Jacob-Dick v. Dick

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Jacob-Dick v. Dick

JENNIFER R. JACOB-DICK v. CHARLES H. DICK
(AC 46535)
Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Cradle, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the plain-
tiff’s postdissolution motion for contempt with respect to the defendant’s
failure to pay certain child health care expenses. The defendant claimed,
inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt.
Held:

The trial court abused its discretion in finding the defendant in contempt
because, in light of the defendant’s payment of all health care expenses
specified in the plaintiff’s motion for contempt prior to the hearing on the
motion, the defendant’s conduct could not reasonably be viewed as wilful
disobedience of a court order.

This court concluded that, although the defendant’s incarceration following
the trial court’s finding of contempt was improper in light of its conclusion
that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt, the
trial court’s order that the defendant be taken into custody until the alleged
arrearage was purged did not constitute an improper criminal sanction, as
by its plain terms the sanction was conditional in nature and allowed the
defendant to end the sentence and discharge himself by paying the sum of
the arrearage.

Argued November 20, 2024—officially released March 18, 2025

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Fairfield and tried to the court, Hon. Howard
T. Owens, Jr., judge trial referee; judgment dissolving
the marriage and granting certain other relief in accor-
dance with the parties’ settlement agreement; there-
after, the court, Hon. Eddie Rodriguez, Jr., judge trial
referee, granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, and
the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; orders
vacated; judgment directed.
* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
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Jacob-Dick v. Dick

Dana M. Hrelic, with whom were Meagan A. Cauda,
and, on the brief, Jon T. Kukucka, for the appellant
(defendant).
Jenna McPartland, self-represented, filed a brief as
the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The defendant, Charles H. Dick, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court granting the post-
judgment motion for contempt filed by the self-repre-
sented plaintiff, Jennifer R. Jacob-Dick, known also as
Jenna McPartland. On appeal, the defendant claims that
the court (1) abused its discretion in finding him in
contempt and (2) imposed an improper criminal sanc-
tion. We agree with the defendant’s first claim and,
accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The record discloses the following undisputed facts.
The parties married in 2004, and three children were
born of the marriage. Following the subsequent break-
down of their marriage, the parties entered into a com-
prehensive separation agreement that the court incor-
porated into its judgment of dissolution. Pertinent to
this appeal is paragraph 9.2 of that agreement, which
obligates each party to pay 50 percent of the children’s
‘‘reasonable unreimbursed medical, surgical, psychiat-
ric, psychological hospital, dental, optical, and nursing
expenses, and the cost of prescriptive drugs . . . .’’
On October 30, 2015, the court dissolved the marriage,
finding that it had broken down irretrievably without
attributing fault to either party as to the cause.
On October 13, 2022, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment
motion for contempt by completing a form prepared
by the Judicial Branch for use in our family courts.
See Connecticut Judicial Branch form JD-FM-173. That
form asks the applicant to identify the ‘‘Court Order
and ways the Order has not been followed’’ and then
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Jacob-Dick v. Dick

