the term ‘‘license’’ refers to a physical driver’s
license card, we are persuaded that the legislature
intended the statute to require car rental companies
to ascertain whether a prospective renter possesses a
physical driver’s license card.
The circumstances surrounding the statute’s enact-
ment further support our interpretation of the statute’s
text and legislative history because the use of online
databases to confirm the status of a driver’s license did
not exist. In fact, the plaintiffs argue that § 14-153 ‘‘limits
those who can rent vehicles to those who have valid
driver’s licenses’’ and, because ‘‘[a] modern Connecti-
cut license may be suspended or restricted with no
visible change to the physical document,’’ the plaintiffs
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argue that ‘‘confirming the validity of a license in our
modern era includes checking the status of a [driver’s]
license online . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
‘‘Our case law is clear . . . that when the legislature
chooses to act, it is presumed to know how to draft
legislation consistent with its intent . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) King v. Volvo Excavators
AB, 333 Conn. 283, 296, 215 A.3d 149 (2019); see also
Adesokan v. Bloomfield, 347 Conn. 416, 439, 297 A.3d
983 (2023) (‘‘[h]ad the legislature intended to include
[certain conduct within the meaning of the statute], it
could have done so’’). The plaintiffs acknowledge that
‘‘[t]he relevant language of § 14-153 has been in place
since at least 1931.’’ Indeed, the legislature has amended
§ 14-153 numerous times, but it has not substantively
changed the relevant language. See General Statutes
(Cum. Supp. 1931) § 628c.8 The plaintiffs themselves
argue that the standards for determining the status of
a license have changed since the statute’s enactment
and that the use of online databases for that purpose
is a ‘‘modern system . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) We pre-
sume, therefore, that if the legislature had intended to
impose duties related to modern technological develop-
ments, it would have revised the language of the inspec-
tion requirement accordingly.9
8
General Statutes (Cum. Supp. 1931) § 628c provides in relevant part:
‘‘Any person who shall rent a motor vehicle without a driver shall inspect
or cause to be inspected the motor vehicle operator’s license of the person
by whom such motor vehicle is to be operated, shall compare the signature
on such license with that of the alleged licensee written in his presence
and shall keep a record of the name of such licensee, the number of his
license and the date of issue thereof . . . .’’
9
The plaintiffs attempt to overcome our well settled law that the legislature
‘‘is presumed to know how to draft legislation’’; (internal quotation marks
omitted) King v. Volvo Excavators AB, supra, 333 Conn. 296; by analogizing
the lack of legislative intervention in the present case with the alleged lack
of legislative intervention in the practice of witch trials. Specifically, the
plaintiffs, in their reply brief, state: ‘‘At one time, Connecticut drowned
people, in a process known as the ‘ducking test,’ to determine whether they
were witches possessed by evil spirits. . . . There is no clear indication
that the General Assembly ever passed a law to end our state’s use of the
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Moreover, ‘‘[courts] are not in the business of writing
statutes; that is the province of the legislature. Our role
is to interpret statutes as they are written. . . . [We]
cannot, by [judicial] construction, read into statutes
provisions [that] are not clearly stated.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Aldin Associates Ltd. Partnership
v. State, 230 Conn. App. 223, 249, 330 A.3d 613, cert.
granted, 351 Conn. 911, 330 A.3d 882 (2025); see also,
e.g., PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347, 358,
324 A.3d 780 (2024) (declining to graft onto statutes
language that does not exist); PJM & Associates, LC
v. Bridgeport, 292 Conn. 125, 138, 971 A.2d 24 (2009)
(‘‘[w]hen a court interprets [a statute], it cannot change
the inherent meaning of words or supply additional
terms to change the meaning of the provision at issue’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Lucarelli v. State,
16 Conn. App. 65, 70, 546 A.2d 940 (1988) (we may not
‘‘interpret [a] statute as including . . . expressions
[that] would . . . alter its meaning’’).
