K. S. v. C. S.

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2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
K. S. v. C. S.

K. S. v. C. S.*
(AC 47229)
Alvord, Elgo and Cradle, Js.**

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment dissolving her marriage
to the defendant and granting the defendant’s motion for contempt. She
claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly entered an order into the
judgment of dissolution prohibiting contact between the parties’ minor child
and the plaintiff’s boyfriend, A. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering, as part of its custody
and visitation orders, that the plaintiff shall not allow the child to have
contact with A, as the court weighed the evidence before it in finding that
contact with A was not in the child’s best interests.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the defendant final
decision-making authority with respect to medical and educational issues
for the parties’ child.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the plaintiff in contempt
of its order prohibiting contact between the parties’ child and A, as the
court found that the plaintiff was aware of the order and had wilfully violated
it, its finding having been supported by the unrebutted documentary evidence
that A was living at the marital residence with the plaintiff and the child.

The trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to the
defendant in connection with the defendant’s motions for contempt, as
portions of those fees were for counsel’s time spent on other motions and
proceedings, and, accordingly, the awards were vacated and the matter was
remanded for further proceedings.

The trial court’s factual findings underlying its child support and marital
property division orders were clearly erroneous, and, because those orders
were not severable from its alimony orders, the case was remanded to the
trial court to refashion all of its financial orders.
Argued February 3—officially released April 22, 2025

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
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K. S. v. C. S.

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Danbury and tried to the court, Figueroa Laskos,
J.; judgment dissolving the marriage, granting certain
other relief, and finding the plaintiff in contempt, from
which the plaintiff appealed to this court; thereafter,
the trial court, Figueroa Laskos, J., entered certain
interim orders regarding the plaintiff’s visitation with
the minor child, and the plaintiff filed an amended
appeal with this court. Reversed in part; further pro-
ceedings.

Alexander J. Cuda, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Opinion

ALVORD, J. The plaintiff, K. S., appeals from the
judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the
defendant, C. S.,1 which included a finding of contempt
against the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that
the court improperly (1) entered an order in the judg-
ment of dissolution prohibiting contact between the
parties’ minor child and the plaintiff’s boyfriend, A, (2)
awarded the defendant final decision-making authority
with respect to the child’s medical and educational
issues, (3) granted the defendant’s motion for contempt
alleging violations of the court’s interim order prohib-
iting contact between the child and A, (4) ordered the
plaintiff to pay attorney’s fees in connection with the
defendant’s motions for contempt, (5) entered orders
regarding child support, specifically challenging its fac-
tual findings as to the parties’ incomes, and (6) entered
1
On November 8, 2024, the defendant filed a notice of intent not to file
a brief. Accordingly, we consider this appeal on the basis of the plaintiff’s
brief and the record, as defined by Practice Book § 60-4, and oral argument
by the plaintiff.
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orders regarding the division of marital property, specif-
ically challenging its factual finding regarding the equity
in the marital home.2
We disagree with the plaintiff’s first and second
claims. With respect to the third and fourth claims,
we conclude that, although the court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the plaintiff in contempt of its
no contact interim order, its awards of attorney’s fees
constituted an abuse of its discretion. Accordingly, we
remand the case for reconsideration of the attorney’s
fees awards. Finally, we agree with the plaintiff’s fifth
and sixth claims and conclude that the court made
clearly erroneous factual findings underlying its child
support and division of marital property orders.
Because these orders are not severable from the other
financial orders, we reverse the judgment of the trial
court with respect to the financial orders and remand
this case for a new trial on all financial issues.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history in this dissolution action that was
highly contentious on the issues of custody and parent-
ing arrangements. The parties were married on Novem-
ber 16, 2013, in Florida, and are the parents of one
minor child, who was born in 2018. The plaintiff initiated
the underlying dissolution proceeding in February,
2022.
On February 23, 2022, the plaintiff filed an application
for a temporary restraining order against the defendant,
which the court, Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial
referee, granted ex parte. The plaintiff had alleged that
the defendant was not taking his prescribed medica-
tions appropriately, was staying awake all night, and
that she believed he was ‘‘in the midst of an extended
manic episode.’’ On March 1, 2022, the parties entered
2
For ease of analysis, we address the plaintiff’s claims in a different order
than they are set forth in her brief.
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K. S. v. C. S.

into a stipulation that the temporary restraining order,
pursuant to which the defendant would surrender or
transfer all firearms and ammunition and would not
assault, threaten, abuse, harass, follow, interfere with
or stalk the plaintiff, would remain in effect until the
earliest to occur of a subsequent written agreement of
the parties, further order of the court, or sixty days
from the date of the agreement, without prejudice to
either party seeking a modification of the temporary
restraining order.
In March, 2022, the court, Hon. Heidi G. Winslow,
judge trial referee, approved the pendente lite agree-
ment of the parties that the plaintiff would have exclu-
sive use and possession of the marital home located
in Brookfield (marital home), the plaintiff would have
primary residential custody of the child, and the defen-
dant would have supervised parenting time with the
child.
At some point, the plaintiff began a romantic relation-
ship with A, who was a friend of the defendant prior
to and during the marriage; the defendant and A are
no longer friends. In April, 2022, the defendant filed a
motion for order alleging, on the basis of A’s criminal
conviction history and prior incarceration, that the
defendant believed it was ‘‘not in the best interest’’ of
the child to have any contact with A, and seeking that
the court prohibit A from having any contact with
the child.
On June 23, 2022, the defendant filed an application
for a temporary restraining order on behalf of the child
against A. The defendant alleged that A has an extensive
criminal history and had hit the child. On July 7, 2022,
the court, D’Andrea, J., issued a restraining order
requiring that A stay away from the marital home and
have no contact with the child, to expire on July 7, 2023.
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K. S. v. C. S.

