62-64 Bank Street, LLC v. Amelio

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62-64 Bank Street, LLC v. Amelio

62-64 BANK STREET, LLC v. CARMINE AMELIO
(AC 48082)
Moll, Westbrook and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant tenant appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the plain-
tiff landlord in the plaintiff’s summary process action, and the plaintiff
moved to dismiss the appeal. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that this
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because it was
jurisdictionally late pursuant to statute (§ 47a-35 (b)). Held:

The defendant’s appeal was timely pursuant to § 47a-35 (b), as new five day
appeal periods with respect to the judgment of possession and the denial
of the defendant’s motion to reargue arose following the trial court’s grant
of the defendant’s fee waiver application pursuant to the rule of practice
(§ 63-1 (c) (1)), this court having determined, under the limited and unique
circumstances presented in this appeal, that, when the defendant attempted
to file a timely and proper appeal during the appeal periods, the appeal should
have remained pending, rather than having been rejected, notwithstanding
an error on the appeal form, and, treating the appeal form as if it had been
returned on the basis of the error, the defendant corrected it within the
time allowed pursuant to the rule of practice ((2024) § 62-7 (a)).

The defendant’s appeal was not moot, even though he was no longer in
possession of the leased premises, because the parties’ lease did not expire
until 2027, and, accordingly, if the defendant were successful on the merits
of his appeal, he could be afforded practical relief in the form of a writ of
restoration.

Considered February 5—officially released May 13, 2025

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Litchfield, where the
case was tried to the court, Lobo, J.; judgment for the
plaintiff; thereafter, the court, Lobo, J., denied the defen-
dant’s motion to reargue and to vacate the judgment
of possession, and the defendant appealed to this court;
subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal. Motion to dismiss appeal denied.
John D. Tower, in support of the motion.
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Carmine Amelio, self-represented, in opposition to
the motion.
Opinion

MOLL, J. In this summary process appeal, the self-
represented defendant, Carmine Amelio, appeals from
the judgment of possession rendered by the trial court
in favor of the plaintiff, 62-64 Bank Street, LLC, as well
as from the court’s denial of his motion to reargue. On
October 11, 2024, the plaintiff moved to dismiss this
appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the
grounds that it is (1) jurisdictionally late pursuant to
General Statutes § 47a-35 (b)1 and/or (2) moot because
the defendant is no longer in possession of the premises
at issue. On February 5, 2025, we denied the plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss and indicated that an opinion would
follow. This opinion sets forth the reasoning for our
decision.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. In Febru-
ary, 2024, the plaintiff commenced the present summary
process action against the defendant with respect to a
commercial property located at 64 Bank Street in New
Milford (premises).2 The sole ground alleged by the
1
General Statutes § 47a-35 provides: ‘‘(a) Execution shall be stayed for
five days from the date judgment has been rendered, provided any Sunday
or legal holiday intervening shall be excluded in computing such five days.
‘‘(b) No appeal shall be taken except within such five-day period. If an
appeal is taken within such period, execution shall be stayed until the final
determination of the cause, unless it appears to the judge who tried the
case that the appeal was taken solely for the purpose of delay or unless
the defendant fails to give bond, as provided in section 47a-35a. If execution
has not been stayed, as provided in this subsection, execution may then
issue, except as otherwise provided in sections 47a-36 to 47a-41, inclusive.’’
2
The plaintiff commenced a separate summary process action (separate
action) against the defendant with respect to a commercial property located
at 62 Bank Street in New Milford, which action was consolidated with the
present action for trial on March 26, 2024. The trial court, Lobo, J., rendered
judgments of possession in the present action and in the separate action
simultaneously. On the basis of the defendant’s appeal form, the defendant
has appealed only from (1) the judgment of possession rendered in the
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plaintiff in support of its complaint was nonpayment
of rent by the defendant.3 The defendant answered the
plaintiff’s complaint and asserted several special defenses,
which the plaintiff denied.
On April 4, 2024, the defendant filed a notice indicat-
ing that the present action had been removed to the
United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 14414 and 1446 (2018).5
On June 27, 2024, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted a motion
filed by the plaintiff to remand the present action to
the Superior Court, concluding that the removal had
been improper and that the present action should have
been removed, if at all, to the United States District
present action and (2) the denial of his motion to reargue filed in the present
action. Thus, the judgment of possession rendered in the separate action
is not at issue in this appeal and is not germane to the plaintiff’s motion to
dismiss. Accordingly, notwithstanding that the present action and the sepa-
rate action were consolidated for trial, we refer only to the present action
in setting forth the relevant procedural history.
3
In a pretrial brief, the plaintiff represented that the parties’ lease for the
premises began on February 1, 2023, and expires on December 31, 2027.