The defendant argues that for this court to adopt the
plaintiffs’ position, we would have to read provisions
ducking test, but we can safely conclude that the good people of Connecticut
came to realize—even without legislative intervention—that the test did not
serve the public policy for which it originally was intended. Here, the court
is confronted with two statutes that should act to protect the lives and safety
of Connecticut residents . . . § 14-153 . . . and General Statutes § 14-227j
. . . . If someone with a court imposed [ignition interlock device] restriction
on their license can freely rent a vehicle without an [ignition interlock]
device, and if the rental agent has no obligation beyond visually confirming
that the lessee possesses a valid looking piece of plastic, then both statutes
are undermined, and the test no longer serves the policy behind either.’’
First, the plaintiffs’ assertion that the legislature never intervened to prohibit
the ‘‘ducking test’’ is undercut by the legislature’s adoption of statutes crimi-
nalizing homicide. See General Statutes §§ 53a-54a through 53a-58. Second,
any prohibition on the ‘‘ducking test’’ concerns a negative duty to refrain
from drowning another person. The plaintiffs, however, ask us to read into
§ 14-153 an affirmative duty for car rental companies to investigate the
status of a prospective renter’s driver’s license. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded that the tragic history of witch trials in Connecticut is relevant
to the issue of whether certain duties exist pursuant to § 14-153.
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into the statute that do not exist. We agree. The language
in the statute is silent as to any requirement that car
rental companies use electronic tools to verify the valid-
ity or status of a prospective renter’s license. The legis-
lature has, however, expressly permitted similar verifi-
cation in other statutes, which indicates that it knows
how to impose such a requirement if it so intended.
See, e.g., General Statutes § 30-86 (c) (1) (seller of alco-
hol ‘‘may perform a transaction scan10 to check the
validity of a driver’s license or identity card presented
by a cardholder’’ (footnote added)); General Statutes
§ 53-344 (d) (2) (seller of tobacco products ‘‘may per-
form a transaction scan to check the validity of a driver’s
license or identity card presented by a cardholder’’).
Additionally, the legislature knows how to instruct car
rental companies to limit their services to those drivers
with certain licenses. See, e.g., General Statutes § 14-
227j (e) (‘‘[n]o provision of this section shall be con-
strued to authorize the operation of a motor vehicle by
any person whose motor vehicle operator’s license has
been refused, suspended or revoked, or who does not
hold a valid motor vehicle operator’s license’’). In fact,
§ 14-153 expressly requires car rental companies to
refuse service to minors without the written consent
of a parent or guardian. See General Statutes § 14-153
(‘‘no person shall rent or lease any motor vehicle with-
out a driver to a minor without the written consent of
a parent or guardian of such minor’’). The statute does
not, however, expressly require car rental companies
to refuse service to other types of licensed drivers, such
as those with restricted licenses. To interpret the statute
as including a duty to search online databases to con-
firm the status of a prospective renter’s driver’s license
would alter the statute’s meaning by placing additional
10
General Statutes § 30-86 (a) (3) defines ‘‘transaction scan’’ as ‘‘the pro-
cess by which a permittee or permittee’s agent or employee checks, by
means of a transaction scan device, the validity of a driver’s license or an
identity card . . . .’’
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burdens on car rental companies. ‘‘If the legislature had
wished to’’ place such burdens on rental car companies,
‘‘it easily could have done so.’’ Lucarelli v. State, supra,
16 Conn. App. 70.
Because we conclude that § 14-153 required only that
the defendant inspect Nogiec’s physical driver’s license
card to confirm its facial validity, the trial court properly
determined that the defendant did not have a duty pur-
suant to § 14-153 to use an online database to confirm
whether Nogiec’s license was subject to any restric-
tions. In the present case, the employee who rented the
motor vehicle to Nogiec submitted an affidavit in which
he averred that, before renting the vehicle to Nogiec,
he had inspected Nogiec’s driver’s license and con-
firmed that it was facially valid and unexpired. The
plaintiffs did not present any evidence to the contrary
regarding that issue of fact in opposing summary judg-
ment. Thus, the court properly concluded that no genu-
ine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defen-
dant fulfilled its duties pursuant to § 14-153.
