Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

UNIFOODS, S.A. DE C.V. v. JULIA
MAGALLANES ET AL.
(AC 46166)
Moll, Seeley and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for
the defendants M and C, the owners of F Co. The plaintiff, which had
obtained a federal court judgment against F Co. and its successor in interest,
I Co., claimed that M and C had fraudulently concealed and transferred
business assets and income in an effort to avoid the judgment. Held:

The trial court properly determined that M and C had satisfied their burden
of proving that no genuine issue of material fact existed that the plaintiff’s
claims were time barred under the one year and four year limitation periods
of the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (§ 52-552j (1) and (2)).

The plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact as to when it discovered or reasonably could have discovered the
allegedly fraudulent transfers within the limitation period of § 52-552j (1)
or the tolling provision of the statute (§ 52-595) governing fraudulent conceal-
ment.

An unsworn declaration by the plaintiff’s export director did not constitute
competent evidence of any fraudulent transfer, as it was not based on
personal knowledge, lacked a foundation for its claims and relied on specula-
tion and conjecture.

Argued September 19—officially released December 31, 2024

Procedural History

Action for, inter alia, a declaratory judgment setting
aside allegedly fraudulent conveyances by the defen-
dants, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the
court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee,
granted in part the defendants’ motion to strike; subse-
quently, the court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge
trial referee, granted the defendants’ motion for sum-
mary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from
which the plaintiff appealed to this court; thereafter,
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

this court dismissed the appeal as to CIMA Sales Strate-
gies, LLC; subsequently, the court, Menon, J., granted
the parties’ motion for a stay. Affirmed.
Thomas W. Mott, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Catherine R. Keenan, for the appellees (named
defendant et al.).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The plaintiff, Unifoods, S.A. de C.V., appeals
from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court
in favor of the defendants Julia Magallanes and Calvin
Cordulack on counts two through five of the plaintiff’s
operative complaint asserting violations of the Connect-
icut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA), Gen-
eral Statutes § 52-552a et seq.1 On appeal, the plaintiff
claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) the
defendants satisfied their initial burden of demonstra-
ting that no genuine issues of material fact existed and
that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff’s fraudulent transfer
claims were time barred pursuant to General Statutes
§ 52-552j,2 and (2) after shifting the burden of proof
1
CIMA Sales Strategies, LLC, is also a defendant in the present action. On
May 5, 2023, this court ordered, sua sponte, the parties to file supplemental
memoranda addressing whether this appeal should be dismissed in part for
lack of a final judgment only as to CIMA Sales Strategies, LLC, because
there were counts of the plaintiff’s operative complaint—counts one and
six—that remained pending against it. See Practice Book § 61-3; Phillips v.
Hebron, 201 Conn. App. 810, 817–18, 244 A.3d 964 (2020). In their respective
supplemental memoranda filed in compliance with this court’s briefing order,
the parties agreed that no final judgment exists as to CIMA Sales Strategies,
LLC. On June 7, 2023, this court dismissed the appeal in part for lack of a
final judgment only as to CIMA Sales Strategies, LLC. On May 8, 2024, the
trial court, Menon, J., granted a joint motion filed by the parties seeking to
stay the trial court proceedings pending this court’s resolution of this appeal,
with the current stay in effect through January 20, 2025.
In the interest of simplicity, we refer to Magallanes and Cordulack collec-
tively as the defendants.
2
General Statutes § 52-552j provides: ‘‘A cause of action with respect to
a fraudulent transfer or obligation under sections 52-552a to 52-552l, inclu-
sive, is extinguished unless action is brought: (1) Under subdivision (1) of
subsection (a) of section 52-552e, within four years after the transfer was
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had not established the
existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding
the timeliness of its claims. We disagree and, accord-
ingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which are undisputed, and proce-
dural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. In July, 2008, the defendants formed Incredible
Foods Group, LLC (IFG). On October 23, 2013, IFG
commenced arbitration proceedings against the plain-
tiff alleging that the plaintiff had breached a sublicense
agreement executed by IFG and the plaintiff in Novem-
ber, 2011. The plaintiff then filed a counterclaim alleg-
ing, inter alia, that IFG failed to repay loans that the
plaintiff had made to it. On July 24, 2014, the arbitrator
issued a final award rejecting IFG’s claims and awarding
the plaintiff a total of $568,104.30, which included dam-
ages, attorney’s fees and interest, and administrative
fees and expenses. On August 11, 2014, Magallanes
formed iSell Unlimited, LLC (iSell).3
On September 5, 2014, IFG filed with the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York (District Court) a petition to vacate in part the
made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the
transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the
claimant; (2) under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 52-552e or
subsection (a) of section 52-552f, within four years after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred; or (3) under subsection (b) of section
52-552f, within one year after the transfer was made or the obligation
was incurred.’’
3
The defendants averred in respective personal affidavits, which are part
of the record, that Cordulack was not a member of, and had no interest in,
iSell. In an unsworn declaration of a representative of the plaintiff, which
is also part of the record, the plaintiff’s representative stated that iSell was
‘‘formed by Magallanes and/or Cordulack . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) As the
trial court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, noted in its
decision granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, when cou-
pled with the defendants’ averments, ‘‘the ‘or’ aspect of the plaintiff’s submis-
sion is validated (undisputed), and the ‘and’ version appears to lack any
supporting evidence.’’
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arbitration award. The plaintiff opposed IFG’s petition
and sought to confirm the arbitration award. On July
6, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for joinder of iSell
as a successor in interest to IFG, which motion was
granted by a federal magistrate judge and affirmed by
the District Court. By way of decisions filed on Septem-
ber 29 and October 2, 2015, the District Court denied
IFG’s petition to vacate the arbitration award and con-
firmed the award against IFG and iSell. The aggregate
amount of the District Court’s judgment, including
attorney’s fees that were subsequently awarded, was
$579,244.30. No appeals were taken from these deci-
sions.
On October 26, 2015, iSell filed a voluntary chapter 7
bankruptcy petition (bankruptcy petition) in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut
(Bankruptcy Court). The bankruptcy petition disclosed
(1) a bank account at Stamford Bank & Trust valued
at $50 as iSell’s only asset and (2) $573,550 in unsecured
nonpriority claims, including judgment debt owed to
the plaintiff in the amount of $568,100,4 as iSell’s only
liabilities. On October 29, 2015, a certificate of notice
(notice) was issued by the Bankruptcy Noticing Center,
providing information about the bankruptcy petition
and a scheduled meeting of creditors, which notice the
plaintiff acknowledges that it received.5
On October 30, 2015, Magallanes formed CIMA Sales
Strategies, LLC (CIMA). Magallanes is a manager and
4
In granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court,
Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, stated that the discrepancy
between the $568,100 judgment debt listed in the bankruptcy petition and
the $579,244.30 awarded to the plaintiff by the District Court was ‘‘primarily,
if not solely, attributable to the noninclusion of attorney’s fees [in the bank-
ruptcy petition] that were awarded to the plaintiff.’’
5
The meeting of creditors was held on January 6, 2016. In her affidavit
submitted in support of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
Magallanes averred that the plaintiff did not attend this meeting. The plaintiff
did not present evidence rebutting this averment.
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member of, and the agent for service of process for,
CIMA, and, at all relevant times, directly or indirectly,
Magallanes has wholly or partially controlled CIMA’s
business activities.6
On January 31, 2016, the bankruptcy trustee filed a
report of no distribution, reporting that there was no
property available for distribution to creditors of iSell’s
bankruptcy estate over and above that exempted by
law and certifying that the estate had been fully adminis-
tered. The report of no distribution further reflected
that $50 in assets were abandoned and that $573,550
in claims were scheduled to be discharged. The bank-
ruptcy case was closed on April 4, 2016.7
The plaintiff commenced the present action against
Cordulack on June 13, 2020, and subsequently cited in
6
On the basis of their evidentiary submissions filed in connection with
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the parties do not dispute
that Magallanes formed CIMA on October 30, 2015. In its operative complaint,
the plaintiff alleged that (1) CIMA was registered with the Secretary of the
State on October 30, 2015, (2) ‘‘Magallanes is the agent for service of process
and a ‘manager’ of . . . CIMA, and upon information and belief is a member,
beneficial owner, and/or partner of CIMA,’’ and, (3) ‘‘[a]t all relevant times,
Magallanes, directly or indirectly, has controlled in whole or in part the
business activities of CIMA.’’ In her answer, Magallanes admitted that (1)
CIMA was formed on October 30, 2015, (2) ‘‘Magallanes is the principal, a
manager, a member, and the agent for service of process for . . . CIMA,’’
and, (3) as the plaintiff alleged, ‘‘[a]t all relevant times, Magallanes, directly
or indirectly, has controlled in whole or in part the business activities of
CIMA.’’ In his answer, Cordulack denied knowledge of these facts alleged
in the operative complaint.
7
Neither IFG nor iSell is a party to the present action. It is undisputed
that IFG was dissolved in December, 2014. As for iSell, the Secretary of the
State’s records, of which we may take judicial notice; see Kloiber v. Jellen,
207 Conn. App. 616, 626–27, 263 A.3d 952 (2021); reflect that Magallanes
filed articles of dissolution on April 11, 2017, providing that iSell’s effective
date of dissolution was April 4, 2016. In her affidavit submitted in support
of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Magallanes averred that
iSell no longer exists without specifying the date on which iSell was dis-
solved. In an unsworn declaration of a representative of the plaintiff, which
is also part of the record, the plaintiff’s representative stated that, on the
basis of the Secretary of the State’s records, iSell was dissolved on April
11, 2017.
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Magallanes and CIMA on August 23, 2020.8 The plain-
tiff’s complaint dated August 18, 2020 (operative com-
plaint), contained six counts, of which counts two
through five are relevant to this appeal.9 In count two,
the plaintiff asserted a claim of fraudulent transfer in
violation of General Statutes § 52-552e (a) (1)10 of
8
According to the state marshal’s return of service filed with the trial
court on June 19, 2020, the defendants and CIMA were served with the
plaintiff’s original complaint, dated June 1, 2020, by abode service on June
13, 2020. On June 29, 2020, Magallanes and CIMA filed a motion to dismiss
the original complaint against them for lack of personal jurisdiction on the
basis of insufficient service of process. On July 14, 2020, anticipating that
the motion to dismiss would be granted, the plaintiff filed a motion to cite
in Magallanes and CIMA as party defendants in the present action, which
the trial court, Hon. Kevin Tierney, judge trial referee, granted on July 28,
2020. As reflected in the state marshal’s subsequent return of service filed
with the court on August 26, 2020, service of the plaintiff’s operative com-
plaint, dated August 18, 2020, was effectuated on Magallanes and CIMA by
abode service on August 23, 2020.
9
In count one of the operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged that CIMA
was holding assets and/or property subject to a constructive trust for the
benefit of the plaintiff and that CIMA would be unjustly enriched were it
permitted to retain those assets and/or property. In count six, the plaintiff
sought to domesticate the District Court’s judgment, alleging that the defen-
dants and CIMA were liable for the satisfaction of that judgment. On August
31, 2020, the defendants and CIMA moved to strike counts one and six,
along with portions of the prayer for relief. On August 12, 2021, the trial
court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, granted in part the
motion to strike, striking the portion of count six directed to the defendants,
as well as portions of the relief requested by the plaintiff. That ruling is not
at issue in this appeal.
We note that no judgment has been rendered on the stricken sixth count
as to the defendants. ‘‘It is well established that [t]he granting of a motion
to strike . . . ordinarily is not a final judgment . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Dressler v. Riccio, 205 Conn. App. 533, 537 n.2, 259 A.3d
14 (2021). Nevertheless, because the summary judgment rendered in the
defendants’ favor disposed of the remaining counts of the operative com-
plaint against them, a final judgment exists as to the defendants. See id.
(appeal was taken from final judgment, notwithstanding that motion for
judgment on stricken count had not been adjudicated, because remaining
counts were disposed of by way of summary judgment).
10
General Statutes § 52-552e (a) provides: ‘‘A transfer made or obligation
incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, if the creditor’s claim
arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred and if
the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1) With actual
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

