Marciniszyn v. Board of Education

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Marciniszyn v. Board of Education

JOSHUA MARCINISZYN ET AL. v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF
SOUTHINGTON ET AL.
(AC 46736)
Suarez, Clark and Lavine, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, a self-represented nonattorney father and his minor son by
and through the father as next friend, appealed from the trial court’s denial
of their petition for a bill of discovery. They claimed, inter alia, that the
court erred when it determined that they had failed to establish probable
cause for their claims that the defendants had discriminated against the son
in denying him admission to a public high school program in violation of
several federal civil rights laws. Held:

This court properly considered, sua sponte, the issue of the plaintiff father’s
standing to bring this appeal in his individual capacity and of his authority
to proceed in a representative capacity as a self-represented nonattorney
on behalf of his minor son, as exceptional circumstances warranted this
court’s review, the parties have been afforded an opportunity to be heard,
the plaintiffs have failed to raise a colorable claim of prejudice, and the
record was adequate for review, even though the parties did not raise the
issue in their principal briefs.

The plaintiff father had standing in his individual capacity to appeal from
the trial court’s decision denying the petition for a bill of discovery, as he
was classically aggrieved by the court’s decision in that, as one of two
plaintiffs in the proceedings before the court, he suffered an injury when
the court denied his request to act pursuant to its common-law authority
to issue the bill.

The plaintiff father, notwithstanding his aggrievement by the trial court’s
decision, did not have standing to bring the action in his individual capacity
in the first instance because he was not classically aggrieved, as a review
of the petition revealed that the injuries alleged therein were exclusively
injuries to his minor son and not to him, and the court should have dismissed
the petition as to the father for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather
than denying it.

This court dismissed the appeal as to the minor son as the plaintiff father
did not have the authority as a self-represented nonattorney to proceed in
a representative capacity on behalf of his son, and the father failed to cure
that defect by retaining counsel to appear on behalf of the son when this
court afforded the father the opportunity to do so.
Argued September 4, 2024—officially released February 11, 2025
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Marciniszyn v. Board of Education

Procedural History

Petition for a bill of discovery seeking certain infor-
mation related to the application process for a high
school educational program, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Waterbury and tried to
the court, Pierson, J.; judgment denying the petition,
from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Appeal
dismissed in part; reversed in part; judgment directed.
Joshua Marciniszyn, self-represented, the appellant,
and for the appellant D (plaintiffs).
Peter J. Murphy, with whom were Bradley M. Harper
and, on the brief, Chelsea C. McCallum, for the appellee
(named defendant).
Opinion

CLARK, J. The plaintiffs, Joshua Marciniszyn, who is
self-represented, and his minor child D, by and through
Marciniszyn as next friend, appeal from the trial court’s
denial of their petition for a bill of discovery (petition).
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the court erred when
it determined that they failed to establish probable
cause for their claims that the defendants, the Board
of Education of the Town of Southington and the town
of Southington, had discriminated against D in violation
of several federal civil rights laws. They also argue that
the court improperly granted the defendants a continu-
ance to file an objection to their petition and improperly
limited the presentation of testimony at the hearing
on the petition. We conclude that Marciniszyn lacked
standing to bring this action in his individual capacity.
We therefore reverse in part the court’s judgment and
remand the case with direction to dismiss the petition
as to Marciniszyn in his individual capacity. We dismiss
the appeal as to D because Marciniszyn lacks authority,
as a self-represented nonattorney, to proceed in a repre-
sentative capacity on D’s behalf before this court.
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The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to this appeal. Southington High
School operates an educational program called the
Southington Regional Agriculture program (AG pro-
gram). Students from the towns of Southington, Berlin,
Farmington, Bristol, New Britain, Cheshire, Plainville,
Terryville, Waterbury, and Wolcott are eligible to apply
to the AG program, but not all students who apply
are accepted. D applied to the AG program for the
2023–2024 school year and was placed on a waiting list.
The plaintiffs commenced this action on March 7,
2023. They filed their petition, captioned as ‘‘Joshua
Marciniszyn [and] Joshua Marciniszyn P/P/A1 (Minor
Child) [D], Plaintiff v. [Defendants].’’ They sought an
order directing the defendants to disclose, inter alia,
‘‘the [t]raining [m]anual used, referenced, and imple-
mented, to evaluate all the applications’’ to the AG pro-
gram; ‘‘every and all, applications, separated into those
initially accepted, those put on wait lists, and those
rejected,’’ including information about applicants’
grades, test scores, and recommendations; internal and
external communications to and from ‘‘decision mak-
ers, including but not limited to, the principal, vice
principal, superintendent, teachers, [and] school
board’’; and ‘‘social media research conducted on each
student.’’ They also sought to compel the defendants
to answer certain interrogatories, including: ‘‘Please
state in detail why [D] was not selected at the initial
selection process?’’ ‘‘What additional steps could [D]
have completed to secure placement?’’ And ‘‘[p]lease
describe the complete and entire methodology . . .
used to reach the determination of students accepted,
rejected, and placed on the wait list . . . .’’
1
‘‘Per proxima amici, or [PPA], means by or through the next friend, and
is employed when an adult brings suit on behalf of a minor, who was unable
to maintain an action on his own behalf at common law.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Marciniszyn v. Taylor, Superior Court, judicial district of
Waterbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 19, 2021).
