1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking

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1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking

1ST ALLIANCE LENDING, LLC v. DEPARTMENT
OF BANKING ET AL.
(AC 46493)
Bright, C. J., and Westbrook and Eveleigh, Js.
Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its
administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant Commissioner of
Banking revoking the plaintiff’s license to do business as a mortgage lender
in this state and imposing a civil penalty for multiple violations of state and
federal law. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the commissioner did not
have authority to revoke the plaintiff’s license because it had already been
revoked in a separate administrative action. Held:
The trial court did not err in failing to modify or vacate the commissioner’s
revocation order because the commissioner had the authority to revoke the
plaintiff’s mortgage lender license in the present matter after the compelled
revocation of the plaintiff’s license in a separate administrative action.

The trial court did not improperly defer to the defendant Department of
Banking’s statutory interpretation of the term mortgage loan originator as
defined in the Connecticut SAFE Act (§ 36a-485 et seq.) in reaching its
conclusion that substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s finding
that the plaintiff violated that act by using unlicensed individuals to take
residential mortgage loan applications.
The commissioner did not improperly apply a provision (§ 36a-498e (b))
of the Connecticut SAFE Act retroactively because substantial evidence
supported the commissioner’s finding that the plaintiff’s improper conduct
continued after the provision’s effective date.
The trial court properly concluded that substantial evidence in the record
supported the commissioner’s finding that the plaintiff failed to cooperate
with the department’s subpoena in violation of the governing statute
(§ 36a-17).
There was no merit to the plaintiff’s claim that it was deprived of due
process, as the department’s hearing procedures complied with the Uniform
Administrative Procedure Act (§ 4-166 et seq.), the plaintiff failed to establish
any facts indicating that the department’s hearing officer or commissioner
was biased, and this court reviewed the record to ensure that substantial
evidence supported the commissioner’s challenged findings.
This court declined to review the plaintiff’s inadequately briefed claim that
the penalties ordered by the commissioner were unconstitutionally exces-
sive.
Argued September 12—officially released December 17, 2024
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1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the defendant Commis-
sioner of Banking revoking the plaintiff’s license to
serve as a mortgage lender in Connecticut and imposing
a civil penalty, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court,
Cordani, J.; judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal,
from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Ross H. Garber, with whom, on the brief, were Mitchel
H. Kider, pro hac vice, and Michael Y. Kieval, pro hac
vice, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Patrick T. Ring, assistant attorney general, with
whom were John Langmaid, assistant attorney general,
and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The plaintiff, 1st Alliance Lending,
LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dis-
missing the plaintiff’s administrative appeal from the
decision of the defendant Commissioner of Banking
(commissioner) revoking the plaintiff’s license to do
business as a mortgage lender and ordering the plaintiff
to pay a civil penalty. The plaintiff claims that (1) the
commissioner did not have authority to revoke the
plaintiff’s license that already had been revoked in a
separate administrative action, (2) the court improperly
deferred to the incorrect interpretation of General Stat-
utes § 36a-485 by the defendant Department of Banking
(department), (3) the commissioner improperly applied
General Statutes § 36a-498e (b) (1) retroactively, (4)
substantial evidence does not support the commission-
er’s finding that the plaintiff failed to cooperate with
the investigation, (5) the court and the department vio-
lated the plaintiff’s due process rights, (6) the commis-
sioner imposed penalties that are unconstitutionally
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1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking

excessive, and (7) if any of the commissioner’s findings
of violation were made in error, we must remand the
matter for a new penalty hearing. We affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. This dispute arises from the plain-
tiff’s policies and procedures regarding its unlicensed
employees. The plaintiff is a Connecticut limited liabil-
ity company that was licensed by the department to
engage in business as a mortgage lender. The plaintiff
employed two relevant classes of employees that
assisted customers in applying for and obtaining mort-
gage loans: mortgage loan originators (MLOs) and home
loan consultants (HLCs).1 MLOs are licensed by the
state to take residential mortgage loan applications and
to offer and negotiate terms of residential mortgage
loans.2 HLCs, on the other hand, interact with potential
borrowers but are not licensed as MLOs. HLCs are not
authorized to take residential mortgage loan applica-
tions or to offer or negotiate terms of residential mort-
gage loans. The plaintiff’s HLCs used a software pro-
gram called Byte3 to input information received from
potential borrowers into a database, which was used
to populate a loan application with the information
collected by the HLCs.
In 2017, the plaintiff’s vice president of compliance,
Briana Massey, and its compliance analyst, Brianna Pri-
vott, prepared an internal compliance audit to assess
Prior to 2018, the class of HLCs held the title of submission coordinators.
1

