J. R. v. N. K.

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J. R. v. N. K.*
(AC 46564)
Bright, C. J., and Westbrook and Prescott, Js.**

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing his applica-
tion for relief from abuse, which had sought the issuance of a domestic
violence restraining order against the defendant, his former domestic part-
ner. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded
that the defendant was not exercising coercive control and/or stalking the
plaintiff pursuant to statute (§ 46b-1 (b) (2) and (4)). Held:

This court, concluding that the language of § 46b-1 (b) (4) was clear and
unambiguous and that the examples set forth therein did not constitute an
exhaustive or exclusive list, applied a broader definition of the term than
used by the trial court, and determined that the plaintiff failed to establish
a prima facie case that the defendant had, in purpose or effect, unreasonably
interfered with the plaintiff’s free will and personal liberty, as any coercive
control contemplated by § 46b-1 (b) (4) had ended by the time the plaintiff
filed the application for a domestic violence restraining order.

The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish
a prima facie case that the defendant had stalked the plaintiff pursuant to
§ 46b-1 (b) (2), as there was a legitimate purpose for all of the defendant’s
communications to the plaintiff, including emails with attachments of judg-
ment liens and mortgage related documents for a property the parties owned,
and they were not sent with the intent to harass, terrorize or alarm.

This court concluded that the plaintiff’s unpreserved claim that he was
denied his federal and state constitutional right to equal protection when
he was treated differently than similarly situated heterosexual or female
victims was not supported by any evidence of discrimination or bias by the
trial court, as the record was devoid of any evidence that the trial court had
selectively treated the plaintiff for impermissible reasons, and the plaintiff’s
reliance on the outcome of other cases involving different facts did not
suggest otherwise.

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103 § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
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The trial court improperly dismissed this action for failure to diligently
prosecute pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 14-3) because the defendant
should have moved for a judgment of dismissal pursuant to the rule of
practice (§ 15-8), rather than for a directed verdict, the case having been
tried to the court and not to a jury, and, accordingly, this case was remanded
with direction to render a judgment of dismissal pursuant to Practice Book
§ 15-8.
Argued December 9, 2024—officially released May 6, 2025

Procedural History

Application for relief from abuse, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Nor-
walk, where the court, Hon. Michael E. Shay, judge
trial referee, issued a temporary restraining order ex
parte; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Heller,
J.; subsequently, the court, Heller, J., granted the defen-
dant’s motion for a directed verdict, denied the plain-
tiff’s application for relief from abuse and rendered a
judgment of dismissal, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Improper form of judgment;
reversed; judgment directed.
Brody E. Tice, with whom was David V. DeRosa, for
the appellant (plaintiff).
Jennifer Neal Bardavid, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The plaintiff, J. R., appeals from the
trial court’s order dismissing his application for relief
from abuse seeking the issuance of a domestic violence
restraining order against the defendant, N. K. On appeal,
the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1)
concluded that the defendant was not exercising coer-
cive control and/or stalking the plaintiff, (2) denied the
plaintiff his federal and state right to equal protection,
and (3) dismissed the plaintiff’s application for failure
to prosecute with reasonable diligence. We disagree
with the plaintiff as to the first two claims but conclude
that the form of the judgment is improper. We therefore
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remand this case with direction to dismiss the plaintiff’s
application for failure to establish a prima facie case
pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8.
The following undisputed facts, as evidenced by the
record, and procedural history are relevant to our con-
sideration of this appeal. On May 3, 2023, the plaintiff
filed an application for relief from abuse pursuant to
General Statutes § 46b-15, seeking a restraining order
against the defendant. In his affidavit in support of his
request for relief, the plaintiff averred the following
facts. The plaintiff and the defendant entered into a
domestic partnership in 1999. In 2008, the parties jointly
purchased a residential property where they resided
together. The plaintiff eventually became aware that
the defendant was making unauthorized withdrawals
from the plaintiff’s financial accounts, including his
retirement account. The plaintiff also learned of several
lawsuits involving the defendant’s attempts to defraud
others and that one of the defendant’s immediate family
members had a history of serious criminal conduct.
Based on these facts, the plaintiff and the defendant
ended their relationship in May, 2019.
The plaintiff asked the defendant if he would agree
to sell their property, but the defendant repeatedly
refused. The plaintiff thereafter learned that, while they
were still domestic partners, the defendant secretly had
married S, an Iranian immigrant whom the defendant
brought into the United States on a marriage visa.
According to the plaintiff’s affidavit, in June, 2022, the
plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant
to compel the sale of the property.
In December, 2022, the plaintiff learned that, in addi-
tion to making unauthorized withdrawals from the
plaintiff’s accounts, the defendant had engaged in fraud-
ulent transactions using financial accounts that the
defendant had opened in the plaintiff’s name using the
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plaintiff’s personal information. The plaintiff reported
the defendant’s conduct to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other
appropriate law enforcement agencies. On January 20,
2023, shortly after learning that the plaintiff had
reported his criminal conduct, the defendant directed S
to move into the parties’ residence. The plaintiff further
averred that, ‘‘[a]s it was not safe to be in the same
home and outnumbered by individuals who [had] stolen
[his] personal identity and committed crimes against
[him] and others, [he] was immediately forced to move
out and seek emergency housing. [He] was advised not
to disclose that address for personal safety reasons. At
that same time, [he] was also advised to block [the
defendant] from contacting [him] on [his] cell phone.’’
