In re Cunha

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 265
In re Cunha

IN RE NICKOLA J. CUNHA
(AC 46813)
NICKOLA J. CUNHA v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
(AC 46890)
Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

In these consolidated appeals, the respondent attorney appealed, in the first
case, from the judgment of the trial court ordering a trustee to disburse
funds from the respondent’s fiduciary accounts following her disbarment
from the practice of law and, in a second case, from the judgment of the
trial court dismissing as moot her action seeking a declaratory judgment
regarding attorney’s fees allegedly owed to her. The respondent claimed,
inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to have
permitted third parties to intervene in the postdisbarment proceedings to
settle a dispute over attorney’s fees. Held:

Contrary to the respondent’s claim that, because the underlying disciplinary
proceedings against her were initiated pursuant to statute (§ 51-84) and the
rule of practice (§ 2-45), the trial court’s jurisdiction was exclusively limited
to determining what discipline should be imposed on the respondent, the
trial court, pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 2-64) and its inherent authority,
had subject matter jurisdiction over the respondent’s client files for the
purpose of protecting the interests of her clients and unfettered power to
act as situations may seem to require to achieve that purpose, including
granting permissive intervention to third parties.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting permissive intervention
in the postdisbarment action to two former clients and an insurance company
holding disputed funds, as the intervention was timely and likely to expedite
the resolution of the underlying proceedings, the intervenors had a clear
interest in the controversy, and the necessity and value of the intervention
were apparent because the resolution of the intervenors’ fee dispute was
necessary before the court could completely determine the proper distribu-
tion of the respondent’s funds to protect her former clients.

The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Practice Book
§ 2-64 and its inherent authority, to resolve a dispute by former clients
over the respondent’s legal fees arising from a separate matter within the
postdisbarment action.

Because this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court ordering the
respondent’s funds to be disbursed to her former clients, the appeal from the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 265 ,0 3
In re Cunha
court’s dismissal of the respondent’s declaratory judgment action regarding
a portion of those funds was moot, and, accordingly, dismissed.

Argued October 2, 2024—officially released January 21, 2025

Procedural History

Order, in the first case, appointing a trustee to oversee
the respondent’s fiduciary accounts following the dis-
barment of the respondent from the practice of law, in
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex,
where the court, Moukawsher, J., granted the motions
of John Skura et al. to intervene, and action, in the
second case, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the
disbursement of certain attorney’s fees allegedly owed
to the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Hon. Patty
J. Pittman, judge trial referee, granted the motion of
the defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company to transfer the action to the judicial district
of Middlesex; thereafter, the court, Moukawsher, J., in
the first case, ordered the trustee to disburse certain
funds and rendered judgment thereon, and, in the sec-
ond case, rendered judgment dismissing the action as
moot, from which the plaintiff filed separate appeals
to this court; subsequently, this court consolidated the
appeals. Affirmed in first case; appeal dismissed in
second case.

Nickola J. Cunha, self-represented, the appellant in
Docket Nos. AC 46813 and 46890 (respondent in first
case, plaintiff in second case).
John Skura, self-represented, the appellee in Docket
No. AC 46813 (intervenor).
Thomas A. Plotkin, for the appellee in Docket Nos.
AC 46813 and 46890 (intervenor State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company in first case, defendant
in second case).
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 265
In re Cunha

Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary counsel, for the
amicus curiae in Docket No. AC 46813 (Office of Chief
Disciplinary Counsel).

Opinion

CRADLE, J. These consolidated appeals arise from
disciplinary proceedings against the respondent,1 Nick-
ola J. Cunha, related to her disbarment from the practice
of law. In Docket No. AC 46813, the respondent appeals
from the judgment of the trial court ordering that funds
she claimed as attorney’s fees be disbursed to her for-
mer clients (postdisbarment action). In Docket No. AC
46890, the respondent appeals from the same judgment2
and, additionally, the trial court’s judgment of dismissal
rendered in a separate action commenced by the
respondent in which she sought a declaratory judgment
with respect to attorney’s fees related to her representa-
tion of former clients (declaratory judgment action).3
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court (1)
improperly permitted third parties to intervene in the
postdisbarment action where the intervenors lacked
standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and (2)
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the claims
1
Although Nickola J. Cunha is the plaintiff in the underlying action in
Docket No. AC 46890, for the sake of clarity, she is referred to as the
respondent throughout this opinion.
2
On the appeal form that the respondent filed in AC 46813, she lists the
trial court docket number of the postdisbarment action for the judgment
from which she is appealing. On the appeal form that the respondent filed
in AC 46890, she lists the trial court docket numbers of both the declaratory
judgment and the postdisbarment actions for the judgments from which she
is appealing. The preliminary statements of issues that she filed are identical
in both appeals.
3
On August 28, 2023, the respondent filed a motion for review of the
court’s disbursement decision and the court’s judgment of dismissal in the
declaratory judgment action. On December 13, 2023, this court denied the
respondent’s motion for review and sua sponte ordered the consolidation
of the appeals in AC 46813 and AC 46890.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 265 ,0 5
In re Cunha

raised by the intervening parties and by a nonparty.4
We affirm the judgment of the trial court in AC 46813
and consequently dismiss the appeal in AC 46890 as
moot.

