In re J. D.

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In re J. D.

IN RE J. D.*
(AC 47971)
Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Seeley, Js.**

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed from, inter alia, the judgment of the trial
court terminating her parental rights as to her minor child. The mother
claimed that she did not receive the effective assistance of counsel in oppos-
ing the petition to terminate her parental rights and advocating for her
motion for posttermination visitation because her counsel did not present
the testimony of a psychologist who had evaluated her. Held:

This court concluded that the record was inadequate to review the respon-
dent mother’s claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to call the psychologist as a witness, as the record was silent as to the
testimony the psychologist would have provided at the termination trial and
the mother failed to present this court with a sufficient record to overcome
the strong presumption that counsel’s decision not to call the psychologist
to testify was strategically sound.
Argued January 16—officially released May 19, 2025***

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Juvenile
Matters, where the respondent mother filed a motion
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
*** May 19, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re J. D.

for posttermination visitation; thereafter, the case was
tried to the court, Knight, J.; judgment terminating the
respondents’ parental rights and denying the respon-
dent mother’s motion for posttermination visitation,
from which the respondent mother appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, for the
appellant (respondent mother).
Lori Ann Knuth, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, and Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The respondent mother, A. T., appeals from
the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families,
terminating her parental rights and denying her motion
for posttermination visitation rights with respect to her
daughter, J.1 On appeal, the respondent claims that she
did not receive effective assistance of counsel in oppos-
ing the petition to terminate her parental rights because
her trial counsel did not present the testimony of Ralph
Balducci, a psychologist, who had evaluated the respon-
dent in January, 2023. We conclude that the respondent
has not presented an adequate record by which we can
review that claim and, accordingly, affirm the judgment
of the court.2
1
The respondent father, who participated at the termination of parental
rights trial, does not challenge on appeal the termination of his parental
rights. Throughout this opinion, we refer to the mother as the respondent.
Additionally, we note that, although the respondent’s parental rights with
regard to another child were terminated in this same trial, she does not make
any claims on appeal with respect to the propriety of that determination. We
note as well that a third child of the respondent was adjudicated neglected
on that same date, which determination is also not the subject of this appeal.
2
On appeal, the attorney for the minor child adopted the position of the
petitioner.
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The following undisputed facts, as found by the court
or otherwise disclosed by the record, are relevant to
this appeal. J was born in May, 2021. At that time, the
Department of Children and Families (department) had
been involved with the respondent’s family since 2019.3
The respondent was facing eviction and did not receive
adequate prenatal care during her pregnancy with J.
As a result of concerns the department had with the
respondent’s care of her older children, the respondent
was referred to mental health therapy but inconsistently
availed herself of that service and was discharged
unsuccessfully. The respondent also was referred to
programming to address ongoing issues with misuse
of marijuana but was discharged twice due to poor
attendance. On October 29, 2021, the petitioner filed a
neglect petition as to J.
On March 25, 2022, J was adjudicated neglected and
committed to the care of the petitioner. Citing the
respondent’s failure to participate in in-home visits, as
well as her failure to engage with substance abuse treat-
ment and a failure to maintain communication with the
department, the court found that it was in the best
interest of the child to be committed to the petitioner’s
custody.4
After the court ordered J committed to the custody
of the petitioner, the respondent and J’s father
attempted to prevent her from being taken into care by
hiding her, in what a previous court referred to as a
3
At the time of J’s birth, the respondent’s two other children were under
protective supervision, having been adjudicated neglected in 2019. These
children, born to a different father than J’s father, were committed to the
custody of the petitioner in October, 2021.
4
In 2015 and 2019, the department had placed the father on the Central
Registry of Abuse and Neglect following its substantiation of sexual abuse
of two minors. At the time of J’s commitment, and throughout the events
relevant to this appeal, the father was unwilling to comply with the depart-
ment’s requests to assess his home and for him to participate in evaluations
to determine if sex offender treatment was recommended.
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‘‘ ‘shell game.’ ’’ The respondent claimed that J was with
the father, and the father refused all attempts to commu-
nicate with him. As a result, a ‘‘silver alert’’ was issued
through an emergency notification system to the public.
See In re Cassandra C., 316 Conn. 476, 490 n.5, 112
A.3d 158 (2015). Three days after the court’s order, J
was located at the respondent’s apartment and placed
in the custody of the petitioner. On April 8, 2022, the
father, acting with the knowledge and support of the
respondent, abducted J from foster care, and trans-
ported her to his sister’s home. The father’s sister noti-
fied the police, and J was returned to the care of the
petitioner the following day.