In July and August, 2022, the defendant filed a series
of motions for contempt pendente lite, alleging viola-
tions of the court’s orders related to parenting time and
the automatic orders requiring the plaintiff to partici-
pate in the parenting education program. In December,
2022, the court, Figueroa Laskos, J.,3 accepted and
made an order of the court the parties’ agreement to
modify parenting time. The defendant was to have addi-
tional parenting time, and the parenting time was to be
unsupervised. On May 25, 2023, the court entered
interim orders with respect to the defendant’s parenting
time and also ordered that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s boyfriend,
[A], shall have no contact with the minor child’’ (interim
no contact order).
The dissolution action, together with certain of the
parties’ pendente lite motions, was tried to the court
over several days in April and May, 2023, with closing
argument in September, 2023. The court, by agreement
of the parties, also consolidated for trial an application
for a restraining order that was filed on April 23, 2023,
by the plaintiff against the defendant. The court heard
testimony from the parties, both of whom were repre-
sented by counsel; A; two appraisers; and the defen-
dant’s stepfather; and it admitted numerous exhibits
into evidence. Following the close of evidence, the court
orally denied the restraining order application on the
basis that the statutory requirements pursuant to Gen-
eral Statutes § 46b-15 had not been met.
On July 7, 2023, the restraining order on behalf of
the child against A expired. Although the defendant
filed a motion to extend the restraining order, the court,
Fox, J., dismissed it because of lack of service of pro-
cess. After the close of evidence but before the court
heard closing arguments, the defendant filed, on July
3
Unless otherwise indicated in this opinion, all references to the trial
court are to Judge Figueroa Laskos.
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26, 2023, a motion for contempt pendente lite, alleging
violation of the interim no contact order prohibiting A
from having contact with the child. The plaintiff objected
to the motion.
The court issued its memorandum of decision dissolv-
ing the parties’ marriage on November 17, 2023. With
respect to parenting orders, the court awarded the par-
ties joint legal and shared physical custody of the child,
with the defendant having final decision-making author-
ity with respect to medical and educational issues, and
set forth a parenting schedule. The court ordered the
plaintiff to pay the defendant child support in the
amount of $282 weekly, which the court noted was in
accordance with the child support guidelines. The court
ordered that the ‘‘plaintiff shall not allow the minor
child to have any contact with [A] until further order
of the court or written agreement of the parties; contact
between [A] and the minor child shall be deemed a
substantial change in circumstances’’ (dissolution judg-
ment no contact order). Among other property division
orders, the court awarded the plaintiff the marital home
and ordered her to pay the defendant a property settle-
ment in the amount of $133,500. The court ordered the
plaintiff to pay the defendant periodic alimony in the
amount of $260 weekly for five years from the date of
dissolution. The alimony was made nonmodifiable as
to the term. The court granted the defendant’s motions
for contempt alleging violation of the court’s orders
related to parenting time and prohibiting A from having
contact with the child, and the court ordered the plain-
tiff to pay attorney’s fees in the amounts of $1837.50
and $3675, respectively. Finally, the court ordered the
parties to comply with Practice Book § 25-26 (g), which
requires a party seeking to modify parenting orders to
seek permission from the court.
On November 27 and December 1, 2023, the plaintiff
filed motions for reargument and reconsideration,
which were denied. This appeal followed.
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On January 23, 2024, the defendant filed a postjudg-
ment motion for modification, seeking sole legal and
physical custody of the child on the basis that the plain-
tiff had permitted A to have contact with the child. On
May 14, 2024, the court entered the following interim
orders, to remain in effect until further order of the
court: ‘‘The plaintiff’s parenting time with the minor
child shall be supervised. The plaintiff shall provide a
supervisor for her parenting time to ensure that [A] is
not present. If a supervisor is not available, the child
shall be returned to the defendant . . . . The plaintiff
shall provide the name and address of the supervisor
to [the defendant’s counsel].’’ The plaintiff filed an
amended appeal thereafter.
On November 20, 2024, the court denied the defen-
dant’s motion for modification. The court found that,
following the dissolution judgment, A lived with the
plaintiff and that the plaintiff allowed A to have contact
with the child. The court noted that the judgment pro-
hibited such contact and found a substantial change in
circumstances. Turning to the best interests of the child
determination, the court found that it was not in the
best interests of the child to modify the parenting plan.
The court found that the plaintiff had followed the
interim orders requiring supervised contact and that
the plaintiff would be able to meet the child’s best
interests going forward. Accordingly, the court denied
the defendant’s motion for modification and vacated
its interim order requiring the plaintiff’s parenting time
to be supervised. The court stated that ‘‘[t]he orders
issued in the judgment remain in effect.’’
Also on November 20, 2024, the court issued the
following order: ‘‘The plaintiff . . . agrees that she will
not allow the minor child . . . to have contact with
[A] during her parenting time and that if [A] is in her
home during her parenting time that she will leave with
the child and contact the defendant . . . to return the
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K. S. v. C. S.

child to his care if she does not have anywhere else to
go. The court finds that this representation meets the
child’s best interests. It is made an order of the court
modifiable by court order or written agreement of the
parties.’’ The plaintiff did not thereafter amend her
appeal. See footnote 4 of this opinion.
On December 10, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to
vacate the order prohibiting contact between the child
and A. Therein, she alleged, inter alia, that the dissolu-
tion judgment no contact order is inconsistent with the
parenting schedule and was not based on any findings
that contact with A would harm the child or was con-
trary to the child’s best interests. The motion to vacate
was denied by the trial court on April 2, 2025. Additional
facts and procedural history will be set forth as neces-
sary.
I
The plaintiff’s first claim on appeal is that the court,
in its November 17, 2023 memorandum of decision,
improperly ordered that ‘‘the plaintiff shall not allow
the minor child to have any contact with [A] until further
order of the court or written agreement of the parties
. . . .’’ We conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion.4
4
We note, as an initial matter, that the plaintiff’s appellate challenge to
the dissolution judgment no contact order is not rendered moot by way of
postjudgment orders. In its November 20, 2024 orders, the court stated that
‘‘[t]he orders issued in the judgment remain in effect.’’ To the extent that
the plaintiff’s brief could be interpreted as raising issues related to the May
14, 2024 orders, we note that such issues are moot as those orders were
vacated by the court’s November 20, 2024 orders. See Y. H. v. J. B., 224
Conn. App. 793, 796, 313 A.3d 1245 (2024) (to extent brief was interpreted
as challenging pendente lite order, issues were moot as order was superseded
by judgment of dissolution).
To the extent that the plaintiff argues in her brief that the court improperly
ordered that any contact between A and the child shall be deemed a substan-
tial change in circumstances, that issue also is moot.
‘‘Before a court may modify a custody order, it must find that there has
been a material change in circumstances since the prior order of the court,
but the ultimate test is the best interests of the child. . . . These require-
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We begin by setting forth the legal principles and
standard of review relevant to this claim. ‘‘The trial
court’s authority to issue orders pertaining to the cus-
tody and visitation of minor children is prescribed by
statute.’’ R. H. v. M. H., 350 Conn. 432, 441, 324 A.3d
720 (2024). General Statutes § 46b-56 (a) provides in
relevant part that ‘‘the court may make or modify any
proper order regarding the custody, care, education,
visitation and support of the children if it has jurisdic-
tion . . . . Subject to the provisions of section 46b-
56a, the court may assign parental responsibility for
raising the child to the parents jointly, or may award
custody to either parent or to a third party, according
to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and
subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems
equitable. . . .’’ ‘‘Under § 46b-56 (c), the court, in
determining custody, must consider the best interests
of the child and, in doing so, may consider, among
other factors, one or more of the [seventeen] factors
enumerated in the provision.’’ Zhou v. Zhang, 334 Conn.
601, 632, 223 A.3d 775 (2020).
ments are based on the interest in finality of judgments . . . and the family’s
need for stability. . . . The trial court’s discretion includes only the power
to adapt the order to some distinct and definite change in the circumstances
or conditions of the parties. . . . [I]ts inquiry is necessarily confined to a
comparison between the current conditions and the last court order.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) J. Y. v.
M. R., 215 Conn. App. 648, 658, 283 A.3d 520 (2022).
In the present case, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion to modify
custody, which was the subject of a hearing, and the court ruled on that
motion on November 20, 2024. In its ruling, the court found that a substantial
change of circumstances had occurred since the November 17, 2023 judg-
ment of dissolution but that it was not in the best interests of the child to
modify the parenting plan. Any future modification of custody will involve
a determination of whether there has been a substantial change of circum-
stance since the court’s November 20, 2024 order. Accordingly, the court’s
November 17, 2023 order that contact shall be deemed a substantial change
in circumstances became inoperative following the court’s November 20,
2024 order. Given that we cannot afford the plaintiff any relief, we express
no opinion on the propriety of the challenged order.
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‘‘Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision
regarding custody, visitation and relocation orders is
one of abuse of discretion. . . . [I]n a dissolution pro-
ceeding the trial court’s decision on the matter of cus-
tody is committed to the exercise of its sound discretion
and its decision cannot be overridden unless an abuse
of that discretion is clear. . . . The controlling princi-
ple in a determination respecting custody is that the
court shall be guided by the best interests of the child.
. . . In determining what is in the best interests of the
child, the court is vested with a broad discretion. . . .
[T]he authority to exercise the judicial discretion under
the circumstances revealed by the finding is not con-
ferred upon this court, but upon the trial court, and
. . . we are not privileged to usurp that authority or
to substitute ourselves for the trial court. . . . A mere
difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our
intervention. Nothing short of a conviction that the
action of the trial court is one which discloses a clear
abuse of discretion can warrant our interference. . . .
‘‘The trial court has the opportunity to view the par-
ties first hand and is therefore in the best position to
assess the circumstances surrounding a dissolution
action, in which such personal factors as the demeanor
and attitude of the parties are so significant. . . .
[E]very reasonable presumption should be given in
favor of the correctness of [the trial court’s] action. . . .
We are limited in our review to determining whether
the trial court abused its broad discretion to award
custody based upon the best interests of the child as
reasonably supported by the evidence.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Baker-Grenier v. Grenier, 147
Conn. App. 516, 519–20, 83 A.3d 698 (2014).
The plaintiff raises a number of contentions in sup-
port of her claim that the dissolution judgment no con-
tact order is improper. First, she maintains that she
was unable to comply with the order because the trial
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12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
K. S. v. C. S.