4
Title 28 of the United States Code, § 1441, provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
GENERALLY.—Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant
or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such action is pending. . . .’’
5
Title 28 of the United States Code, § 1446, provides in relevant part:
‘‘(a) GENERALLY.—A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil
action from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States
for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice
of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal,
together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such
defendant or defendants in such action. . . .
‘‘(d) NOTICE TO ADVERSE PARTIES AND STATE COURT.—Promptly
after the filing of such notice of removal of a civil action the defendant or
defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall
file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall
effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and
until the case is remanded. . . .’’
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Court for the District of Connecticut (District Court).
Thereafter, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York remanded the present
action to the Superior Court.
On July 15, 2024, the defendant filed a notice indicat-
ing that the present action had been removed to the
District Court. On July 24, 2024, the District Court, sua
sponte, issued an order of remand for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, on August 8, 2024, the
District Court remanded the present action to the Supe-
rior Court.
Trial in the present action was scheduled to begin
on the morning of August 13, 2024. Prior to the start
of trial that morning, the defendant filed a notice with
the trial court indicating that the present action had
been removed, for a second time, to the District Court.
Additionally, the defendant filed a separate notice
requesting that the trial court take judicial notice that,
in light of the aforementioned removal of the present
action to the District Court, the trial court lacked juris-
diction to proceed further. That same day, the trial
court, Lobo, J., summarily denied the defendant’s request
for judicial notice and proceeded with trial, which the
defendant did not attend. The trial court, on the record,
defaulted the defendant for his failure to appear at trial.
On August 14, 2024, the trial court rendered a judg-
ment of possession in the plaintiff’s favor with respect
to the premises. At the outset of its decision, the trial
court stated that, ‘‘[a]t 8:48 a.m. on the morning of trial,
the defendant again filed another last minute notice
of removal to the [District Court], making the same
jurisdictional arguments that were previously denied
. . . . As the [District] Court no longer has jurisdiction
pursuant to Miles v. Miles, [Docket No. 12-CV-4014 (JS)
(ETB), 2012 WL 3542319, *1 (E.D.N.Y. August 13, 2012)],
and Shapiro v. Logistec USA, Inc., 412 F.3d 307, 310–11
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([2d Cir.] 2005), the [trial] court contacted the defendant
via both telephone and email informing the defendant
that the court was moving forward on the underlying
matter. Although [trial] was scheduled for 9:30 a.m.,
evidence was heard in the afternoon following the
defendant’s failure to appear . . . .’’ The trial court
proceeded to determine that (1) the plaintiff had satis-
fied, by a preponderance of the evidence, its burden of
proof and (2) the defendant had failed to establish, by
a fair preponderance of the evidence, any defenses. In
addition to rendering a judgment of possession in the
plaintiff’s favor, the trial court determined that the
defendant owed an arrearage of $13,113.59 with respect
to the premises, exclusive of costs and attorney’s fees.
There was no additional activity in the present action
until August 26, 2024, when the plaintiff filed a summary
process execution for possession, which was issued
that same day.
On August 28, 2024, the defendant filed a motion to
reargue, to reconsider, and to vacate the judgment of
possession (motion to reargue) on the basis that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment
of possession while the present action, after it had been
removed to the District Court for a second time,
remained pending before the District Court. On August
30, 2024, the trial court summarily denied the defen-
dant’s motion to reargue.
Meanwhile, on August 29, 2024, the District Court,
sua sponte, issued an order of remand on the basis
of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, the
District Court remanded the present action to the Supe-
rior Court on September 11, 2024.
On September 23, 2024, the plaintiff returned the
summary process execution for possession, which
reflected that, on September 13, 2024, the defendant’s
possessions had been removed from the premises. On
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October 2, 2024, after he had been granted a fee waiver
by the trial court on September 25, 2024, the defendant
filed this appeal from the judgment of possession and
the denial of his motion to reargue.6
On October 11, 2024, the plaintiff moved to dismiss
this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on
two separate grounds. First, the plaintiff asserts that
this appeal is jurisdictionally late pursuant to § 47a-35
(b). Second, the plaintiff contends that this appeal is
moot because the defendant no longer has possession
of the premises. On October 31, 2024, the defendant
filed an opposition to the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.7
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that this
appeal is neither jurisdictionally late nor moot.