On July 7, 2022, both the father and the respondent
were arrested and charged with the crimes of risk of
injury to a child and interfering with an officer after an
incident in which the father refused to return his seven
year old daughter from a different relationship to that
child’s mother following a weekend visit. Pursuant to
a court order, police officers arrived at the respondent’s
apartment to retrieve the child. The respondent refused
to grant the officers entry to her home. Upon forcing
entry into the respondent’s residence, and despite the
respondent’s insistence that the father was not present,
police officers located the father hiding with the child
in a stairwell of the residence.

On September 21, 2022, updated specific steps were
ordered for each parent with regard to J. These specific
steps required the respondent, inter alia, to sign releases
so that the department could receive updates regarding
her treatment, to participate in parenting education and
supervised visitation, and to prohibit the father from
residing in her home without department approval. At
the request of the court, Balducci evaluated the respon-
dent and produced a report detailing his findings in
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January, 2023. Balducci concluded that it would be
5

‘‘detrimental’’ to the children for visitation with the
respondent to be reduced or eliminated, as the children
‘‘appear bonded’’ with the respondent and it would be
‘‘confusing and represent a significant loss to the chil-
dren to have their contact with [the respondent]
reduced or discontinued.’’6 Balducci also determined
that ‘‘[r]eunification appears possible’’ given the circum-
stances, but that ‘‘[i]t remains uncertain what role [the
father] will play in his children’s lives and as a support,
or detriment, to [the respondent] given that [the father]
did not participate in these [c]ourt-ordered evalua-
tions.’’
Throughout the events leading up to the termination
trial, and despite the full no-contact protective order,
the court found that the respondent ‘‘was observed in
the father’s company multiple times.’’ As the court
noted in its memorandum of decision, on April 12, 2023,
‘‘the father went to a multifamily dwelling in Bridgeport
where the [respondent] and the father’s sister were
living in separate apartments. The father broke down
the door to the [respondent’s] first floor apartment in
an attempt to locate her, while the [respondent]
attempted to escape by running up to the father’s sister’s
apartment where the sister and eight children were
present. The father kicked in the door to the sister’s
apartment, brandished a gun, and began arguing with
the [respondent] over the location of a gaming console.
Police were called to the scene and soon recovered a
The January, 2023 report was attached to the respondent’s appellate
5

brief. Additionally, we note that Balducci previously had evaluated the
respondent in February, 2020, but the 2020 report is not contained in the
record.
6
Due to the fact that the father did not appear for the court-ordered
evaluation, Balducci noted that he had insufficient and limited information
from which to render an opinion as to whether the father should undergo
a sexual offender evaluation or otherwise receive treatment for ‘‘problem
sexualized behavior.’’
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‘ghost’ gun and another fully loaded firearm in a vehicle
7

the parents shared. Subsequently, the father was
charged with eight counts of risk of injury, violation of a
protective order, various firearms violations, disorderly
conduct, and criminal mischief. Following his arrest,
full no-contact protective orders issued, with the father
as the subject and the [respondent] and the father’s
sister as the protected parties. The [respondent] denied
being assaulted despite the father’s sister’s claim that
the father had indeed assaulted the [respondent]. Nota-
bly, several months later during a court-ordered evalua-
tion in February, 2024, the [respondent] provided . . .
an account of the incident totally at odds with the police
report.’’ (Footnote in original.)
Further, ‘‘[o]n April 24, 2023, the father’s sister called
the police to report that the father was in the [respon-
dent’s] home. The department went to the home accom-
panied by a Bridgeport police officer, but the [respon-
dent] refused to let them in to search for the father. Two
days later, a department employee saw the [respondent]
and the father together at a New Haven courthouse
where the father had a scheduled court hearing.’’ Addi-
tionally, ‘‘on June 19, 2023, the father’s sister reported
that the father and the [respondent] drove to her home
and threatened and harassed her. When the father’s
sister approached the father, who was seated in the
back seat of the car, he rolled down the window,
knocked a phone she was using to record the incident
from her hand, and punched her in the face. She stated
he then got out of the car, brandished a gun, and threat-
ened that he would return to shoot up the house. The
[respondent] was also in the car goading another indi-
vidual to fight the father’s niece. The father was eventu-
ally arrested for this conduct and charged with two
7
‘‘Ghost guns are guns that have no serial numbers and are usually made
by piecing together firearm components in a do-it-yourself manner. When
assembled, they operate as fully functioning firearms that are largely untrace-
able.’’
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In re J. D.

