Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Pizzoferrato v. Mansions, LLC

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Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel.
Pizzoferrato v. Mansions, LLC

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS &
OPPORTUNITIES EX REL. WENDY
PIZZOFERRATO ET AL. v. THE
MANSIONS, LLC, ET AL.
(AC 46774)
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The defendants appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff
commission and the intervening individual plaintiffs, W and R, finding that
the defendants violated the state fair housing laws (§ 46a-64b et seq.) by
constructively denying the individual plaintiffs’ request for an accommoda-
tion of the defendants’ no pets policy for W’s two emotional support dogs.
The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined
that two emotional support dogs were necessary for W’s equal use and
enjoyment of the dwelling. Held:

The defendants’ claim that the trial court improperly concluded that W
suffered from a disability that required an accommodation when the court
found only that the defendants regarded her as being disabled was without
merit because the court also found that the plaintiffs satisfied their burden
of proving that W had a ‘‘record of’’ having a mental disability within the
meaning of the statute (§ 46a-51 (20)).

The trial court improperly concluded that the plaintiffs met their burden of
showing that two emotional support dogs were necessary for W’s equal use
and enjoyment of the dwelling, as the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, was insufficient as a
matter of law to prove that both dogs were necessary to ameliorate the
effects of W’s mental disability.
Argued September 10, 2024—officially released March 4, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, alleged
housing discrimination, and for other relief, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland,
where the court, Gordon, J., granted the motion to
intervene filed by Wendy Pizzoferrato et al.; thereafter,
the case was tried to the court, Huddleston, J.; judgment
for the plaintiffs, from which the defendants appealed
to this court. Reversed; judgment directed.
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Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel.
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Richard M. Hunt, pro hac vice, with whom, on the
brief, was Maria K. Tougas, for the appellants (defen-
dants).
Libby Reinish, human rights attorney, with whom
was Michelle Dumas Keuler, for the appellee (named
plaintiff).
Robert F. Kappes, for the appellees (intervening
plaintiffs).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. In this housing discrimination action,
the defendants, The Mansions, LLC (Mansions), 75
Hockanum, Inc., and Candace Barnard,1 appeal from
the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a court
trial, in favor of the plaintiff, the Commission on Human
Rights and Opportunities (commission), and the
intervening plaintiffs, Wendy Pizzoferrato (Wendy) and
Rudy Pizzoferrato (Rudy).2 The court found that the
defendants violated the state fair housing laws, General
Statutes § 46a-64b et seq., by constructively denying
the Pizzoferratos’ request for an accommodation of the
defendants’ ‘‘no pets’’ policy for Wendy’s two emotional
support dogs. On appeal, the defendants claim that the
court improperly concluded that (1) Wendy needed her
emotional support dogs to ameliorate the effects of a
disability when the court found only that the defendants
regarded her as being disabled and not that she actually
was disabled, (2) two emotional support dogs were
necessary for Wendy’s equal use and enjoyment of the
dwelling, and (3) the defendants constructively denied
the Pizzoferratos’ request for an accommodation. We
1
Mansions is the owner of an apartment complex in Vernon, 75 Hockanum,
Inc., is the managing entity for Mansions, and Barnard is the director of
operations for Mansions.
2
The Pizzoferratos filed a notice with this court adopting the appellate
brief filed by the commission. For ease of discussion, we refer to the commis-
sion and the Pizzoferratos collectively as the plaintiffs.
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agree with the defendants’ second claim and, therefore,
reverse the judgment of the trial court.3
The following facts, as found by the court, and proce-
dural history are relevant to our analysis of the defen-
dants’ claims. ‘‘In 2017, the Pizzoferratos sold [their
house] and moved into an apartment complex known
as Vintage at the Grove (Vintage). At the time, they had
two pet Shih Tzu dogs. Vintage was ‘pet friendly’ but
charged a monthly fee for the two dogs. [Wendy]
became friends with a manager at Vintage, who told
her that the pet fees would be waived if the dogs were
emotional support animals. The manager also gave her
the name of a therapist, who in turn recommended
Maurice LaPointe, a licensed marital and family thera-
pist. [Wendy] contacted [LaPointe] and met with him.
[LaPointe] subsequently provided a certification for Vin-
tage that [Wendy] ‘suffers from moderate anxiety and
that her two canines provide relief.’ Vintage accepted
[LaPointe’s] certification and stopped charging the pet
fees. . . .
‘‘In 2019, [the Pizzoferratos] began to look for a less
expensive apartment. They first visited Mansions’ rental
office in May, 2019. Victoria Dumeng and Amanda Proto
greeted them. Dumeng, who introduced herself as a
Mansions employee, said she would answer all their
questions. . . . The Pizzoferratos were impressed by
the complex, although the apartment was not quite what
they wanted. Before paying a $200 application fee, they
asked whether their two dogs would be a problem.
[Dumeng] answered that ‘all you need is a note from
your doctor.’ The Pizzoferratos completed a rental
application on May 25, 2019, in which they identified
3
Because we conclude that the defendants are entitled to judgment in
their favor due to the plaintiffs’ failure to establish that the requested accom-
modation was necessary for Wendy’s equal use and enjoyment of the dwell-
ing, we do not consider whether the court properly found that the defendants
constructively denied the Pizzoferratos’ request.
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their two dogs as ‘assistance animals.’ They did not
obtain an apartment at Mansions at that time.
‘‘In October, 2019, they again visited Mansions for a
tour of a townhouse unit. They again went to Mansions’
rental office, where [Dumeng] and [Proto] worked.
Before touring the townhouse, [Wendy] again asked
[Dumeng] if her two support animals would be a prob-
lem in light of Mansions’ no pet policy. [Dumeng] said
that all she would need was a note from her doctor.
They toured the townhouse unit, which met their needs
and suited their preferences. . . . They submitted
online rental applications on October 22, 2019, which
were accepted by [Dumeng] and processed by [Proto].
The online application form contained a section . . .
for identifying two pets and boxes to check regarding
‘assistance animal status.’ [Rudy’s] application indi-
cated that they had two dogs. His application stated
the names, ages, breed, and weights of the two dogs
and checked the ‘yes’ box on the line for ‘assistance
animal status.’
‘‘On October 22, 2019, the same day that they submit-
ted the Mansions rental application, and before that
application was approved by Mansions, the Pizzofer-
ratos gave notice to Vintage that they would be vacating
their Vintage apartment by December 22, 2019. . . .
On October 23, 2019, [Wendy] obtained Mansions’
‘Request for Accommodation’ form and provided it to
[LaPointe], who completed it for her. The form was
preprinted with seven paragraphs, each of which had
blanks for the responding provider to fill in.4 . . .
LaPointe wrote ‘[Wendy]’ [for] the patient’s name,
4
‘‘The preprinted paragraph 7 provided as follows:
‘‘ ‘For requests related to emotional support or therapy animals only:
___________’s (name of patient) animal, a ___________ (species and breed),
provides emotional support that alleviates the listed symptoms of
___________’s (name of patient) mental impairment. (List the symptoms):
_______________.’ ’’
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‘shitzu’ after ‘a’ and before ‘(species and breed),’ and
‘panic attacks’ . . . for symptoms.
‘‘[Wendy] submitted the completed form to Mansions
on October 24, 2019. [Dumeng] forwarded the accom-
modation request to Richard Hunt, a Texas attorney
whose practice focuses on the federal Fair Housing Act
[(FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2024)] and who advises
Mansions on fair housing issues. According to an entry
dated October 24, 2019, in an activity log maintained
by Mansions, [Dumeng] noted that ‘Richard approved
the request.’ By email sent on October 25, 2019, [Proto]
informed the Pizzoferratos that their rental application
had been accepted and told them how to access and
sign their lease electronically. The Pizzoferratos signed
and submitted the lease documents the same day. By
email [sent] on October 26, 2019, [Dumeng] advised
[Wendy] that her accommodation request had been
approved. Attached to [that] email were an ‘Animal
Addendum’ and a ‘Support or Service Animal Amend-
ment to Animal Addendum’ for the Pizzoferratos to
complete. [Rudy] returned the completed forms to Man-
sions. The completed forms identified the same two
dogs that the Pizzoferratos had identified on their rental
application.
‘‘It was at that point that problems arose. Although
both the rental application and the animal addendum
had spaces for identifying two animals, and the Pizzofer-
ratos had clearly identified their two dogs on both of
those forms, the accommodation request form had only
one space. Observing that the Pizzoferratos’ animal
addendum listed two dogs, [Dumeng] sought advice
from [Hunt]. He advised her to notify [Wendy] ‘that the
original request was for one dog and that we would be
able to accept the one dog as an exception to our no-
pet policy, however, not the second one.’ [Dumeng]
accordingly sent an email to [Wendy] on November 1,
2019, that stated in relevant part: ‘We approved your
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request for accommodation based on information from
your therapist indicating you needed one dog as an
emotion[al] support animal to mitigate the symptoms
of your anxiety. There was no indication that you
needed two dogs. We will permit the one emotional
support dog as an exception to our no pets policy, but
not the other.’
‘‘Before [Wendy] read that email, she appeared at
Mansions’ office to provide copies of the dogs’ vaccina-
tion records and dog licenses for the town of Vernon,
which she had obtained at Mansions’ request. According
to [Dumeng’s] note in Mansions’ activity log, [Wendy]
was ‘made aware of the email and that proof for the
need of the second dog was necessary in order to
approve [its] residency on the property. She had her
husband Rudy email over the form that they had sup-
plied to their previous residence.’ The form that
[LaPointe] had provided to Vintage, and that the Pizzof-
erratos now provided to Mansions, stated that [Wendy]
‘suffers from moderate anxiety and that her two canines
provide relief.’ [Wendy] testified that [Dumeng] told her
‘that should be fine.’ However, [Dumeng] forwarded
the Vintage accommodation form to [Hunt] ‘to review
and advise.’
