In re Tianna M.-M.

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In re Tianna M.-M.

IN RE TIANNA M.-M.*
(AC 48194)
Cradle, C. J., and Clark and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminat-
ing his parental rights with respect to his minor child. The father claimed
that the court improperly concluded that the Department of Children and
Families made reasonable efforts to reunify him with his child. Held:

The trial court’s finding that the Department of Children and Families made
reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent father with his minor child
was supported by clear and convincing evidence, and this court could not
conclude that the department’s efforts, with respect to assisting the father
in addressing his history of intimate partner violence, were unreasonable
merely because the department did not refer him to a specialized program
for that issue, as, although intimate partner violence was a significant barrier
to the father’s reunification with his child, it was not the only barrier.

Argued April 24—officially released June 25, 2025**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Juvenile Mat-
ters, where the case was tried to the court, Hon. Stephen
F. Frazzini, judge trial referee; judgment terminating
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** June 25, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Tianna M.-M.

the respondents’ parental rights, from which the respon-
dent father appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, for the
appellant (respondent father).
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom
were Judith Chicoine, assistant attorney general, and,
on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).

Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. The respondent father, Toraine M.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, terminating his parental rights with
respect to his minor child, Tianna M.-M. (Tianna).1 On
appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly
concluded that the Department of Children and Fami-
lies (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify
him with Tianna.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.3
1
In the same proceeding, the court also terminated by consent the parental
rights of Tianna’s mother. Because she has not appealed from that judgment,
we refer in this opinion to Toraine M. as the respondent.
2
On appeal, the respondent also challenges the constitutionality of Gen-
eral Statutes § 17a-111b (a) (2). Specifically, he argues that § 17a-111b (a)
(2) is unconstitutional because that statute relieves the department of its
obligation to make reasonable efforts at reunification if the court previously
has approved a permanency plan other than reunification, as happened in
the present case. As the respondent’s counsel conceded during oral argument
before this court, however, because the trial court here expressly found
that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification and we affirm
those findings, we need not address the respondent’s constitutional claim.
‘‘As a jurisprudential matter, Connecticut courts follow the recognized policy
of self-restraint and the basic judicial duty to eschew unnecessary determina-
tions of constitutional questions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Timothy B., 219 Conn. App. 823, 828 n.5, 296 A.3d 342, cert. denied, 349
Conn. 919, 318 A.3d 439 (2023).
3
The attorney for Tianna filed a statement adopting the brief of the peti-
tioner.
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The following facts, as set forth by the trial court,
and procedural history are relevant to our resolution
of the respondent’s claim on appeal. Tianna was born
in July, 2021. Beginning in January, 2022, Tianna’s
mother had been ‘‘the victim of numerous incidents of
domestic violence committed by the [respondent] in
which [he] had slapped, bitten, choked, [broken her]
nose, and given her black eyes during incidents
occurring in Tianna’s presence.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) The respondent was ‘‘arrested several
times for family violence crimes committed against
[Tianna’s mother] . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted.) On April
22, 2022, a criminal protective order entered against
the respondent, which prohibited him from having any
contact with Tianna’s mother or Tianna (protective
order).
In December, 2022, the probate court, at the request
of Tianna’s mother, awarded temporary guardianship
of Tianna to her maternal aunt. On February 20, 2023,
while Tianna was visiting her mother, police officers,
and later the department, responded to the mother’s
home after receiving a report that the mother had been
fighting with her boyfriend, Brandon F., in the presence
of Tianna. Following that incident, Tianna’s aunt noti-
fied the department that she wished to relinquish her
temporary guardianship of Tianna.4 On March 13, 2023,
the court, Westbrook, J., granted the petitioner’s motion
for an ex parte order of temporary custody of Tianna
and issued preliminary specific steps for the respondent
to facilitate his reunification with Tianna, which included,
among other things, that he (1) engage in parenting
and individual counseling, (2) attend and complete an
4
On March 6, 2023, the department met with Tianna’s mother and some
of her relatives but was unable to identify a maternal family member who
was willing and suitable to care for Tianna. At that time, the department
had been unable to locate the respondent, and, although the department
obtained telephone numbers for the respondent two days later, it ‘‘called
and texted those numbers without initially getting a response.’’
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appropriate domestic violence program, and (3) address
intimate partner violence/domestic violence with a qual-
ified therapist.5
On June 13, 2023, the court, Dannehy, J., adjudicated
Tianna neglected and committed her to the care of
the petitioner and issued final specific steps for the
respondent. The final specific steps were similar to the