counts of violating a protective order, assault in the
third degree, threatening with a firearm, and breach of
the peace.’’8
In August, 2023, department social worker Christo-
pher Traylor prepared a social study in support of the
termination petition. Traylor’s report noted that the
respondent had been compliant with providing releases
for all her providers. The report, nonetheless, noted
that ‘‘mental health, intimate partner violence and the
lack of safe housing’’ were ongoing issues ‘‘due to [the
father] having consistent access to her home as there
have been multiple reports of [the respondent] being
seen with [the father].’’ Noting the substantiation of
sexual violence by the father, Traylor concluded that
the respondent ‘‘fails to comprehend how allowing [the
father] access to her home and children puts them at
risk for safety.’’
On September 6, 2023, the petitioner filed a petition
seeking to terminate the respondent’s parental rights
with respect to J. The petition alleged that the depart-
ment had made reasonable efforts to locate the parents
and reasonable efforts to reunify J with her parents.
The petitioner further alleged that grounds existed for
termination of parental rights because the child had
been found in a previous proceeding to have been
neglected, abused, or uncared for and both parents had
failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation
that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable
time, considering the age and needs of J, the parents
could assume a responsible position in her life.
On January 31, 2024, police officers were dispatched
to the respondent’s residence in response to an alterca-
tion between the respondent and the father’s mother.
8
The trial court noted that, on August 27, 2023, the father was ‘‘again’’
charged with violation of a protective order, but that the ‘‘circumstances
of this violation are unclear.’’
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Finding the father present, despite the full no-contact
order, the officers arrested the father. As a result of
these events, the department concluded that, despite
the respondent’s claims otherwise, the respondent was
sharing her apartment with the father.
Jessica Biren Caverly, a psychologist, evaluated the
respondent and submitted a report to the court on April
4, 2024. The court credited the testimony of Caverly,
who conducted interviews and psychological testing of
both parents and observed visitation sessions between
the respondent and the children. Caverly recommended
that the respondent’s rights to J be terminated, based
on several factors, ‘‘including but not limited to the
[respondent’s] failure to acknowledge [intimate partner
violence] and to follow through with [intimate partner
violence] services and counseling; her inconsistent and
deficient engagement in mental health treatment; her
unwillingness to be forthcoming with providers and
the department regarding several issues, including her
relationship with the father and her pregnancies with
[her other children]; and her inability to recognize the
danger that the father posed to the children given the
prior substantiations of allegations that he sexually
abused minors, his poor decision-making, and his pur-
ported criminal behavior. During the interview, [Cav-
erly] was alarmed that the [respondent] expressed that
she did not believe that the father needed to be super-
vised with the children despite the numerous allega-
tions that he sexually assaulted minors, including
minors who are related to him. [Caverly] stated overall
that she had concerns about the respondent being in a
parenting role. . . . [Caverly] further expressed that,
although the respondent and her children are familiar
with each other, there was no evidence that they were
bonded.’’9
9
We note that Caverly reviewed Balducci’s psychological evaluation
reports from 2020 and 2023, in preparing her April, 2024 report. In addition,
Caverly discussed the respondent’s mental health treatment with two of the
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In April, 2024, Eleanor Buchanan, a department social
worker, filed an addendum to the social study in support
of the termination of parental rights. The addendum to
the social study stated that, since the filing of the peti-
tion for termination of parental rights, the respondent
had given birth to her fifth child despite having denied
her pregnancy to the department. Buchanan also
reported that the respondent had been refusing to pro-
vide the petitioner with her address and had ‘‘consis-
tently refused to sign releases for the [d]epartment to
obtain provider updates on a regular basis.’’ Most
recently, Buchanan reported that, on April 4, 2024, she
had met with the respondent during a supervised visit
with the respondent’s youngest child and the respon-
dent had refused to sign releases.10
The respondent filed a motion for posttermination
visitation on May 10, 2024. Trial on the petition for
termination of parental rights, as well as the motion
for posttermination visitation, was held on May 13, 2024,
and lasted a single day. The petitioner called Caverly,
Traylor, and Buchanan and introduced numerous exhib-
its.11 The respondent also testified.
respondent’s providers, Claire Utz and Diane Dodge. Caverly also consulted
with Melanie Vitelli regarding the respondent’s participation in ‘r Kids Family
Center’s therapeutic family time program.
10
Buchanan testified at trial as to these events, noting specifically that
the department had referred the respondent to the Yale Child Study Center
in an attempt to address the issue of intimate partner violence. Buchanan
further testified that, despite having engaged with that program, the respon-
dent had failed to sign a release allowing the department to communicate
with that provider.
11
The exhibits accepted into evidence included: (1) the father’s specific
steps filed September 20, 2022; (2) the respondent’s specific steps filed
September 20, 2022; (3) Traylor’s social study dated August 10, 2023; (4) a
social study addendum authored by Buchanan, dated April 25, 2024; (5) a
permanency plan study filed December 28, 2022; (6) a permanency plan
study addendum filed May 19, 2023; (7) a study filed in support of the neglect
petition filed July 14, 2022; (8) a social worker affidavit filed June 17, 2023;
(9) a study filed in support of the neglect petition filed March 27, 2024;
(10) a parenting/psychological evaluation filed April 5, 2024; (11) Caverly’s
curriculum vitae; (12) the respondent’s certified criminal history; and (13)
the father’s certified criminal history. The court also took judicial notice of
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On July 5, 2024, the court issued its memorandum of
decision, granting the petition to terminate the parental
rights of the respondent and denying her motion for
posttermination visitation with J.12 The court found that
the respondent was not fully cooperating with the
department, having refused to sign a release to enable
the department to get updated information and to per-
mit the department to conduct home visits, and having
failed to provide proof of employment. The court noted
that the respondent’s most recent therapist had offered
the record of the various child protection proceedings regarding all three
children that were the subject of the trial.
12
We note that ‘‘ ‘[p]roceedings to terminate parental rights are governed
by [General Statutes] § 17a-112. . . . Because a respondent’s fundamental
right to parent his or her child is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must be
strictly complied with before termination can be accomplished and adoption
proceedings begun.’ . . . Section 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part that
‘[t]he Superior Court, upon notice and hearing . . . may grant a petition
filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence
that (1) the [d]epartment . . . has made reasonable efforts to locate the
parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection
(a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the
parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except
that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing
pursuant to section 17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that
such efforts are not required, (2) termination is in the best interest of the
child, and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court
. . . to have been neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding
. . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take
to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-
129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would
encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and
needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the
life of the child . . . .’ ’’ (Citation omitted.) In re Niya B., 223 Conn. App.
471, 487–88, 308 A.3d 604, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024).
‘‘Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists
of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During
the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more
of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in § 17a-112
[(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. . . . If the trial court
determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds
to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court
must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.
. . . The best interest determination also must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 476 n.5.
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In re J. D.