‘‘According to Mansions’ activity log, on November
6, 2019, [Hunt] advised that ‘we have a few different
ways to go about this, depending on if we wanted to
lose the resident or possibly incur a complaint.’ . . .
Dumeng passed the issue to [Barnard] to proceed.
‘‘[Barnard], Mansions’ director of operations, testified
that ‘final authority to grant or deny housing accommo-
dation requests’ rested with her. She had been away
from the office when the Pizzoferratos submitted their
rental application, accommodation request, and other
documents. On November 6, 2019, she learned of the
issue regarding the Pizzoferratos’ second dog. On the
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same day, she sent an email to [Wendy], advising her
that Mansions needed additional information to con-
sider the second dog because the document provided
by [LaPointe] ‘does not constitute reliable evidence of
a disability related need for a second emotional support
dog.’ She further stated that to consider the second
dog, Mansions would need to have [LaPointe] provide
the following:
‘‘ ‘An explanation, on [his] letterhead, of why your
anxiety requires not one, but two emotional support
animals, along with a reference to scientific studies or
papers justifying the conclusion that two animals will
better control your anxiety than one.’
‘‘ ‘An explanation of why [his] original document
mentioned only a single emotional support animal.’
‘‘ ‘A statement based on [his] sessions with you of
how frequently your anxiety is so acute you cannot
leave your apartment.’
‘‘In addition, [Barnard’s] email stated, ‘we need to
know whether you take one or both of your dogs with
you to work on a daily basis.’ She concluded that ‘[o]nce
you provide this additional information we will evaluate
your request for accommodation with respect to a sec-
ond dog.’
‘‘[Wendy] was very upset by this email. She believed
that Mansions was requesting her therapist’s treatment
notes, which she regarded as private; she did not believe
there were scientific papers of the sort requested by
[Barnard]; and she thought the email indicated that
Mansions did not want the Pizzoferratos as tenants.
[Rudy] was also upset. He said ‘it was clear they didn’t
want us here.’ The Pizzoferratos had already given
notice that they were terminating their lease at Vintage,
effective as of December 22, 2019, which gave them
only a few weeks to find alternative housing. [Rudy]
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was concerned that if they provided additional informa-
tion to fulfill Mansions’ ‘impossible demands,’ ‘they
would just come up with more because . . . they didn’t
want us there.’ They concluded that they needed to find
another place to live as quickly as possible.
‘‘On November 8, 2019, [Wendy] emailed a lengthy
emotional response to [Barnard], describing [Barnard’s]
actions as ‘vile and evil’ and violative of fair housing
laws and health privacy laws. She requested a refund of
all money that the Pizzoferratos had paid to Mansions.
Mansions’ activity log indicates that as of November
12, 2019, the lease was canceled. The Pizzoferratos
admitted that Mansions refunded all money that the
Pizzoferratos had paid it.
‘‘The Pizzoferratos did locate alternative housing.
They considered it to be inferior to Mansions because
it was smaller, more dated, and lacked the amenities
that had drawn them to Mansions. They moved into a
rental unit . . . for approximately [one] year before
buying a new residence.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote
added; footnotes omitted.)
The Pizzoferratos filed a discriminatory practice com-
plaint with the commission pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 46a-82. After an initial investigation, the commis-
sion found that there was reasonable cause to believe
that a discriminatory practice had been committed, and
both the Pizzoferratos and the defendants elected a
civil action in lieu of an administrative hearing pursuant
to General Statutes § 46a-83 (g) (2). The commission
thereafter filed the underlying action against the defen-
dants, alleging that the defendants discriminated
against the Pizzoferratos on the basis of Wendy’s dis-
ability by, among other things, denying their request
for a reasonable accommodation in violation of General
Statutes § 46a-64c. The plaintiffs asserted that Wendy
has a mental disability within the meaning of General
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Statutes § 46a-51 (20), which provides that ‘‘ ‘[m]ental
disability’ refers to an individual who has a record of,
or is regarded as having one or more mental disorders,
as defined in the most recent edition of the American
Psychiatric Association’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders [(DSM)]’ . . . .’’
The case proceeded to a court trial, which spanned
two days in October, 2022. Wendy, Rudy, LaPointe, and
Barnard all testified at trial, and the defendants also
presented videos of the depositions of two psycholo-
gists, Cassandra Boness and Dennis Perez, who testified
as experts for the defendants. At the conclusion of
the plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, the defendants moved for
a judgment of dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 15-
8 for failure to make out a prima facie case. The defen-
dants’ counsel argued that the plaintiffs failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish that Wendy had a dis-
ability and that the defendants constructively denied
her request for a reasonable accommodation. More spe-
cifically, the defendants’ counsel argued that LaPointe’s
testimony was not credible because he failed to testify
regarding the specific diagnostic criteria he applied in
diagnosing Wendy and that nothing written in Barnard’s
November 6 email could be construed as a denial of
Wendy’s requested accommodation.
In response, both the commission’s counsel and
counsel for the Pizzoferratos argued that, because
Wendy requested an accommodation, which the defen-
dants initially granted on the basis of the information
Wendy provided to them about her disability, there was
sufficient evidence that she is disabled within the mean-
ing of § 46a-51 (20). They further argued that Barnard’s
November 6 email requesting, among other things, sci-
entific studies demonstrating the need for two support
animals was a constructive denial of Wendy’s request
because the defendants asked for studies that their own
experts asserted do not exist. The court, Huddleston,
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J., reserved judgment on the motion, and the defendants
presented their case-in-chief, which included testimony
from Barnard and videos of the depositions of Boness
and Perez.
In their posttrial briefs, the plaintiffs argued that the
testimony of both Wendy and LaPointe established that
she has a record of having generalized anxiety disorder,
a recognized diagnosis under the DSM, and that the
defendants’ granting of the accommodation request for
one dog established that Wendy was ‘‘regarded as’’ hav-
ing a disability. The defendants, however, argued that
the plaintiffs ‘‘presented no credible evidence at trial
that [Wendy] had a disability, that she needed the
accommodation, or that the accommodation was
refused.’’ As to LaPointe’s testimony, the defendants
argued that given ‘‘the discrepancy between his treat-
ment notes and [both] the diagnostic criteria for gener-
alized anxiety disorder and [Perez’] expert testimony,
the [plaintiffs] failed to provide evidence making it more
probable than not that [Wendy] suffered from a mental
disorder diagnosed in the DSM. Thus, they failed to
prove she had a ‘mental disability’ as defined in . . .
§ 46a-51 (20).’’
On July 28, 2023, the court issued a memorandum of
decision, rendering judgment for the plaintiffs. The
court concluded that the definition of ‘‘mental disabil-
ity’’ in § 46a-51 (20) applies to state fair housing claims5
and that the plaintiffs had established that Wendy has
a mental disability within the meaning of the statute.
5
On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly concluded
that § 46a-51 (20) applies to fair housing claims. In their posttrial brief in
the trial court, however, the defendants argued that Wendy ‘‘was required
to prove her disability as a ‘handicap’ under the [FHA] or to rely on the
‘includes, but is not limited to’ language in § 46a-64b (8) to find some other
definition of a mental disability under Connecticut law. That alternative
definition is found in . . . § 46a-51 (20) . . . .’’ After the parties filed their
posttrial briefs, during oral argument before the trial court, the defendants’
counsel again argued that ‘‘[t]here are two definitions of disability. One is
the Connecticut definition of a mental disability or mental impairment. The
other is the [FHA] . . . .’’
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‘‘[A] party cannot take a path at trial and change tactics on appeal. . . .
[T]he term induced error, or invited error, has been defined as [a]n error that
a party cannot complain of on appeal because the party, through conduct,
encouraged or prompted the trial court to make the [alleged] erroneous
ruling. . . . It is well established that a party who induces an error cannot
be heard to later complain about that error. . . . This principle bars appel-
late review of induced nonconstitutional error and induced constitutional
error. . . . The invited error doctrine rests [on principles] of fairness, both
to the trial court and to the opposing party.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gladstein v. Goldfield, 163 Conn. App. 579, 585,
137 A.3d 60 (2016), appeal dismissed, 325 Conn. 418, 159 A.3d 661 (2017).
The record demonstrates that the plaintiffs expressly relied on the defini-
tion of mental disability in § 46a-51 (20) and that the defendants argued that
the plaintiffs had failed to establish that Wendy satisfied either prong of
that definition. On appeal, however, the defendants attempt to pursue a
different claim, arguing that, ‘‘[d]espite the ‘includes, but is not limited to’
language, the legislature’s deliberate exclusion of the definition of ‘mental
disability’ while explicitly including the definition of ‘physical disability’
clearly indicates an intent that the definition of ‘mental disability’ in [§] 46a-
51 (20) does not apply to the phrase ‘physical or mental disability’ used in
[§] 46a-64b.’’ They rely on ‘‘the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius—the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another—[under
which] we presume that when the legislature expresses items as part of a
group or series, an item that was not included was deliberately excluded.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mayer v. Historic District Commission,
325 Conn. 765, 776, 160 A.3d 333 (2017).
We question the application of the defendants’ proffered canon of statutory
construction given that § 46a-64b (8) expressly provides that the definitions
of physical and mental disability are ‘‘not limited to’’ the expressed items
in the series that follows. See Woodbridge Newton Neighborhood Environ-
mental Trust v. Connecticut Siting Council, 349 Conn. 619, 637–38, 321
A.3d 363 (2024) (‘‘The statute makes clear . . . that the list is not exclusive,
because it provides that significant adverse effects ‘includ[e], but [are] not
limited to,’ the expressly listed factors. . . . Accordingly, the legislature
has not ruled out the possibility that there may be unenumerated, significant
adverse effects that must be considered . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)). Never-
theless, because the defendants not only failed to raise this claim before
the trial court but also invited the court to apply § 46a-51 (20), we decline
to review it. See Gladstein v. Goldfield, supra, 163 Conn. App. 584–85 (declin-
ing to review plaintiff’s unpreserved claim that ‘‘definition of mistake, as
advanced by all parties at trial and embraced by the trial court, was incorrect’’
because ‘‘she induced the action of the court from which she now com-
plains’’); see also Healey v. Haymond Law Firm, P.C., 174 Conn. App. 230,
241 n.6, 166 A.3d 10 (2017) (‘‘It may be misleading, however, to refer to this
doctrine simply as ‘induced error.’ . . . Given that the doctrine implicates
only a claim’s reviewability, our jurisprudence is clear that the doctrine
does not require us to address the merits of the claim.’’ (Emphasis omitted.));
Gladstein v. Goldfield, supra, 585 n.3 (‘‘[b]ecause we conclude that the
plaintiff’s claim is not reviewable, we need not determine whether the court’s
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The court first reasoned that, ‘‘[i]n approving the accom-
modation request, [the defendants] treated [Wendy] as
having a mental disability and as having established
that an emotional support animal would alleviate at
least one or more symptoms of her disability. [There-
fore] [t]he plaintiffs met their burden of proving that
[Wendy] was ‘regarded as’ having a disability and thus
was disabled within the terms of both § 46a-64b (8)
. . . and § 46a-51 (20).’’
