In re S. G.

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In re S. G.

IN RE S. G. ET AL.*
(AC 47745)
Seeley, Westbrook and Palmer, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed from the trial court’s judgments rendered
for the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating
her parental rights with respect to her minor children. The mother claimed,
inter alia, that the court improperly determined that she had failed to achieve
a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of the
statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)). Held:

The trial court’s determination that the respondent mother failed to achieve
the degree of personal rehabilitation required by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)
was supported by sufficient evidence in the record.

The trial court’s finding that the termination of the respondent mother’s
parental rights was in the best interests of the children was not clearly
erroneous, as there was sufficient evidence in the record to support that
determination, even given the existence of a bond between the mother and
the children.

Argued November 12—officially released December 24, 2024**

Procedural History

Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Litchfield, Juvenile Mat-
ters, and transferred to the judicial district of New Lon-
don, Juvenile Matters at Waterford, where the cases
were tried to the court, Hoffman, J.; judgments termi-
nating the respondents’ parental rights, from which the
respondent mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** December 24, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re S. G.

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent mother).
Monica O’Connell, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, and Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The respondent mother,1 Elizabeth G.,
appeals from the judgments of the trial court rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families (commissioner), terminating her parental
rights with respect to her minor children, M and S (col-
lectively, children). On appeal, the respondent claims
that the court erred when it determined that (1) she
had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal
rehabilitation within the meaning of General Statutes
§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), and (2) termination of her paren-
tal rights was in the children’s best interests.2 We dis-
agree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the
court.
The following relevant facts, which the court found
by clear and convincing evidence, and procedural his-
tory are relevant to this appeal. M was born in May,
2017, and S in August, 2019. The respondent and the
children’s father, Christopher G. (father), ‘‘have been
involved with [the Department of Children and Families
1
Christopher G., the father of the minor children, is not involved in this
appeal. The trial court found that Christopher G. ‘‘had not sufficiently rehabil-
itated . . . to the extent [he] could assume a responsible position in [the
children’s] lives in view of their ages and needs, or within a reasonable
period of time thereafter’’ and that ‘‘termination of [his] parental rights’’ is
in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, the court terminated his
parental rights as to both children. He has not appealed from that judgment.
Our references in this opinion to the respondent are to the mother only.
2
The attorney for the minor children filed a statement adopting the brief
filed by the commissioner.
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In re S. G.

(department)] since 2019. The first [report to the depart-
ment] was made on August 26, 2019, following the birth
of [S] . . . . It was noted [that the respondent] illicitly
used Percocet and codeine and [that, after S was born,
the child] spent nine days in [the neonatal intensive
care unit] with withdrawal symptoms.’’ S was born pre-
maturely and addicted to opioids, which was found to
correlate with the respondent’s substance use during
her pregnancy. The department’s investigation revealed
that the father was aware of the respondent’s substance
use during her pregnancy. Thereafter, the commissioner
filed neglect petitions on October 3, 2019, and the chil-
dren were placed under an order of protective supervi-
sion from February 5, 2020, until September 2, 2020.
‘‘The second [report to the department] was made
. . . on October 27, 2020, [when it] received a Careline3
report from the Root Center [for Advanced Recovery
(Root Center)] after [the respondent] self disclosed
[that] she was actively using fentanyl at night while
the children were sleeping.’’ (Footnote added.) A third
report to the department was made by the Winchester
Police Department (police department) on January 17,
2021, after the respondent and the father ‘‘were found
disoriented in the home’’ on January 14, 2021, when
police officers had gone to the family’s home in
response to a call for medical assistance that the respon-
dent had placed regarding the father. Upon arriving at
the home, the police found the father in a disoriented
state, and the respondent ‘‘told the police that the father
had done ‘a bag of stuff in the bedroom.’ ’’ The father
was hospitalized with a suspected overdose and, the
next day, the respondent turned a bag of fentanyl over
to the police, stating that she believed it was what the
‘‘Careline is a department telephone service that mandatory reporters
3

and others may call to report suspected child abuse or neglect.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Niya B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 478 n.7, 308
A.3d 604, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024).
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father had ingested the day before. Two days later, the
respondent ‘‘reported to [the police department that]
the father was at the hospital for a couple of hours and
there were high levels of arsenic in his system.’’ That
same day, she also turned additional bags of a powdery
substance over to the police department. The father
admitted to the respondent that he had used heroin
on January 14, 2021, and the police reported that the
children were in the home on that day, at the time the
father was suspected to have overdosed.4 This resulted
in the department entering into a safety plan with the
respondent and the father on January 19, 2021, which
required that the father not be left unsupervised with the
children and that the respondent supervise all contact
between the children and the father pending the fulfill-
ment of certain releases of records from her treatment
providers to the department.
Shortly afterward, on February 2, 2021, the depart-
ment was notified by the police that, on January 27,
2021, the police department had ‘‘received two separate
calls [regarding] the family. The first call was from the
father, who indicated [that] there was a dispute with
the [family’s] landlord over rent due, and [the] second
call was from a concerned citizen [reporting] that [the
respondent] was asleep in a car in [the] parking lot of
[a] laundromat and [was later] seen driving erratically.
The police arrived at the home, and the father was
[found] alone with the children in violation of the safety
plan.’’ Thereafter, on February 3, 2021, the commis-
sioner filed neglect petitions and sought orders of tem-
porary custody, all of which were granted by the court.
Also on February 3, 2021, the court ordered preliminary
specific steps for the respondent to facilitate her
reunion with the children.5
4
Toxicology screening of the father indicated that there was no arsenic
present in the father’s system on January 14, 2021, but that he tested positive
for fentanyl and heroin on that day.
5
The preliminary specific steps required the respondent, inter alia, to
keep all appointments set by or with the department; to cooperate with the
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On July 14, 2021, the court adjudicated the children
neglected, committed them to the care and custody of
the commissioner, and ordered final specific steps for
the respondent.6 Approximately one year later, on July
29, 2022, the commissioner filed petitions to terminate
the parental rights of both the respondent and the father
as to each child. With respect to the respondent, the
termination petitions alleged, inter alia, that, pursuant
to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), the children previously had
been adjudicated neglected and the respondent had
failed to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation as
would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable
period of time, given the ages and needs of the children,
she could assume a responsible position in their lives.
The termination of parental rights trial concerning
both petitions was held on July 17 and 21 and December
4, 2023, and March 14, 2024. During the trial, counsel for
department’s home visits; to let the department know where she and the
children are at all times; to take part in counseling and make progress toward
both parenting and individual treatment goals; to submit to a substance
abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about treatment, includ-
ing inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention; to
submit to random drug testing; not to use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or
medicine; to cooperate with service providers recommended for counseling,
in home support services, and substance abuse assessment and treatment;
to cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing; to sign, within thirty
days, releases allowing the department to communicate with service provid-
ers to check on her attendance, cooperation, and progress toward identified
goals, and for use in future court proceedings; to get and/or maintain ade-
quate housing and a legal income; immediately to let the department know
about any changes in the makeup of the household; to get and/or cooperate
with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan to
avoid more domestic violence incidents; not to get involved with the criminal
justice system; to cooperate with the children’s therapy; to visit the children
as often as the department permits and demonstrate appropriate parent/
child interactions during visits; to inform the department, within thirty days,
of information concerning any person whom she would like the department
to consider as a placement resource for the children; and to tell the depart-
ment the names and addresses of the children’s grandparents.
6
The final specific steps were identical to the preliminary specific steps.
See footnote 5 of this opinion.
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In re S. G.