to include in her treatment a component regarding inti-
mate partner violence, but that the respondent
‘‘demurred, claiming she was not a victim of domestic
violence.’’ Further, the court found that the department
‘‘has made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent
with the children . . . . Notwithstanding the depart-
ment’s attempt to support and assist the [respondent],
the [respondent] refused to open her eyes to the reality
of her situation. She rebuffed assistance from mental
health providers by refusing to discuss the father or
[intimate partner violence]. She forfeited her chance at
potentially reunifying with the children after completing
[the therapeutic family time program] because of her
unwillingness to truly engage in mental health treatment
and her choice to remain with the father despite his
conduct and history. Additionally, the [respondent] is
unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reunification
efforts.’’13 The court further found that J, being three
years old, needed ‘‘a reliable and attentive caregiver
who can attend to [her] needs and keep [her] safe. [She
has] been in the care of the department for a relatively
lengthy period of time . . . . [She needs] permanency.
Given the totality of the circumstances, including the
[respondent’s] history and the minimal progress she
has made over the years, the [respondent] has failed
13
We note that the court’s memorandum of decision makes clear that,
‘‘[a]ccording to testimony, [Balducci] conducted a second evaluation of the
[respondent] in January, 2023, and proposed that reunification of the children
with the [respondent] ‘appears possible’ because testing of the [respondent]
no longer indicated clinical concerns for depression or anxiety and the
respondent’s emotional regulation and behavior control capabilities had
improved. The court gives little weight to this assessment as [Balducci] did
not testify at trial, nor were any of his reports offered into evidence. As
such, the court has no context for this opinion.’’ We note, as well, that
Balducci reported that the respondent described her relationship with the
father as ‘‘supportive’’ but that he did not evaluate the father and, as a result,
left open the question of what role the father would play in the children’s
lives ‘‘and as a support, or detriment’’ to the respondent. This conclusion
came at the end of the paragraph that began with ‘‘[r]eunification
appears possible.’’
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to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as
would encourage the belief that within a reasonable
time, considering the age and needs of [J], she could
assume a responsible position in [her life].’’ The court
further found that, given the totality of the circum-
stances, the petitioner had proven, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that it was in the best interest of J to
terminate the respondent’s parental rights pursuant to
General Statutes § 17a-112 (k).14 This appeal followed.
The respondent’s sole claim, raised for the first time
on appeal, is that she did not receive the effective assis-
tance of counsel in opposing the petition to terminate
her parental rights and advocating for her motion for
14
General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where
termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether
to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and
shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent
of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child
by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2)
whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable
efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms of any
applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or
agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled
their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of
the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s
person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control
of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed
significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent
has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the
foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which
the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to
reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to
incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the mainte-
nance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other
custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been
prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by
the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the
unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of
the parent.’’ We note that the respondent has not challenged any of the
factual findings by the court.
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In re J. D.