CUFTA against Magallanes and CIMA. In count three,
the plaintiff asserted a claim of fraudulent transfer in
violation of § 52-552e (a) (2) and/or General Statutes
§ 52-552f11 of CUFTA against Magallanes and CIMA. In
support of counts two and three, the plaintiff alleged in
relevant part that ‘‘some or all of the business, property,
customers, assets, powers, privileges, and/or obliga-
tions of iSell . . . now . . . belong to CIMA pursuant
to a fraudulent transfer from iSell, through . . . Maga-
llanes, to CIMA for no consideration or nominal consid-
eration contemporaneous with iSell’s bankruptcy filing.
. . . Magallanes has intentionally and purposely
attempted to hide and conceal . . . a . . . fraudulent
conveyance of business assets and income in an effort
to avoid the plaintiff’s judgment against IFG and iSell.
. . . By virtue of the fraud, actual or constructive, of
iSell and . . . Magallanes . . . CIMA is a successor in
interest to IFG and iSell and improperly holds assets
and/or property contrary to equity and good con-
science.’’ To further support count two, the plaintiff
alleged, inter alia, that Magallanes and iSell transferred
assets to CIMA with the actual intent to hinder, delay,
intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation, and the debtor (A) was engaged or was about to engage in a
business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction, or (B) intended
to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur,
debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.’’
11
General Statutes § 52-552f provides: ‘‘(a) A transfer made or obligation
incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the
transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent
at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or
obligation.
‘‘(b) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose
claim arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an
insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time and
the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.’’
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or defraud the plaintiff. To further support count three,
the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Magallanes trans-
ferred iSell’s assets to CIMA without receiving a reason-
ably equivalent value in return, leaving iSell unable to
meet its obligations to the plaintiff.
In count four of the operative complaint, the plaintiff
alleged that Magallanes violated § 52-552e (a) (1) of
CUFTA, inter alia, by knowingly transferring assets
belonging to IFG and/or iSell to herself and/or to others
with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the
plaintiff. In count five, the plaintiff alleged that Cordu-
lack violated § 52-552e (a) (1) of CUFTA, inter alia, by
knowingly (1) transferring assets belonging to IFG and/
or iSell to himself and/or to others with the actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud the plaintiff, and/or (2)
conspiring with and/or allowing Magallanes to transfer
assets belonging to IFG and/or its successors to herself
and/or to others with the actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud the plaintiff.
On February 9, 2022, the defendants each filed an
answer denying the material allegations of the plaintiff’s
respective claims against them. Additionally, the defen-
dants each asserted special defenses alleging that the
plaintiff’s claims were time barred pursuant to the limi-
tations provisions of § 52-552j. Magallanes contended
that (1) counts two and four of the operative complaint
were time barred under subsection (1) of § 52-552j and
(2) count three was time barred under subsection (2)
of § 52-552j. Cordulack claimed that count five was time
barred pursuant to § 52-552j (1). The plaintiff did not
file replies to the defendants’ special defenses.
On June 16, 2022, the defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, accompanied by a supporting mem-
orandum of law, as to counts two through five of the
operative complaint on the ground that the plaintiff’s
fraudulent transfer claims were brought outside of the
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

