Karosi v. Karosi

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Karosi v. Karosi

ROBERT KAROSI v. DONNA KAROSI
(AC 47068)
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting in part a
motion for order filed by the plaintiff in a postjudgment dissolution matter.
The defendant claimed that the court acted in excess of its authority when
it ordered a transfer of custodianship from the defendant to the plaintiff of
an education savings account established pursuant to statute (26 U.S.C.
§ 529). Held:

The trial court acted within its authority pursuant to the relevant statutes
(§§ 46b-56 and 46b-84) in ordering a transfer of the custodianship of the
§ 529 account to the plaintiff, the minor child’s custodial parent, as the
§ 529 account was established postdissolution by agreement of the parties
expressly for the benefit of the parties’ minor child and the transfer of the
custodianship of the § 529 account was distinct from an order modifying
the division of marital property.

Argued January 15—officially released February 18, 2025

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of New Haven at Meriden, and transferred to the
judicial district of Middlesex; thereafter, the case was
tried to the court, Dewey, J.; judgment dissolving the
marriage and granting certain other relief in accordance
with the parties’ settlement agreement; subsequently,
the court, Albis, J., granted in part the plaintiff’s motion
for order, and the defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Meagan A. Cauda, with whom was Dana M. Hrelic,
and, on the brief, Jon T. Kukucka, for the appellant
(defendant).
Robert Karosi, self-represented, the appellee (plain-
tiff).
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Karosi v. Karosi

Opinion

ALVORD, J. In this postjudgment dissolution matter,
the defendant, Donna Karosi, appeals from the judg-
ment rendered by the trial court granting in part the
motion for order filed by the plaintiff, Robert Karosi.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court acted
in excess of its statutory authority when it ordered
a change in custodianship over the education savings
account established pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 529 (§ 529
account)1 for the benefit of the parties’ then minor child.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of the defendant’s claim on
appeal. The court, Dewey, J., dissolved the parties’ mar-
riage on April 10, 2008. The parties have one child
together, who was born in 2005.2 The judgment of disso-
lution incorporated by reference the parties’ separation
agreement, also dated April 10, 2008 (separation agree-
ment), pursuant to which the parties had joint legal
custody of the child. In paragraph 14 of the separation
agreement, the parties agreed to sell the marital home
and that ‘‘[t]he net proceeds from the sale of the marital
home shall be divided as follows . . . [t]he first
$50,000.00 shall be placed in a 529 account for the minor
child with the [p]laintiff . . . as custodian and he shall
make annual accountings and provide copies of state-
ments to the [d]efendant . . . .’’3 Paragraph 15 of the
1
‘‘Title 26 of the United States Code, § 529, provides for the creation
of an account specifically designed for higher education related qualified
expenses. Earnings on contributions invested are tax deferred and withdraw-
als are tax free when used for qualified educational expenses.’’ Leonova v.
Leonov, 201 Conn. App. 285, 302 n.16, 242 A.3d 713 (2020), cert. denied, 336
Conn. 906, 244 A.3d 146 (2021).
2
At the time of the court’s decision in August, 2023, the child had graduated
from high school. The child turned eighteen years old in November, 2023.
Both parties represented in their appellate briefs that the child was
attending college.
3
The separation agreement provided that, after the first $50,000 was placed
in the § 529 account, ‘‘[t]he next sum of $90,000 shall be payable to the
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Karosi v. Karosi