For the purposes of this appeal, we refer to this class of employees as HLCs.
2
General Statutes § 36a-485 (20) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[m]ortgage
loan originator means an individual who for compensation or gain . . . (A)
takes a residential mortgage loan application, or (B) offers or negotiates
terms of a residential mortgage loan. . . . [T]he [Secure and Fair Enforce-
ment for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 (federal SAFE Act), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5101 et seq.], requires such individual to be licensed as a mortgage loan
originator under state laws implementing said [federal SAFE Act] . . . .’’
3
The Byte software program is a loan origination system designed to
originate mortgage files including recording mortgage applications, storing
documents, and processing and closing loan files.
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whether the plaintiff’s HLCs were improperly engaging
in conduct that required an MLO license and whether
the plaintiff was otherwise complying with Connecti-
cut’s lending requirements. The audit report, published
on February 1, 2018, expressed concerns that the plain-
tiff was violating, inter alia, General Statutes § 36a-485
et seq. (Connecticut SAFE Act); the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.; the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C § 1601 et seq.; and
the TILA-RESPA4 Integrated Mortgage Disclosure Rule
(TRID), 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024 and 1026. Specifically, the
report stated that ‘‘[HLCs] were at times engaging in
what may constitute as licensed activity under the [Con-
necticut] SAFE Act. Further, instances of [HLCs] failing
to meet the requirements of the ECOA permissible
credit [inquiries] were found.’’ The audit report also
found that ‘‘[t]he transaction testing found instances
where [l]oan [e]stimates were not sent to applicants
pursuant to TILA disclosure requirements . . . .’’ With
respect to the Connecticut SAFE Act, the audit stated
that HLCs ‘‘were found to present an unacceptable
amount of risk. The issues found were systemic and
required immediate attention. Compliance [t]raining
was conducted . . . for all [HLCs] regarding what is
and is not unlicensed activity. Additionally, written
guidance was provided to all [HLCs] to supplement the
training. . . . The most prevalent issues were as fol-
lows: Impermissible Credit [Inquiries]; Credit Repair
Advice; Discussion of Rate and Term; Credit Decisions;
Disqualified Borrowers.’’ Moreover, the report stated
that, ‘‘[w]hile there are sufficient reporting tools avail-
able in Byte to track and monitor TRID compliance,
2017 saw an unusual increase in violations’’ with ‘‘loan
estimates sent out late or not sent out at all.’’
4
RESPA is the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601
et seq.
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On May 3, 2018, two associate financial examiners
from the department visited the plaintiff’s place of busi-
ness unannounced to conduct a routine compliance
examination. The plaintiff, along with other mortgage
lenders, was scheduled to be examined between the
first quarter of 2016 and May 3, 2018. Of the mortgage
lenders that the department was required to examine,
the examiners chose the plaintiff on the basis of the
date of its last examination and the location of its place
of business. During the examination, Massey and Eric
Sanders, the plaintiff’s chief executive of loan servicing,
completed Uniform Manager’s Questionnaires, which
the department gives to all licensees for mortgage
lender exams. In response to the questionnaire, Massey
and Sanders provided the examiners with, inter alia,
the plaintiff’s 2017 internal audit report, which indicated
that the plaintiff was not in compliance with state and
federal law governing mortgage lenders. The examiners
also interviewed various personnel of the plaintiff,
including MLOs, HLCs, and executives. Following the
May 3, 2018 examination, the examiners requested addi-
tional documents from the plaintiff, which Massey and
Sanders provided. Beginning on September 19, 2018,
one of the department’s attorneys, Stacey Serrano, also
emailed Massey requesting documents, some of which
she provided.
On December 5, 2018, as a result of the department’s
compliance examination, the commissioner issued to
the plaintiff notices of (1) intent to revoke the plaintiff’s
mortgage lender license, (2) intent to issue a cease and
desist order, (3) intent to impose a civil penalty, and
(4) the right to a hearing. Through June 14, 2019, the
department, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-182 (c),5
5
General Statutes § 4-182 (c) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[n]o revoca-
tion, suspension, annulment or withdrawal of any license is lawful unless,
prior to the institution of agency proceedings, the agency gave notice by
mail to the licensee of facts or conduct which warrant the intended action
and the specific provisions of the general statutes or of regulations adopted
by the agency that authorize such intended action, and the licensee was
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sent letters notifying the plaintiff of the opportunity
to show compliance with the legal requirements for
retention of its mortgage lender license. The plaintiff,
however, did not show compliance. On July 15, 2019,
the commissioner issued amended and restated notices
of intent to (1) revoke the plaintiff’s mortgage lender
license, (2) issue an order to cease and desist, and (3)
impose a civil penalty (amended notice). The amended
notice alleged eleven grounds for finding that the plain-
tiff violated state and federal law.6
given an opportunity to show compliance with all lawful requirements for
the retention of the license. . . .’’
6
Specifically, the amended notice contained the following allegations: the
plaintiff (1) engaged the services of unlicensed MLOs in violation of 12
C.F.R. § 1026.36 (f) (2) (2019) and General Statutes §§ 36a-486 (b) (1) and
36a-678 (a); (2) assisted or aided and abetted the conduct of individuals
acting as unlicensed MLOs in violation of § 36a-498e (a) (6); (3) accepted
applications or referrals of applicants from, or paid fees to, unlicensed MLOs
in violation of General Statutes § 36a-496; (4) failed to comply with General
Statutes §§ 36a-485 to 36a-498f, inclusive, 36a-498h, 36a-534a, and 36a-534b,
or other state or federal law applicable to its business in violation of § 36a-
498e (a) (8); (5) failed to establish, enforce and maintain policies and proce-
dures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with § 36a-498e (a) in
violation of § 36a-498e (b) (1); (6) failed to make records available and to
cooperate with the department’s Consumer Credit Division’s examination
in violation of General Statutes § 36a-17 (e); (7) failed to provide Connecticut
applicants with adverse action notices in violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (a); (8) required that Connecticut appli-
cants submit documents verifying information related to the application
before providing loan estimates in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1026.19 (e) (2)
(iii) and § 36a-678 (a); (9) failed to identify unlicensed MLOs on the respective
loan documents even though such individuals had primary responsibility
for origination in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36 (g) (1) (ii) and § 36a-678
(a); (10) made untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements not misleading or engaged
in an act, practice or course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit
on persons by holding out unlicensed MLOs to potential borrowers as the
individuals primarily responsible for mortgage loan origination and failing
to disclose to potential borrowers that such persons were unlicensed to do
so, and disclosing to investors, government agencies and regulators that the
licensed MLOs were the individuals primarily responsible for the origination
of the mortgage loans, in violation of General Statutes § 36a-53b; and (11)
made a false or misleading statement to the department when it stated that
employees were not informed of their terminations in writing, when in fact,
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While the revocation proceeding regarding the plain-
tiff’s compliance issues (compliance matter) was pend-
ing, the plaintiff’s surety company notified the depart-
ment, in May, 2019, that it was cancelling the plaintiff’s
surety bond coverage effective July 31, 2019. Upon
receiving this notice, the department sent the plaintiff ‘‘a
letter, dated June 7, 2019, stating that [General Statutes]
§ 36a-4927 required the plaintiff to maintain a surety
bond running concurrently with the period of the
license for the plaintiff’s main office, and that the plain-
tiff’s failure to have a bond in effect on July 31, 2019,
would result in the commissioner’s automatic suspen-
sion of the plaintiff’s license and inactivation of the
licenses of each Connecticut [MLO] sponsored by the
plaintiff.’’ (Footnote added.) 1st Alliance Lending, LLC
v. Dept. of Banking, 342 Conn. 273, 277, 269 A.3d 764
(2022). The letter further informed the plaintiff that it
could avoid these outcomes by reinstating or obtaining
a new surety bond or by ceasing to do business and
surrendering its license. Id.
On July 29, 2019, the plaintiff sent an email to the
department stating that it was voluntarily surrendering
its license. Id., 278. The commissioner did not accept
the plaintiff’s license surrender and instead suspended
the plaintiff’s mortgage lender license on July 31, 2019.
Id. In light of the plaintiff’s failure to reinstate or obtain
a new surety bond, on August 1, 2019, the commissioner,
pursuant to § 36a-492 (c), issued to the plaintiff notices
of automatic suspension, intent to revoke its mortgage
the plaintiff provided employee termination forms to employees informing
them of their termination of employment, in violation of General Statutes
§ 36a-53a.
7
General Statutes § 36a-492 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Each licensed
mortgage lender . . . shall file with the commissioner a single surety bond,
written by a surety authorized to write such bonds in this state, covering
its main office and any branch office, in a penal sum determined in accor-
dance with subsection (d) of this section . . . . The bond shall cover all
mortgage loan originators sponsored by such licensee. . . .’’
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lender license, and its right to a hearing (surety bond
matter). Id. ‘‘The plaintiff requested a hearing, which
was held in September, 2019. Following the hearing,
the commissioner upheld the suspension. The commis-
sioner also concluded that, pursuant to General Statutes
§ 36a-494, the plaintiff’s failure to maintain a surety
bond, as required by § 36a-492, supported the revoca-
tion of the plaintiff’s mortgage lender license. Accord-
ingly, the commissioner ordered the revocation of the
plaintiff’s mortgage lender license. The suspension and
revocation had national ramifications for the plaintiff
because they hampered its ability to conduct business
in other states and could result in ‘a series of cross-
defaults with other counterparties and [other] revoca-
tions.’ A properly effectuated surrender would not have
had these negative ramifications.’’ Id., 278–79.
In November, 2019, the plaintiff appealed the commis-
sioner’s order in the surety bond matter to the Superior
Court, which subsequently dismissed the appeal. See
1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking, Superior
Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-
XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 26, 2020) (70 Conn. L. Rptr. 365,
369), aff’d, 342 Conn. 273, 269 A.3d 764 (2022). In March,
2021, the plaintiff appealed to our Supreme Court,
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See 1st
Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking, supra, 342
Conn. 292. In doing so, our Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff’s claims that ‘‘the governing statutes do not
permit the defendants to suspend the plaintiff’s license
. . . [and] that, even if the relevant statutes gave the
defendants discretion to suspend its license, the trial
court incorrectly concluded that the commissioner law-
fully exercised his discretion.’’ Id., 279–80. The Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff’s attempted surrender of
its license was ineffective because it did not comply
with General Statutes § 36a-51 (c), and because ‘‘the
plaintiff did not properly surrender its license before
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1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking

the expiration of the surety bond . . . the commis-
sioner was statutorily required to suspend the plaintiff’s
license.’’ Id., 288. Addressing the plaintiff’s claim that
the commissioner did not lawfully exercise his discre-
tion, the Supreme Court stated: ‘‘The plaintiff also
argues that the statutory scheme should not be interpre-
ted to permit the department to decline to take action
on a request to surrender, thereby creating a situation
in which the lender has a license but no surety bond.
In other words, the plaintiff contends, the department’s
own actions in failing to accept the license surrender
created the licensing violation. Neither the plaintiff’s
brief, nor our independent research, however, indicates
that the department is under any statutory or regulatory
obligation to take action on a request to surrender
within a time certain following receipt of the request.
Moreover, in this case, there is no indication in the
record that the department unreasonably delayed in
taking action on the plaintiff’s request; rather, it was
the plaintiff that waited to submit its request to surren-
der until two days before its surety bond was set to be
cancelled. After not receiving a response to its June 7
letter, the department even followed up with the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff was well aware of the ongoing 2018
enforcement proceeding and of the obligation to main-
tain a surety bond as long as it held a license. At any
time following [the surety’s] notice of cancellation, the
plaintiff could have reached out to the department to
discuss the time and conditions for a request to surren-
der. See General Statutes § 36a-51 (c) (1). The plaintiff
failed to do so. To the extent that the plaintiff wants
to impose greater time constraints on the department’s
response to a request to surrender a mortgage license,
its recourse is with the General Assembly, not this
court.’’ Id., 289–90.
While the appeal of the surety bond matter was pend-
ing, the department continued with the revocation pro-
ceeding in the compliance matter. Between September,
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2019, and February, 2020, the department held fifteen
days of administrative hearings on the amended notice,
during which the parties presented witness testimony
and thousands of pages of exhibits to the hearing offi-
cer, Attorney Cynthia Antanaitis. At the end of the
administrative hearings, the hearing officer, pursuant
to General Statutes § 4-179,8 wrote a proposed decision,
which she gave to the commissioner for consideration
along with the entire administrative record. On April
16, 2021, the commissioner issued a decision in which
he found that the plaintiff had violated (1) the Connecti-
cut SAFE Act by engaging the services of unlicensed
MLOs; (2) the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681m,9 by failing to send adverse action notices to
prospective borrowers; (3) General Statutes §§ 36a-
498e (a) (7)10 and 36a-678 (a)11 by providing consumers
with loan estimate disclosures without the verification
of information or an executed real estate contract; (4)
§ 36a-498e (a) (6) by aiding and abetting the unlicensed
8
General Statutes § 4-179 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(c) Except when
authorized by law to render a final decision for an agency, a hearing officer
shall, after hearing a matter, make a proposed final decision. . . .’’
9
The Fair Credit Reporting Act provides in relevant part: ‘‘If any person
takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in
whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report, the
person shall . . . provide oral, written, or electronic notice of the adverse
action to the consumer . . . .’’ 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (a).
10
General Statutes § 36a-498e (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[n]o
person who is required to be licensed and who is subject to this section
. . . may, directly or indirectly . . . (6) Conduct any business as a mortgage
lender, mortgage correspondent lender, mortgage broker, lead generator,
mortgage loan originator or loan processor or underwriter without holding
a valid license as required under this section . . . or assist or aid and abet
any person in the conduct of business as a mortgage lender, mortgage
correspondent lender, mortgage broker, lead generator, mortgage loan origi-
nator or loan processor or underwriter without a valid license . . . (7) Fail
to make disclosures as required by this section . . . and any other applica-
ble state or federal law including regulations adopted thereunder . . . .’’
11
General Statutes § 36a-678 (a) provides that ‘‘each person shall comply
with all provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act [15 U.S.C. § 1601
et seq.] that apply to such person . . . .’’
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1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking

activities of call center employees; (5) General Statutes
§ 36a-17 (e) by failing to produce subpoenaed records to
the department; (6) § 36a-498e (b) by failing to establish,
enforce, and maintain policies and procedures reason-
ably designed to achieve compliance with regulatory
requirements; (7) General Statutes § 36a-53b (2)12 by
failing to inform potential borrowers that call center
employees were not licensed MLOs; and (8) § 36a-53b
(3) by failing to dispel the notion that its call center
representatives were licensed. On the basis of these
violations, the commissioner ordered the plaintiff to
cease and desist its violations, revoked the plaintiff’s
license to act as a mortgage lender in Connecticut, and
imposed a civil penalty in the amount of $750,000.
Pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183,13 the plaintiff
appealed the commissioner’s decision to the Superior
Court. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for
leave to present additional evidence. The plaintiff
argued that certain Byte data logs, which the hearing
officer had excluded during the administrative hearings,
demonstrated that the HLCs did not conduct activities
that require an MLO license. The court, Cordani, J.,
pursuant to § 4-183 (h),14 granted the motion and
12
General Statutes § 36a-53b provides in relevant part that ‘‘[n]o person
shall, in connection with any activity subject to the jurisdiction of the com-
missioner . . . (2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading;
or (3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.’’
13
General Statutes § 4-183 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] person
who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency
and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court
as provided in this section. . . .’’
14
General Statutes § 4-183 (h) provides that, ‘‘[i]f, before the date set for
hearing on the merits of an appeal, application is made to the court for
leave to present additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of
the court that the additional evidence is material and that there were good
reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding before the agency, the
court may order that the additional evidence be taken before the agency
upon conditions determined by the court. The agency may modify its findings
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1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking

remanded the matter to the department, ordering it to
consider additional evidence from the Byte system. On
April 5, 2022, the commissioner issued a supplemental
decision in which he found that the additional Byte
system evidence did not refute the relevant facts upon
which his decision was based and declined to make
any changes to his decision. The plaintiff appealed the
commissioner’s decision and supplemental decision to
the Superior Court, which dismissed the plaintiff’s
administrative appeal. This appeal followed. See Gen-
eral Statutes § 4-184.15 Additional facts will be set forth
as necessary.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improp-
erly failed to vacate or modify the commissioner’s order
to revoke the plaintiff’s mortgage lender license
because the commissioner did not have the authority
to revoke it. It argues that the commissioner could not
have revoked its license on April 16, 2021, because its
license already had been revoked on October 4, 2019,
in the surety bond matter. The department, on the other
hand, argues that the commissioner had authority to
revoke the plaintiff’s license because (1) the plaintiff’s
license was active when the department sought revoca-
tion of the plaintiff’s license in the compliance matter;
(2) the plaintiff attempted to avoid revocation in the
compliance matter by attempting to surrender its
license in the surety bond matter, in which the depart-
ment was statutorily required to proceed in revoking the
plaintiff’s license; and (3) revocation in the compliance
matter and revocation in the surety bond matter have
and decision by reason of the additional evidence and shall file that evidence
and any modifications, new findings, or decisions with the reviewing court.’’
15
General Statutes § 4-184 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]n aggrieved
party may obtain a review of any final judgment of the Superior Court under
this chapter. . . .’’
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1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking

materially different purposes and consequences. We
agree with the department.
‘‘We begin by articulating the applicable standard of
review in an appeal from the decision of an administra-
tive agency. Judicial review of [an administrative
agency’s] action is governed by the [Uniform Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166
et seq.]16 . . . and the scope of that review is very
restricted. . . . With regard to questions of fact, it is
neither the function of the trial court nor of this court
to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that
of the administrative agency. . . . Judicial review of
the conclusions of law reached administratively is also
limited. The court’s ultimate duty is only to decide
whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted
unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its
discretion. . . . Conclusions of law reached by the
administrative agency must stand if the court determines
that they resulted from a correct application of the law
to the facts found and could reasonably and logically
follow from such facts.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Goldstar
Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288
Conn. 790, 800, 955 A.2d 15 (2008).
‘‘Cases that present pure questions of law, however,
invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily
involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence,
16
General Statutes § 4-183 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The court shall
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the
agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, con-
clusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made
upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on
the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. . . .’’
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the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally
or in abuse of its discretion. . . . [Our Supreme Court
has] determined, therefore, that the traditional defer-
ence accorded to an agency’s interpretation of a statu-
tory term is unwarranted when the construction of a
statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judi-
cial scrutiny [or to] . . . a governmental agency’s time-
tested interpretation . . . . Whether the relevant statu-
tory scheme granted the commissioner the legal author-
ity to . . . revoke the plaintiff’s mortgage lender
license is a question of statutory interpretation over
which our review is plenary. . . . We review . . . the
relevant statutory scheme in accordance with General
Statutes § 1-2z and our familiar principles of statutory
construction.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) 1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of
Banking, supra, 342 Conn. 280–81.
We also note that, ‘‘[b]ecause the . . . appeal to the
trial court [was] based solely on the [administrative]
record, the scope of the trial court’s review of the [com-
missioner’s] decision and the scope of our review of
that decision are the same. . . . In other words, the
trial court’s decision in this administrative appeal is
entitled to no deference from this court.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner
of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commission,
307 Conn. 53, 63 n.15, 52 A.3d 636 (2012); see also
Hartford Police Dept. v. Commission on Human
Rights & Opportunities, 347 Conn. 241, 246 n.1, 297
A.3d 167 (2023).
General Statutes §§ 36a-488 (b)17 and 36a-492 require
mortgage lenders to maintain surety bond coverage.
Pursuant to § 36a-492 (c), when a surety company seeks
17
General Statutes § 36a-488 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In the case of
an initial application for a [mortgage lender] license, the following supple-
mentary information shall be filed, as applicable . . . (2) a bond as required
by section 36a-492 . . . .’’
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to cancel a mortgage lender’s bond, it must notify the
commissioner of the effective date of cancellation, at
which point the ‘‘commissioner shall automatically sus-
pend the licenses of a mortgage lender . . . .’’ 18
(Emphasis added.) Our Supreme Court has stated that
‘‘the use of the word ‘shall’ in § 36a-492 (c) is mandatory,
and, as a result, the commissioner is statutorily required
to suspend a mortgage lender license in the event of
surety bond cancellation unless the mortgage lender
satisfies one of the two exceptions to the requirement
of automatic suspension.’’ 1st Alliance Lending, LLC
v. Dept. of Banking, supra, 342 Conn. 283. Once the
automatic suspension is in place, § 36a-492 (c) requires
that ‘‘the commissioner shall (A) give the licensee notice
of the automatic suspension, pending proceedings for
revocation or refusal to renew pursuant to section 36a-
494 and an opportunity for a hearing on such action in
accordance with section 36a-51 . . . .’’ In the present
case, given the plaintiff’s notice that it intended to sur-
render its license, which the commissioner refused to
accept, it was clear that the plaintiff was not seeking
a renewal of its license, leaving revocation as the only
statutory option available to the commissioner under
§ 36a-492, which the commissioner successfully accom-
plished.
Essentially, the plaintiff argues that its license, having
been revoked once, could not be revoked a second
time. The commissioner argues that the plaintiff cannot
18
General Statutes § 36a-492 (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The surety
company shall have the right to cancel the bond at any time by a written
notice to the principal stating the date cancellation shall take effect . . . .
A surety bond shall not be cancelled unless the surety company notifies
the commissioner in writing not less than thirty days prior to the effective
date of cancellation. After receipt of such notification from the surety com-
pany, the commissioner shall give written notice to the principal of the
date such bond cancellation shall take effect . . . . The commissioner shall
automatically suspend the licenses of a mortgage lender . . . on such
date . . . .’’
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successfully thwart an ongoing revocation proceeding
based on allegedly significant substantive compliance
failures by surrendering its license or by engineering
an automatic revocation due to the cancellation of its
surety bond. The resolution of this issue is important
because the parties agree that not all revocations are
equal and that the revocation at issue in the present
case has greater regulatory consequences for the plain-
tiff both in Connecticut and in other jurisdictions.
Section 36a-494 (a) (1) provides that the commis-
sioner has the authority to ‘‘suspend, revoke or refuse
to renew any mortgage lender . . . license or take any
other action . . . for any reason which would be suffi-
cient grounds for the commissioner to deny an applica-
tion for such license . . . or if the commissioner finds
that the licensee . . . has done any of the following
. . . (C) violated any of the provisions of this title or
of any regulation or order adopted or issued pursuant
thereto pertaining to any such person, or any other law
or regulation applicable to the conduct of its business
. . . .’’ The statutory scheme further provides that the
department may pursue revocation proceedings against
a mortgage lender with an inactive license under certain
circumstances. Section 36a-51 (c)19 expressly permits
19
General Statutes § 36a-51 (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) Any licensee
may surrender any license issued by the commissioner under any provision
of the general statutes by surrendering the license to the commissioner in
person or by registered or certified mail, provided, in the case of a license
issued through the system, as defined in section 36a-2, such surrender shall
be initiated by filing a request to surrender on the system. No surrender on
the system shall be effective until the request to surrender is accepted by
the commissioner. Surrender of a license shall not affect the licensee’s
civil or criminal liability, or affect the commissioner’s ability to impose an
administrative penalty on the licensee pursuant to section 36a-50 for acts
committed prior to the surrender. . . . If no proceeding is pending or has
been instituted by the commissioner at the time of surrender . . . the com-
missioner may still institute a proceeding to suspend, revoke or refuse to
renew a license . . . up to the date one year after the date of receipt of
the license by the commissioner, or, in the case of a license issued through
the system, up to the date one year after the date of the acceptance by the
commissioner of a request to surrender a license.
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the commissioner to revoke mortgage lender licenses
that have expired or been surrendered up to one year
after expiration or the date that the commissioner
accepted a request to surrender. Although the statutory
scheme is silent as to whether the commissioner may
revoke a license that already has been revoked, we find
that the commissioner has such authority under the
circumstances in the present matter.