On February 27, 2023, the defendant began sending
emails to the plaintiff’s email address associated with
the corporation where the plaintiff worked. Some of
these emails contained, in the subject line, key words,
such as ‘‘FRAUD’’ and ‘‘FRAUDULENT’’ in boldface
type and capital letters. The plaintiff believed that these
emails were intended to trigger review by his employer’s
compliance department and put his position at risk. On
February 28, 2023, the plaintiff’s attorney sent an email
to the defendant’s attorney stating that the defendant
was not to contact the plaintiff at work or by any other
means. Notwithstanding the email from the plaintiff’s
attorney on February 28, 2023, the plaintiff averred that
the defendant continued to send harassing emails to
the plaintiff’s corporate email address.1
On March 27, 2023, the plaintiff filed a report with the
Westport Police Department. At this time, the plaintiff
spoke with a police officer who told the plaintiff that
he would contact the defendant and direct him to cease
1
These emails, which were admitted into evidence at the hearing on the
plaintiff’s application, were dated March 3, 10, 20, 24, 25 and 27, 2023.
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all contact with the plaintiff immediately. The police
officer also advised the plaintiff to seek a protective
order. Later the same day, the plaintiff received a FedEx
courier package at his office. The plaintiff averred that
the contents of the package ‘‘confirmed [that the defen-
dant] had been stalking [him], as the package contained
a letter from [the defendant] listing the address of the
Norwalk apartment complex where [the plaintiff had]
been hiding.’’2 The defendant continued to send emails
to the plaintiff’s corporate email address on April 7, 10
and 13, 2023. The plaintiff stated in his affidavit that
he was ‘‘fearful [the defendant] [would] escalate his
conduct in order to maintain control over [the plain-
tiff’s] life and finances. [He was] afraid for [his] personal
safety, and of losing [his] job. [He] simply [wished] to
be left alone at [his] workplace, and in his personal life.’’
On May 3, 2023, the court, Hon. Michael E. Shay,
judge trial referee, issued a temporary restraining order
ex parte and scheduled a hearing to take place on May
16, 2023. At the hearing, the plaintiff testified in support
of his application. After the plaintiff rested, the defen-
dant orally moved for a ‘‘directed verdict’’ on the ground
that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case
that he was a victim of domestic violence as defined
in General Statutes § 46b-1 (b). Following argument,
the court, Heller, J. granted the defendant’s motion,
concluding that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the
requirements of § 46b-15, specifically, that the plaintiff
was a victim of domestic violence as defined in § 46b-
1 (b). The court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff had
not established that the defendant had exercised coer-
cive control over the plaintiff, as required by § 46b-1
(b) (4) or stalked the plaintiff as required by § 46b-1
(b) (2). In its oral decision, the court discharged the
temporary restraining order that was entered on an ex
2
This letter, which was dated March 24, 2023, was admitted into evidence
at the hearing on the plaintiff’s application.
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parte basis on May 3, 2023, and denied the plaintiff’s
application for relief from abuse.3 Thereafter, on May
16, 2023, the court rendered a judgment of dismissal,
pursuant to Practice Book § 14-3, for failure to prose-
cute the action with reasonable diligence. This appeal
followed.

Before addressing the plaintiff’s claims on appeal, we
address the standard of review applicable to this matter.
As previously indicated in this opinion, after the plaintiff
rested, the trial court granted the defendant’s oral
motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the
plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case pursuant
to § 46b-15, specifically, that the plaintiff was a victim
of domestic violence as defined in § 46b-1 (b). Because
this case was tried to the court and not a jury, however,
the defendant should have moved for a judgment of
dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8, the rule
applicable to civil matters tried to the court, rather
than for a directed verdict.4 ‘‘[B]ecause the standard
for granting a motion for directed verdict is the same
as the standard for granting a motion for judgment of
dismissal [pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8]’’; Winn v.
Posades, 281 Conn. 50, 54 n.1, 913 A.2d 407 (2007); we
will treat the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict
as a motion for a judgment of dismissal for purposes
of this appeal.
3
The trial court also ordered that the parties not make any efforts to
contact each other, physically or electronically, and that they communicate
with each other through counsel. Although the authority of the court to
order such relief under the circumstances of this case is unclear, this portion
of the court’s order has not been challenged on appeal.
4
Practice Book § 15-8 provides: ‘‘If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a
civil matter tried to the court, the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested,
a defendant may move for judgment of dismissal, and the judicial authority
may grant such motion if the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie
case. The defendant may offer evidence in the event the motion is not
granted, without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent
as if the motion had not been made.’’
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‘‘The standard for determining whether the plaintiff
has made out a prima facie case, under Practice Book
§ 15-8, is whether the plaintiff put forth sufficient evi-
dence that, if believed, would establish a prima facie
case, not whether the trier of fact believes it. . . . For
the court to grant the motion [for judgment of dismissal
pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8], it must be of the
opinion that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima
facie case. In testing the sufficiency of the evidence,
the court compares the evidence with the allegations
of the complaint. . . . In order to establish a prima
facie case, the proponent must submit evidence which,
if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts
which it is adduced to prove. . . . [T]he evidence
offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and inter-
preted in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], and
every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the plain-
tiff’s] favor. . . . Whether the plaintiff has established
a prima facie case is a question of law, over which
our review is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted, emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Charter
Oak Lending Group, LLC v. August, 127 Conn. App.
428, 434–35,14 A.3d 449, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 901,
23 A.3d 1241 (2011).5
I
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court
improperly concluded that the defendant was not exer-
cising coercive control over him, pursuant to § 46b-1
5
Similarly, ‘‘[w]hether the evidence presented by the plaintiff was suffi-
cient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict is a question of law, over
which our review is plenary. . . . Directed verdicts are not favored. . . .