the commissioner presented testimony from Shannon
Hedden, a clinician at Healing Hoofbeats who had
worked with the children; Kelly McGinley-Hurley, a
department services coordinator assigned to the case;
Larissa Turner, a department social worker assigned to
the case; Stephen Humphrey, an expert in clinical and
forensic psychology who had completed a court-
ordered evaluation of the respondent, the father and
the children; and Sarah Laisi Lavoie, a visitation supervi-
sor at Connecticut Family Support Services who had
supervised visitation sessions between the respondent,
the father and the children.7 The father did not testify,
and his counsel presented testimony from Araly
Espinal, a visitation coach at Quality Parenting Center
who had worked with the family, and the father’s
mother. The respondent did not testify or present testi-
mony from any witnesses.

At trial, the evidence presented detailed the respon-
dent’s history of substance use, her unstable housing
and employment, the children’s needs, and the respon-
dent’s relationship with the children and can be summa-
rized as follows. Regarding the children’s needs and
their relationship with the respondent, Hedden testified
that the children referred to the respondent as ‘‘Liz,’’
that the children’s foster parents are attentive to their
emotional needs, that ‘‘[the children] struggle with
knowing what attachment is,’’ and that ‘‘the foster par-
ents are giving them a structured place where they can
feel like a child and start to kind of develop into their
own individual personalities without having to feel like
it’s going to get pulled away from them again.’’ Hedden
further testified that the children ‘‘need that stability
and structure [a]nd . . . the foster parents can provide
that for them.’’
7
Turner also was called as a witness by the attorney for the minor children,
who did not present testimony from any other witnesses.
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In re S. G.

Laisi Lavoie testified that the children were happy to
see the respondent during most visits and had a ‘‘play-
ful’’ relationship with her but that there were frequent
concerns about the respondent’s ability to comply with
the rules for visits, such as those requiring the respon-
dent not to whisper or give candy to the children. Simi-
larly, Espinal testified that the respondent never missed
a visit, that the children were happy to see the respon-
dent at visits, that the respondent came prepared for
the visits and that the respondent kept the children
fully engaged at visits; however, she also indicated that
the respondent had issues complying with program
rules. For example, Espinal stated that during one visit,
the respondent applied makeup to M and removed an
eyepatch that S was wearing, despite being instructed
not to do so.
As to the respondent’s substance use history, McGin-
ley-Hurley testified that the respondent has a ‘‘history
of misuse of opiates and fentanyl dat[ing] back to her
[being] an early teenager,’’ that she had observed ‘‘a
pattern of inconsistent treatment engagement with . . .
respect to [the respondent],’’ and that the respondent
was ‘‘actively testing positive for illicit substances . . .
from March of 2022 . . . through the end of March,
2023, at the Root Center.’’ With respect to visits with
the children, she testified that the respondent brought
items from her home despite being given instructions
to the contrary because of the risk that the items might
be contaminated with fentanyl. She also testified that
confronting the respondent about this ‘‘would lead to
a verbally aggressive outburst’’ by the respondent.
Turner testified that the respondent had been subject
to two evictions, refused a hair test in April, 2023, was
not employed, and had rescinded ‘‘any active releases
. . . that would allow [the department] to reach out to
[the respondent’s] service providers.’’ Lastly, Humphrey
testified that he diagnosed the respondent with ‘‘opiate
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In re S. G.

use disorder, severe’’ based on her ‘‘chronic use of sub-
stances . . . over several decades,’’ and, if not for
those issues, ‘‘there likely would not be [a] substantial
child protection concern.’’ In his court-ordered psycho-
logical evaluation, which was admitted into evidence,
Humphrey explained that, although the respondent has
a positive relationship with her children and, if clean
and sober, she would have the capacity to understand
and meet the children’s needs, given the severity of her
substance use problems, the children should remain
in foster care. He concluded in his report that before
reunification could take place, the respondent would
have to, inter alia, ‘‘remain engaged in outpatient sub-
stance abuse treatment [and] continue to test negative
for illicit substances or unprescribed medications,’’
both of which she has failed to do.
On April 22, 2024, the court issued a memorandum
of decision in which it terminated the respondent’s and
the father’s parental rights with respect to the children.8
8
We note that ‘‘ ‘[p]roceedings to terminate parental rights are governed
by § 17a-112. . . . Because a respondent’s fundamental right to parent his
or her child is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must be strictly complied
with before termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings
begun.’ . . . Section 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part that ‘[t]he Superior
Court, upon notice and hearing . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to
this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the [d]epart-
ment . . . has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify
the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-
111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or
unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is
not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section
17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not
required, (2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . .
(B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been
neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent
of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return
of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to
achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child,
such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child
. . . .’ ’’ (Citation omitted.) In re Niya B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 487–88, 308
A.3d 604, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024).
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In re S. G.