In Stern v. Medical Examining Board, 208 Conn. 492,
545 A.2d 1080 (1988), our Supreme Court concluded
that the Medical Examining Board (board) had no juris-
diction to revoke the plaintiff’s license to practice medi-
cine because the plaintiff allowed his license to expire
before the board filed disciplinary charges against him.
Id., 501. The court reasoned that the board only had
authority to discipline ‘‘physicians,’’ and the fact that
the plaintiff’s license had expired meant that he was
not a physician at the time that the board commenced
disciplinary proceedings. Id., 502. The court further
reasoned that, although the board might have had ‘‘con-
tinuing jurisdiction to levy a monetary fine on the plain-
tiff,’’ the board only sought revocation of the plaintiff’s
license. Id., 503.

Although the present matter is similar to Stern
because the plaintiff did not have an active mortgage
lender license at the time that the commissioner
revoked its license in the underlying proceedings, the
present matter is distinguishable from Stern in two
significant ways. First, the plaintiff held an active mort-
gage lender license at the time that the department
‘‘(2) If any license issued on the system expires due to the licensee’s
failure to renew such license, the commissioner may institute a revocation
or suspension proceeding, or issue an order revoking or suspending the
license, under applicable authorities not later than one year after the date
of such expiration. . . .’’
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initiated revocation proceedings against it in the compli-
ance matter. The plaintiff’s license did not become inac-
tive until approximately ten months after the commis-
sioner first issued notice of intent to revoke the
plaintiff’s license in the compliance matter. Second, the
department not only sought to revoke the plaintiff’s
license, but also to impose a civil fine and to issue a
cease and desist order, whereas the board in Stern
sought only to revoke an expired license. Accordingly,
unlike the board in Stern, the commissioner had author-
ity to pursue revocation proceedings and civil penalties
in the compliance matter because the plaintiff was a
licensed mortgage lender subject to the department’s
authority at the time that the proceedings commenced.
See Patel v. Board of Healing Arts, 22 Kan. App. 2d
712, 713, 920 P.2d 477 (1996) (because jurisdiction was
proper at time disciplinary proceedings commenced,
court found that subsequent cancellation of plaintiff’s
license did not affect board’s jurisdiction).
Moreover, the plaintiff cannot avoid the conse-
quences of violating the mortgage loan statutes merely
by forfeiting its surety bond during the department’s
compliance revocation proceeding. If that were the
case, the department’s ability to hold mortgage lenders
accountable for violating mortgage loan statutes would
be significantly circumscribed because compliance
revocation proceedings, which by nature require inten-
sive fact finding, take more time than revocation pro-
ceedings based on a mortgage lender’s failure to main-
tain proper surety bond coverage. ‘‘In construing a
statute, common sense must be used and courts must
assume that a reasonable and rational result was
intended.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goldstar
Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, supra,
288 Conn. 803. Thus, we conclude that the commis-
sioner had the authority to follow through with its initial
revocation proceedings in the compliance matter after
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the plaintiff forfeited its surety bond, which required
the commissioner to initiate additional revocation pro-
ceedings that carry lesser consequences. See id., 805
(‘‘[t]he plaintiffs’ contention that a provider can place
itself beyond the reach of these strong statutory sanc-
tions and provisions simply by terminating its provider
agreement on thirty days notice, defies logic and
requires a construction of the statute that thwarts its
intended purpose, and leads to an absurd result’’).