applicable limitations period of § 52-552j.12 To support
the motion, the defendants submitted personal affida-
vits along with several appended exhibits, including a
copy of the bankruptcy petition. As to count two, the
defendants asserted that (1) the plaintiff expressly
alleged that the purported fraudulent transfers were
‘‘contemporaneous’’ with iSell’s October 26, 2015 bank-
ruptcy filing, such that the four year limitations period
of § 52-552j (1) expired on October 26, 2019,13 or, alter-
natively, (2) if the term ‘‘contemporaneous’’ were
broadly construed, the limitations period terminated
on April 4, 2020, four years after the close of iSell’s
bankruptcy case. Insofar as the separate one year limita-
tions period of § 52-552j (1) applied, the defendants
contended that (1) the plaintiff received notice of the
bankruptcy petition by way of the notice issued on
October 29, 2015, such that it discovered or reasonably
could have discovered any purported fraudulent trans-
fers at that time, or (2) in the alternative, if the notice
were not received by the plaintiff, then the plaintiff
unequivocally was aware of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings by no later than April 18, 2019, when the plaintiff
acknowledged iSell’s bankruptcy while deposing Cor-
dulack as part of postjudgment proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court, such that April 18, 2020, was the ‘‘most
outside possible date’’ on which the limitations period
expired. With respect to count three, incorporating their
12
As an additional special defense directed to count four of the operative
complaint, Magallanes alleged that, insofar as count four raised a common-
law fraudulent transfer claim, it was time barred by the three year limitations
period of General Statutes § 52-577. Cordulack asserted a substantively
similar special defense directed to count five. The applicability of § 52-577
was not addressed by the parties or by the court in connection with the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the parties do not rely on
§ 52-577 on appeal. Thus, we need not address § 52-577 further.
13
The defendants stated that the plaintiff ‘‘had until October 29, 2019, to
bring a timely claim for fraudulent transfer under . . . § 52-552e (a) (1).’’
We construe the defendants’ reference to October 29, 2019, rather than to
October 26, 2019, to be a scrivener’s error.
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reasoning as to count two, the defendants maintained
that the plaintiff’s claim was extinguished pursuant to
§ 52-552j (2) either on October 26, 2019, or April 4, 2020.
As to counts four and five of the operative complaint,
the defendants contended that the plaintiff expressly
alleged that the purported transfers occurred ‘‘prior to
the [October 26, 2015] iSell bankruptcy filing,’’ such
that the four year limitations period of § 52-552j (1)
expired no later than October 26, 2019. Insofar as the
separate one year limitations period of § 52-552j (1)
applied, the defendants maintained that it was ‘‘indis-
putable’’ that the plaintiff knew of iSell’s bankruptcy
proceedings on or before April 18, 2019, when the plain-
tiff referenced the bankruptcy proceedings during Cor-
dulack’s deposition, such that the plaintiff’s claims
could have been brought no later than April 18, 2020.
All of the dates identified by the defendants as possible
terminal dates for the applicable limitations period pre-
ceded the plaintiff’s commencement of the present
action against them.
On July 29, 2022, the plaintiff filed a memorandum
of law in opposition to the defendants’ motion for sum-
mary judgment. To support its memorandum of law,
the plaintiff submitted an unsworn declaration of Javier
Perezgrovas Robles Gil (Perezgrovas),14 the plaintiff’s
14
The unsworn declaration, which Perezgrovas executed in Mexico, was
submitted in accordance with the Uniform Unsworn Foreign Declarations
Act, General Statutes § 1-65aa et seq. See General Statutes § 1-65bb (6)
(‘‘ ‘Sworn declaration’ means a declaration in a signed record given under
oath. ‘Sworn declaration’ includes a sworn statement, verification, certificate
or affidavit.’’); General Statutes § 1-65bb (7) (‘‘ ‘[u]nsworn declaration’ means
a declaration in a signed record that is not given under oath, but is given
under penalty of perjury’’); General Statutes § 1-65cc (‘‘[s]ections 1-65aa to
1-65hh, inclusive, apply to an unsworn declaration by a declarant who at the
time of making the declaration is physically located outside the boundaries
of the United States whether or not the location is subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States’’); General Statutes § 1-65dd (‘‘[i]f a law of this state
requires or permits use of a sworn declaration, an unsworn declaration
meeting the requirements of sections 1-65aa to 1-65hh, inclusive, has the
same effect as a sworn declaration’’).
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

export director, appended to which were excerpts from
Magallanes’ responses to interrogatories and to
requests for production, dated May 27, 2021, pro-
pounded in the present action. The plaintiff refuted
the defendants’ contention that the relevant limitations
period vis-à-vis its fraudulent transfer claims started to
run on October 26, 2015, the date of iSell’s bankruptcy
filing, because the defendants’ evidentiary submissions
failed to demonstrate a lack of any genuine issues of
material fact as to when (1) the alleged fraudulent trans-
fers took place and (2) the plaintiff discovered or rea-
sonably could have discovered said transfers. More-
over, the plaintiff asserted that it first discovered an
alleged fraudulent transfer in 2020, when, through a
private investigator hired by its attorneys, it learned
that Magallanes had formed CIMA.

The plaintiff further contended that iSell fraudulently
disclosed in the bankruptcy petition only one asset, a
Stamford Bank & Trust bank account valued at $50,
which was not an accurate and complete representation
of iSell’s financial affairs. According to the plaintiff,
iSell improperly failed to disclose several additional
assets in the bankruptcy petition, namely, (1) a bank
account at Citibank (Citibank account), the records of
which the plaintiff had subpoenaed in 2019, (2) used
furniture, which, according to Magallanes’ interrogatory
responses, CIMA ‘‘took over’’ after the furniture had
been abandoned by IFG, iSell, and the bankruptcy
trustee, and (3) a services agreement with an entity
known as Empacadora San Marcos USA, Ltd. (services
agreement), which (a) IFG had assigned to iSell in
August, 2014, and that, according to Perezgrovas’
unsworn declaration, iSell later had transferred to CIMA
at or around the time of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, and (b) the plaintiff discovered in 2022. The
plaintiff additionally argued that Magallanes failed to
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

disclose her formation of CIMA to the bankruptcy
trustee.
The plaintiff maintained that, as a result of the defen-
dants’ alleged acts of fraudulently concealing and trans-
ferring assets, (1) the bankruptcy trustee did not dis-
cover any additional assets prior to filing the report of
no distribution on January 31, 2016, and (2) it was
‘‘impossible’’ for the plaintiff to have discovered the
purported fraudulent transfers on the basis of the bank-
ruptcy petition. The plaintiff further argued that there
were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
defendants ‘‘intentionally concealed the plaintiff’s
causes of action to further avoid the [District Court’s]
judgment,’’ thereby invoking the tolling provisions of
General Statutes § 52-595.15
On September 6, 2022, the defendants filed a reply
memorandum, appended to which were the plaintiff’s
responses to interrogatories and requests for produc-
tion, dated December 8, 2020, propounded in the pres-
ent action. In response to the plaintiff’s argument that
they failed to demonstrate that there were no genuine
issues of material fact concerning, inter alia, the dates
of any alleged fraudulent transfers, the defendants con-
tended that (1) they ‘‘[could not] prove a negative, nor
[was] it their obligation to do so,’’ (2) they were relying
on the allegations of the operative complaint to assert
their statute of limitations defenses, and (3) the plain-
tiff’s failure to present any evidence of a transfer, let
alone a fraudulent transfer, could not operate to create
genuine issues of material fact. The defendants main-
tained that they denied the existence of any fraudulent
transfers and presented evidence that, other than $50
15
General Statutes § 52-595 provides: ‘‘If any person, liable to an action
by another, fraudulently conceals from him the existence of the cause of
such action, such cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against such
person so liable therefor at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon
first discovers its existence.’’
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

in a bank account, iSell had no assets at the time of its
bankruptcy filing, such that ‘‘any purported fraudulent
transfer . . . would have occurred before the bank-
ruptcy . . . .’’ In addition, the defendants iterated that
the plaintiff had received notice of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in 2015, such that, insofar as the one year
limitations period of § 52-552j (1) applied, the plaintiff’s
claims were extinguished in 2016.
The defendants further asserted that the plaintiff
failed to meet its burden to submit any competent evi-
dence establishing genuine issues of material fact
undermining their statute of limitations defenses. With
regard to iSell’s bankruptcy proceedings, the defen-
dants argued that the plaintiff had ‘‘no basis, other than
supposition, to claim that iSell or Magallanes engaged
in fraud’’ because (1) neither the bankruptcy trustee
nor the Bankruptcy Court made any findings of any
wrongdoing during the bankruptcy proceedings, (2) the
plaintiff did not seek to reopen the bankruptcy case
to assert fraud, (3) the January 31, 2016 report of no
distribution reflected that the bankruptcy trustee, after
‘‘ ‘[making] a diligent inquiry into the financial affairs
of [iSell] and the location of the property belonging to
the [bankruptcy] estate,’ ’’ found no assets other than
$50 in a bank account, and (4) the plaintiff presented
no evidence as to what documentation the bankruptcy
trustee had requested or received.
With regard to the plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment
argument predicated on § 52-595, the defendants con-
tended that the plaintiff had offered no evidence of
any transfer, let alone a fraudulent transfer, that the
defendants allegedly concealed. As to the Citibank
account, the defendants asserted that, although the
record reflected that the plaintiff had subpoenaed Citi-
bank records in 2019, the plaintiff failed to submit evi-
dence that iSell actually owned a Citibank account that
was open and funded at the time of the bankruptcy
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

