Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

KIMBERLY ELDRIDGE v. HOSPITAL OF
CENTRAL CONNECTICUT
(AC 46868)
Moll, Suarez and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendant,
rendered following its grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
on the plaintiff’s complaint alleging, inter alia, employment discrimination
based on disability. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly
concluded that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist with respect
to whether the defendant’s reasons for its termination of her employment
were pretextual in nature. Held:

The trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment on the plaintiff’s claim of disability discrimination, as it properly applied
the burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (411
U.S. 792) to evaluate the discrimination claim, and, after the defendant
presented unrefuted evidence that its termination of the plaintiff’s employ-
ment was not based on her disability, the burden shifted to the plaintiff,
and the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the defendant’s reasons
for terminating her employment were pretextual.

The trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment on the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant failed to provide her with
a reasonable accommodation for her disability, as the plaintiff failed to
present evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that she initiated
a request for a reasonable accommodation or that the defendant had a
position available to which she could have been reassigned prior to the
termination of her employment.
Argued September 9, 2024—officially released February 11, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, alleged
employment discrimination, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New Britain, where the court, Knox, J., granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and ren-
dered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
James V. Sabatini, for the appellant (plaintiff).
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

David R. Jimenez, with whom were Adam J. Lyke,
and, on the brief, Jessica L. Draper, for the appellee
(defendant).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The plaintiff, Kimberly Eldridge, appeals
from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court
in favor of the defendant, the Hospital of Central Con-
necticut, with respect to her claims under the Connecti-
cut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General
Statutes § 46a-51 et seq., for disability discrimination,
failure to accommodate, and retaliation.1 The plaintiff
raises two claims. First, with respect to her allegation
of disability discrimination, the plaintiff claims that the
court improperly concluded that a genuine issue of
material fact did not exist with respect to whether the
defendant’s reasons for the termination of her employ-
ment were pretextual in nature. Second, in connection
with her claim that the defendant failed to provide her
with a reasonable accommodation for her disability,
the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded
that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist with
respect to whether she made a good faith request for an
accommodation. We affirm the judgment of the court.
The record before the court, viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party,
reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural
history. The defendant hired the plaintiff as a licensed
registered nurse on or about March 6, 2017. The plaintiff
suffers from several conditions including alcoholism
and bipolar disorder. In May, 2018, the plaintiff began
a medical leave of absence pursuant to both the federal
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 2601 et seq. (2018), and the Connecticut Family and
Medical Leave Act (CFMLA), General Statutes § 31-51kk
1
The plaintiff has not challenged the court’s summary judgment with
respect to her retaliation claim set forth in the third count of her complaint.
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

et seq., to undergo treatment for alcoholism and bipolar
disorder, as well as depression. By the time the plaintiff
went on leave, the defendant was aware of her medical
conditions. The plaintiff was entitled to up to twelve
weeks of leave under the FMLA and up to sixteen weeks
of leave under the CFMLA.
During the plaintiff’s leave of absence, the Depart-
ment of Public Health (department) began investigating
the plaintiff’s history of alcohol abuse. At the conclusion
of the investigation, the department expressed con-
cerns as to the impact the plaintiff’s alcoholism had
on her ability to work as a nurse and recommended
disciplinary action. In response to the department’s
findings and recommendation, the Board of Examiners
for Nursing suspended the plaintiff’s Connecticut nurs-
ing license as of August 22, 2018. The plaintiff’s license
remained suspended until she voluntarily surrendered
it on May 28, 2019.
On October 17, 2018, Prudential Insurance Company
of America, the third-party administrator through which
the defendant managed its employees’ leaves of
absences, informed the plaintiff that, although she had
exhausted her FMLA leave as of August 6, 2018, and
her CFMLA leave as of September 3, 2018, her leave
benefits would be further extended through November
11, 2018. On November 12, 2018, the defendant termi-
nated the plaintiff’s employment. As of the date of termi-
nation, the plaintiff’s nursing license remained sus-
pended, she had not provided the defendant with a
return to work date, and she had not informed the
defendant as to whether she would ever be able to
return to work.
On February 19, 2021, the plaintiff commenced this
action against the defendant.2 In her complaint, the
A person alleging discriminatory work practices in violation of CFEPA
2