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The plaintiffs alleged that they were entitled to this
information because the defendants had discriminated
against D in violation of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.; the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq.; Title VI2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and ‘‘Title 42 of the C.F.R., et
al.’’3 The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants
‘‘wilfully and maliciously acted in bad faith and with
extreme prejudice’’ when they put D on a waiting list
for the AG program and that this decision constituted
discrimination against D ‘‘based on race, (biracial birth),
sex, gender, sexual orientation, sexual orientation of
parent, [individualized education program] status, dis-
ease or diagnosis, place of current residence, place of
current educational district, place of current educa-
tional school and/or other factors that this discovery
will reveal.’’ In support of these claims of discrimina-
tion, the plaintiffs alleged that D had been placed on a
waiting list despite being a uniquely strong candidate
for admission to the AG program, as evidenced by his
grades, standardized test scores, and extracurricular
activities.
The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants’
decision to place D on a waiting list impeded D’s future
college and career plans. In particular, they claimed
2
Although the plaintiffs did not, in their petition, expressly list Title VI
among the civil rights statutes that they accused the defendants of violating,
they cited elsewhere in their petition to the language of Title VI as setting
forth a ‘‘standard’’ that, they claimed, the defendants had breached. Mindful
that self-represented parties’ pleadings should be construed ‘‘broadly and
realistically, rather than narrowly and technically’’; (internal quotation marks
omitted) Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 569, 877
A.2d 761 (2005); we construe the plaintiffs’ petition to allege probable cause
for a Title VI violation.
3
In a later filing, the plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants had violated
‘‘all other federal and state laws, to which publicly funded schools are
subject to.’’
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that D was ‘‘entitled to remedy’’ for: ‘‘[l]oss of education
that would prepare him for the career path he has cho-
sen’’; ‘‘[l]oss of education that would appear on his
resume that college acceptance boards review’’; [l]oss
of education that would position him to receive scholar-
ships and grants to further his education beyond high
school’’; ‘‘[l]ifetime loss of income in his chosen career,
as a result of lost education . . . [and] [l]oss of educa-
tional information and resources that would be
unknown to him, giving students that attend, the advan-
tage over him in the same career field.’’
Following briefing and oral argument,4 the trial court,
Pierson, J., denied the petition on July 7, 2023. The
court concluded that ‘‘[t]he . . . claims of discrimina-
tion are premised on the assumption that, as [D], an
excellent student, was denied admission to the [AG]
program, such denial must have been based on imper-
missible discrimination of some kind. Such an assump-
tion is insufficient to give rise to an inference of inten-
tional or otherwise prohibited discrimination. The
application is devoid of detailed facts demonstrating
that [D’s] characteristics affected, in any way, the defen-
dants’ decision to place him on the ‘wait list.’ ’’ (Empha-
sis omitted.) The court concluded that the plaintiffs
4
Prior to oral argument on the plaintiffs’ petition in the trial court, the
court, over the plaintiffs’ objection, continued the matter from April 10 to
May 1, 2023, in order to allow the defendants time to file an objection to
the petition and the plaintiffs time to file a reply thereto. On the date
scheduled for oral argument on the petition, before he began his argument,
Marciniszyn asked if the trial court would be allowing testimony, stating
that D was available to authenticate certain exhibits that the plaintiffs had
filed. The court replied that testimony would be unnecessary because the
defendants had not objected to the exhibits. Although the plaintiffs, in
this appeal, challenge both the continuance order and the exclusion of D’s
proffered testimony, along with the court’s determination that they had
failed to establish probable cause for a bill of discovery, we do not reach
the merits of their claims in light of our conclusions herein that Marciniszyn
lacked standing in his individual capacity to bring this action and lacks
authority as a self-represented nonattorney to proceed on D’s behalf before
this court.
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were using their petition as a means of conducting a
‘‘ ‘fishing expedition.’ ’’ This appeal followed.
On September 30, 2024, following oral argument
before this court, we sua sponte ordered the parties to
submit supplemental memoranda addressing (1)
whether Marciniszyn has standing to bring this appeal
in his individual capacity, and (2) whether, in light of
this court’s decision in Lowe v. Shelton, 83 Conn. App.
750, 755–59, 851 A.2d 1183, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 915,
859 A.2d 568 (2004), Marciniszyn—who is neither an
attorney licensed to practice law in Connecticut, nor
admitted pro hac vice—is authorized, as a self-repre-
sented nonattorney, to proceed in a representative
capacity on behalf of D, and, if not, whether and how
that defect may be cured. The parties filed supplemental
memoranda in accordance with this order.
Thereafter, on October 23, 2024, we ordered that the
adjudication of this appeal be stayed for sixty days in
order to afford Marciniszyn an opportunity to retain an
attorney licensed to practice and in good standing in
Connecticut to represent D in this appeal.5 We further
specified that this attorney, if retained, must file an
appearance with this court within sixty days, along with
a statement specifying (1) whether they intended to
adopt the plaintiffs’ brief or submit a substitute brief
in lieu thereof, and (2) whether they sought reargument
of the appeal. We cautioned that, should Marciniszyn
fail to comply with this order, the appeal as to D may
be dismissed.
Marciniszyn did not retain counsel to represent D
within sixty days of our October 23, 2024 order. On
5
As a minor, D may not represent himself. See, e.g., V. V. v. V. V., 218
Conn. App. 157, 168, 291 A.3d 109 (2023) (‘‘a child may bring a civil action
only by a guardian or next friend, whose responsibility it is to ensure that
the interests of the ward are well represented’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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December 19, 2024, the plaintiffs filed a motion
requesting an extension of time of ninety days to secure
counsel for D. The defendants did not file a response.
We denied the motion on January 2, 2025, and lifted
the stay. The appeal is now ready for adjudication.