posttermination visitation because her trial counsel
failed to call Balducci as a witness. The petitioner
argues that the respondent did not create a record suffi-
cient to support the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel because there is no record of the reasons why
counsel elected not to call Balducci as a witness—
leaving open the possibility that such a decision was a
reasonable trial strategy. Further, the petitioner argues
that the record is silent as to whether Balducci would
have continued to opine that reunification was possible
in light of the respondent’s ‘‘many violations of her
specific steps’’ after Balducci’s 2023 evaluation.
According to the petitioner, potential avenues existed
for the respondent to create a sufficient record for
appellate review, but the respondent did not pursue
those avenues. We agree with the petitioner that the
record is inadequate for us to review the respon-
dent’s claim.
We next set forth the principles that guide our review.
‘‘In Connecticut, a parent who faces the termination of
his or her parental rights is entitled, by statute, to the
assistance of counsel.’’15 In re Alexander V., 223 Conn.
15
General Statutes § 45a-717 (b) provides: ‘‘If a respondent parent appears
without counsel, the court shall inform such respondent parent of his or
her right to counsel and upon request, if he or she is unable to pay for
counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent such respondent parent. No
respondent parent may waive counsel unless the court has first explained
the nature and meaning of a petition for the termination of parental rights.
Unless the appointment of counsel is required under section 46b-136, the
court may appoint counsel to represent or appear on behalf of any child in
a hearing held under this section to speak on behalf of the best interests
of the child. If the respondent parent is unable to pay for his or her own
counsel or if the child is unable to pay for the child’s counsel, in the case
of a Superior Court matter, the reasonable compensation of counsel
appointed for the respondent parent or the child shall be established by,
and paid from funds appropriated to, the Judicial Department and, in the
case of a Probate Court matter, the reasonable compensation of counsel
appointed for the respondent parent or the child shall be established by,
and paid from funds appropriated to, the Judicial Department, however, in
the case of a Probate Court matter, if funds have not been included in the
budget of the Judicial Department for such purposes, such compensation
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557, 569, 613 A.2d 780 (1992). Consistent with that statu-
tory right, our Supreme Court has held that a parent
facing such proceedings has the right to the effective
assistance of counsel. See State v. Anonymous, 179
Conn. 155, 160, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Danyellah
S.-C., 167 Conn. App. 556, 567, 143 A.3d 698, cert.
denied, 323 Conn. 913, 150 A.3d 228 (2016). ‘‘Moreover,
a parent whose rights have been terminated may assert,
on direct appeal, that he or she was deprived of the
right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. . . .
[I]t is the responsibility of the respondent to demon-
strate trial counsel’s ineffectiveness by reference to the
record and not merely by allegation.’’ (Citations omit-
ted.) In re Peter L., 158 Conn. App. 556, 563–64, 119
A.3d 23 (2015).