After setting forth the procedural history and making
the relevant jurisdictional findings, the court stated that
it ‘‘ha[d] carefully considered the termination of paren-
tal rights petitions, the criteria set forth in the relevant
General Statutes, the applicable case law, as well as all
the evidence and testimony presented, the demeanor
and credibility of the witnesses, the evidence, and the
arguments of counsel according to the standards of
law.’’ In addition, the court took ‘‘judicial notice of the
entire record of the prior nondelinquency proceedings,
including pleadings, petitions, social studies, status
reports, evaluations, court memoranda and specific
steps, as well as the dates and contents of the court’s
findings, orders, ruling and judgments.’’ The court made
its findings regarding the petitions for termination of
parental rights ‘‘by clear and convincing evidence.’’ Spe-
cifically, the court found by clear and convincing evi-
dence that (1) the department had made reasonable
efforts to locate the respondent and to reunify the
respondent with her children and, further, that the
respondent was unable and unwilling to benefit from
the reunification efforts, (2) the commissioner estab-
lished that a statutory ground for termination exists,
namely, that the respondent had failed to achieve a
sufficient level of personal rehabilitation as required by
§ 17a-112 (j) (3), and (3) termination of the respondent’s
parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
This appeal followed.
‘‘Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights
consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase.
During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one
or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in
§ 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. . . . If the trial
court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it
proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial
court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the
child. . . . The best interest determination also must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 476 n.5.
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In this appeal, the respondent challenges the court’s
finding concerning the statutory ground of failure to
rehabilitate within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) and
its best interests finding. We now address each claim
in turn.9
I
The respondent first claims that, during the adjudica-
tory phase, the court improperly determined that she
9
Even though the respondent’s appellate brief contains those two issues
in the statement of issues and is organized as addressing those two issues
only, in her brief she makes several references to the efforts the department
made at reunification while arguing that the court erred in finding that she
failed to rehabilitate. To the extent that those references as well as certain
statements by the respondent’s counsel at oral argument before this court
can be construed as a challenge to the court’s finding that the department
made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with the children, we
conclude that such a claim is inadequately briefed and, therefore, decline
to review it. See State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868 (2016)
(‘‘Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid
abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this
court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal
. . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Moreover,
even if this court were to review the claim, it would dismiss it as moot
because the respondent failed to challenge the court’s determination that
she was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s reunification
efforts. See In re Autumn O., 218 Conn. App. 424, 432–33, 292 A.3d 66
(‘‘[T]he department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts
to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit
from reunification efforts. . . . Because either finding, standing alone, pro-
vides an independent basis for satisfying § 17a-112 (j) (1) . . . in cases in
which the trial court concludes that both findings have been proven, a
respondent on appeal must demonstrate that both determinations are
improper. If the respondent fails to challenge either one of those independent
alternative bases . . . the trial court’s ultimate determination that the
requirements of § 17a-112 (j) (1) were satisfied remains unchallenged and
intact. . . . In such instances, the appeal is moot, as resolution of a respon-
dent’s claim of error in her favor could not [afford] her any practical relief.’’
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 346
Conn. 1025, 294 A.3d 1026 (2023); see also In re A’vion A., 217 Conn. App.
330, 353–58, 288 A.3d 231 (2023) (dismissing as moot portion of appeal
challenging court’s finding that department made reasonable efforts to
reunify respondent with children when respondent did not also challenge
court’s alternative finding that respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit
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In re S. G.

had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal
rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3)
(B) (i). Specifically, the respondent argues that the
court erred in reaching this determination because she
‘‘has continued to try and address her substance abuse
issues [and] [w]hile . . . still engaged in addressing
those issues, she has consistently maintained her visita-
tion and her relationship with her children and has
demonstrated the ability during visits to engage in
appropriate activities and boundary setting and, more
importantly, [has] demonstrat[ed] love and affection for
her children.’’ We are not persuaded.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. The respon-
dent reported that she started to abuse pain medication
around the time she was in the twelfth grade, that her
‘‘drug of choice’’ was pills, which later led to her use
of heroin, and that she has been addicted to narcotics
since she was eighteen. A toxicology screen of the
respondent revealed that, on January 14, 2021, the date
that the father overdosed while at home with the chil-
dren, she tested positive for cocaine and fentanyl.
Between the date that the children were removed from
the respondent’s custody—February 3, 2021—to the
date that the court rendered its judgments terminating
her parental rights—April 22, 2024—the department
referred the respondent to a number of services, includ-
ing for parenting, substance abuse and mental health
treatment.
In its memorandum of decision, the court summa-
rized the respondent’s engagement with the services
referred to her, stating: ‘‘[The respondent] did not
engage in mental health treatment from the onset of
from reunification efforts, as ‘‘either finding, standing alone, provides an
independent basis for satisfying § 17a-112 (j) (1)’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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this case until July 8, 2021. [The respondent] attended
mental health treatment at Tides of Mind [Counseling]
from July 8, 2021, until September 30, 2021. [The respon-
dent] discontinued treatment with Tides of Mind [Coun-
seling] upon entry into inpatient treatment. [The respon-
dent] has not engaged in mental health treatment since
September, 2021. [The respondent] reported to [the
department] that she was in therapy at the Connecticut
Counseling Center, but [the department] could not con-
firm due to [the respondent’s] failure to sign releases
of information.

‘‘As to substance abuse treatment, [the respondent]
was engaged with the Root Center from the onset of
this case until April, 2021, [when the respondent] self
discharged . . . and it was recommended [that] she
engage in outpatient services. [The respondent] report-
edly attended an intake with Lisa Haut, however, infor-
mation from that appointment was not available
because [the respondent] did not sign a release of infor-
mation. [The respondent] self-reported [that] she did
not engage in any services with [Haut]. As a result of
the lack of toxicology screens and continued concerns
regarding parental insight into her substance abuse,
the department facilitated a Regional Resource Group
Consultation on September 20, 2021. On September 27,
2021, a referral was made to Screening and Brief Inter-
vention Referral to Treatment (SBIRT). [The respon-
dent] did not cooperate with the referral. As a result
of [the respondent’s] noncompliance to submit to [toxi-
cology] screens it was recommended that [she] submit
to a hair test. [The respondent] did not comply with
the request. On October 20, 2021, [the respondent] was
admitted [as an] inpatient at the Stonington Institute
[but] . . . was [discharged] on October 24, 2021. In
November, [2021], the department recommended [that
the respondent] reengage in substance abuse treatment
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In re S. G.

