Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Dance Right, LLC

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Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Dance Right, LLC

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
OPPORTUNITIES v. DANCE
RIGHT, LLC, ET AL.
(AC 46950)
Bright, C. J., and Suarez and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s order remanding its administra-
tive appeal from the decision of its human rights referee, which concluded
that the defendant employer had discriminated against its former employee,
M, on the basis of her disability but that M failed to establish that she had
been constructively discharged. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the
court erred by remanding the matter to the referee without sustaining the
appeal. Held:

The trial court erred in remanding the matter to the referee for an amended
decision while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal because, pursuant to
statute (§ 4-183), there was no legal basis for the remand, as there was
no ambiguity in the referee’s decision that required a clarification or an
articulation.

The trial court should have dismissed the appeal because there was substan-
tial evidence in the record to support the referee’s finding that M failed to
prove that she was constructively discharged.

Argued October 16, 2024—officially released January 7, 2025

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of a human rights referee
for the plaintiff concluding that the named defendant
discriminated against the complainant Amber Frazier
Manning but that the complainant Amber Frazier Man-
ning failed to establish that she had been constructively
discharged, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New Britain, where the court, Hon. Henry
S. Cohn, judge trial referee, remanded the matter to the
human rights referee for the plaintiff, from which the
plaintiff appealed and the named defendant cross
appealed; thereafter, the named defendant withdrew its
cross appeal. Reversed; judgment directed.
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Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Dance Right, LLC

Michael E. Roberts, human rights attorney, for the
appellant (plaintiff).
Kristi D. Kelly, for the appellee (named defendant).
Opinion

CLARK, J. The plaintiff, the Commission on Human
Rights and Opportunities (commission), appeals from
the order of the trial court remanding its administrative
appeal from the decision of the commission’s human
rights referee (referee).1 In the administrative proceed-
ings before the commission, the referee found that the
defendant Dance Right, LLC (Dance Right), discrimi-
nated against the complainant, Amber Frazier Manning,
on the basis of her disability by failing to provide her
with a reasonable accommodation, but that the com-
plainant failed to establish that she had been construc-
tively discharged.2 In the commission’s administrative
appeal, the trial court, following oral argument, issued
an order (remand order) in which it determined that
the referee’s findings with respect to the reasonable
accommodation claim conflicted with the finding that
Dance Right did not constructively discharge the com-
plainant and remanded the matter to the referee to issue
an amended opinion addressing that conflict. On appeal,
the commission claims that the trial court erred by (1)
remanding the matter to the referee without sustaining
the appeal, and (2) failing to conclude that Dance
Right’s failure to provide the complainant with a reason-
able accommodation established, as a matter of law,
1
‘‘Due to unusual procedures applicable to proceedings before the com-
mission, in this administrative appeal, the commission is named as both a
plaintiff (in its own capacity) and as a defendant (in its capacity as the agency
under which the commission’s human rights referee issued the decision
from which the commission appealed). See General Statutes § 46a-94a.’’
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance,
322 Conn. 154, 157 n.1, 140 A.3d 190 (2016).
2
The complainant, who was also named as a defendant, did not file an
appearance or otherwise participate in the proceedings before the Superior
Court and likewise has not participated in this appeal.
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that the complainant was constructively discharged.3
We agree that the trial court’s remand order was
improper, but conclude that substantial evidence sup-
ported the referee’s finding that the complainant was
not constructively discharged. Accordingly, we reverse
the judgment of the trial court and remand the case
with direction to dismiss the commission’s appeal.
The following facts, as found by the referee or as
otherwise undisputed in the record, and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In
or around March, 2014, the complainant was sexually
assaulted while volunteering at an anime convention.
At the time of the assault, the complainant was
employed as an assistant manager at Brookstone in the
Westfarms Mall in Farmington. Following the assault,
the complainant had difficulty maintaining her perfor-
mance at work and was terminated from her position
in April, 2014. In August, 2014, the complainant was
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
as a result of the sexual assault. Shortly thereafter, the
complainant began working at the jewelry counter at
Sears. During her training, however, the complainant
became concerned that it would be difficult to remove
herself from her assigned post in the event of a panic
attack or other PTSD related episode. In addition, dur-
ing this time the complainant started experiencing
worsening PTSD related symptoms, including panic
attacks, loss of appetite, and insomnia. As a result, the
complainant left her position with Sears.
Dance Right is a dance studio and franchise of Arthur
Murray International. At all times relevant to this case,
Dance Right was co-owned by Jonathan Stangel and
3
The commission also claims that the referee improperly found that the
complainant failed to mitigate her damages. As the commission concedes,
we need not address that claim if we conclude, as we do in this opinion,
that substantial evidence supported the referee’s finding that the complain-
ant was not constructively discharged.
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Jessica Megargle, with Camilla Cazagrande serving as
manager. In the fall of 2014, the complainant learned
from Cazagrande, who was a friend of hers, that Dance
Right was looking for an administrative assistant. On
October 24, 2014, the complainant applied for the admin-
istrative assistant position and was hired on the same
day. On her employment application, in response to a
question asking whether she had any condition that
might limit her ability to perform the duties of the posi-
tion, the complainant disclosed her PTSD diagnosis.
The complainant was initially hired on a trial basis at
a rate of $10.50 per hour. On December 15, 2014, Dance
Right agreed to make the complainant a salaried
employee and increased her pay to an hourly equivalent
of $12.50 per hour.
Dance Right maintained a handbook of policies and
procedures primarily directed toward its dance instruc-
tors. The only policy in the handbook regarding sexual
harassment stated in full: ‘‘Under no circumstances will
sexually inappropriate behavior or comments be toler-
ated. Unnecessary actions of this nature will be dealt
with in a manner appropriate to state and federal guide-
lines. If you have encountered sexual harassment, you
are required to fill out a written complaint with manage-
ment immediately so we may protect you.’’ Dance Right
did not maintain any written policy regarding disability
discrimination or procedures for requesting reasonable
accommodations.