As we have recently reiterated, we evaluate counsel’s
performance in a termination proceeding under the fol-
lowing two-pronged standard: ‘‘The range of compe-
tence . . . requires not errorless counsel, and not
counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel
whose performance is reasonably competent, or within
the range of competence displayed by lawyers with
ordinary training and skill in [that particular area of
the] law. . . . A showing of incompetency without a
showing of resulting prejudice . . . does not amount
to ineffective assistance of counsel. . . . In making
such a claim, it is the responsibility of the respondent
to create an adequate record pointing to the alleged
ineffectiveness and any prejudice the respondent claims
resulted from that ineffectiveness. . . . In the absence
of findings by the trial court in this regard, we directly
review the trial court record. . . . We are mindful that
a fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects
shall be established by the Probate Court Administrator and paid from the
Probate Court Administration Fund.’’
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In re J. D.

of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of coun-
sel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct
from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the
difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court
must indulge a strong presumption that [the] conduct
[of trial counsel] falls within the wide range of reason-
able professional assistance; that is, [an appellant] must
overcome the presumption that, under the circum-
stances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Wendy G.-R., 225 Conn. App.
194, 204–205, 314 A.3d 1029, cert. denied, 349 Conn.
916, 316 A.3d 357 (2024).
In In re Wendy G.-R., we considered the claim, raised
for the first time on direct appeal, that the respondent
mother’s counsel had rendered ineffective assistance
during a termination of parental rights trial. That claim
was centered on the fact that the respondent mother’s
counsel did not object, after the presentation of evi-
dence, to a motion by counsel for the petitioner to
amend the petition seeking termination of parental
rights. The respondent mother argued that ‘‘ ‘no reason-
able attorney’ ’’ would have failed to object to such a
motion and that there was no possible way to construe
trial counsel’s inaction as anything but deficient. Id.,
203. The respondent mother also argued that there
could be ‘‘no dispute’’ that she was prejudiced by her
counsel’s deficient performance because, without the
amendment to the petition, her parental rights would
not have been terminated. Id. We determined that the
respondent mother could not satisfy her burden. Id.,
211. In so concluding, we noted that, in order to satisfy
the respondent mother’s burden of proving that counsel
had rendered deficient representation, a party ‘‘must
do more than demonstrate that counsel failed to object
to the motion to amend. Instead, she must demonstrate
that counsel’s failure to object cannot be explained by
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one or more possible strategic reasons that are objec-
tively reasonable.’’ Id. We noted that ‘‘the record [was]
bereft of any evidence of the actual strategy, if any,
that the [respondent mother’s] counsel employed when
she did not object [to the motion to amend].’’ (Emphasis
in original.) Id., 208.

The lack of an adequate record is an inherent pitfall
in any direct appeal of a termination judgment that
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. See In re Jona-
than M., 255 Conn. 208, 235, 764 A.2d 739 (2001) (‘‘[i]n
a case such as this, wherein a parent alleges ineffective
assistance of counsel at the termination trial, the record
may not contain the factual predicates sufficient to
review, on direct appeal, the appointed attorney’s ade-
quacy’’) As our Supreme Court in In re Jonathan M.
has observed, and, as we also discussed in In re Wendy
G.-R., there are, however, possible avenues by which
a parent whose parental rights have been terminated
can develop an adequate record: ‘‘General Statutes
§ 45a-719 provides a number of alternatives through
which a party may attempt to open the final judgment
of termination and assert a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. The first option permits a motion to
open the judgment in accordance with General Statutes
§ 52-212 or General Statutes § 52-212a. These provisions
allow a four month window from the date of judgment
within which such a motion may be brought. Second,
the principles governing the opening of judgments at
common law may also provide an indigent parent a
means of gaining a review of the adequacy of trial coun-
sel at the termination proceeding. It is a well-established
general rule that even a judgment rendered by the court
. . . can subsequently be opened [after the four month
limitation] . . . if it is shown that . . . the judgment
. . . was obtained by fraud . . . or because of mutual
mistake. . . . Thus, when a judgment of termination
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In re J. D.