court found that A lives with her at the marital home
but ‘‘did not provide any means to reconcile then how
the plaintiff was supposed to have her parenting time
and prevent contact with A.’’ She argues that ‘‘the trial
court’s orders are conditioning the plaintiff’s parenting
time on some ability of the plaintiff to remove [A] from
the premises, without an evident means to do so.’’ The
plaintiff offers no relevant authority in support of a duty
on behalf of the trial court to ‘‘reconcile’’ the presence
of A at the marital home with the court’s parenting
time orders. See Zhou v. Zhang, supra, 334 Conn. 632
(‘‘[w]hile the rights, wishes and desires of the parents
must be considered it is nevertheless the ultimate wel-
fare of the child [that] must control the decision of
the court’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). To the
contrary, the court may establish limitations on parent-
ing time based on the best interests of the child. See
Battistotti v. Suzanne A., 182 Conn. App. 40, 54, 188
A.3d 798 (rejecting claim that trial court’s limitation of
plaintiff’s parenting time to town of Greenwich was
inconsistent with court’s finding that it was in best
interests of child to spend significant, quality time with
plaintiff), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 904, 191 A.3d 1000
(2018). Accordingly, we reject this argument.
Second, the plaintiff contends that the order was
improper because it was premised on hostility between
A and the defendant, rather than on the relationship
between A and the child. Although the court considered
A’s actions toward the defendant, those actions were
but one factor it considered in making its orders. See
Zilkha v. Zilkha, 180 Conn. App. 143, 175, 183 A.3d 64
(‘‘in matters involving custody and visitation, the court
properly exercises its discretion by weighing all the
facts and circumstances of the family situation’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 328 Conn.
937, 183 A.3d 1175 (2018). The court weighed the evi-
dence before it in finding that A’s ‘‘actions and his
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K. S. v. C. S.

presence are not in the child’s best interest.’’ Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the plaintiff has not demon-
strated that the court exceeded its broad discretion in
crafting custody and visitation orders by ordering that
the plaintiff shall not allow the minor child to have
contact with A.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court abused its
discretion in awarding the defendant final decision-
making authority with respect to medical and educa-
tional issues. We are not persuaded.

The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant. After finding that the plaintiff had not been accom-
modating with the defendant’s work schedule nor had
she made progress toward fostering a relationship
between the child and the defendant, the court deter-
mined that ‘‘assigning a parent to have final decision
authority on medical and educational issues will avoid
the conflicts that currently exist. This is in the child’s
best interest.’’ On the basis of these findings, the court
entered the following order: ‘‘[The parties] shall have
joint legal custody of the minor child . . . . The defen-
dant shall have final decision-making authority on medi-
cal and educational issues, including the selection of a
school, after considering the plaintiff’s input. The plain-
tiff shall respond to a written request for input on medi-
cal and educational decisions within seventy-two hours.
A lack of written response from the plaintiff within
seventy-two hours is to be considered a no opinion
response and [the defendant] shall solely proceed with-
out the plaintiff’s input.’’

The plaintiff’s main challenge to this order is her
position that the parties no longer had issues sur-
rounding the defendant’s work schedule and, thus, the
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14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
K. S. v. C. S.

court should not have awarded the defendant final deci-
sion-making authority on the basis of the parties’ inabil-
ity to resolve issues with respect to work schedules.
We are not persuaded that the absence of a current
conflict as to scheduling precluded the court from
determining that an award of final decision-making
authority was necessary and that it was most appro-
priate that the defendant be given final decision-making
authority. See Desai v. Desai, 119 Conn. App. 224, 231,
987 A.2d 362 (2010) (‘‘[w]e are limited in our review to
determining whether the trial court abused its broad
discretion in awarding the defendant ultimate decision-
making authority’’). Accordingly, the plaintiff has not
demonstrated that the court abused its discretion.
III
The plaintiff’s third claim on appeal is that the court
improperly granted the defendant’s motion for con-
tempt alleging violations of the court’s interim order
prohibiting contact between the child and A. We are
not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of this claim. Following the close
of evidence on May 25, 2023, with closing arguments
to be scheduled at a later date, the defendant’s counsel
requested certain interim orders, including that the
court order the plaintiff to not permit A to be in the
presence of the child.5 The plaintiff’s counsel objected
‘‘to any orders regarding [A].’’ The court stated: ‘‘And
as for the request that [A] not be in the presence of the
child as an interim order, that request—again, having
heard all of the testimony and determining what’s in
the best interests of the child—the court does find that
that is a request that meets the child’s best interests.
5
As noted previously, the defendant had filed a motion in April, 2022,
seeking that the court prohibit A from having contact with the child, which
was not adjudicated.
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K. S. v. C. S.