and begin an [intensive outpatient program] at [the Mid-
western Connecticut Council of Alcoholism]. [The
respondent] did not comply. [The respondent] said she
engaged in [an intensive outpatient program], but the
department was unable to verify this because [the
respondent] did not sign a release of information. In
March of 2022, [the respondent] indicated [that] she
reengaged in [services at the Root Center] but revoked
her releases on June 17, 2022. [The respondent] then
reinstated her releases and her last [toxicology] screen
on July 5, 2022, tested positive for fentanyl and opiates.
The department met with [Root Center staff] on July
15, 2022, and, on August 19, 2022, it was reported [that
the respondent’s] attendance had been consistent and
she had not missed any medication dates; however, [the
respondent] continued to test positive for opiates and
fentanyl.
‘‘[The respondent] . . . submitted to the court-
ordered evaluation with [Humphrey] on March 22 and
29, 2022. [Humphrey] opined that the primary child
protection concern was [the respondent’s] . . . opioid
use disorder but [that] there was potential for rehabilita-
tion in a time frame conducive to reunification. As a
result of the evaluation, it was recommended [that the
respondent] . . . comply with a hair test every ninety
days, engage in treatment for six months, demonstrate
abstinence from substances, regularly visit with the
children and refrain from acts that would form the basis
for an arrest, [so] then efforts for reunification might
begin. [The respondent] was referred for a hair test on
July 19, 2022, [however, she] did not submit to the test
until July 26, 2022. The hair test reflected a positive
result for fentanyl. [The respondent] did not comply
with any subsequent requests for a hair test.
‘‘The Root Center’s September, 2022 report noted that
[the respondent] was unsuccessfully discharged from
intensive outpatient treatment on August 11, 2022, as
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[she] discontinued treatment on her own. [The respon-
dent’s] [toxicology] screen [from] August 8, 2022, tested
positive for opiates and fentanyl and her [toxicology]
screen [from] September 1, 2022, was positive for fen-
tanyl and norfentanyl. The Root Center’s October, 2022
report noted [that the respondent] again restricted her
releases and . . . [that she] was discharged . . .
[because she] discontinued treatment. [The respon-
dent] was [again referred] for [an intensive outpatient
program] on September 29, 2022; however, she did not
reengage. The department had trouble obtaining
updates in November and December, 2022, due to the
lack of releases signed by [the respondent].
‘‘In January, 2023, it was reported [that the respon-
dent] had been [taking a daily dose of] methadone but
[a urine sample collected from her on November 4,
2022], tested positive for marijuana, opiates, fentanyl
and heroin. [The respondent] attended an intake for
[an intensive outpatient program] on December 27,
2022, but did not attend any sessions. The February,
[2023] update from the Root [Center] indicated [that
the respondent had been] unsuccessfully discharged
for lack of attendance. [A urine sample collected from
the respondent] on January 25, 2023, was positive for
fentanyl and heroin. In June, 2023, the department
attempted to get an update from the Root Center and
was informed [that the respondent had] revoked her
release [earlier in the month] and was no longer engaged
with the Root Center. It was later learned that [the
respondent] had been unsuccessfully discharged from
intensive outpatient treatment at the Root Center in
January, 2023. [The respondent] did not reengage in
the recommended treatment. In March, 2023, [a urine
sample collected from the respondent] tested positive
for methadone and norfentanyl. [The respondent’s toxi-
cology] screens [from] April and May, [2023], were posi-
tive for methadone only. On June 29, 2023, the father
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informed [the department] that he and [the respondent]
stop[ped] engaging [with] the Root Center in June, 2023,
and . . . stated: ‘[The respondent and I] took the next
step in [our] sobriety and shed the medication crutch.’
‘‘[The respondent] . . . [has] not [been] referred to
the . . . Family Time Program since June of 2021 due
to [her] lack of progress in services and [her] active
substance use. [The respondent] . . . [was] referred to
parenting services and supervised visitation [at the]
Quality Parenting Center on February 9, 2023. It is noted
[that the respondent] . . . [came] prepared for the vis-
its; however, there [were] concerns with [the respon-
dent’s] . . . ability to adhere to the [program’s] rules
and expectations. Of note is that on March 20, 2023,
[the respondent] was asked several times not to remove
[S’s] eyepatch, which [he] is required to wear, but [the
respondent] continued to remove it. During another
visit that took place with [the Quality Parenting Center]
on June 22, 2023, it was reported [that the respondent]
presented as ‘rude’ throughout the visit . . . [Quality
Parenting Center staff] observed many cuts and bruises
on [her] hands, and the visit ended early because [the
respondent] did not feel well. As of July 6, 2023, [the
respondent] had outstanding criminal charges for [two
separate counts of larceny in the sixth degree, one count
of larceny in the third degree, and one count of] stealing
a firearm.’’
In adjudicating whether the respondent had failed to
achieve sufficient rehabilitation within the meaning of
§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), the court set forth the relevant
legal standard and then summarized the results of the
respondent’s efforts to rehabilitate, stating: ‘‘[The
respondent] has a history with [the department] dating
back to 2019. [The respondent] has a long history of
substance abuse dating back to her early teenage
years. . . .
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‘‘As to personal rehabilitation, as noted in detail
above, [the respondent] has failed to participate or
make progress in any [of the] recommended services.
Despite multiple referrals and attempts to engage [the
respondent] in treatment, to address her substance use,
mental health, and parenting, she has not followed
through with recommended services. [The respondent]
has continued to show limited insight into her children’s
needs. . . .
‘‘There is no better example of the unfortunate conse-
quences of [the respondent’s] failure to stay sober than
her failure to comply with the recommendations of the
court-ordered psychological evaluation. The evaluation
indicated that if [the respondent] was able to demon-
strate [that] she had remained drug free and was
attending substance abuse treatment for a period [of]
six months, reunification would be a viable option. . . .
[The respondent] continues to show little insight into
how her substance abuse impacts her ability to provide
a safe and stable environment for her children. . . .
As to parenting, it appears [the respondent] . . . [has]
engaged in parenting services and [has] regularly
attended the scheduled visitation. [However, concerns
remain] that [the respondent] . . . continue[s] to have
limited insight into the problems that led to the removal
of the children. . . .
‘‘[The respondent] . . . [is] unable to parent [the
children] and serve as their [caretaker]. [She] [is] unable
to meet the developmental, emotional, educational and
medical and moral needs of [the] children. [She] cannot
provide for the shelter, nurturance, safety and security
of the children. . . . [The respondent does not have]
stability in [her] own [life] to enable [her] to care for
[the children]. . . . [The respondent] has [not] made
significant progress toward personal rehabilitation and
clearly cannot assume a responsible position in [the
children’s] lives considering their ages and needs.’’
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(Citation omitted.) Thus, the court found that the ‘‘evi-
dence clearly and convincingly establishes’’ that the
commissioner ‘‘met [her] burden of proof [of establish-
ing] that [the respondent] . . . [has] failed to rehabili-
tate in that, given the ages and needs of [the children]
[she] cannot assume a responsible position in [the chil-
dren’s lives] within a reasonable period of time [as]
[she] continue[s] to fail to demonstrate the ability to
rehabilitate despite being offered ongoing services.’’
In making this finding, the court emphasized that its
‘‘paramount consideration . . . is the issue of stability
and permanency for [the children]. . . . [The chil-
dren’s] need for permanence far outweighs any remote
chance that [the respondent] . . . may rehabilitate in
the far distant future. . . . [The children] cannot afford
to wait for [the respondent] to rehabilitate. . . .
‘‘[The department] has provided compelling evidence
that [the children] need permanency and stability now.10