The court then rejected the defendants’ contentions
that LaPointe, as a licensed marriage and family thera-
pist, is unqualified to provide a DSM diagnosis and that
there was insufficient factual support for LaPointe’s
diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder. The court
reasoned that ‘‘[t]he claim that a licensed marital and
family therapist is categorically unqualified by training
and experience to make a DSM diagnosis is inconsistent
with General Statutes § 20-195a (3), which defines the
scope of practice for licensed marital and family thera-
pists.6 . . . Although marital and family therapists
work ‘within the context of marriage and family sys-
tems,’ they are authorized by law to make diagnoses
within that framework. . . .
‘‘LaPointe testified credibly that he had completed
three years in a master’s degree program in marriage
and family counseling, had a thousand client contact
hours before taking the licensure examination, and had
several internships before being licensed in 2002 as a
marriage and family therapist. Since then, he has taken
interpretation of the term ‘mistake’ in [General Statutes] § 52-109 was
proper’’).
6
General Statutes § 20-195a (3) provides: ‘‘ ‘Marital and family therapy’
means the evaluation, assessment, diagnosis, counseling, management and
treatment of emotional disorders, whether cognitive, affective or behavioral,
within the context of marriage and family systems, through the professional
application of individual psychotherapeutic and family-systems theories and
techniques in the delivery of services to individuals, couples and families
. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
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continuing education courses, attended workshops, and
read literature to keep current in his field. Under § 7-
2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, he was qualified
by education and experience to testify as an expert
within his field, including the diagnosis of ‘emotional
disorders, whether cognitive, affective, or behavioral’ in
the context of marriage and family systems.’’ (Footnote
added.)

As to whether LaPointe correctly diagnosed Wendy
with generalized anxiety disorder, the court reasoned
that ‘‘Perez testified as to the shortcomings in
[LaPointe’s] diagnosis, stating that the record did not
contain sufficient information about the frequency,
duration, and severity of [Wendy’s] anxiety and that
[LaPointe] lacked information with respect to certain
of the DSM criteria for a generalized anxiety disorder
diagnosis. If, as the defendants contend, the definition
of ‘mental disability’ in § 46a-51 (20) required a plaintiff
to prove that he or she has been accurately diagnosed
with one or more mental disorders as defined in the
DSM, the court would be inclined to agree that the
plaintiffs’ proof was insufficient. [LaPointe] did not
apply the DSM criteria with mathematical precision.
. . . Nevertheless, he did document symptoms she
reported that are consistent with generalized anxiety
disorder, including excessive worry, difficulty concen-
trating, difficulties sleeping, and body aches. Based on
his observations of [Wendy], he testified: ‘I believe
[Wendy] is an anxious person, and has been an anxious
person for a long time, and that encounters . . . with
her son . . . would activate anxious symptoms which
she suffers from.’ He stood by his diagnosis of general-
ized anxiety disorder. Whether . . . he properly
applied all the DSM criteria, the court is persuaded
that he made his diagnosis in good faith based on his
personal observations of [Wendy] in therapy sessions.
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‘‘Contrary to the defendants’ claims, the accuracy of
[LaPointe’s] DSM diagnosis is not the dispositive issue.
As previously discussed, the definition of ‘mental dis-
ability’ in § 46a-51 (20) is not limited to persons who
have a mental disorder as defined by the DSM, but
includes any individual ‘who has a record of, or is
regarded as having one or more mental disorders,’ as
defined in the DSM. Because the defendants treated
[Wendy] as having a disability when they granted her
accommodation request, the plaintiffs have proved that
[Wendy] was a person with a mental disability within
the meaning of § 46a-51 (20).’’ (Emphasis in original;
footnotes omitted.)
The court then concluded that having two dogs rather
than one was ‘‘necessary’’ for Wendy’s equal enjoyment
of the apartment within the meaning of § 46a-64c (a)
(6) (B) (ii) because Wendy ‘‘testified that she relied on
the two dogs for different types of comfort and support
when she had panic attacks.’’ Finally, the court con-
cluded that the defendants constructively denied the
request for accommodation when they requested addi-
tional documentation, which the plaintiffs ‘‘reasonably
construed . . . as indicating that Mansions did not
want them there.’’ Accordingly, the trial court rendered
judgment for the plaintiffs. The court imposed a $3300
civil penalty against each defendant and awarded
Wendy $7500 and Rudy $5000 in damages for emotional
distress. This appeal followed.
‘‘In order to prove a failure-to-accommodate claim,
a plaintiff must show (1) that the plaintiff or a person
who would live with the plaintiff had a [disability] within
the meaning of § [46a-64c]; (2) that the defendant knew
or reasonably should have been expected to know of
the [disability]; (3) that the accommodation [may be]
necessary to afford the [disabled] person an equal
opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the
accommodation requested was reasonable; and (5) that
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the defendant refused to make the requested accommo-
dation.’’ Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140, 156
(2d Cir. 2014).7 On appeal, the defendants claim that
the plaintiffs failed to establish two of these necessary
elements—namely, that Wendy has a disability within
the meaning of the state fair housing laws and that the
requested accommodation for two emotional support
dogs was necessary to afford her an equal opportunity
to use and enjoy the dwelling. We address each claim
in turn.
I
The defendants claim that the court improperly con-
cluded that Wendy suffered from a disability that
required an accommodation when the court found only
that the defendants regarded her as being disabled.
They argue that ‘‘[o]nce the trial court found that
[Wendy] did not suffer from any real disability or handi-
cap, a finding that her requested accommodation was
necessary for her equal use and enjoyment of the apart-
ment because of her disability became impossible. A
7
‘‘[W]hen the overlap between state and federal law is deliberate, as in
this case, federal decisions are particularly persuasive.’’ Commission on
Human Rights & Opportunities v. Savin Rock Condominium Assn., Inc.,
273 Conn. 373, 386, 870 A.2d 457 (2005). Thus, in addressing claims brought
under ‘‘our state fair housing laws, we are guided by the cases interpreting
federal fair housing laws . . . despite differences between the state and
federal statutes.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. William
Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 343 Conn. 31, 43, 272 A.3d 150 (2022); see also
Webster Bank v. Oakley, 265 Conn. 539, 568, 830 A.2d 139 (2003) (‘‘[i]t is
well established that in addressing claims brought under both federal and
state housing laws, we are guided by the cases interpreting federal fair
housing laws . . . despite differences between the state and federal stat-
utes’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903, 124 S.
Ct. 1603, 158 L. Ed. 2d 244 (2004). Nevertheless, it is also well settled that
‘‘federal law defines the beginning and not the end of our approach to the
subject. . . . [Thus], we have interpreted our statutes even more broadly
than their federal counterparts, to provide greater protections to our citizens,
especially in the area of civil rights.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Commission on Human Rights & Oppor-
tunities v. Savin Rock Condominium Assn., Inc., supra, 386 n.11.
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disability that arises from a mistaken belief by the land-
lord cannot give rise to a need for an accommodation.’’
The plaintiffs respond that the court found that Wendy
satisfied both prongs of the definition of ‘‘mental disabil-
ity’’ under § 46a-51 (20) because it ‘‘found that [Wendy]
had a record of [generalized anxiety disorder], a mental
disorder in the DSM,’’ and ‘‘that the [defendants]
regarded [Wendy] as having this disorder. . . . But
either finding, standing alone, is sufficient to hold that
[Wendy] is a person with a mental disability.’’ (Citation
omitted; footnote omitted.) We conclude that the defen-
dants’ claim is without merit because the court found
that the plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proving that
Wendy has a ‘‘record of’’ having a mental disability
within the meaning of § 46a-51 (20).8
Our resolution of the defendants’ claim requires that
we construe the court’s judgment and the relevant stat-
utes. Accordingly, our review is plenary. See Rader v.
Valeri, 223 Conn. App. 243, 257, 308 A.3d 66 (construc-
tion of court’s judgment is question of law subject to
plenary review), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 959, 312 A.3d
37 (2024); see also Lopez v. William Raveis Real Estate,
Inc., 343 Conn. 31, 41–42, 272 A.3d 150 (2022) (statutory
construction raises question of law subject to plenary
review). ‘‘It is well settled that we follow the plain
meaning rule pursuant to General Statutes § 1-2z in
construing statutes to ascertain and give effect to the
apparent intent of the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Lopez v. William Raveis Real Estate,
Inc., supra, 42.
Pursuant to § 46a-64b (8), ‘‘ ‘[p]hysical or mental dis-
ability’ includes, but is not limited to, intellectual dis-
ability, as defined in section 1-1g, and physical disabil-
ity, as defined in subdivision (15) of section 46a-51, and
8
Our conclusion as to the ‘‘record of’’ prong, discussed further in this
opinion, renders moot the defendants’ claim that the court improperly found
that the defendants regarded Wendy as being disabled.