II
We next consider the plaintiffs’ argument that the
common law imposed on the defendant ‘‘a duty to
inspect the validity of Nogiec’s license using an online
database because a reasonable person under these cir-
cumstances would know that the plaintiffs’ injuries
were a likely result from a failure to do so.’’ The plain-
tiffs argue that, ‘‘[h]ad [the defendant] exercised reason-
able care in determining the status of Nogiec’s license
using online [Department of Motor Vehicles] records,
it would have discovered the [ignition interlock device]
requirement and been aware of his incompetence to
drive or drive the vehicle rented to him.’’ The defendant,
however, argues that ‘‘Connecticut negligent
entrustment cases do not support . . . [an] affirmative
duty to investigate license status.’’ It asserts that ‘‘[t]he
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plaintiffs seek to stretch the common law’’ and urges
this court to ‘‘decline the invitation.’’ We conclude that,
under the circumstances of this case, the defendant did
not have an affirmative common-law duty to determine
whether Nogiec’s license was subject to an ignition
interlock device restriction before renting him a motor
vehicle.
The following legal principles are relevant to our
resolution of this issue. ‘‘[G]eneral common-law princi-
ples . . . [provide] that the test for the existence of a
legal duty of care entails (1) a determination of whether
an ordinary person in the defendant’s position, knowing
what the defendant knew or should have known, would
anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suf-
fered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on
the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the
defendant’s responsibility for its negligent conduct
should extend to the particular consequences or partic-
ular plaintiff in the case. . . . Additionally, [a] duty to
use care may arise from a contract, from a statute, or
from circumstances under which a reasonable person,
knowing what he knew or should have known, would
anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suf-
fered was likely to result from his act or failure to act.
. . . Our law makes clear, however, that [a] simple
conclusion that the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable
. . . cannot by itself mandate a determination that a
legal duty exists. Many harms are quite literally foresee-
able, yet for pragmatic reasons, no recovery is allowed.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Glover v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 343 Conn. 513, 532–33,
275 A.3d 168 (2022).
‘‘It is a well accepted general tort principle that a
person ordinarily will not be deemed liable for the
actions of another that result in an injury to a third
party. . . . There is no duty so to control the conduct
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of a third person as to prevent him from causing physi-
cal harm to another unless [an exception applies]. . . .
The tort of negligent entrustment is [an] exception to
this general tort principle. The rationale underlying the
imposition of negligent entrustment liability on suppli-
ers of chattels is that one has a duty not to supply a
chattel to another who is likely to misuse it in a manner
causing unreasonable risk of physical harm to the
entrustee or others.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Adams v. Air-
craft Spruce & Specialty Co., supra, 215 Conn. App.
441–42. ‘‘[T]he elements of a cause of action sounding
in negligent entrustment of an automobile are (1) the
owner of an automobile entrusts it to another person
(2) whom the owner knows or should reasonably know
is so incompetent to operate it that injury to others
should reasonably be anticipated, and (3) such incom-
petence results in injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 445.
Neither this court nor our Supreme Court has specifi-
cally addressed the question of whether a car rental
company may be held liable for negligent entrustment
of a motor vehicle for failing to investigate whether a
renter’s driver’s license is subject to an ignition inter-
lock device requirement. Nevertheless, the decisions
addressing the issue of negligent entrustment in Turner
v. American District Telegraph & Messenger Co., 94
Conn. 707, 110 A. 540 (1920); Greeley v. Cunningham,
116 Conn. 515, 165 A. 678 (1933); Shea v. Brown, 146
Conn. 631, 153 A.2d 419 (1959); and Soto v. Bushmaster
Firearms International, LLC, 331 Conn. 53, 202 A.3d
262, cert. denied sub nom. Remington Arms Co., LLC
v. Soto, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 513, 205 L. Ed. 2d 317
(2019); are relevant to our analysis.