I
As a preliminary matter, in their supplemental memo-
randum to this court, the plaintiffs claim that it is
improper for us to raise and decide, sua sponte, the
issues of Marciniszyn’s standing to bring this appeal in
his individual capacity and of his authority to proceed
in a representative capacity on behalf of D. In particular,
the plaintiffs argue that no exceptional circumstances
justify our consideration of these issues and that our
consideration of these issues would prejudice them. We
disagree.
‘‘Our appellate courts generally do not consider
issues that were not raised by the parties. . . . This is
because our system is an adversarial one in which the
burden ordinarily is on the parties to frame the issues
. . . . There are, however, well established exceptions
to this rule.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Connor, 321 Conn. 350, 362,
138 A.3d 265 (2016). ‘‘[W]ith respect to the propriety
of a reviewing court raising and deciding an issue that
the parties themselves have not raised . . . the
reviewing court (1) must do so when that issue impli-
cates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) has
the discretion to do so if (a) exceptional circumstances
exist that would justify review of such an issue if raised
by a party, (b) the parties are given an opportunity to be
heard on the issue, and (c) there is no unfair prejudice
to the party against whom the issue is to be decided.’’
Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown &
Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 128, 84
A.3d 840 (2014) (Blumberg). The record must also be
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adequate for review of the unpreserved issue. See, e.g.,
Matos v. Ortiz, 166 Conn. App. 775, 792, 144 A.3d
425 (2016).
‘‘Exceptional circumstances [justifying sua sponte
review of an unpreserved issue in the court’s discretion]
exist when the interests of justice, fairness, integrity
of the courts and consistency of the law significantly
outweigh the interest in enforcing procedural rules gov-
erning the preservation of claims. . . . To satisfy con-
cerns of fundamental fairness, at a minimum, the parties
must be provided sufficient notice that the court intends
to consider an issue. It is implicit that an opportunity
to be heard must be a meaningful opportunity . . . .
The parties must be allowed time to review the record
with that issue in mind, to conduct research, and to
prepare a response. . . . Additionally, [p]rejudice may
be found, for example, when a party demonstrates that
it would have presented additional evidence or that it
otherwise would have proceeded differently if the claim
had been raised at trial.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 335
Conn. 53, 59, 225 A.3d 953 (2020). ‘‘[B]ecause it may be
difficult for a party to prove definitively that it would
have proceeded in a different manner and, as a result,
would suffer unfair prejudice if the reviewing court
were to consider the unpreserved issue, once that party
makes a colorable claim of such prejudice, the burden
shifts to the other party to establish that the first party
will not be prejudiced by the reviewing court’s consider-
ation of the issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Connor, supra, 321 Conn. 373–74.
The issue of Marciniszyn’s standing in his individual
capacity implicates subject matter jurisdiction as to
him; see, e.g., Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v.
Healy, 158 Conn. App. 113, 115, 118 A.3d 637 (2015);
and this court is therefore required to raise and decide
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the issue sua sponte. By contrast, the issue of Marcinis-
zyn’s authority, as a self-represented nonattorney, to
proceed in a representative capacity on behalf of D
does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. See Lowe
v. Shelton, supra, 83 Conn. App. 759 (‘‘the filing of an
appeal on behalf of a minor by a nonattorney parent
does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction’’). We are
convinced, however, that sua sponte consideration of
this latter issue is proper because exceptional circum-
stances warrant our review, the parties have been
afforded an opportunity to be heard, the plaintiffs have
failed to raise a colorable claim of prejudice, and the
record is adequate for review.

In Lowe v. Shelton, supra, 83 Conn. App. 756–59, this
court held that, in general, nonattorney parents may
not represent their minor children on appeal without
the assistance of an attorney. The court in Lowe rea-
soned that ‘‘ ‘it is not in the interests of minors or incom-
petents that they be represented by [nonattorneys].
Where they have claims that require adjudication, they
are entitled to trained legal assistance so their rights
may be fully protected.’ ’’ Id., 757, quoting Cheung v.
Youth Orchestra Foundation of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d
59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990). Because ‘‘[t]he choice to appear
[in a self-represented capacity] is not a true choice for
minors who under state law . . . cannot determine
their own legal actions . . . [t]here is . . . no individ-
ual choice to proceed [in a self-represented capacity]
for courts to respect, and the sole policy at stake con-
cerns the exclusion of [nonlicensed] persons to appear
as attorneys on behalf of others.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Lowe v. Shelton, supra, 757. As the
court in Lowe explained, ‘‘[t]he conduct of litigation by
a nonlawyer creates unusual burdens not only for the
party he represents but as well for his adversaries and
the court. The lay litigant frequently brings pleadings
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that are awkwardly drafted, motions that are inarticu-
lately presented, proceedings that are needlessly multi-
plicative. In addition to lacking the professional skills
of a lawyer, the lay litigant lacks many of the attorney’s
ethical responsibilities, e.g., to avoid litigating unfounded
or vexatious claims.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 758.6
We begin with the question of whether exceptional
circumstances justify our sua sponte review of Marcini-
szyn’s authority, as a self-represented nonattorney, to
proceed in a representative capacity on behalf of D.
We note at the outset that this court in Lowe reached
its holding only after ordering supplemental briefs at
oral argument on the questions of (1) whether the court
had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because
it was filed by the plaintiff’s parents without the aid of
an attorney, and (2) whether any defect resulting from
the parents’ filing of the appeal was curable. See id.,
753 (describing supplemental brief order without analy-
sis of why order was proper). Moreover, although we
are unaware of any case in which this court or our
Supreme Court has squarely discussed the propriety of
a court’s consideration, sua sponte, of nonattorney self-
represented parents’ authority to ‘‘represent’’ their chil-
dren, our research reveals that at least six of the federal
circuit courts of appeals—including the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, whose case
law influenced this court’s holding in Lowe—have con-
sidered this issue sua sponte. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Com-
missioner of Social Security, 518 Fed. Appx. 691, 692
n.1 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Dunlop v.