As the administrative assistant, the complainant’s job
duties included, among other things, staffing the recep-
tion desk, answering and returning phone calls, confirm-
ing client appointments, tracking lessons, and speak-
ing with clients in person and over the phone to ensure
their accounts were up to date. One student, Ross
White, often would call to ask questions about his les-
sons and instructors, sometimes calling more than one
dozen times in a single day. When at the studio for his
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lessons, White would hang out near the reception desk,
tell the complainant that she was ‘‘beautiful’’ or ‘‘won-
derful,’’ and, at times, would stare at her. White, along
with other students, also occasionally brought candy,
flowers, or dessert foods for the staff members at Dance
Right, including the complainant. The complainant told
Megargle that White’s behavior made her uncomfort-
able and was having an effect on her PTSD. Megargle
told the complainant that she should continue to be
polite in her interactions with White and that she should
be gracious and accept his gifts. The complainant also
told Cazagrande about White’s conduct and the effect
it was having on her PTSD. In response, Cazagrande
told the complainant that White previously had acted
inappropriately while Cazagrande was his dance
instructor, including an incident in which he unsnapped
her bra while dancing. Cazagrande also told the com-
plainant that, after she reported White’s behavior, White
was reassigned to a different instructor.
On January 17, 2015, Dance Right hosted an evening
dance showcase at the Sheraton Hotel in Windsor
Locks. At some point during the showcase, one of Dance
Right’s instructors, Raelynn Hall, reported to Megargle
that while she was dancing with White, he grabbed
her buttocks while performing a ‘‘dip’’ move. Megargle
verbally reprimanded White that evening, and White
left the event immediately thereafter. The complainant
did not witness the incident, but Hall told her about it
later that evening. Hearing about the incident triggered
the complainant’s PTSD symptoms, causing her to expe-
rience anxiety, loss of appetite, and insomnia. Approxi-
mately one week after the event, the complainant told
Megargle that White’s conduct had triggered her PTSD
symptoms and asked what action would be taken in
response to the incident. Megargle told the complainant
that she had reprimanded White at the event and did
not think any further action was necessary, but that
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White might be asked to leave the studio if he continued
engaging in inappropriate conduct. The complainant
asked Megargle to provide her with any policies that
Dance Right maintained regarding sexual harassment,
but no such policy was ever provided.
On February 24, 2015, the complainant was working
at the front desk while Hall and another instructor were
giving a group dance lesson. Hall approached the com-
plainant and told her that White had just groped her
again. Hall told the complainant that, during the lesson,
White ran his hand up her side to her breast and then
down to the small of her back and her buttocks in a
manner that was not appropriate for the dance moves
being taught. The complainant did not witness the inci-
dent but reported it to Cazagrande, who said she would
discuss it with Megargle. Later that evening, the com-
plainant reported the incident to Megargle, who told
the complainant that Dance Right would look into the
incident and that they had to consider both sides before
taking action. In addition, Hall, Cazagrande, and another
instructor, Mary Jaqueline Kirchoff, called Stangel to
notify him of the incident. Upon learning of the allega-
tions, Stangel commenced an investigation by speaking
with Kirchoff, Hall, Cazagrande, and the complainant.
Following the incident, the complainant’s PTSD
symptoms worsened. She felt that Dance Right was
an unsafe environment and feared that she would be
exposed to inappropriate sexual conduct without the
company taking any action. The complainant discussed
the incident and the effect it had on her PTSD with
Megargle and Stangel and requested that Dance Right
accommodate her by removing White as a student.
Stangel told the complainant that he understood her
concerns but that he needed more information before
summarily removing White from the studio. Stangel and
Megargle offered to adjust the complainant’s schedule
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so she could avoid working during White’s lessons.4 On
or around February 26, 2015, Dance Right changed the
complainant’s pay structure from salary to hourly and
reduced her pay to $12 per hour.

During the two weeks following the February 24, 2015
incident, the complainant asked Megargle on multiple
occasions for an update on the status of the investiga-
tion. The complainant told Megargle that the situation
was causing her anxiety and that she would have to
resign if White was not asked to leave the studio. Megar-
gle told the complainant that they were still investigat-
ing the incident. Megargle testified that, following the
February 24, 2015 incident, White did not return to the
studio for another lesson until March 10, 2015, and
that she spoke with White about the incident that day.
Megargle further testified that, after speaking with
White, she had to confer with Stangel about what action
should be taken regarding the incident.

On March 13, 2015, the complainant wrote a resigna-
tion letter to Megargle stating: ‘‘I am sorry I have to do
this, but I feel I have no other choice. I am leaving
[Dance Right] . . . because I feel it is an unsafe work
environment and a hostile one. I would not expect any-
one to tolerate assault of any kind, especially in the
workplace. It sickens and saddens me that it is not
dealt with quickly and decisively here at [Dance Right].’’
Megargle received the complainant’s resignation letter
the following day, on March 14, 2015. Pursuant to a
letter agreement dated March 17, 2015, Dance Right
suspended White’s lessons effective March 30, 2015, due
4
The referee found that Dance Right’s offer to accommodate the complain-
ant by adjusting her schedule ‘‘would have resulted in a further loss of pay
. . . .’’ The complainant, however, testified that she ‘‘never got any [answer]’’
about whether adjusting her schedule would affect her pay, and Stangel
testified that it was not his intention that the complainant’s pay would be
reduced if she adjusted her schedule.
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to ‘‘two recent complaints [from] staff of inappropriate
behavior.’’
On September 8, 2015, the complainant filed a com-
plaint with the commission, alleging that Dance Right
discriminated against her on the basis of her PTSD, in
violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 46a-60 (a)
(1),5 by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation
and constructively discharging her. The commission
investigated the complaint and, upon finding reasonable
cause that a discriminatory practice occurred and that
conciliatory efforts had failed, held a contested case
hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-84. The hear-
ing was held over the course of five days in November,
2018, after which the parties submitted posthearing
briefs.