proceedings. With regard to the services agreement, the
defendants argued that the plaintiff failed to provide
any evidence of the value of the agreement, that it was
transferred fraudulently, or whether the bankruptcy
trustee was aware of it.16 Additionally, the defendants
argued that the trial court should disregard Perezgrovas’
unsworn declaration because, inter alia, it was not made
upon personal knowledge.
On December 1, 2022, the court, Hon. Kenneth B.
Povodator, judge trial referee, ordered, sua sponte, the
parties to file supplemental memoranda addressing the
effect, if any, of Governor Ned Lamont’s Executive
Order No. 7G (executive order)17 on the court’s analysis.
The court stated that the defendants had identified
dates in April, 2020, as potential terminal dates for the
expiration of the applicable limitations period and that
the executive order presumptively suspended any limi-
tations period that would have run on those dates. The
court further stated that, ‘‘[i]f a modified argument as
to alternate dates (dates unaffected by the executive
order) is required based on the acknowledged inapplica-
bility of the April [2020] dates, that also may be submit-
ted.’’
On December 14, 2022, the parties filed supplemental
memoranda in compliance with the court’s briefing
16
In their September 6, 2022 reply memorandum, the defendants did not
expressly address the used furniture identified by the plaintiff in its memo-
randum of law in opposition to their motion for summary judgment.
17
Executive Order No. 7G, § 2 (March 19, 2020), issued during the COVID-
19 pandemic, provides in relevant part: ‘‘Notwithstanding any provision of
the Connecticut General Statutes or of any regulation, local rule or other
provision of law, I hereby suspend, for the duration of this public health
and civil preparedness emergency, unless earlier modified or terminated by
me, all statutory (1) location or venue requirements; (2) time requirements,
statutes of limitations or other limitations or deadlines relating to service
of process, court proceedings or court filings; and (3) all time requirements
or deadlines related to the Supreme, Appellate and Superior courts or their
judicial officials to issue notices, hold court, hear matters and/or render
decisions . . . .’’ This provision expired on March 1, 2021. See Executive
Order No. 10A, § 5 (February 8, 2021).
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

order. The plaintiff argued that, pursuant to the execu-
tive order, any limitations period scheduled to expire
in April, 2020, was suspended on March 19, 2020, and
remained suspended when it commenced the present
action against the defendants. In contrast, the defen-
dants argued that the executive order was immaterial
to the court’s analysis because there were no genuine
issues of material fact that the plaintiff’s fraudulent
transfer claims were extinguished prior to the issuance
of the executive order. As to counts two, four, and five
of the operative complaint, the defendants maintained
that, pursuant to § 52-552j (1), the statute of limitations
expired on one of the following dates: (1) October 29,
2016, one year after the notice had been mailed to the
plaintiff; (2) October 26, 2019, four years after iSell’s
bankruptcy filing; or (3) January 31, 2020, four years
after the filing of the bankruptcy trustee’s report of no
distribution. As to count three, the defendants asserted
that, pursuant to § 52-552j (2), the statute of limitations
expired on October 26, 2019, four years after iSell’s
bankruptcy filing.

In addition, the defendants acknowledged that, in
initially moving for summary judgment, they identified
‘‘alternative’’ dates in April, 2020, on which the limita-
tions period governing the plaintiff’s fraudulent transfer
claims expired. They explained, however, that, ‘‘[a]fter
the plaintiff submitted its objection [to the defendants’
motion for summary judgment] and [Perezgrovas’]
unsworn declaration . . . it became readily apparent
that the alternative arguments made by the defendants
were unnecessary and that the court did not need to
reach the alternative arguments because there [were]
no genuine issue[s] of material fact that [1] any alleged
‘fraudulent’ transfer from iSell to any third party
occurred on or before October 26, 2015,’’ and (2) the
plaintiff knew or reasonably could have known about
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

any such transfer on October 29, 2015, or on January
31, 2016.
On December 20, 2022, the court granted the defen-
dants’ motion for summary judgment on counts two
through five of the operative complaint.18 Preliminarily,
the court observed that, with regard to fraudulent trans-
fer claims, ‘‘the date or dates of transfers generally are
known or knowable, and any claim of concealment
usually has an identified date of learning of the claimed
concealed fraudulent transfer. [The present action] has
a highly unusual—potentially approaching unique—
quality in that there is no identified date (with compe-
tent evidence) of transfer/conveyance of any compe-
tently identified material property that is being chal-
lenged by the plaintiff as a claimed fraudulent transfer.
Indeed, it goes even further than a lack of specificity as
to when a transfer occurred; there is a lack of competent
evidence as to what was transferred or conveyed that
might give rise to a fraudulent transfer/conveyance
claim. In that context, it is not surprising that a specific
date cannot be identified, since a transfer of specified
property on a given date presupposes an ability to iden-
tify the property transferred (as well as the fact of a
transfer having occurred); it is something of an oxymo-
ron to speak of a specified date of transfer of property
if the property itself cannot be identified.’’ As the court
recognized, the defendants denied the existence of any
transfer giving rise to the plaintiff’s fraudulent transfer
claims, and, in asserting their statute of limitations
defenses, they relied on the plaintiff’s allegations that
18
The court also rendered summary judgment in favor of CIMA, which
had joined the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We limit our
discussion to the defendants because this appeal has been dismissed as to
CIMA. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
Additionally, the court stated that it heard argument on the motion for
summary judgment on September 12, 2022. No transcript has been filed in
this appeal, and, pursuant to Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (3), the plaintiff
certified that no transcript was deemed necessary for this appeal.
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the purported fraudulent transfers occurred at about
the time of iSell’s bankruptcy filing and/or the District
Court’s judgment. The court proceeded to conclude that
the defendants had ‘‘established, at least on a prima
facie basis, the absence of any transfer within a poten-
tially relevant (and timely) time period other than as
claimed by the plaintiff—the plaintiff’s own allegations
relating to transfers are in terms of events more than
four years prior to the commencement of [the present
action].’’
Having concluded that the defendants satisfied their
prima facie burden, the court stated that ‘‘the burden
shift[ed] to the plaintiff to establish a material issue of
fact, either as to a fraudulent transfer within the statu-
tory limitations period or an act of concealment relating
to an actionable fraudulent concealment within the stat-
utory period.’’ The court then determined that the plain-
tiff had failed to offer competent evidence of a fraudu-
lent transfer of ‘‘material proportion’’ within any
applicable limitations period.19
The court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on the sev-
eral assets it identified as having been fraudulently
transferred in arguing that genuine issues of material
fact existed as to the defendants’ statute of limitations
defenses. As to the Citibank account, the court stated
that, although the record reflected that the plaintiff had
subpoenaed Citibank in 2019 for bank records regarding
iSell, the plaintiff failed to identify any funds found in
any such account or a transfer of funds from any such
account. Moreover, the court determined that the con-
cealment of any ‘‘trivial’’ transaction from the Citibank
account would not constitute a ‘‘concealment of facts
for the purpose of obtaining delay on the [plaintiff’s]
19
The court noted that the plaintiff had approximately two years since
the commencement of the present action against the defendants to conduct
discovery and had not requested additional time to conduct discovery pursu-
ant to our rules of practice.
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

part in filing a complaint on [its] cause of action.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.)
Turning to the used furniture in the possession of
CIMA that IFG and iSell previously had owned, the
court determined that (1) Magallanes’ interrogatory
responses contained the only evidence in the record of
the furniture’s value, which was less than $200, (2) the
bankruptcy trustee ‘‘apparently deemed that furniture
to be not worth the effort of treatment as an asset for
purposes of winding up [iSell’s] bankruptcy estate,’’ and
(3) the furniture ‘‘fail[ed] to be of concern to the court
because there [was] no plausibility to any claim that
the transfer of the furniture may have been part of an
attempt to deprive the plaintiff of property that it could
have obtained in partial satisfaction of its judgment,
and, even if that supposition were to be deemed unrea-
sonable, the court has little doubt that it fail[ed] to
represent a material issue of fact.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)
Like the Citibank account, the court deemed any trans-
action of the used furniture to be ‘‘trivial,’’ such that
the concealment of any such transfer was not a ‘‘con-
cealment of facts for the purpose of obtaining delay on
the [plaintiff’s] part in filing a complaint on [its] cause
of action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
With respect to the services agreement, the court
first determined that, although the record reflected that
IFG had transferred the agreement to iSell in 2014, there
was no competent evidence establishing that iSell later
transferred the agreement to CIMA.20 The court
acknowledged that Perezgrovas stated in his unsworn
declaration that, ‘‘[u]pon information and belief, at
some point in time the services agreement . . . was
ultimately transferred to CIMA, which the plaintiff only
learned about in May of 2022 when the defendants vol-
untarily disclosed that fact in the course of this litiga-
tion.’’ The court rejected these statements because they
20
A copy of the services agreement was not made part of the record.
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