preliminary specific steps, with a few relevant addi-
tions, namely, that the respondent (1) ‘‘[p]articipate
in a [mental health evaluation] in order to assess and
determine [the] level of need for [mental health] ser-
vice[s]’’; (2) ‘‘[e]ngage in [an intimate partner violence]
program, component, or provider’’; and (3) engage in
supervised visitation, but ‘‘[o]nly after the protective
order has been modified or no longer exists . . . .’’
Judith Stewart, a department social worker, was
assigned to the respondent’s case in May, 2023. When
Stewart met with the respondent shortly thereafter, the
respondent stated that he was participating in mental
health services at Wheeler Clinic and the Capitol Region
Mental Health Center (Capitol Region). He further stated
that he was receiving intimate partner violence services
from Capitol Region. Stewart subsequently obtained a
release from the respondent and attempted to contact
those service providers to confirm the respondent’s
participation with the treatment providers. In addition,
the department referred the respondent to Fatherhood
Engagement Services (FES), and the respondent com-
plied with those services, which included weekly par-
enting groups ‘‘working on structure, the importance
of the role of a father, and the impact [that intimate
partner violence] has on children.’’ (Internal quotation
5
On March 17, 2023, the respondent appeared before the court, Nguyen-
O’Dowd, J., and agreed to the sustaining of the order of temporary custody.
On the same date, the court issued amended preliminary specific steps for
the respondent, which were identical to the preliminary specific steps except
for two additions that are not relevant to the issue on appeal.
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marks omitted.) Furthermore, the department also
encouraged the respondent to seek modification of the
protective order so that it could begin offering the
respondent visitation with Tianna. Although the respon-
dent sought to modify the protective order in criminal
court on two separate occasions, both requests were
denied.
In November, 2023, the respondent was convicted of
carrying a pistol without a permit, for which he received
a sentence of five years of incarceration, execution
suspended after one year of incarceration, followed by
three years of probation. In December, 2023, Stewart
finally received a response from Capitol Region, which
informed her that it was not providing the respondent
with intimate partner violence services and that it did
not offer such services. After learning that the respon-
dent, contrary to his earlier representations, had not
been engaged in those services, Stewart planned to refer
him to the Intimate Partner Violence-Family Assess-
ment Intervention Response (IPV-FAIR) program at
Community Health Resources (CHR) but did not do so
after learning of the respondent’s impending incarcera-
tion.
On December 18, 2023, the petitioner submitted a
permanency plan of termination of parental rights and
adoption, which was approved by the court on January
23, 2024.6 Thereafter, in February, 2024, the respondent
began serving his sentence. On March 7, 2024, the peti-
tioner filed a petition to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights alleging, inter alia, that the department
had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent
with Tianna, that the respondent had failed to achieve
sufficient personal rehabilitation, and that there was
no ongoing parent-child relationship.7 The termination
6
The respondent did not object to the permanency plan.
7
See footnote 1 of this opinion.
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petition was tried before the court, Hon. Stephen F.
Frazzini, judge trial referee, on August 22, 2024.
On September 19, 2024, the court rendered judgment
terminating the respondent’s parental rights pursuant
to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j).8 In its memorandum
of decision, the court first found that the petitioner
had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
department made reasonable efforts to reunify the
respondent with Tianna. Specifically, the court found
that ‘‘[the department] had confirmed that [the respon-
dent] was participating in mental health services at
Wheeler Clinic and [Capitol Region]; sought confirma-
tion from [Capitol Region] that he was, as he claimed,
receiving [intimate partner violence] treatment services
there; after learning that his services at [Capitol Region]
did not address domestic violence issues made arrange-
ments to refer him to [the IPV-FAIR] program at CHR
but could not do so because of his imminent incarcera-
tion; and referred him to the FES program.’’ The court
then found that the petitioner had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the respondent had failed to
achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation,
8
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
Court . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the [department] has made reasonable
efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in
accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds
in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts . . . (2) termination is in the best interest of the child,
and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court . . .
to have been neglected . . . in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of
such child . . . has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation
as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering
the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible
position in the life of the child; [or] . . . (D) there is no ongoing parent-
child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as
a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional,
moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the
establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would
be detrimental to the best interest of the child . . . .’’
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In re Tianna M.-M.