First, in Turner v. American District Telegraph &
Messenger Co., supra, 94 Conn. 707, ‘‘the defendant
security company entrusted a loaded pistol to an
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employee who later instigated a fight with and ulti-
mately shot the plaintiff . . . . [Our Supreme Court]
held that there was insufficient evidence to support a
verdict for the plaintiff on his negligent entrustment
claim because there was not even a scintilla of evidence
that the defendant had or [should] have had knowledge
or even suspicion that [its employee] possessed any of
the traits . . . attributed to him by the plaintiff, includ-
ing that he was a reckless person, liable to fall into a
passion, and unfit to be [e]ntrusted with a deadly
weapon . . . . The court then stated [that] [w]ithout
this vitally important fact . . . the plaintiff’s [negligent
entrustment] claim falls to the ground . . . .’’ (Citation
omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Adams v. Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co.,
supra, 215 Conn. App. 443–44.
Next, in Greeley v. Cunningham, supra, 116 Conn.
515, our Supreme Court considered whether the owner
of a vehicle was liable for negligent entrustment when
he allowed the codefendant, an unlicensed driver, to
drive his motor vehicle under the supervision of a
licensed driver. Id., 517. The court stated: ‘‘[T]he owner
[of a motor vehicle] may be liable for injury resulting
from the operation of an automobile he loans to
another, when he knows or ought reasonably to know
that the one to whom he [entrusts] it is so incompetent
to operate it, by reason of inexperience or other cause,
that the owner ought reasonably to anticipate the likeli-
hood that in its operation injury will be done to others.’’
Id., 518. ‘‘While [the operator] had not received a license
to operate an automobile,’’ the owner of the vehicle
had reason to believe she was competent to do so, and
he complied with the requirements of the applicable
statute11 by ensuring she was supervised by a licensed
11
The applicable statute in Greeley provided ‘‘that an unlicensed person
over sixteen years of age, who has not had a license issued to him suspended
or revoked, may operate a motor vehicle upon the highways while under
the instruction of and accompanied by a licensed operator, who shall have
full control of the vehicle.’’ Greeley v. Cunningham, supra, 116 Conn. 521.
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driver. Id., 521. The court concluded that the owner was
not liable for negligent entrustment of his automobile
because ‘‘[t]he statute amounts to a legislative
affirmance that an unlicensed person operating an auto-
mobile under the conditions specified in the statute, is
not to be deemed so incompetent that the general safety
of the public requires that he be kept off the high-
ways.’’ Id.
Then, in Shea v. Brown, supra, 146 Conn. 631, the
issue was whether car dealers could be held liable for
negligent entrustment when their salesman allowed a
prospective buyer with a suspended driver’s license to
borrow a motor vehicle for a test drive. Id., 631–32. The
dealers had ‘‘made no attempt to ascertain from the
salesman whether [the buyer] possessed an operator’s
license or was otherwise qualified to operate a motor
vehicle.’’ Id., 632. The plaintiff claimed that the dealers
knew or should have known that the buyer was so
incompetent to operate a motor vehicle that they ‘‘ought
reasonably to anticipate the likelihood of injury to oth-
ers by reason of that incompetence . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. Our Supreme Court con-
cluded that the dealers were not liable for negligent
entrustment because ‘‘[t]he fact that [the buyer’s]
license had been suspended did not as a matter of law
establish that he was an incompetent operator. To have
obtained the license in the first place, he had to pass
an examination to prove his competency. . . . [T]here
was nothing to show that [the buyer] lacked the skill,
technique or capability necessary for the operation of
an automobile. In addition, [General Statutes § 14-60
(a) (1)] permits a dealer to loan a motor vehicle . . .
for not more than [thirty] days for the purpose of trial
of a motor vehicle.’’ Id., 633.