. . . Thus, the evidence clearly and convincingly estab-
lishes that as of the end of the trial of this matter,
[the respondent] . . . had not sufficiently rehabilitated
[herself] to the extent [she] could assume a responsible
position in [the children’s] lives in view of their ages and
needs, or within a reasonable period of time thereafter.’’
(Citation omitted; footnote added.)
We next set forth the relevant standard of review and
legal principles. ‘‘Failure to achieve a sufficient degree
10
In addition to the previously discussed testimony of Hedden on this
subject, social studies conducted by the department were also admitted
into evidence. In an addendum to one of those social studies, dated June
29, 2023, the social worker concluded that ‘‘[the respondent was] unable to
provide a safe, nurturing home environment free of substance use for [the]
. . . children,’’ that ‘‘[M] and [S] are in need of a permanent and stable
living arrangement in order to grow and develop in a healthy manner,’’ and
that, after approximately two years in the commissioner’s custody, ‘‘[t]o
allow additional time for [the respondent] to rehabilitate is contrary to the
best interests of the children and their need for permanency.’’
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of personal rehabilitation is one of the seven statutory
grounds on which parental rights may be terminated
under § 17a-112 (j) (3). Section 17a-112 (j) permits a
court to grant a petition to terminate parental rights ‘if
it finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . (3)
. . . (B) the child [(i)] has been found by the Superior
Court . . . to have been neglected . . . in a prior pro-
ceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been
provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return
of the child to the parent . . . and has failed to achieve
such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encour-
age the belief that within a reasonable time, considering
the age and needs of the child, such parent could
assume a responsible position in the life of the child
. . . .’ ’’ In re A’vion A., 217 Conn. App. 330, 347, 288
A.3d 231 (2023).
‘‘The trial court is required, pursuant to § 17a-112, to
analyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as it relates
to the needs of the particular child, and further . . .
such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reason-
able time. . . . The statute does not require [a parent]
to prove precisely when [he or she] will be able to
assume a responsible position in [his or her] child’s life.
Nor does it require [him or her] to prove that [he or
she] will be able to assume full responsibility for [his
or her] child, unaided by available support systems.
It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he or she]
has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would
reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date
[he or she] can assume a responsible position in [his
or her] child’s life. . . . Personal rehabilitation as used
in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)] refers to the restoration of
a parent to his or her former constructive and useful
role as a parent. . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the
critical issue is not whether the parent has improved
[his or her] ability to manage [his or her] own life, but
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rather whether [he or she] has gained the ability to care
for the particular needs of the child at issue. . . .
‘‘During the adjudicatory phase of a termination pro-
ceeding, a court generally is limited to considering only
evidence that occurred before the date of the filing of
the petition or the latest amendment to the petition,
often referred to as the adjudicatory date. . . . Never-
theless, it may rely on events occurring after the [adjudi-
catory] date . . . [in] considering the issue of whether
the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that
the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life
within a reasonable time. . . .
‘‘A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from
both the trial court’s factual findings and from its
weighing of the facts in assessing whether those find-
ings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in
§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly . . . the appropriate
standard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency,
that is, whether the trial court could have reasonably
concluded, upon the facts established and the reason-
able inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative
effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ulti-
mate conclusion]. . . . When applying this standard,
we construe the evidence in a manner most favorable
to sustaining the judgment of the trial court. . . . We
will not disturb the court’s subordinate factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . Thus, [i]t is not
the function of this court to sit as the [fact finder] when
we review the sufficiency of the evidence . . . . In
making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given
the most favorable construction in support of the [judg-
ment] of which it is reasonably capable. . . . In other
words, [i]f the [trial court] could reasonably have
reached its conclusion, the [judgment] must stand, even
if this court disagrees with it.’’ (Citations omitted; foot-
note omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
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Niya B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 488–90, 308 A.3d 604, cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024).
In the present case, the respondent has not chal-
lenged the court’s subordinate factual findings as being
clearly erroneous. Instead, she points to the evidence
of her interactions with her children and argues that it
‘‘undermines confidence in the trial court’s conclusions
and decision.’’ Because the respondent has not chal-
lenged any of the court’s factual findings in support
of its determination that she had failed to rehabilitate
within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B), we limit
our review to whether the record contains sufficient
evidence from which the trial court reasonably could
have concluded, upon the facts established and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the
respondent failed to rehabilitate. See In re Autumn O.,
218 Conn. App. 424, 434, 292 A.3d 66 (‘‘[w]e review the
trial court’s subordinate factual findings for clear error,
and review its finding that the respondent failed to
rehabilitate for evidentiary sufficiency’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1025, 294
A.3d 1026 (2023).
Moreover, ‘‘[i]t is well established that a respondent’s
failure to acknowledge the underlying personal issues
that form the basis for the department’s concerns indi-
cates a failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal
rehabilitation. See In re Kamora W., 132 Conn. App.
179, 190, 31 A.3d 398 (2011) (respondent refused to
acknowledge drug or alcohol problem); In re Jocquyce
C., 124 Conn. App. 619, 626–27, 5 A.3d 575 (2010)
(respondent failed to acknowledge habitual involve-
ment with domestic violence); In re Christopher B., 117
Conn. App. 773, 784, 980 A.2d 961 (2009) (respondent
blamed others for problems); In re Jermaine S., 86
Conn. App. 819, 834, 863 A.2d 720 (respondent’s inability
to admit she had substance abuse problem thwarted
her ability to achieve rehabilitation), cert. denied, 273
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Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005); In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.
App. 470, 481, 771 A.2d 244 (2001) (respondent failed
to recognize her need for recommended counseling).
. . . [A]s a general proposition, the failure to acknowl-
edge and make progress in addressing the issues that
led to a child’s removal may be one of many contributing
factors to a court’s determination that a parent has
failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabili-
tation.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Niya B., supra, 223 Conn. App. 491–92;
see also In re Nevaeh G.-M., 217 Conn. App. 854, 877,
290 A.3d 867 (‘‘[i]n determining whether a parent has
achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may
consider whether the parent has corrected the factors
that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether
those factors were included in specific expectations
ordered by the court or imposed by the department’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 346
Conn. 925, 295 A.3d 418 (2023); In re Janazia S., 112
Conn. App. 69, 95, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009) (‘‘[a]lthough
the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must
show more than any rehabilitation’’ (emphasis in origi-
nal; internal quotation marks omitted)).