The following legal principles are relevant to our
resolution of the plaintiff’s claims. ‘‘A threshold inquiry
of this court upon every appeal presented to it is the
question of appellate jurisdiction. . . . It is well estab-
lished that the subject matter jurisdiction of the Appel-
late Court . . . is governed by [General Statutes] § 52-
263, which provides that an aggrieved party may appeal
to the court having jurisdiction from the final judgment
of the court. . . . [O]nce the question of lack of juris-
diction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no
matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court
6
On the basis of his appeal form and his preliminary statement of the
issues, the defendant also is appealing from the trial court’s denial of his
August 13, 2024 request for judicial notice, an interlocutory ruling that
became subject to appellate review upon the rendering of the judgment of
possession. See Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc. v. Gurski, 49
Conn. App. 731, 734, 715 A.2d 819 (‘‘[r]eview of an interlocutory ruling
must await an appeal from the final judgment’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 920, 722 A.2d 809 (1998). In the interest
of simplicity, in analyzing the merits of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, we
refer to the judgment of possession, without accompanying references to
the denial of the request for judicial notice, and the denial of the defendant’s
motion to reargue as the decisions from which the defendant has appealed.
7
The defendant was granted an extension of time to file his opposition
to the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.
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must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the
case. . . . If it becomes apparent to the court that such
jurisdiction is lacking, the appeal must be dismissed.’’
(Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey, 224 Conn. App. 867,
872–73, 315 A.3d 1112, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 910, 324
A.3d 141 (2024).
The defendant’s removal of the present action to the
District Court prior to the start of trial, as well as the
District Court’s subsequent remand of the present
action to the Superior Court, materially affect our exam-
ination of the plaintiff’s claims. ‘‘ ‘Removal is effective
upon filing a notice of removal in both the relevant
federal and state courts, and providing notice to the
other parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (a) [and] (d). At that
time, ‘‘the State court shall proceed no further unless
and until the case is remanded.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (d).
‘‘A proper filing of a notice of removal immediately
strips the state court of its jurisdiction.’’ Yarnevic v.
Brink’s, Inc., 102 F.3d 753, 754 (4th Cir. 1996). Thus,
even if a case is later remanded, it is under the sole
jurisdiction of the federal court from the time of filing
until the court remands it back to state court.’ In re
Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 231 n.6 (3d Cir. 2002).’’8 Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Tarzia, 186 Conn. App. 800, 804–
805 n.4, 201 A.3d 511 (2019). ‘‘When . . . a certified
copy of a remand to state court is mailed to the state
We note that repeated removals of an action to federal court may subject
8

a litigant to sanctions, such as a prohibitory order. See, e.g., Hatcher v.
Ferguson, 664 Fed. Appx. 308, 309, 311 (4th Cir. 2016) (affirming order
prohibiting litigant from attempting future removals of particular state court
action following litigant’s third removal to federal court); Miles v. Miles,
supra, 2012 WL 3542319, *1 (barring litigant from filing additional removal
petitions with respect to particular state court action in conjunction with
order remanding action, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, to state court
for second time). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) provides in relevant part
that ‘‘[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and
any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the
removal. . . .’’
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court clerk, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c)9 authorizes the state
court to proceed again with the case. See Ins. Co. of
Pennsylvania v. Waterfield, 102 Conn. App. 277, 283,
925 A.2d 451 (2007) (under plain language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447, state court has subject matter jurisdiction to
proceed as soon as remand effected).’’ (Footnote
added.) Massad v. Greaves, 116 Conn. App. 672, 678,
977 A.2d 662, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 938, 981 A.2d 1079
(2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 904, 130 S. Ct. 3276, 176
L. Ed. 2d 1183 (2010); see also Shapiro v. Logistec USA,
Inc., supra, 412 F.3d 312 (federal court’s jurisdiction
terminates when remand order issued under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447 (c), which provision ‘‘ ‘is not self-executing,’ ’’
has been mailed to state court).
I
We first address the plaintiff’s claim that this appeal
is jurisdictionally late pursuant to § 47a-35 (b). The
defendant argues that (1) his appeal from the denial of
his motion to reargue is timely in light of the fee waiver
application that he had filed, and the trial court had
granted, before he had filed this appeal, and (2) he had
moved for permission to file a late appeal from the
judgment of possession.10 For the reasons that follow,
9
Title 28 of the United States Code, § 1447 (c), provides: ‘‘A motion to
remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter
jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of
removal under section 1446 (a). If at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case
shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require payment of
just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a
result of the removal. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed
by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon
proceed with such case.’’
10
On October 16, 2024, after the plaintiff had moved to dismiss this appeal,
the defendant filed a motion for permission to file a late appeal in which
he maintained that this appeal was (1) timely, insofar as he had appealed
from the denial of his motion to reargue, and (2) untimely, insofar as he
had appealed from the judgment of possession, but that good cause existed
to warrant a belated appeal therefrom. On February 5, 2025, we ordered
that no action was necessary on the defendant’s motion for permission to
file a late appeal following our denial of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.
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we conclude that this appeal is timely pursuant to § 47a-
35 (b).