By way of background, the respondent, on January
25, 2022, was disbarred from the practice of law for
misconduct related to her representation of a party in
a marriage dissolution matter. In Ambrose v. Ambrose,
223 Conn. App. 609, 637, 309 A.3d 305 (2024), this court
affirmed the January 25, 2022 judgment of the trial court
disbarring the respondent. The present appeals concern
disciplinary proceedings ancillary to that judgment. The
following facts, as set forth by the trial court, and proce-
dural history are relevant to the resolution of the
respondent’s claims.

On January 28, 2022, the court, Moukawsher, J.,
issued an order in the marriage dissolution matter set-
ting forth procedures related to his order disbarring the
respondent from the practice of law and, pursuant to
Practice Book § 2-64,5 appointed Attorney Corrine A.
4
The respondent also claims that certain court orders were ex post facto
orders in violation of her due process rights. The respondent, however, fails
to advance any substantive legal or factual analysis explaining how the
orders were ex post facto or how they deprived the respondent of her due
process rights. ‘‘[W]e are not required to review issues that have been
improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analy-
sis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandon-
ing an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . The parties may not
merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the
facts of the case and the law cited.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868 (2016).
We therefore conclude that any such claims are inadequately briefed, and,
accordingly, we decline to address them.
5
Practice Book § 2-64 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Whenever an attorney
is placed upon inactive status, suspended, disbarred, or resigns, the court,
upon such notice to him or her as the court may direct, shall appoint
an attorney or attorneys to inventory the files of the inactive, suspended,
disbarred or resigned attorney and to take such action as seems indicated
to protect the interests of the attorney’s clients. . . .’’
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 265
In re Cunha

Boni-Vendola as trustee ‘‘to take such steps as are nec-
essary to protect the interests of [the respondent’s]
clients’ funds, [interest on lawyers’ trust account
(IOLTA account)], and all fiduciary accounts.’’ The
court’s order further instructed the respondent not to
withdraw any funds from those accounts and directed
the respondent to provide the trustee, within seventy-
two hours, a list of her clients, including their contact
information and itemization of all billing identifying any
balance remaining, all active or pending case files, and
information regarding the respondent’s financial accounts.
The order stated that the respondent’s failure to comply
shall be considered misconduct and may subject her
to punishment for contempt of court. Thereafter, the
court established a separate docket for administrative
purposes in connection with the winding up of the
respondent’s law practice.6
On February 8, 2022, the trustee filed a motion for
advice, indicating that the respondent had yet to provide
the required documents and information pursuant to
the court’s January 28, 2022 order. On the same date,
the court issued an order instructing the trustee to file
a motion for contempt against the respondent if she
did not comply within seven days.7 On February 10,
2022, the trustee notified the court that the respondent
still had not turned over the required materials and,
additionally, that the respondent’s bank had informed
the trustee that on February 2, 2022, the respondent
had withdrawn $30,000 from her IOLTA account. The
trustee, on February 16, 2022, again sought the advice
of the court, indicating that because the bank is ‘‘unable
to change the signer’’ on the respondent’s IOLTA account,
6
The court entered its January 25, 2022 memorandum of decision dis-
barring the respondent from the practice of law as the judgment in the
postdisbarment action.
7
The court’s order further stated that, ‘‘[i]n the meantime, the trustee
should attempt to determine through any public means the information she
requires and begin carrying out her duties.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 265 ,0 7
In re Cunha

it needed a court order authorizing it to open a new
IOLTA account and to transfer the funds from the
respondent’s account to the new account. On March 2,
2022, the court issued an order authorizing the bank to
take such action and further ordered that the Office of
Chief Disciplinary Counsel (disciplinary counsel) ‘‘is
hereby authorized to file appropriate motions to enforce
[the] court’s orders and to participate in [the] proceed-
ings to whatever extent may be needed to protect the
public interest and the interest of [the respondent’s]
former clients.’’ Two days later, on March 4, 2022, disci-
plinary counsel filed a motion for contempt against the
respondent for her failure to comply with the court’s
January 28, 2022 order.
On April 27, 2022, following a hearing, the court
granted disciplinary counsel’s motion for contempt
against the respondent, finding that she had not com-
plied with the court’s order in that she failed to provide
the trustee with any of the required documentation
or information and that she had withdrawn, without
authorization, $30,000 from her IOLTA account. The
court noted that the respondent failed to offer any evi-
dence to support her entitlement to the withdrawn
funds and instead ‘‘gave a rambling account of having
done a bunch of work for the client in question on
various cases.’’ Accordingly, the court further granted
the request of disciplinary counsel to order an audit of
the respondent’s IOLTA account, stating that ‘‘[o]ne
purpose of ordering the audit is to direct . . . disciplin-
ary counsel—in cooperation with the trustee—to deter-
mine if [the respondent] stole her client’s $30,000.’’8
8
The court further ordered the respondent to appear in person before
the court on May 11, 2022, and stated that, if the respondent failed to provide
the trustee with the client information prior to that hearing, the court would
consider ‘‘other steps to ensure compliance’’ with its January 28, 2022 order.
On May 11, 2022, the respondent did not appear at the hearing and the
trustee represented to the court that the respondent had not provided the
client information. The court issued a capias for the respondent and, at the
request of the trustee, stayed the capias until May 16, 2022. On May 16,
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 265
In re Cunha