[A] is not to have any contact at all with the minor child.’’
The plaintiff’s counsel inquired of the court whether
the no contact order was an interim order, subject to
potential change in the final orders, and the court
responded that it was. The court also entered its interim
orders in writing, stating that ‘‘the plaintiff’s boyfriend,
[A] shall have no contact with the minor child.’’
Two months after the close of evidence but before
closing argument was held, on July 26, 2023, the defen-
dant filed a motion for contempt pendente lite. Therein,
he alleged that the plaintiff wilfully and intentionally
had violated the court’s interim orders by permitting A
to be in the presence of the minor child on more than
one occasion. The defendant also filed a motion for
order, seeking to reopen the evidence to allow his July,
2023 motion for contempt pendente lite to be heard.
The plaintiff filed an objection to the motions for con-
tempt and to reopen the evidence, maintaining that the
interim orders had not been violated and, thus, the
motions should be denied. On August 16, 2023, the court
granted a caseflow request filed by the defendant and
ordered that the motion to reopen the evidence would
be heard by the court. On August 23, 2023, the court
granted the motion for order to reopen the evidence.
On September 14, 2023, a hearing was scheduled on
the defendant’s motion for contempt and closing argu-
ments on the dissolution trial. At the start of the hearing,
the plaintiff’s counsel indicated that the plaintiff would
not be attending the hearing that day because she felt
like she could not miss any more days of work. The
court asked the defendant’s counsel whether she had
intended to call the plaintiff as a witness, and she
responded that she had but also indicated that she was
ready to proceed in the plaintiff’s absence. The court
then asked the defendant’s counsel whether she was
requesting that the court draw an adverse inference
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16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
K. S. v. C. S.

based on the plaintiff’s failure to appear, and the defen-
dant’s counsel responded that she was. The court stated
that it would proceed, given that no request had been
made to continue the matter. The plaintiff’s counsel
then requested a continuance, in light of the potential
adverse inference. The court stated that it would pro-
ceed with the hearing and would hear from the plain-
tiff’s counsel at the end.
The court then heard the testimony of the defendant
and received several exhibits into evidence.6 The defen-
dant testified to driving by the marital home on a num-
ber of occasions, at different times of the day, and
viewing A’s vehicle parked in the driveway at times
that the plaintiff had parenting time with the child. The
defendant offered into evidence photographs showing
A’s vehicle parked at the marital home, evidence show-
ing that A’s address had been changed to the marital
home, and social media postings.
Following the close of evidence on the motion for
contempt, the court provided the plaintiff’s counsel an
opportunity to be heard regarding any request concern-
ing the plaintiff being made available for testimony.
After the court recessed to allow the plaintiff’s counsel
to contact his client, counsel stated that he withdrew
his ‘‘request for further time and further opportunity
even remotely.’’ The court then held closing arguments
with respect to both the dissolution trial and the motion
for contempt.7
In its November 17, 2023 memorandum of decision,
the court found that A previously had been convicted
of, inter alia, assault in the second degree and violation
6
A was subpoenaed by abode service at the marital home to appear at
the September 14, 2023 hearing. A did not appear, and the court declined
the defendant’s request to issue a capias.
7
In closing argument, the plaintiff’s counsel stated: ‘‘Your Honor may be
finding an adverse . . . [inference] in my client not being here and I under-
stand that. But an adverse inference and evidence are two different things.’’
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of a protective order. A’s former spouse was the victim
of the assault, which resulted in her receipt of a sixty
year protective order against A. The court recounted
that, on July 7, 2022, a restraining order had been
entered prohibiting contact between A and the child,
to extend to July 7, 2023. The allegations contained
within the restraining order application were A’s crimi-
nal history and that A had hit the child. The court found
that, ‘‘[a]t least three times the plaintiff asked the defen-
dant to modify the restraining order between [A] and
the minor child as a bargaining chip to reach an agree-
ment on the dissolution and parenting plan. The plaintiff
placed her desire to allow [A] to have access to the
minor child above the court’s concern for the child’s
safety; this is not in the child’s best interest.’’
With respect to the motion for contempt, the court
reiterated its May 25, 2023 interim order prohibiting A
from having any contact with the child and found such
order to be clear and unambiguous. The court then
made the following factual findings by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Noting that A ‘‘displayed unrestrained
anger while testifying,’’ the court found that A had cre-
ated a Facebook posting showing that he traveled to
Florida with the plaintiff and the child and that he
created such posting purposely to upset the defendant.
The court also found that A had posted on Facebook
a photograph showing that he was in the marital home.
The court found: ‘‘The plaintiff, despite a court order
restricting [A] from the minor child and the house,
chose [A] over her child’s safety. [A’s] actions show
a purposeful pattern to annoy the defendant and an
indifference to court orders. This level of hostility is
not in the best interests of the minor child. The court
finds that [A’s] actions and his presence are not in the
child’s best interests.’’
The court also found that A was living at the marital
property. In support of this finding, the court found
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that A has used the address of the marital home as his
address since June 23, 2022. The court found that the
United States Postal Service has been forwarding A’s
mail from an address in Danbury to the marital home.

The court made several findings with respect to
instances in which A’s vehicle was parked at the marital
home. It was parked there during the plaintiff’s parent-
ing time with the child on August 1, 2023, and the vehicle
remained parked there at 11:40 p.m., together with the
plaintiff’s vehicle. The court found that the defendant
had driven by the marital home on August 21, 2023, and
had seen A’s vehicle parked there at 10:36 a.m., when
the child was not at daycare.8 As recently as September
7, 2023, the court found that A’s car was parked at the
marital home. On the basis of these findings, the court
concluded that A was living at the marital home. The
court further found that A ‘‘takes purposeful steps to
show through Facebook that he is in the marital house.’’