Section 47a-35 provides: ‘‘(a) Execution shall be
stayed for five days from the date judgment has been
rendered, provided any Sunday or legal holiday
intervening shall be excluded in computing such five
days.
‘‘(b) No appeal shall be taken except within such five-
day period. If an appeal is taken within such period,
execution shall be stayed until the final determination
of the cause, unless it appears to the judge who tried
the case that the appeal was taken solely for the purpose
of delay or unless the defendant fails to give bond, as
provided in section 47a-35a. If execution has not been
stayed, as provided in this subsection, execution may
then issue, except as otherwise provided in sections
47a-36 to 47a-41, inclusive.’’
‘‘Summary process is a special statutory procedure
designed to provide an expeditious remedy. . . . It
enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased prem-
ises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to
which, under the common-law actions, they might be
subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their
terms. . . . Summary process statutes secure a prompt
hearing and final determination. . . . Therefore, the
statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly
construed and strictly followed. . . .
‘‘Appeals in summary [process] proceedings are gov-
erned by the statutes specifically relating thereto rather
than statutes relating to appeals generally. . . . Thus,
parties must comply with the five day appeal period
pursuant to § 47a-35, rather than with the general
twenty day appeal period provided in Practice Book
§ 63-1 (a).11 The requirement that appeals in summary
11
Practice Book § 63-1 (a) provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[u]nless a differ-
ent time period is provided by statute, an appeal must be filed within twenty
days of the date notice of the judgment or decision is given. . . .’’
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process actions comply with § 47a-35 is jurisdictional.
. . . Therefore, compliance with its mandate is a neces-
sary prerequisite to an appellate court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; foot-
note added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing
Authority v. Parks, 211 Conn. App. 528, 530–31, 273
A.3d 245 (2022); see also HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wil-
son, 235 Conn. 650, 659, 668 A.2d 1309 (1995) (‘‘[i]n
light of the plain language of § 47a-35, the fact that the
summary process statutes are in derogation of common
law and the legislative policy in favor of the swift resolu-
tion of disputes between landlords and tenants regard-
ing rights of possession, we conclude that an appeal
pursuant to § 47a-35 must be brought within five days
of the rendering of a summary process judgment’’);
Three Deer Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Johnson, 223
Conn. App. 544, 549–50 and n.3, 308 A.3d 1109 (2024)
(this court lacked jurisdiction over late portion of
appeal challenging stipulated summary process judg-
ment but had jurisdiction over remaining portion of
appeal challenging denial of motion to open judgment
when appeal was filed within five day statutory appeal
period that arose following denial of motion); cf. Cen-
trix Management Co., LLC v. Fosberg, 218 Conn. App.
206, 214–15, 291 A.3d 185 (2023) (twenty day appeal
period of Practice Book § 63-1, rather than five day
appeal period of § 47a-35 (b), applied to postjudgment
award of attorney’s fees pursuant to General Statutes
§ 42-150bb in summary process action because post-
judgment motion for statutory attorney’s fees did not
challenge underlying judgment of possession but,
rather, was ‘‘a separate ancillary proceeding distinct
from the judgment of possession rendered pursuant to
the summary process statutes’’).
Pursuant to Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1),12 the filing
of certain motions during an appeal period functions
12
Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1) provides: ‘‘If a motion is filed within the
appeal period that, if granted, would render the judgment, decision or accep-
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to create a new appeal period after the motions are
resolved as detailed in the provision. Section 63-1 (c)
(1) applies to summary process actions. See, e.g., Atlan-
tic St. Heritage Associates, LLC v. Bologna, 204 Conn.
App. 163, 170, 252 A.3d 881 (2021) (new five day appeal
period was created as to judgment of possession follow-
ing issuance of notice of trial court’s denial of motion
to open judgment, which motion was filed within origi-
nal five day appeal period). In addition to encompassing
motions that, if granted, would render the judgment or
decision ‘‘ineffective,’’ § 63-1 (c) (1) provides in relevant
part that, ‘‘[i]f, within the appeal period, any motion is
filed, pursuant to Section 63-6 or 63-7, seeking waiver
of fees, costs and security or appointment of counsel,
a new twenty day appeal period or statutory period for
filing the appeal shall begin on the day that notice of
tance of the verdict ineffective, either a new twenty day period or applicable
statutory time period for filing the appeal shall begin on the day that notice
of the ruling is given on the last such outstanding motion, except as provided
for additur or remittitur in the next paragraph.
‘‘If a motion for additur or remittitur is filed within the appeal period and
granted, a new twenty day appeal period shall begin upon the earlier of (A)
acceptance of the additur or remittitur or (B) expiration of the time set for
the acceptance. If the motion is denied, the new appeal period shall begin
on the day that notice of the ruling is given.
