Laffin v. Laffin

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Laffin v. Laffin

HEATHER M. LAFFIN v. BRIAN E. LAFFIN
(AC 47492)
Suarez, Clark and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying his motion
for modification of alimony pursuant to statute (§ 46b-86). He claimed, inter
alia, that the court erroneously failed to find that his job loss constituted
a substantial change in circumstances warranting a modification of his
alimony obligation as set forth in the parties’ settlement agreement incorpo-
rated into the judgment of dissolution. Held:

The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for modification of
alimony, as the separation agreement unambiguously precluded modifica-
tion of alimony and the court, therefore, lacked authority to grant the motion
for modification pursuant to § 46b-86 (a).

This court rejected the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred by
failing to address his claim that alleged false representations by the plaintiff
warranted modification of alimony because, to the extent that the defendant
claimed that the plaintiff had fraudulently induced him to enter into the
separation agreement, the defendant would be required to raise such a claim
by way of a motion to open the judgment, not a motion for modification
pursuant to § 46b-86 (a).
Argued February 20—officially released April 8, 2025

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Windham at Putnam, where the court, Chad-
wick, J., rendered judgment dissolving the marriage
and granting certain other relief in accordance with
the parties’ settlement agreement; thereafter, the court,
Altermatt, J., denied the defendant’s motion for modifi-
cation of alimony and rendered judgment thereon, from
which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Brian E. Laffin, self-represented, the appellant
(defendant).
Heather M. Bruneau, self-represented, the appellee
(plaintiff).
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Laffin v. Laffin

Opinion

CLARK, J. In this postjudgment dissolution matter,
the self-represented defendant, Brian E. Laffin, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion
for modification of his obligation to pay periodic ali-
mony to the self-represented plaintiff, Heather M. Laf-
fin, now known as Heather M. Bruneau. On appeal, the
defendant claims that the court erred in (1) failing to
find that his job loss constituted a substantial change in
circumstances warranting a modification of his alimony
obligation pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-86 (a),1
and (2) failing to address his claim that alleged false
representations by the plaintiff regarding her financial
condition warranted modification of his obligation.2 We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The
plaintiff and the defendant were married on May 13,
2016. On May 17, 2023, the court, Chadwick, J., entered
a judgment of uncontested dissolution, incorporating
by reference the terms of a separation agreement, which
the parties negotiated with the assistance of a mediator.
Section 1 of the separation agreement requires the
defendant to pay periodic alimony to the plaintiff for
three years and five months in the amount of $3225
1
General Statutes § 46b-86 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Unless and to
the extent that the decree precludes modification, any final order for the
periodic payment of permanent alimony or support, an order for alimony
or support pendente lite or an order requiring either party to maintain life
insurance for the other party or a minor child of the parties may, at any
time thereafter, be continued, set aside, altered or modified by the court
upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party
. . . . If a court finds that a substantial change in circumstances of either
party has occurred, the court shall determine what modification of alimony,
if any, is appropriate, considering the criteria set forth in section 46b-82.’’
2
The defendant also claims that the court erred in failing to consider
certain evidence concerning the financial circumstances of the parties. We
need not address this claim in light of our conclusion that the court lacked
authority under § 46b-86 (a) to modify alimony.
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Laffin v. Laffin