6
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion, this language does not require the
court, before concluding that a Lowe defect exists, to conduct an individual-
ized evaluation of whether a nonattorney, self-represented parent acting in
a representative capacity on behalf of his child would create ‘‘unusual bur-
dens’’ for his adversaries and the court. Rather, the court in Lowe discussed
the burdens imposed by self-represented parties’ litigation simply as one
rationale for its ultimate holding. See Lowe v. Shelton, 83 Conn. App. 758–59.
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Colvin, 572 U.S. 1005, 134 S. Ct. 1521, 188 L. Ed. 2d 455
(2014); Adams ex rel. D.J.W. v. Astrue, 659 F.3d 1297,
1299 (10th Cir. 2011); Myers v. Loudoun County Public
Schools, 418 F.3d 395, 399 (4th Cir. 2005); McPherson
v. School District No. 186, 32 Fed. Appx. 769, 770 (7th
Cir. 2002); Wenger v. Canastota Central School District,
146 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1025, 119 S. Ct. 1267, 143 L. Ed. 2d 363 (1999); Osei-
Afriyie v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d
876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Harris v. Apfel, 209
F.3d 413, 414 (5th Cir. 2000) (addressing nonattorney,
self-represented parent’s authority to represent child in
Social Security appeal when issue was raised for first
time by appellee on appeal).7
7
We are aware of one circuit that has taken a different approach. In W.
J. v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 93 F.4th 1228, 1235–37 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. W. J. v. Becerra, U.S. , S. Ct. ,
L. Ed. 2d (2024), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit sua sponte ordered supplemental briefing on the question of whether
a minor’s self-represented parents were authorized to act in a representative
capacity on behalf of their child in prosecuting, and appealing the denial
of, a claim for compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-1 et seq. (Vaccine Act). After reviewing the
parties’ supplemental briefing, the court concluded that ‘‘this case does not
require us to answer our own question.’’ Id., 1236. The court explained that
dismissal of the case would be inefficient and unfair in light of the fact that
the government, even after the order for supplemental briefing, had not
asked that the appeal be dismissed; that the Rules of the Court of Federal
Claims, where the claim had been filed, and procedural rules for Vaccine
Act cases expressly permitted such representation; that the Federal Circuit
had adjudicated the merits of claims brought by self-represented parents
on behalf of their children in several prior nonprecedential decisions; and
that the case, which had been fully briefed and argued, had been working
its way through the courts for three years and was predicated on alleged
injuries that were more than seventeen years old. Id.
W. J., like all the federal cases we cite herein, is not binding on this
court and constitutes, at most, persuasive authority only. In any event, the
circumstances that motivated the Federal Circuit to refuse to decide the
representation question in W. J. are either absent from or carry significantly
less force in this case. Here, the defendants, following our order for supple-
mental memoranda, have requested that we conclude that Marciniszyn lacks
authority to proceed on behalf of D. Moreover, this court’s holding in Lowe,
which predates the inception of this case by almost two decades and with
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We find the reasoning of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Wenger to be persua-
sive. In that case, the court stated that, because ‘‘[t]he
infant is always the ward of every court wherein his
rights or property are brought into jeopardy, and is
entitled to the most jealous care that no injustice be
done to him,’’ courts have a duty, sua sponte, to inquire
as to the propriety of—and to restrain—self-repre-
sented nonattorney parents’ representation of their chil-
dren. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wenger v.
Canastota Central School District, supra, 146 F.3d 125.
This court’s holding in Lowe was informed by, and
expressed, that same solicitude for minors’ entitlement
to trained legal representation so that they may effec-
tively litigate their claims. See Lowe v. Shelton, supra,
83 Conn. App. 757 (‘‘[t]he purpose for requiring an attor-
ney is to ensure that children rightfully entitled to legal
relief are not deprived of their day in court by unskilled,
if caring, parents’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This concern likewise informs our conclusion that it is
appropriate for this court to raise and decide the ques-
tion of Marciniszyn’s authority, as a self-represented
which the plaintiffs are well acquainted; see footnote 8 of this opinion;
expressly forbids self-represented nonattorney parents without a personal
interest at stake from proceeding on their child’s behalf, and the plaintiffs
have cited no statute or rule of practice to the contrary. In the one case of
which we are aware in which this court decided the merits of an appeal
that suffered from a Lowe defect, it did so without any discussion of or
attempt to distinguish the decision in Lowe. See Shockley v. Okeke, 92 Conn.
App. 76, 882 A.2d 1244 (2005), appeal dismissed, 280 Conn. 777, 912 A.2d
991 (2007) (certification improvidently granted). Moreover, in a dissenting
opinion in Shockley, Judge Schaller—the author of Lowe—considered the
defect a threshold issue that implicated this court’s authority to decide the
appeal and would have given the parties an opportunity to brief the issue
and cure the defect. See id., 86–92 (Schaller, J., dissenting). Finally, notwith-
standing the plaintiffs’ assertion that ‘‘a substantial period has [e]lapsed’’
since D’s alleged injury—his placement on a waiting list—this event
occurred, by the plaintiffs’ own representations, in February, 2023; the case
was filed in March, 2023; and oral argument before this court occurred in
September, 2024. This is a far cry from the more than seventeen years
between injury and adjudication that the court confronted in W. J.
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nonattorney, to proceed in a representative capacity on
behalf of D, even though the parties did not raise the
issue in their principal briefs.