must exhaust his or her administrative remedies by filing a complaint with
the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) in accordance
with General Statutes § 46a-82. Only after obtaining a release of jurisdiction
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant discrimi-
nated against her on the basis of disability in violation
of General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (1) when it unlawfully
terminated her employment due to her disability and
failed to engage in the required good faith interactive
process to provide her with a reasonable accommoda-
tion. On February 28, 2023, the defendant filed a motion
for summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum
of law. Attached to its memorandum were affidavits,
excerpts from the plaintiff’s deposition, and other docu-
mentary evidence. On May 30, 2023, the plaintiff filed
a memorandum in opposition to the defendant’s motion
which included additional documentary evidence. The
court heard oral argument on June 20, 2023.
On August 11, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
of decision in which it concluded that there were no
genuine issues of material fact with respect to the plain-
tiff’s claims and that the defendant was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. With respect to the disability
discrimination claim set forth in count one of the plain-
tiff’s complaint, the court determined that, although the
plaintiff had established a prima facie case of disability
discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas3 frame-
work, the defendant had articulated legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons for the termination. The court
determined that the plaintiff subsequently failed to pres-
ent evidence that created a genuine issue of material
from the CHRO may that person pursue a civil action in the Superior Court.
See General Statutes § 46a-100. Any such action must be brought within
ninety days of receipt of the CHRO release. General Statutes § 46a-101 (e).
Moreover, any such action must be brought within two years from the date
of the filing of the CHRO complaint. General Statutes § 46a-102. In the
present case, the plaintiff obtained a release of jurisdiction from the CHRO
on November 30, 2020.
3
Adapted from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93
S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), and its progeny, the McDonnell Douglas
framework is the test generally employed in assessing discrimination claims
under Connecticut law. See Cooling v. Torrington, 221 Conn. App. 567, 583
n.11, 302 A.3d 319 (2023).
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

fact that the defendant’s proffered reasons for the termi-
nation were pretextual. Furthermore, the court deter-
mined that the defendant was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law on the plaintiff’s claim for failure to
accommodate, as the plaintiff failed to identify any
request for accommodation made prior to termination.
This appeal followed.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of
review. ‘‘The standards governing our review of a
court’s decision to grant a defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment are well settled. Practice Book § [17-
49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof
submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion
for summary judgment, the trial court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has
the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue
[of] material facts which, under applicable principles
of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter
of law . . . and [only on such a showing] the party
opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary
foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact. . . . [I]ssue-finding, rather than
issue-determination, is the key to the procedure. . . .
[T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when
ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . . . [Its]
function is not to decide issues of material fact, but
rather to determine whether any such issues exist. . . .
Our review of the decision to grant a motion for sum-
mary judgment is plenary. . . . We therefore must
decide whether the court’s conclusions were legally
and logically correct and find support in the record.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cooling v. Torring-
ton, 221 Conn. App. 567, 582–83, 302 A.3d 319 (2023).
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