‘‘Construing the record before us in the manner most
favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial court,
as we are obligated to do’’; In re Anthony S., 218 Conn.
App. 127, 148, 290 A.3d 901 (2023); we conclude that
there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the
court’s finding that the respondent had failed to achieve
a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as would
encourage the belief that, considering the ages and
needs of the children, she could assume a responsible
position in their lives within a reasonable time. The
overwhelming evidence that was before the court estab-
lishes that the respondent is a longtime and active user
of fentanyl, heroin and opiates. The evidence also shows
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that the respondent’s struggles with substance use, par-
ticularly fentanyl and heroin, and her lack of insight in
understanding how her continued substance use has
negatively impacted the well-being and safety of the
children were the primary concerns of the department
throughout its involvement with the respondent. In par-
ticular, the evidence clearly established that, despite
the department’s efforts to assist the respondent with
addressing her substance use, she remained an active
user of fentanyl and heroin from the time that the chil-
dren were placed in the commissioner’s custody in Feb-
ruary, 2021, to the time of trial.11 The respondent’s fail-
ure to acknowledge or correct her problem with
substance use is also demonstrated through her docu-
mented refusal to consistently submit to toxicology
screening12 or to sign releases relating to her substance
abuse treatment, which continued into 2023.13 Indeed,
the respondent’s noncompliance in this regard was as
frequent as her positive toxicology results.
The court also found that, due to the children’s need
for permanence and stability, ‘‘[the children] cannot
afford to wait for [the respondent] to rehabilitate.’’ See
In re Amneris P., 66 Conn. App. 377, 385, 784 A.2d
457 (2001) (affirming trial court’s determination that
11
The respondent tested positive for fentanyl and heroin at various times
in 2021. In 2022, the respondent tested positive for fentanyl and opiates in
July, fentanyl in August and September, and fentanyl and opiates in Novem-
ber. The respondent’s substance use continued into 2023, as she tested
positive for fentanyl in January and March of 2023.
12
For instance, the respondent refused to submit to a hair test on May 18,
2023, and the department was unable to obtain the results of the respondent’s
toxicology screens as recently as June, 2023, the month prior to the com-
mencement of the termination trial.
13
Similarly, given the respondent’s recent evictions—two months before
the termination trial, the respondent was in the process of being evicted
from her home, after having previously been evicted from her prior home—
the court could have reasonably inferred that the respondent failed to
acknowledge her lack of parental insight into how her substance use
impacted her ability to provide the children with a stable home.
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respondent failed to rehabilitate because, ‘‘[a]lthough
the respondent may have achieved a level of stability
within her limitations, the court had more than suffi-
cient evidence to support a finding that her personal
gains were not made in a timely way so as to assist her
child’’ and, therefore, ‘‘[t]he court’s finding that the child
should not be further burdened by having to wait for her
mother to achieve the level of competency necessary
to parent her was fully supported by the evidence’’).
An addendum to one of the social studies admitted into
evidence indicates that ‘‘[the respondent has] limited
insight into [the] children’s current development, needs,
and age appropriate behaviors.’’ Although the respon-
dent asserts in her appellate brief that ‘‘the law ‘sets
no particular time’ ’’ as to when she must be able to
assume a responsible position in her children’s lives,
the evidence concerning the children’s need for perma-
nency and stability supports the court’s determination
that she would not be able to do so within a reasonable
time, given the ages and needs of the children and
given her failure to acknowledge and make progress in
addressing the issues that led to the removal of the
children.