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also includes, but is not limited to, persons who have
a handicap as that term is defined in the [FHA].’’ The
FHA9 defines ‘‘Handicap’’ as ‘‘(1) a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person’s major life activities, (2) a record of having
such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having
such an impairment . . . .’’ 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h) (2024).
‘‘The first definition is often referred to as the ‘actual
disability’ prong, and the [second and] third as the
[record of and] ‘regarded as’ prong[s].’’ SoCal Recovery,
LLC v. Costa Mesa, 56 F.4th 802, 812–13 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, U.S. , 144 S. Ct. 422, 217 L. Ed. 2d 234
(2023). ‘‘Though the FHA uses the word ‘handicap’
instead of ‘disability,’ ‘handicap’ is defined using the
same three alternative definitional prongs as ‘disability’
under the [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)].
Thus, the words ‘handicap’ and ‘disability’ are construed
to have the same meaning.’’10 Id., 811; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102 (1) (2024).
9
‘‘The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 amended the [FHA] to bar
housing discrimination against the handicapped. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6,
102 Stat. 1619, 1620–22 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)).’’ Davis v. Echo Valley
Condominium Assn., 945 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 162, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1099 (2020).
10
‘‘Until 2008, the ADA definition of ‘disability’ was virtually identical to
the FHA definition of ‘handicap,’ and so the [c]ourt’s interpretation of the
ADA was frequently applied to the FHA.’’ Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty,
Inc., 788 F.3d 31, 40 n.10 (2d Cir. 2015). ‘‘The definition of ‘disability’ under
the ADA was previously interpreted narrowly. . . . In 2008, however, Con-
gress passed the ADA Amendments Act (the ‘ADAAA’) . . . which broad-
ened the definition of ‘disability’ under the ADA. . . . ‘[T]he principal pur-
pose of the ADAAA was to overrule the [United States] Supreme Court’s
arguably narrow interpretation of what constitutes an ADA-qualifying dis-
ability . . . and to make clear that the substantial-limitation requirement
in the definition of ‘‘disability’’ is not an exacting one.’ ’’ (Citations omitted.)
Hamilton v. Westchester County, 3 F.4th 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2021). ‘‘The FHA,
however, was not similarly amended and so our FHA interpretation is still
guided by pre-ADAAA cases.’’ Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty, Inc., supra,
40 n.10.
We note that, because § 46a-51 (20) does not include the federal defini-
tion’s substantial limitation requirement, the distinction between cases
decided before and after the ADAAA has no bearing on our analysis in the
present case.
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Accordingly, under federal law ‘‘[i]t is insufficient for
individuals attempting to prove disability status under
this [definition] to merely submit evidence of a medical
diagnosis of an impairment. Instead, the ADA requires
those claiming [to be disabled] . . . to prove a disabil-
ity by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation
[caused by their impairment] in terms of their own
experience . . . is substantial.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Anderson v. Discovery Communica-
tions, LLC, 517 Fed. Appx. 190, 195 (4th Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1164, 134 S. Ct. 1009, 187 L. Ed.
2d 851 (2014).11
The plaintiffs, however, alleged that Wendy was dis-
abled within the meaning of § 46a-51 (20), which pro-
vides that ‘‘ ‘[m]ental disability’ refers to an individual
who has a record of, or is regarded as having one or
more mental disorders, as defined in the most recent
edition of the’’ DSM.12 Thus, unlike the FHA, which
requires that a plaintiff prove that her mental impair-
ment ‘‘substantially limits one or more . . . major life
activities’’; 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h) (2024); § 46a-51 (20)
requires no functional limitation. See A. Long, ‘‘State
Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the
Americans with Disabilities Act,’’ 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 597,
642 (2004) (‘‘[b]ecause Connecticut’s definition simply
refers a court to an established list of mental conditions,
a plaintiff alleging the existence of a mental disability
11
In Anderson v. Discovery Communications, LLC, supra, 517 Fed. Appx.
190, the court explained that the ADAAA amendments did not apply to that
case ‘‘because [the plaintiff] was terminated prior to their enactment.’’ Id.,
195 n.7; see footnote 10 of this opinion.
12
Section 46a-64b, which sets forth definitions applicable to discriminatory
housing practices, makes clear in subsection (8) that mental disability
‘‘includes, but is not limited to, intellectual disability, as defined in section
1-1g . . . and also includes, but is not limited to, persons who have a
handicap as that term is defined in the [FHA].’’ (Emphasis added.) In addition,
§ 46a-51 expressly provides that the definitions set forth therein apply to
‘‘this chapter,’’ which necessarily includes § 46a-64b.
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is relieved of the task of demonstrating any functional
limitation’’). Another distinguishing feature of § 46a-51
(20) is that it does not include an ‘‘actual disability’’
prong; rather, it provides only the two alternative defini-
tional prongs—‘‘record of’’ or ‘‘regarded as.’’
Before the trial court, the plaintiffs presented evi-
dence as to both prongs of § 46a-51 (20), through the
testimony of Wendy and LaPointe regarding Wendy’s
diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder, which is a
mental disorder defined in the DSM. Although the defen-
dants claim that the court found that the plaintiffs had
satisfied only the ‘‘regarded as’’ definitional prong under
§ 46a-51 (20), it is evident from the court’s analysis that
it found that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden as
to the ‘‘record of’’ prong as well.
In construing the court’s judgment, we are mindful
that ‘‘judgments are to be construed in the same fashion
as other written instruments. . . . The determinative
factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all
parts of the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to
that which is clearly implied as well as to that which
is expressed. . . . [A] trial court opinion must be read
as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation,
to discern the parameters of its holding.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Alpha Beta Cap-
ital Partners, L.P. v. Pursuit Investment Management,
LLC, 193 Conn. App. 381, 428, 219 A.3d 801 (2019), cert.
denied, 334 Conn. 911, 221 A.3d 446 (2020), and cert.
denied, 334 Conn. 911, 221 A.3d 446 (2020).
In finding that Wendy was disabled within the mean-
ing of our state fair housing laws, the court concluded
that LaPointe’s diagnosis of generalized anxiety disor-
der, although incomplete in some respects, constituted
a record of Wendy having a mental disorder defined in
the most recent edition of the DSM. To be sure, the
court found that LaPointe’s notes and testimony did
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not establish that he meticulously followed the DSM in
making his diagnosis, but that does not equate to a
finding that Wendy did not have a record of generalized
anxiety disorder, as the defendants appear to suggest.
Indeed, the court expressly rejected all of the defen-
dants’ challenges to the validity of LaPointe’s diagnosis,
concluding that LaPointe ‘‘was qualified by education
and experience to testify as an expert within his field,
including the diagnosis of ‘emotional disorders,
whether cognitive, affective, or behavioral’ in the con-
text of marriage and family systems’’ pursuant to § 7-
2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Although the
court noted that it was free to reject LaPointe’s diagno-
sis of generalized anxiety disorder, the court accepted
his diagnosis because it was ‘‘persuaded that he made
his diagnosis in good faith based on his personal obser-
vations of [Wendy] in therapy sessions.’’ The court,
however, emphasized that the accuracy of LaPointe’s
diagnosis was not the dispositive issue because ‘‘the
definition of ‘mental disability’ in § 46a-51 (20) . . .
includes any individual ‘who has a record of, or is
regarded as having one or more mental disorders,’ as
defined in the DSM.’’ Although the court’s final state-
ment on this issue was that ‘‘[b]ecause the defendants
treated [Wendy] as having a disability . . . the plain-
tiffs have proved that [Wendy] was a person with a
mental disability within the meaning of § 46a-51 (20),’’
we will not ignore its other finding that LaPointe, in
good faith, made a record of her mental disorder as
defined in the DSM.
Given this analysis regarding LaPointe’s diagnosis
and the defendants’ challenges thereto, coupled with
the court’s continued references to the ‘‘record of’’
prong in § 46a-51 (20), we read the court’s decision as
finding that Wendy has a record of having generalized
anxiety disorder as defined in the DSM. Although the
defendants emphasize that the court did not expressly
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state that the plaintiffs had met their burden of estab-
lishing this fact, that conclusion is clearly implied by
the court’s extensive discussion and ultimate rejection
of the defendants’ challenges to LaPointe’s testimony
and diagnosis. See Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P.
v. Pursuit Investment Management, LLC, supra, 193
Conn. App. 428. Simply put, when read in its entirety,
the court’s decision is not amenable to the defendants’
limited construction. Consequently, we disagree that
the court found only that Wendy was regarded as having
a mental disability under § 46a-51 (20). Instead, we con-
clude that the court also found that Wendy has a record
of having a mental disability. For this reason, the defen-
dants’ claim that a finding that the defendants regarded
Wendy as having a disability is, without more, insuffi-
cient for the plaintiffs to establish a need for an accom-
modation necessarily fails.
In their reply brief, the defendants nevertheless assert
that ‘‘all [of their] arguments . . . concerning a plain-
tiff who has a ‘regarded as’ disability apply with equal
force to a person who has only a ‘record of’ a disability.
In either case, the plaintiff’s need for an accommodation
must be decided based on whether the accommodation
ameliorates or alleviates the ‘regarded as’ or ‘record
of’ disability, not based on whether it ameliorates or
alleviates whatever nondisabling condition the defen-
dant may have mistaken for a disability.’’ We are not
persuaded.
To establish that a requested accommodation ‘‘may
be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity
to use and enjoy a dwelling’’; General Statutes § 46a-
64c (a) (6) (c) (ii); a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘‘that
the desired accommodation will affirmatively enhance
a disabled plaintiff’s quality of life by ameliorating the
effects of the disability.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Quad Enterprises Co., LLC v. Southold, 369
Fed. Appx. 202, 207–208 (2d Cir. 2010); see also R. Huss,
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‘‘Pups, Paperwork, and Process: Confusion and Conflict
Regarding Service and Assistance Animals Under Fed-
eral Law,’’ 20 Nev. L.J. 785, 800–801 (2020) (‘‘[o]nly if
a person has a disability and there is a disability-related
need for the particular animal is it necessary for a hous-
ing provider to modify a no-pets policy’’ (emphasis in
original; footnote omitted)). Thus, to prevail on a failure
to accommodate claim, there must be a disability, the
effects of which can be ameliorated by the requested
accommodation.