On June 1, 2022, disciplinary counsel filed a motion
to disburse funds, reporting therein that a limited audit
of the respondent’s IOLTA account revealed a single
deposit in the amount of $290,421.65, reflecting the net
proceeds of a personal injury settlement of Paula Moen,
a former client of the respondent. Disciplinary counsel,
on the basis of ‘‘[his] examination of the IOLTA account
bank records, [his] discussions with the client Moen,
and limited information from the respondent,’’ stated
that Moen was due a minimum of $179,723.85 as net
proceeds from the settlement.9 Disciplinary counsel fur-
ther stated that it appeared that only a portion of the
settlement proceeds, in the amount of $101,470.13,
remained in the respondent’s IOLTA account and that
this amount should be paid to Moen, thereby leaving
an outstanding balance of $78,253.72 due to Moen. In
addition, disciplinary counsel asserted that its limited
audit revealed that the respondent, on top of her one-
third attorney’s fee from the settlement, had taken, with-
out authorization from the court, an additional $78,000,
rather than the previously believed $30,000, from
Moen’s settlement proceeds. The court subsequently
granted disciplinary counsel’s motion to disburse the
funds, and the trustee tendered a check payable to Moen
in the amount of $101,470.13.
Thereafter, at the direction of the trustee and disci-
plinary counsel, Attorney Steven M. Lettick, the respon-
dent’s cocounsel in several prior matters, paid into the
2022, the trustee reported that the respondent had delivered three case files
but claimed that most of her former clients have possession of their files.
The trustee indicated that she ‘‘is unable to contact many of [the respon-
dent’s] former clients to confirm [that claim] as she was not given phone
numbers, email addresses, or mailing addresses for many of [the respon-
dent’s] former clients.’’ The following day, on May 17, 2022, the court ordered
the capias to be executed, and, on June 3, 2022, it was served on the
respondent.
9
Disciplinary counsel calculated the amount due to Moen by subtracting
from the settlement proceeds the respondent’s one-third contingency fee,
pursuant to the attorney fee agreement with Moen, as well as costs and
expenses.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 265 ,0 9
In re Cunha

new IOLTA account several checks representing the
respondent’s earned attorney’s fees from those matters.
On November 7, 2022, the respondent filed a motion
seeking immediate disbursement of her attorney’s fees
paid into the new IOLTA account by Lettick, asserting
that the ‘‘trustee has not engaged in any legal services
for the prior clients of the [respondent] that would
entitle [the trustee] to a proportionate share of the legal
fees earned by the [respondent].’’ The court denied the
respondent’s motion, stating: ‘‘When the court disbarred
[the respondent], it set up a process to account for
what she is owed and what she owes her clients. [The
respondent] has not cooperated with that process thus
frustrating attempts to know what she may be owed.
Additionally, some of [the respondent’s] clients are dis-
puting her right to the money she seeks in her motion.
The court can’t grant her motion when her right to the
money is either disputed or unknown. The court orders
the trustee to consult with disciplinary counsel and any
other necessary persons to form an opinion on who
has a right to the money.’’
Thereafter, on March 21, 2023, disciplinary counsel
notified the court that John Skura and his wife, Lie Tjun
Lim Skura, former clients of the respondent, had settled
their claims for uninsured motorist coverage with State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State
Farm) directly. Disciplinary counsel stated that the
Skuras had contacted him claiming that the respondent
was not entitled to attorney’s fees from their settle-
ments due to ‘‘misconduct’’ and informed the court that
State Farm was holding the disputed fees, in the total
amount of $17,499.99, while awaiting instructions as to
whom the money should be disbursed. Accordingly,
disciplinary counsel filed a motion for order ‘‘requesting
the court’s guidance in determining the proper forum
for resolving [the Skuras’] claim[s].’’ Meanwhile, the
respondent commenced the declaratory judgment
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 265
In re Cunha