Sua sponte consideration of this issue is also war-
ranted in light of Connecticut’s prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law. It is well established that
‘‘[a self-represented] party may not appear on behalf of
another [self-represented] party . . . [and] [t]o do so
would be to engage in the unauthorized practice of
law.’’ (Citation omitted.) Collard & Roe, P.C. v. Klein,
87 Conn. App. 337, 343–44 n.3, 865 A.2d 500, cert. denied,
274 Conn. 904, 876 A.2d 13 (2005); see also General
Statutes § 51-88. As our Supreme Court has explained,
the various functions inherent in the practice of law
‘‘require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill and
great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations . . . [and] [i]t is of importance to the welfare
of the public that these manifold customary functions
[of practicing law] be performed by persons possessed
of adequate learning and skill and of sound moral char-
acter, acting at all times under the heavy trust obligation
to clients which rests upon all attorneys.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide
Grievance Committee v. Patton, 239 Conn. 251, 255,
683 A.2d 1359 (1996); accord Collinsgru v. Palmyra
Board of Education, 161 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 1998)
(‘‘Requiring a minimum level of competence protects
not only the party that is being represented but also
his or her adversaries and the court from poorly drafted,
inarticulate, or vexatious claims. . . . Not only is a
licensed attorney likely to be more skilled in the prac-
tice of law, but he or she is also subject to ethical
responsibilities and obligations that a lay person is not.
In addition, attorneys may be sued for malpractice.’’
(Citation omitted.)). In keeping with these strong public
policy considerations, this court has not hesitated in
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other contexts to consider, sua sponte, whether a self-
represented party attempting to proceed before this
court in a representative capacity was engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., Cazenovia Creek
Funding I, LLC v. Roman, 223 Conn. App. 739, 743,
309 A.3d 419 (2024); Ellis v. Cohen, 118 Conn. App. 211,
214 n.8, 982 A.2d 1130 (2009). The plaintiffs have set
forth no compelling justification for why we should
take a different course here. We therefore conclude
that the interests of justice, fairness, integrity of the
courts and consistency of the law militate in favor of
our considering, sua sponte, Marciniszyn’s authority as
a self-represented nonattorney to proceed before this
court in a representative capacity on behalf of D, and
significantly outweigh the interest in enforcing proce-
dural rules governing the preservation of claims.
The plaintiffs do not argue that we have deprived
them of a meaningful opportunity to be heard on this
issue and, indeed, our September 30, 2024 order for
supplemental memoranda has afforded them such an
opportunity. See, e.g., CCT Communications, Inc. v.
Zone Telecom, Inc., 327 Conn. 114, 126 n.9, 172 A.3d
1228 (2017) (explaining that Blumberg ‘‘calls for supple-
mental briefing when a reviewing court raises an unpre-
served issue sua sponte’’ (emphasis omitted)); Shockley
v. Okeke, 92 Conn. App. 76, 91–92, 882 A.2d 1244 (2005)
(Schaller, J., dissenting) (‘‘[b]ecause the lack of author-
ity to proceed without counsel . . . implicates our
authority to decide the appeal, I would give the parties
an opportunity to address the Lowe problem by ordering
supplemental briefs’’ (citation omitted)), appeal dis-
missed, 280 Conn. 777, 912 A.2d 991 (2007) (certification
improvidently granted).
With respect to prejudice, the plaintiffs assert that
our consideration of this issue will cause them ‘‘extreme
prejudice’’ because a substantial amount of time has
already elapsed since D was notified that he had been
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placed on a waiting list for the AG program. The plain-
tiffs do not, however, attempt to explain how, had the
issue of Marciniszyn’s authority as a self-represented
nonattorney to proceed on D’s behalf arisen in the trial
court, they would have presented any additional evi-
dence or otherwise proceeded differently—which is the
relevant inquiry when determining whether review of
an unpreserved issue would prejudice a party. See, e.g.,
Kinity v. US Bancorp, 212 Conn. App. 791, 813–14, 277
A.3d 200 (2022).8 The plaintiffs have thus failed to raise
a colorable claim of prejudice.
Finally, the record is adequate for review of this issue.
As we discuss in greater detail in parts II and III of this
opinion, the question requires no fact-finding on our
part—it is undisputed that Marciniszyn is a self-repre-
sented nonattorney who is attempting to act as D’s next
friend—and instead requires us simply to assess the
propriety of this representative relationship on the basis
of the plaintiffs’ pleading and established legal princi-
ples. See, e.g., Matos v. Ortiz, supra, 166 Conn. App.
794 (record is adequate for review of unpreserved issue
when issue presents ‘‘a pure question of law and the
relevant facts are undisputed’’). Therefore, we conclude
that sua sponte consideration of Marciniszyn’s standing
in his individual capacity, and of his authority as a self-
represented nonattorney to proceed in a representative
capacity on behalf of D, is proper.
II
We next consider the question of Marciniszyn’s stand-
ing, in his individual capacity. In their supplemental
8
We note that, before they commenced the present action, the plaintiffs
previously confronted motions to dismiss and for default, predicated on
Lowe, in a separate action in which Marciniszyn sought to proceed on D’s
behalf without the assistance of an attorney. See Marciniszyn v. Taylor,
Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
S; see also, e.g., Jackson v. Drury, 191 Conn. App. 587, 590 n.4, 216 A.3d
768 (‘‘[a]n appellate court may take judicial notice of files in the same or
other cases’’), cert. denied, 333 Conn. 938, 218 A.3d 1050 (2019).