A trial court should direct a verdict only when a jury could not reasonably
and legally have reached any other conclusion. . . . In reviewing the trial
court’s decision to direct a verdict in favor of a defendant we must consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. . . . Although it is
the jury’s right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences
from the facts proven . . . it may not resort to mere conjecture and specula-
tion. . . . A directed verdict is justified if . . . the evidence is so weak
that it would be proper for the court to set aside a verdict rendered for the
other party.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Curran
v. Kroll, 303 Conn. 845, 855–56, 37 A.3d 700 (2012).
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(b) (4), or stalking him, pursuant to § 46b-1 (b) (2).6
Our analysis of this claim requires a review of the trial
court’s decision in light of §§ 46b-15 and 46b-1 (b), the
applicable statutory provisions.
Section 46b-15 (a) provides in relevant part that
‘‘[a]ny family or household member, as defined in sec-
tion 46b-38a,7 who is the victim of domestic violence, as
defined in section 46b-1, by another family or household
member may make an application to the Superior Court
for relief under this section. . . .’’ (Footnote added.)
Section 46b-1 (b) defines ‘‘domestic violence’’ as ‘‘(1)
A continuous threat of present physical pain or physical
injury against a family or household member, as defined
in section 46b-38a; (2) stalking, including, but not lim-
ited to, stalking as defined in section 53a-181d, of such
family or household member; (3) a pattern of threaten-
ing, including, but not limited to, a pattern of threaten-
ing as described in section 53a-62, of such family or
household member or a third party that intimidates such
family or household member; or (4) coercive control
of such family or household member, which is a pattern
of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably inter-
feres with a person’s free will and personal liberty.’’
Section 46b-1 (b) (4) then provides a list of examples
of conduct that are included within the definition of
‘‘coercive control.’’8
6
The plaintiff contends that the trial court’s findings in this regard were
clearly erroneous. Whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case,
however, is a question of law, over which our review is plenary. Charter
Oak Lending Group, LLC v. August, supra, 127 Conn. App. 434–35.
7
Because the plaintiff and the defendant previously had resided together,
the trial court found that they were ‘‘family or household member[s]’’ within
the definition of General Statutes § 46b-38a (2). This finding has not been
challenged on appeal.
8
General Statutes § 46b-1 (b) (4) provides in relevant part that ‘‘ ‘Coercive
control’ includes, but is not limited to, unreasonably engaging in any of
the following:
‘‘(A) Isolating the family or household member from friends, relatives or
other sources of support;
‘‘(B) Depriving the family or household member of basic necessities;
‘‘(C) Controlling, regulating or monitoring the family or household mem-
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A
Coercive Control
We first consider whether the trial court improperly
concluded that the defendant had not exercised coer-
cive control over the plaintiff pursuant to § 46b-1 (b)
(4). As to this claim, the plaintiff first contends that the
trial court improperly limited the definition of ‘‘coercive
control’’ in § 46b-1 (b) (4) to the examples set forth in
the statute without applying the complete definition of
that term specified in the same statute. Applying the
broader definition of ‘‘coercive control,’’ the plaintiff
contends that the evidence demonstrated ‘‘a pattern of
behavior [by the defendant] that in purpose or effect
unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and
personal liberty,’’ and, thus, established ‘‘coercive con-
trol’’ pursuant to § 46b-1 (b). The resolution of the plain-
tiff’s claim requires that we first consider, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, whether the court improperly
limited its consideration of ‘‘coercive control’’ to the
examples set forth in § 46b-1 (b) (4).
‘‘To the extent that the [plaintiff’s] claims raise issues
of statutory interpretation, we note that [i]ssues of stat-
utory construction raise questions of law, over which
we exercise plenary review. . . . When construing a
statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and
give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . .
In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned
ber’s movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic
resources or access to services;
‘‘(D) Compelling the family or household member by force, threat or
intimidation, including, but not limited to, threats based on actual or sus-
pected immigration status, to (i) to engage in conduct from which such
family or household member has a right to abstain, or (ii) abstain from
conduct that such family or household member has a right to pursue;
‘‘(E) Committing or threatening to commit cruelty to animals that intimi-
dates the family or household member; or
‘‘(F) Forced sex acts, or threats of a sexual nature, including but not
limited to, threatened acts of sexual conduct, threats based on a person’s
sexuality or threats to release sexual images.’’
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manner, the meaning of the statutory language as
applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question
of whether the language actually does apply. . . . Gen-
eral Statutes § 1-2z directs this court to first consider
the text of the statute and its relationship to other
statutes to determine its meaning. If, after such consid-
eration, the meaning is plain and unambiguous and does
not yield absurd or unworkable results, we shall not
consider extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute. . . . Only if we determine that the statute is not
plain and unambiguous or yields absurd or unworkable
results may we consider extratextual evidence of its
meaning such as the legislative history and circum-
stances surrounding its enactment . . . the legislative
policy it was designed to implement . . . its relation-
ship to existing legislation and common law principles
governing the same general subject matter . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) L. L. v. M. B., 216
Conn. App. 731, 739–40, 286 A.3d 489 (2022).
As previously set forth in this opinion, § 46b-1 (b) (4)
defines ‘‘coercive control’’ as ‘‘a pattern of behavior
that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with
a person’s free will and personal liberty. ‘Coercive con-
trol’ includes, but is not limited to, unreasonably engag-
ing’’ in any of the examples set forth in subparagraphs
(A) though (F) of the statute. See footnote 8 of this
opinion. In its decision, the trial court considered only
the examples set forth in the statute and concluded
that the plaintiff had not established coercive control;
however, the court did not consider the broader defini-
tion of the term, namely, whether the defendant had
‘‘in purpose or effect unreasonably interfere[d] with
[the plaintiff’s] free will and personal liberty.’’9 We note,
9
Specifically, the court stated:
‘‘As far as coercive control, that is a new element of the statute as counsel
knows. And coercive control is defined in § 46b-1, and we are starting in
[sub]section (B) and then going through sub[paragraphs] (A) through (F),
the statute says coercive control includes but is not limited to unreasonably
engaging in any of the following:
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however, that ‘‘the phrase [including but not limited to
in § 46b-1 (b) (4)] convey[s] a clear intention that the
items listed in the definition do not constitute an
exhaustive or exclusive list.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Lusa v. Grunberg, 101 Conn. App. 739, 756,
923 A.2d 795 (2007); see also Casey v. Lamont, 338
‘‘(A), isolating the family or household member from friends, relatives,
or other sources of support. Now [the plaintiff] testified that he had no
family here, so by reason of the fact he is living in the United States, and
he testified that he’s originally from Peru, he has no family members here.