Lastly, in Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Interna-
tional, LLC, supra, 331 Conn. 53, the issue was whether
the manufacturer and sellers of a rifle were liable for
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negligent entrustment when a mother purchased a rifle
and thereafter gave it to her son, who used it to perpe-
trate a school shooting. Id., 71–72. Our Supreme Court
concluded: ‘‘The rule that a cause of action for negligent
entrustment will lie only when the entrustor knows or
has reason to know that the direct entrustee is likely
to use a dangerous instrumentality in an unsafe manner
would bar the plaintiffs’ negligent entrustment claims.
Specifically, there is no allegation in this case that there
was any reason to expect that [the] mother was likely
to use the rifle in an unsafe manner.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Id., 81.
In each of these cases, the court declined to hold an
entrustor liable under a negligent entrustment theory
when no circumstances gave the entrustor a reason to
suspect that the entrustee was likely to use the entrusted
item in a way that would cause injury to others. Accord-
ingly, our review of Connecticut’s negligent entrustment
case law suggests that whether a car rental company
may be held liable for negligent entrustment of a motor
vehicle does not depend on whether the company could
have taken affirmative steps to learn about the renter’s
incompetence; rather, it depends on whether readily
apparent facts gave the company a reason to suspect
that the renter was incompetent to operate a motor
vehicle. See id., 80 (our Supreme Court ‘‘never has sug-
gested that a cause of action for negligent entrustment—
whether involving a vehicle, a weapon, or some other
dangerous item—will lie in the absence of evidence that
the direct entrustee is likely to use the item unsafely’’).
Moreover, our case law suggests that when a statute
governs a particular type of entrustment, the entrustor
is not required to do more than comply with the statute
unless the circumstances indicate that the entrustee is
likely to use the item in a way that will injure others.
Accordingly, we are persuaded that, in the absence
of readily apparent facts indicating that a prospective
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renter is incompetent to operate a motor vehicle, car
rental companies do not have a duty to take steps
beyond the requirements of § 14-153 to confirm the
status of the prospective renter’s driver’s license.
The plaintiffs have not cited a single case in Connecti-
cut or any other jurisdiction holding that a car rental
company is obligated to verify the status of a renter’s
license using an online database, in the absence of any
reason to suspect that the renter has any limitation on
his ability to drive. In fact, the plaintiffs concede that
‘‘other jurisdictions have not found a duty for rental
car agencies to assess the present status of a potential
renter’s driver’s license using online [Department of
Motor Vehicles] databases.’’ Indeed, courts in other
states that have considered this issue have uniformly
held that there is no such duty or that it is the function
of the legislature, not the courts, to impose such a duty.
See, e.g., Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 188 Cal.
App. 4th 1055, 1059, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71 (2010) (‘‘a
rental car agency is not liable for negligent entrustment
where the agency has fully complied with the [statutory]
requirements . . . and the customer does not appear
impaired or otherwise unfit to drive at the time of
rental’’); Young v. U-Haul Co. of D.C., 11 A.3d 247, 250
(D.C. App. 2011) (motor vehicle rental company had
no duty to inquire into competency of renter to drive
motor vehicle when renter presented facially valid,
unexpired driver’s license and did not appear physically
or mentally impaired); Rivers v. Hertz Corp., 121 So.