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memorandum, the plaintiffs argue that Marciniszyn has
standing to bring this appeal because he was a named
party in the proceedings before the trial court and ‘‘has
legally cognizable economic, social, and emotional
intertwined interests’’ in D’s admission to the AG pro-
gram, in connection with D’s future college admissions
prospects, financial aid and scholarship opportunities,
and employment and earning potential. We agree that
Marciniszyn is aggrieved by the trial court’s decision
denying the petition and, thus, has standing, in his indi-
vidual capacity, to bring this appeal. We further con-
clude, however, that Marciniszyn lacked standing in
his individual capacity to bring this action in the first
instance because he has not established that he has
suffered a direct injury, traceable to the defendants’
conduct, to a legally protected interest belonging to
him. As such, the trial court should have dismissed,
rather than denied, the petition as to Marciniszyn in his
individual capacity.
We begin with a brief discussion of the difference
between appellate standing and a party’s standing to
bring an action in the first instance. In order to establish
standing in, and thereby invoke the jurisdiction of,
either this court or the trial court, a plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing that he or she is aggrieved. Cf.
Perry v. Perry, 312 Conn. 600, 620, 95 A.3d 500 (2014);
Martinelli v. Martinelli, 226 Conn. App. 563, 572–73,
319 A.3d 198 (2024); see also Lewin v. United States
Surgical Corp., 21 Conn. App. 629, 631, 575 A.2d 262
(‘‘[t]he burden of proving aggrievement rests with the
plaintiffs who have claimed it’’), cert. denied, 216 Conn.
801, 577 A.2d 716 (1990). ‘‘There are two general types
of aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory; either
type will establish standing, and each has its own unique
features.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ava
W., 336 Conn. 545, 554, 248 A.3d 675 (2020). ‘‘The funda-
mental test for determining [classical] aggrievement
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encompasses a well-settled twofold determination:
first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully
demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in
[the subject matter of the challenged action], as distin-
guished from a general interest, such as is the concern
of all members of the community as a whole. Second,
the party claiming aggrievement must successfully
establish that this specific personal and legal interest
has been specially and injuriously affected by the [chal-
lenged action].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Browning v. Van Brunt, DuBiago & Co., LLC, 330
Conn. 447, 455, 195 A.3d 1123 (2018). Statutory
aggrievement, meanwhile, ‘‘exists by legislative fiat, not
by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case.
In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, par-
ticular legislation grants standing to those who claim
injury to an interest protected by that legislation.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Criminal
Complaint, 350 Conn. 633, 639, 325 A.3d 921 (2024).
As our Supreme Court has emphasized, however,
‘‘[s]tanding for purposes of bringing an action differs
from the aggrievement requirement for appellate review
under [General Statutes] § 52-263.’’ In re Ava W., supra,
336 Conn. 555. When analyzing whether a plaintiff is
classically aggrieved for purposes of bringing an action,
the court must assess whether the plaintiff has made
a colorable allegation of direct injury, in an individual
or representative capacity, to a protected interest, that
is traceable to the conduct of the defendant. See, e.g.,
Frillici v. Westport, 264 Conn. 266, 280–81, 823 A.2d
1172 (2003). A party can be classically ‘‘aggrieved’’ for
purposes of appellate standing, by contrast, when he
affirmatively requests that a court act, and his request
is denied—even if he lacked standing to bring the action
in the trial court. See, e.g., In re Ava W., supra, 555–57.
In the context of the appellate standing inquiry, it is the
request for judicial relief itself—and not the underlying
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factual allegations marshaled in support of that
request—that establishes the requisite ‘‘specific per-
sonal and legal interest,’’ and it is the court’s denial of
that request that constitutes the requisite injury. Id., 555.
The reviewing court retains, however, the obligation to
consider—even sua sponte—whether a plaintiff in a
case over which it has appellate jurisdiction had stand-
ing to bring the action in the first place. See, e.g., Smith
v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 460 n.5, 839 A.2d 589 (2004);
see also State v. Bryan, 229 Conn. App. 364, 366 n.3,
327 A.3d 467 (2024) (‘‘[i]t is well established . . . that
[t]he trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction does
not . . . deprive this court of appellate jurisdiction to
determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Although our order for supplemental memoranda
asked the parties to address Marciniszyn’s standing, in
his individual capacity, to bring this appeal, the parties’
submissions largely focus on whether the underlying
claims asserted in the action were personal to Marcinis-
zyn or instead were predicated solely on injuries to
D. Properly understood, this analysis addresses, not
Marciniszyn’s appellate standing but, rather, his stand-
ing to bring this action in his individual capacity in
the first instance. We therefore address Marciniszyn’s
standing, in his individual capacity, both to appeal and
to bring this action. We afford these issues plenary
review. See, e.g., C. M. v. R. M., 219 Conn. App. 57, 65,
293 A.3d 968 (2023); Johnson v. Rell, 119 Conn. App.
730, 736, 990 A.2d 354 (2010).
A
We begin with Marciniszyn’s standing to appeal.
Because Marciniszyn does not allege that he is statuto-
rily aggrieved, he must establish that he has been classi-
cally aggrieved by the trial court’s decision. See, e.g.,
In re Probate Appeal of Kusmit, 188 Conn. App. 196,
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201, 204 A.3d 776 (2019). Upon our review of the record
and the parties’ supplemental memoranda, we conclude
that he has done so. As one of two plaintiffs in the
proceedings before the trial court, Marciniszyn affirma-
tively requested that the court act, pursuant to its com-
mon-law authority, to issue a bill of discovery. The
trial court then denied this request, thereby causing
Marciniszyn to suffer an injury. He is therefore classi-
cally aggrieved by the trial court’s decision. See, e.g.,
In re Ava W., supra, 336 Conn. 555–57 (mother was
classically aggrieved by trial court’s denial of motion
for posttermination visitation ‘‘because she was a party
to the underlying litigation who requested that the trial
court act pursuant to its common-law authority’’ and
trial court denied her request). He thus has standing to
maintain this appeal in his individual capacity.