there was no ongoing parent-child relationship, and that
termination of his parental rights was in Tianna’s best
interest.9
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court
improperly concluded that the department made rea-
sonable efforts to reunify him with Tianna. We disagree.
The following legal principles and standard of review
govern our resolution of the respondent’s claim. ‘‘Sec-
tion 17a-112 (j) (1) requires that before terminating
parental rights, the court must find by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the department has made reason-
able efforts . . . to reunify the child with the parent
. . . . This court has consistently held that the [trial]
court, [w]hen making its reasonable efforts determina-
tion . . . is limited to considering only those facts pre-
ceding the filing of the termination petition . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Caiden B.,
220 Conn. App. 326, 348, 297 A.3d 1025, cert. denied,
348 Conn. 904, 301 A.3d 527 (2023).
‘‘The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the
department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances
are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the
word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or
by the federal act from which the requirement was
drawn. . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing every-
thing reasonable, not everything possible. . . . [R]ea-
sonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether
reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the
The respondent has not challenged the court’s findings with respect to
9

the statutory grounds for termination or the best interest determination. We
further note that, in rendering judgment, the court denied the respondent’s
motion to transfer guardianship of Tianna to her paternal grandmother,
which had been consolidated for trial with the termination petition. The
respondent does not challenge that portion of the court’s judgment on
appeal.
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careful consideration of the circumstances of each indi-
vidual case. . . .
‘‘Our review of the court’s reasonable efforts determi-
nation is subject to the evidentiary sufficiency standard
of review [which asks] whether the trial court could
have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that
the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to
justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . In so doing, we
construe the evidence in a manner most favorable to
sustaining the judgment of the trial court and will not
disturb the court’s subordinate factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous. . . .
‘‘In reviewing the trial court’s reasonable efforts
determination, this court [does] not examine the record
to determine whether the trier of fact could have
reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . .
In our review of the record for evidentiary sufficiency,
we are mindful that, as a reviewing court, [w]e cannot
retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the wit-
nesses. . . . Rather, [i]t is within the province of the
trial court, when sitting as the fact finder, to weigh the
evidence presented and determine the credibility and
effect to be given the evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) In re Charli M., 229 Conn.
App. 72, 79–80, 326 A.3d 1123, cert. denied, 350 Conn.
935, 327 A.3d 384 (2024).
In challenging the court’s reasonable efforts determi-
nation, the respondent primarily contends that ‘‘[the
department] never referred [him] to any [intimate part-
ner violence] services at any time,’’ which he argues
was not reasonable when ‘‘[intimate partner violence]
was clearly a principal barrier to reunification in this
case.’’ As noted previously, however, the department
referred the respondent to FES, and through those ser-
vices, the respondent attended weekly group parenting
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In re Tianna M.-M.