‘‘Motions that, if granted, would render a judgment, decision or acceptance
of the verdict ineffective include, but are not limited to, motions that seek:
the opening or setting aside of the judgment; a new trial; the setting aside
of the verdict; judgment notwithstanding the verdict; reargument of the
judgment or decision; collateral source reduction; additur; remittitur; or any
alteration of the terms of the judgment. Motions that do not give rise to a
new appeal period include those that seek: clarification or articulation, as
opposed to alteration, of the terms of the judgment or decision; a written
or transcribed statement of the trial court’s decision; or reargument of a
motion listed in the previous paragraph.
‘‘If, within the appeal period, any motion is filed, pursuant to Section 63-
6 or 63-7, seeking waiver of fees, costs and security or appointment of
counsel, a new twenty day appeal period or statutory period for filing the
appeal shall begin on the day that notice of the ruling is given on the last
such outstanding motion. If a party files, pursuant to Section 66-6, a motion
for review of any such motion, the new appeal period shall begin on the
day that notice of the ruling is given on the motion for review.’’
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the ruling is given on the last such outstanding motion.
If a party files, pursuant to Section 66-6, a motion for
review of any such motion, the new appeal period shall
begin on the day that notice of the ruling is given on
the motion for review.’’
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of the plaintiff’s timeliness claim.
The defendant did not attempt to file an appeal within
the five day appeal period that arose following the judg-
ment of possession rendered on August 14, 2024, or the
separate five day appeal period that followed the denial
of his motion to reargue on August 30, 2024.13 On Sep-
tember 4, 2024, the defendant attempted to file an
appeal; however, that appeal was rejected by the Office
of the Appellate Clerk on September 5, 2024, because
the defendant did not pay the requisite filing fee or
submit a fee waiver. Additionally, on September 4, 2024,
the defendant filed with the trial court a fee waiver
application, which the court, Menjivar, J., denied on
September 6, 2024. On September 9, 2024, the defendant
timely requested a hearing on the denied fee waiver
application.14 On September 13, 2024, the trial court
13
The defendant filed the motion to reargue outside of the five day appeal
period vis-à-vis the judgment of possession, and, therefore, the denial of
the motion to reargue did not create a new appeal period as to the judgment
of possession. See Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1); see also Three Deer Associ-
ates Ltd. Partnership v. Johnson, supra, 223 Conn. App. 549–50 and n.3
(this court lacked jurisdiction over late portion of appeal from stipulated
summary process judgment but had jurisdiction over remaining, timely por-
tion of appeal from denial of motion to open judgment); Housing Authority
v. Parks, supra, 211 Conn. App. 533–34 (denial of motion to reargue filed
outside of five day appeal period with respect to judgment of dismissal of
summary process action did not give rise to new appeal period as to judgment
of dismissal).
14
See Practice Book § 63-6 (‘‘If the [fee waiver] application is denied in
whole or in part, and the applicant wishes to challenge that denial, the
applicant shall file a written request for a hearing, pursuant to Section 8-2,
within ten days of the issuance of notice of the denial of the application.
The clerk of the trial court shall assign the application for a hearing within
twenty days of the filing of the request and the judicial authority shall act
promptly on the application following the hearing.’’).
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clerk assigned the denied application for a hearing
scheduled for September 24, 2024, with the hearing later
being rescheduled to September 25, 2024. On September
25, 2024, following a hearing, the court, Lynch, J.,
granted the fee waiver application. On October 1, 2024,
the defendant again attempted to file an appeal; how-
ever, that appeal was rejected by the Office of the Appel-
late Clerk that same day for reasons that we detail
later in this opinion. On October 2, 2024, the defendant
successfully filed this appeal.
At this juncture, we consider the ramifications of the
defendant’s removal of the present action to the District
Court on August 13, 2024, and the District Court’s
remand of the present action to the Superior Court on
September 11, 2024.15 In doing so, we are guided by this
court’s decision in Knutson Mortgage Corp. v. Salata,
55 Conn. App. 784, 740 A.2d 918 (1999). In Salata, within
the appeal period that arose with respect to an order
confirming a foreclosure sale (confirmation order), the
defendant filed for bankruptcy, invoking the stay provi-
sions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1).16 Id., 786–87. Approxi-
mately three months later, the plaintiff obtained relief
from the bankruptcy stay. Id., 786. The next day, the
defendant filed a motion to reargue the confirmation
order. Id. The trial court denied the motion to reargue,
and the defendant filed an appeal challenging both the
15
We iterate that, although the District Court issued an order of remand
on August 29, 2024, the District Court did not remand the present action
to the Superior Court until September 11, 2024. See Shapiro v. Logistec
USA, Inc., supra, 412 F.3d 312; Massad v. Greaves, supra, 116 Conn. App. 678.