action against State Farm, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that she was entitled to the disputed $17,499.99
as her attorney’s fees arising from her representation
of the Skuras.
On April 5, 2023, the court in the postdisbarment
action issued an order stating in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he
court received notice that State Farm . . . is holding
$8333.32 related to the claim of one former client [John
Skura] and $9166.66 for another [ Lie Tjun Lim Skura].
. . . The clients apparently claim [that the respondent]
should forfeit these sums for misconduct and State
Farm wants to know what to do with the money. To
resolve this dispute, the court orders the trustee . . .
to invite State Farm to move in this case to interplead
these sums into court for disposition. The trustee is to
invite the former clients to move to intervene in this
case for the purpose of claiming these sums. . . .
[U]nder Practice Book § 2-64, this court has jurisdiction
over all funds associated with the winding up of [the
respondent’s] practice. The parties to any such litigation
may move to consolidate them with this matter.’’ There-
after, the Skuras and State Farm filed motions to inter-
vene in the postdisbarment action. The respondent
moved to dismiss the motions to intervene on the
ground that the prospective intervenors lacked standing
to intervene, thereby depriving the court of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to resolve their claims. Following a hear-
ing, on June 23, 2023, the court denied the respondent’s
motions to dismiss, reasoning that § 2-64 provided the
court with jurisdiction over the disputed funds in that
it was required ‘‘to protect [the respondent’s] clients
by making sure monies that may be due to them are
collected under the protection of the trustee and dis-
bursed in accordance with law.’’ The court therefore
granted State Farm’s motion to intervene for the pur-
pose of interpleading the disputed funds into the court
and granted the Skuras’ motions to intervene ‘‘for the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 265 ,0 11
In re Cunha

sole purpose of asserting their claim to money held
by the trustee.’’ Subsequently, on June 26, 2023, upon
motion by State Farm and over the respondent’s objec-
tion, the declaratory judgment action was transferred
to the same judicial district as the postdisbarment
action.10
On July 21, 2023, the court held a hearing, at which
it heard testimony from Moen and John Skura, regard-
ing the disbursement of the attorney’s fees related to
the Skuras’ settlements and the remaining balance of
the respondent’s IOLTA account in the amount of
$34,601.20, which was funded entirely by the respon-
dent’s earned attorney’s fees from prior matters paid
into the new account by Lettick.11 Thereafter, on August
15, 2023, the court rendered a judgment of dismissal in
the declaratory judgment action against State Farm,
stating that it had ‘‘entered orders disposing of the
money and, consequently, of this claim’’ on the basis
of its June 23, 2023 order directing State Farm to
interplead the disputed funds into the postdisbarment
action. The following day, on August 16, 2023, the court
issued a memorandum of decision in the postdisbar-
ment action, ordering the trustee to pay to John Skura
the funds, in the amount of $17,499.99, that otherwise
would have been the respondent’s attorney’s fees
related to his and his wife’s settlements.12 In addition,
the court, finding that the respondent ‘‘had no legal
10
We note that, although the declaratory judgment action was transferred
to the same judicial district as the postdisbarment action, the two matters
were never consolidated by the trial court.
11
The respondent, chief disciplinary counsel, the trustee, and counsel for
State Farm were present at the hearing.
12
Lie Tjun Lim Skura was not present at the hearing. The court, noting
that John Skura was ‘‘the only Skura to press his claims at the hearing,’’
thus awarded him the respondent’s attorney’s fees relating to both his and
his wife’s settlements. Neither the respondent nor Lie Tjun Lim Skura has
challenged on appeal the manner in which the court disbursed the monies
to the Skuras.
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 265
In re Cunha

right to take the $78,000 [from the settlement proceeds]
she held in trust for [Moen],’’ ordered the trustee to
pay Moen the remaining balance of the respondent’s
IOLTA account in the amount of $34,601.20. This consol-
idated appeal followed.13
I
The respondent first claims that intervention by the
Skuras and State Farm was improper in that the interve-
nors ‘‘lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the
trial court.’’14 Specifically, the respondent argues that,
because the underlying disciplinary proceedings were
initiated pursuant to General Statutes § 51-8415 and
Practice Book § 2-45,16 ‘‘the sole purpose [of the underly-
ing proceedings was] the protection of the court.’’
Accordingly, she asserts that the Skuras and State Farm
had no ‘‘direct or immediate interest in the discipline
13
Disciplinary counsel filed an application to appear as amicus curiae on
the basis that he had participated as a ‘‘friend of the court’’ in the underlying
disciplinary proceedings. On May 15, 2024, this court granted disciplinary
counsel’s application to file an amicus brief, and, on September 9, 2024, we
granted disciplinary counsel’s request to participate in oral argument.
14
The respondent advances the same claim with respect to Moen. We note,
however, that Moen never attempted to intervene, nor did she independently
attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the court otherwise. Rather, she
appeared only as a witness at a hearing related to the reconciliation of
the respondent’s IOLTA account. Accordingly, we address the respondent’s
claim that intervention was improper only with respect to the intervening
parties—specifically, the Skuras and State Farm.
15
General Statutes § 51-84 provides ‘‘(a) Attorneys admitted by the Supe-
rior Court shall be attorneys of all courts and shall be subject to the rules
and orders of the courts before which they act.
‘‘(b) Any such court may fine an attorney for transgressing its rules and
orders an amount not exceeding one hundred dollars for any offense, and
may suspend or displace an attorney for just cause.’’
16
Practice Book § 2-45 provides: ‘‘If [cause for attorney discipline] occurs
in the actual presence of the court, the [disciplinary] order may be summary,
and without complaint or hearing; but a record shall be made of such order,
reciting the ground thereof. Without limiting the inherent powers of the
court, if attorney misconduct occurs in the actual presence of the court,
the Statewide Grievance Committee and the grievance panels shall defer to
the court if the court chooses to exercise its jurisdiction.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 265 ,0 13
In re Cunha