B
We next consider whether Marciniszyn, notwith-
standing his aggrievement by the trial court’s decision,
had standing to bring the action in his individual capac-
ity in the first instance. The legal principles underlying
our inquiry are well established. ‘‘The requirement that
a party have standing is fundamental. [A] party must
have standing to assert a claim in order for the court
to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. . . .
Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in
motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction
of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the cause
of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest
in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . Where a
party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently
without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the
cause.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Burton v. Freedom of Information Commis-
sion, 161 Conn. App. 654, 658–59, 129 A.3d 721 (2015),
cert. denied, 321 Conn. 901, 136 A.3d 642 (2016).
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‘‘Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep
aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substan-
tive rights. Rather, it is a practical concept designed to
ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits
brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that
judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others
are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and
vigorously represented. . . . These two objectives are
ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant
makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered
or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative
capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of
concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. . . . The
requirement of directness between the injuries claimed
by the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also
is expressed, in our standing jurisprudence, by the focus
on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert
the claim at issue.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v.
Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 486, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).
As we have discussed, ‘‘[s]tanding is established by
showing that the party claiming it is authorized by stat-
ute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved. . . .
Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as
distinguished from a certainty, that some legally pro-
tected interest . . . has been adversely affected. . . .
[O]nly those individuals who have suffered a direct
injury would have standing.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Martinelli v. Martinelli,
supra, 226 Conn. App. 572–73. Conclusory statements
devoid of adequate supporting factual allegations, how-
ever, do not establish the requisite protected interest.
See, e.g., State Marshal Assn. of Connecticut, Inc. v.
Johnson, 198 Conn. App. 392, 405, 234 A.3d 111 (2020).
The plaintiffs do not claim that Marciniszyn is author-
ized by statute to bring this action. Thus, in order for
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Marciniszyn to have standing to bring this action in his
individual capacity, the plaintiffs must establish that
he is classically aggrieved, i.e., that he has set forth a
colorable claim of direct injury, traceable to the defen-
dants’ conduct, to a personal, legally protected interest.
See, e.g., Andross v. West Hartford, 285 Conn. 309,
323, 939 A.2d 1146 (2008). A review of the petition,9
however—reading its allegations in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiffs—reveals that the injuries alleged
therein are exclusively injuries to D, not to Marciniszyn.
It is D’s right to be free from discrimination, D’s college
and career prospects, and D’s future earning potential
that the plaintiffs allege have been harmed by the defen-
dants’ decision to place D on a waiting list. As such,
the plaintiffs’ allegations do not demonstrate that Mar-
ciniszyn—as opposed to D—was classically aggrieved
in his individual capacity. See, e.g., Shockley v. Okeke,
supra, 92 Conn. App. 84–85 (Superior Court properly
dismissed mother’s probate appeal from denial of minor
child’s name change application for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction where ‘‘the only matter properly before
either the Probate Court or the Superior Court was the
child’s right to a change of name’’ and, ‘‘[a]s the plaintiff
had no legal interest at issue, she was not aggrieved by
the decision of the Probate Court denying the applica-
tion for a change of name’’).

The fact that the plaintiffs now claim, in their supple-
mental memorandum, that Marciniszyn has ‘‘legally cog-
nizable economic, social, and emotional intertwined
interests’’ of his own in D’s ability to attend the AG
program—interests that the plaintiffs value at ‘‘hun-
dreds of thousands . . . if not millions’’ of dollars—
does not change our conclusion. This is so for two
9
The plaintiffs’ reply to the defendants’ objection to the petition largely
mirrored the allegations in the petition and did not set forth any additional
claims of direct harm to Marciniszyn.
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reasons. First, the plaintiffs never made any such asser-
tion in their petition, and ‘‘a memorandum of law is not
a proper vehicle for supplementing the factual allega-
tions in a complaint . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Ross v. Commissioner of Correction, 217
Conn. App. 286, 324, 288 A.3d 1055, cert. denied, 346
Conn. 915, 290 A.3d 374 (2023). Second, even if it were
proper for us to consider the plaintiffs’ new allegations
as part of our standing analysis, these allegations are
wholly conclusory. The plaintiffs do not state with any
specificity what Marciniszyn’s ‘‘economic, social, and
emotional intertwined interests’’ actually are, describe
how those interests have been injured by D’s placement
on a waiting list, or explain how they calculated the
monetary value of those interests. In the absence of
adequate supporting factual allegations, these thread-
bare claims do not sufficiently allege classical
aggrievement. See, e.g., Hendel’s Investors Co. v. Zon-
ing Board of Appeals, 62 Conn. App. 263, 274, 771 A.2d
182 (2001) (conclusory statements that ‘‘ ‘[p]laintiff is
aggrieved by the decision of the [d]efendant’ ’’ and
‘‘ ‘[t]he [p]laintiff has a specific personal and legal prop-
erty interest which was specifically and injuriously
affected by the action of the [d]efendant’ ’’ are insuffi-
cient to establish aggrievement). We therefore reverse
in part the trial court’s denial of the petition on the
merits and remand with instructions to dismiss the peti-
tion with respect to Marciniszyn in his individual capac-
ity.10
10
We emphasize that Marciniszyn—independent of the question of his
authority to represent D’s interests as a self-represented nonattorney, which
we discuss in part III of this opinion—had standing in a representative
capacity to assert claims on D’s behalf in the trial court. See Lowe v. Shelton,
supra, 83 Conn. App. 755; accord In re Tayquon H., 76 Conn. App. 693,
698–99, 821 A.2d 796 (2003) (‘‘[a]lthough, generally speaking, a person has
no standing to assert the rights of another, when the parties include a
guardian and a minor ward . . . the guardian is indeed entitled to assert
the legal rights of her ward’’ (footnote omitted)). Throughout proceedings
in the trial court, however, Marciniszyn purported to proceed both as D’s
next friend and in his individual capacity. As he failed to establish any
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III
We now consider whether, in light of this court’s
decision in Lowe, Marciniszyn has the authority as a
self-represented nonattorney to proceed in a represen-
tative capacity on behalf of D, or whether the appeal
as to D should be dismissed. The plaintiffs argue that
Lowe is distinguishable from the present case. We dis-
agree.