16
Title 11 of the United States Code, § 362 (a), provides in relevant part:
‘‘[A] petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . operates
as a stay, applicable to all entities, of—
‘‘(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title . . . .’’
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confirmation order and the denial of the motion to
reargue. Id. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal
as untimely. Id., 785. This court denied the motion to
dismiss, concluding that (1) the defendant’s bankruptcy
filing stayed the appeal period attendant to the confir-
mation order because the bankruptcy stay prohibited
the filing of an appeal, thereby preventing the appeal
period from running, and (2) after the bankruptcy stay
had been lifted, the defendant filed the motion to rear-
gue within the appeal period that had restarted and
later filed a timely appeal following the denial of that
motion. Id., 788.
We deem the rationale in Salata to be compelling
and applicable to the circumstances of present action.
In Salata, a bankruptcy stay prohibited the filing of an
appeal from the confirmation order until the stay had
been lifted, thereby preventing the relevant appeal
period from running in the interim. Id. Similarly, after
the defendant had removed the present action to the
District Court on August 13, 2024, thereby ‘‘immediately
strip[ping] the state court of its jurisdiction’’; (internal
quotation marks omitted) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Tarzia, supra, 186 Conn. App. 805 n.4; no appeal could
have been filed as to the August 14, 2024 judgment of
possession or the August 30, 2024 denial of the defen-
dant’s motion to reargue until the District Court had
remanded the present action to the Superior Court on
September 11, 2024, whereupon the District Court’s sole
jurisdiction over the present action was terminated. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1446 (d) and 1447 (c) (2018). It follows,
therefore, that the respective five day appeal periods
that arose as to the judgment of possession and the
denial of the motion to reargue were stayed until Sep-
tember 11, 2024.
We now turn to the events that transpired following
the District Court’s remand of the present action to the
Superior Court on September 11, 2024. No appeal or
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motion pursuant to Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1) was
filed within five days—excluding the intervening Sun-
day—after the remand.17 At the time of the remand,
however, there were ongoing proceedings in the trial
court in connection with the defendant’s fee waiver
application filed on September 4, 2024, and initially
denied on September 6, 2024. Two days prior to the
remand, on September 9, 2024, the defendant requested
a hearing on the denied fee waiver application, and two
days following the remand, on September 13, 2024, the
trial court clerk assigned the denied application for a
hearing to be held on September 24, 2024. On September
13, 2024, the defendant filed a caseflow request seeking
to reschedule the hearing, which request the trial court,
Roraback, J., granted on September 16, 2024, reschedul-
ing the hearing to September 25, 2024. On the day of
the hearing, the trial court, Lynch, J., granted the fee
waiver application.
We are cognizant of the fact that, for purposes of
invoking the operation of Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1),
no fee waiver application was filed within the respective
appeal periods of the judgment of possession and the
denial of the defendant’s motion to reargue once they
began to run upon the District Court’s remand of the
present action to the Superior Court. Nevertheless,
under the limited and unique circumstances before us,
where the trial court was engaged in ongoing proceed-
ings on the defendant’s September 4, 2024 fee waiver
17
Within this time period, the defendant (1) moved to disqualify Judge
Lobo and Judge Menjivar from presiding over any additional proceedings
in the present action and (2) filed a notice of bankruptcy, as later amended.
The motions to disqualify are of no moment to our analysis because, if
granted, no judgment or decision would have been rendered ineffective.
See Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1). As for the bankruptcy notice, as amended,
the defendant claimed that a bankruptcy stay was in effect because a non-
party named Alfonso Amelio, who had an alleged financial interest in the
premises, had filed for bankruptcy. We deem the bankruptcy filing by a
nonparty, which neither party addresses in connection with the plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss, to be immaterial to the timeliness issue before us.
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application at the time of the remand, we conclude that
treating that fee waiver application as if it had been filed
timely upon remand is appropriate. Indeed, concluding
otherwise would suggest that the defendant was
required to file another fee waiver application within
the five day appeal periods following the remand in
order to activate the provisions of § 63-1 (c) (1), which
would be an unreasonable requirement when, after the
remand, (1) the trial court clerk assigned the fee waiver
application, which was initially denied on September
6, 2024, for a hearing and (2) the trial court, following
the hearing, granted the fee waiver application. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that, following the trial court’s Sep-
tember 25, 2024 grant of the fee waiver application,18
new five day appeal periods arose vis-à-vis the judgment
of possession and the denial of the motion to reargue
pursuant to § 63-1 (c) (1). Excluding the intervening
Sunday, the new appeal periods expired on October
1, 2024.
Finally, we now must address the fact that the defen-
dant arguably filed this appeal on October 2, 2024, one
day following the expiration of the new five day appeal
periods. Again emphasizing the limited and unique cir-
cumstances of the present action, we deem this appeal
to have been timely filed on October 1, 2024.