of the [respondent] solely instituted to protect the
court’’ and, therefore, could not establish standing to
intervene as a matter of right. Conversely, State Farm
argues that it and the Skuras joined the underlying
proceedings by way of permissive intervention, rather
than intervention as of right, and, accordingly, that the
court did not abuse its discretion in granting their
motions to intervene. We agree with State Farm.
The following legal principles are relevant to the reso-
lution of the respondent’s claim. When a controversy
is before a court, ‘‘if a complete determination cannot
be had without the presence of other parties, the court
may direct that such other parties be brought in.’’ Gen-
eral Statutes § 52-107. This statute ‘‘provide[s] for both
permissive intervention and intervention as a matter of
right.’’ BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 295 Conn. 194,
203–204, 990 A.2d 853 (2010). ‘‘Intervention as of right
provides a legal right to be a party to the proceeding
that may not be properly denied by the exercise of
judicial discretion. Permissive intervention means that,
although the person may not have the legal right to
intervene, the court may, in its discretion, permit him
or her to intervene, depending on the circumstances.’’
Id., 204 n.8.
In the present case, the court, after being made aware
of the Skuras’ claim to the funds being held by State
Farm, directed the trustee to invite the relevant third
parties, State Farm and the Skuras, to move to intervene
in the postdisbarment action. The court indicated that,
once the respective motions were filed, it would deter-
mine whether ‘‘interpleader and intervention are allowed.’’
State Farm and the Skuras subsequently moved to inter-
vene, and the court, following a hearing, granted their
motions ‘‘for the sole purpose’’ of resolving the Skuras’
fee dispute, characterizing the matter as ‘‘adjunct to the
process of protecting the interests of [the respondent’s]
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 265
In re Cunha

former clients’’ pursuant to Practice Book § 2-64. Specif-
ically, the court stated that ‘‘State Farm wishes to pay
the [disputed funds] to the trustee,’’ that ‘‘the Skuras
ask to intervene to make a claim on [those funds],’’
and that ‘‘[t]he court grants the requests.’’ (Emphasis
added.) State Farm and the Skuras thus joined the
underlying matter by way of permissive intervention.
Accordingly, because the Skuras and State Farm did
not, as the respondent claims, intervene as of right,
the respondent’s claim misstates the applicable law.17
‘‘Cases involving permissive intervention . . . do not
involve standing or aggrievement but whether a trial
court abused its discretion in [allowing or] failing to
allow intervention.’’ In re Ryan V., 46 Conn. App. 69,
72 n.6, 698 A.2d 371 (1997); see also Franco v. East
Shore Development, Inc., 271 Conn. 623, 630, 858 A.2d
703 (2004) (‘‘[T]here is no requirement that a prospec-
tive intervenor, in its motion to intervene, assert the
same claim as the plaintiff in the original action. . . .
The whole point of intervention is to allow the participa-
tion of persons with interests distinct from those of the
original parties; it is therefore to be expected that an
intervenor’s standing will have a somewhat different
basis from that of the original plaintiffs.’’ (Emphasis in
17
We note that the respondent further argues that State Farm and the
Skuras lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court through inter-
vention because they were neither statutorily nor classically aggrieved. In
so arguing, the respondent relies on D’Attilo v. Statewide Grievance Com-
mittee, 329 Conn. 624, 188 A.3d 727 (2018), in which our Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal for lack of standing where
the plaintiffs sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court by way
of a writ of mandamus challenging the Statewide Grievance Committee’s
dismissal of their grievance complaints against several attorneys. Id., 631–33.
Because the issue in D’Attilo was whether the plaintiffs had a legal right
to judicial intervention for purposes of overturning the disciplinary deci-
sions of a grievance body, it is inapposite to the present case, in which the
court granted third parties permissive intervention in disbarment proceed-
ings for the purpose of protecting the interests of a disbarred attorney’s
clients pursuant to Practice Book § 2-64.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 265 ,0 15
In re Cunha

original; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Accord-
ingly, ‘‘[p]ermissive intervention, which is entrusted to
the trial court’s discretion, depends on a balancing of
factors, and the court’s determination will only be dis-
turbed for an abuse of discretion.’’ Common Condo-
minium Assns., Inc. v. Common Associates, 5 Conn.
App. 288, 290–91, 497 A.2d 780 (1985).
‘‘In deciding whether to grant a request for permissive
intervention, a trial court should consider: the timeli-
ness of the intervention; the [prospective] intervenor’s
interest in the controversy; the adequacy of representa-
tion of such interests by other parties; the delay in the
proceedings or other prejudice to the existing parties
the intervention may cause; and the necessity for or
value of the intervention in resolving the controversy.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Austin-Casares v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 640, 664, 81 A.3d
200 (2013).
In light of the relevant factors that guide a trial court’s
decision with respect to permissive intervention, and,
in turn, our determination of whether the court abused
its discretion, it is helpful to first clarify the nature of
the controversy that was before the court. Contrary to
the respondent’s claim, although the underlying disci-
plinary proceedings against her were initiated under
General Statutes § 51-84 and Practice Book § 2-45, the
court’s jurisdiction was not limited exclusively to
determining what discipline should be imposed on the
respondent. ‘‘The proceeding to disbar [or suspend] an
attorney is neither a civil action nor a criminal proceed-
ing, but is a proceeding sui generis, the object of which
is not the punishment of the offender, but the protection
of the court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State-
wide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232,
238, 558 A.2d 986 (1989). Once disciplinary proceedings
are initiated, however, ‘‘the court controls the situation
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 265
In re Cunha

and procedure, in its discretion, as the interests of jus-
tice may seem to it to require.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 238–39. ‘‘There are three possible
sources for the authority of courts to sanction counsel
. . . . These are inherent power, statutory power, and
the power conferred by published rules of the court.
. . . That power may be expressly recognized by rule
or statute but it exists independently of either and arises
because of the control that must necessarily be vested
in courts in order for them to be able to manage their
own affairs so as to achieve an orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Presnick, 19 Conn. App. 340,
347, 563 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 801, 567 A.2d
833 (1989). In such proceedings, ‘‘[t]he power of the
courts is left unfettered to act as situations, as they
may arise, may seem to require, for efficient discipline
of misconduct and the purging of the bar from the
taint of unfit membership.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki,
supra, 239.
The court, in setting forth procedures related to the
disbarment order and in appointing Boni-Vendola as
trustee, expressly stated that it was exercising its juris-
diction under Practice Book § 2-64, which required the
court to appoint a trustee to ‘‘inventory the files of
the [the respondent] and to take such action as seems
indicated to protect the interests of the [respondent’s]
clients.’’18 Our rules of practice thus expressly provided
the court with jurisdiction over the respondent’s client
files for the purpose of protecting the interests of her
clients, and, moreover, pursuant to the court’s inherent
authority, it had ‘‘unfettered [power] to act as situations,
18
Although the respondent summarily asserts that the court ‘‘mistakenly
relie[d] on Practice Book § 2-64 as a basis for jurisdiction’’ over the underly-
ing proceedings, she fails to set forth any legal basis to support this claim.
(Footnote omitted.)
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 265 ,0 17
In re Cunha

as they may arise, may seem to require’’ to achieve
that purpose. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See
Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, supra, 211
Conn. 239.

With this context in mind, we consider whether the
court abused its discretion in granting the Skuras’ and
State Farm’s motions for permissive intervention. We
begin with the first factor, timeliness. ‘‘[T]here are no
absolute ways to measure timeliness . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Austin-Casares v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of America, supra, 310 Conn. 649. ‘‘Although
the point to which the suit has progressed is one factor
in the determination of timeliness, it is not solely dispos-
itive. Timeliness is to be determined from all the circum-
stances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651.
The court, while attempting to satisfy its mandate to
protect the interests of the respondent’s clients, learned
that the Skuras were claiming an interest in funds
related to matters in which the respondent represented
them. Under such circumstances, we conclude that
intervention was timely in that the sole underlying pur-
pose was to assist the court with resolving a controversy
presently before it—namely, whether the Skuras had
an interest in the respondent’s funds. With respect to
the remaining factors, the Skuras, former clients of the
respondent claiming interest in funds related to her
representation, had a clear interest in the controversy.
State Farm, as it indicated in its motion to intervene,
also had an interest in the controversy by virtue of its
possession of those disputed funds in that it ‘‘require[d]
advice and direction [from the court] as to the proper
distribution of the funds.’’ Additionally, the intervenors’
interests were not likely to be adequately represented
by the existing parties where the respondent was main-
taining a separate, ongoing action against State Farm
and the respondent’s claim to the disputed funds was
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 265
In re Cunha