On June 30, 2022, the referee issued a memorandum
of decision. The referee first concluded that Dance
Right failed to provide the complainant with a reason-
able accommodation. The referee found that the com-
plainant had requested that Dance Right remove White
as a student and provide a sexual harassment policy and
that ‘‘[t]here is no evidence that [Dance Right] seriously
considered whether the complainant’s proposed acc-
ommodations would impose an undue hardship in the
5
General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 46a-60 (a) provides in relevant part:
‘‘It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . (1)
[f]or an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the
case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need . . . to discharge
from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual
in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because
of the individual’s . . . present or past history of mental disability . . . or
physical disability . . . .’’
The complaint initially alleged discrimination on the basis of a physical
disability, but subsequently was amended to add an allegation of discrimina-
tion on the basis of a mental disability. The complaint also alleged that Dance
Right violated General Statutes § 46a-58 (a), on the basis of a deprivation
of rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101
et seq., but that claim was abandoned following the hearing.
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particular circumstances of [Dance Right’s] studio work-
place or would involve significant difficulties or expense.’’
The referee found that Dance Right ‘‘established that
. . . it was investigating the incident before taking any
action to remove White as a customer and was moving
forward with that investigation.’’ The referee further
found, however, that Dance Right ‘‘delayed addressing
the complainant’s requested accommodations while it
[conducted the investigation]’’ and ‘‘did not articulate
any reason for not engaging more directly in the inter-
active process with the complainant in the interim,6 at
a minimum providing the complainant with a requested
sexual harassment policy or ameliorating the effect that
[White’s] presence was having on her PTSD condition.’’
(Footnote added.) The referee also found that, although
Dance Right proposed allowing the complainant to flex
her schedule to avoid working while White was present,
‘‘there was no clarity in how the proposed alternative
would work in light of the proposed terms, including
a further wage reduction, or how such accommodation
would have addressed [the complainant’s] underlying
concerns.’’
The referee further concluded, however, that the
complainant failed to prove that she had been construc-
tively discharged. The referee found that, ‘‘although
[Dance Right] was aware that the complainant’s PTSD
was being triggered, and [was] aware of accommoda-
tions [that] she requested, there is no evidence that
6
‘‘Once a disabled individual has suggested to his employer a reasonable
accommodation, [the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA),
General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq.] requires . . . that the employer and the
employee engage in an informal, interactive process with the qualified indi-
vidual with a disability in need of the accommodation . . . [to] identify the
precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable
accommodations that could overcome those limitations. . . . In this effort,
the employee must come forward with some suggestion of accommodation,
and the employer must make a good faith effort to participate in that discus-
sion.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Curry v. Allan
S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 416, 944 A.2d 925 (2008).
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the respondent intentionally created the complained of
work atmosphere.’’ The referee further explained that
‘‘[a] claim of constructive discharge must be supported
by more than the employee’s subjective opinion that
the job conditions have become so intolerable that he
or she was forced to resign’’ and found that ‘‘[n]o such
evidence has been presented here.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) On the basis of those findings, the
referee determined that ‘‘[t]he complainant failed to
establish a prima facie case of constructive discharge
by showing that [Dance Right] intentionally created the
complained of work atmosphere, and that the work
atmosphere was so difficult or unpleasant that a reason-
able person in the complainant’s shoes would have felt
compelled to resign.’’
On the basis of the determination that Dance Right
had not constructively discharged the complainant, the
referee found that the complainant voluntary resigned
and, therefore, was not entitled to back pay.7 The ref-
eree ordered Dance Right to ‘‘cease and desist from all
acts of discrimination prohibited under federal and
state law’’ and to post certain notices provided by the
commission, but declined to award the complainant
back pay damages.
On August 8, 2022, the commission timely appealed
the referee’s decision to the Superior Court. In its brief
7
Alternatively, the referee found that, even if the complainant had been
constructively discharged, she ‘‘affirmatively chose not to seek or apply for
new employment in mitigation of her potential damages.’’ Specifically, the
referee found that, following her resignation, the complainant did not seek
new employment or apply for unemployment compensation because she
and her husband had ‘‘resolved that he would support them both financially
through his job while she would work to maintain the household.’’ As noted
previously; see footnote 3 of this opinion; although the commission chal-
lenged the referee’s determination that the complainant failed to mitigate
her damages, we need not address that issue in light of our conclusion that
there was substantial evidence to support the referee’s finding that the
complainant was not constructively discharged.
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to the Superior Court, the commission claimed that the
referee’s determination that the complainant had not
been constructively discharged conflicted with her con-
clusion that Dance Right had failed to provide the com-
plainant with a reasonable accommodation. Specifi-
cally, the commission contended that the referee’s
conclusion that Dance Right failed to provide the com-
plainant with a reasonable accommodation, and the
factual findings underlying that conclusion, established
as a matter of law that Dance Right constructively dis-
charged the complainant. Dance Right argued that the
court should dismiss the appeal because the evidence
in the record supported the referee’s finding that there
was no constructive discharge.
On September 11, 2023, following briefing and oral
argument, the court issued the remand order, in which it
found ‘‘that there [was] a conflict between the referee’s
findings of fact and the referee’s conclusion that there
was no objective ground for a finding of constructive
discharge or awarding of damages therefor.’’ Quoting
paragraph 93 of the referee’s findings of fact (finding
93), the court further stated: ‘‘To illustrate, the referee
found that ‘[Dance Right] was aware that the situation
[following the February 25, 2015 incident] was causing
the complainant anxiety, to the point where if no action
was taken, the complainant would have no choice but
to leave.’ ’’ Nevertheless, the court did not sustain the
appeal but, rather, remanded the matter to the referee
‘‘for an amended opinion on this point and consider-
ation of damages, if appropriate.’’
On September 13, 2023, the commission moved for
reconsideration of the remand order. The commission
argued that, in finding that there was a ‘‘conflict’’
between the referee’s factual findings regarding the rea-
sonable accommodation claim and the determination
that the complainant had not been constructively dis-
charged, the court had agreed with ‘‘the crux of the
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. . . [c]ommission’s claim of error on the issue of con-
structive discharge.’’ The commission further con-
tended that this ‘‘conflict’’ was not an ambiguity that
required clarification but, rather, was a legal error that
required the court to sustain the appeal. On September
21, 2023, the court issued an order denying the motion
for reconsideration, which stated that the remand order
had directed the referee ‘‘to clarify whether [the com-
plainant] was constructively discharged when Dance
Right failed to accommodate her . . . [and] to award
her damages if appropriate’’ and that ‘‘[s]uch . . . clari-
fication may be appealed subsequently to the court as
part of the already pending administrative appeal.’’ This
appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural his-
tory will be set forth as necessary.