As we have explained, in Lowe, this court held that, as
a general matter, a nonattorney, self-represented parent
lacks the authority to maintain an appeal on behalf of
his minor child. See Lowe v. Shelton, supra, 83 Conn.
App. 755–59. The court left open, however, the possibil-
ity that a nonattorney, self-represented parent may be
authorized to proceed on his minor child’s behalf when
the parent also has a personal interest at stake in the
action. Id., 758–59. In particular, the court in Lowe dis-
tinguished the matter before it from the scenario that
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit confronted in Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103 (2d
Cir. 2002).
In Machadio, the court held that a nonattorney, self-
represented parent may represent her minor child in
an appeal from a denial of supplemental security
income (SSI) benefits, when that parent ‘‘has a suffi-
cient interest in the case and meets basic standards of
competence . . . .’’ Id., 107. The court in Machadio
further concluded that the district court had not erred
in permitting the self-represented plaintiff parent to
proceed on her child’s behalf, because—in addition to
meeting the basic standard of competency to proceed—
she had a personal financial stake in the government’s
decision as to whether to pay SSI benefits. Id., 106–108.
This was so, the court explained, because the plaintiff
direct injury to himself, Marciniszyn did not have standing to proceed in
his individual capacity; he only had standing to proceed as D’s next friend.
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parent was responsible for the cost of her child’s alleged
disability, and, ‘‘[i]f [the child] qualifie[d] for disability
benefits, then the federal government [would] assume
some of the costs associated with [her] condition, free-
ing the plaintiff’s limited resources for other living
expenses.’’ Id., 107. In Lowe, by contrast, this court
determined that the parents seeking to maintain the
appeal—who had accused a school official of libeling
their son but had raised no claims of their own—had
not been directly harmed by the lower court’s judgment
in the defendants’ favor and thus had no interest at
stake. Lowe v. Shelton, supra, 83 Conn. App. 758–59.
This court therefore concluded that the parents in Lowe
could not represent their minor son without an attor-
ney’s assistance. Id., 759.
The plaintiffs claim that this case is analogous to
Machadio because Marciniszyn and D both have inter-
ests in the outcome of the matter. For the reasons we
set forth in part II of this opinion, however, Marciniszyn
has failed to establish that he, as opposed to D, has
any direct interest at stake in the trial court’s resolution
of the matter. Accordingly, as with the parents in Lowe,
‘‘[t]he [plaintiffs’] reliance on [Machadio] . . . is mis-
placed.’’ Id., 758. We therefore conclude that Marcinis-
zyn, as a self-represented nonattorney, lacks the author-
ity to maintain this appeal on D’s behalf.
In Lowe, this court held that when a nonattorney,
self-represented parent without an interest at stake in
the case files an appeal on behalf of his minor child,
the appeal suffers from a curable defect. Id., 760. This
court in Lowe identified two ways in which that defect
may be cured: either by having counsel appear on behalf
of the minor child; or by the child filing his own self-
represented appearance, if he has reached the age of
majority during the pendency of the appeal. Id., 761.
As we have explained, we provided the plaintiffs with an
opportunity to cure the defect by affording Marciniszyn
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sixty days in which to retain counsel to appear on D’s
behalf. See, e.g., Munoz v. Stableford, Superior Court,
judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-13-
5034701-S (January 10, 2014) (57 Conn. L. Rptr. 454,
455) (affording parent sixty days to cure Lowe defect
by retaining counsel). He has not done so. Nor has D
reached the age of majority, such that he would be
eligible to file a self-represented appearance.11 Accord-
ingly, we dismiss the appeal as to D.
The appeal is dismissed as to D; the judgment denying
the petition as to Marciniszyn in his individual capacity
is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to
render judgment dismissing the petition as to Marcinis-
zyn for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the judgment
is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

11
In their supplemental memorandum, the plaintiffs suggest that this court
should allow them to cure the Lowe defect by staying adjudication of the
appeal until D reaches the age of majority and then permitting D to file a
self-represented appearance. The record reflects that D is currently sixteen
years old. The age of majority in this state is eighteen years. See General
Statutes § 1-1d. The plaintiffs’ proposed ‘‘cure’’ would thus delay the resolu-
tion of this appeal by more than one year, in contravention of our responsibil-
ity to ‘‘[process] cases in an orderly and expeditious manner.’’ Srager v.
Koenig, 42 Conn. App. 617, 622, 681 A.2d 323, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 935,
684 A.2d 709 (1996), and cert. denied, 239 Conn. 936, 684 A.2d 709 (1996).
The plaintiffs cite no authority or other extenuating circumstances to justify
such an extraordinary delay in the proceedings, and we decline to adopt
this course of action.