The court found that the plaintiff’s testimony, in hear-
ings held prior to September 14, 2023, concerning A
was not credible. The court drew an adverse inference
against the plaintiff on the basis of her failure to appear
in court on September 14, 2023, to refute that A lives
with her and the child. The court found that the plaintiff
was aware of the court’s order that A have no contact
with the child and that she had wilfully violated that
order by allowing A to reside in the marital home and
8
The court additionally found: ‘‘The car was moved and again located at
[the marital home] on August 23, 2023, at 10:36 a.m., and again at 11:40 p.m.
[A.’s] car remained alone at the [marital home] on August 24, 2023, at 7:25
a.m.; the plaintiff was not scheduled for work that day until 12 noon. . . .
‘‘On August 28, 2023, [A’s] car was at the [marital home] at 6:03 a.m. along
with the plaintiff’s car; again, on Tuesday, August 29, 2023, at 7:25 a.m.; and
on August 30, 2023, at 7:36 p.m. during the plaintiff’s parenting time. The
court finds credible that, approximately two weeks prior to September 14,
2023, the [defendant] observed [A] driving his black Jeep and [giving] the
[defendant] the finger while driving by.’’
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have contact with the child. On the basis of these find-
ings, the court found the plaintiff in contempt.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly granted the defendant’s motion for contempt. In
support of this claim, she argues (1) the court erred in
finding her not credible because she had not testified
pertaining to the subject matter of the motion for con-
tempt and (2) there was no evidence of contact between
the child and A, and the adverse inference drawn by
the court against the plaintiff could not provide such
evidence.9
We begin by setting forth the legal principles and
standard of review relevant to this claim. ‘‘Contempt is
a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which
has power to punish for such an offense. . . . If the
underlying court order was sufficiently clear and unam-
biguous, we . . . determine whether the trial court
9
The plaintiff also argues that the defendant’s motion for contempt did
not comply with Practice Book § 25-27 (a) (2), which requires that a motion
for contempt state ‘‘the specific acts alleged to constitute the contempt
. . . .’’ She argues that hearsay statements of the parties’ child and A’s
former landlord, which underlay the allegations of the motion, were not
introduced into evidence at the hearing and, thus, she was not properly
advised of the charges against her. We disagree with the plaintiff that the
hearsay statements contained within the motion but not introduced into
evidence at the hearing rendered the motion insufficient as to notice. The
defendant’s motion alleged that the plaintiff wilfully and intentionally had
violated the interim no contact order in that A had been present at the
marital home with the child. Thus, we conclude that the motion sufficiently
placed the plaintiff on notice as to what actions would be the subject of
the contempt hearing. See O’Connell v. O’Connell, 101 Conn. App. 516, 525,
922 A.2d 293 (2007).
Moreover, this court has stated that ‘‘[t]he proper way to attack a variance
between pleadings and proof is by objection at the trial to the admissibility
of that evidence which varies from the pleadings, and failure to do so at
the trial constitutes a waiver of any objection to such variance.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Medeiros v. Medeiros, 175 Conn. App. 174, 178
n.4, 167 A.3d 967 (2017); see id. (noting that defendant failed to object during
contempt hearing when plaintiff introduced evidence that she was denied
visits with child on two additional dates).
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abused its discretion in issuing . . . a judgment of
contempt, which includes a review of the trial court’s
determination of whether the violation was wilful or
excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding.
. . . [T]his court will not disturb the trial court’s orders
unless it has abused its legal discretion or its findings
have no reasonable basis in fact. . . . It is within the
province of the trial court to find facts and draw proper
inferences from the evidence presented. . . . [E]very
reasonable presumption will be given in favor of the
trial court’s ruling, and [n]othing short of a conviction
that the action of the trial court is one which discloses a
clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Casiraghi v. Casi-
raghi, 200 Conn. App. 771, 787, 241 A.3d 717 (2020).
We first address the plaintiff’s argument that the court
erred in finding her not credible, given that she did not
offer testimony, because of her nonappearance in court.
Although the plaintiff correctly asserts that, when a
party does not testify at a hearing, there is no finding
to be made as to that party’s credibility; see W. K. v.
M. S., 212 Conn. App. 532, 544, 275 A.3d 232 (2022); the
court expressly stated that ‘‘the plaintiff’s testimony
concerning [A] prior to September 14, 2023, is not
credible.’’ Accordingly, we are not convinced that the
court made a finding as to the plaintiff’s credibility
based on her absence. As to the plaintiff’s contention
that the credibility finding regarding her testimony prior
to September 14, 2023, is improper because her testi-
mony predated the filing of the motion for contempt
and the allegations asserted therein, we assume without
deciding that the court improperly introduced its prior
credibility determination into the contempt proceeding.
However, we are convinced that any such error is harm-
less in light of the court’s detailed findings made on
the basis of the unrebutted documentary evidence
admitted at the hearing showing that A lived in the
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marital home. In sum, the court’s mention of its assess-
ment of the credibility of the plaintiff’s prior testimony
does not ‘‘undermine appellate confidence in the court
[fact-finding] process’’; (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) Hospital Media Network, LLC v. Henderson, 209
Conn. App. 395, 433, 268 A.3d 657 (2021), cert. denied,
343 Conn. 916, 274 A.3d 867 (2022); and, accordingly,
we conclude that the court’s reference to its credibility
determination is harmless.
The plaintiff’s second argument is that the court’s
finding that the plaintiff violated the interim no contact
order by ‘‘allowing [A] to reside in the home where the
minor child lives and have contact with the minor child’’
was erroneous because there was no evidence of actual
contact between the child and A. Specifically, the plain-
tiff emphasizes the defendant’s testimony that he had
not seen the child with A since the entry of the interim
no contact order and maintains that the ‘‘[t]he order
was not a prohibition of [A] parking his car at the
former marital residence, gardening there, nor even
living there.’’
Because this claim requires us to examine the find-
ings of the trial court, we reiterate that ‘‘[t]he credibility
of witnesses, the findings of fact and the drawing of
inferences are all within the province of the trier of
fact. . . . We review the findings to determine whether
they could legally and reasonably be found, thereby
establishing that the trial court could reasonably have
concluded as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Netter v. Netter, 220 Conn. App. 491, 501, 298 A.3d
653 (2023); see also Casiraghi v. Casiraghi, supra, 200
Conn. App. 787 (‘‘[i]t is within the province of the trial
court to find facts and draw proper inferences from the
evidence presented’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). ‘‘A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is
not supported by any evidence in the record or when
there is evidence to support it, but the reviewing court
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is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been made.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Kirwan v. Kirwan, 187 Conn. App. 375, 393–94,
202 A.3d 458 (2019).
We are not persuaded that the court’s finding that
the plaintiff permitted A to have contact with the child is
clearly erroneous. It was based on unrebutted evidence
that A had his mail forwarded to the marital home and
that A’s vehicle was parked together with the plaintiff’s
vehicle at the marital home while the plaintiff had par-
enting time with the child and the child would not have
been at school. The court also received into evidence
Facebook postings from A’s account that included a
photograph of the view from within the marital home
and a post stating: ‘‘I don’t live here! Hahahahahahahah-
Hhahahahahaha.’’ The trial court reasonably could have
found that the plaintiff permitted A to have contact with
the child on the basis of the unrebutted documentary
evidence presented that A was living at the marital
home with the plaintiff and the child.
Finally, we note that the plaintiff did not appear at the
hearing to rebut the evidence offered by the defendant,
prompting the court to draw ‘‘an adverse inference
based on the plaintiff’s failure to appear . . . to refute
that [A] lives with her and the minor child.’’ The plaintiff
relies on the general proposition that an adverse infer-
ence cannot be used to supply proof of a fact. See In
re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 638, 847 A.2d 883 (2004).
Having already determined that the court’s finding was
supported by the evidence submitted at the hearing,