sessions addressing, among other things, ‘‘the impact
[intimate partner violence] has on children.’’ Although
the department did not refer the respondent to a special-
ized intimate partner violence program as it had initially
intended, we reiterate that the respondent told the
department that he already was receiving treatment for
intimate partner violence at Capitol Region when he
was not, in fact, receiving such treatment. The respon-
dent had represented that he was already receiving
treatment for intimate partner violence and, thus, there
was no basis, at that time, for the department to refer the
respondent to an additional program. Instead, Stewart
promptly ‘‘attempted multiple times, beginning in July,
2023, to verify [that] information,’’ as was necessary
before the department could refer the respondent to
an intimate partner violence program in order ‘‘to avoid
a duplication of services.’’ Because ‘‘it took a while for
[Capitol Region] to get back to [Stewart],’’ the depart-
ment did not learn that the respondent had not been
receiving intimate partner violence services until
December, 2023.10 At that point, the department sought
10
The respondent argues that the department’s ‘‘six month delay in veri-
fying whether [Capitol Region] even provides [intimate partner violence]
services’’ was not reasonable, particularly when, according to the respon-
dent, ‘‘such information is readily available at a moment’s notice on [Capitol
Region’s] website’’ as well as a corresponding link to its informational
brochure. Specifically, the respondent asserts that both resources list the
services offered by Capitol Region and that neither list includes intimate
partner violence treatment among those services.
The respondent acknowledges, however, that Capitol Region’s website
and informational brochure were not admitted into evidence before the trial
court. Accordingly, the respondent asks this court to take judicial notice
of those resources in support of his argument that ‘‘[the department’s] failure
to . . . take [the] very simple, cost free step [of checking those resources]
to obtain such essential information constitutes a breach of its duty to make
reasonable efforts to reunify the [respondent] with his child.’’ In other words,
the respondent asks us to take judicial notice of those materials for the
purpose of weighing evidence and inferring facts. We decline to do so. See
In re Corey C., 198 Conn. App. 41, 62 n.18, 232 A.3d 1237 (‘‘[W]e cannot
consider evidence not available to the trial court to find adjudicative facts
for the first time on appeal. . . . It is well established that this court does
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to refer the respondent to the IPV-FAIR program at CHR
but did not do so because it learned of the respondent’s
impending incarceration.11 On the basis of the foregoing
evidence, we conclude that the department’s efforts,
with respect to assisting the respondent in addressing
his history of intimate partner violence, were not unrea-
sonable merely because the department did not refer
him to a specialized program for that issue.
Moreover, it is well established that ‘‘[o]ur courts
are instructed to look to the totality of the facts and
circumstances presented in each individual case in
deciding whether reasonable efforts have been made.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Caiden B.,
supra, 220 Conn. App. 349–50. Thus, even if we were
to assume that the respondent would have benefited
from the department taking additional action to ensure
that he was receiving intimate partner violence services,
the department’s failure to do so, by itself, would not
defeat the court’s reasonable efforts determination. See,
e.g., In re Ryder M., 211 Conn. App. 793, 812, 274 A.3d
218, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 931, 276 A.3d 433 (2022);
see also In re Charli M., supra, 229 Conn. App. 83
(‘‘the question [on appeal] is not whether some evidence
would support a determination that the department
should have referred the respondent to an [intimate
partner violence] program but, rather, whether the total-
not find facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 335 Conn.
930, 236 A.3d 217 (2020).
11
In support of his claim on appeal, the respondent contends that the
department still could have referred him to the IPV-FAIR program in Decem-
ber, 2023, so that he at least ‘‘could have received approximately two full
months of services’’ prior to his February, 2024 incarceration. As the respon-
dent acknowledges in his brief to this court, however, the trial court found
that the department ‘‘could not do so because of his imminent incarceration
. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The respondent has not challenged that factual
finding by the court as clearly erroneous, and, even if he had, our review
of the record leads us to conclude that the evidence, construed in the light
most favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial court, supports the
court’s finding.
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In re Tianna M.-M.

ity of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that the department’s reunification efforts, considered
cumulatively, were reasonable’’).12