per month. Section 1 also contains a nonmodifiability
provision, which provides that ‘‘[s]aid alimony may not
be modifiable as to amount, term or cohabitation in
accordance with [§ 46b-86 (b)]3 but may terminate
sooner should the [plaintiff] remarry. Said alimony shall
also terminate if either party were to decease.’’ (Foot-
note added.) The separation agreement further provides
that the agreement ‘‘contains the entire understanding
of the parties’’ and that ‘‘[t]here are no representations,
promises, warranties, covenants or understandings by
or between the parties other than those expressly set
forth herein.’’ Both parties filed affidavits in support of
dissolution in which they averred that the agreement
‘‘represents our full agreement on all issues relating
to the dissolution of our marriage or legal separation,
including . . . alimony . . . .’’
On November 14, 2023, the defendant filed a motion
for modification of alimony. In support of that motion,
the defendant alleged that during the negotiation of
the separation agreement, the plaintiff provided false
information concerning her financial condition. The
defendant asserted that the plaintiff had claimed during
the negotiation that her teaching certification was inac-
tive and that she had been unable to obtain employment,
when in fact her teaching certification was active and
she had declined two job offers. The defendant also
asserted that, prior to entering the separation agree-
ment, he had given the plaintiff $25,350 to be used for
3
General Statutes § 46b-86 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In an action for
divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment brought by
a spouse, in which a final judgment has been entered providing for the
payment of periodic alimony by one party to the other spouse, the Superior
Court may, in its discretion and upon notice and hearing, modify such
judgment and suspend, reduce or terminate the payment of periodic alimony
upon a showing that the party receiving the periodic alimony is living with
another person under circumstances which the court finds should result in
the modification, suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because
the living arrangements cause such a change of circumstances as to alter
the financial needs of that party. . . .’’
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construction projects on a farm that the parties jointly
owned and that the plaintiff kept the money for herself
without completing the construction projects. The
defendant claimed that, if the plaintiff had disclosed
that information, ‘‘it would have affected mediation
negotiations and [his] willingness to sign off on the
[separation] agreement’’ and requested that the court
terminate alimony.
On March 12, 2024, the court, Altermatt, J., heard
argument on the defendant’s motion for modification.
The defendant reiterated the claim set forth in his
motion regarding the plaintiff’s alleged false representa-
tions during the negotiation of the separation agree-
ment. In addition, the defendant claimed, for the first
time, that he had lost his job after he filed the motion
for modification and was unable to pay alimony as a
result of his loss of income. Specifically, the defendant
claimed that he had relocated to Australia to work for
an Australian pharmaceutical company but was termi-
nated shortly thereafter and had been unsuccessful in
his attempts to obtain new employment. The defendant
argued that his loss of employment constituted a sub-
stantial change in circumstances that justified terminat-
ing alimony. The plaintiff objected to the defendant’s
motion, denying that she provided false information
during the negotiation of the separation agreement and
claiming that, on the basis of the defendant’s earnings
during the previous two years, he should be able to pay
alimony as required by the separation agreement while
searching for new employment.
The court denied the defendant’s motion for modifi-
cation on the record. The court stated that, if the defen-
dant filed another motion with additional documenta-
tion regarding his financial condition, the court would
‘‘look very closely at your earnings at that time . . . .
But in the meantime . . . you’ve got to meet your obli-
gations under the [separation agreement].’’ The court
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noted that, as of the date of the hearing, the defendant
owed $9775 in unpaid alimony. The court ordered the
defendant to continue paying alimony as required by
the separation agreement, plus an additional $1000 per
month until the arrearage was satisfied. On the same
day, the court entered a written order stating: ‘‘The
defendant’s motion for modification of the alimony pro-
visions of the parties’ [May 15, 2023] settlement agree-
ment, which was accepted and entered as an order of
this court, is denied. The court finds that the defendant
has not made the requisite showing that would warrant
such a modification.’’ The nonmodifiability provision
of the parties’ separation agreement was not raised by
the court or the parties.4