In summary, the totality of the evidence sufficiently
establishes that the factors that led to the children’s
initial commitment—the respondent’s substance use
and her lack of insight—have not been corrected or
even properly acknowledged by the respondent and
that the children’s need for permanence and stability
outweighed the potential that the respondent may reha-
bilitate at some undefined point in the future. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the evidence, when construed
in the manner most favorable to sustaining the court’s
judgments, is sufficient to support the court’s determi-
nation that the respondent failed to achieve such a
degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage
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the belief that, within a reasonable time, she could
assume a responsible position in the children’s lives.
II
Next, the respondent claims that during the disposi-
tional phase, the court erred in determining that the
termination of her parental rights was in the children’s
best interests. Specifically, the respondent argues that
‘‘[t]he evidence clearly demonstrated that the [respon-
dent] expresses love and affection for [the] children, is
concerned for [the] children’s health and well-being,
provides food and activities for the children during the
visits, and, while the children are not able to live with
her, the [respondent] during visits with the children
. . . engage[s] [them] in creative and meaningful activi-
ties, provide[s] structure and redirection when needed,
and demonstrate[s] appropriate love and affection
toward the children.’’ She further argues that ‘‘[t]here
has not been any evidence that would address the
impact and consequences of the children never being
able to see the [respondent] again’’ and that she and
the father ‘‘have been the one constant in the children’s
lives [and] have been nurturing and giving to [the] chil-
dren to the best of their abilities and circumstances.’’
Conversely, the commissioner argues that the respon-
dent’s ‘‘affection for her children is not enough to find
clear error in the . . . court’s best interest[s] determi-
nation,’’ which ‘‘is not clearly erroneous because there
is sufficient evidence in the record to support it.’’ We
agree with the commissioner.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. The children
have been in foster care since they were removed from
the respondent’s custody, and, at the time the court
rendered its decision, the children were in their fourth
foster placement. The first foster home requested the
children’s removal in August, 2021, due to a lack of a
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specific time frame in which the children would be
reunified. The children were subsequently placed in
their second foster home; however, that home
requested the children’s removal after ‘‘receiving bad-
gering emails and phone calls from the parents.’’ The
children were then placed in their third foster home,
but, in December, 2022, those foster parents requested
removal of the children after the foster parents received
‘‘verbally aggressive emails’’ from the respondent and
the father, including one ‘‘acknowledg[ing] [that the
respondent and the father knew] where the foster par-
ents . . . lived.’’ The foster parents also became aware
that the respondent and the father had moved within
four miles of the foster parents’ home.14 Thereafter, the
children were placed in their fourth foster home, where
they have since resided. At trial, Turner testified that
the children’s present foster home ‘‘is free of any safety
concerns,’’ that the children ‘‘are very bonded to the
foster parents [whom they] refer to . . . as ‘mom’ and
‘dad,’ ’’ and that the children ‘‘express that they are
happy [and] . . . that they don’t want to go anywhere
else but live on the farm [where their foster home is
located].’’
In the portion of its memorandum of decision con-
cerning disposition, the court made findings pursuant
to § 17a-112 (k)15 and then analyzed whether the termi-
nation of the respondent’s parental rights was in the
14
The court found that it was reported to the department that the respon-
dent ‘‘was ‘absolutely giddy’ over the fact that the children were being
disrupted from their [third foster placement].’’
15
General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where
termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether
to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and
shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent
of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child
by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2)
whether the [department] has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family
pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended
from time to time; (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into
and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent
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children’s best interests, stating: ‘‘In determining
whether terminating [the respondent’s] . . . parental
rights would be in the best interests of [the children]
the court has considered various factors as to each
child. The court must look at each child’s interest in
sustained growth, develop[ment], well-being, and in the
continuity and stability of his or her environment . . .
the ages and needs of each child, the length and nature
of his or her stage of foster care, the contact and lack
thereof [between each child and the respondent], the
potential benefit or detriment of [the child] retaining a
connection with his or her biological [parent]; [the
child’s] genetic bond with [the biological parent] . . .
and the seven statutory factors [in § 17a-112 (k)] and
the court’s findings thereon.16 The court has also bal-
anced each child’s intrinsic need for stability and perma-
nence against the potential benefits of maintaining a
connection with [the respondent]. . . .
to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (4) the
feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents,
any guardian of such child’s person and any person who has exercised
physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with
whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the
child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circum-
stances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child
to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited
to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child
as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court
may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions,
and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the
guardian or other custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a
parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with
the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the
child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic
circumstances of the parent.’’
16
The court made the following written findings pursuant to § 17a-112 (k)
‘‘by clear and convincing evidence’’ as to the respondent: (1) the respondent
was offered the services described previously in this opinion by the depart-
ment; (2) the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent
with the children; (3) ‘‘[t]here continues to be concerns of ongoing substance
use and mental health concerns . . . [and the respondent] has not followed
through with any recommended services’’; (4) ‘‘M . . . is emotionally
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‘‘The court finds that termination of [the respon-
dent’s] . . . parental rights is in the best interests of
[the children]. The convincing and clear evidence has
established that [the respondent] . . . [is] in no better
position today to provide for [the children] than [she
was] at the time of their removal. The problems that
led to the [children’s] removal have not been rectified
and the prospects of improvement are bleak especially
in light of [the respondent’s] lack of progress [with]
services to address her mental health, substance abuse
and parenting . . . .
‘‘[This] conclusion is supported by the testimony of
the witnesses as well as the information contained in
the exhibits presented at the . . . trial. [The children]
desperately need the permanency and stability that they
have in their foster home. Termination of parental rights
will bring that much needed stability and permanency
to them and an opportunity to have . . . healthy and
bonded to both [the respondent and the father and she] expresses excitement
over her visitation with [them] and asks about her return to their care . . .
[M] is also bonded with her . . . foster parents [as] [s]he looks to them for
affection and appears comfortable in their care . . . [S] appears comfort-
able and bonded to [the respondent] and the father during his time with
them, however, he does not display signs of distress upon separation . . .
[S] is also bonded to his . . . foster parents [as] [h]e looks to them for
affection and appears comfortable in their care’’; (5) ‘‘S . . . is four years
old [and] M . . . is six years old’’; (6) the respondent has not ‘‘followed
through with . . . services [recommended] . . . by the department . . .
[t]here continues to be ongoing substance use and mental health concerns
. . . [t]he department’s efforts to make appropriate assessments are hin-
dered by the lack of compliance with services and lack of compliance [with]
signing releases of information, the [p]arents continue to use substances,
have unaddressed mental health concerns and have engaged in criminal
activity [and] [a]s a result, neither [of them] will be able [to] establish a
caregiving role within a reasonable period of time given the children’s needs
and ages’’; and (7) the respondent ‘‘has not been prevented from maintaining
a meaningful relationship with her children by the conduct of the father or
the unreasonable act of any other person or by her economic circumstances
[as her] lack of engagement/progress in services to address her mental
health, substance abuse and parenting have interfered with her ability to