is predicated on fraud or mutual mistake and the indi-
gent’s appointed counsel fails to address these issues,
presumably rendering the assistance ineffective, the
parent may have a remedy to open the judgment at
common law. . . . [A] parent may [also] file a petition
for a new trial. See General Statutes § 52-582. Under
this option, a parent whose rights have been terminated
has three years within which to file a petition. General
Statutes § 52-270 provides that the court may grant such
a petition for reasonable cause. . . . Finally, we recog-
nize that § 45a-719 . . . limits all of the available
options by precluding the court from granting any
motion or petition filed after a final decree of adoption
has been entered.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added;
footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Jonathan M., supra, 255 Conn. 236–40; see also
In re Wendy G.-R., supra, 225 Conn. App. 205 (‘‘the
respondent had an opportunity to develop a factual
record related to counsel’s allegedly deficient perfor-
mance and any resulting prejudice’’).16
16
We note that the petitioner’s counsel, in oral argument to this court,
conceded that § 45a-719 allows a parent who alleges ineffectiveness of coun-
sel at a trial terminating his or her parental rights to petition for a new trial
on that basis.
General Statutes § 45a-719 provides: ‘‘The court may grant a motion to
open or set aside a judgment terminating parental rights pursuant to section
52-212 or 52-212a or pursuant to common law or may grant a petition for
a new trial on the issue of the termination of parental rights, provided the
court shall consider the best interest of the child, except that no such motion
or petition may be granted if a final decree of adoption has been issued
prior to the filing of any such motion or petition. Any person who has legal
custody of the child or who has physical custody of the child pursuant to
an agreement, including an agreement with the Department of Children and
Families or a licensed child-placing agency, may provide evidence to the
court concerning the best interest of the child at any hearing held on the
motion to reopen or set aside a judgment terminating parental rights. For
the purpose of this section, ‘best interest of the child’ shall include, but not
be limited to, a consideration of the age of the child, the nature of the
relationship of the child with the caretaker of the child, the length of time
the child has been in the custody of the caretaker, the nature of the relation-
ship of the child with the birth parent, the length of time the child has been
in the custody of the birth parent, any relationship that may exist between
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Under the circumstances presented by this case, we
conclude that the record before us is inadequate to
review the respondent’s claim that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to call Balducci as a
witness. We note that, at oral argument before this
court, the respondent’s counsel conceded that it would
be ‘‘speculative’’ to guess as to what Balducci may have
concluded, if presented with evidence of the events
that transpired between the date of his report and the
termination hearing, because there is ‘‘no way to know’’
how these events—including the April, 2023 incident
in which the father brandished a firearm during a con-
flict with the respondent, as well as the respondent’s
ongoing relationship with the father—would have
shaped Balducci’s conclusion as to whether reunifica-
tion efforts were likely to be successful. Similarly, the
record is devoid of any explanation as to why trial
counsel decided not to call Balducci—including
whether he was available and willing to testify at the
termination hearing. See In re Alexander V., supra, 223
Conn. 571 (‘‘[a]lthough we acknowledge the possibility
that counsel could, under some circumstances, be
deemed ineffective for failure to make an adequate trial
record of an important legal issue, we are, as an appel-
late court, limited to the record presented to us in decid-
ing the merits of an appeal’’); Banks v. Commissioner
of Correction, 225 Conn. App. 234, 244, 314 A.3d 1052
the child and siblings or other children in the caretaker’s household, and
the psychological and medical needs of the child. The determination of the
best interest of the child shall not be based on a consideration of the socio-
economic status of the birth parent or the caretaker.’’ See also In re Jonathan
M., supra, 255 Conn. 238–39 (discussing available avenues to develop factual
record, including, ‘‘as the department concedes, a parent may file a petition
for a new trial’’); In re Shanice P., Superior Court, judicial district of Middle-
sex, Child Protection Session at Middletown, Docket No. JV-XX-XXXXXXX-S
(October 6, 2000) (28 Conn. L. Rptr. 284, 286) (‘‘[w]here a new trial is sought
in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the legislature has decreed
[through § 45a-719] that the court must also consider the best interests of
the child’’), appeal dismissed, 64 Conn. App. 78, 779 A.2d 151 (2001).
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In re J. D.

(‘‘[t]he trial transcript seldom discloses all of the consid-
erations of strategy that may have induced counsel to
follow a particular course of action’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 349 Conn. 922, 321 A.3d
1130 (2024); Harris v. Commissioner of Correction,
134 Conn. App. 44, 57, 37 A.3d 802 (‘‘[t]he failure of
defense counsel to call a potential defense witness does
not constitute ineffective assistance unless there is
some showing that the testimony would have been help-
ful in establishing the asserted defense’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)), cert. denied, 304 Conn. 919, 41
A.3d 306 (2012). In sum, the respondent has failed to
present us with a sufficient record to overcome the
strong presumption that the decision not to call Bal-
ducci was strategically sound.17
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

17
This logic applies equally to the respondent’s claim that counsel’s failure
to call Balducci contributed to the denial of the respondent’s motion for
posttermination visitation.