were not predicated on Perezgrovas’ personal knowl-
edge and there was no indication of the source of the
information upon which Perezgrovas relied. Setting
aside its determination that Perezgrovas’ statements did
not constitute competent evidence, the court deter-
mined that the plaintiff failed to present evidence con-
cerning (1) the value of the services agreement, (2)
whether the services agreement was subject to execu-
tion by the plaintiff, and (3) whether the services agree-
ment was transferable without consent. As the court
explained, ‘‘[i]f the [services] agreement were not an
asset of material value that could be obtained by way
of postjudgment execution, [then] the transfer [thereof]
could not be material, and the failure to disclose (or the
affirmative act of concealment) could not be material
to a statute of limitations tolling argument.’’21
In addition, the court discounted the plaintiff’s argu-
ment that, during iSell’s bankruptcy proceedings, Maga-
llanes improperly had failed to disclose her formation of
CIMA. The court determined that there was no ‘‘obvious
nexus’’ between this argument and the plaintiff’s fraudu-
lent transfer claims because (1) there was no ‘‘apparent
‘transfer’ ’’ of an asset in connection with CIMA’s forma-
tion and, in any event, (2) any such transfer necessarily
would have occurred when CIMA was formed in 2015,
and there was no evidence that the formation of CIMA
and CIMA’s business operations had been concealed.
In summary, the court concluded that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff
ha[d] not established the existence of a potentially
fraudulent transfer (of material proportion) by compe-
tent evidence, and ha[d] not identified the date of such
21
With respect to iSell’s Stamford Bank & Trust bank account, the court
stated that (1) the account was disclosed in the bankruptcy petition and,
thus, not concealed, and (2) assuming arguendo that the account was con-
cealed and transferred, it was a ‘‘trivial’’ asset such that its transfer did not
constitute a ‘‘concealment of facts for the purpose of obtaining delay on
the [plaintiff’s] part in filing a complaint on [its] cause of action.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

a transfer as coming within a permissible period of time
for purposes of a statute of limitations analysis (again
by competent evidence)—with the latter essentially a
natural consequence of the former.’’22 This appeal fol-
lowed. Additional facts and procedural history will be
set forth as necessary.
Before turning to the plaintiff’s claims, we set forth
the following applicable standard of review and legal
principles. ‘‘In seeking summary judgment, it is the mov-
ant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence
of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement
that the moving party for summary judgment has the
burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue
as to all the material facts, which, under applicable
principles of substantive law, entitle [the movant] to a
judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant
to a strict standard. To satisfy [its] burden the movant
must make a showing that it is quite clear what the
truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the
existence of any genuine issue of material fact. . . .
As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the oppo-
nent. . . . When documents submitted in support of a
motion for summary judgment fail to establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving
party has no obligation to submit documents establish-
ing the existence of such an issue. . . . Once the mov-
ing party has met its burden, however, the opposing
22
In opposing the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
further argued that (1) the motion was filed one day late in violation of the
court’s operative scheduling order and (2) Cordulack’s deposition testimony
adduced in connection with the District Court proceedings, a transcript of
which was appended to his affidavit, constituted inadmissible hearsay. In
response, the defendants contended that (1) the motion for summary judg-
ment was filed in the late evening on June 15, 2022, which belated filing
caused no prejudice to the plaintiff, and (2) Cordulack’s deposition testimony
was admissible. The court did not address these arguments in its decision
granting the motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff on appeal has
not raised any claims of error predicated on these issues. Thus, these issues
are not before us for consideration.
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

party must present evidence that demonstrates the exis-
tence of some disputed factual issue. . . . It is not
enough, however, for the opposing party merely to
assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere
assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the
existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute
evidence properly presented to the court under Practice
Book § [17-45]. . . . Our review of the trial court’s deci-
sion to grant [or to deny a] motion for summary judg-
ment is plenary. . . .
‘‘[I]n the context of a motion for summary judgment
based on a statute of limitations special defense, [the
movant] typically [meets its] initial burden of showing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by dem-
onstrating that the action had commenced outside of
the statutory limitation period. . . . When the [non-
movant] asserts that the limitations period has been
tolled by an equitable exception to the statute of limita-
tions, the burden normally shifts to the [nonmovant]
to establish a disputed issue of material fact in avoid-
ance of the statute. . . . Put differently, it is then
incumbent upon the party opposing summary judgment
to establish a factual predicate from which it can be
determined, as a matter of law, that a genuine issue of
material fact exists.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Kuselias v. Zingaro & Cretella,
LLC, 224 Conn. App. 192, 207–208, 312 A.3d 118, cert.
denied, 349 Conn. 916, 316 A.3d 357 (2024).
Section 52-552j, which applies to the plaintiff’s fraud-
ulent transfer claims, contains three limitations provi-
sions, the first two of which are relevant to this appeal.
The first limitations provision governs claims of fraudu-
lent transfer in violation of § 52-552e (a) (1) of CUFTA,
as asserted in counts two, four, and five of the operative
complaint, and requires such claims to be brought
‘‘within four years after the transfer was made . . . or,
if later, within one year after the transfer . . . was or
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0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 23
Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-552j (1). The second limita-
tions provision applies to claims of fraudulent transfer
in violation of § 52-552e (a) (2) or § 52-552f (a) of
CUFTA, as asserted in count three, and requires such
claims to be brought ‘‘within four years after the transfer
was made . . . .’’23 General Statutes § 52-552j (2).
Additionally, § 52-595, on which the plaintiff relies,
codifies the tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment.
See Reyes v. State, 222 Conn. App. 538, 550, 306 A.3d
515 (2023). ‘‘With respect to fraudulent concealment
under § 52-595, [t]he question . . . is whether the
[plaintiff] [has] adduced any credible evidence that [the
defendants] fraudulently concealed the existence of the
[plaintiff’s] cause of action. . . . Under our case law,
to prove fraudulent concealment, the [plaintiff] [was]
required to show: (1) [the defendants’] actual aware-
ness, rather than imputed knowledge, of the facts neces-
sary to establish the [plaintiff’s] cause of action; (2)
[the defendants’] intentional concealment of these facts
from the [plaintiff]; and (3) [the defendants’] conceal-
ment of the facts for the purpose of obtaining delay on
the [plaintiff’s] part in filing a complaint on [its] cause of
action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 550–51.
‘‘Our Supreme Court further has explained that, [t]o
23
The third limitations provision of § 52-552j governs claims of fraudulent
transfer in violation of § 52-552f (b) of CUFTA, which concerns a transfer
to an insider for an antecedent debt, and requires such claims to be brought
‘‘within one year after the transfer was made . . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-
552j (3). In her special defense directed to count three of the operative
complaint, Magallanes asserted that count three was time barred under both
the four year limitations period of § 52-552j (2) and the one year limitations
period of § 52-552j (3). Additionally, in moving for summary judgment, the
defendants contended that both § 52-552j (2) and (3) applied to count three.
In rendering summary judgment in the defendants’ favor, the court did not
reference the one year limitations period of § 52-552j (3), and none of the
parties addresses on appeal the applicability of § 52-552j (3) to count three.
Thus, with respect to count three, our analysis is limited to the limitations
period set forth in § 52-552j (2).
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

meet this burden, it [is] not sufficient for the [plaintiff]
to prove merely that it [is] more likely than not that
the defendants had concealed the cause of action.
Instead, the [plaintiff] [must] prove fraudulent conceal-
ment by the more exacting standard of clear, precise,
and unequivocal evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Tunick v. Tunick, 201 Conn. App. 512, 553,
242 A.3d 1011 (2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 910, 244
A.3d 561 (2021).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improp-
erly determined that the defendants satisfied their initial
burden of demonstrating no genuine issues of material
fact that the present action was commenced against
the defendants outside of the applicable limitations
periods of § 52-552j, whereupon the court shifted the
burden to the plaintiff to prove the existence of genuine
issues of material fact concerning the timeliness of its
fraudulent transfer claims. As to counts two through
five of the operative complaint, the plaintiff contends
that the defendants failed to establish the lack of any
genuine issues of material fact that its claims were
brought outside of the four year limitations period of
§ 52-552j (1) or (2), as applicable. With respect to counts
two, four, and five only, the plaintiff further asserts that
the defendants failed to establish any genuine issues
of material fact that its claims were brought outside of
the separate one year limitations period of § 52-552j
(1). We are not persuaded.