‘‘But there is no evidence that [the defendant] isolated [the plaintiff] from
his friends, relatives, or sources of support.
‘‘(B) is depriving family or a household member of basic necessities. There
is no evidence of that.
‘‘(C), controlling, regulating, and monitoring the family or household mem-
ber’s movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic
resources, or access to services.
‘‘[The plaintiff] testified that he was the victim of identity theft, that [the
defendant] had opened an account in his name under his Social Security
number that he was not aware of, but that does not fall within the statutory
definition of coercive control.
‘‘It may well raise a whole host of other issues, but it doesn’t satisfy the
definition of coercive control and does not demonstrate that [the defendant]
was controlling, regulating, and monitoring [the plaintiff’s] movements, com-
munications, daily behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to ser-
vices.
‘‘Sub[paragraph] (D) states that coercive control can be compelling the
family or household member by force, threat or intimidation, including but
not limited to threats based on actual or suspected immigration status, to,
one, engage in conduct from which such family or household member has
a right to abstain or, two, abstain from conduct that such family or household
member has a right to pursue.
‘‘There is no evidence that sub[paragraph] (D) of the statutory definition
has been satisfied.
‘‘Sub[paragraph] [E] indicates that coercive control may mean committing
or threatening to commit cruelty to animals that intimidates a family or
household member.
‘‘There was no evidence of any acts or threats to commit cruelty to animals.
‘‘And the last sub[paragraph], (F), forced sex acts or threats of a sexual
nature, including but not limited to threatened acts of sexual conduct, threats
based on a person’s sexuality, or threats to release sexual images.
‘‘Again, there was no evidence of any forced sexual acts or threatened
acts of sexual conduct, threats based on a person’s sexuality or threats to
release sexual images here.
‘‘So, the definition of coercive control has . . . not been satisfied.’’
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Conn. 479, 491, 258 A.3d 647 (2021) (concluding, in
context of COVID-19 executive orders, that statutory
list preceded by phrase ‘‘including but not limited to’’
evinces legislative intent not to limit scope of statute
to events enumerated in statute).
Consequently, we conclude that the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous in that the plaintiff
did not need to prove that the defendant’s conduct
met one of the examples set forth in § 46b-1 (b) (4) to
establish coercive control. Instead, he needed to prove
only that the defendant’s conduct constituted ‘‘a pattern
of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably inter-
fere[d] with [the plaintiff’s] free will and personal lib-
erty.’’ General Statutes § 46b-1 (b) (4).
Because our review of a court’s dismissal under Prac-
tice Book § 15-8 is plenary, we next consider whether,
applying the more expansive definition of coercive con-
trol, the plaintiff had established a prima facie case that
the defendant engaged in conduct violative of § 46b-1
(b) (4). Specifically, considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and drawing every
reasonable inference in the plaintiff’s favor, we consider
whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case that
the defendant had ‘‘in purpose or effect unreasonably
interfere[d] with [the plaintiff’s] free will and personal
liberty.’’ Applying this definition, we conclude that the
plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of coercive
control as set forth in § 46b-1 (b) (4).
The following additional facts are necessary for the
resolution of this claim. At the hearing on the applica-
tion, the plaintiff expanded on the claims made in his
application and supporting affidavit. Specifically, he tes-
tified about the money that the defendant took out of
the plaintiff’s bank accounts and the accounts that the
defendant opened in the plaintiff’s name. He testified
that he had limited ability to invite others to the parties’
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residence because the defendant was not comfortable
receiving guests in the home. He testified that he contin-
ued living in the parties’ residence with the defendant
after the parties’ domestic partnership ended in 2019
‘‘because . . . that was [his] home’’ and he ‘‘couldn’t
go anywhere.’’10
The plaintiff also testified in more detail regarding
the emails, attachments thereto, and the FedEx package
mentioned in his affidavit filed in support of his ex parte
application. Specifically, the plaintiff testified that, on
February 27, 2023, the defendant sent him an email at
work, the subject of which was ‘‘FRAUDULENT 1099
NEC.’’ Attached to the email was an IRS Form 1099-
NEC (Form 1099-NEC) which reported that the plaintiff
had paid the defendant nonemployee compensation
during calendar year 2022 in the amount of $85,994.58.
On March 3, 2023, after the plaintiff’s attorney told the
defendant’s attorney that the defendant was not to con-
tact the plaintiff at his workplace, the defendant sent
a second email to the plaintiff’s workplace regarding
the Form 1099-NEC. On March 10, 2023, the defendant
sent a third email regarding the same subject to the
plaintiff’s work email. On March 27, 2023, the plaintiff
received the FedEx package at work, which contained
the same correspondence as was in the earlier emails
regarding ‘‘FRAUDULENT 1099 NEC.’’