The record reveals that, on October 1, 2024, the defen-
dant attempted to file a timely appeal, submitting an
appeal form (October 1, 2024 appeal form) accompa-
nied by the fee waiver granted by the trial court in the
present action on September 25, 2024. The fee waiver
18
Notice of the trial court’s September 25, 2024 grant of the fee waiver
application was issued that same day. See Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1) (‘‘[i]f,
within the appeal period, any motion is filed, pursuant to Section 63-6 or
63-7, seeking waiver of fees, costs and security or appointment of counsel,
a new twenty day appeal period or statutory period for filing the appeal
shall begin on the day that notice of the ruling is given on the last such
outstanding motion’’).
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listed the docket number for the present action only,
whereas the October 1, 2024 appeal form listed the
docket numbers for both the present action and the
separate summary process action (separate action)
commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant. See
footnote 2 of this opinion. On October 1, 2024, the
Office of the Appellate Clerk rejected that appeal for
nonpayment of the requisite filing fee19 stemming from
the mismatch between the two docket numbers listed
on the October 1, 2024 appeal form and the single
docket number listed on the fee waiver. See Practice
Book § 60-7 (b) (‘‘At the time of filing, the appellant
must (1) pay all required fees; or (2) upload a signed
application for waiver of fees and the order of the trial
court granting the fee waiver; or (3) certify that no fees
are required. Any document that requires payment of
a fee as a condition of filing may be returned or rejected
for noncompliance with the Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure.’’) In other words, the defendant appeared to be
relying on the fee waiver granted in the present action
only to appeal from (1) the judgment of possession
rendered in the present action, along with the denial
of his motion to reargue, and (2) the judgment of pos-
session rendered in the separate action; however, with-
out a separate fee waiver granted in the separate action,
the defendant could not forgo payment of the filing fee
required in order to appeal from the judgment rendered
in the separate action.20 The next day, the defendant
19
When an appeal is rejected for nonpayment of the requisite filing fee,
an appellate docket number is generated by the electronic filing system but
the Office of the Appellate Clerk will not accept any filings under that docket
number because the appeal is deemed to be disposed.
20
Effective January 1, 2025, our rules of appellate procedure were
amended to clarify that, ‘‘if an appellant is using a fee waiver for a joint
appeal, a granted waiver is required for each trial court docket number
being appealed.’’ Practice Book § 61-7, commentary; see Practice Book § 61-
7 (a) (3) (‘‘In the case of a joint appeal, only one entry fee is required. The
appellant filing the appeal shall pay the entry fee. If using a fee waiver for
a joint appeal, a granted waiver is required for each trial court docket
number being appealed.’’).
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properly filed this appeal, with both the appeal form
(October 2, 2024 appeal form) and the appended fee
waiver listing the docket number for the present
action only.
It is apparent that, on October 1, 2024, the defendant
attempted to file a timely and proper appeal with
respect to the present action as reflected by his October
1, 2024 appeal form, as well as the accompanying fee
waiver, which both listed the docket number for the
present action. We conclude, under the limited and
unique circumstances presented here, that the error in
the October 1, 2024 appeal form—the improper inclu-
sion of two docket numbers—did not mandate rejection
of the appeal for nonpayment of the requisite filing fee;
instead, the appeal should have remained pending and
the October 1, 2024 appeal form should have been
returned as a result of the error. See Pritchard v. Pritch-
ard, 281 Conn. 262, 275, 914 A.2d 1025 (2007) (‘‘[T]he
forms for appeals and amended appeals do not in any
way implicate appellate subject matter jurisdiction.
They are merely the formal, technical vehicles by which
parties seek to invoke that jurisdiction. Compliance
with them need not be perfect; it is the substance that
matters, not the form.’’). Pursuant to Practice Book
(2024) § 62-7 (a),21 if the Office of the Appellate Clerk
returns any papers that are timely but noncompliant
21
Practice Book (2024) § 62-7 (a) provides: ‘‘It is the responsibility of
counsel of record to file papers in a timely manner and in the proper form.
The appellate clerk may return any papers filed in a form not in compliance
with these rules; in returning, the appellate clerk shall indicate how the
papers have failed to comply. The clerk shall note the date on which they
were received before returning them, and shall retain an electronic copy
thereof. Any papers correcting a timely, noncomplying filing shall be deemed
to be timely filed if a complying document is refiled with the appellate clerk
within fifteen days of the official notice date, which is the notice date
indicated on the return form. The official notice date is not the date the
return form is received. Subsequent returns for the same filing will not
initiate a new fifteen day refiling period. The time for responding to any
such paper shall not start to run until a complying paper is filed.’’