A

With regard to the four year limitations period, the
plaintiff maintains that the defendants did not establish
the lack of any genuine issues of material fact as to
when the purported fraudulent transfers occurred, and
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

identified several possible transfer dates and the corres-
ponding dates on which the governing limitations
period expired. We disagree.

As the court explained in its decision, the defendants
denied the existence of any fraudulent transfers and
relied on the allegations of the operative complaint
to assert their statute of limitations defenses. In the
operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged that unspeci-
fied assets belonging to iSell were fraudulently trans-
ferred on unidentified dates. The plaintiff alleged in
support of counts two and three that the purported
transfers at issue were ‘‘contemporaneous with iSell’s
[October 26, 2015] bankruptcy filing,’’ whereas it alleged
in support of counts four and five that the purported
transfers at issue had occurred while Magallanes or
Cordulack were ‘‘engaged in arbitration and litigation
in the [District Court] and prior to the iSell bankruptcy
filing . . . .’’ In other words, the plaintiff’s allegations
expressly related to fraudulent transfers that occurred
before or contemporaneously with iSell’s bankruptcy
filing on October 26, 2015. Accordingly, we agree with
the court that the defendants demonstrated, on the
basis of the allegations in the operative complaint alone,
that no genuine issues of material fact existed that the
purported fraudulent transfers occurred more than four
years prior to the commencement of the present action
against the defendants in 2020.

Moreover, we are not convinced by the plaintiff’s
contention that the defendants’ reliance in their sum-
mary judgment submissions on various possible termi-
nal dates for the applicable limitations period created
genuine issues of material fact. It is apparent that the
defendants’ dependence on multiple dates was a func-
tion of the indeterminate nature of the plaintiff’s allega-
tions regarding the details and the timing of the claimed
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

fraudulent transfers.24 As we have concluded, however,
relying on the plaintiff’s own allegations, the defendants
ultimately demonstrated that no genuine issues of mate-
rial facts existed that the alleged fraudulent transfers
occurred more than four years before the plaintiff had
filed the present action against the defendants.
In sum, insofar as the four year limitations period of
§ 52-552j (1) or (2) applied to the plaintiff’s fraudulent
transfer claims, we conclude that the court properly
determined that the defendants satisfied their initial
burden to prove that no genuine issues of material fact
existed and that the plaintiff’s claims were time barred
pursuant to these provisions.
B
With regard to counts two, four, and five only, the
plaintiff also contends that the defendants failed to
24
The plaintiff further contends that (1) the defendants, in moving for
summary judgment, identified dates in April, 2020, as potential terminal
dates for the applicable limitations periods, and (2) pursuant to the executive
order, any limitations periods that were scheduled to expire in April, 2020,
were suspended until March 1, 2021, after the commencement of the present
action against the defendants, such that the defendants’ failure to demon-
strate no genuine issues of material fact as to the dates of the fraudulent
transfers was fatal to their motion for summary judgment. In their supple-
mental brief filed in response to the court’s December 1, 2022 briefing
order, the defendants clarified that they were no longer asserting that any
limitations period was scheduled to expire in April, 2020, such that the
executive order was not germane to their motion for summary judgment.
Indeed, in the December 1, 2022 briefing order, the court invited the parties
to present ‘‘modified argument[s] as to alternate dates (dates unaffected by
the executive order) [if] required based on the acknowledged inapplicability
of the April [2020] dates . . . .’’ For these reasons, the plaintiff’s contention
is unavailing.
The plaintiff also claims that, even if the defendants satisfied their initial
burden of proof, the court improperly failed to determine whether any dates
in April, 2020, were ‘‘dispositive’’ for purposes of the defendants’ statute of
limitations defenses, which determination was necessary in order to resolve
whether the executive order applied. When the court’s decision is reasonably
construed in its entirety, however, it is clear that the court determined there
to be no genuine issues of material fact that no limitations period was
scheduled to expire in April, 2020, such that the executive order did not apply.
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Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes

demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material
fact that the plaintiff’s claims were asserted outside of
the one year limitations period of § 52-552j (1). We
disagree.

In moving for summary judgment, the defendants
contended that the notice,25 issued on October 29, 2015,
informed the plaintiff of iSell’s bankruptcy proceedings,
such that the plaintiff did or reasonably could have
discovered any purported fraudulent transfers as a
result of its receipt of the notice. Accordingly, the defen-
dants maintained that the plaintiff’s claims in counts
two, four, and five of the operative complaint were not
timely under the one year limitations period of § 52-
552j (1).