In the emails and the correspondence in the FedEx
package regarding this form, the defendant repeatedly
asked the plaintiff to ‘‘provide a detailed summary for
services rendered regarding the Form 1099 NEC issued
to [the defendant] by [the plaintiff] in the amount of
$85,994.58.’’ The plaintiff testified that he issued the
10
The plaintiff contends that this ‘‘forced cohabitation’’ was the result of
the defendant’s refusal to sell the property. The plaintiff’s affidavit in support
of his application for a domestic relations restraining order, however, indi-
cates that he commenced an action to force a sale of the property in
June, 2022.
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Form 1099-NEC to the defendant upon advice from an
accountant and in response to the claimed fraudulent
activity of the defendant involving the plaintiff’s finan-
cial accounts. The plaintiff further testified, however,
that he did not inform the defendant that he was going
to issue the Form 1099-NEC to him. Nor was there
any evidence that the plaintiff ever responded to the
defendant’s requests for information regarding the
form.

The plaintiff also testified about emails the defendant
sent to him at work regarding the parties’ jointly owned
residence that the plaintiff left at the end of January,
2023. He testified that, on March 20, 24, 25 and 27, 2023,
and on April 7, 10 and 13, 2023, the defendant sent
emails to the plaintiff at work regarding judgment liens
that had been placed on the residence and the fact
that the mortgage on the residence had not been paid.
Attached to these emails were copies of the liens and
correspondence from the mortgage lender. The plaintiff
testified that he did not respond to any of the emails
about the mortgage and judgment liens with a request
that the defendant communicate with him using a differ-
ent email address. The plaintiff testified that he had
been paying the mortgage on the residence until Decem-
ber, 2022, one month prior to moving out. The plaintiff
testified that he continued to receive rental income
from the property after he moved out at the end of
January, 2023. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff
acknowledged that the defendant would want him to
continue to pay the mortgage. He testified, however,
that he could not afford to do so as he had to pay rent
on his new residence.

The plaintiff contends that the evidence he provided,
viewed in the light most favorable to him, meets the
statutory definition of coercive control. In making this
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argument, he relies on comments made by various legis-
lators when § 46b-1 was amended in 2021.11 Specifically,
the plaintiff relies, in part, on the comment of Senator
Kasser that, ‘‘as dangerous as it is to be in an abusive
relationship, [it is] even more dangerous to leave’’; 64
S. Proc., Pt. 3, 2021 Sess., p. 2087, remarks of Senator
Alexandra Kasser; and the comment of Senator Kelly
that the legislation ‘‘[gives] victims the tools they need
to protect themselves, to stand up for themselves, and
to get out of bad situations.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., p.
2136, remarks of Senator Kevin C. Kelly. In the present
case, however, the relationship between the parties had
already ended and the plaintiff had moved out of the
parties’ residence when he filed the application for a
domestic violence restraining order. Specifically, the
plaintiff testified that he had moved out of the parties’
residence in January, 2023. The application for a domes-
tic violence restraining order was filed on May 3, 2023.
Furthermore, the emails that the defendant sent to the
plaintiff’s corporate email address commenced on Feb-
ruary 27, 2023, after the plaintiff had vacated the parties’
residence.
Under these circumstances, even if the defendant’s
actions while the parties were living together consti-
tuted ‘‘coercive control’’ within the meaning of § 46b-
1 (b) (4), any coercive control contemplated by the
11
In 2021, § 46b-1 (b) was amended to include the definition of ‘‘domestic
violence.’’ Public Acts 2021, No. 21-78, § 1. During the discussion regarding
the proposed legislation, Representative Stafstrom pointed out that the legis-
lation expanded the definition of domestic violence to include coercive
control, which he described as ‘‘a pattern of threatening, humiliating, intim-
idating, or exploiting actions used to harm, punish, or frighten a person and
deprive them of their freedom, autonomy, and basic human rights.’’ 64
H.R. Proc., Pt. 14, 2021 Sess., p. 9756, remarks of Representative Steven J.
Stafstrom. Senator Kelly similarly remarked that domestic violence is ‘‘about
power and control that goes beyond a single act of violence’’ and ‘‘includes
emotional and psychological abuse, intimidation, and isolation.’’ 64 S. Proc.,
Pt. 3, 2021 Sess., p. 2135, remarks of Senator Kevin C. Kelly. Senator Kasser,
speaking about the ‘‘public health crisis’’ of domestic violence, stated that
‘‘[ninety percent] of domestic abuse is not violent. It’s psychological, finan-
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statute had ended by the time the plaintiff filed the
application for a domestic violence restraining order.
Put another way, the plaintiff had managed to leave the
bad situation in which he was living months before he
filed his application. Although it is true that the parties
were still in dispute over financial issues that arose
during their relationship and after it ended, the evidence
presented in support of those issues does not demon-
strate that the defendant exercised coercive control of
the plaintiff as defined by the statute. To the contrary,
the undisputed evidence is that the defendant’s commu-
nications that are the basis for the plaintiff’s application
were sent in response to decisions made and actions
taken by the plaintiff that negatively impacted the defen-
dant’s finances. Although the plaintiff may have had
every right to undertake such actions, the defendant’s
requests for information regarding the plaintiff’s actions
do not constitute coercive control under § 46b-1 (b)
(4).12 Considering the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff, and drawing every reasonable infer-
ence in the plaintiff’s favor; Charter Oak Lending
Group, LLC v. August, supra, 127 Conn. App. 434–35;
we conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima
facie case that the defendant had ‘‘in purpose or effect
unreasonably interfere[d] with [the plaintiff’s] free will
and personal liberty’’ as required by § 46b-1 (b) (4).
B
Stalking
We next consider whether the trial court improperly
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish a
prima facie case that the defendant had stalked the
cial, sexual, and legal, because those methods are even more effective at
controlling a person and diminishing [his or] her agency and ability to leave.’’
Id., pp. 2086–2088, remarks of Senator Alexandra Kasser.