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with the rules of appellate procedure, then ‘‘[a]ny
papers correcting [the] timely, noncomplying filing shall
be deemed to be timely filed if a complying document
is refiled . . . within fifteen days . . . .’’ The defen-
dant could then have filed a corrected appeal form
that properly listed only the docket number for the
present action.

On the basis of the record, we deem this appeal to
have been timely filed on October 1, 2024, because (1)
the defendant attempted to file a timely and proper
appeal vis-à-vis the present action on October 1, 2024,
which appeal, notwithstanding an error in the October
1, 2024 appeal form, should have remained pending
rather than been rejected, (2) the October 1, 2024 appeal
form should have been returned on the basis of the
error contained therein, and (3) treating the October 1,
2024 appeal form as if it had been returned, the error
in the October 1, 2024 appeal form was corrected by
the October 2, 2024 appeal form within the time allowed
by Practice Book (2024) § 62-7 (a).22

In sum, we conclude that this appeal is timely pursu-
ant to § 47a-35 (b).

II

We next address the plaintiff’s claim that this appeal
is moot on the basis that the defendant is no longer in
possession of the premises. The defendant argues that
this appeal is not moot because (1) he is claiming on
the merits of this appeal that the trial court improperly
22
We note that, pursuant to Practice Book § 60-2, this court ‘‘may . . .
on its own motion or upon motion of any party . . . (5) order that a party
for good cause shown may file a late appeal . . . unless the court lacks
jurisdiction to allow the late filing . . . .’’ Our decision today does not,
in contravention of § 60-2 (5), permit the late filing of an appeal that is
jurisdictionally late; rather, for the reasons that we delineated, we hold that
this appeal is deemed to have been timely filed on October 1, 2024.
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conducted proceedings while the present action, fol-
lowing removal on August 13, 2024, was pending before
the District Court and (2) possession of the premises
may be restored to him following this court’s adjudica-
tion of the merits. We conclude that this appeal is
not moot.
‘‘Mootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to
resolve. . . . It is a [well settled] general rule that the
existence of an actual controversy is an essential requi-
site to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of
appellate courts to decide moot questions, discon-
nected from the granting of actual relief or from the
determination of which no practical relief can follow.
. . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the
time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pen-
dency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency
of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an
appellate court from granting any practical relief
through its disposition of the merits, a case has become
moot. . . . [A] subject matter jurisdictional defect may
not be waived . . . [or jurisdiction] conferred by the
parties, explicitly or implicitly. . . . [T]he question of
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . .
and, once raised, either by a party or by the court itself,
the question must be answered before the court may
decide the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Brookstone Homes, LLC v. Merco Holdings, LLC, 208
Conn. App. 789, 798–99, 266 A.3d 921 (2021).
‘‘Summary process appeals are particularly suscepti-
ble to becoming moot upon some action taken by the
parties. . . . As a general matter, this court has con-
cluded that an appeal has become moot when, at the
time of the appeal, an appellant no longer is in posses-
sion of the premises. . . . As our Supreme Court has
explained, that general rule does not apply when an
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appellant can demonstrate that the judgment has poten-
tially prejudicial collateral consequences to the defen-
dant. . . . Such collateral consequences include the
impairment of a party’s ability to seek a writ of restora-
tion, which allows a tenant wrongly evicted to be
restored to the premises . . . .

‘‘Almost two centuries ago, this state’s highest court
recognized that a party to a summary process action
that wrongly is dispossessed of leased property is
clearly entitled to a writ restoring him to the possession
thereof, provided that the term of the lease has not yet
expired. . . . As [our] Supreme Court observed, courts
have been in the habit of awarding such writs . . . .
If therefore, the tenant has been [wrongly] dispossessed
of his property, both justice and authority require, that
he be restored.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Bridgeport v. Grace Building, LLC,
181 Conn. App. 280, 295–96, 186 A.3d 754 (2018).

In the present action, per the plaintiff’s representa-
tion, the parties’ lease for the premises does not expire
until December 31, 2027. See footnote 3 of this opinion.
Moreover, according to his preliminary statement of
the issues and his opposition to the plaintiff’s motion
to dismiss, the defendant intends to claim on the merits
of this appeal that he is entitled to restoration to the
premises because the trial court improperly rendered
the judgment of possession, which thereafter led to
the issuance of the summary process execution for
possession, while the present action was pending
before the District Court following removal. If the
defendant is successful on the merits of this appeal,
then ‘‘an avenue of practical relief remains viable under
Connecticut precedent, in the form of a writ of restora-
tion.’’ Bridgeport v. Grace Building, LLC, supra, 181
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Conn. App. 298. Accordingly, we conclude that this
appeal is not moot.
The motion to dismiss is denied.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.