instructs in relevant part: ‘‘List specific language of the
court order you claim is not being followed. Then,
explain exactly how the order is not being followed.
You must be specific. . . .’’ The plaintiff nonetheless
did not list any specific language from a court order
but, rather, stated: ‘‘See attached. See Stipulation
328.00, Order 328.10, Agreement/Order 148.00.’’ In a
document appended to that form, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had failed to pay (1) an outstanding
arrearage of $500 for child health care expenses, (2)
$50 ‘‘for contact lenses for the youngest child,’’ and (3)
$308.50 ‘‘for an eye exam, lens fitting, and contact lenses
for [the] same child.’’1 The plaintiff concluded her
motion by asking the court to hold the defendant in
contempt and order him ‘‘to pay these expenses . . . .’’2
The parties appeared before the court, Hon. Eddie
Rodriguez, Jr., judge trial referee, on March 22, 2023.
When the court inquired as to whether the defendant
was representing himself,3 the defendant replied: ‘‘I am
here today to try and get this matter resolved and dis-
posed hopefully once and for all. In my estimation of
what has been served on me by the plaintiff, it would
cost me more money to have an attorney here, com-
pared to the dollar amounts in question. And so just a
simple cost benefit analysis I decided to show up myself
and I will do my very best under some very difficult
circumstances to represent my interests in my case as
best as I can.’’
1
The plaintiff also alleged in her motion that the defendant had failed to
comply with his child support obligations. The plaintiff withdrew that claim
at the outset of the April 12, 2023 hearing, affirmatively acknowledging that
she was ‘‘not owed any money in child support.’’
2
The total amount of health care expenses specified in the plaintiff’s
motion for contempt is $858.50.
3
The defendant appeared in a self-represented capacity before the trial
court at the March 22 and April 12, 2023 hearings. He subsequently was
represented by counsel at the time of his May 2, 2023 motion for reargument
and reconsideration.
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In response, the court stated: ‘‘I want to advise you
that if you’re found in contempt, you could be incarcer-
ated . . . .’’ When the court then informed him that it
would entertain a reasonable continuance request, the
defendant replied, ‘‘[g]iven what Your Honor has just
said about incarceration, I would make that request.’’
The court then addressed the plaintiff and stated:
‘‘There are certain rules that I have to comply with
and one of them, especially when there’s a real risk of
someone going to jail, is to give that person a last chance
to pony up the money . . . .’’ The court thus continued
the matter until April 12, 2023, and cautioned the defen-
dant as follows: ‘‘I’ll decide your claims and I’ll decide
[the plaintiff’s] claims, and then I’ll make a ruling. But
you’ve been forewarned that if I find you in contempt
of court, I’ll probably incarcerate you. Just beware.’’
On April 5, 2023, the defendant filed an objection to
the motion for contempt, in which he argued, inter
alia, that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the
requirements of Practice Book § 25-27, as her motion
failed to specify ‘‘the relevant and specific language
of the court orders that the plaintiff claims are being
‘wilfully violated’ by the defendant.’’4 The defendant
also claimed that he had made payment to the plaintiff
for all of the health care expenses specified in her
motion for contempt, stating: ‘‘The plaintiff has received
$858.50 in the form of a Schwab Check #106 as a good
faith settlement offer seeking full and final resolution
of her claims in her motion for contempt . . . in lieu
of costly and time-consuming litigation. As of the filing
of this objection, the plaintiff has not yet cashed the
check.’’
4
Practice Book § 25-27 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Each motion for
contempt must state . . . the date and specific language of the order of
the judicial authority on which the motion is based [and] the specific acts
alleged to constitute the contempt of that order, including the amount of
any arrears claimed due as of the date of the motion or a date specifically
identified in the motion . . . .’’
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The court conducted a hearing on April 12, 2023, at
which both parties testified. During her testimony, the
plaintiff confirmed that she had received the check from
the defendant in the amount of $858.50 prior to the
hearing. The plaintiff stated that she ‘‘believe[d] that
check is intended to . . . cure’’ her motion for con-
tempt. The plaintiff testified that she had not cashed
that check because she ‘‘wanted to have a hearing.’’
The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had failed
to pay additional health care expenses beyond those
specified in her motion for contempt.5
In his testimony, the defendant emphasized that he
paid $858.50 to the plaintiff ‘‘last week’’ and that he did
so ‘‘in the hopes that we could have a swift and simple
resolution to this matter.’’ The defendant further testi-
fied that he was ‘‘at a loss for what obligations . . . I
am supposed to fulfill that I have not because I cannot
see them specified in the plaintiff’s motion [for con-
tempt], and . . . the plaintiff has a check in her hand
to cover any and all claimed amounts [in her motion
for contempt] . . . .’’ When the defendant then noted
that a $100,000 trust fund had been established for child
related expenses in accordance with the parties’ separa-
tion agreement, the following colloquy ensued:
‘‘The Court: Sir, that’s all in the record.
‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, so—
‘‘The Court: You don’t have to take my time to read
what’s already available in the record. That’s not in
dispute—
‘‘[The Defendant]: Okay, I was going—
5
The plaintiff testified that the defendant had not paid additional expenses
that were incurred subsequent to the filing of her motion for contempt—
namely, $299 for two dental bills and $219.98 for an order of contact lens.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff did not amend her motion for contempt
to include those expenses.
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‘‘The Court: Don’t interrupt me, man. You’re going
to get into trouble, and it’s not civil contempt. It’s called
criminal contempt. Don’t interrupt a judge when he’s
talking.
‘‘[The Defendant]: I apologize, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: Just don’t do it.