I
The commission first claims that the court erred in
remanding the matter to the referee for an amended
decision while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal.8
8
On March 5, 2024, this court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to address
in their briefs whether the remand order was an appealable final judgment
because it was ‘‘a remand authorized by General Statutes § 4-183 (j)’’ or ‘‘an
otherwise interlocutory order that satisfies the test for finality articulated
in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31 [463 A.2d 566] (1983),’’ or, alternatively,
‘‘whether [the] appeal must be dismissed for lack of a final judgment.’’ We
conclude that the court’s remand order is immediately appealable under
the second prong of the finality test set forth in State v. Curcio, supra, 31,
because it ‘‘so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings
cannot affect them.’’
As the commission argues in its brief, the commission had a statutory
right to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the referee. See General
Statutes § 46a-94a (a) (providing right to appeal referee’s decision ‘‘in accor-
dance with [§] 4-183’’). As we discuss subsequently in this opinion, the
remand order, as supplemented by the order denying the motion for reconsid-
eration, required the referee to issue an amended decision that, at a mini-
mum, would have altered the referee’s analysis with respect to the construc-
tive discharge claim. The remand order further provided that any further
proceedings in the trial court would be based on the amended decision.
Accordingly, we conclude that the remand order so concluded the commis-
sion’s right to obtain judicial review of the final decision that further proceed-
ings could not affect that right.
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The commission contends that, because there was no
ambiguity in the referee’s decision that required a clari-
fication or articulation, there was no basis for the court
to remand the matter to the referee while retaining
jurisdiction over the appeal. We agree.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and
legal principles applicable to this claim. The commis-
sion’s claim that the court lacked the authority to issue
the remand order is a question of law subject to plenary
review. See, e.g., AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v.
Plan & Zoning Commission, 260 Conn. 232, 239–40,
796 A.2d 1164 (2002) (‘‘Whether the trial court had the
power to issue [an] order, as distinct from the question
of whether the trial court properly exercised that
power, is a question involving the scope of the trial
court’s inherent powers and, as such, is a question of
law. . . . Accordingly, our review is plenary.’’ (Citation
omitted.)). Likewise, ‘‘[t]o the extent the present claim
requires us to interpret the trial court’s order . . . our
review is also plenary.’’ Glory Chapel International
Cathedral v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co., 224
Conn. App. 501, 512, 313 A.3d 1273 (2024).
Judicial review of a decision of the commission is
governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act
(UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. See General
Statutes § 46a-94a (a). This court has recognized three
circumstances under the UAPA in which a court is
authorized to remand an administrative appeal to the
agency. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public
Utilities Regulatory Authority, 223 Conn. App. 136,
143–45, 307 A.3d 967 (2023).
First, General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides in relevant
part that a court in an administrative appeal ‘‘shall
affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds
that substantial rights of the person appealing have
been prejudiced because the administrative findings,
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inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In viola-
tion of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in
excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made
upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error
of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized
by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise
of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall
sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, may render a
judgment under subsection (k)9 of this section or
remand the case for further proceedings. For purposes
of this section, a remand is a final judgment.’’ (Footnote
added.) Because a remand pursuant to § 4-183 (j) is a
final judgment; see Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities v. Board of Education, 270 Conn. 665,
675–76, 855 A.2d 212 (2004); the court does not retain
jurisdiction following a remand issued pursuant to sub-
section (j).
Second, § 4-183 (h) provides that, ‘‘[i]f, before the date
set for hearing on the merits of an appeal, application
is made to the court for leave to present additional
evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court
that the additional evidence is material and that there
were good reasons for failure to present it in the pro-
ceeding before the agency, the court may order that
the additional evidence be taken before the agency upon
conditions determined by the court. The agency may
modify its findings and decision by reason of the addi-
tional evidence and shall file that evidence and any
modifications, new findings, or decisions with the
reviewing court.’’ Although § 4-183 (h) does not
9
General Statutes § 4-183 (k) provides: ‘‘If a particular agency action is
required by law, the court, on sustaining the appeal, may render a judgment
that modifies the agency decision, orders the particular agency action, or
orders the agency to take such action as may be necessary to effect the
particular action.’’
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expressly refer to a remand, our Supreme Court ‘‘[has]
recognized that orders under subsection (h) fairly may
be characterized as remands.’’ Hogan v. Dept. of Chil-
dren & Families, 290 Conn. 545, 558, 964 A.2d 1213
(2009). Because § 4-183 (h) contemplates that the par-
ties will return to the Superior Court for judicial resolu-
tion of the appeal after the agency takes additional
evidence, the court retains jurisdiction pending a
remand pursuant to that subsection.
Third, this court recognized in Commission on
Human Rights & Opportunities v. Hartford, 138 Conn.
App. 141, 153–54, 50 A.3d 917, cert. denied, 307 Conn.
929, 55 A.3d 570 (2012), that the court has the authority
to remand an administrative appeal to the agency for
an articulation, while retaining jurisdiction over the
appeal. We explained that, ‘‘[a]lthough the plain text of
§ 4-183 expressly refers to remands only in subsection
(j) and implicitly refers to remands in subsection (h),
it does not state that the types of remands addressed
in § 4-183 constitute an exhaustive list despite the legis-
lature’s knowledge of how to express such an intent.’’
(Footnote omitted.) Id., 153. We further observed that
‘‘[r]eviewing courts typically have the ability to obtain
articulations from the tribunals whose decisions they
review.’’ Id., 153–54.10
In the present case, the remand did not fall within
any of the circumstances described in the preceding
paragraphs for which a remand is authorized. Although
10
The commission argues that Commission on Human Rights & Opportu-
nities v. Hartford, supra, 138 Conn. App. 141, was wrongly decided and
that we should conclude that judges of the Superior Court lack the authority
to order articulations of an agency’s decision. In light of our conclusion
that the remand order was not an order for an articulation, we need not
address that claim. In any event, as this court recently noted in response
to an identical claim, ‘‘[i]t is well established . . . that one panel of this court
cannot overrule the precedent established by a previous panel’s holding.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public
Utilities Regulatory Authority, supra, 223 Conn. App. 148 n.9.