12
In reaching this conclusion, we in no way suggest any view as to the
plaintiff’s allegations of the defendant’s actions regarding the defendant’s
manipulation of the plaintiff’s finances.
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plaintiff pursuant to § 46b-1 (b) (2). As to this claim,
the plaintiff contends that the emails the defendant sent
to the plaintiff’s corporate email address and the FedEx
package that was delivered to the plaintiff’s place of
business establish that the defendant had stalked the
plaintiff as contemplated by § 46b-1 (b) (2). We are not
persuaded.
Section 46b-1 (b) (2) provides that domestic violence
means ‘‘stalking, including, but not limited to, stalking
as described in section 53a-181d, of such family or
household member . . . .’’ In its oral decision, the
court focused on § 53a-181d (b) (2), which provides
that ‘‘[a] person is guilty of stalking in the second degree
when . . . [s]uch person with intent to harass, terror-
ize or alarm, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in
a course of conduct directed at or concerning a specific
person that would cause a reasonable person to fear
that such person’s employment, business or career is
threatened, where (A) such conduct consists of the
actor telephoning to, appearing at or initiating commu-
nication or contact to such other person’s place of
employment or business, including electronically,
through video-teleconferencing or by digital media, pro-
vided the actor was previously and clearly informed to
cease such conduct, and (B) such conduct does not
consist of constitutionally protected activity . . . .’’
As to this subparagraph, the plaintiff’s claim focuses
on the emails that the defendant sent to the plaintiff’s
corporate email address after being told by the plain-
tiff’s attorney that all such communications should be
directed to that attorney. As set forth earlier in this
opinion, these emails contained attachments including
a Form 1099-NEC that the plaintiff had issued to the
defendant as well as copies of judgment liens, mortgage
statements, and overdue notices pertaining to the par-
ties’ property. The plaintiff further argues that the
FedEx package that the defendant sent to the plaintiff’s
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place of business that contained the plaintiff’s new
home address proved that the defendant was stalking
him as defined in the statute. In particular, the plaintiff
testified that he was concerned that these emails and
the package sent to his office would have an impact
on his job and that the package evidenced that the
defendant had managed to discover the plaintiff’s new
home address, which he had taken steps to prevent the
defendant from learning.13
As previously stated in this opinion, the plaintiff
acknowledged that he did not respond to any of the
defendant’s emails with a request that the defendant
send communications to the plaintiff using a different
email address. He testified that he had stopped paying
the mortgage on the property as he could not afford it
once he moved out because he had to pay rent. He also
testified that he had not informed the defendant that
he was going to issue a Form 1099-NEC to him.
In its oral decision, the trial court found that the
defendant contacted the plaintiff at his place of employ-
ment after being told not to do so and noted the plain-
tiff’s testimony that this caused the plaintiff to fear for
his employment. The court concluded, however, that
the plaintiff had not sustained his burden of establishing
that the defendant did so with the intent to harass,
terrorize or alarm, and for no legitimate purpose. Specif-
ically, the court found that the emails contained attach-
ments such as judgment liens or communications from
a mortgage company relating to the home the parties
13
As part of this claim, the plaintiff contends that these communications
must be evaluated on the basis of the context and surrounding circumstances
between the parties and that ‘‘an order of protection is routinely appropriate
where a defendant fails to refute or offer any explanation for their actions.’’
To the extent the plaintiff’s argument challenges the defendant’s failure to
offer an explanation for his actions, we note that the plaintiff did not call
the defendant to testify as a witness during his case-in-chief and the trial
court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to make out a
prima facie case, thus alleviating the defendant’s need to testify.
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jointly owned, and that nothing in the attached docu-
ments was threatening. The court further noted that,
because the plaintiff had an ownership interest in the
property and had been paying the mortgage, the defen-
dant had a legitimate purpose for forwarding the docu-
ments to the plaintiff. The court noted that the commu-
nications ‘‘related to the property for which [the
plaintiff] was paying the mortgage and they [related]
to a 1099 that was apparently issued.’’14
On the basis of our review of the testimony and exhib-
its in this case, we agree with the trial court that the
emails and attached documents were not sent to the
14
As to this section of the statute, the trial court’s oral decision provides:
‘‘[N]otice was provided, as [the plaintiff] testified, to [the defendant] to not
contact him and the contact did consist of [the defendant] contacting [the
plaintiff] at his place of employment.
‘‘And [the plaintiff] testified that he felt that the nature of the emails and
the material that was sent did cause him to fear that his employment was
threatened.
‘‘But when we go to the very first clause that says such person with intent
to harass, terrorize or alarm and for no legitimate purpose engages in a
course of conduct, it’s at that point where I think [the plaintiff] has not
sustained his burden of proof.
‘‘I have reviewed the emails as they were introduced into evidence. Most
of them are emails transmitting documents.
‘‘The attachments are communications from third parties that consist
either of judgment liens that have been placed on the land records of
the city of Stamford, liens against the title of the real property . . . or
communications from the mortgage company.
‘‘Nothing in those documents that are attached are in the nature of threat-
ening documents. You know, certainly somebody would [not] be happy or
[would be] alarmed or distressed to learn that their property is in foreclosure
or that there are mortgage liens or judgment liens against the property, but
transmitting those documents, given the fact that [the] . . . documents are
not fabrications, they are—you know, appear to be as they are on their face
communications from the mortgage company and certificates of judg-
ment liens.
‘‘There is nothing intrinsically harassing, terrorizing or alarming about
those documents. And in transmittal emails sending those to [the plaintiff],
I do not consider [rising] to the level of being sent with an intent to harass,
terrorize or alarm.
‘‘In fact . . . [the plaintiff] has an ownership interest in the property and
was paying the mortgage, so these are documents that most definitely if
[the plaintiff] has not received them, would be—it would be appropriate
for [the defendant] to forward them to him.’’