we reject the plaintiff’s contention that the adverse
inference in the present case improperly was used to
supply proof of a fact. Rather, the court appropriately
drew an adverse inference from the plaintiff’s failure
to appear to rebut the defendant’s evidence, which is
permissible under our appellate authority. ‘‘[A] trier of
fact generally may draw an adverse inference against
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a party for its failure to rebut evidence. . . . After a
prima facie case is established, an adverse inference
may be drawn against a party for his or her failure to
testify, unless the party was entitled to rely upon one
of the few exceptional privileges that carry with it a
protection from adverse inferences.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Norberg-Hurlburt
v. Hurlburt, 162 Conn. App. 661, 673, 133 A.3d 482
(2016); see id. (where court heard testimony of defen-
dant that plaintiff and another individual were cohab-
itating and received into evidence exhibit showing they
were engaged, court properly drew adverse inference
with respect to issue of cohabitation because plaintiff
failed to appear to testify at scheduled hearing). Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the plaintiff in contempt.
IV
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
ordered her to pay attorney’s fees in connection with
the defendant’s motions for contempt related to viola-
tions of the interim no contact order and parenting time
order. She argues, inter alia, that the court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney’s fees that were not
restricted to efforts related to the contempt actions.
We agree.
We first set forth the legal principles that guide our
analysis. ‘‘General Statutes § 46b-87 grants the court
the discretion to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing
party in a contempt proceeding. The award of attorney’s
fees in contempt proceedings is within the discretion
of the court. . . . An abuse of discretion in granting
the counsel fees will be found only if this court deter-
mines that the trial court could not reasonably have
concluded as it did. . . . Importantly, where contempt
is established, the concomitant award of attorney’s fees
properly is awarded pursuant to § 46b-87 and is
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restricted to efforts related to the contempt action.’’
(Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Malpeso v. Malpeso, 165 Conn. App.
151, 184, 138 A.3d 1069 (2016).
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to this claim. The defendant filed four motions for
contempt, two of which alleged violations of parenting
time (contempt motions ## 123.00 and 125.00), one that
alleged violation of the order requiring the plaintiff to
participate in the parenting education program (con-
tempt motion #126.00), and one that related to the
interim no contact order (contempt motion #165.00).
In each motion, the defendant requested that the court
order the plaintiff to pay attorney’s fees in connection
with prosecution of that motion.
On May 22, 2023, the defendant filed an affidavit of
fees relating to his contempt motions ##123.00, 125.00
and 126.00. Among other entries, it contained an entry
with the description ‘‘preparation of motion for con-
tempt (parenting education).’’ The affidavit included
total fees in the amount of $1837.50. During closing
argument on September 13, 2023, the defendant’s coun-
sel argued: ‘‘And I’m asking for a finding of contempt
on motion #123.00, which was for the parenting time.
And I’ve submitted an affidavit of fees, which was dated
May 22nd . . . for fees on that particular motion. And
then . . . there’s also another motion regarding par-
enting time, which is 12[5].00, and that’s covered in the
affidavit of fees that was submitted . . . .’’
On September 13, 2023, the defendant filed a supple-
mental affidavit of attorney’s fees, which contained
entries related to contempt motion #165.00 and the
restraining order application against A. Specifically,
among other entries, the affidavit contained entries with
the description ‘‘preparation of restraining order re [A],
call with client,’’ ‘‘preparation for TRO hearing . . .’’
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and ‘‘court appearance (TRO).’’ Those three entries con-
cerning the restraining order totaled $1900 out of the
affidavit’s total fees in the amount of $4180.
The defendant’s counsel addressed the affidavit of
fees during closing argument. Specifically, she stated:
‘‘I’m seeking legal fees on the contempt motion on an
affidavit of fees . . . for today’s contempt . . . and
for which also includes the restraining order, the appli-
cation that was filed by [the defendant]. And although
it was filed and served at [A’s] usual place of abode,
he didn’t appear, so I’m asking that he receive attorney’s
fees for that. So, the total for contempt and the attor-
ney’s fees for the subsequent restraining order is
$6017.52.’’ The plaintiff’s counsel asked that the court
order no fees on the basis that the contempt motions
should be denied on the basis of a lack of evidence that
the plaintiff wilfully disobeyed an order.
In its memorandum of decision, the court granted
contempt motions ##123.00 and 125.00 and ordered the
plaintiff to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $1837.50.
The court denied contempt motion #126.00. The court
granted contempt motion #165.00 and ordered the plain-
tiff to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $3675.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court abused
its discretion in its awards of attorney’s fees because,
inter alia, portions of those fees were for work unrelated
to the motions for contempt. We first address the
$1837.50 award, which award corresponded with the
total amount shown in the related affidavit of fees. As
noted previously, that affidavit included at least one
entry that related to a separate motion for contempt,
concerning the parenting education program, which
was denied. An award of fees that encompasses fees
related to a separate motion is not proper. See Malpeso
v. Malpeso, supra, 165 Conn. App. 185 (court abused
its discretion in awarding fees after finding defendant
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in contempt where most of fees sought in affidavit
related to ‘‘plaintiff’s motion for modification,’’ which
was never filed (emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted)); Allen v. Allen, 134 Conn. App. 486,
503, 39 A.3d 1190 (2012) (court exceeded its discretion
in awarding fees for time spent by defendant’s counsel
negotiating with IRS because such efforts were unre-
lated to contempt action); see also Wald v. Cortland-
Wald, 226 Conn. App. 752, 789, 319 A.3d 769 (2024)
(court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only
$1000 in attorney’s fees where affidavit reflected fees
in amount of $17,282.50, because affidavit included fees
related to motion for contempt that were denied by
court). The court’s award of $3675 is improper for the
very same reason. The affidavit filed by the defendant’s
counsel contained entries related to the restraining
order proceedings filed by the defendant against A.
Although the court did not award the full $4180 sought,
it awarded only $505 less than the full amount. This is
improper in light of entries related to the restraining
order in the cumulative amount of $1900. Accordingly,
we conclude that the court exceeded its discretion in
awarding fees for counsel’s time spent on other motions
and proceedings. Thus, we vacate the awards of attor-
ney’s fees and remand this matter to the court for fur-
ther proceedings in accordance with this opinion.10
V
The plaintiff’s next two claims on appeal challenge
the factual findings underlying the court’s financial
awards. Specifically, she claims that the child support
10
Because we conclude that the court improperly awarded fees for time
spent on other motions, we need not reach the plaintiff’s additional argument
that she was not afforded the opportunity to be heard on the fees claimed
by the defendant. We note, however, that during closing argument, counsel
was given the opportunity to respond to the request, and his response was
limited to a conclusion that a contempt finding was not warranted and did
not extend to the amount or nature of the fees requested.
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award rested on clearly erroneous factual findings as
to the parties’ incomes and that the court’s property
distribution award rested on a clearly erroneous finding
as to the equity in the marital home. Finally, she con-
tends that these errors require a reversal of the financial
orders in their entirety.
Before addressing the plaintiff’s claims, we set forth
the applicable standard of review. ‘‘The standard of
review in family matters is well settled. An appellate
court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic
relations cases unless the court has abused its discre-
tion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude
as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In
determining whether a trial court has abused its broad
discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every
reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of
its action. . . . Appellate review of a trial court’s find-
ings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review. The trial court’s findings are binding
upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in
light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record