Although intimate partner violence was a significant
barrier to the respondent’s reunification with Tianna,
as the court noted, it was not the only barrier.13 In
particular, the specific steps for the respondent reflect
that unaddressed mental health concerns, which stemmed
from the respondent’s unresolved trauma and underly-
ing mental health conditions,14 presented another signif-
12
In In re Charli M., supra, 229 Conn. App. 72, the respondent father’s
challenge to the trial court’s reasonable efforts determination, much like
the respondent’s challenge in this case, ‘‘focuse[d] primarily on the fact that
the department did not refer him to a specialized [intimate partner violence]
program’’ when ‘‘[intimate partner violence] was the most significant issue
preventing reunification.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 82. In
that case, this court noted that the department had confirmed with the
respondent’s therapist that intimate partner violence was being addressed
in therapy, and that to the extent that those issues were not being sufficiently
addressed, ‘‘it was due to [the respondent’s] failure consistently to engage
with his therapist . . . .’’ Id. Moreover, this court, in In re Charli M., con-
cluded that the respondent’s argument was unavailing because the depart-
ment’s cumulative efforts at reunification—which included referring the
respondent for supervised visitation and to a housing assistance program,
a reunification readiness assessment, and FES, as well as assisting the
respondent with locating a therapist and following up with his therapist
regarding treatment—were sufficient to support the trial court’s reasonable
efforts finding. See id., 80–84.
13
In the department’s social study in support of the termination petition,
which was admitted into evidence at the termination trial, the reasons
for seeking termination of the respondent’s parental rights, in addition to
‘‘unresolved/unaddressed intimate partner violence,’’ were ‘‘lack of sufficient
parenting skills, unresolved/unaddressed mental health, and [the fact that]
he is currently incarcerated.’’ Indeed, the court found that ‘‘the most
important steps [for the respondent’s reunification with Tianna] . . .
related to remedying the ‘parenting deficiencies’ of poor decision-making,
lack of insight and accountability, episodes of violence, aggression and
hostility manifest in the domestic violence incidents with Tianna’s mother,
and not understanding his child’s needs . . . .’’
14
The respondent’s mental health diagnoses included ‘‘oppositional defiant
disorder, other specified trauma and stressor related disorder, attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder, predominantly hyperactive/impulsive presen-
tation, cannabis use disorder, disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, and
unspecified anxiety disorder.’’
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icant barrier to his reunification with Tianna.15 The
respondent’s argument on appeal, that the department’s
efforts failed to sufficiently address the concerns with
intimate partner violence solely because he was not
referred to a specialized program to address that issue,
overlooks the court’s findings that the respondent’s acts
of intimate partner violence were symptomatic of unad-
dressed mental health concerns.16 In assessing whether
the department had made reasonable efforts at reunifi-
cation, the court, therefore, properly considered the
department’s efforts related to providing the respon-
dent with mental health services. Specifically, the court
found that the department had confirmed with the
respondent’s individual providers that he was receiving
such services, maintained communication with his clini-
cians to monitor his progress, and referred the respon-
dent to FES to engage in additional mental health ser-
vices. Notably, the mental health services provided to
the respondent were addressing some of the underlying
15
The final specific steps for the respondent included that he (1) take
part in both parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward
identified treatment goals, which included, inter alia, ‘‘[u]nderstand[ing]
[the] impact that [mental health] . . . [has] on [a] child’s development’’; (2)
‘‘[p]articipate in a [mental health evaluation] in order to assess and determine
[the] level of need for [mental health] service[s]’’; and (3) ‘‘[t]ake part in
individual counseling to gain knowledge of [mental health] diagnosis, unre-
solved trauma, and how it has [a] direct impact [on his] child.’’
16
Specifically, the court found that ‘‘[t]he evidence . . . shows that [the
respondent] has a long history of mental health issues that date back to his
childhood and have repeatedly been manifest in aggressive and violent
behavior.’’ In addition, the court found that ‘‘[t]he principal barrier in [the
respondent’s] ability to assume a responsible position in Tianna’s life at all
times throughout this case has been his poor judgment and decision-making
and his lack of self-control that resulted in him committing repeated acts
of violence against Tianna’s mother, sometimes in Tianna’s presence.’’
Finally, in concluding that termination of parental rights was in Tianna’s
best interest, the court found: ‘‘The respondent . . . has not addressed the
underlying issues of aggression and violence that have characterized his
conduct for many years and prevent him from being a suitable caretaker
for Tianna. . . . [I]t is impossible to ascertain whether [the respondent]
will ever . . . learn how to control his anger or whatever other emotion
leads him to erupt into intimate partner violence . . . .’’
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issues which the court found to result in the respondent
committing acts of intimate partner violence.17 In addi-
tion, the department provided the respondent with a
substance abuse evaluation18 and case management ser-
vices, which included individual meetings with depart-
ment social workers, participation at large team meet-
ings, and attendance during administrative case
reviews. The court also found, however, that the respon-
dent had only ‘‘partially complied’’ with the depart-
ment’s efforts to assist him in addressing the underlying
mental health issues that were causing him to commit
acts of intimate partner violence. Specifically, the court
found that the respondent had been ‘‘participating in
weekly therapy at Wheeler Clinic . . . [but] stopped
participating there . . . [in] June, 2023 . . . and was
discharged . . . in September, 2023 [for] not attending
regularly.’’ The evidence indicated that ‘‘attempts were
made to [re]engage [the respondent] in services [at
Wheeler Clinic] to no avail,’’ and, although the respon-
dent was scheduled to be readmitted in November,
2023, he ‘‘did not follow through.’’ The court also found
that the respondent ‘‘originally had weekly therapy ses-
sions [at Capitol Region], but because of his work
schedule he had been unable [to meet] that regularly
and was transferred to Capitol Region’s maintenance
program, in which he met monthly with a clinician
. . . .’’
17
See footnote 16 of this opinion. The respondent ‘‘was in treatment [at
Capitol Region] for anxiety management’’ and ‘‘was also participating in
weekly therapy at Wheeler Clinic to address his coping skills and anger
management issues.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
18
The final specific steps for the respondent also included that he ‘‘[s]ubmit
to a substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about
treatment’’ and that he participate in ‘‘[substance use] counseling to gain
knowledge of addiction, unresolved trauma, and how it has a direct impact
[on his] child . . . .’’ The record indicates that the respondent completed
a substance abuse evaluation at Wheeler Clinic in April, 2023, and the
department, after following up with the respondent’s clinician, determined
that further evaluation and treatment for substance use was not necessary.
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0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
In re Tianna M.-M.