separation agreement provided that ‘‘[t]he parties shall
equally divide college costs pursuant to statute after
exhausting the 529 account . . . .’’ In its orders, the
court also reserved jurisdiction to enter educational
support orders pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c.
On February 8, 2011, the court, E. Gordon, J., held a
hearing on then pending motions, and the court ordered
that the defendant would have sole custody of the child.
The court also ordered a change in custodianship of the
child’s § 529 account from the plaintiff to the defendant
(2011 order).
During the summer of 2022, the plaintiff was awarded
sole custody of the child, pursuant to an ex parte tempo-
rary order that was followed by a stipulation of the
parties that ‘‘[t]he temporary orders shall remain in
place . . . .’’ On November 21, 2022, the plaintiff filed
a motion for order, requesting, inter alia, that custodian-
ship of the child’s § 529 account be transferred from
the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also
requested, inter alia, that the court terminate the parties’
obligation to communicate through Our Family Wizard
and to permit the child to communicate with the defen-
dant as the child chooses, with the support and guid-
ance of the child’s counselor.4 On August 4, 2023, the
court, Albis, J., held a hearing on the motion for order
and other motions.5 Both parties testified during the
hearing, and several documents were admitted into evi-
dence.
[p]laintiff . . . [and] [t]he remaining net proceeds shall be divided equally
between the parties . . . .’’
4
In the defendant’s appellate brief, the court’s attention is directed to an
objection to the plaintiff’s motion for contempt and not an objection related
to the motion for order.
5
At the beginning of the hearing, the defendant’s counsel stated: ‘‘We are
not going to be challenging the order that was entered last summer giving
[the plaintiff] custody. That will be accepted and is really moot. The child
is going to be eighteen in November.’’ The defendant’s counsel also acknowl-
edged that the custodial order had been continued by subsequent agreement.
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In its August 4, 2023 oral ruling, the court addressed
the plaintiff’s motion for order, which it explained had
been treated as a motion for modification. The court
stated: ‘‘As to the 529 college fund, requesting an order
of switching control or custodianship of that account
from the defendant to the plaintiff, the court notes that
in 2011 when custody was changed to the [defendant],
the court, at that time, also changed control of that
account to the legal custodian. I find it appropriate at
this time to do the same thing. And it further appears
that the plaintiff has and will have more knowledge
about the incidental expenses that might be eligible for
payment from that account given his relationship with
the child compared to that of the [defendant].
‘‘And this—that casts no aspersions on the [defen-
dant] or any doubt that she fully intended and would
have used the account properly, but these parties obvi-
ously have a lot of difficulty communicating. There are
a lot of issues and a very unfortunate set of relationships
here, and I find that can be minimized to some extent
by having the [plaintiff] have control over that account.
So that request is granted, and the . . . defendant . . .
is ordered within thirty days to execute any necessary
paperwork through counsel to change the custodian-
ship or control of the 529 account to the plaintiff.’’
Following the court’s ruling, the defendant’s counsel
stated: ‘‘The judgment said that the 529 was to be used
for college per the statute. Once she transfers this
account to him, would the court consider an order that
he must notify her what he is using that account for,
that it’s going to college, and she gets documentation,
as she would have had to do for him? Because that
account has to be exhausted first before they pay 50/
50.’’ The plaintiff did not object to that proposed order
and, as requested by the defendant, the court ordered
the plaintiff to provide the defendant with written notice
of ‘‘any and all expenditures he makes from that account
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Karosi v. Karosi

and the nature of each expense.’’ Upon further request
of the defendant’s counsel, the court also ordered the
plaintiff to provide ‘‘[c]opies of invoices or receipts as
appropriate depending on the nature of the expenses.’’6
On August 11, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for
reargument and reconsideration. The defendant argued,
inter alia, that the § 529 account constituted marital
property and, thus, ‘‘the account cannot be changed
postjudgment as the court does not have authority to
do so.’’ The defendant requested reargument and recon-
sideration or, in the alternative, that ‘‘any funds not
used for the child for college expenses by the age of
thirty (30) years of age, be transferred directly to the
child at that time.’’ On October 4, 2023, the plaintiff
filed an objection to the motion for reargument and
reconsideration and a memorandum of law in support
thereof. The plaintiff argued that the court properly
transferred custodianship of the § 529 account. He
argued in the alternative, in relevant part, that, ‘‘if it is
improper to transfer custody of a 529 account . . .
then it was unequivocally improper to transfer it from
the plaintiff to the defendant back in 2011 and as such,
should have remained with the plaintiff . . . .’’ (Cita-
tion omitted.) The defendant filed a reply on October
6, 2023. The court granted reargument limited to ‘‘the
legal issue of whether the 529 account was property
for which the court did not have jurisdiction, postjudg-
ment, to change the custodian.’’7
6
The court additionally ordered ‘‘as to any expenses the plaintiff has
already incurred that he believes are properly paid from the 529 account
under applicable IRS statutes and regulations, he shall first notify the [defen-
dant] in writing of the expense, his intention to pay himself back from the
account, and a copy of any regulation that he relies on to support that.
‘‘And [the defendant] shall have thirty days to object in writing. If she
does object, then the money shall not be reimbursed. She shall state the
reason for her objection based on the regulations, and if she objects, then
the expense shall not be paid unless the parties agree or a court orders
otherwise.’’
7
Although the court used the term jurisdiction, we note that the distribu-
tion of personal property postdissolution does not implicate the court’s
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Karosi v. Karosi