‘‘[The Defendant]: I apologize, Your Honor. I won’t
do it.
‘‘The Court: Just don’t do it. What you’re reading is
not necessary. It’s a waste of my time. It’s a waste of
your ex-wife’s time. It’s a waste of the staff’s time.’’
After the defendant’s testimony concluded, the court
questioned the plaintiff as follows:
‘‘The Court: Okay, is it your testimony that between
March 22 and today, April 12, 2023, you’ve received the
money from [the defendant]?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I received some money from [the
defendant], yes.
‘‘The Court: You did. And is that the check that you
received?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: That is a check, yes.
‘‘The Court: What is the date of the check?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: April 4, 2023.
‘‘The Court: And what is the amount of the check?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: $858.50.
‘‘The Court: Okay.’’
The court then heard closing arguments from the
parties. At the time, the defendant argued that he had
‘‘acted in good faith’’ and reiterated that he had ‘‘sent
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the plaintiff a check in the amount of $858.50 corres-
ponding to what I understood were the [amounts speci-
fied] in her [motion for contempt].’’
When closing arguments concluded, the court stated:
‘‘The testimony of the defendant is found to be not
credible. He spent more time and effort in delaying
payments than he has in being candid with the mother
of his children with regard to payment of [health care]
expenses, which the court believes to be reasonable.
His actions are overwhelmingly, in the court’s opinion,
done in bad faith to delay making his court-ordered
payments in a timely manner. He has engaged histori-
cally throughout the history of this case, postjudgment,
in obstructing the orders of the court and delaying com-
pliance with court-ordered payments. The court finds
[the defendant] in contempt of court. I find an arrearage
total . . . of $1377.75. I’m ordering that you be taken
into custody until you purge that amount. And the mat-
ter is ordered to continue to monitor compliance [on]
Wednesday, April 26. Court stands in recess.’’6
The defendant subsequently filed a motion for reargu-
ment and reconsideration, in which he argued, inter
alia, that the plaintiff’s motion for contempt ‘‘fails to
comply with Practice Book § 25-27 which requires that
a motion for contempt must state the date and specific
6
The court subsequently issued an order, in which it stated that ‘‘the
plaintiff has carried her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant has wilfully violated clear orders of the court.’’ The
court thus found the defendant in contempt and ordered ‘‘the defendant be
committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction with a purge
bond amount of $1377.75.’’ The record before us does not indicate precisely
how long the defendant was incarcerated; in her appellate brief, the plaintiff
avers that the defendant ‘‘was incarcerated for approximately six hours, in
which time he was able to make the correct purge payment.’’ Approximately
two weeks after the April 12, 2023 hearing, the court entered a supplemental
order, which states: ‘‘Upon receipt of the funds for the purge, the Clerk’s
Office is ordered to disburse $1377.75 to [the plaintiff] by sending the funds
to [the plaintiff].’’
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language of the order [and] the specific acts alleged to
constitute contempt of that order . . . .’’ The defen-
dant also argued that the plaintiff, at the April 12, 2023
hearing, ‘‘raised other claims of which the defendant
did not have notice . . . . The plaintiff did not amend
her motion to include these allegations.’’ The court sum-
marily denied that motion by order dated May 19, 2023,
and this appeal followed.
I
The defendant’s primary contention is that the court
abused its discretion in finding him in contempt. On
the undisputed facts of this case, we agree.
‘‘To constitute contempt, it is not enough that a party
has merely violated a court order; the violation must
be wilful. . . . It is the burden of the party seeking an
order of contempt to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, both a clear and unambiguous directive to the
alleged contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful
noncompliance with that directive. . . . [T]he trial
court’s determination that the violation was wilful [is
governed by] the abuse of discretion standard.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted.) Puff v. Puff, 334 Conn. 341, 365–66, 222
A.3d 493 (2020); see also Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn.
324, 336, 915 A.2d 790 (2007) (‘‘[t]he abuse of discretion
standard applies to a trial court’s decision on a motion
for contempt’’). We review the factual findings that
underlie a court’s contempt determination pursuant to
the clearly erroneous standard. See Talbot v. Talbot,
148 Conn. App. 279, 289, 85 A.3d 40, cert. denied, 311
Conn. 954, 97 A.3d 984 (2014).
The appellate courts of this state often are presented
with complex and challenging claims. This is not one
of them. In her motion for contempt, the plaintiff specifi-
cally alleged that the defendant failed to pay a total
of $858.50 in child health care expenses. The record
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unequivocally demonstrates that the defendant ten-
dered payment in that amount to the plaintiff more than
one week prior to the contempt hearing, as the plaintiff
repeatedly acknowledged in her testimony. In light of
that admission, the court’s finding of wilful noncompli-
ance cannot stand.
We are particularly troubled by the fact that, after
the plaintiff admitted on cross-examination that she
received a check from the defendant in the amount of
$858.50 prior to the April 12, 2023 hearing in what she
characterized as an attempt to ‘‘cure’’ her motion for
contempt, the court conducted its own brief examina-
tion of the plaintiff, in which she confirmed not only
her receipt of that check, but the date and amount
thereof. In light of the plaintiff’s admission that the
defendant tendered payment for all of the health care
expenses specified in her motion for contempt prior to
the contempt hearing, the court’s failure to acknowl-
edge the defendant’s compliance in that regard is inex-
plicable.
Moreover, the defendant had no notice prior to the
April 12, 2023 hearing that the plaintiff would be claim-
ing additional unpaid health care expenses as a basis for
her motion for contempt beyond the $858.50 specified