Furthermore, the final status of the plaintiff’s license
was not yet settled when the commissioner revoked
the plaintiff’s license in the compliance matter. The
commissioner issued the order to revoke the plaintiff’s
license in the compliance matter on April 16, 2021. At
that time, the plaintiff’s appeal of the surety bond matter
to the Supreme Court was still pending. Our Supreme
Court’s affirmance of the surety bond revocation in
February, 2022, would not constitute a basis for the
Superior Court to reverse the commissioner’s revoca-
tion decision in the underlying matter. Clearly, the com-
missioner had the authority and jurisdiction to revoke
the plaintiff’s license for its various compliance failures
given that that the revocation proceedings were insti-
tuted prior to the surety bond matter and the plaintiff
was still disputing the revocation of its license in the
surety bond matter when the commissioner acted in
the present matter. The plaintiff could have chosen to
abandon its appeal of the revocation in the present
matter because its revocation in the surety bond matter
had been upheld by our Supreme Court, but it chose
to continue with the appeal because of the regulatory
consequences of the revocation in the present matter
as well as the substantial penalty that the commissioner
imposed. Under these circumstances—where the plain-
tiff, recognizing the possibility of a compliance revoca-
tion, consciously caused the first revocation to avoid
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the more serious consequences of the second revoca-
tion—it is somewhat disingenuous for the plaintiff to
argue that, once its license had been revoked, it could
not be revoked a second time. This is especially true
given that the more serious revocation proceeding,
which resulted in the second revocation, began first.
Because we find that the commissioner had the
authority to revoke the plaintiff’s mortgage lender
license in the compliance matter after the compelled
revocation of the plaintiff’s license in the surety bond
matter, the trial court did not err in failing to modify
or vacate the commissioner’s revocation order.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
deferred to the department’s statutory interpretation of
‘‘mortgage loan originator’’ as defined in § 36a-485 (20).
We disagree.
‘‘[R]eview of an administrative agency decision
requires a court to determine whether there is substan-
tial evidence in the administrative record to support
the agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the
conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable.
. . . Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the
case or substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or
questions of fact. . . . Our ultimate duty is to deter-
mine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency,
in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, ille-
gally or in abuse of its discretion.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v.
Dept. of Social Services, supra, 288 Conn. 833. ‘‘An
appellate court’s duty in assessing whether substantial
evidence has been presented is to determine whether
the record affords a substantial basis of fact from which
the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred from the
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evidence presented.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 834.
The parties’ dispute as to the meaning of ‘‘mortgage
loan originator’’ presents a question of statutory inter-
pretation. As previously stated, although courts afford
deference to the construction of a statute applied by
the administrative agency empowered by law to carry
out the statute’s purposes, such deference is ‘‘unwar-
ranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not
previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to]
. . . a governmental agency’s time-tested interpreta-
tion . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept.
of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commis-
sion, 298 Conn. 703, 716–17, 6 A.3d 763 (2010). The
department’s interpretation of ‘‘mortgage loan origina-
tor’’ has never been subjected to judicial scrutiny or
consistently applied by the agency over a long period
of time. Accordingly, the traditional deference normally
accorded to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory
term is not warranted in this case. See id., 717–18.
Additionally, because the appeal to the trial court was
based solely on the record, we accord no deference to
the trial court’s interpretation of ‘‘mortgage loan origi-
nator.’’ See Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of
Information Commission, supra, 307 Conn. 63 n.15.
The Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage
Licensing Act of 2008 (federal SAFE Act), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5101 et seq.,20 is ‘‘the main federal statute governing
licensing’’ of MLOs. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau v. 1st Alliance Lending, LLC, Docket No. 3:21-
cv-55 (RNC), 2022 WL 993582, *3 (D. Conn. March 31,
2022). The federal SAFE Act ‘‘encouraged states to
implement state versions of the SAFE Act, with the
20
Title 12 of the United States Code, § 5102 (4) (A), provides that a loan
originator, who must be licensed, ‘‘means an individual who—(I) takes a
residential mortgage loan application; and (II) offers or negotiates terms of
a residential mortgage loan for compensation or gain . . . .’’
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minimum standards in the federal statute as a floor. 12
C.F.R. § 1008.1 (b).’’ Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau v. 1st Alliance Lending, LLC, supra, 2022 WL
993582, *2. As a result of the federal SAFE Act, the
Connecticut legislature enacted the Connecticut SAFE
Act, which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[m]ortgage
loan originator means an individual who for compensa-
tion or gain . . . (A) takes a residential mortgage loan
application, or (B) offers or negotiates terms of a resi-
dential mortgage loan. . . .’’ General Statutes § 36a-485
(20). Pursuant to the federal SAFE Act as implemented
by the Connecticut SAFE Act, individuals who engage
in either activity must be licensed as an MLO.21
Both parties agree that the additional definitions set
forth in Regulation H, 12 C.F.R. § 1008 et seq., which
implements the federal SAFE Act, should govern what
conduct constitutes acting as an MLO pursuant to the
Connecticut SAFE Act. Regulation H provides that ‘‘[a]n
individual ‘takes a residential mortgage loan applica-
tion’ if the individual receives a residential mortgage
loan application for the purpose of facilitating a deci-
sion whether to extend an offer of residential mortgage
loan terms to a borrower or prospective borrower (or to
accept the terms offered by a borrower or prospective
borrower in response to a solicitation), whether the
application is received directly or indirectly from the
borrower or prospective borrower.’’ 12 C.F.R.
§ 1008.103 (c) (1) (2024). The parties disagree as to
whether the conduct of the plaintiff’s HLCs meets the
definition of ‘‘tak[ing] a residential mortgage loan appli-
cation’’ as set forth in Regulation H. The plaintiff argues
that the department improperly expanded the definition
21
Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports the commis-
sioner’s finding that the plaintiff’s HLCs took residential mortgage loan
applications in violation of the Connecticut SAFE Act, we do not reach the
issue of whether substantial evidence also supports the commissioner’s
finding that the HLCs offered or negotiated terms of residential mortgage
loans.
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of MLO to include individuals that ‘‘collect limited infor-
mation to enter into a computer [so] that the company
can provide a prequalification letter . . . .’’ The depart-
ment, on the other hand, argues that it has not expanded
the definition of MLO and that the plaintiff’s HLCs’
conduct constitutes taking applications under the guise
of processing prequalification. We agree with the
department.
‘‘In construing a statute, common sense must be used
and courts must assume that a reasonable and rational
result was intended. . . . Moreover, [w]e must avoid
a construction that fails to attain a rational and sensible
result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature
sought to achieve. . . . If there are two possible inter-
pretations of a statute, we will adopt the more reason-
able construction over one that is unreasonable.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Ser-
vices, supra, 288 Conn. 803–804.
Here, the plaintiff’s HLCs communicated with poten-
tial borrowers, collected information, and input such
information into the Byte database, which automati-
cally generated draft loan applications for the MLOs
with that information. The plaintiff argues that this con-
duct does not constitute ‘‘taking a loan application’’
because HLCs do not collect all information necessary
for an application. In particular, the plaintiff argues that
it avoided the licensure requirement by instructing the
HLCs not to collect information on potential borrowers’
property addresses. It appears that the plaintiff seeks
to apply the definition of ‘‘application’’ set forth in TRID,
which provides that ‘‘an application consists of the sub-
mission of the consumer’s name, the consumer’s
income, the consumer’s social security number to
obtain a credit report, the property address, an estimate
of the value of the property, and the mortgage loan
amount sought.’’ (Emphasis added.) 12 C.F.R. § 1026.2
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(a) (3) (ii) (2024). Regulation H, however, defines appli-
cation more broadly. It states that ‘‘[a]pplication means
a request, in any form, for an offer (or a response to a
solicitation of an offer) of residential mortgage loan
terms, and the information about the borrower or pro-
spective borrower that is customary or necessary in a
decision on whether to make such an offer.’’ 12 C.F.R.
§ 1008.23 (2024). Because the federal SAFE Act pro-
vides the minimum standards for state versions of the
SAFE Act, the Connecticut SAFE Act definition of
‘‘application’’ cannot be narrower than the federal defi-
nition. We conclude that the broader definition set forth
in Regulation H governs the definition of application
for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff
violated the Connecticut SAFE Act. Accordingly, the
plaintiff cannot avoid the licensing requirement of the
Connecticut SAFE Act merely by instructing the HLCs
not to obtain property addresses because neither the
federal SAFE Act nor Regulation H expressly requires
applications to contain that information.
Even if we accepted the plaintiff’s contention that
property addresses are a necessary element of applica-
tions, there is substantial evidence in the record show-
ing that the HLCs routinely collected all information
necessary, including property addresses, to complete
all six components of the 1003 form, which the plaintiff
agrees is a residential mortgage loan application. For
example, the plaintiff employed Martin Murdock as an
HLC from July, 2016, to January, 2019. The following
exchange occurred between the department’s counsel
and Murdock before the hearing officer:
‘‘Q. So, looking at the first bullet point [of the HLC job
description] it says ‘obtain all applicable information
to complete 1003.’ Would you say that while [an HLC for
the plaintiff] that you basically obtained all applicable
information to complete 1003 for potential borrowers?
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‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. And then in parentheses it says ‘no property infor-
mation or final loan amount.’ Would you at times obtain
property information for a potential borrower?
‘‘A. At times, yes.
‘‘Q. And would you obtain a final loan amount for a
potential borrower while employed as [an HLC for the
plaintiff]?
‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. So, looking at this description of [HLC while
employed by the plaintiff] you would obtain all applica-
ble information to complete a 1003, including property
information and final loan amount?
‘‘A. Yeah. . . . [A]t times I sometimes didn’t do the
full inquiry. I would get income, assets, credit informa-
tion, and I would ask them if there’s a particular prop-
erty that they had in mind. If they didn’t, then I would
leave that information out for property information, the
final loan amount. If they did, I would let them know
if that house is something that they could pursue.’’
The plaintiff also employed Alexander Cottone as an
HLC from June, 2016, to December, 2018. Similar to
Murdock, Cottone testified that he would obtain all
information necessary to complete all six parts of the
1003, including property addresses, which he used to
gather information on loans available to potential bor-
rowers.22 Sara Jenkins, an HLC employed by the plaintiff
22
The following exchange occurred between the department’s counsel
and Cottone before the hearing officer:
‘‘Q. Okay. So, you would obtain information to complete a 1003?
‘‘A. I would, yes. I would absolutely get all parts that were necessary to
complete a 1003, all six parts, yes.
‘‘Q. So, this [HLC job description] indicates no property information. So
would you at times get property information . . . ? . . .
‘‘A. Yes, when people would tell me that they found a house I would tell
them, send me the contract. I wouldn’t be the one who would put the address
in the system. The majority of the time it was done by the [MLO]. They
were the one who put that last part in, which we had a few at the company.
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from July, 2013, to July, 2019, also testified that she
would obtain purchase and sales agreements from
potential borrowers, which showed the property
addresses. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s own internal
compliance audit report stated that HLCs engaged in
activity that required an MLO license and that the com-
pliance issues were ‘‘systemic.’’ Because the plaintiff’s
HLCs testified that they routinely obtained property
addresses from potential borrowers, substantial evi-
dence supports a finding that the HLCs took mortgage
loan applications even under the plaintiff’s own inter-
pretation of Regulation H.