We therefore agree with the defendants that a plaintiff
who does not suffer from a disability cannot establish
a disability related need for an accommodation based
solely on a landlord’s mistaken belief that the plaintiff
suffered from a disability. For example, a plaintiff who
was mistakenly regarded as being blind by a prospective
landlord could not establish that the landlord’s refusal
to allow him to move in with his dog to assist him in
navigating the apartment constituted an illegal failure
to accommodate because there is no disability giving
rise to the need for the dog. Consistent with this reason-
ing, the federal regulations implementing the ADA in
the employment context expressly provide that an
employer is ‘‘not required to provide a reasonable
accommodation to an individual who meets the defini-
tion of disability solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong
. . . .’’ 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (e) (2024). Accordingly,
although the ‘‘regarded as’’ prong is necessary to pre-
clude landlords from refusing to rent to prospective
tenants because of perceived disabilities, a perceived
disability does not give rise to the need for a reasonable
accommodation.13
13
The defendants argue that the ‘‘regarded as’’ prong requires that the
landlord’s belief as to the prospective tenant’s disability be mistaken or
incorrect. We do not agree. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (l) (1) (2024) (‘‘an
individual is ‘regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual is
subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical
or mental impairment’’ (emphasis added)). In fact, in the employment con-
text, the federal regulations state that if an employee is discriminated against
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There is a difference, though, when a prospective
tenant has a record of a disability. In such a circum-
stance, a licensed professional has determined that the
individual suffers from a disability that requires an
accommodation. Indeed, the regulations implementing
the ADA make clear that ‘‘[w]hether an individual has
a record of an impairment . . . should not demand
extensive analysis.’’ 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (k) (2) (2024).
In the present case, the plaintiffs established that a
licensed professional not only had diagnosed Wendy
with a mental disorder that is defined in the most recent
edition of the DSM but also continued to provide her
treatment for that disorder. Accordingly, because they
established that Wendy has a record of having a mental
disability, there is no distinction between the ‘‘record
of’’ prong under § 46a-51 (20) and the ‘‘actual disability’’
prong under the FHA for purposes of a failure to accom-
modate claim.
Consequently, we conclude that the court properly
found that the plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proving
that Wendy has a ‘‘record of’’ having a mental disability
within the meaning of § 46a-51 (20) and, therefore, prop-
erly proceeded to consider whether the plaintiffs had
established the third element of their failure to accom-
modate claim—‘‘that the accommodation [may be] nec-
essary to afford the [disabled] person an equal opportu-
nity to use and enjoy the dwelling . . . .’’ Olsen v. Stark
Homes, Inc., supra, 759 F.3d 156.
II
The defendants claim that the court improperly con-
cluded that two emotional support dogs may be neces-
sary for Wendy’s equal use and enjoyment of the dwell-
ing. They argue that the court committed a legal error
because he is regarded as having a disability there is no need to determine
whether he has a record of a disability or actually suffers from a disability.
See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (g) (3) (2024) (‘‘[w]here an individual is not challenging
a covered entity’s failure to make reasonable accommodations and does
not require a reasonable accommodation, it is generally unnecessary to
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by applying an improperly expansive definition of ‘‘nec-
essary’’ to the plaintiffs’ failure to accommodate claim.
The following additional facts, as found by the trial
court, are relevant to the defendants’ claim. The court
found that ‘‘[t]he evidence established that the defen-
dants had initially granted the Pizzoferratos’ request
and only later claimed that the approval was limited to
one dog. Other evidence included [LaPointe’s] note to
Vintage (also supplied to Mansions) that [Wendy]
needed her two canines to relieve her symptoms of
anxiety. [Wendy] testified that the dogs had different
personalities that helped her in different ways: Chloe,
a fourteen year old dog, would recognize when [Wendy]
was stressed and would cuddle up on her chest and
bop her nose; Mitsie, a twelve year old dog, would
try to engage [Wendy] to engage in active play when
[Wendy] was distressed.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)
Relying on regulatory guidance from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) concerning
emotional support animals and Bhogaita v. Altamonte
Heights Condominium Assn., Inc., 765 F.3d 1277 (11th
Cir. 2014), the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ evi-
dence was sufficient to establish that two dogs were
necessary for Wendy’s use and enjoyment of the dwell-
ing. Specifically, the court reasoned as follows. ‘‘In a
final rule published as ‘Pet Ownership for the Elderly
and Persons with Disabilities,’ 73 Fed. Reg. 63,834-01,
HUD discussed the necessity element of a reasonable
accommodation claim . . . . [HUD stated that]
‘[h]ousing providers are entitled to verify the existence
of the disability, and the need for the accommodation—
if either is not readily apparent. Accordingly, persons
proceed under the ‘actual disability’ or ‘record of’ prongs’’). Regardless of
his actual disability status, the employee was subjected to discrimination due
to the employer’s subjective belief, whether or not that belief was correct.
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who are seeking a reasonable accommodation for an
emotional support animal may be required to provide
documentation from a physician, psychiatrist, social
worker, or other mental health professional that the
animal provides support that alleviates at least one of
the identified symptoms or effects of the existing dis-
ability. . . . [E]motional support animals do not need
training to ameliorate the effects of a person’s mental
and emotional disabilities. Emotional support animals
by their very nature, and without training, may relieve
depression and anxiety, and/or help reduce stress-
induced pain in persons with certain medical conditions
affected by stress.’
‘‘HUD’s comments . . . indicate that an emotional
support animal may be considered ‘necessary’ for pur-
poses of the [FHA] if the animal ‘provides support that
alleviates at least one of the identified symptoms or
effects of the existing disability.’ Its position is reflected
in federal decisions involving emotional support ani-
mals. For instance, in Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights
Condominium Assn., Inc., supra, 765 F.3d 1289, the
[United States Court of Appeals for the] Eleventh Cir-
cuit summarized the ‘necessity’ element of a failure
to accommodate claim involving an emotional support
animal as whether the plaintiff ‘offered sufficient evi-
dence that having the dog would affirmatively enhance
his quality of life by ameliorating the effects of his
disability.’ . . .
‘‘[Thus] HUD considers an emotional support animal
to provide a disability related benefit if it ‘ameliorates’
even one of the symptoms of the person’s disability.
. . . Federal cases are replete with instances in which
. . . providers have supported a patient’s need for an
emotional support animal to relieve symptoms of anxi-
ety or depression. See, e.g., Bhogaita v. Altamonte
Heights Condominium Assn., Inc., supra, 765 F.3d
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1281 (plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist provided three let-
ters to housing provider explaining that plaintiff had
‘therapeutic relationship’ with his specific dog, emo-
tional support animal that served to ‘ameliorate other-
wise difficult to manage day to day psychiatric symp-
toms’); Warren v. Delvista Towers Condominium
Assn., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 1082, [1084] (S.D. Fla. 2014)
(plaintiff’s psychiatrist, who diagnosed plaintiff with
severe depression and post-traumatic stress disorder,
‘strongly recommended’ that housing provider allow
patient to keep emotional support animal because of
the dog’s ‘therapeutic use and function’); [see also]
Castellano v. Access Premier Realty, Inc., 181 F. Supp.
3d 798, [805, 807] (E.D. Cal. 2016) (plaintiff’s treating
physician declared that plaintiff suffered from anxiety
disorder and depression that would be eased by emo-
tional support animal); Chavez v. Aber, 122 F. Supp. 3d
581, 587 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (psychiatrist for plaintiff’s
mentally disabled child recommended that child’s treat-
ment should include use of emotional support ani-
mal). . . .

‘‘The plaintiffs’ evidence of the necessity of two dogs
is not overwhelming, but it is, all things considered,
sufficient to meet their burden of proof by a fair prepon-
derance of the evidence. As the decision in Bhogaita
suggests, an individual’s relationship with a specific
animal can have particular benefit. In this case, [Wendy]
testified that she relied on the two dogs for different
types of comfort and support when she had panic
attacks. The court is persuaded that each dog amelio-
rated one or more of the symptoms of her anxiety disor-
der, and, in that sense, each was necessary for her equal
use and enjoyment of the dwelling, as such necessity
has been explained by HUD and by federal court deci-
sions in reliance on HUD’s guidance.’’ (Emphasis in
original.)
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On appeal, the defendants argue that the court
‘‘adopted a legally incorrect definition of necessity’’ and
‘‘incorrectly held that the accommodation was neces-
sary because it made [Wendy] feel better, not because
without both dogs, [Wendy] could not equally use and
enjoy the apartment.’’ Specifically, they argue that the
court misconstrued Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights
Condominium Assn., Inc., supra, 765 F.3d 1281, ‘‘to
mean that having two dogs was ‘necessary’ if [the dogs]
did no more than provide ‘comfort and support when
she had panic attacks.’ . . . Bhogaita requires more.
. . . To alleviate or ameliorate the effect of a disability
requires more than just making the plaintiff feel better;
it requires that the accommodation alleviate the condi-
tion that makes the plaintiff disabled. . . . This is con-
sistent with the decision the trial court rejected, Cinna-
mon Hills Youth Crisis Center, Inc. v. Saint George
City, 685 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 2012).’’ (Citations omitted.)
The plaintiffs respond that, on the basis of Wendy’s
testimony at trial, the court properly held that both of
Wendy’s two assistance animals were necessary for her
equal use and enjoyment of the dwelling. We conclude
that the court applied an incorrect legal standard in
concluding that both dogs were necessary.
Whether the court applied the correct legal standard
in determining that two emotional support dogs were
necessary pursuant to § 46a-64c (a) (6) (C) (ii) ‘‘presents
an issue of statutory construction that raises a question
of law, over which we exercise plenary review.’’ Lopez
v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., supra, 343 Conn. 42.