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the order denying the commission’s motion for recon-
sideration indicates that the court considered the
remand to be for an articulation, the remand order
authorized the referee to modify her legal conclusions
and issue additional orders, which is not permissible
in an articulation. ‘‘An articulation is appropriate where
the [tribunal’s] decision contains some ambiguity or
deficiency reasonably susceptible of clarification,’’ but
it ‘‘is not an opportunity for a [tribunal] to substitute a
new decision [or] to change the reasoning or basis of
a prior decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Walshon v. Walshon, 42 Conn. App. 651, 655–56, 681
A.2d 376 (1996); see also Sosin v. Sosin, 300 Conn. 205,
240, 14 A.3d 307 (2011) (‘‘a trial court may not alter its
initial findings by way of a further articulation’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, ‘‘[a]n articulation
presupposes ambiguity or incompleteness in the legal
reasoning of the [tribunal] in reaching its decision.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 129
Conn. App. 746, 763, 23 A.3d 18 (2011), aff’d, 306 Conn.
438, 51 A.3d 334 (2012); see, e.g., Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority,
supra, 223 Conn. App. 147–48 and n.8 (remand order
constituted order for articulation because it ‘‘required
[the agency] to clarify the bases for its decision,’’ and
agency’s decision filed in compliance with remand
‘‘[did] not modify, in any way, the conclusions of [the
agency] or the orders in the final decision’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Commission on Human
Rights & Opportunities v. Hartford, supra, 138 Conn.
App. 153–54 (order remanding matter for referee to
issue clarification regarding specific issues that court
found to be unclear in referee’s decision was order for
articulation).

Here, the referee’s decision was neither ambiguous
nor incomplete. Although the order denying the motion
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for reconsideration characterized the remand as requir-
ing the referee ‘‘to clarify whether [the complainant]
was constructively discharged,’’ the referee unambigu-
ously found that ‘‘[t]he complainant failed to establish
a prima facie case of constructive discharge . . . .’’
Additionally, the referee found that the complainant
was not entitled to damages, but the remand order
directed the referee to ‘‘[consider] . . . damages, if
appropriate.’’ Thus, the remand order did not merely
instruct the referee to clarify an ambiguity. Rather, the
remand order required, at a minimum, that the referee
‘‘change the reasoning or basis of [the] prior decision’’;
Walshon v. Walshon, supra, 42 Conn. App. 656; and
contemplated that the referee might reach a different
legal conclusion with respect to the constructive dis-
charge claim and issue additional orders beyond those
included in the final decision.11 This was not a permissi-
ble use of an articulation.
The remand order also was not authorized by § 4-
183 (j). As discussed previously, § 4-183 (j) authorizes
the court to remand an administrative appeal to the
agency for further proceedings after sustaining the
11
The transcript of the argument on the merits of the administrative appeal
further supports our conclusion that the remand was not for an articulation.
During the argument, the court asked the parties whether the matter should
be remanded for the referee to ‘‘review or reissue her opinion, [taking] into
account the conflicting portions of the findings of fact vis-à-vis the finding
of no constructive discharge . . . .’’ In explaining the purpose of such a
remand, the court stated that the referee ‘‘might have . . . the option of
deciding whether or not that inconsistency can be resolved. In doing that,
she still wouldn’t have to issue any ruling on damages or she might say
. . . that I’ve changed my view, there is a constructive discharge and I’m
going to issue damages.’’ (Emphasis added.) Later in the hearing, the court
asked counsel for Dance Right: ‘‘[W]ouldn’t you like [the referee] to look
at [the] facts and say, oh, all that’s going on here is a failure to accommodate
and this two week period is too short . . . ? . . . Then you wouldn’t have
the problem at all. . . . Or maybe the [referee] looking at this would . . .
come out entirely differently and they’d say, not only was it a failure to
accommodate here but there was a lot going on here . . . that should be
cleared up here one way or another.’’
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appeal on the basis of a finding that the ‘‘substantial
rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced’’
for one of the six reasons delineated in that subsection.
Here, the court did not sustain the appeal or make a
finding that the commission was prejudiced for one of
the reasons delineated in § 4-183 (j). On the contrary,
in its order denying the motion for reconsideration, the
court made clear that it intended to retain jurisdiction
over the appeal pending the remand, stating that the
‘‘clarification [issued by the referee in compliance with
the remand order] may be appealed subsequently to
the court as part of the already pending administrative
appeal.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court’s intention to
retain jurisdiction pending the remand indicates clearly
that the remand order was not issued pursuant to § 4-
183 (j). See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities v. Hartford, supra, 138 Conn. App. 153
(concluding that ‘‘remand order was not issued under
subsection (j) [of § 4-183]’’ in part because ‘‘the court
indicated its intention to retain jurisdiction’’); cf. Hogan
v. Dept. of Children & Families, supra, 290 Conn. 558
and n.7 (concluding that remand order was issued pur-
suant to § 4-183 (j) where ‘‘there [was] nothing in the
record to suggest that the trial court intended to retain
jurisdiction while the hearing officer reconsidered its
decision [in accordance with the remand order]’’).

Finally, the remand order was not issued pursuant
to § 4-183 (h) because neither party moved for leave to
present additional evidence before the referee, and the
court did not order the referee to take additional evi-
dence on remand. See Wakefield v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, 90 Conn. App. 441, 443, 877 A.2d 1
(remand pursuant to § 4-183 (h) permits party to present
additional evidence before agency upon demonstration
‘‘that the additional evidence is material and that there
are good reasons for the failure to present it in the
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proceeding before the agency’’), cert. denied, 275 Conn.
931, 883 A.2d 1253 (2005).