therein. Nevertheless, at the outset of the plaintiff’s
testimony at the hearing, the court stated: ‘‘[E]xplain
to me what it is that you claim [the defendant] has not
paid you with specificity with regard to health care
expenses.’’ The defendant, who was self-represented at
that time, then stated: ‘‘Your Honor, may I ask a ques-
tion?’’ The court replied, ‘‘No.’’ The plaintiff then pro-
ceeded to detail additional health care expenses that
were not included in her motion for contempt. See
footnote 5 of this opinion.
When the plaintiff finished her testimony on direct
examination, the defendant immediately revisited his
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previous attempt to obtain clarification from the court
regarding the scope of the contempt proceeding:
‘‘[The Defendant]: Is now the time where I can ask
Your Honor a question first before I ask her any ques-
tions?
‘‘The Court: You’re going to ask me a question?
‘‘[The Defendant]: Yeah.
‘‘The Court: About what?
‘‘[The Defendant]: Well, I filed [an objection] to her
[motion for contempt] that we are having a discussion
on right now. And all the information that was relayed
in [the plaintiff’s] testimony is not included in the
motion [for contempt], so I came here today—well, if
I read [her motion for contempt], understanding that
her claim for monetary—money that she claimed is
owed is only $800, like $830.’’
In response, the court did not address the substance
of defendant’s objection and simply stated: ‘‘Her testi-
mony is what it is.’’
The defendant then proceeded to cross-examine the
plaintiff in an attempt to ascertain the total amount
of claimed health care expenses. When the defendant
remarked to the plaintiff that ‘‘you testified [that the
motion for contempt] does not specify, enumerate or
total any dollar amounts owed by the defendant,’’ the
court interrupted, stating: ‘‘Her testimony does, sir. So,
let’s move along.’’ The defendant thereafter reiterated
in his closing argument that he had ‘‘sent the plaintiff
a check in the amount of $858.50 corresponding to
what I understood were the [amounts specified] in her
[motion for contempt].’’
Despite the foregoing, the court found the defendant
in contempt for having failed to pay a total of $1377.75
in health care expenses, which sum included the $858.50
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specified in the plaintiff’s motion for contempt. In so
doing, the court ignored the uncontroverted fact that
the defendant paid the plaintiff $858.50 for those health
care expenses prior to the contempt hearing, as the
plaintiff admitted in her testimony. Furthermore, the
court found him in contempt for additional expenses
that were not specified in the motion for contempt, in
contravention of Practice Book § 25-27; see footnote 4
of this opinion; and principles of due process. See New
Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority,
291 Conn. 489, 500, 970 A.2d 570 (2009) (motion for
contempt must set forth alleged misconduct with partic-
ularity to comply with due process requirements); Leo-
nova v. Leonov, 201 Conn. App. 285, 316–17, 242 A.3d
713 (2020) (due process of law requires parties charged
with contempt to be advised of charges against them),
cert. denied, 336 Conn. 906, 244 A.3d 146 (2021).
Civil contempt is ‘‘avoidable through obedience
. . . .’’ International Union, United Mine Workers of
America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827, 114 S. Ct. 2552,
129 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1994). In light of the defendant’s
payment of all health care expenses specified in the
plaintiff’s motion for contempt prior to the April 12,
2023 hearing, the defendant’s conduct cannot reason-
ably be viewed as wilful disobedience of a court order.
See Connolly v. Connolly, 191 Conn. 468, 483, 464 A.2d
837 (1983). We therefore conclude that the court abused
its discretion in finding the defendant in contempt.
II
The defendant also argues that the court imposed an
improper criminal sanction by ordering his immediate
incarceration until the arrearage was purged.7 Although
7
In the introduction section of his principal appellate brief, the defendant
relatedly contends that ‘‘because the sanctions imposed were . . . criminal
in nature . . . expungement of the record of incarceration is also war-
ranted.’’ Apart from that prefatory statement, the defendant provided no
mention or analysis of this contention in either his principal or reply brief,
rendering it inadequately briefed. See, e.g., Taylor v. Mucci, 288 Conn. 379,
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we agree that his incarceration was improper in light
of our conclusion in part I of this opinion, we disagree
that the court’s order constituted an improper criminal
sanction.
We begin by noting that ‘‘[t]he court’s authority to
impose civil contempt penalties arises not from statu-
tory provisions but from the common law. . . . The
penalties which may be imposed . . . arise from the
inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with
its orders. In Connecticut, the court has the authority
in civil contempt to impose on the contemnor either
incarceration or a fine or both.’’ (Citations omitted.)
Papa v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, 186 Conn.
725, 737–38, 444 A.2d 196 (1982). The abuse of discretion
standard governs claims involving the propriety of a
civil contempt sanction ordered by the court. See id.,
738; Edmond v. Foisey, 111 Conn. App. 760, 774, 961
A.2d 441 (2008).
As the United States Supreme Court has explained,
the critical consideration in determining whether a
sanction is civil or criminal in nature is ‘‘the character
of the relief that the proceeding will afford. If it is for
civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the
benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal con-
tempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority
of the court. . . . If the relief provided is a sentence
of imprisonment, it is remedial if the defendant stands
committed unless and until he performs the affirmative
act required by the court’s order, and is punitive if
the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite
period.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631–32, 108 S.
Ct. 1423, 99 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1988); accord Ullmann v.
State, 230 Conn. 698, 709, 647 A.2d 324 (1994) (‘‘it is
383 n.4, 952 A.2d 776 (2008). We therefore decline to review that abstract
assertion.
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Jacob-Dick v. Dick