On October 16, 2023, the court held reargument, fol-
lowing which the court stated: ‘‘I do find that in this
case the § 529 account was not an existing marital asset
that was allocated to one party or the other, but rather
was the product of an order at the time of judgment,
by agreement of the parties, that an account would be
created that was for the benefit of their minor child
solely, and to be used for educational expenses. So, for
that reason, I don’t find that the court is prohibited by
the principle on property distributions at the time of
judgment from changing the manner, as the court has
done before in this case, albeit before [Greenan v.
Greenan, 150 Conn. App. 289, 91 A.3d 909, cert. denied,
314 Conn. 902, 99 A.3d 1167 (2014)], changing the custo-
dianship of the account to make sure that the purposes
are best served by having the parent who is more
directly involved on a day-to-day basis with the child
be in charge of the account.’’ Accordingly, the court
denied the defendant’s request for relief asking the
court to amend its order transferring custodianship of
the § 529 account.
The court ordered that any funds remaining in the
§ 529 account when the child turns thirty years old shall
be turned over to the child and that, any time after the
child turns twenty-six years old, upon the child’s written
notification to the plaintiff and the defendant that the
child has no intention to pursue further education, the
balance of the § 529 account shall be turned over to
the child within sixty days of the notice. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court lacked
statutory authority to transfer custodianship of the
§ 529 account on the basis that the account constituted
marital property, the division of which could not be
subject matter jurisdiction but, rather, its statutory authority. See Reinke
v. Sing, 328 Conn. 376, 391–92, 179 A.3d 769 (2018).
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modified postdissolution. We disagree that the court
exceeded its statutory authority.

The present claim implicates the scope of the court’s
authority to act with respect to the postdissolution
transfer of custodianship of the § 529 account ordered
to be created at the time of the dissolution by agreement
of the parties for the benefit of the minor child. ‘‘Any
determination regarding the scope of a court’s . . .
authority to act presents a question of law over which
our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Callahan v. Callahan, 192 Conn. App. 634, 684,
218 A.3d 655, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 939, 218 A.3d 1050
(2019); see also Leonova v. Leonov, 201 Conn. App. 285,
304, 242 A.3d 713 (2020) (affording plenary review to
claim that court exceeded statutory authority in order-
ing parties to establish and contribute to § 529 account),
cert. denied, 336 Conn. 906, 244 A.3d 146 (2021).