Because there was no legal basis for the court to
remand the matter to the referee for the purposes stated
in its remand order while retaining jurisdiction over the
appeal, we conclude that the court erred in remanding
the matter to the referee for an amended opinion.
II
Having concluded that the trial court improperly
remanded the case to the referee, we turn to the com-
mission’s challenge to the referee’s finding that the com-
plainant failed to prove that she was constructively
discharged. The commission claims that the court erred
in failing to sustain its appeal on the basis that the
referee’s conclusion that Dance Right failed to provide
the complainant with a reasonable accommodation
established, as a matter of law, that Dance Right con-
structively discharged the complainant. Dance Right
argues that there was substantial evidence in the record
to support the referee’s finding that the complainant
failed to prove her constructive discharge claim and,
therefore, that the court should have dismissed the
appeal. We agree with Dance Right.12
12
We note that, because Dance Right argues that this court should reverse
the court’s judgment with direction to dismiss the commission’s administra-
tive appeal, it should have pursued its claim by way of a cross appeal. See
Mitchell v. Silverstein, 67 Conn. App. 58, 60 n.5, 787 A.2d 20 (2001) (‘‘[i]f
an appellee wishes to change the judgment in any way, the party must file
a cross appeal’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 259 Conn.
931, 793 A.2d 1085 (2002). Although Dance Right did file a cross appeal
challenging the trial court’s remand order, it subsequently withdrew that
appeal. Notwithstanding this procedural defect, we exercise our discretion
to address Dance Right’s claim because it is intertwined with our resolution
of the commission’s appeal, the issue was preserved before the trial court
and fully briefed and argued by both parties on appeal to this court, and
the parties agreed that this court can and should decide this issue. See
DeBeradinis v. Zoning Commission, 228 Conn. 187, 198 n.7, 635 A.2d 1220
(1994) (exercising discretion to address claim that should have been raised
by way of cross appeal ‘‘[b]ecause the issue has been fully briefed and it
appears that the parties will not be prejudiced’’). Moreover, because ‘‘the
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We begin by setting forth the standard of review and
legal principles that guide our resolution of this claim.
‘‘It is well established that [j]udicial review of [an admin-
istrative agency’s] action is governed by the [UAPA]
. . . and the scope of that review is very restricted.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commission on
Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon, 207 Conn.
App. 668, 672, 263 A.3d 887 (2021), aff’d, 347 Conn. 58,
295 A.3d 919 (2023). ‘‘Review of an appeal taken from
the order of an administrative agency such as the [com-
mission] is limited to determining whether the agency’s
findings are supported by substantial and competent
evidence and whether the agency’s decision exceeds
its statutory authority or constitutes an abuse of discre-
tion. . . . [E]vidence is sufficient to sustain an agency
finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which
the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of
Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Oppor-
tunities, 212 Conn. App. 578, 586, 276 A.3d 447, cert.
denied, 345 Conn. 902, 282 A.3d 466 (2022). ‘‘[T]he possi-
bility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s
finding from being supported by substantial evidence.
. . . Ultimately, [t]he question is not whether the
[reviewing] court would have reached the same conclu-
sion but whether the record before the [agency] sup-
ports the action taken.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Hartford Police Dept. v.
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 347
Conn. 241, 247, 297 A.3d 167 (2023).
scope of the trial court’s review of the [referee’s] decision and the scope
of our review of that decision are the same’’; (internal quotation marks
omitted) Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commis-
sion, 307 Conn. 53, 63 n.15, 52 A.3d 636 (2012); remanding the case for the
trial court to address the issue in the first instance would serve only to
further delay resolution of the matter underlying this appeal.
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‘‘Normally, an employee who resigns is not regarded
as having been discharged, and thus would have no
right of action for abusive discharge [under the CFEPA].
. . . Through the use of constructive discharge, the
law recognizes that an employee’s voluntary resignation
may be, in reality, a dismissal by an employer. . . .
Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an
employer, rather than directly discharging an individual,
intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere
that forces an employee to quit involuntarily.’’ (Citation
omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148,
178, 717 A.2d 1254 (1998).
‘‘To plead a prima facie case of constructive dis-
charge, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the employer
intentionally created the complained of work atmo-
sphere, (2) the work atmosphere was so difficult or
unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s
shoes would have felt compelled to resign, and (3) the
plaintiff in fact resigned.’’ Karagozian v. USV Optical,
Inc., 335 Conn. 426, 430, 238 A.3d 716 (2020). ‘‘The
standard contains a subjective inquiry (did the employer
intend to create the working condition) and an objective
inquiry (the impact the working conditions would have
on a reasonable person).’’ Id., 443. ‘‘[A] claim of con-
structive discharge must be supported by more than
the employee’s subjective opinion that the job condi-
tions have become so intolerable that he or she was
forced to resign.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 247 Conn. 178.
Rather, the intolerability requirement requires proof
that ‘‘the working conditions imposed by the employer
had become so onerous, abusive, or unpleasant that a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would
have felt compelled to resign.’’ Suarez v. Pueblo Inter-
national, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2000).13 ‘‘In other
13
‘‘We look to federal law for guidance in interpreting state employment
discrimination law, and analyze claims under [the CFEPA] in the same
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words, work conditions must have been so intolerable
that [the employee’s] decision to resign was void of
choice or free will—that her only option was to quit.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Kohl’s Dept. Stores, Inc.,
774 F.3d 127, 134 (1st Cir. 2014); accord Brittell v. Dept.
of Correction, supra, 179 (‘‘[h]ad the plaintiff estab-
lished that she was given the choice either to continue
working [under the same discriminatory conditions] or
to leave the employ of the defendant, she might well
have prevailed on [the intolerability] element of her
claim’’).
On appeal, the commission argues that an employer’s
failure to provide an employee with a reasonable
accommodation may establish both the subjective and
objective elements of a constructive discharge claim as
a matter of law. During oral argument before this court,
however, the commission clarified that it is not claiming
that a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation
always amounts to a constructive discharge. Rather,
the commission argues that if an employee requests a
reasonable accommodation and puts the employer on
notice that she will resign if the employer does not
provide that accommodation, the employer’s failure to
provide the accommodation within a reasonable period
of time establishes a constructive discharge as a matter
of law.