We conclude that the notice constituted sufficient
evidence to sustain the defendants’ initial burden to
demonstrate no genuine issues of material fact vis-à-
vis the one year limitations period of § 52-552j (1). The
notice, which the plaintiff admits to having received,26
unequivocally alerted the plaintiff that iSell had filed
the bankruptcy petition, which listed the plaintiff as a
creditor and iSell’s assets at the time as comprising $50
in a bank account. Pursuant to the notice, the plaintiff
reasonably could have discovered any purported fraud-
ulent transfers made by iSell, particularly given the
proximity of the bankruptcy filing to the District Court’s
judgment rendered against iSell less than one month
prior. The plaintiff commenced the present action
25
The defendants submitted a copy of the notice in support of their motion
for summary judgment.
26
Although the plaintiff concedes that it received the notice, the record
is silent as to the date of receipt. Nevertheless, as the defendants argued
in their summary judgment submissions and maintain on appeal, under the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, ‘‘[s]ervice by mail of process, any
other document, or notice is complete upon mailing.’’ Fed. R. Bankr. P.
9006 (e).
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against the defendants in 2020, more than one year after
the notice was issued.27 Thus, the plaintiff’s claim fails.28
In sum, we conclude that the court properly deter-
mined that the defendants satisfied their initial burden
of establishing that there were no genuine issues of
material fact as to the applicable limitations provisions
of § 52-552j and that the plaintiff’s fraudulent transfer
claims were untimely under these provisions. We fur-
ther conclude that, upon determining that the defen-
dants had met their initial burden, the court correctly
shifted the burden to the plaintiff to establish the exis-
tence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether
its claims were time barred under § 52-552j.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the trial court, after
shifting the burden to it, improperly concluded that it
failed to establish genuine issues of material fact as
to whether its fraudulent transfer claims were timely
pursuant to § 52-552j. The plaintiff maintains that its
27
In the alternative, the bankruptcy trustee’s report of no distribution
filed on January 31, 2016, notice of which the plaintiff acknowledges having
received and evidence of which was submitted by the defendants in support
of their motion for summary judgment, also would have served to alert the
plaintiff of any purported fraudulent transfers by iSell. The plaintiff initiated
the present action against the defendants more than one year after the
report of no distribution was filed and, thus, outside of the one year limita-
tions period of § 52-552j (1).
28
The plaintiff further maintains that the court overlooked the one year
limitations period of § 52-552j (1) in granting the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The court did not address expressly whether the defen-
dants met their burden as to this provision; however, the court acknowledged
that the notice was issued following iSell’s bankruptcy filing. Assuming
arguendo that the court did not adequately consider this issue, we decide
it on the merits because the defendants properly raised it in their summary
judgment submissions and our review on appeal is plenary. See Wilmington
Trust, National Assn. v. N’Guessan, 214 Conn. App. 229, 234, 279 A.3d 310
(2022) (concluding, as matter of law, that defendant could not prevail on
merits of claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel raised in objection
to motion for summary judgment that trial court did not address).
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evidentiary submissions demonstrated that the bank-
ruptcy petition did not accurately reflect iSell’s assets,
and, therefore, there were genuine issues of material
fact as to (1) when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably
could have discovered the purported fraudulent trans-
fers for purposes of the one year limitations period of
§ 52-552j, as applicable to counts two, four, and five of
the operative complaint, and (2) whether the defen-
dants fraudulently concealed causes of action for pur-
poses of the tolling provisions of § 52-595, as applicable
to count three.29 Specifically, the plaintiff identifies (1)
the Citibank account, (2) the used furniture, and (3)
the services agreement as assets that the defendants
omitted from the bankruptcy petition and fraudulently
concealed.30 Additionally, the plaintiff relies on Magalla-
nes’ formation of CIMA to argue further that genuine
issues of material fact existed. We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we set forth the following additional
relevant legal principles. Practice Book § 17-45 (a) pro-
vides: ‘‘A motion for summary judgment shall be sup-
ported by appropriate documents, including but not
29
The plaintiff does not claim on appeal that its evidentiary submissions
created genuine issues of material fact as to whether any purported fraudu-
lent transfers occurred within the four years preceding the commencement
of the present action against the defendants. See General Statutes § 52-552j
(1) and (2).
30
In their reply brief to the plaintiff’s memorandum of law in opposition
to their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argued that the
plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim pursuant to § 52-595 was not prop-
erly before the court because the plaintiff had failed to specially plead it.
See Mountaindale Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Zappone, 59 Conn. App.
311, 319 n.11, 757 A.2d 608 (‘‘[i]n order to raise a claim of fraudulent conceal-
ment, the party challenging a statute of limitations defense must affirmatively
plead it’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 947,
762 A.2d 903 (2000). The court did not address this argument in its decision.
The defendants on appeal did not present this issue as an alternative ground
for affirmance; see Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1); and, although they cursorily
raise this issue in their appellate brief, it is not adequately briefed. See Worth
v. Picard, 218 Conn. App. 549, 551 n.3, 292 A.3d 754 (2023) (‘‘[i]t is well
settled that our appellate courts are not obligated to consider issues that are
not adequately briefed’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly,
we deem this issue to be abandoned.
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limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony
under oath, disclosures, written admissions and other
supporting documents.’’ Practice Book § 17-46 provides
in relevant part: ‘‘Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. . . .’’ ‘‘Section
17-46 sets forth three requirements necessary to permit
the consideration of material contained in affidavits
submitted in a summary judgment proceeding. The
material must: (1) be based on personal knowledge; (2)
constitute facts that would be admissible at trial; and
(3) affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. . . . Affida-
vits that fail to meet the criteria of . . . § 17-46 are
defective and may not be considered to support the
judgment. Defects in affidavits include such things as
assertions of facts or conclusory statements.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Atlantic St.
Heritage Associates, LLC v. Atlantic Realty Co., 216
Conn. App. 530, 550, 285 A.3d 1128 (2022). ‘‘Personal
knowledge’’ is defined to mean ‘‘[k]nowledge gained
through firsthand observation or experience, as distin-
guished from a belief based on what someone else has
said.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (12th Ed. 2024) p. 1041.
Averments qualified by the clause ‘‘upon information
and belief’’ are not predicated upon personal knowl-
edge. See, e.g., Walker v. Housing Authority, 148 Conn.
App. 591, 599–600, 85 A.3d 1230 (2014) (averment pre-
ceded by phrase to ‘‘the best of my information and
belief’’ reflected lack of personal knowledge). We con-
strue these legal principles to apply with equal force
to Perezgrovas’ unsworn declaration.
A
We first consider the Citibank account. In her affida-
vit, Magallanes averred that she received notice from
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Citibank, which she identified as ‘‘iSell’s bank,’’ that the
plaintiff had served Citibank with a subpoena seeking
bank statements and other documents regarding IFG
and iSell. Appended to the affidavit was a copy of a
letter received by Citibank, dated June 3, 2019, with the
subpoena enclosed. In his unsworn declaration, citing
Magallanes’ affidavit, Perezgrovas stated that ‘‘iSell
apparently . . . had a bank account at Citibank . . .
yet no bank account at Citibank was disclosed or listed
in [the] bankruptcy petition.’’ (Citations omitted.) The
court concluded that, to the extent that such an account
existed, the plaintiff failed to submit evidence of an
account balance or the transfer of any funds from any
such account to the defendants, and, therefore, the evi-
dence concerning the Citibank account did not create
any genuine issues of material fact.
We agree with the court’s reasoning, which the plain-
tiff fails to address substantively in its appellate briefs.
Although there were evidentiary submissions in the
record reflecting that the Citibank account existed, the
plaintiff failed to submit any other evidence regarding
the account, including evidence of a transfer of funds
from the account. Without competent evidence of any
such transfer, the plaintiff could not demonstrate that
it later discovered a purported fraudulent transfer
involving the Citibank account for purposes of the one
year limitations period of § 52-552j (1) or the tolling
provisions of § 52-595. Accordingly, we conclude that
the evidence regarding the Citibank account did not
assist the plaintiff in sustaining its burden to establish
a genuine issue of material fact as to the defendants’
statute of limitations defenses.
B
We next address the used furniture. In an interroga-
tory response propounded by Magallanes on May 27,
2021, Magallanes stated that ‘‘CIMA had no assets at
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the time of its inception on October 30, 2015. CIMA
took over the used furniture abandoned by IFG and
then iSell, which the iSell bankruptcy trustee also aban-
doned. The fair market value of those furnishings was
less than $200.’’ In his unsworn declaration, Perezgrovas
stated that, ‘‘[i]n [the] bankruptcy petition, iSell repre-
sented that it had no office equipment, furnishings, or
supplies,’’ which contradicted Magallanes’ interroga-
tory response. The court concluded that the used furni-
ture was not a ‘‘material’’ asset, such that the plaintiff
could not rely on it to create a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact.

The plaintiff contests the court’s determination that
the assets it identified as having been fraudulently trans-
ferred, including the used furniture, had to be ‘‘material’’
in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
Assuming arguendo that the court’s ‘‘materiality’’ analy-
sis as to the used furniture was legally incorrect,31 we
conclude that the plaintiff’s claim fails, as a matter of
law, on a separate ground that, although not addressed
by the court, necessarily arises because the focus of
our examination is on whether the plaintiff sustained
its burden to demonstrate a genuine issue of material
fact as to the one year limitations period of § 52-552j
(1), as well as the tolling provisions of § 52-595. See
Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia,
LLC, 226 Conn. App. 583, 596–97, 319 A.3d 123 (‘‘[w]e
may affirm the judgment of the court if it reached the
right result, even if it did so for the wrong reason’’
31
The court also applied this ‘‘materiality’’ analysis in rejecting the plain-
tiff’s reliance on the other assets that it identified as having been fraudulently
transferred. The plaintiff challenges the propriety of the court’s analysis
globally. We need not address the validity of the court’s ‘‘materiality’’ analysis
because (1) as to the used furniture, we assume, without deciding, that the
court’s analysis was improper, and (2) as to the other assets, addressed in
parts II A and C of this opinion, we dispose of the plaintiff’s claims on
grounds that are not dependent on the court’s materiality analysis.
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(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 350
Conn. 905, 323 A.3d 344 (2024).
On the basis of Perezgrovas’ unsworn declaration
and Magallanes’ interrogatory response, the plaintiff
first discovered or reasonably could have discovered
the purported fraudulent transfer of the used furniture
on May 27, 2021, the date of Magallanes’ interrogatory
response. Pursuant to the one year limitations period
of § 52-552j (1), a claimant must assert a fraudulent
transfer cause of action ‘‘within one year after the trans-
fer . . . was or could reasonably have been discovered
by the claimant . . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-552j (1).
Applying the plain and unambiguous language of this
provision; see General Statutes § 1-2z (‘‘The meaning
of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained
from the text of the statute itself and its relationship
to other statutes. If, after examining such text and con-
sidering such relationship, the meaning of such text is
plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or
unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the mean-
ing of the statute shall not be considered.’’); to comply
with the one year limitations period of § 52-552j (1),
the plaintiff was required to bring a fraudulent transfer
claim predicated on the used furniture within one year
after May 27, 2021. The plaintiff commenced the present
action against the defendants and filed its operative
complaint in 2020, before the one year limitations period
of § 52-552j (1) began to run.
The same reasoning applies to § 52-595, which pro-
vides that a fraudulently concealed cause of action
‘‘shall be deemed to accrue . . . at the time when the
person entitled to sue thereon first discovers its exis-
tence.’’ General Statutes § 52-595. Applying the plain
and unambiguous language of the statute; see General
Statutes § 1-2z; a cause of action for a fraudulent trans-
fer on the basis of the used furniture accrued on May
27, 2021. The plaintiff initiated the present action
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against the defendants and filed its operative complaint
in 2020, before any such fraudulent transfer claim had
accrued.
In sum, whether applying the one year limitations
period of § 52-552j (1) or the tolling provisions of § 52-
595, no fraudulent transfer claim premised on the used
furniture could have been brought properly prior to May
27, 2021. The plaintiff commenced the present action
against the defendants and filed its operative complaint
in 2020; ergo, any fraudulent transfer claim predicated
on the used furniture fell outside of the applicable limi-
tations periods. Indeed, it would strain logic to conclude
that, for statute of limitations purposes, the plaintiff
raised a timely fraudulent transfer claim on the basis
of its discovery of an asset after it had asserted its
cause of action.32 Accordingly, we conclude that the
plaintiff did not demonstrate the existence of any genu-
ine issues of material fact vis-à-vis the defendants’ stat-
ute of limitations defenses on the basis of the used
furniture.
C
We next consider the services agreement. According
to Magallanes’ affidavit, the services agreement was
conveyed from IFG to iSell on August 15, 2014. Per
Perezgrovas’ unsworn declaration, ‘‘[u]pon information
and belief, at some point in time the services agreement
. . . was ultimately transferred to CIMA, which the
plaintiff only learned about in May of 2022 when the
defendants voluntarily disclosed that fact in the course
of this litigation.’’ The court concluded that Perezgro-
vas’ unsworn declaration did not constitute competent
evidence of a transfer of the services agreement to
32
To pursue a fraudulent transfer claim predicated on the used furniture,
the plaintiff, following its discovery of the used furniture, had to timely (1)
file an amended complaint in the present action or (2) commence a new
action. The plaintiff did neither.
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CIMA, such that no genuine issues of material fact arose
on the basis of the services agreement. As the court
explained: ‘‘[T]here is the competency-disqualifying
‘upon information and belief’ [clause]. Further, there is
no indication of the source of that purported informa-
tion—how it came to be known by [Perezgrovas]—and
no identified source for the claimed recent disclosure.
. . . Magallanes’ affidavit contains no such informa-
tion, and the interrogatory responses in the record also
do not seem to contain relevant information; did some
unidentified person tell [Perezgrovas] that there had
been an unidentified form of ‘disclosure’?’’