In accordance with § 1-2z, we begin our analysis with
the text of the statute, which provides in relevant part:
‘‘For purposes of this subdivision, discrimination
includes . . . (ii) a refusal to make reasonable accom-
modations in rules, policies, practices or services, when
such accommodations may be necessary to afford such
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person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 46a-64c (a) (6) (C) (ii).
The FHA likewise provides that housing discrimina-
tion includes, among other things, the ‘‘refusal to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, prac-
tices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to
use and enjoy a dwelling . . . .’’ 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f) (3)
(B) (2024). This provision requires ‘‘that the requested
modification or accommodation be reasonable and that
the [denial] result . . . in so diminishing [the disabled]
person’s use and enjoyment of the premises as to consti-
tute a denial of equal opportunity.’’ Austin v. Farm-
ington, 826 F.3d 622, 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 580
U.S. 962, 137 S. Ct. 398, 196 L. Ed. 2d 297 (2016).
‘‘A reasonable accommodation under the [FHA] may
include the use of an emotional support animal in one’s
own home, despite the existence of a rule, policy or
law prohibiting such an animal. See, e.g., Castillo [Con-
dominium Assn.] v. U.S. [Dept.] of Housing & Urban
Dev[elopment], 821 F.3d 92, 100 (1st Cir. 2016); Ander-
son v. [Blue Ash], 798 F.3d 338, 363 (6th Cir. 2015);
Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights [Condominium Assn.],
Inc., [supra, 765 F.3d 1289].’’ Revock v. Cowpet Bay West
Condominium Assn., 853 F.3d 96, 110 (3d Cir. 2017).14
14
As the Michigan Court of Appeals recently observed in Riverbrook v.
Fabode, 333 Mich. App. 645, 963 N.W.2d 415 (2020), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 510 Mich. 1061, 981 N.W.2d 468 (2022), ‘‘[i]n recent years, govern-
ments have allowed people with psychological disabilities to register ‘Emo-
tional Support Animals’ . . . to help them navigate the world. This designa-
tion is more fluid than that of a service dog used to assist the blind or others
with physical needs. And the fuzzy edges of these laws have spawned abuse.
We have all heard the tales: a woman claiming a disability who tried to
bring an emotional support peacock in the main cabin on a flight, or the
United States Department of Transportation requiring airlines to permit
emotional support miniature horses on passenger airliners. Landlords have
also felt the fallout from ‘emotional support animal’ abuses, with tenants
purchasing [emotional support animal] certification online to dodge pet
prohibitions in their leases.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 647–48.
The Michigan Court of Appeals emphasized that ‘‘[t]he statute does not
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Although neither this court nor our Supreme Court
has considered the meaning of ‘‘necessary’’ in § 46a-
64c (a) (6) (C) (ii), several federal appellate courts have
construed the same requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(f) (3) (B). See Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities v. Savin Rock Condominium Assn.,
Inc., 273 Conn. 373, 386, 870 A.2d 457 (2005) (‘‘[i]n
construing a Connecticut statute that is similar to fed-
eral law, we often turn to decisions construing the fed-
eral law for guidance’’). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit conducted an extensive
textual analysis of the same statutory language in Vorch-
heimer v. Philadelphian Owners Assn., 903 F.3d 100,
105–109 (3d Cir. 2018). In that case, the plaintiff, a
disabled resident in the defendant’s building, ‘‘wanted
to leave [her rolling walker] in her building’s lobby. The
building managers refused, but offered her four other
ways to store and access her walker. She sued under
the [FHA], claiming that her preferred accommodation
was necessary to equally enjoy her home. The District
Court dismissed her complaint, holding that she had
not plausibly pleaded necessity.’’ Id., 103.
In affirming the judgment, the Third Circuit reasoned
that ‘‘ ‘[n]ecessary’ is a ‘[word] of limitation.’ . . . As
an adjective, it means ‘[i]ndispensable, requisite, essen-
tial, needful; that cannot be done without,’ or ‘absolutely
required.’ . . . The other sense of the adjective is
causal: ‘Inevitably determined or fixed by predestina-
tion or the operation of natural laws; happening or
existing by an inherent necessity.’ . . . So the word
provide that a tenant may automatically establish a handicap and a need
for an [emotional support animal] with a simple letter or that the court may
not delve into the accuracy or legitimacy of the diagnosing party’s opinion.
. . . [T]he court must carefully consider the reliability of the methods
employed by [the medical professional], as well as her final opinion. Only
then can the district and circuit courts determine if [the landlord] refused
to make a reasonable accommodation for a tenant with a disability or
handicap.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 659–60.
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‘necessary,’ without more, is stringent. . . . Necessi-
ties do not include conveniences and creature comforts,
much as they are desirable or even helpful.
***
‘‘The statute applies ‘when such accommodations
may be necessary,’ but ‘may’ does not change our analy-
sis. . . . In this statute, ‘may’ signals not a low proba-
bility of necessity, but rather the conditional mood.
The condition, when met, makes the accommodation
necessary, as in the phrase ‘as the case may be.’ ‘[W]hen
such accommodations may be necessary’ in [42 U.S.C.]
§ 3604 (f) (3) (B) is another way of saying ‘whenever
they are necessary’ or ‘as far as they are necessary.’
In short, the . . . necessity element requires that an
accommodation be essential, not just preferable. . . .
‘‘Necessity tracks an underlying need or goal. . . .
[Section 3604 (f) (3) (B) of title 42 of the United States
Code] tells us what to look for: an ‘accommodation
. . . [that] may be necessary to afford [the disabled]
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.’
. . . The text pegs the necessity to the goal of providing
the particular tenant with equal housing opportunity.
. . . ‘Think of the blind woman who obtains an exemp-
tion from a ‘‘no pets’’ policy for her seeing eye dog, or
the paraplegic granted special permission to live on a
first floor apartment because he cannot climb the
stairs.’ . . . The blind woman’s need is a way to navi-
gate to and around her apartment. The paraplegic’s need
is a way to get to his apartment. Once we identify the
particular tenant’s need, we can gauge what is neces-
sary to afford that tenant equal housing opportunity.
. . .
‘‘Giving the paraplegic a first-floor apartment is one
way to give him access and thus equal opportunity to
use his apartment. But an elevator would work too.
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That alternative would give him access to every apart-
ment, so a first-floor apartment would no longer be
necessary. The landlord has to offer at least one of the
accommodations, but not both. If she does offer one
of them, she has not ‘refus[ed] to make reasonable
accommodations . . . [that] may be necessary to
afford [the tenant] equal [housing] opportunity.’ . . .
In that vein, food is necessary to survive. But if soup
and salad are on offer, a sandwich is not necessary.
Gauging necessity, then, requires considering whether
another alternative on offer satisfies the goal of equal
housing opportunity for that tenant.
***
‘‘Of course, the proffered alternatives must still sat-
isfy the remainder of the subsection’s third element:
affording equal housing opportunity. That may require
more than ‘just those accommodations that are abso-
lutely necessary for the disabled individual’s treatment
or basic ability to function.’ . . . To qualify as alterna-
tive ‘reasonable accommodations,’ the accommoda-
tions must afford the particular disabled person equal
opportunity both to use and to enjoy her home. An
accommodation that does not provide equal opportu-
nity, or that provides equal opportunity to use but not
to enjoy, will not satisfy that requirement.
‘‘So courts must weigh whether the tenant’s requested
accommodation and the landlord’s proposed alternative
afford equal housing opportunity. Whether the accom-
modations do so depends on that particular tenant’s
abilities and disability, which may require a fact-inten-
sive inquiry. But all the proffered alternatives that afford
equal opportunity to use and to enjoy housing bear
on whether a specific accommodation is necessary.’’
(Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) Vorchheimer v.
Philadelphian Owners Assn., supra, 903 F.3d 105–109.
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The Third Circuit also observed that ‘‘sister-circuit
precedent adopts the strict sense of ‘necessary.’ As
then-Judge Gorsuch recognized, ‘necessary’ in [42
U.S.C.] § 3604 (f) (3) (B) bears its ordinary meaning:
‘The word implies more than something merely helpful
or conducive. It suggests instead something ‘‘indispens-
able,’’ ‘‘essential,’’ something that ‘‘cannot be done with-
out.’’’ Cinnamon Hills [Youth Crisis Center, Inc. v.
Saint George City, supra, 685 F.3d 923]. ‘Put simply,
the statute requires accommodations that are necessary
(or indispensable or essential) to achieving the objec-
tive of equal housing opportunities between those with
disabilities and those without.’ . . .

‘‘Other circuits make the same point using the lan-
guage of causation. Necessity functions as a but-for
causation requirement, tying the needed accommoda-
tion to equal housing opportunity. An accommodation
is necessary if, ‘without the accommodation, the plain-
tiff will be denied an equal opportunity to obtain [or
use, or enjoy] the housing of her choice.’ [Wisconsin
Community Services, Inc. v.] Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737,
749 (7th Cir. 2006) (en banc); accord id. . . . 754–55
(‘cause-in-fact’ and ‘but for’ cause); Anderson [v. Blue
Ash, supra, 798 F.3d 361] (‘but for . . . causation
inquiry’ . . . ); see also [Lapid-Laurel, LLC v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 460 (3d Cir. 2002)]
(quoting other circuits’ cases adopting . . . ‘but for
. . . causation requirement’). Cf. Bhogaita v. Alta-
monte Heights [Condominium Assn., Inc., supra, 765
F.3d 1289] (upholding . . . jury verdict for plaintiff
because, ‘without the [emotional-support] dog [sought],
[the plaintiff’s] social interactions would be so over-
whelming that he would be unable to perform work of
any kind’ . . . ). In short, these precedents confirm our
. . . reading of the plain text.’’ Vorchheimer v. Phila-
delphian Owners Assn., supra, 903 F.3d 110.