The plaintiff additionally argues that the HLCs’ collec-
tion of information does not constitute the taking of a
mortgage loan application because the HLCs did not
input consumer information directly into applications.
The appendix to Regulation H, however, provides that
‘‘[a]n individual ‘takes a residential mortgage loan appli-
cation’ even if the individual . . . [o]nly inputs the
information into an online application or other auto-
mated system . . . .’’ 12 C.F.R. § 1008, Appendix A (a)
(1) (i) (2024). Here, HLCs routinely collected all infor-
mation required for a residential mortgage loan applica-
tion and input such information into the Byte system,
which automatically created draft applications for the
I’m sure you guys know. But, yes, we would get that information. It would
come in the form of either a purchase and sales contract, which would
come directly to us as [an HLC]. And then it was handed off to—which was
the last part of the—the application, and then it was handed off to the [MLO]
for them to do the official . . . 1003. . . .
‘‘Q. So, even before you get a purchase and sale contract would you
receive information concerning a property address that a borrower was
interested [in]?
‘‘A. Yes, absolutely.
‘‘Q. And what if anything would you do with that information?
‘‘A. Usually look up the house, look up taxes, what the purchase price is
on Zillow, or . . . something similar to that. That would give me an accurate
portrayal of what the potential amount could be for . . . the loan amount.’’
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MLOs. We conclude that inputting consumer informa-
tion into the Byte system constitutes taking a residential
mortgage loan application pursuant to the definition
set forth in Regulation H.

Lastly, the plaintiff argues that the HLCs’ collection of
information does not constitute the taking of a mortgage
loan application because MLOs independently verify
the information before completing the application. The
appendix to Regulation H, however, provides that ‘‘[a]n
individual ‘takes a residential mortgage loan applica-
tion’ even if the individual . . . [i]s not responsible for
verifying information. The fact that an individual who
takes application information from a borrower or pro-
spective borrower is not responsible for verifying that
information . . . does not mean that the individual is
not taking an application . . . .’’ 12 C.F.R. § 1008,
Appendix A (a) (1) (i) (2024). Accordingly, even if the
MLOs were responsible for verifying information col-
lected by HLCs, an HLC’s collection of unverified con-
sumer information constitutes taking an application.

The trial court properly concluded that substantial
evidence supports the commissioner’s finding that the
plaintiff violated the Connecticut SAFE Act by using
unlicensed HLCs to take residential mortgage loan
applications. The administrative record reveals that,
under the plaintiff’s business model, HLCs collected
information from potential borrowers, including their
property addresses, and input the collected information
into the Byte system, which automatically generated
draft applications for the MLOs. We conclude that this
conduct constitutes ‘‘taking a residential mortgage loan
application’’ under the definitions set forth in Regula-
tion H and the Connecticut SAFE Act. Accordingly, we
conclude that the court did not improperly defer to the
department’s interpretation of the definition of MLO in
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reaching its conclusion that substantial evidence sup-
ports the commissioner’s finding that the plaintiff vio-
lated the Connecticut SAFE Act.
III
The plaintiff next claims that the commissioner
improperly applied § 36a-498e (b) (1) retroactively.
Although the department agrees that § 36a-498e (b),
which became effective July 1, 2018, does not apply
retroactively, it argues that substantial evidence sup-
ports the commissioner’s finding that the plaintiff’s
improper conduct continued after the provision’s effec-
tive date and, therefore, the commissioner did not apply
the statute retroactively.23 We agree with the depart-
ment.
The appropriate standard of review is well settled. As
previously stated, ‘‘[r]eview of an administrative agency
decision requires a court to determine whether there
is substantial evidence in the administrative record to
support the agency’s findings of basic fact and whether
the conclusions drawn from those facts are reason-
able.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goldstar
Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, supra,
288 Conn. 833.
Section 36a-498e (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1)
[n]o person, other than an individual, who is required
23
The department also argues that the plaintiff did not preserve its retroac-
tivity claim for appeal because it ‘‘never made this argument before the
commissioner and at best presented a cursory statement about the effective
date of the subsection before the trial court.’’ The plaintiff stated the follow-
ing in its memorandum in support of its appeal to the trial court: ‘‘§ 36a-
498e (b) was promulgated by Public Act 17-233 and became effective July
1, 2018. None of the sixteen borrower transactions discussed in the [commis-
sioner’s decision] extend past May, 2018. Accordingly, [the plaintiff] could
not have violated § 36a-498e (b) . . . with regard to the transactions dis-
cussed in the [commissioner’s decision].’’ Because this claim presents a
question of whether the department improperly applied a statute, the plaintiff
properly preserved the claim by raising it to the trial court. We, therefore,
reject the department’s preservation argument.
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to be licensed . . . shall fail to establish, enforce and
maintain policies and procedures reasonably designed
to achieve compliance with [regulatory requirements].
. . . (3) No violation of this subsection shall be found
unless the failure to establish, enforce and maintain
policies and procedures resulted in conduct in violation
of . . . state or federal law . . . .’’
Here, the commissioner made the following findings:
‘‘While [the plaintiff] had a patchwork of policies and
procedures that were modified over time, these were
insufficient to address the violations involved in this
case. More important, such policies and procedures
were not enforced. [The plaintiff] hired employees with
no prior experience or training in the financial services
industry to be the main point of consumer contact; did
not sufficiently address the red flags associated with
call center employee conduct; assigned call center
employees to sales rather than having them supervised
by a licensed MLO; offered only sporadic training . . .
which was at odds with the compensation structure
and employee contests that encouraged call center
employees to snare borrowers at any cost; and did not
utilize a predictable and consistent pattern of discipline
in dealing with problem employees. While [the plaintiff]
argues that it subsequently attempted remedial mea-
sures, including discipline, in some instances, this was
a case of ‘too little, too late.’ ’’
Substantial evidence in the record supports the com-
missioner’s finding that the plaintiff failed to establish,
enforce, and maintain policies and procedures reason-
ably designed to achieve compliance with regulatory
requirements and that such failure resulted in conduct
that violated state and federal law. The plaintiff’s own
2017 internal audit report, which was published on Feb-
ruary 1, 2018, stated that its business model increased
the likelihood of violations, and communications
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between the plaintiff’s compliance officer and execu-
tives confirmed that the plaintiff understood this.
Indeed, the plaintiff created a business model that
incentivized the HLCs to close loans by paying them
commission, holding contests, and offering prizes based
on the number of loans they closed. Some HLCs made
more in commission than base salary, and many
believed they were the primary contact between the
plaintiff and potential borrowers. Although the plaintiff
incentivized the HLCs to close loans, it instructed them
not to take the property information of potential bor-
rowers to avoid the unlicensed taking of mortgage loan
applications. As discussed in part II of this opinion,
however, this instruction was often ignored by HLCs,
without negative consequences, and, thus, substantial
evidence supports the commissioner’s finding that the
plaintiff violated the Connecticut SAFE Act. Moreover,
the plaintiff concedes that it violated TILA and other
regulatory requirements related to issuing adverse
action notices to borrowers. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s
policies and procedures resulted in regulatory viola-
tions.