We begin with a review of General Statutes § 46b-
81 (a), which governs the equitable distribution of the
marital estate and provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[a]t
the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a
marriage . . . the Superior Court may assign to either
spouse all or any part of the estate of the other spouse.
. . .’’ ‘‘[T]he court’s authority to divide the personal
property of the parties, pursuant to § 46b-81, must be
exercised, if at all, at the time that it renders judgment
dissolving the marriage. . . . A court, therefore, does
not have the authority to modify the division of property
once the dissolution becomes final. . . . Although the
court does not have the authority to modify a property
assignment, a court . . . does have the authority to
issue postjudgment orders effectuating its judgment.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Schneider v. Schneider, 161 Conn. App. 1, 6, 127
A.3d 298 (2015); see also General Statutes § 46b-86 (a)
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(prohibiting postjudgment modification of property dis-
tribution).8
We also set out the relevant statutes governing sup-
port orders for children in dissolution proceedings.
General Statutes § 46b-56 (a) provides in relevant part:
‘‘In any controversy before the Superior Court as to the
custody or care of minor children . . . the court may
make . . . any proper order regarding the custody,
care, education, visitation and support of the children
. . . .’’ Section 46b-56c governs educational support
orders, which are ‘‘order[s] entered by a court requiring
a parent to provide support for a child or children to
attend for up to a total of four full academic years an
institution of higher education or a private career school
for the purpose of attaining a bachelor’s or other under-
graduate degree, or other appropriate vocational
instruction.’’ General Statutes § 46b-56c (a). In addition
to educational support orders issued in compliance with
the mandates of § 46b-56c, this court has recognized
that a trial court that has retained jurisdiction to enter
educational support orders in the future has authority,
pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46b-56 and 46b-84,9 to
8
In explaining why our statutes prohibit the postdissolution modification
of a property distribution order, our Supreme Court has stated that ‘‘[t]he
purpose of a property division pursuant to a dissolution proceeding is to
unscramble existing marital property in order to give each spouse his or
her equitable share at the time of dissolution. . . . By comparison, the
purpose of both periodic and lump sum alimony is to provide continuing
support. . . . Hence, once the marital property is divided, the court has
fulfilled its responsibility, and, therefore, continuing jurisdiction over divided
marital property does not further the goal of the statutes.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Reinke v. Sing, 328 Conn. 376, 381 n.3, 179 A.3d 769 (2018).
9
General Statutes § 46b-84 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Upon or subse-
quent to the . . . dissolution of any marriage or the entry of a decree of
. . . divorce, the parents of a minor child of the marriage, shall maintain
the child according to their respective abilities, if the child is in need of
maintenance. . . .
‘‘(d) In determining whether a child is in need of maintenance and, if in
need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide such maintenance
and the amount thereof, the court shall consider the age, health, station,
occupation, earning capacity, amount and sources of income, estate, voca-
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issue financial orders to secure such future educational
support orders. See Leonova v. Leonov, supra, 201
Conn. App. 307 (‘‘[w]hen a court retains jurisdiction
over educational support . . . it has the discretion to
issue a financial order that would secure any educa-
tional support order that might be entered in the
future’’); see id., 311 (‘‘court’s order to establish the
two § 529 plans to secure any future educational sup-
port order was eminently fair’’).
We next consider two relevant decisions of this court
involving appeals from judgments of dissolution that
contained orders relating to § 529 accounts. In Greenan
v. Greenan, supra, 150 Conn. App. 289, the trial court
had ordered in the dissolution judgment that the plain-
tiff continue to maintain the two minor children’s § 529
accounts, which the plaintiff had ‘‘previously estab-
lished and in which he had elected to place more than
$280,000.’’ Id., 310. The court also ordered that the
defendant, to whom the court had granted sole custody
of the minor children, be the custodian of the accounts.
Id.
On appeal, the plaintiff in Greenan argued that the
court’s orders regarding the § 529 accounts violated the
provision of § 46b-56c that limits educational expenses
to the amount charged by the University of Connecticut,
because the amount in the accounts ‘‘far exceeds tuition
at the University of Connecticut for both children.’’
Id., 309. He further argued that ‘‘the court improperly
disguised the assignment of his property (the 529
accounts) as an educational order,’’ and ‘‘that the court,
in fashioning this order, failed to take into account
the first factor of § 46b-56c (c), the parents’ income.’’
(Footnote omitted.) Id. In resolving these claims, the
tional skills and employability of each of the parents, and the age, health,
station, occupation, educational status and expectation, amount and sources
of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of the child.
. . .’’
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court first explained that, ‘‘[a]lthough 529 accounts per-
tain to education expenses . . . the court’s orders
regarding the plaintiff’s 529 accounts were not educa-
tional support orders pursuant to § 46b-56c. . . . The
court’s orders with respect to the 529 accounts did not
require the plaintiff to provide support in the future for
the children to attend college. Rather, the court ordered
that the plaintiff continue to maintain the accounts
. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Id.,
310. The court noted that the defendant, who had sole
custody of the children, was ordered pursuant to § 46b-
56c to ‘‘be responsible for the educational expenses of
the minor children . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. Finally, the court explained that ‘‘[t]he
accounts, per the court’s order and 26 U.S.C. § 529 were
for the benefit of the minor children. The court’s order
simply changed the person who was the custodian of
the accounts, which were previously existing property,
from the plaintiff to the defendant.’’ (Footnote omit-
ted.) Id.
The court in Greenan then stated that ‘‘[t]he 529
accounts were marital property pursuant to . . . § 46b-
81, under the broad definition given to that term by our
legislature. . . . The accounts were existing property,
though payments were contemplated to be made from
the accounts in the future.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote
omitted.) Id., 311. This court concluded that the court
did not err in its orders related to the § 529 accounts. Id.
More recently, in Leonova v. Leonov, supra, 201 Conn.
App. 287, this court considered an appeal from the
judgment of dissolution, which challenged the trial
court’s order that the parties establish and contribute
to a § 529 account for each of their two minor children.
In that case, the plaintiff’s mother had gifted the minor
children $30,000 each, which money the parties instead
had used to renovate a home. Id., 290–91. The plaintiff
testified that the parties had agreed that the amount
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would be repaid to the children, and, in closing argu-
ment, the plaintiff’s counsel requested that the court
restore the money to the children. Id., 303. In its finan-
cial orders, the court ‘‘ordered each of the parties to
place $30,000, to be deducted from each party’s share
of one of two distributed marital assets, into two § 529
plans, one for each of the children, with the plaintiff
to serve as trustee of those plans.’’ (Footnote omitted.)
Id., 303–304.
On appeal, the defendant in Leonova claimed that
the court acted in excess of its statutory authority by
ordering the parties to establish and contribute to the
§ 529 accounts. Id., 302. Specifically, the defendant
argued, inter alia, that the court’s order constituted
an impermissible property assignment under § 46b-81,
because the order distributed marital funds to someone
other than the other spouse. Id., 303, 306. The defendant
further argued that to the extent that the order consti-
tuted a form of postsecondary educational support, it
violated § 46b-56c (c), in that the court did not under-
take an analysis of the statutory factors contained
therein. Id., 305.
This court in Leonova rejected the defendant’s claim,
concluding that ‘‘the court imposed [the order regarding
the § 529 accounts] to secure future educational sup-
port to the children, which is within its authority in a
dissolution proceeding, pursuant to [§] 46b-56.’’ Id., 303.
The court explained that, although the trial court did
not expressly state its intention, the court’s order creat-
ing the two § 529 accounts was crafted ‘‘to secure a
potential postmajority educational support order.’’ Id.,
306–307. The court noted that the trial court had
reserved jurisdiction to enter a postmajority educa-
tional order and stated that, when a court retains juris-
diction over educational support, ‘‘it has the discretion
to issue a financial order that would secure any educa-
tional support order that might be entered in the future.’’
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Id., 307. This court explained: ‘‘Because the statutory
scheme anticipates that a dissolution may occur in
advance of the time postsecondary educational deci-
sions appropriately can be made, it provides a mecha-
nism for the court to retain jurisdiction for the purpose
of ordering educational support for adult children. In
its orders, the court reserved jurisdiction to enter an
educational support order pursuant to § 46b-56c at an
appropriate time.’’ Id., 308. The court also noted that
‘‘the order in the court’s memorandum of decision that
establishes the two § 529 plans follows immediately
after the order in which the court reserves jurisdiction
to enter an educational support order in the future.’’
Id. The court concluded that ‘‘[t]he creation of a § 529
plan to fund an educational support order fits well
within’’ the wide latitude of discretion afforded a trial
court in making its financial orders. Id., 309; see also
Louney v. Louney, 13 Conn. App. 270, 274–75, 535 A.2d
1318 (1988) (rejecting claim that court impermissibly
limited use of marital property for particular purpose
in affirming trial court’s order limiting use of funds held
in joint accounts for children’s education on basis that
‘‘this portion of the court’s order can reasonably be
understood as providing for the support and mainte-
nance of the children; it is well settled that the court
has broad discretion in this regard’’).
Considering this precedent, we conclude that the
court had authority to transfer custodianship of the
§ 529 account from the defendant to the plaintiff under
the analysis in Leonova, and that the present case is
readily distinguishable from Greenan. In Greenan v.
Greenan, supra, 150 Conn. App. 310, the dissolution
court made orders regarding ‘‘the plaintiff’s 529
accounts,’’ which had been established prior to the dis-
solution proceedings and into which the plaintiff had
elected to place more than $280,000. Under the facts
of that case, the court stated that the previously existing
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Karosi v. Karosi