The defendant filed the present appeal on March 27,
2024. In his appellate brief, the defendant claims that
the court erred in denying his motion for modification
by failing to find that his job loss constituted a substan-
tial change in circumstances warranting modification
of alimony and failing to address his claim regarding
the plaintiff’s alleged false representations during the
negotiation of the separation agreement. On February
11, 2025, this court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to
‘‘be prepared to address at oral argument . . . whether
the March 12, 2024 judgment denying the defendant’s
. . . motion for modification can be affirmed in whole
or in part on the alternative ground that, under the plain
and unambiguous terms of the [separation] agreement,
the trial court lacked the authority to modify alimony
4
After filing the present appeal, on August 5, 2024, the defendant filed
another motion to modify alimony predicated on his job loss, along with
three affidavits and other supporting documentation. The parties appeared
for a hearing on the defendant’s motion on August 21, 2024. On December
2, 2024, the court, DeMeola, J., denied the defendant’s motion on the basis
that the nonmodifiability provision of the separation agreement precluded
such modification. The defendant did not appeal from the denial of that
motion.
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pursuant to . . . § 46b-86.’’5 During oral argument
before this court, the defendant argued that the non-
modifiability provision was only intended to ensure that
alimony would not be reduced or terminated if the
plaintiff were to lease a portion of the farm, which she
5
‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has held that, when an appellant would not be
entitled to a directed judgment upon prevailing on the claim raised on
appeal, the reviewing court may raise, sua sponte, an alternative ground for
affirmance that would be likely to arise on remand.’’ State v. Henderson,
312 Conn. 585, 596, 94 A.3d 614 (2014), citing Blumberg Associates World-
wide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 166, 84
A.3d 840 (2014). In the present case, if the defendant were to prevail on his
claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for modification, he
would not be entitled to a directed judgment because there are factual
determinations that must be made by the trial court prior to ordering a
modification of alimony. Specifically, ‘‘[w]hen presented with a motion for
modification, a court must first determine whether there has been a substan-
tial change in the financial circumstances of one or both of the parties. . . .
Second, if the court finds a substantial change in circumstances, it may
properly consider the motion and, on the basis of the [General Statutes]
§ 46b-82 criteria, [which governs the determination of whether to award
alimony and the duration and amount of the award] make an order for
modification.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Olson v. Mohammadu,
310 Conn. 665, 673, 81 A.3d 215 (2013). With respect to whether the defen-
dant’s job loss would constitute a substantial change in financial circum-
stances, the defendant would be required to establish that his job loss
was ‘‘excusable and not brought about by [his] own fault.’’ Sanchione v.
Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 407, 378 A.2d 522 (1977). Because these factual
issues were not addressed by the trial court, even if we were to agree with
the defendant that the court erred in denying his motion for modification,
we would be required to remand the case to that court for further proceed-
ings. See, e.g., Olson v. Mohammadu, supra, 685–86 (where trial court denied
motion for modification on improper basis, Supreme Court remanded matter
for trial court to ‘‘determine whether the defendant established a substantial
change in circumstances and, if so, what modification of alimony or child
support, if any, is appropriate’’). Moreover, given that the defendant’s August
5, 2024 motion for modification, which also was predicated on his job loss,
was denied on the basis that the separation agreement precludes modifica-
tion; see footnote 4 of this opinion; it is likely that the issue of the effect
of the nonmodifiability provision on the motion at issue in the present appeal
would arise during the proceedings on remand. Accordingly, in the interests
of judicial economy, we address whether the trial court’s judgment may be
affirmed on the alternative ground that alimony is nonmodifiable under the
separation agreement. See Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown &
Brown of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 166.
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retained as part of the separation agreement. Specifi-
cally, the defendant claimed that the nonmodifiability
provision was inserted because the plaintiff wanted the
ability to ‘‘have a roommate or roommates or rent the
farm in some capacity that would enhance her ability
to keep the farm and not sell it’’ and that the provision
was not intended to prevent the court from modifying
alimony for other reasons. The plaintiff argued that
the nonmodifiability provision precludes modification
under any circumstance. We conclude that the plain
language of the separation agreement unambiguously
precludes modification of alimony. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court on that alternative
ground.
‘‘It is well established that a separation agreement
that has been incorporated into a dissolution decree
and its resulting judgment must be regarded as a con-
tract and construed in accordance with the general
principles governing contracts. . . . When construing
a contract, we seek to determine the intent of the parties
from the language used interpreted in the light of the
situation of the parties and the circumstances con-
nected with the transaction. . . . [T]he intent of the
parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable
construction of the written words and . . . the lan-
guage used must be accorded its common, natural, and
ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly
applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . .
When only one interpretation of a contract is possible,
the court need not look outside the four corners of the
contract. . . . Extrinsic evidence is always admissible,
however, to explain an ambiguity appearing in the
instrument. . . . When the language of a contract is
ambiguous, the determination of the parties’ intent is
a question of fact. . . . When the language is clear and
unambiguous, however, the contract must be given
effect according to its terms, and the determination
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of the parties’ intent is a question of law.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Nation-Bailey v. Bailey, 316
Conn. 182, 191–92, 112 A.3d 144 (2015).
The question of whether a contract is ambiguous is
a question of law over which our review is plenary. See
Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Welch Enterprises, Inc., 114
Conn. App. 290, 294, 970 A.2d 730 (2009). ‘‘A contract
is unambiguous when its language is clear and conveys
a definite and precise intent. . . . The court will not
torture words to impart ambiguity where ordinary
meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . . Moreover,
the mere fact that the parties advance different interpre-
tations of the language in question does not necessitate
a conclusion that the language is ambiguous.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Nation-Bailey v. Bailey,
supra, 316 Conn. 192.
Section 46b-86 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Unless
and to the extent that the decree precludes modifica-
tion, any final order for the periodic payment of perma-
nent alimony or support . . . may, at any time there-
after, be continued, set aside, altered or modified by
the court upon a showing of a substantial change in
the circumstances of either party . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.) ‘‘It is a well settled principle of matrimonial
law that courts have the authority under § 46b-86 to
preclude the modification of alimony awards.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) O’Neill v. O’Neill, 209 Conn.
App. 165, 180, 268 A.3d 79 (2021). Although ‘‘[i]t is well
established within our jurisprudence that [p]rovisions
which preclude modification of alimony . . . tend to
be disfavored . . . [n]onmodification provisions that
are clear and unambiguous . . . are enforceable.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Eckert v. Eckert, 285 Conn. 687, 693, 941 A.2d 301 (2008).
‘‘If an order for periodic alimony is meant to be nonmod-
ifiable, the decree must contain language to that effect.
. . . There is no given set of words that must be used
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to preclude modification; an order is nonmodifiable if
the decree distinctly and unambiguously expresses that
it is.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Robaczynski v. Robaczynski, 153 Conn. App. 1,
6, 100 A.3d 408 (2014).
In the present case, the separation agreement unam-
biguously precluded modification of alimony. The non-
modifiability provision expressly provides that ‘‘ali-
mony may not be modifiable as to amount, term or
cohabitation . . . but may terminate sooner should the
[plaintiff] remarry’’ and ‘‘shall also terminate if either
party were to decease.’’ The meaning of this provision
is unambiguous: alimony may not be modified as to
amount or term but may be terminated if the plaintiff
were to remarry and shall be terminated if either party
were to decease. The court, therefore, lacked authority
to grant the defendant’s motion for modification.
Although the defendant argues that the parties
intended only to preclude modification if the plaintiff
received additional income from leasing a portion of
the farm, it is well established that the intent of the
parties to a contract ‘‘must be determined from the
language of the instrument and not from any intention
either of the parties may have secretly entertained.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greenburg v.
Greenburg, 26 Conn. App. 591, 596, 602 A.2d 1056
(1992); see also Celini v. Celini, 115 Conn. App. 371,
378, 973 A.2d 664 (2009) (‘‘[i]t is well settled that we
will not import terms into [an] agreement . . . that are
not reflected in the contract’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Here, nothing in the separation agreement
indicates that the parties intended to limit the otherwise
broad language precluding modification of the amount
or term of alimony. In fact, in executing the separation
agreement, the parties expressly acknowledged that it
‘‘contains the entire understanding of the parties’’ and
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that ‘‘[t]here are no representations, promises, warrant-
ies, covenants or understandings by or between the
parties other than those expressly set forth herein.’’
Moreover, both parties filed affidavits affirming that the
separation agreement ‘‘represents our full agreement
on all issues relating to the dissolution of our marriage
or legal separation, including . . . alimony . . . .’’
Thus, we cannot import a more limited construction
based on an alleged intention of the parties that does
not appear in the language of the agreement.
During oral argument before this court, the defendant
also argued that the nonmodifiability provision should
not be enforced because doing so would cause him an
‘‘extreme financial hardship.’’ The defendant, however,
did not provide us with any authority that supports that
proposition, and our own research has not uncovered
any support for the defendant’s position. As this court
has recognized, ‘‘the mere fact that one party is unhappy
with the results that flow from the language they agreed
to incorporate into an agreement, or the court now
determines that the agreed upon language is no longer
equitable under the circumstance[s] as they have
evolved, is not grounds for the court to rewrite the
contract to provide what it determines to be a more
equitable outcome.’’ (Emphasis added.) Simpson v.
Simpson, 222 Conn. App. 466, 485, 306 A.3d 477 (2023),
cert. granted, 348 Conn. 942, 307 A.3d 909 (2024).
Finally, we reject the defendant’s contention that the
court erred by failing to address his claim that alleged
false representations by the plaintiff warranted modifi-
cation of alimony. ‘‘[I]n determining the threshold
inquiry of a substantial change in circumstances, the
trial court is limited to considering events arising after
the dissolution decree or the most recent modification
thereof.’’ Olson v. Mohammadu, 310 Conn. 665, 675, 81
A.3d 215 (2013); see also Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228
Conn. 729, 737–38, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994) (‘‘[t]o obtain
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a modification, the moving party must demonstrate that
circumstances have changed since the last court order
such that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either
party to it’’ (emphasis added)). Because the defendant’s
motion relied on alleged false representations made by
the plaintiff prior to the date of dissolution, § 46b-86
(a) does not authorize modification of alimony on that
basis. To the extent the defendant claims that the plain-
tiff fraudulently induced him to enter into the separation
agreement, the defendant would be required to raise
such a claim by way of a motion to open the judgment,
not a motion for modification pursuant to § 46b-86 (a).
See, e.g., Gaary v. Gillis, 162 Conn. App. 251, 252 n.1,
131 A.3d 765 (2016) (noting distinction between motion
to modify alimony and motion to open judgment based
on fraud); see also Magowan v. Magowan, 73 Conn.
App. 733, 737, 812 A.2d 30 (2002) (‘‘if the [dissolution]
judgment conforms to the stipulation it cannot be
altered or set aside without the consent of all the parties,
unless it is shown that the stipulation was obtained by
fraud, accident or mistake’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 134
(2003); Pospisil v. Pospisil, 59 Conn. App. 446, 449–50,
757 A.2d 655 (‘‘a marital judgment based upon a stipula-
tion may be opened if the stipulation, and thus judg-
ment, was obtained by fraud . . . [or] by fraudulent
nondisclosure’’ (citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940, 761 A.2d
762 (2000). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
properly denied the defendant’s motion for modifica-
tion.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.