The plaintiff maintains on appeal that (1) the bank-
ruptcy petition did not disclose the services agreement
or its purported transfer to CIMA and (2) the plaintiff
did not discover the purported transfer of the services
agreement to CIMA until 2022. Additionally, the plaintiff
generally challenges the court’s determination that Per-
ezgrovas’ unsworn declaration was not competent evi-
dence.

We agree with the court that, insofar as it discussed
the services agreement, Perezgrovas’ unsworn declara-
tion did not constitute competent evidence of any fraud-
ulent transfer. With respect to the services agreement,
Perezgrovas’ statements were qualified by the phrase,
‘‘[u]pon information and belief,’’ which, as the court
repeatedly iterated in its decision, effectively negated
any personal knowledge. Without competent evidence
of a fraudulent transfer of the services agreement to
CIMA, the plaintiff could not meet its burden to demon-
strate a later discovery of any such transfer in accor-
dance with the one year limitations period of § 52-552j
(1) or the tolling provisions of § 52-595. Accordingly,
we conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish any
genuine issues of material fact as to the defendants’
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statute of limitations defenses predicated on its eviden-
tiary submissions regarding the services agreement.33
D
Finally, the plaintiff relies on Perezgrovas’ unsworn
declaration to argue that it was unaware of any pur-
ported fraudulent transfers or concealment of assets
until 2020, when a private investigator hired by its attor-
neys discovered that Magallanes had formed CIMA. Per-
ezgrovas stated in relevant part: ‘‘It was [the private
investigator’s] investigation that revealed to [the plain-
tiff] in 2020 that Magallanes had formed now a second
successor entity, CIMA, to continue the business of IFG
and iSell. It was at this time [that the plaintiff] learned
that CIMA was conducting much of the same business
as iSell and IFG as a food broker, was owned by Magalla-
nes, maintained the same business address as iSell and
IFG, and maintained many of the same business rela-
tionships iSell and IFG once had. [The plaintiff] filed
suit within months after discovering this information.’’
Perezgrovas further stated: ‘‘Upon information and
belief CIMA performs the same business as iSell and
is a successor in interest to iSell that was formed for
the purpose of continuing in business while avoiding
the [District Court] judgment.’’ The court rejected the
plaintiff’s reliance on Perezgrovas’ unsworn declaration
insofar as it addressed CIMA’s formation and business
operations, stating in relevant part that (1) Perezgrovas
33
Additionally, the plaintiff’s claim fails pursuant to the rationale applica-
ble to the used furniture set forth in part II B of this opinion. In his unsworn
declaration, Perezgrovas stated that the plaintiff did not discover the pur-
ported fraudulent transfer of the services agreement to CIMA until May,
2022. Accordingly, pursuant either to the one year limitations period of § 52-
552j (1) or the tolling provisions of § 52-595, a fraudulent transfer claim
predicated on the services agreement could not be properly brought before
the putative date of discovery in May, 2022, setting aside the lack of a
specific date in the record. The plaintiff commenced the present action
against the defendants and filed its operative complaint in 2020, well before
its purported discovery of the services agreement in May, 2022.
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did not set forth a foundation for his knowledge con-
cerning the nature and the operation of CIMA’s busi-
ness, and, in any event, (2) there was no apparent trans-
fer of assets implicated by CIMA’s formation.
The plaintiff contends that ‘‘it is reasonable to con-
clude that iSell intentionally only listed one asset [in
the bankruptcy petition] in order to conceal the transfer
of assets and [the] continuation of business under newly
formed CIMA.’’ As noted in part II C of this opinion,
the plaintiff also generally challenges the court’s deter-
mination that Perezgrovas’ unsworn declaration was
not competent evidence.
We agree with the court’s analysis. First, beyond iden-
tifying himself as the plaintiff’s export director, Perez-
grovas did not adequately detail how he was capable
of discussing CIMA’s business operations. Indeed, Per-
ezgrovas stated that his knowledge about CIMA was
predicated ‘‘[u]pon information and belief,’’ ostensibly
including information gleaned from the private investi-
gator. This was insufficient to establish the personal
knowledge necessary for his unsworn declaration to be
deemed competent evidence in this regard.
Second, at best, Perezgrovas’ statements in his
unsworn declaration concerning CIMA relied on specu-
lation and conjecture to indicate the existence of fraud-
ulent transfers, such that they did not aid the plaintiff
in sustaining its burden.34 See Forestier v. Bridgeport,
223 Conn. App. 298, 332, 308 A.3d 102 (2024) (‘‘Although
the court must view the inferences to be drawn from
34
In her affidavit, Magallanes averred that ‘‘CIMA is a food broker, repre-
senting emerging food brands into the Hispanic market and also offer[ing]
business consulting and trade marketing agency to Hispanic food brand
companies. . . . I have built this business based on my strong relationships
with the Hispanic food brand companies. Without me personally, there is
no business for CIMA.’’ These averments do not advance the plaintiff’s
proposition that CIMA’s formation and business operations evidenced fraud-
ulent transfers.
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the facts in the light most favorable to the party oppos-
ing the motion . . . a party may not rely on mere specu-
lation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts
to overcome a motion for summary judgment. . . . A
party opposing a motion for summary judgment must
substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is
a genuine issue of material fact together with the evi-
dence disclosing the existence of such an issue.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.)). For these reasons, we
conclude that the plaintiff did not prove the existence of
genuine issues of material fact vis-à-vis the defendants’
statute of limitations defenses predicated on its eviden-
tiary submission regarding CIMA’s formation and busi-
ness operations.
In sum, we conclude that the court (1) properly deter-
mined that the defendants satisfied their initial burden
to demonstrate no genuine issues of material fact that
the plaintiff’s fraudulent transfer claims were brought
outside of the applicable limitations periods of § 52-
552j and, therefore, as a matter of law, time barred, and
(2) after shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff,
properly determined that the plaintiff failed to establish
any genuine issues of material fact avoiding the applica-
tion of § 52-552j. Accordingly, we further conclude that
the court properly granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to counts two through five of
the operative complaint.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.