§ 529 accounts were marital property. Id., 311. Citing
Greenan, this court in Leonova v. Leonov, supra, 201
Conn. App. 311, recognized that ‘‘§ 529 plans established
and funded by the parties themselves might qualify as
marital property under the broad definition given to
that term by our legislature in § 46b-81, in that such
accounts are existing property at the time of the divorce
proceedings . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis
added.) This court in Leonova, however, found § 46b-81
inapplicable to the dissolution court’s order to establish
two new § 529 accounts. Id., 306. This court reasoned
that the order did not constitute a distribution of marital
property from one spouse to the other but, rather, it
constituted a proper exercise of the court’s authority
pursuant to §§ 46b-56 and 46b-84, to issue an order
‘‘securing funds for the children’s future educational
needs.’’ Id., 311.
Because the present case involves similar considera-
tions as set forth in Leonova, we are guided by its
holding to conclude that § 46b-81 is inapplicable to our
consideration of the claim in this appeal. Specifically,
the establishment of the § 529 account under the facts
of this case was not a distribution of marital property.10
Critical to our analysis is the fact that the § 529 account
was not a presently existing asset at the time of dissolu-
tion. Rather, the dissolution judgment contemplated
the establishment of the § 529 account to fund future
education for the then minor child. Specifically, the
parties’ separation agreement provided that the first
$50,000 of the proceeds from the anticipated sale of
the marital home would be ‘‘placed in a 529 account
for the minor child with the [p]laintiff . . . as custo-
dian . . . .’’11 Moreover, the language in the separation
10
In light of our conclusion, we need not address the defendant’s reliance
on Buehler v. Buehler, 138 Conn. App. 63, 70, 50 A.3d 372 (2012), in support of
her argument that the court’s order in the present case improperly modified
property distribution orders made at the time of the dissolution judgment.
11
We are not persuaded that the circumstances compelling the establish-
ment of the § 529 account, namely, that the separation agreement directed
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Karosi v. Karosi