the nature of the relief itself that is instructive in
determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal’’).
The court emphasized that ‘‘the conditional nature of
the punishment renders the relief civil in nature because
the contemnor can end the sentence and discharge him-
self at any moment by doing what he had previously
refused to do.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Hicks v. Feiock, supra, 633; see also Shillitani v. United
States, 384 U.S. 364, 368, 86 S. Ct. 1531, 16 L. Ed. 2d
622 (1966) (‘‘[w]hen the [contemnors] carry the keys
of their prison in their own pockets . . . the action is
essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of
other parties and has quite properly been exercised for
centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees’’
(citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted));
Mays v. Mays, 193 Conn. 261, 266, 476 A.2d 562 (1984)
(‘‘[t]he sanction of confinement until purged’’ is prop-
erly ‘‘classified as civil rather than criminal’’ because
‘‘the contemnor [is] in a position to purge himself’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Bound by that precedent, we conclude that the sanc-
tion in the present case was civil in nature. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court found the defendant
in contempt and found an arrearage of $1377.75. It then
stated to the defendant: ‘‘I’m ordering that you be taken
into custody until you purge that amount.’’ By its plain
terms, that sanction was conditional in nature and
allowed the defendant to end the sentence and dis-
charge himself by paying that sum. For that reason, we
conclude that the court’s order did not constitute an
improper criminal sanction.
The judgment of contempt is reversed and the orders
stemming from that judgment are vacated, and the case
is remanded with direction to deny the plaintiff’s Octo-
ber 13, 2022 motion for contempt.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.