in direct conflict with the Skuras’ claim to the funds.19
We further conclude that the intervention was likely
to expedite, rather than delay, the resolution of the
underlying proceedings. At the time the motions to
intervene were filed, the interests of the respondent’s
clients had remained unresolved for nearly seventeen
months. Significantly, during the June 23, 2023 hearing
on the motions to intervene, the court largely attributed
the delay in the underlying proceedings to the respon-
dent’s lack of cooperation and expressly stated that
its reason for directing the Skuras and State Farm to
intervene was because the court was ‘‘trying now to
move as quickly as [it could]’’ to wind up the respon-
dent’s practice.20 Finally, the necessity and value of the
intervention is apparent because the resolution of the
19
We further note that, although Boni-Vendola’s role as trustee was to
protect the interests of the respondent’s clients, the Skuras’ interest in the
disputed funds was premised on the respondent’s alleged misconduct during
her representation on their behalf in a previous matter unrelated to the
underlying proceedings. Accordingly, Boni-Vendola’s ability to adequately
represent their interests likely would have been limited because she had
no direct involvement in the circumstances underlying the Skuras’
claimed interest.
20
The court’s concerns with the respondent’s compliance with its orders
actually dated back to early 2022. As stated herein, on April 27, 2022, the
court held the respondent in contempt for her failure to comply with its
January 28, 2022 order, and, on May 17, 2022, the court executed a capias
for the respondent for her continued failure to comply with its order.
With respect to the Skuras’ claims specifically, the court, on December
22, 2022, denied the respondent’s November 7, 2022 motion requesting, inter
alia, that it order State Farm to release the disputed funds directly to her,
stating: ‘‘When the court disbarred [the respondent] it set up a process to
account for what she is owed and what she owes her clients. [The respon-
dent] has not cooperated with that process thus frustrating attempts to
know what she may be owed. . . . The court can’t grant her motion when
her right to the money is either disputed or unknown.’’
Additionally, during the June 23, 2023 hearing on the motions to intervene,
the court expressly attributed the lack of resolution to the respondent’s
failure to comply with court orders, stating that ‘‘the process of trying to
find out who [the Skuras] were and what claim [they] might have was
difficult because [the court] hadn’t gotten access to documents that were
subpoenaed by the court and that had been requested and that there was
a long process to discover that [the Skuras] even existed.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 265 ,0 19
In re Cunha

Skuras’ fee dispute was necessary before the court
could completely determine the controversy before it—
that is, the proper distribution of the respondent’s funds
so as to protect the interests of her former clients,
which included the Skuras.
Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in granting permissive intervention to the
Skuras and State Farm in the postdisbarment action.
II
The respondent next claims that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the fee disputes
raised by the Skuras and by Moen.21 Specifically, the
respondent argues that, because neither General Stat-
utes § 51-84 nor Practice Book §§ 2-45 and 2-64 autho-
rize the court to ‘‘award a remedy [or] consider the
rights, interests, or benefits’’ of Moen or the Skuras,
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their
claims.22 We disagree.
We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles.
‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a
court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented
by the action before it. . . . A court does not truly
lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to
21
With respect to Moen, the respondent appeals only from the court’s
August 16, 2023 decision ordering the trustee to disburse to Moen the
remaining balance of the respondent’s IOLTA account in the amount of
$34,601.20. The respondent did not appeal from the court’s July 13, 2022
order granting disciplinary counsel’s motion to disburse to Moen $101,470.13,
which represented the remaining balance of Moen’s settlement funds. During
oral argument before this court, the respondent clarified that she is challeng-
ing the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to disburse funds to Moen only
to the extent that the funds came from the respondent’s earned attorney’s
fees from prior, unrelated matters rather than from Moen’s settlement pro-
ceeds.
22
On appeal, the respondent challenges the court’s disbursement decision
only on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. She
does not challenge the merits of the decision, nor does she challenge the
court’s factual findings.
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 265
In re Cunha

entertain the action before it. . . . Once it is deter-
mined that a tribunal has authority or competence to
decide the class of cases to which the action belongs,
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in
favor of entertaining the action. . . . [I]n determining
whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every
presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn.
435, 442–43, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002). ‘‘The issue of subject
matter jurisdiction is a question of law over which our
review is plenary.’’ Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Roz-
bicki, 150 Conn. App. 472, 480, 91 A.3d 932, cert. denied,
314 Conn. 931, 102 A.3d 83 (2014).
The respondent’s arguments in support of this claim
are belied by the relevant statutes and rules of practice.
In particular, she asserts that ‘‘[t]here is absolutely no
language in [Practice Book] § 2-64 authorizing the court
to award a remedy nor [to] consider the rights, interests
or benefits of an individual.’’ As stated previously, § 2-
64 not only authorizes the court to consider the rights
and interests of a disbarred attorney’s clients but it
expressly requires the court to inventory such rights
and interests and to appoint a trustee authorized to
take any actions necessary for the protection thereof.
The language of § 2-64 thus plainly conferred subject
matter jurisdiction on the court over the rights, inter-
ests, and benefits of the Skuras and Moen as former
clients of the respondent.
Again, ‘‘it bears emphasizing that attorney disciplin-
ary proceedings are sui generis, that it is the exclusive
duty of the Judicial Branch to regulate attorneys . . . .’’
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hickey, 328 Conn. 688, 702,
182 A.3d 1180 (2018). Once initiated, ‘‘the court controls
the situation and procedure, in its discretion, as the
interests of justice may seem to it to require. . . . [T]he
power of the courts is left unfettered to act as situations,
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19