It can be reasonably inferred from the administrative
record that the plaintiff’s systemic compliance issues
continued after the effective date of § 36a-498e (b). The
plaintiff argues that it could not have violated the Con-
necticut SAFE Act after July 1, 2018, because its 2018
internal audit report rated its institutional licensing
compliance as ‘‘satisfactory’’ and its compliance man-
agement as ‘‘fair.’’ This report is undercut, however, by
the fact that the plaintiff was provided an opportunity
to show compliance with the legal requirements for
retention of its mortgage lender license on June 14,
2019, but it failed to do so. Additionally, testimony of
the plaintiff’s employees indicates that the plaintiff did
not come into compliance with the Connecticut SAFE
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Act after July 1, 2018. Massey, the plaintiff’s vice presi-
dent of compliance, testified that from 2017 to 2019,
the plaintiff did not focus on compliance. She stated
that she had to argue for ‘‘even the simplest of compli-
ance,’’ and it was ‘‘not something that was well liked
or supported.’’ She further testified that after she pub-
lished the 2017 internal audit report on February 1,
2018, she recommended long-term solutions to ensure
that the plaintiff complied with licensing requirements,
but the plaintiff never implemented the solutions. In
fact, the plaintiff told Massey that it would not imple-
ment her recommendations at least partially because
they would cost the plaintiff too much money.
Moreover, Murdock, Cottone, and Jenkins, who were
employed by the plaintiff as HLCs before and after
July 1, 2018, testified that, throughout their employment
with the plaintiff, they collected all information neces-
sary to complete residential mortgage loan applications,
which supports the commissioner’s finding that the
plaintiff violated the SAFE Act, as discussed in part II
of this opinion. Neither Murdock, Cottone, nor Jenkins
indicated that the plaintiff changed their job responsibil-
ities after July 1, 2018. Because the evidence demon-
strates that the plaintiff did not make any significant
changes to ensure regulatory compliance after July 1,
2018, the commissioner reasonably could infer from the
record that the plaintiff’s violations that took place prior
to the effective date of § 36a-498e (b) continued after
that date.
Substantial evidence in the record supports the com-
missioner’s finding that the plaintiff failed to establish,
enforce, and maintain policies and procedures reason-
ably designed to achieve compliance with regulatory
requirements, which resulted in conduct that violated,
inter alia, the Connecticut SAFE Act after July 1, 2018.
Because substantial evidence supports the commission-
er’s finding that the plaintiff violated § 36a-498e (b) after
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its effective date, we conclude that the commissioner
did not improperly apply § 36a-498e (b) retroactively.
IV
The plaintiff next claims that the commissioner
improperly concluded that the plaintiff failed to fulfill
its obligation pursuant to § 36a-17 to cooperate with the
department’s investigation because (1) the department
failed to seek judicial enforcement of its subpoena and
(2) substantial evidence does not support the commis-
sioner’s finding that the plaintiff failed to cooperate
with it. We disagree.
Section 36a-17 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(c) For the
purpose of any investigation . . . the commissioner
may . . . direct, order or subpoena such person to pro-
duce records the commissioner deems relevant or mate-
rial. . . . (e) Any person who is the subject of any
inquiry, investigation, examination or proceeding pur-
suant to this section shall (1) make its records available
to the commissioner in readable form . . . (3) provide
copies or computer printouts of records when so
requested; (4) make or compile reports or prepare other
information as directed by the commissioner . . . and
(6) otherwise cooperate with the commissioner. . . .’’
The following additional facts are relevant to the
resolution of this claim. On September 19, 2018, as part
of the department’s investigation into the compliance
matter, Serrano requested that the plaintiff provide
emails sent and received by ten of the plaintiff’s employ-
ees over a specified four month period. In recognition
that the materials requested were voluminous, Serrano
offered to allow a ‘‘rolling basis for the production of
such records’’ and advised the plaintiff that it did not
have to produce emails protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Counsel for the plaintiff responded as follows:
‘‘[T]here are over 200,000 emails for the custodians and
time frame you identified, some of which are protected
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by the attorney-client privilege and others of which are
personal or otherwise irrelevant to regulated lending
activities. To review each of these 200,000-plus emails
. . . would be time and cost prohibitive.’’ After dis-
cussing the production request over a phone call, Ser-
rano emailed the plaintiff’s counsel clarifying the scope
and relevancy of their production request and
explaining that failure to comply would result in a viola-
tion of § 36a-17. On October 12, 2018, the department
issued a subpoena ordering the plaintiff to produce
the requested emails, with which the plaintiff failed to
comply. At the time that the administrative hearings
began, the plaintiff still had not produced a significant
portion of the requested emails.

The commissioner found that, ‘‘[d]uring the hearing,
the department noted that no emails were produced in
response to the request, notwithstanding the depart-
ment’s subsequent issuance of a subpoena . . . with
which [the plaintiff] failed to comply.’’ It further found
that ‘‘[the plaintiff’s] claim of hardship is not persuasive.
In addition, as a regulated member of the financial ser-
vices industry serving consumers in Connecticut and
other states, [the plaintiff’s] failure to comply with a
governmental subpoena is unacceptable.’’ The commis-
sioner thereafter concluded that ‘‘[the plaintiff’s] failure
to produce the requested emails even after the agency
subpoenaed them constitutes a violation of [§] 36a-17
(e) . . . . As a then-licensed mortgage lender, [the
plaintiff] had an obligation to comply with state laws
governing the operation of its licensed business.’’