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plaintiff with the intent to harass, terrorize or alarm, and
for no legitimate purpose. The emails that transmitted
judgment liens or other mortgage related documents
from third parties to the plaintiff contained no text from
the defendant to the plaintiff. As to the emails labeled
‘‘FRAUDULENT 1099 NEC,’’ the plaintiff admitted that
he did not inform the defendant that he was going to
issue a Form 1099-NEC to him. It is not surprising that
the defendant would want an explanation regarding the
nonemployee compensation stated on that form in the
amount of $85,994.58. The FedEx package that was sent
to the plaintiff at work indicated that it was the ‘‘Final
Request’’ as to the Form 1099-NEC. The plaintiff
acknowledged that he had not responded to any of the
prior emails with a request that the defendant direct
the emails to a different email address. Thus, there was
a legitimate purpose for all of the defendant’s communi-
cations. Considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and drawing every reasonable
inference in the plaintiff’s favor; Charter Oak Lending
Group, LLC v. August, supra, 127 Conn. App. 424–35;
the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff had
failed to establish a prima facie case that the defendant
had stalked the plaintiff pursuant to § 46b-1 (b) (2).15
15
The court also concluded that the plaintiff had not established a prima
facie case of stalking pursuant to § 53a-181d (b) (1), which provides that
‘‘[a] person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when . . . [s]uch
person knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at or concerning
a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to (A) fear for such
person’s physical safety or the physical safety of a third person; (B) suffer
emotional distress; or (C) fear injury to or the death of an animal owned
by or in possession and control of such specific person . . . .’’ General
Statutes § 53a-181d (b) (1). The plaintiff provides only a cursory analysis
regarding the application of this subdivision of the statute to the facts of
this case, simply indicating that he testified regarding subparagraphs (A)
and (B). In light of our conclusion that there was a legitimate purpose for
the defendant’s communications, which consisted primarily of emails and
attachments related to the property for which the plaintiff had been paying
the mortgage and a Form 1099-NEC that the plaintiff had issued to the
defendant, we similarly agree with the trial court that the plaintiff had not
established a prima facie case of stalking pursuant to § 53a-181d (b) (1).
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II
The plaintiff next claims that he was denied his fed-
eral and state constitutional right to equal protection
when he was treated differently than similarly situated
heterosexual or female victims. According to the plain-
tiff, case law establishes that heterosexual or female
victims fleeing an aggressor under far less egregious
facts have regularly been granted an order of protection.
The plaintiff cites Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture,
L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection,
253 Conn. 661, 757 A.2d 1 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1148, 121 S. Ct. 1089, 148 L. Ed. 2d 963 (2001), for the
proposition that ‘‘[a] violation of equal protection by
selective [treatment] arises if: (1) the person, compared
with others similarly situated, was selectively treated;
and . . . (2) such selective treatment was based on
impermissible considerations such as race, religion,
intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional
rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injury a per-
son.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 671.
In response, the defendant contends that the plaintiff
did not raise this claim before the trial court and his
claim does not survive review pursuant to State v. Gold-
ing, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as
modified by In re Yasiel, 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d
1188 (2015),16 because, ‘‘[i]n the instant case, there is
The court further noted that § 53a-181d (b) (3), which involves the disclo-
sure of an individual’s personal identifying information without consent,
was not at issue in this case.
16
Pursuant to Golding, ‘‘a [party] can prevail on a claim of constitutional
error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim
is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right;
(3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the
[party] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the
state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.’’
(Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn.
239–40; see In re Yasiel, supra, 317 Conn. 781 (modifying third prong of
Golding). ‘‘The first two Golding requirements involve whether the claim
is reviewable, and the second two involve whether there was constitutional
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no evidence of a lack of equal protection or bias on
the part of the court or that the plaintiff was denied a
fair trial. Additionally, the cases [the plaintiff] cites are
not analogous to the instant case and therefore offer
no support for the plaintiff’s claims of a lack of equal
protection thus [the plaintiff’s] claim should fail.’’
Essentially, the defendant argues that the plaintiff can-
not satisfy Golding’s third prong of establishing the
existence of the alleged constitutional violation. We
agree.17
The crux of the plaintiff’s equal protection claim is
that the plaintiff, who is an immigrant, a minority, and
a member of the LGBTQ community, is a member of a
quasi-suspect class and was selectively treated based on
impermissible considerations. Specifically, the plaintiff
contends that no similarly situated heterosexual person
would have been denied an order of protection had
they presented the same uncontested testimony and
evidence. The plaintiff states that he is ‘‘unaware of any
case where any female or heterosexual applicant has
been denied a protective order based on such a trou-
bling or egregious [claim], particularly where no con-
trary explanation was even offered by a defendant.’’18
The plaintiff relies on cases in which orders of protec-
tion were granted to heterosexual female complainants
error requiring a new trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Na-
Ki J., 222 Conn. App. 1, 7, 303 A.3d 1206, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 929, 304
A.3d 860 (2023). ‘‘Golding is applicable in civil cases as well as criminal
cases.’’ Hammer v. Posta, 170 Conn. App. 701, 707 n.6, 155 A.3d 801 (2017).
17
‘‘We are free to respond to the [plaintiff’s] claim by focusing on which-
ever Golding prong is most relevant, as the inability to meet any one prong
requires a determination that the [plaintiff’s] claim must fail.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, 226
Conn. App. 617, 634, 319 A.3d 242, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 912, 324 A.3d
143 (2024).
18
As set forth earlier in this opinion, the plaintiff did not call the defendant
to testify as a witness during his case-in-chief and, after the plaintiff rested,
the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict for
failure to make out a prima facie case.