3d 1078, 1080 (Fla. App. 2013) (holding that, ‘‘[a]bsent
any facts to demonstrate [car rental company] had some
knowledge of the deficient driver’s license, there can
be no duty imposed upon [it] to investigate and discover
[the renter’s] suspended driver’s license’’), review
denied, 147 So. 3d 526 (Fla. 2014); Cowan v. Jack, 922
So. 2d 559, 567 (La. App. 2005) (car rental company
was not liable for negligent entrustment when renter
‘‘presented a facially valid, unexpired driver’s license
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and . . . did not appear physically or mentally
impaired at the time of the rental’’), cert. denied, 926
So. 2d 544 (La. 2006); Nunez v. A&M Rentals, Inc., 63
Mass. App. 20, 25, 822 N.E.2d 743 (2005) (rejecting claim
that car rental company had duty to use online database
to verify status of renter’s license); Cousin v. Enterprise
Leasing Co.-South Central, Inc., 948 So. 2d 1287, 1292
(Miss. 2007) (holding that Mississippi law ‘‘only places
a burden on rental car companies to accept facially
valid, unexpired driver’s licenses’’); Weber v. Budget
Truck Rental, LLC, 162 Wn. App. 5, 14, 254 P.3d 196
(motor vehicle rental company did not have duty to do
more than look at face of license and confirm that it
is unexpired, belongs to person presenting it, and bears
no marks indicating suspension or revocation), review
denied, 172 Wn. 2d 1015, 262 P.3d 64 (2011).12 Our review
of the case law in Connecticut and other jurisdictions
persuades us that car rental companies do not have a
duty to confirm the validity or status of a renter’s driv-
er’s license using an online database in the absence of
readily apparent facts providing a reason to suspect
12
The plaintiffs argue that cases from other jurisdictions are not relevant
to our analysis because they do not ‘‘directly [address] the issue of a rental
to a person with an [ignition interlock device] requirement’’ and that most
of those cases hold ‘‘that investigating the status of the operator’s license,
even if required, would not have been relevant, because the suspended
license was not evidence that the operator was unfit to drive and thus could
not form the basis of a negligent entrustment claim.’’ Although none of the
cases we cite to specifically address licenses that are subject to an ignition
interlock device restriction, we disagree that these cases are not relevant
to our analysis. Our review of the case law from other jurisdictions reveals
that most jurisdictions have consistently held that a car rental company
does not have a duty to take additional steps to ascertain the competence
of the renter or the validity of their license, provided (1) a car rental company
complies with its state’s statutory requirements for renting a motor vehicle;
(2) the renter presents a facially valid and unexpired license; and (3) the
renter, at the time of the rental, did not display any signs of mental or
physical unfitness to operate a motor vehicle. See, e.g., Cowan v. Jack,
supra, 922 So. 2d 567. We see no reason why this case law is not relevant
to all limitations or restrictions on a license, including an ignition interlock
device requirement.
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that a prospective renter has any limitation on his ability
to drive.13
In the present case, the employee who rented the
motor vehicle to Nogiec averred that he had inspected
Nogiec’s driver’s license card and confirmed that it was
facially valid and was unexpired and that Nogiec had not
demonstrated any signs of mental or physical impairment
or any other unfitness to operate a motor vehicle. As
we have previously indicated, and as noted by the trial
court, the plaintiffs presented no contradictory evi-
dence in opposing the motion for summary judgment
that raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the defendant had reason to know that Nogiec’s license
was subject to an ignition interlock device requirement
or that he was otherwise incompetent to operate a
motor vehicle. Additionally, as discussed in part I of this
opinion, the defendant complied with the inspection
requirement of § 14-153. Accordingly, the trial court
properly concluded that no genuine issues of material
fact existed and that the defendant was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs’ negligent
entrustment claims.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
13
We note that every Superior Court decision that has considered the
issue of whether § 14-153 imposes a duty to inspect renters’ driving histories
or criminal records has reached a similar conclusion, namely, that car rental
companies need only inspect the facial validity of renters’ physical driver’s
license cards. See, e.g., Flaherty v. Sood, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2020
WL 8455466, *7 (Conn. Super. December 7, 2020) (‘‘[c]ase law . . . con-
cludes [that] car rental companies presented with a facially valid driver’s
license have no duty to investigate the driver’s competence or driving his-
tory’’); Wells v. Hertz Corp., Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2019 WL 5172239,
*5 (Conn. Super. September 17, 2019) (‘‘a rental car company is under a
duty to check the prospective renter’s driver’s license to ensure that it is
facially valid’’); Chapman v. Herren, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX, 2010 WL
2927377, *7 (Conn. Super. June 24, 2010) (‘‘a rental car company is not
required to investigate a potential renter’s driving record; rather, the rental
car company must only assess the facial validity of a driver’s license before
renting to that driver’’).