Moreover, the court found that, with respect to ‘‘the
most important steps [for the respondent’s reunification
with Tianna] . . . those related to remedying the ‘par-
enting deficiencies’ of poor decision-making, lack of
insight and accountability, episodes of violence, aggres-
sion and hostility manifest in the domestic violence
incidents with Tianna’s mother, and not understanding
his child’s needs, [the respondent’s] compliance has
been abysmal.’’ See In re Nevaeh W., 154 Conn. App. 156,
165–66, 107 A.3d 539 (2014) (determination of whether
department made reasonable efforts to reunify may be
assessed in light of respondent’s failure to engage in
services), rev’d in part on other grounds, 317 Conn. 723,
120 A.3d 1177 (2015).

Finally, the court found that ‘‘the initial barrier to
Tianna being returned to [the respondent’s] custody at
the time . . . [that the termination petition was filed]
was the . . . protective order . . . that prohibited
him from being in Tianna’s presence.’’ Indeed, the court
recognized in its memorandum of decision that the
respondent was ‘‘legally unable to reunite with [Tianna]’’
while the protective order was in place.19 As we stated
previously, the department encouraged the respondent
to seek modification of the protective order, but his
requests for modification were denied by the criminal
court.20 Under such circumstances, we cannot con-
clude, and the respondent does not contend, that there
was any additional action the department could have
taken to assist the respondent in overcoming that signif-
icant barrier to reunification.
19
Because the respondent had been incarcerated since February, 2024,
the court also noted in its memorandum of decision that, notwithstanding
the protective order, ‘‘[the respondent’s] current incarceration prevents
reunification now . . . .’’
20
We note that the protective order was vacated in July, 2024, and the
department subsequently arranged a visit between Tianna and the respon-
dent the following month while he was incarcerated.
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16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re Tianna M.-M.

Accordingly, on the basis of our review of the record,
we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence
to support the court’s finding that the department made
reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with
Tianna.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.