be the primary caretaker of her children.’’
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emotionally stable [lives]. [The children’s] needs are
those of all children. They have an interest in sustained
growth, development, well-being and a continuous, sta-
ble environment. Accordingly, based upon the clear and
convincing evidence presented, the court finds that it
is in [the children’s] best interests to terminate the
parental rights of [the respondent] . . . .’’17 (Citations
omitted; footnote added.)
Our standard of review in a challenge to a trial court’s
best interest determination in a proceeding to terminate
parental rights is well established. ‘‘[A]n appellate tribu-
nal will not disturb a trial court’s finding that termina-
tion of parental rights is in a child’s best interest unless
that finding is clearly erroneous.18 . . . We do not
examine the record to determine whether the trier of
fact could have reached a conclusion other than the
one reached. . . . [Rather] every reasonable presump-
tion is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . . In
the dispositional phase of a termination of parental
rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from
the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the
child. . . . In the dispositional phase . . . the trial
court must determine whether it is established by clear
and convincing evidence that the continuation of the
respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interest
of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is
mandated to consider and make written findings regard-
ing seven factors delineated in . . . § 17a-112 [(k)].
17
The court also noted that, ‘‘[a]t the conclusion of the trial, the attorney
for the minor children requested that the court . . . terminate the parental
rights of [the respondent] . . . as to [the children] as it was in [their] best
interests . . . to do so.’’
18
‘‘A finding is clearly erroneous when either there is no evidence in the
record to support it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. . . . On appeal, our function is
to determine whether the trial court’s conclusion was factually supported
and legally correct.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Autumn O.,
supra, 218 Conn. App. 442 n.13.
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. . . The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for
the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need
to be proven before termination can be ordered.’’ (Foot-
note in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re Autumn O., supra, 218 Conn. App. 442. ‘‘Indeed . . .
[t]he balancing of interests in a case involving termina-
tion of parental rights is a delicate task and, when sup-
porting evidence is not lacking, the trial court’s ultimate
determination as to a child’s best interest is entitled to
the utmost deference. . . . [A] trial court’s determina-
tion of the best interests of a child will not be overturned
on the basis of one factor if that determination is other-
wise factually supported and legally sound.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Aubrey K., 216 Conn.
App. 632, 654–55, 285 A.3d 1153 (2022), cert. denied,
345 Conn. 972, 286 A.3d 907 (2023).
‘‘Our appellate courts have recognized that long-term
stability is critical to a child’s future health and develop-
ment . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Anthony H., 104 Conn. App. 744, 767, 936 A.2d 638
(2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100
(2008). ‘‘In addition to considering the seven factors
listed in § 17a-112 (k), [t]he best interests of the child
include the child’s interests in sustained growth, devel-
opment, well-being, and continuity and stability of [his
or her] environment. . . . Furthermore, in the disposi-
tional stage, it is appropriate to consider the importance
of permanency in children’s lives. . . . The respon-
dent’s efforts to rehabilitate, although commendable,
speak to [her] own conduct, not the best interests of
the child. . . . [W]hatever progress a parent arguably
has made toward rehabilitation is insufficient to reverse
an otherwise factually supported best interest finding.
. . . Additionally, although the respondent may love
her children and share a bond with them, the existence
of a bond between a parent and a child, while relevant,
is not dispositive of a best interest determination.’’
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(Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Autumn O., supra, 218 Conn.
App. 444. ‘‘Our courts consistently have held that even
when there is a finding of a bond between parent and
a child, it still may be in the child’s best interest to
terminate parental rights.’’ In re Rachel J., 97 Conn.
App. 748, 761, 905 A.2d 1271, cert. denied, 280 Conn.
941, 912 A.2d 476 (2006).
The essence of the respondent’s argument is that the
court’s best interest determination is clearly erroneous
because a strong bond exists between her and the chil-
dren.19 Our case law, however, treats the existence of
such a bond as relevant to a court’s best interest deter-
mination, but not dispositive. See In re Autumn O.,
supra, 218 Conn. App. 444. Consequently, so long as
there is sufficient evidence to support the court’s reli-
ance on other factors, its best interest determination
is entitled to deference. See id., 443–45 (affirming best
interest determination, which was challenged as clearly
erroneous based on respondent’s ‘‘strong relationship’’
with children, because ‘‘ample evidence in the record’’
supported ‘‘court’s conclusion that it was in the best
interests of the minor children to terminate the respon-
dent’s parental rights’’ due to children’s need for ‘‘a safe
home environment’’). In the present case, the court
expressly set forth the ‘‘various factors’’ that it consid-
ered when making its best interest determination. In
particular, the court weighed ‘‘each child’s interest in
19
Aside from this central argument, the respondent also argues that the
court’s best interest determination was clearly erroneous because,
‘‘[a]lthough the trial court noted in its decision that . . . a loving relationship
between a parent and child does not preclude termination of parental rights,
when the court balances that bond against the children’s need for perma-
nency and stability . . . [t]he evidence in this case is that the . . . children
have had at least four different placements in foster care.’’ We reject this
argument because, as previously discussed, it was the respondent’s deliber-
ate conduct in disrupting the children’s foster placements that caused such
instability.
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sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the
continuity and stability of his or her environment . . .
the ages and needs of each child, the length and nature
of his or her stage of foster care, the contact and lack
thereof [between each child and the respondent], the
potential benefit or detriment of [the child] retaining a
connection with [the respondent], his or her genetic
bond’’ with the respondent and its findings under § 17a-
112 (k).
The court explicitly factored the existence of a bond
between the respondent and the children into its best
interest analysis. It ultimately determined, however,
that, despite the existence of any such bond, the termi-
nation of the respondent’s parental rights was necessary
to provide the children with ‘‘much needed stability and
permanency’’ and the ‘‘opportunity to have a healthy
and emotionally stable life.’’ There was sufficient evi-
dence in the record to support that determination, as
the evidence at trial established that, during the time
that the respondent consistently demonstrated an
inability to maintain her sobriety or to meaningfully
engage with the services referred to her by the depart-
ment, the children were ‘‘thriv[ing]’’ in their present
foster placement, a home that ‘‘is free of any safety
concerns’’ and where the children ‘‘are very bonded to
the foster parents [whom] [t]hey refer to . . . as ‘mom’
and ‘dad.’ ’’ In addition, such evidence established that
this is the children’s fourth foster placement, with their
prior placements having been intentionally disrupted
by the respondent’s conduct, and the testimony pro-
vided by Hedden emphasized that the children ‘‘need
. . . stability and structure’’ and that ‘‘the foster parents
can provide that for them.’’ The court’s decision to
assign the greatest weight in its best interest analysis
to the children’s need for permanence and stability can-
not be considered clearly erroneous simply because a
bond exists between the respondent and the children.
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See In re Rachel J., supra, 97 Conn. App. 761; see also In
re Anthony H., supra, 104 Conn. App. 763–68 (rejecting
respondent’s argument that because she has strong
bond with children, and one child ‘‘had a number of
different foster parents in the [time] he has been in the
petitioner’s custody,’’ trial court’s best interest determi-
nation was clearly erroneous, and concluding instead
that ‘‘the court properly found that she has failed to
undertake the rehabilitative steps outlined for her or
to take advantage of the services provided to her in a
timely manner so that she could be reunified with the
children [and as] [t]he best interests of the children call
for permanency’’).
We conclude that the court’s finding, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the termination of the respon-
dent’s parental rights is in the best interests of the
children, even given the existence of a bond between
the respondent and the children, is not clearly errone-
ous. Accordingly, in light of the evidence in the record
before us, especially concerning the respondent’s sub-
stance use, her failure to make any progress toward
sobriety and the children’s need for stability and perma-
nency, we conclude that the court’s finding that it is in
the children’s best interests to terminate the respon-
dent’s parental rights is factually supported and legally
sound. We, therefore, will not substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.