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Applying this construction in Vorchheimer, the court
concluded that the District Court properly dismissed
the plaintiff’s complaint, reasoning that, ‘‘[t]o enjoy her
home, [the plaintiff] needed access to her walker with-
out having to stand for minutes. She pleaded four alter-
natives on offer that, on their face, satisfied those needs.
And she attached doctors’ letters that distinguish her
needs from her preferences. Because the [federal fair
housing laws guarantee] her only a ‘reasonable accom-
modation’ that satisfies her needs, not the particular
accommodation that she wanted, we will affirm.’’ Id.,
113.
In the present case, the trial court rejected the defen-
dants’ reliance on Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Own-
ers Assn., supra, 903 F.3d 105–109, and Cinnamon Hills
Youth Crisis Center, Inc. v. Saint George City, supra,
685 F.3d 917.15 Instead, the court found persuasive the
15
The plaintiffs contend that ‘‘[t]he [United States Courts of Appeals for
the] Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have [held] that a reason-
able accommodation is necessary when it ‘ameliorates’ or ‘alleviates’ the
effects of the disability,’’ whereas ‘‘[t]he [United States Courts of Appeals
for the] Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted a higher standard,
holding that an accommodation is necessary when it is ‘required,’ ‘indispens-
able,’ or ‘essential.’ ’’
Our research, however, reveals that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have
embraced the ‘‘higher standard’’ for necessity, citing both Vorchheimer and
Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Center, Inc., with approval. See Howard v.
HMK Holdings, LLC, 988 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 2021) (‘‘Necessary sug-
gests something that cannot be done without. . . . Thus, the inquiry is a
causal one that examines whether the requested accommodation . . .
would redress injuries that otherwise would prevent a disabled resident
from receiving the same enjoyment from the property as a non-disabled
person would receive.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.)); Davis v. Echo Valley Condominium Assn., 945 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir.
2019) (‘‘[A] total smoking ban likely was not necessary (that is, indispensable,
essential, something that cannot be done without) to give [the plaintiff] the
same opportunity to use and enjoy her condo as compared to a non-disabled
person who dislikes the smell of smoke. . . . [T]he law does not require
more or better opportunities for those with handicaps as compared to those
without . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.)), cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 162, 207 L. Ed. 2d
1099 (2020).
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reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Bhogaita v. Alta-
monte Heights Condominium Assn., Inc., supra, 765
F.3d 1289.
In Bhogaita, the plaintiff, Ajit Bhogaita, was ‘‘a United
States Air Force veteran who suffer[ed] from post-trau-
matic stress disorder (PTSD) that developed after a
sexual assault he endured during his military service.
In 2001, Bhogaita bought a condominium unit managed
by the [defendant (Association)] and subject to its rules.
Among those rules, the Association prohibited occu-
pants from keeping dogs weighing more than twenty-
five pounds. In 2008, Bhogaita acquired a dog, Kane,
that exceeded the weight limit. Though no medical pro-
fessional prescribed the dog initially, Bhogaita’s psychi-
atric symptoms improved with Kane’s presence, so
much so that Bhogaita began to rely on the dog to help
him manage his condition. He kept the dog for the next
two years.
‘‘On May 4, 2010, the Association demanded that Bho-
gaita remove Kane from his unit, pursuant to the weight
limit. Bhogaita responded by providing the first of three
letters from Dr. Shih-Tzung Li, his treating psychiatrist,
explaining that the dog was an emotional support ani-
mal. The first letter, written on May 7, read in rele-
vant part:
‘‘Due to mental illness, Mr. Bhogaita has certain limi-
tations regarding social interaction and coping with
We also note that the Eighth Circuit has adopted the ‘‘higher standard,’’
explaining: ‘‘Necessity is a high standard under the FHA and the ADA. . . .
Necessary means something indispensable, essential, something that cannot
be done without. . . . [It] require[s] accommodations that are necessary
(or indispensable or essential) to achieving the objective of equal housing
opportunities between those with disabilities and those without. . . . [I]f
the proposed accommodation provides no direct amelioration of a disabili-
ty’s effect, it cannot be said to be necessary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) One Love Housing, LLC v. Anoka, 93 F.4th 424,
433 (8th Cir. 2024).
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stress and anxiety. In order to help alleviate these diffi-
culties, and to enhance his ability to live independently
and to fully use and enjoy the dwelling unit, I am pre-
scribing an emotional support animal that will assist
Mr. Bhogaita in coping with his disability. . . .
‘‘In the second letter, sent days later, Dr. Li added
specific information about the dog. He wrote that Bho-
gaita has a therapeutic relationship with this specific
dog, Kane. As an emotional support animal, Kane serves
to ameliorate otherwise difficult to manage day to day
psychiatric symptoms in Mr. Bhogaita. . . . In July, the
Association responded by sending Bhogaita its first
request for additional information regarding his disabil-
ity and the need for accommodation. . . .
‘‘Bhogaita responded later that month by providing
a third letter from Dr. Li, in which the doctor indicated
the nature and cause of the disability for the first time:
He was treating Bhogaita for [a]nxiety related to mili-
tary trauma. . . . Dr. Li explained further [that] [Bho-
gaita’s condition] limits his ability to work directly with
other people, a major life activity. Currently he has been
hired to perform technical support work from home.
He is able to work with the assistance of his emotional
support animal. Otherwise his social interactions would
be so overwhelming that he would be unable to perform
work of any kind. I am familiar with the therapeutic
benefits of assistance animals for people with disabili-
ties such as that experienced by Mr. Bhogaita. Upon
request, I would be happy to answer other questions
you may have concerning my recommendation that Mr.
Bhogaita have an emotional support animal. Should you
have additional questions, please do not hesitate to
contact me. . . .
‘‘Shortly thereafter, Bhogaita also sent a response to
the Association in which he answered the Association’s
questions in turn. Bhogaita identified his diagnosis and
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incorporated by reference Dr. Li’s third letter to explain
how his PTSD affects major life activities. . . . After
receiving Dr. Li’s three letters . . . the Association sent
Bhogaita a second request for information on August
17, 2010. . . . Nearly two and a half months passed,
during which time Bhogaita did not respond. On Novem-
ber 3, 2010, the Association sent a third request for
information, this time requesting a sworn statement
from Dr. Li to include specific facts [regarding the
nature of the disability and the duration and extent of
Dr. Li’s treatment]. . . . That letter went on to state
that Bhogaita was to respond by December 6, and if he
did not, the letter would serve as the Association’s for-
mal demand for [Bhogaita] to remove any dogs over
[twenty-five pounds] from [his] unit no later than
December 10, 2010. . . .
‘‘Rather than responding, Bhogaita filed a complaint
with [HUD] and the Florida Commission on Human
Relations . . . . He claimed that the Association’s con-
duct amounted to a failure to make a reasonable accom-
modation in violation of the disability provisions of the
[state and federal fair housing laws]. In January 2011,
[both agencies] issued findings of cause against the
Association. Accordingly, the Association agreed to
allow Bhogaita to keep Kane. . . .
‘‘In October 2011, Bhogaita brought suit. On the Asso-
ciation’s motion, the district court dismissed Bhogaita’s
claim of disability discrimination brought under 42
U.S.C. § 3604 (f) (2), while his reasonable accommoda-
tion claim, under [42 U.S.C.] § 3604 (f) (3) and analogous
Florida law, survived. . . .
‘‘A two-day jury trial followed. . . . After presenta-
tion of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor
of Bhogaita: It found that Bhogaita was disabled and
requested an accommodation for his disability, that the
accommodation was necessary and reasonable, and
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that Bhogaita suffered damages because of the Associa-
tion’s refusal to accommodate.’’ (Citations omitted;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condominium Assn.,
Inc., supra, 765 F.3d 1281–84.
The Association appealed, claiming, among other
things, that Bhogaita failed to present sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate that the requested accommoda-
tion was necessary. Id., 1288. In rejecting that claim,
the Eleventh Circuit explained that ‘‘[a] successful [rea-
sonable] accommodation claim requires that the accom-
modation sought be necessary to afford [the claimant]
equal opportunity to use and enjoy the relevant dwell-
ing. . . . The word equal is a relative term that requires
a comparator to have meaning. . . . Under the FHA,
the comparator is a person without a disability, and an
accommodation extends an equal opportunity when it
addresses the needs the disability creates. . . . Thus,
a necessary accommodation is one that alleviates the
effects of a disability. . . . The jury was properly
instructed to that effect.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. The District Court had
instructed the jury that ‘‘[t]o prove that the desired
accommodation is necessary, [Bhogaita] must show, at
a minimum, that the accommodation would affirma-
tively enhance [his] quality of life by ameliorating (or
reducing) the effects of his disability.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 1290.
Notably, the Eleventh Circuit explained that ‘‘[s]ome
other arrangement, such as having a lighter-weight dog
permitted by the Association’s policy, might similarly
alleviate Bhogaita’s symptoms, and evidence of such
could be relevant to the reasonableness determination,
which asks whether the requested accommodation ‘is
both efficacious and proportional to the costs to imple-
ment it.’ . . . It is not, however, relevant to the neces-
sity determination, which asks whether the requested
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accommodation ameliorates the disability’s effects.
. . . Both necessity and reasonableness are required
. . . but in this appeal, the Association does not raise
the issue of reasonableness with respect to Bhogaita’s
requested accommodation. For that reason, we do not
engage in the highly fact-specific reasonableness
inquiry, which would require a balancing of the parties’
needs. . . . The question we address is a different,
more limited one: whether Bhogaita offered sufficient
evidence that having the dog would affirmatively
enhance his quality of life by ameliorating the effects
of his disability.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 1289.
As to that limited question, the court reasoned that
‘‘Bhogaita produced evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could conclude that his dog alleviated the
effects of his [post-traumatic stress disorder]. Specifi-
cally, Dr. Li’s letters said that Kane assists Bhogaita in
coping with his disability . . . and ameliorate[s] Bho-
gaita’s psychiatric symptoms . . . and that without the
dog, Bhogaita’s social interactions would be so over-
whelming that he would be unable to perform work of
any kind. . . . In sum, the letters directly support the
jury’s verdict: The requested accommodation was nec-
essary to afford [Bhogaita] an opportunity to use and
enjoy the dwelling.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id.
We agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in
Bhogaita that ‘‘a necessary accommodation is one that
alleviates the effects of a disability.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 1288. We disagree, however, with
the court’s reasoning that consideration of alternative
proffered accommodations is not part of the necessity
determination. Instead, we agree with the textual analy-
sis of the Third Circuit in Vorchheimer and likewise
conclude that, under § 46a-64c, the plain meaning of
the word ‘‘necessary’’ requires courts to consider ‘‘all
the proffered alternatives that afford equal opportunity
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to use and to enjoy housing’’ in deciding whether a
specific accommodation is necessary. Vorchheimer v.
Philadelphian Owners Assn., supra, 903 F.3d 109; see
also Wilkison v. Arapahoe, 302 Neb. 968, 981–82, 926
N.W.2d 441 (2019) (‘‘[T]he . . . necessity element
requires that an accommodation be essential to the
equal enjoyment from the property, not just preferable.
The plain meaning of necessary requires courts to con-
sider the alternatives on offer.’’ (Footnote omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.)).
Accordingly, although the fair housing laws require
‘‘reasonable accommodations necessary for a disabled
individual to receive the same enjoyment from the prop-
erty as a non-disabled person would receive [and] not
merely those accommodations that the disabled individ-
ual cannot function without or for which no alternative
is available away from the dwelling’’; (citation omitted;
emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted)
Anderson v. Blue Ash, supra, 798 F.3d 361; the plain
meaning of ‘‘necessary’’ requires that the accommoda-
tion be essential to the equal enjoyment of the dwelling,
‘‘not just preferable.’’ Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian
Owners Assn., supra, 903 F.3d 107.16
In the present case, this standard required the court
to consider whether the available alternative offered
by the defendants of allowing the Pizzoferratos to have
one emotional support dog satisfied Wendy’s needs and
thereby afforded her an equal opportunity to use and
enjoy the dwelling. The court did not engage in this
specific inquiry. Instead, it relied on Wendy’s testimony
‘‘that she relied on the two dogs for different types of
16
For the same reason, we are not persuaded by the trial court’s reliance
on the HUD guidance. The fact that an emotional support animal is a
necessary accommodation because it ameliorates one or more symptoms
of a disability does not mean that, because several additional dogs each
also ameliorates the same symptoms, all such dogs are necessary for that pur-
pose.
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comfort and support when she had panic attacks’’ to
conclude that it was ‘‘persuaded that each dog amelio-
rated one or more of the symptoms of her anxiety disor-
der, and in that sense, each was necessary for her equal
use and enjoyment of the dwelling, as such necessity
has been explained by HUD and by federal court deci-
sions in reliance on HUD’s guidance.’’
The problem with the court’s analysis is that there
was no evidence that Wendy suffered from either differ-
ent types of anxiety or different symptoms of the same
anxiety that required different types of emotional sup-
port. As noted by the trial court, the only evidence
regarding how Wendy’s two dogs alleviated the symp-
toms of her generalized anxiety disorder was Wendy’s
testimony that one dog would engage her in play while
the other would cuddle up and ‘‘bop’’ her on the nose.
Her testimony provided some detail on the connection
between her anxiety and the two dogs, explaining that,
‘‘[i]f I get—feel an anxiety coming, if I can, I try to
bring my dogs around me. But actually, they notice it
hopefully before I notice it. . . . [A]nimals can actually
read the chemical balance. They sense that in your
brain. So, if I started acting nervous or something,
Chloe, which was one of my dogs, would climb up on
my chest and actually give me a bop with her nose.
And [Mitsie] was more of an active interactive. That’s
why I had two of them. She would bring a tennis ball
and try to play soccer with me to take—it was to take
my mind off of what was making me anxious. . . .
‘‘[E]very dog has a different personality, and one dog
was more of a I’m going to cuddle up, I’m going to bop
you, I’m going to try to get you to hug me, where the
other dog would be come on, let’s forget about this,
let’s go play, let’s get active, let’s go somewhere else.’’
Consequently, the only evidence of how the dogs emo-
tionally supported Wendy was that they both reacted
to her anxiety and provided relief for the same anxiety
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but in different ways. There was no evidence that
Chloe’s hugging was at times ineffective and Mitsie’s
playing was required or vice versa.17 Put another way,
the court relied on the fact that both dogs could be
helpful in alleviating Wendy’s anxiety but never consid-
ered whether having both dogs was necessary because,
for example, neither dog could be effective all of the
time.
We also find it significant that LaPointe provided no
meaningful evidence regarding the connection between
Wendy’s generalized anxiety disorder and the need for
two dogs. In exhibit 1, the 2018 certification that
LaPointe provided for Wendy certifying that she had a
disability and required a reasonable accommodation,
LaPointe wrote: ‘‘This therapist is verifying that Wendy
. . . suffers from moderate anxiety and that her two
canines provide relief.’’ He did not state that the dogs
were necessary to ameliorate her anxiety or, if an emo-
tional support animal was necessary, why one dog
would not be sufficient. Furthermore, he testified that
he has no training regarding emotional support animals
or other therapeutic uses of animals and that he neither
prescribed nor recommended that Wendy get an emo-
tional support animal because ‘‘[s]he already had two
dogs.’’ This evidence stands in stark contrast to the
evidence presented in other cases involving emotional
support animals, where courts have found sufficient
evidence of necessity for the requested accommoda-
tion.
17
Wendy testified that her dog Chloe died ‘‘about two years’’ before the
trial and that she effectively replaced Chloe with her son’s cat, Ivory, which
her son had left with the Pizzoferratos when he moved out of state. She
explained that Ivory ‘‘thinks it’s a dog,’’ she ‘‘did some work with it,’’ and
now ‘‘it’s working out pretty well.’’ She further explained that Chloe was
‘‘the bopper that would crawl on [her] nose. And the cat’s name is Ivory,
and he’s the one that—he crawls up and is right in [her] face.’’ There was
no evidence that LaPointe or any other licensed professional has determined
that Ivory is necessary, in addition to Mitsie, to ameliorate the effects of
Wendy’s generalized anxiety disorder.
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In Bhogaita, for example, the court observed that
‘‘Dr. Li’s letters said that Kane assists Bhogaita ‘in cop-
ing with his disability’ . . . and ‘ameliorate[s]’ Bhogai-
ta’s ‘psychiatric symptoms’ . . . and that without the
dog, Bhogaita’s ‘social interactions would be so over-
whelming that he would be unable to perform work of
any kind.’ ’’ (Citations omitted.) Bhogaita v. Altamonte
Heights Condominium Assn., Inc., supra, 765 F.3d
1289. Similarly, in Hollandale Apartments & Health
Club, LLC v. Bonesteel, 173 App. Div. 3d 55, 100 N.Y.S.3d
711 (2019), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, held that a tenant established that an emo-
tional support dog was necessary under the FHA where
the tenant ‘‘and his therapist testified that an emotional
support dog would alleviate some of his symptoms of
depression and anxiety. The therapist testified that an
emotional support dog would ameliorate the loneliness
and isolation of [the tenant’s] life by providing him
with companionship and unconditional affection. She
further opined that the dog would alleviate the lack of
structure in [the tenant’s] life and help to move his
sleep schedule toward a more normal pattern by requir-
ing him to feed and walk the dog at regular intervals
each day. The therapist noted that [the tenant] had
followed a more structured schedule when he was still
living in his family home, in part because he was then
responsible for feeding and walking the family dogs,
and that, after he moved out, he returned to the house
when necessary to continue caring for and exercising
the dogs until his former wife moved away. Owning a
dog would require [the tenant] to engage in regular
exercise, which the therapist described as ‘one of the
primary behavioral treatments for depression,’ and
would allow him to make better use of the grounds
surrounding the apartment complex. She testified that
a dog’s companionship could alleviate [the tenant’s]
social anxiety and act as a ‘security blanket,’ increasing
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his confidence and willingness to interact with other
people, and would also facilitate social interaction by
offering opportunities to meet other people while out-
doors with the dog. The therapist opined that increased
exercise and social interaction have been shown to
have similar effects to antidepressant medication in
alleviating depression and anxiety, and that increased
energy levels arising from exercise and enhanced social
interactions would improve [the tenant’s] motivation
to engage in various activities of daily life.’’ Id., 66.
Considering the evidence presented to establish the
necessity of one dog in those cases, the lack of evidence
regarding necessity as to the second dog in the present
case is readily apparent. The plaintiffs’ evidence cer-
tainly demonstrated that having both of her dogs as
opposed to only one was preferable, but there was no
evidence to demonstrate that it was essential. In other
words, proof that a requested accommodation is prefer-
able to the plaintiff in alleviating the effects of a disabil-
ity and thereby enhances her enjoyment of her dwelling
is insufficient to prove that the preferred accommoda-
tion is necessary. Thus, the fact that each dog alleviated
the effects of Wendy’s disability, albeit in different ways,
was not sufficient to demonstrate that the accommoda-
tion for a second dog was necessary, i.e., indispensable,
to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the
dwelling.
In sum, we conclude that the court erred in that the
definition of necessary it applied was so broad as to
include preference, thereby diluting the plaintiffs’ bur-
den of proof. Therefore, the court incorrectly concluded
that the plaintiffs met their burden as to the third ele-
ment of their failure to accommodate claim. Further-
more, because the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, was
insufficient as a matter of law to prove that both dogs
were necessary to ameliorate the effects of Wendy’s
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generalized anxiety disorder, the court should have ren-
dered judgment for the defendants. See, e.g., Cokic v.
Fiore Powersports, LLC, 222 Conn. App. 216, 231–32,
304 A.3d 179 (2023) (new hearing on defendant’s motion
for attorney’s fees was not warranted notwithstanding
court’s failure to make necessary findings because
defendant failed to present evidence to support required
findings).
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to render judgment for the defendants.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.