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as support for his claim that he was denied equal protec-
tion; these cases, however, are readily distinguishable
from the present case. For example, we do not agree
with the plaintiff that the fact pattern in Tala E. H. v.
Syed I., 183 Conn. App. 224, 192 A.3d 494 (2018), cert.
denied, 330 Conn. 959, 199 A.3d 19 (2019), ‘‘closely
parallels the instant appeal.’’ In Tala E. H., this court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court extending an
order of protection against the defendant for six
months, noting that the defendant ‘‘acknowledged that
he ‘badgered’ the plaintiff with text messages and that
he was controlling. He admitted that he went to her
workplace and gave her a handwritten message, tracked
her when she was operating his motor vehicle, used
surveillance cameras to observe her comings and
goings, and visited her friends and family to ascertain
information about her.’’19 Id., 242. Similarly, in Kath-
rynne S. v. Swetz, 191 Conn. App. 850, 852–53, 216 A.3d
858 (2019), this court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court granting the plaintiff’s application for relief from
abuse and issuing a domestic violence restraining order
where the plaintiff averred ‘‘that the defendant
screamed in her left ear, verbally attacked her so force-
fully that she would be covered in his spit, followed
her throughout the house, opened windows on cold
days, used derogatory language directed at her, threat-
ened to sabotage her car, and barged into her room to
take photographs of her in her nightwear, and that the
defendant had been arrested for assaulting her in 2015.’’
In sum, the facts in the cases cited by the defendant
are in no way similar to the facts in the present case,
which involved written communications from the
defendant that either forwarded information to the
19
The defendant in Tala E. H. v. Syed I., supra, 183 Conn. 232, claimed,
inter alia, that the manner in which the court conducted the hearing on the
continuance of the protective order constituted judicial misconduct and
bias. This court reviewed the claim under the plain error doctrine, but found
no evidence of bias, misconduct or impartiality in the record. Id., 233.
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plaintiff about the property they jointly owned or asked
the plaintiff to explain the basis for the Form 1099-NEC
he had issued to the defendant. The evidence in the
present case reflects none of the threatening or control-
ling behavior at issue in the cases on which the plaintiff
relies. Consequently, the fact that the plaintiff did not
prevail in the present case, while the applicants pre-
vailed in those cases, in no way reflects that he was
denied his right to equal protection.20
Moreover, the plaintiff has presented no basis for us
to conclude that the trial court treated him differently
than any other applicant for a domestic violence
restraining order and, therefore, denied him equal pro-
tection. His appellate briefs cite no evidence of discrimi-
nation or bias by the trial court, and our independent
review of the transcript of the hearing on the plaintiff’s
application does not reveal even a scintilla of evidence
of discrimination or bias. During oral argument before
this court, the plaintiff was unable to point to a single
statement in the record supporting his contention that
he had been denied his federal and state right to equal
protection.
Instead, the plaintiff’s argument is that, because it is
so clear that his application should have been granted,
the only conceivable reason for its denial is the illegal
bias of the trial court. We have regularly rejected similar
claims of bias, noting that dissatisfaction with the out-
come of a proceeding is insufficient to support a claim
20
The defendant also cites K. D. v. D. D., 214 Conn. App. 821, 282 A.3d
528 (2022), as another example in which an order of protection was found
to be appropriate. In that case, however, this court reversed the judgment
of the trial court granting the plaintiff’s application for a civil restraining
order because the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard when
it determined that the defendant had subjected the plaintiff to a pattern of
threatening. Id., 823. Specifically, the trial court in that case erred in failing
to apply an objective standard to its determination when it issued a civil
restraining order based on the ‘‘pattern of threatening’’ provision in § 46b-
15. Id., 826–27.
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of judicial bias. See, e.g., Schimenti v. Schimenti, 181
Conn. App. 385, 395, 186 A.3d 739 (2018) (‘‘[i]n assessing
a claim of judicial bias, we are mindful that adverse
rulings, alone, provide an insufficient basis for finding
bias even when those rulings may be erroneous’’) Sim-
ply put, the record is devoid of any evidence that the
trial court had selectively treated the plaintiff for imper-
missible reasons, and the outcome of other cases involv-
ing different facts does not suggest otherwise. Under
these circumstances, the plaintiff has not established
that a constitutional violation existed.

III
The plaintiff’s final claim is that the trial court improp-
erly dismissed this case for failure to diligently prose-
cute pursuant to Practice Book § 14-3. We agree with
the plaintiff that the form of the judgment is improper.
As stated earlier in this opinion, the trial court, in its
decision, granted the defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy
the requirements of § 46b-15. The court thereafter dis-
charged the temporary restraining order that was
entered on an ex parte basis on May 3, 2023, and denied
the plaintiff’s application for relief from abuse. On May
16, 2023, the court rendered a judgment of dismissal,
pursuant to Practice Book § 14-3, for failure to prose-
cute the action with reasonable diligence. As previously
set forth in this opinion, however, because this case
was tried to the court and not a jury, the defendant
should have moved for a judgment of dismissal pursuant
to Practice Book § 15-8, the rule applicable to civil mat-
ters tried to the court. In part I of this opinion, we
treated the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict
as a motion for a judgment of dismissal pursuant to
Practice Book § 15-8 and concluded that the plaintiff
had failed to establish a prima facie case that he was
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a victim of domestic violence as defined in § 46b-1 (b).
The judgment, therefore, should reflect that the trial
court properly dismissed this case pursuant to Practice
Book § 15-8 and not that the case was dismissed pursu-
ant to Practice Book § 14-3 for failure to prosecute with
reasonable diligence.
The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment
is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to
render judgment of dismissal pursuant to Practice Book
§ 15-8.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.