0 Conn. App. 265 ,0 21
In re Cunha

as they may arise, may seem to require, for efficient
discipline of misconduct and the purging of the bar
from the taint of unfit membership. Such statutes [and
rules of practice] as ours are not restrictive of the inher-
ent powers which reside in courts to inquire into the
conduct of their own officers, and to discipline them
for misconduct.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 26, 835 A.2d 998 (2003),
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073, 124 S. Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed.
2d 983 (2004).
With respect to the Skuras, because their claimed
interest to the respondent’s attorney’s fees implicated
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Practice
Book § 2-64, we conclude that the court, notwithstand-
ing the respondent’s ongoing declaratory judgment
action, had subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the
dispute within the disbarment proceedings pursuant to
its inherent powers. Specifically, the inherent power
of courts to manage their dockets is well established,
particularly when, as we conclude here, such action is
related to preventing undue delays.23 See, e.g., Miller v.
Appellate Court, 320 Conn. 759, 771, 136 A.3d 1198
(2016) (courts have inherent power ‘‘to manage [their]
dockets and cases . . . to prevent undue delays in the
disposition of pending cases’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Disciplinary Counsel v. Hickey,
supra, 328 Conn. 704–705 (concluding that, although
applicable rule of practice did not specify procedural
vehicle for raising claim that attorney is ineligible to
apply for reinstatement, trial court had authority to
entertain motion to dismiss application for reinstate-
ment pursuant to ‘‘inherent power to craft procedures
by which it may entertain threshold issues in order
to avoid unnecessary delays and to conserve judicial
resources’’).
23
See footnote 20 of this opinion.
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 265
In re Cunha

With respect to Moen, it is clear to us, and the respon-
dent does not challenge, that Practice Book § 2-64 pro-
vided the court with subject matter jurisdiction over the
funds arising from Moen’s personal injury settlement.24
Notably, the court found that Moen never received her
full interest in settlement proceeds because the respon-
dent ‘‘decided to take for herself . . . $78,000 [of
Moen’s money].’’ Moreover, the court concluded that
the respondent had no legal right to that money and,
accordingly, that ‘‘Moen has a legal right to be paid
$78,000 by [the respondent].’’ Under such circum-
stances, we conclude that the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction extends to the respondent’s earned legal
fees arising from separate matters, namely, by way of
its ‘‘unfettered’’ inherent power ‘‘to act as situations,
as they arise, may seem to require’’ to protect Moen’s
interests. See Statewide Grievance Committee v. Roz-
bicki, supra, 211 Conn. 239.
Because we affirm the judgment of the trial court
ordering the respondent’s funds to be disbursed to her
former clients, the appeal from the court’s dismissal of
the respondent’s declaratory judgment action regarding
a portion of those funds is moot.25 ‘‘It is a [well settled]
general rule that the existence of an actual controversy
is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is
not the province of appellate courts to decide moot
questions, disconnected from the granting of actual
24
We note that, although the respondent herself asked the court to deter-
mine distribution of the funds collected from Lettick by way of her motion
for immediate disbursement of such funds, her motion advanced the same
jurisdictional arguments she raises on appeal. Specifically, she argued that
disciplinary counsel and the trustee, in collecting the funds, had ‘‘unilaterally
engag[ed] in actions beyond any authority of [the] court and absent any
authority by statute or . . . the rules of practice,’’ and, accordingly,
requested that the court immediately distribute the funds to her on the basis
that the court had no authority to withhold such funds and, therefore, lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to resolve any dispute to the funds.
25
Because we affirm the disbursement decision of the trial court in AC
46813, the respondent’s appeal from that judgment in AC 46890 is also moot.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 21

0 Conn. App. 265 ,0 23
In re Cunha

relief or from the determination of which no practical
relief can follow. . . . An actual controversy must exist
not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also through-
out the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the
pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that pre-
clude an appellate court from granting any practical
relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has
become moot.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
M&T Bank v. Lewis, 349 Conn. 9, 20, 312 A.3d 1040
(2024).
The judgment in AC 46813 is affirmed; the appeal in
AC 46890 is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.