The commission’s argument ignores two important
principles applicable to a constructive discharge claim.
First, ‘‘[t]he existence of constructive discharge is an
issue of fact to be resolved by the [fact finder], and
judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate if the
evidence is susceptible to but one interpretation.’’
manner as federal courts evaluate federal discrimination claims.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc., supra, 335 Conn.
438 n.5.
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Strickland v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 555 F.3d 1224,
1229 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Green v. East Haven,
952 F.3d 394, 405 (2d Cir. 2020) (‘‘that this substantive
standard is an objective one . . . does not necessarily
mean that what a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
shoes would have felt compelled to do is determinable
as a matter of law, for an objective question is often
fact-specific’’). As noted previously, under the UAPA,
judicial review of an agency’s factual determination is
governed by the substantial evidence standard, which
‘‘is highly deferential and permits less judicial scrutiny
than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evidence stan-
dard of review.’’14 (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v.
Hartford, supra, 138 Conn. App. 149. Under the substan-
tial evidence standard, ‘‘[t]he question is not whether
the evidence would also support a different, or even
inconsistent conclusion but whether there is substantial
evidence to support the [referee’s] decision . . . .’’
(Citation omitted.) Woodbridge Newton Neighborhood
Environmental Trust v. Connecticut Siting Council,
349 Conn. 619, 645, 321 A.3d 363 (2024).
Second, although Connecticut courts have not
addressed the issue, other courts—including the United
States Supreme Court—have held that where an
14
During oral argument before this court, the commission argued that the
constructive discharge determination is a mixed question of law and fact
subject to plenary review. See, e.g., Crews v. Crews, 295 Conn. 153, 163,
989 A.2d 1060 (2010) (‘‘[i]t is settled that [q]uestions of law and mixed
questions of law and fact receive plenary review’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The commission, however, has not cited any authority for that
proposition. Moreover, in Brittell, the Supreme Court concluded that, ‘‘[i]n
light of the fact-bound nature of determinations regarding the efficacy of
an employer’s response to illegal harassment by one or more of its employees
. . . a clearly erroneous standard is appropriate for our review of the trial
court’s findings.’’ Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 247 Conn. 165.
Accordingly, pursuant to § 4-183 (j), we review the referee’s factual determi-
nation that the complainant was not constructively discharged under the
substantial evidence standard.
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employee claims that she was constructively discharged
on the basis of a discriminatory employment environ-
ment, ‘‘[u]nless conditions are beyond ordinary discrim-
ination, a complaining employee is expected to remain
on the job while seeking redress.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,
542 U.S. 129, 147, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 159 L. Ed. 2d 204
(2004), quoting Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d
1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1997); see Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233
F.3d 432, 440–41 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); see also Poland
v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007) (‘‘con-
structive discharge occurs when the working conditions
deteriorate, as a result of discrimination, to the point
that they become sufficiently extraordinary and egre-
gious to overcome the normal motivation of a compe-
tent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on
the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her
employer’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts
have ‘‘set the bar high for a claim of constructive dis-
charge because . . . antidiscrimination policies are
better served when the employee and employer attack
discrimination within their existing employment rela-
tionship, rather than when the employee walks away
and then later litigates whether his employment situa-
tion was intolerable.’’ Poland v. Chertoff, supra, 1184;
see also McKelvey v. Secretary of United States Army,
450 Fed. Appx. 532, 535 (6th Cir. 2011) (‘‘[constructive
discharge] test deliberately sets a high bar, as the law
generally expects employees to remain on the job while
pursuing relief from harassment’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Johnson v. Shalala, 991 F.2d 126, 131
(4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim that failure to accommo-
date necessarily constitutes constructive discharge, in
part because ‘‘once the employment relationship has
terminated, the parties may harden their positions and
become unable to resolve their dispute,’’ and noting
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that ‘‘[i]t is far better for all concerned to resolve the
dispute while the employment relationship is ongoing’’),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 806, 115 S. Ct. 52, 130 L. Ed. 2d
12 (1994).
In the present case, there is substantial evidence in
the record to support the referee’s finding that the com-
plainant’s work conditions were not so intolerable that
a reasonable person in her position would have felt
compelled to resign. Although the referee found Dance
Right’s handling of the complainant’s accommodation
request to be lacking for purposes of her reasonable
accommodation claim, there is a substantial basis in
the record from which the referee also reasonably could
have determined that the complainant did not face such
pervasive discrimination that a reasonable person in
her position would have felt she had no choice but
to resign.
As discussed previously, the incident that led to the
complainant’s request for White to be removed from
the studio occurred on February 24, 2015, and the com-
plainant resigned seventeen days later, on March 13,
2015. The referee found that, ‘‘[u]pon hearing about
the February 24, 2015 incident, Stangel commenced an
investigation into the incident by speaking with Hall
and Kirchoff within a day or two of hearing about the
complaint’’ and that ‘‘Stangel interviewed Cazagrande
and the complainant [about the incident] on or about
February 26, 2015.’’ The referee further found that
Stangel did not refuse the complainant’s request that
White be removed from the studio, but ‘‘told the com-
plainant he understood her concerns but needed more
information before removing a student from the studio
summarily’’ and offered the complainant ‘‘the option of
arranging [her] schedule to avoid her working during
a time when White had lessons.’’ Moreover, the record
reflects that Dance Right was open to considering alter-
native arrangements that would have accommodated
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the complainant; specifically, Stangel testified that,
even when the complainant rejected the offer to flex
her schedule, he asked the complainant ‘‘to think on it
and respond with something that she felt would have
been more fair,’’ but that the complainant never fol-
lowed up on that conversation.
Moreover, the evidence reflects that, after the Febru-
ary 24, 2015 incident, White did not return to the studio
again until March 10, 2015. Megargle testified that she
spoke with White about the incident on the day he
returned and that White denied that he purposely
groped Hall. Megargle further testified that she then
had to confer with Stangel because he had interviewed
the other witnesses. The record does not reflect the
specific date on which Megargle conferred with Stangel.