I
The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in grant-
ing the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with
respect to her disability discrimination claim set forth
in count one of her complaint. Specifically, the plaintiff
argues that the court erred in applying the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Alternatively, she argues that, even
if the McDonnell Douglas framework applied, the court
erred in first determining that the defendant satisfied
its burden to identify legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for termination and then determining that she
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether those reasons were pretextual. The defendant
counters that the court correctly applied the McDonnell
Douglas framework and concluded that the defendant
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on count
one. We agree with the defendant.
We begin by setting forth the following relevant legal
principles. Under CFEPA, ‘‘employers may not discrimi-
nate against certain protected classes of individuals
. . . .’’ Desrosiers v. Diageo North America, Inc., 314
Conn. 773, 775, 105 A.3d 103 (2014). Section 46a-60 (b)
provides in relevant part: ‘‘It shall be a discriminatory
practice . . . (1) [f]or an employer . . . to discharge
from employment any individual or to discriminate
against such individual in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment because of the
individual’s . . . present or past history of mental dis-
ability . . . [or] physical disability. . . .’’
In order to establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination ‘‘based on adverse employment action
under the burden shifting analysis enumerated by the
United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.
Ed. 2d 668 (1973), and adopted by [our Supreme Court]
in Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut,
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 53–54, 578 A.2d 1054 (1990) . . .
the complainant must prove that: (1) [s]he [was] in the
protected class; (2) [s]he was qualified for the position;
(3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action; and
(4) that the adverse action occurred under circum-
stances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.’’
(Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control
Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 705–706, 900 A.2d 498 (2006).
‘‘The employer may then rebut the prima facie case by
stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for
the employment decision in question. The employee
then must demonstrate that the reason proffered by
the employer is merely a pretext and that the decision
actually was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 705.
‘‘To prove pretext, the plaintiff may show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that [the defendant’s] reason
is not worthy of belief or that more likely than not it
is not a true reason or the only true reason for [the
defendant’s] decision to [terminate the plaintiff’s
employment] . . . . Of course, to defeat summary
judgment . . . the plaintiff is not required to show that
the employer’s proffered reasons were false or played
no role in the employment decision, but only that they
were not the only reasons and that the prohibited factor
was at least one of the motivating factors.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Taing v.
CAMRAC, LLC, 189 Conn. App. 23, 28–29, 206 A.3d 194
(2019). ‘‘A plaintiff may show pretext by demonstrating
such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherences, or contradictions in the employer’s prof-
fered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
[fact finder] could rationally find them unworthy of
credence and hence infer that the employer did not act
for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Bombero v. Warner-Lambert
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 196, 203 n.7 (D. Conn. 2000), aff’d,
9 Fed. Appx. 38 (2d Cir. 2001).
As a threshold issue, we address the plaintiff’s claim
that, by applying McDonnell Douglas, the court applied
an improper legal standard in evaluating her disability
discrimination claim. She argues that, ‘‘[w]hen the rea-
son given by the employer for the adverse employment
action is unrelated to the employee’s disability, the
McDonnell Douglas approach can be used to weed out
nonviable claims of discrimination based on circum-
stantial evidence.’’ She contends, however, that,
‘‘[w]hen the parties agree that the employer complains
of conduct that is the direct result of the employee’s
disability . . . there is no need to evaluate whether the
employer’s adverse employment action made in
response to that conduct is pretextual.’’ She further
asserts that ‘‘[a] plaintiff cannot come forward with
evidence of pretext where the very reason for the
adverse employment action is the disability related
extended medical leave of absence.’’ It is fundamentally
at odds with CFEPA, she argues, to require a plaintiff
claiming disability discrimination to establish pretext
when the employer has terminated the individual’s
employment because of her disability.
The plaintiff’s argument assumes that the defendant’s
adverse employment action is in direct response to the
plaintiff’s disability. The defendant, however, presented
unrefuted evidence that its termination of the plaintiff’s
employment was not based on her disability. The defen-
dant articulated two nondiscriminatory bases for its
termination of the plaintiff’s employment: her failure
to return to work and her inability to work as a regis-
tered nurse due to the loss of her Connecticut nursing
license. Under these circumstances, the McDonnell
Douglas framework of analysis is an appropriate
method to employ. Consequently, the burden shifted to
the plaintiff to present evidence demonstrating, either
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

directly or by inference, the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact with respect to whether these bases
were pretextual.
We next consider whether the court properly applied
the McDonnell Douglas pretext model of analysis. In
the present case, the court determined, and we agree,
that the plaintiff satisfied her burden to make out a
prima facie case and that the defendant satisfied its
burden to identify legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for termination. After the defendant set forth its
two legitimate and nondiscriminatory justifications for
termination, under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
the burden shifted back to the plaintiff to present suffi-
cient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether those stated reasons were pretexts for
discrimination. She, however, has failed to offer any
evidence that the defendant’s legitimate reasons are
pretextual. Instead, she maintains that this is not a
pretext case. For the reasons stated earlier in this opin-
ion, we disagree. After a thorough review of the record,
we agree with the court that the plaintiff did not satisfy
her burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework
because she failed to offer any evidence of pretext.
Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly
applied the McDonnell Douglas framework and ren-
dered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on
the plaintiff’s claim of disability discrimination.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court erred in grant-
ing summary judgment in favor of the defendant on her
failure to accommodate claim because it improperly
concluded that a genuine issue of material fact did not
exist with respect to whether she made a good faith
request for an accommodation. We disagree.
We turn to relevant state law regarding employment
discrimination premised on a failure to reasonably
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

accommodate a disability. ‘‘Section 46a-60 (b) (1) requires
employers to reasonably accommodate an employee’s
disability. . . . In order to survive a motion for sum-
mary judgment on a reasonable accommodation claim,
the plaintiff must produce enough evidence for a rea-
sonable jury to find that (1) [she] is disabled within the
meaning of the [statute], (2) [she] was able to perform
the essential functions of the job with or without a
reasonable accommodation, and (3) [the defendant],
despite knowing of [the plaintiff’s] disability, did not
reasonably accommodate it. . . . If the employee has
made such a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to
the employer to show that such an accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on its business.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barto-
lotta v. Human Resources Agency of New Britain, Inc.,
224 Conn. App. 248, 272–73, 312 A.3d 59, cert. denied,
349 Conn. 908, 313 A.3d 513 (2024). At issue in the
present case is the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff
failed to satisfy her burden, under both the second and
third prongs, by failing to produce evidence that she
initiated the interactive process with a request for
accommodations while still employed by the defen-
dant.