agreement regarding the contemplated § 529 account
made clear that it was to be established ‘‘for the minor
child . . . .’’ Thus, there was always agreement that
the funds in the § 529 account were reserved for the
child’s future educational needs.
Other provisions of the judgment and the procedural
history of this case are consistent with treating the
transfer of custodianship of the § 529 account as dis-
tinct from an order modifying the division of marital
property. The court, at the time of the dissolution,
reserved jurisdiction to enter an educational support
order pursuant to § 46b-56c. Moreover, the language
immediately following the provision of the separation
agreement regarding the § 529 account was the parties’
additional agreement that they would ‘‘equally divide
college costs pursuant to statute after exhausting the
529 account . . . .’’ Finally, the court previously had
transferred custodianship of the § 529 account from
the plaintiff to the defendant when the defendant was
awarded full custody of the child in 2011.
The testimony at the hearing on the plaintiff’s motion
for order underlying this appeal further supports our
determination that the order regarding custodianship
of the § 529 account did not implicate marital property
distribution but, rather, the support and maintenance
of the child. The defendant testified that there was
approximately $65,000 in the account, which was sup-
posed to be used for the child’s college expenses, that
the defendant already had made a payment to the col-
lege from the account for the child, and that the defen-
dant intended to use the § 529 account for the child’s
college expenses pursuant to the judgment and applica-
ble law. The plaintiff testified that he felt that it was in
the creation of the account and that the parties agreed to fund the account
using proceeds from the sale of marital property, lead to the conclusion
that the establishment of the account constituted an order distributing mari-
tal property.
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16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Karosi v. Karosi

the best interest of the child for the plaintiff to serve
as custodian of the § 529 account because there was
tension between the child and the defendant, which
would make communicating regarding expenses stress-
ful for the child. Moreover, during oral argument on
the defendant’s motion for reargument and reconsidera-
tion, both parties confirmed their agreement that any
unused funds in the § 529 account should be turned
over to the child, rather than dispersed to either party.
The parties disagreed only on what age the funds should
be turned over to the child.
Because the § 529 account was established postdisso-
lution by agreement of the parties expressly for the
benefit of the parties’ minor child, we conclude that
the court acted within its statutory authority pursuant
to §§ 46b-56 and 46b-84, in ordering a transfer of custo-
dianship of the § 529 account to the then minor child’s
custodial parent.12
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

12
The defendant does not identify as clearly erroneous any of the court’s
factual findings made in support of its decision transferring custodianship,
including that ‘‘the plaintiff has and will have more knowledge about the
incidental expenses that might be eligible for payment from that account
given his relationship with the child compared to that of the [defendant],’’ and
that the difficult communications between the parties would be minimized
by having the plaintiff serve as custodian of the account.