as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when there is no evidence in the record to support it
. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. . . . Therefore, to conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion, we must find that the court
either incorrectly applied the law or could not reason-
ably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Ferraro v. Ferraro, 168 Conn. App. 723, 727, 147
A.3d 188 (2016).
A
The plaintiff claims that the court’s finding of her
presumptive child support obligation rested on clearly
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erroneous factual findings as to the net income of the
parties. We agree.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to the plaintiff’s claim. Both parties submitted child
support guidelines worksheets on April 12, 2023. In
the defendant’s guidelines worksheet, he identified the
plaintiff’s weekly gross income as $2905 and net income
as $1990. The defendant identified his weekly gross
income as $1225 and net income as $901. In the plain-
tiff’s guidelines worksheet, she identified her weekly
gross income as $2694 and net income as $1845. She
identified the defendant’s weekly gross income as $1225
and net income as $1019.
The plaintiff was questioned at trial on her financial
affidavit filed April 12, 2023. She testified in accordance
with her affidavit that she earned $2694 gross weekly.11
The affidavit reflected a weekly net income of $1845.
The defendant’s financial affidavit reflected gross base
pay of $864 and overtime of $361, for a total gross
income of $1225 and net income of $938. At trial, he
testified that he was currently employed, he earns a
base salary, works about five hours of overtime per pay
period, and that the overtime and base salary were
reflected on his financial affidavit.
In August, 2023, the plaintiff filed an updated financial
affidavit. Therein, she identified her total base pay from
employment income as $2694, listed child support actu-
ally received in the amount of $96, for a total gross
weekly income of $2790. She identified her net weekly
income as $1941.
The court found that the plaintiff is employed as a
pediatric nurse practitioner and has the ability to earn
11
The plaintiff testified: ‘‘For the most part, [the weekly income is] consis-
tent, but I take call that’s on rotation as far as overnight call and then
weekend and holiday call. So, sometimes with that there’s, like, a difference
of a couple hundred dollars per paycheck. . . . But I am paid on a base
salary rate.’’
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$2905 gross, $1941 net weekly. The court found that
the defendant was employed as a forklift operator, with
compensation of $22.50 per hour, plus approximately
two hours of overtime each week. The court found that
the defendant has the ability to earn $864 gross per
week. The court referenced the defendant’s guidelines
worksheet dated April 12, 2023, in rendering its child
support order. It found that the defendant’s guidelines
worksheet showed a presumptive support amount of
$282 weekly to be paid from the plaintiff to the defen-
dant. The court ordered the plaintiff to pay that amount
weekly.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the defendant’s
guidelines worksheet ‘‘overstated the plaintiff’s income
by $145 per week, while understating the defendant’s
income by $118 per week, for a combined difference
of $263 per week between the [incomes listed on the]
defendant’s . . . guidelines [worksheet] and the evi-
dence presented to the court by way of financial affida-
vits.’’ Thus, according to the plaintiff, the court’s finding
of the plaintiff’s presumptive child support obligation
rested on incorrect income figures unsupported by the
evidence. Following our thorough review of the record,
we conclude that the court’s child support order is
inconsistent with the facts found and that the court
could not reasonably have concluded as it did.
We first set forth the legal principles governing child
support orders and the application of the child support
guidelines. General Statutes § 46b-215a provides for a
commission to oversee the issuance of child support
guidelines, which must be updated every four years,
‘‘to ensure the appropriateness of criteria for the estab-
lishment of child support awards . . . .’’ General Stat-
utes § 46b-215a (a). General Statutes § 46b-215b (a) pro-
vides in relevant part: ‘‘The . . . guidelines issued
pursuant to section 46b-215a . . . and in effect on the
date of the support determination shall be considered
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in all determinations of child support award amounts
. . . . In all such determinations, there shall be a rebut-
table presumption that the amount of such awards
which resulted from the application of such guidelines
is the amount to be ordered. A specific finding on the
record at a hearing, or in a written judgment, order or
memorandum of decision of the court, that the applica-
tion of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappro-
priate in a particular case, as determined under the
deviation criteria established by the Commission for
Child Support Guidelines under section 46b-215a, shall
be required in order to rebut the presumption in
such case.’’
‘‘The child support guidelines set forth a worksheet
that provides specific instructions for calculating child
support.’’ Renstrup v. Renstrup, 217 Conn. App. 252,
266, 287 A.3d 1095, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 915, 290
A.3d 374 (2023). The guidelines worksheet states that
‘‘each parent’s share of the basic child support obliga-
tion is determined by calculating each parent’s share
of the combined net weekly income . . . and multi-
plying the result for each parent by the basic child
support obligation.’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-
215a-2c (a) (4). The guidelines provide that the court
should: ‘‘(B) Determine each parent’s percentage share
of the combined net weekly income by dividing the [net
weekly income] amount for each parent by the [total
combined net weekly income] and multiplying by one
hundred percent. . . . (C) Multiply [the amount as cal-
culated in (B), rounded to the nearest whole percent-
age] for each parent by the [basic child support obliga-
tion (from the Schedule of Basic Child Support
Obligations)]. . . . These amounts are each parent’s
share of the basic child support obligation.’’ Id., § 46b-
215a-2c (a) (4).
‘‘Although the child support guidelines create a legal
presumption as to the amount of child support pay-
ments . . . the figures going into that calculation on
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the worksheet must be based on some underlying evi-
dence. . . . A court may not rely on a worksheet unless
it is based on some underlying evidence.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferraro v.
Ferraro, supra, 168 Conn. App. 730.
In the present case, the court identified a presumptive
support amount of $282, which was reflected in the
defendant’s guidelines worksheet. However, the court’s
findings as to each party’s income conflicted with the
income reflected on the defendant’s guidelines work-
sheet, which formed the basis for the court’s determina-
tion of the presumptive amount. Having found the par-
ties’ incomes to be different from those reflected on
the defendant’s guidelines worksheet, the court should
not have used the presumptive amount shown on the
defendant’s guidelines worksheet. See Barbour v. Bar-
bour, 156 Conn. App. 383, 390–91, 113 A.3d 77 (2015)
(where only document supporting increase from $50
to $163 in defendant’s support amount was guidelines
worksheet prepared by plaintiff’s counsel, court’s modi-
fication lacked factual foundation and could not stand);
see also Ferraro v. Ferraro, supra, 168 Conn. App. 731
(where court prepared guidelines worksheet, and fig-
ures used by court did not match figures as provided
in financial affidavit, testified to at trial, or contained
in exhibits submitted to court, determination of parties’
net income lacked evidentiary basis). Accordingly, we
conclude that the court improperly calculated the pre-
sumptive support amount.
Additionally, our review of the record reveals that
the court could not reasonably have concluded as it
did with respect to its factual findings as to the income
of each party.12 The court determined that the plaintiff
12
We note that the court stated each party’s income in terms of the party’s
‘‘ability to earn’’ that amount. We do not view the court’s finding as an
assignment of earning capacity, which is one of the deviation criteria within
the guidelines but, rather, an imprecisely stated finding of each party’s actual
earned income.
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had a weekly income of $2905 gross and $1941 net.
Although the plaintiff’s August, 2023 financial affidavit
reflects a net income of $1941, which is consistent with
the court’s finding of her net income, that $1941 amount
was calculated based on a gross income that included
a $94 weekly child support payment that she was then
receiving from the defendant. Our regulations define
‘‘gross income’’ as ‘‘the average weekly earned and
unearned income from all sources before deductions,
including but not limited to the items listed in subpara-
graph (A) of this subdivision, but excluding the items
listed in subparagraph (B) of this subdivision.’’ Regs.,
Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (11). The definitions
portion of the guidelines expressly identifies, as a gross
income exclusion, ‘‘support received on behalf of a child