‘‘Our Supreme Court has interpreted CFEPA, consis-
tent with analogous federal law; see Curry v. Allan S.
Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 403–404, 415–16, 944
A.2d 925 (2008); to require an employer and an
employee to engage in an informal, interactive process
. . . [to] identify the precise limitations resulting from
[an employee’s] disability and potential reasonable
accommodations that could overcome those limita-
tions. . . . The need for bilateral discussion arises
because each party holds information the other does
not have or cannot easily obtain. . . . The employee
bears the burden of initiating the interactive process
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

and must come forward with some suggestion of accom-
modation, and the employer must make a good faith
effort to participate in that discussion. . . . A plaintiff
who fails to initiate or to participate in the interactive
process in good faith cannot prevail on an employment
discrimination claim under CFEPA. . . . Once the
employee has initiated the informal interactive process,
the employer has a duty of good faith compliance.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cooling v. Torring-
ton, supra, 221 Conn. App. 584.
‘‘The plaintiff bears the burdens of both production
and persuasion as to the existence of some accommoda-
tion that would allow her to perform the essential func-
tions of her employment . . . . To satisfy this burden,
[the] [p]laintiff must establish both that [her] requested
accommodation would enable [her] to perform the
essential functions of [her] job and that it would allow
[her] to do so at or around the time at which it is sought.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Thomson v. Dept. of Social Services, 176 Conn. App.
122, 129, 169 A.3d 256, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 962, 172
A.3d 800 (2017).
In the present case, the plaintiff argues that there are
two types of accommodations at issue: (1) a medical
leave of absence, and (2) job reassignment. A medical
leave of absence is a recognized accommodation; how-
ever, ‘‘[t]he duty to make reasonable accommodations
does not, of course, require an employer to hold an
injured employee’s position open indefinitely while the
employee attempts to recover, nor does it force an
employer to investigate every aspect of an employee’s
condition before terminating [her] . . . based on [an]
inability to work.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 130. Reassignment to an alternative position is also
a recognized accommodation; however, a ‘‘plaintiff
requesting reassignment as [an] accommodation [is]
required to demonstrate the existence, at or around the
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

time when accommodation was sought, of an existing
vacant position to which she could have been reas-
signed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 129.
In addition to arguing that the record contains no
evidence that the plaintiff initiated the good faith inter-
active process, as is required for the defendant to be
obligated to engage in that process, the defendant
asserts that the plaintiff’s arguments premised on those
alleged accommodations fail because ‘‘(1) it is not
required to hold open the plaintiff’s position for an
indefinite period of time and (2) the plaintiff has pro-
duced no evidence of a vacant role that the defendant
could have placed her in before the end of her employ-
ment.’’ The defendant argues that the record is simply
devoid of any evidence that the plaintiff initiated the
good faith interactive process with a request for a rea-
sonable accommodation prior to termination. As the
court noted in its memorandum of decision, ‘‘[even]
the plaintiff’s [own] opposition memorandum does not
point the court to evidence that she actually requested
an accommodation while still employed with the defen-
dant.’’
With respect to the leave of absence claim, the plain-
tiff admits that, as of the date of termination, she had
not provided the defendant with a return to work date
or even notified the defendant that she would ever be
able to return to work. With respect to the claim of job
reassignment, the plaintiff maintains that she may have
been qualified for a position in the dietary field or as
a registered medical assistant. The plaintiff, however,
did not submit any evidence that the defendant had a
vacant position in either of these areas during the period
between the commencement of her leave and the termi-
nation of her employment. The plaintiff admits that
she never applied for an alternative position with the
defendant until after termination. Therefore, the plain-
tiff has not produced any evidence to raise a genuine
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Eldridge v. Hospital of Central Connecticut

issue of material fact that there was a position to which
she could have been reassigned as an accommodation
prior to termination.
Accordingly, the trial court properly rendered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plain-
tiff’s claim for failure to accommodate.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.