Stangel testified, however, that the decision to suspend
White’s lessons was made two or three days before the
March 17, 2015 agreement formally suspending White
from the studio, following a meeting at which Caza-
grande advocated for removing White on the basis of
the impact his actions had on the complainant.
Thus, the evidence reflects that less than three weeks
passed from the time the incident occurred, on Febru-
ary 24, 2015, to the time Dance Right decided to suspend
White’s lessons. The evidence also reflects that White
was present in the studio on only one occasion during
that time period, and there is no evidence that the com-
plainant was forced to have any further interaction with
him during that time. Moreover, the referee found that,
when the complainant inquired during that time period
about what Dance Right intended to do about her con-
cerns, Megargle informed the complainant that Dance
Right was still investigating the situation. On the basis
of the foregoing, we conclude that there was substantial
evidence in the record to support the referee’s finding
that the complainant failed to prove that a reasonable
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person in her position would have felt compelled to
resign.15
The commission has not cited a single case in which
a court has held that an employer’s failure to provide a
reasonable accommodation established a constructive
discharge claim as a matter of law. In its principal appel-
late brief, the commission relies on certain federal court
decisions holding that, under the factual circumstances
presented in those cases, evidence regarding an employ-
er’s failure to provide an accommodation was sufficient
to permit a finding that the employee had been construc-
tively discharged.16 Under the substantial evidence stan-
dard, however, ‘‘[t]he question before us is not whether
15
Because we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support
the referee’s finding that the complainant failed to satisfy the objective
component of her constructive discharge claim, we need not address
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the referee’s finding that
the complainant failed to establish the subjective component of her claim.
See Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 247 Conn. 179 (‘‘[e]ven if we
assume, arguendo, that an employer’s failure to remedy a hostile working
environment may be considered the intentional creation of an intolerable
work atmosphere . . . the plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing
an essential element of her claim, namely, the existence of an intolerable
work atmosphere that would compel a reasonable person in that situation
to resign’’ (citation omitted; emphasis omitted)).
16
We note that the cases on which the commission relies involved either
an outright refusal to accommodate or a failure to respond to the employee’s
request for an accommodation. See Johns v. Brennan, 761 Fed. Appx. 742,
745–46 (9th Cir. 2019) (reversing district court’s order granting motion for
summary judgment for employer because evidence that employer repeatedly
refused or failed to communicate with employee about accommodation
request and failed to respond to her inquiries during five month period about
returning to work with accommodation was sufficient for jury to conclude
that working conditions were so intolerable that reasonable person would
feel compelled to resign); Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542
F.3d 1099, 1109, 1111 (6th Cir. 2008) (reversing district court’s order granting
motion for summary judgment for employer because evidence that employer
refused to read employee’s doctor’s note, meet with employee to discuss
accommodation request, or offer alternative accommodation was sufficient
to survive summary judgment); Smith v. Henderson, 376 F.3d 529, 536–39
(6th Cir. 2004) (reversing district court order granting motion for summary
judgment for employer because evidence that employer refused to honor
previous accommodation restricting employee’s schedule and ‘‘flatly denied’’
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[the] evidence [in the record] compelled the conclusion
reached by the [referee] or whether a different fact
finder reasonably could have reached a different con-
clusion. Rather, the question is whether the evidence
provides any substantial basis of fact from which the
fact in issue reasonably could have been inferred.’’
(Emphasis omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v.
Dept. of Public Utility Control, 266 Conn. 108, 125–26,
830 A.2d 1121 (2003). Thus, the question for this court
is not whether there was sufficient evidence from which
the referee could have reached a different conclusion,
but whether there is a substantial basis in the evidence
to support the referee’s determination.
Lastly, to the extent the trial court construed the
referee’s finding 93 to mean that the referee had found
that the complainant objectively had no choice but to
resign, that interpretation is contradicted by the evi-
dence cited by the referee in support of that finding.
As noted previously, in the remand order, the court
determined that the referee’s finding that the complain-
ant had not been constructively discharged was in con-
flict with finding 93 of the referee’s memorandum of
decision, in which the referee found that ‘‘Megargle was
aware that the situation was causing the complainant
anxiety, to the point where if no action was taken, the
complainant would have no choice but to leave.’’
In support of finding 93, the referee cited Dance
Right’s answer to the complaint, in which Megargle (on
request for alternative accommodation was sufficient to survive summary
judgment).
As discussed previously, Dance Right did not ignore the complainant’s
request for an accommodation or refuse to comply with her request.
Although the referee found that Dance Right failed to reasonably accommo-
date the complainant’s PTSD when it failed to engage more directly with
the complainant or take ameliorative action while it investigated whether
to remove White from the studio, that conduct does not amount to a complete
failure to accommodate like the conduct at issue in the cases cited by the
commission.
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30 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Dance Right, LLC

behalf of Dance Right) stated that ‘‘the complainant
[told] me [that] the situation adversely affected her
including that she would have to leave if [White] was
not asked to leave.’’ Later in the memorandum of deci-
sion, the referee cited Brittell for the proposition that
‘‘[a] claim of constructive discharge must be supported
by more than the employee’s subjective opinion that
the job conditions have become so intolerable that he
or she was forced to resign’’; (internal quotation marks
omitted) Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 247 Conn.
178; and determined that the complainant failed to
establish ‘‘that the work atmosphere was so difficult or
unpleasant that a reasonable person in the complain-
ant’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.’’ In
light of the totality of the referee’s findings, it would
be unreasonable to construe finding 93 as a finding by
the referee that the complainant objectively had no
choice but to resign. Rather, construing the evidence
in the light most favorable to sustaining the referee’s
decision, the more reasonable interpretation is that the
referee found that Megargle was aware that the com-
plainant subjectively believed that she would have to
resign if Dance Right did not comply with her request to
remove White from the studio. As explained previously,
however, a complainant’s subjective belief regarding
the intolerability of the working conditions alone is
insufficient to support a constructive discharge claim.
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that there
was a substantial basis in the evidence to support the
referee’s finding that the complainant failed to establish
that she was constructively discharged and, therefore,
that the trial court should have dismissed the adminis-
trative appeal.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to dismiss the administrative appeal.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.