who is living in the home of the parent whose income
is being determined.’’ Id., § 46b-215a-1 (11) (B) (i). It is
error to consider the defendant’s pendente lite child
support paid to the plaintiff as income for purposes of
determining the parties’ child support obligation.
With respect to the defendant’s income, the court
determined that he had a gross weekly income of $864.
The court made no finding of the defendant’s net weekly
income. ‘‘[I]t is well settled that a court must base its
child support and alimony orders on the available net
income of the parties, not gross income. . . . Whether
an order falls within this prescription must be analyzed
on a case-by-case basis. Thus, while our decisional law
in this regard consistently affirms the basic tenet that
support and alimony orders must be based on net
income, the proper application of this principle is con-
text specific. . . . [W]e differentiate between an order
that is a function of gross income and one that is based
on gross income. . . . [T]he term ‘based’ as used in
this context connotes an order that only takes into
consideration the parties’ gross income and not the
parties’ net income. Consequently, an order that takes
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cognizance of the parties’ disposable incomes may be
proper even if it is expressed as a function of the parties’
gross earnings.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Procaccini v. Pro-
caccini, 157 Conn. App. 804, 808, 118 A.3d 112 (2015).
Moreover, the court could not have used the net income
from the defendant’s guidelines worksheet, as the net
income identified therein was $901, which is greater
than the defendant’s gross income as found by the
court.
Because the court made clearly erroneous factual
findings as to the income of the parties and improperly
calculated the presumptive support amount, the court’s
child support award amounted to an abuse of its discre-
tion.
B
The plaintiff’s next claim on appeal is that the court’s
finding of equity in the marital home in the amount of
$266,986 was clearly erroneous. We agree.
The following procedural history is relevant to this
claim. At trial, the plaintiff was questioned with respect
to her financial affidavit filed April 12, 2023. Therein,
she had identified weekly mortgage expenses of $450
for a first mortgage on the marital home and $20 for a
second mortgage on the home. The plaintiff also intro-
duced into evidence an exhibit summarizing her
expenses, which reflected monthly payments of $1950
and $80.17 toward the first and second mortgages,
respectively. The plaintiff testified that the monthly pay-
ment on the first mortgage included interest, taxes, and
insurance.
In her April, 2023 financial affidavit, the plaintiff esti-
mated the fair market value of the marital home to
be $360,000, identified a current mortgage balance of
$199,456, and listed equity of $160,544. She did not
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include any amount under ‘‘equity line of credit and
other liens.’’ In the defendant’s financial affidavit dated
April 13, 2023, he estimated the fair market value of
the marital home to be $440,000, identified a current
mortgage balance of $198,000, listed ‘‘equity line of
credit and other liens’’ in the amount of $13,400, and
listed equity in the amount of $228,600. On August 23,
2023, the plaintiff filed with the court another financial
affidavit, in which she identified a current mortgage
balance of $210,068. She also identified weekly
expenses of $565 and $19 toward payment of the first
and second mortgages, respectively.
In its memorandum of decision, the court found ‘‘that
the fair market value of the house as of April 12, 2023,
is $450,000 with a principal balance of $199,456 on the
mortgage. The plaintiff continued to pay the mortgage
since April 12, reducing the balance to $183,014, leaving
equity in the marital property in the amount of $266,986
as of the date of this decision.’’ The court awarded the
plaintiff the marital home and ordered her to pay the
defendant $133,500 within six months.
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court’s finding
as to the equity in the marital home was clearly errone-
ous. She maintains that the court’s finding of a mortgage
balance reduction of $16,442, from April through
November, 2023, was not supported by the evidence.
Specifically, she argues that the court failed to take
into account the second mortgage on the home and
improperly calculated the amount of the mortgage bal-
ance reduction because her monthly payments included
interest, taxes, and insurance.
Following our thorough review of the record, we
conclude that the court’s finding that the plaintiff had
reduced the balance on her mortgage to $183,014 is
clearly erroneous because the record is wholly devoid
of evidence to support it. First, we note that, although
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the court found a principal balance of $199,456 as of
April 12, 2023, that number failed to account for the
second mortgage, as was reflected in the plaintiff’s testi-
mony, her expenses listed in her financial affidavit, and
the defendant’s financial affidavit. Moreover, the trial
court’s determination that the balance of the mortgage
had been reduced by $16,442 between April and Novem-
ber likewise is not supported by the evidence. Given
that the mortgage payment, as testified to by the plain-
tiff, includes interest, taxes, and insurance, the court
had no evidence before it to calculate the reduction in
the mortgage balance on the basis of those payments.
‘‘[W]here . . . some of the facts found [by the trial
court] are clearly erroneous and others are supported
by the evidence, we must examine the clearly erroneous
findings to see whether they were harmless, not only
in isolation, but also taken as a whole. . . . If, when
taken as a whole, they undermine appellate confidence
in the court’s [fact-finding] process, a new hearing is
required.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C. D. v.
C. D., 218 Conn. App. 818, 828 n.6, 293 A.3d 86 (2023).
Having found equity in the marital home in the amount
of $266,986 and awarding the home to the plaintiff, the
court issued a property distribution order requiring the
plaintiff to pay the defendant $133,500, or one half the
amount of equity in the home. Because the court’s prop-
erty distribution order rested on its clearly erroneous
finding of the amount of the equity in the home, we are
compelled to conclude that the error was harmful.
C
We now turn to the appropriate relief. ‘‘Individual
financial orders in a dissolution action are part of the
carefully crafted mosaic that comprises the entire asset
reallocation plan. . . . Under the mosaic doctrine,
financial orders should not be viewed as a collection
of single disconnected occurrences, but rather as a
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seamless collection of interdependent elements. Con-
sistent with that approach, our courts have utilized the
mosaic doctrine as a remedial device that allows
reviewing courts to remand cases for reconsideration
of all financial orders even though the review process
might reveal a flaw only in the alimony, property distri-
bution or child support awards. . . .
‘‘Every improper order, however, does not necessar-
ily merit a reconsideration of all of the trial court’s
financial orders. A financial order is severable when it
is not in any way interdependent with other orders and
is not improperly based on a factor that is linked to other
factors. . . . In other words, an order is severable if
its impropriety does not place the correctness of the
other orders in question. . . .
‘‘Determining whether an order is severable from the
other financial orders in a dissolution case is a highly
fact bound inquiry.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Renstrup v. Renstrup, supra, 217
Conn. App. 284.
In the present case, we have determined that the
court made clearly erroneous factual findings underly-
ing its child support and marital property division
orders. We conclude that the court’s errors with respect
to those orders are not severable from the court’s ali-
mony order, which required the plaintiff to pay alimony
in the amount of $260 weekly for a five year term,
which was made nonmodifiable as to the term. This is
particularly so given that the court made clearly errone-
ous factual findings as to the parties’ incomes and the
major asset in the marital estate. See Onyilogwu v.
Onyilogwu, 217 Conn. App. 647, 657–58, 289 A.3d 1214
(2023) (‘‘[b]ecause the court’s support orders, particu-
larly its spousal support or alimony order, are informed
by and reflective of the parties’ incomes and assets, as
affected by the court’s other financial orders, the
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entirety of the mosaic must be refashioned whenever
there is error in the entering of any such interdependent
order’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because it
is uncertain whether the alimony award will remain
intact after reconsidering the child support order and
property distribution orders in a manner consistent with
this opinion, we conclude that the entirety of the mosaic
must be refashioned. Accordingly, on remand, the court
must reconsider all of the financial orders, including
the alimony award.
The judgment is reversed as to the financial orders
and the awards of attorney’s fees, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings on those issues; the
judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.