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the commissioner
cannot find that it had failed to cooperate in violation of
§ 36a-17 because the department failed to seek judicial
enforcement of the subpoena. Although § 36a-17 grants
the commissioner the authority to request the Superior
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Court to order a party to comply with a subpoena,24 the
department is not required to do so.25 Obtaining a court
order would permit the department to move for con-
tempt in the event of failure to comply, but a court order
is not necessary to make the subpoena enforceable.
Rather, if the plaintiff wished to avoid the subpoena,
it could and should have filed a motion to quash or
otherwise objected to the subpoena. See State v. Wil-
liams, 146 Conn. App. 114, 148, 75 A.3d 668 (2013) (‘‘[a]
subpoena . . . commences an adversary process dur-
ing which the person served with the subpoena may
challenge it in court before complying with its
demands’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d,
317 Conn. 691, 119 A.3d 1194 (2015); Southridge Capital
Management, LLC v. Pitkin, Superior Court, judicial
24
General Statutes § 36a-17 (f) provides: ‘‘The [S]uperior [C]ourt for the
judicial district of Hartford, upon application of the commissioner, may issue
to any person refusing to obey a subpoena issued pursuant to subsection
(c) of this section an order requiring that person to appear before the
commissioner or any officer designated by the commissioner to produce
records so ordered or to give evidence concerning the matter under investiga-
tion or in question. Failure to obey the order of the court may be punished
by the court as a contempt of court.’’
25
The plaintiff additionally argues that the department cannot find that it
failed to cooperate because the department failed to ‘‘exhaust [its] statutory
remedies’’ by seeking judicial enforcement of the subpoena. Such argument
is without merit. ‘‘The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law. . . . Under that
doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that
seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding,
unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum.
. . . In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dis-
missed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Direct Energy Services, LLC
v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, 347 Conn. 101, 145–46, 296 A.3d
795 (2023). The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine applies to
parties that prematurely seek to avail themselves of judicial remedies in an
administrative matter. There is no corollary for this doctrine as to judicial
remedies, however, as we have never held that an administrative agency is
required to seek judicial remedies before enforcing their statutory authority
in administrative proceedings. The doctrine is therefore inapplicable where,
as here, the department used administrative remedies to enforce its sub-
poena pursuant to its statutory authority without bringing the matter to
the court.
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district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S
(March 24, 2008) (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 238, 238–39) (‘‘[b]y
its application to quash an investigative subpoena
issued pursuant to [the commissioner’s statutory
authority], the plaintiff is asserting his right to be heard
expeditiously on a matter that is limited in scope from
an ordinary civil action’’). Accordingly, we conclude
that the department was not required to seek judicial
enforcement in order to find that the plaintiff failed to
cooperate with its subpoena.
The plaintiff next argues that the evidence does not
support the commissioner’s finding that it violated
§ 36a-17 because the plaintiff made efforts to resolve
the production dispute, and it produced many of the
emails requested. The plaintiff contends that it ‘‘made
repeated attempts to meet and confer with [the depart-
ment] in order to reach a reasonable resolution’’ but that
the department ‘‘largely ignored the plaintiff’s request
to meet and confer.’’ The record reveals, however, that
the department was responsive to the plaintiff’s con-
cerns regarding its production request. Between Sep-
tember 26 and October 5, 2018, Serrano and the plain-
tiff’s counsel exchanged multiple emails in which the
department narrowed the scope of its request and
extended the deadlines for production. On October 5,
2018, the plaintiff’s counsel and Serrano talked about
the production request over the phone, and Serrano
sent a follow-up email again clarifying the scope of its
request and deadlines for production.
Despite the department’s willingness to work with
the plaintiff so that it could meet its burden of produc-
tion, the record demonstrates that the plaintiff did not
produce all emails requested. Although the plaintiff
points to emails cited in the commissioner’s order as
evidence that it complied with the department’s produc-
tion request, Daniel Landini, an associate financial
examiner for the department, testified that the plaintiff
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never produced the emails requested. The plaintiff’s
counsel also stated before the hearing officer that ‘‘our
issue is not that we didn’t have the emails. It is that
there were way too many.’’ Moreover, John DiIorio, the
plaintiff’s chief executive officer, testified that he did
not know if the plaintiff ever produced the emails
requested by the department. He also testified, how-
ever, that the plaintiff did not produce the emails
requested in the department’s subpoena because it was
‘‘waiting for [the department] to seek enforcement, and
[it] didn’t.’’ Thus, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions,
substantial evidence supports a finding that the depart-
ment conferred with the plaintiff to resolve the plain-
tiff’s concerns, but the plaintiff still failed to produce
all requested emails.
The department, pursuant to its statutory authority
in § 36a-17, issued a valid subpoena on the plaintiff to
produce emails sent and received by particular employ-
ees during a limited period of time. The plaintiff never
effectively challenged the subpoena and refused or
failed to fully comply with it. Thus, the trial court prop-
erly concluded that substantial evidence in the record
supports the commissioner’s finding that the plaintiff
failed to cooperate with the department’s subpoena in
violation of § 36a-17.
V
The plaintiff next claims that it was deprived of due
process because (1) the department failed to give the
plaintiff an opportunity to be heard by an independent
fact finder, and (2) the court failed to provide meaning-
ful review of the commissioner’s decision.26 We con-
clude that the plaintiff’s due process claim lacks merit.
26
The plaintiff also argues that it was deprived of due process because
(1) the department failed to formally articulate its interpretation of ‘‘mort-
gage loan originator,’’ and (2) the trial court deferred to the department’s
interpretation. In part II of this opinion, we concluded that the court did
not improperly defer to the department’s statutory interpretation because
substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s finding that the plaintiff
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The plaintiff first argues that the department failed
to provide a neutral and impartial hearing because both
the commissioner and the hearing officer were biased
in favor of the department. It argues that the hearing
officer was biased because she is employed by the
department and reports to the commissioner. It addi-
tionally argues that the commissioner was biased
because he (1) improperly found that the plaintiff vio-
lated the Connecticut SAFE Act and (2) filed the notices
of intent and issued the final decision in the administra-
tive matter. We are not persuaded.
Our Supreme Court has ‘‘held repeatedly that the
procedures required by the UAPA exceed the minimal
procedural safeguards mandated by the due process
clause.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept.
of Health Services, 228 Conn. 651, 661, 638 A.2d 6 (1994).
The UAPA provides that, ‘‘[i]n a contested case, all
parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing
after reasonable notice.’’ General Statutes § 4-177 (a).
‘‘[A] hearing in an agency proceeding may be held before
(1) one or more hearing officers, provided no individual
who has personally carried out the function of an inves-
tigator in a contested case may serve as a hearing officer
in that case, or (2) one or more of the members of the
agency.’’ General Statutes § 4-176e.
violated the Connecticut SAFE Act even pursuant to the plaintiff’s own
interpretation of MLO. Furthermore, the department applied the definition
set forth in Regulation H, which the plaintiff agrees governs the definition
of MLO. Accordingly, the department has not changed the law nor applied
a ‘‘novel’’ interpretation of MLO as both parties understood the same regula-
tion to apply in the present matter. See Levinson v. Board of Chiropractic
Examiners, 211 Conn. 508, 535, 560 A.2d 403 (1989) (‘‘due process requires
that the notice given must . . . fairly indicate the legal theory under which
such facts are claimed to constitute a violation of the law’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The fact that the department did not accept the plaintiff’s
interpretation as to what conduct constitutes acting as an MLO under Regula-
tion H does not amount to a due process violation. Thus, the plaintiff’s
argument that the department’s statutory interpretation violated its due
process rights is without merit.
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‘‘It is well established that [i]t is not violative of due
process for the same authority which initiated the sub-
ject of the hearing to listen to and determine its outcome
as long as that authority gives the person appearing
before it a fair, open and impartial hearing. . . . An
administrative agency can be the investigator and adju-
dicator of the same matter without violating due pro-
cess.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Elf v. Dept.
of Public Health, 66 Conn. App. 410, 425, 784 A.2d 979
(2001). Moreover, ‘‘there is a presumption that adminis-
trative [agency] members acting in an adjudicative
capacity are not biased. . . . To overcome the pre-
sumption, the plaintiff . . . must demonstrate actual
bias, rather than mere potential bias, of the [agency]
members challenged, unless the circumstances indicate
a probability of such bias too high to be constitutionally
tolerable. . . . The plaintiff has the burden of estab-
lishing a disqualifying interest.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Moraski v. Board of Examiners of
Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 291 Conn. 242, 262,
967 A.2d 1199 (2009).

Here, the department provided the plaintiff with fif-
teen days of administrative hearings before a hearing
officer, and the commissioner subsequently issued a
final decision after reviewing the hearing officer’s pro-
posed decision as well as the administrative record.
The plaintiff does not point to any evidence that shows
that the hearing officer personally carried out investiga-
tive functions in this matter. The fact that the hearing
officer is an employee of the department, standing
alone, does not render the proceedings offensive to due
process. See Elf v. Dept. of Public Health, supra, 66
Conn. App. 425. Nor is due process offended merely
because the commissioner initiated the administrative
proceeding and determined its outcome. See id.
Although the plaintiff argues that the evidence relied
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on by the commissioner does not support his determina-
tion that the HLCs took applications and offered or
negotiated loan terms, mere disagreement with the
commissioner’s findings is not sufficient to demonstrate
that the commissioner was biased. Rather, the plaintiff
attacks the propriety of the structure of the department
generally, essentially arguing that there is inherent
potential for bias. Because, as previously noted, the
combination of investigatory and adjudicative functions
within the same agency does not itself offend due pro-
cess, the plaintiff has not satisfied its burden of showing
that it suffered unconstitutional bias. See id. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the department’s hearing proce-
dures complied with the UAPA and the plaintiff has
failed to establish any facts indicating that the hearing
officer or commissioner was biased. Thus, the depart-
ment did not deprive the plaintiff of due process.

The plaintiff additionally argues that the trial court
deprived it of due process by failing to provide meaning-
ful review of the commissioner’s decision. Again, we are
not persuaded. ‘‘Our case law establishes that judicial
review of administrative decisions is deferential. A stat-
utory right to appeal, however, must be meaningful.
[A] court cannot take the view in every case that the
discretion exercised by the local [agency] must not be
disturbed, for if it did the right of appeal would be empty
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gibbons v.
Historic District Commission, 285 Conn. 755, 766, 941
A.2d 917 (2008). As previously discussed, ‘‘[r]eview of
an administrative agency decision requires a court to
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the
administrative record to support the agency’s findings
of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from
those facts are reasonable.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of
Social Services, supra, 288 Conn. 833.
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The plaintiff argues that the court misapplied the
substantial evidence test by deferring to the department
and, therefore, violated its due process rights. Such an
argument is meritless. The plaintiff has failed to point
to anything in the court’s memorandum of decision that
would support a conclusion that the trial court applied
an incorrect standard of review. Instead, the plaintiff
merely disagrees with the court’s ultimate conclusions.
The court, however, properly articulated the substantial
evidence test and analyzed whether the record supports
the commissioner’s findings of violation. Moreover, on
appeal to this court, we sit in the same position as
the trial court and conduct a de novo review of the
administrative record, employing the same substantial
evidence test. See Commissioner of Correction v. Free-
dom of Information Commission, supra, 307 Conn.
63 n.15. Because we review the record to ensure that
substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s chal-
lenged findings, we ensure that the court afforded the
plaintiff due process by applying the correct test in
determining that the commissioner’s findings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record.
VI
The plaintiff next claims that the penalties ordered
by the commissioner are unconstitutionally excessive
in violation of the eighth amendment to the United
States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecti-
cut constitution. We conclude that the plaintiff’s claim
is inadequately briefed and, therefore, we decline to
review it.
‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented
to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analy-
sis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and
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efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal
. . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their
arguments in their briefs. . . . The parties may not
merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the rela-
tionship between the facts of the case and the law
cited.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868
(2016); see also Getty Properties Corp. v. ATKR, LLC,
315 Conn. 387, 413, 107 A.3d 931 (2015) (claim was
inadequately briefed when appellants undertook ‘‘no
analysis or application of the law to the facts of [the]
case’’). ‘‘Where a claim is asserted in the statement of
issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in
the brief without substantive discussion or citation of
authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power
Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 266 Conn. 108,
120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003).
Here, the plaintiff argues that the penalties ordered
by the commissioner are unconstitutionally excessive.
The plaintiff uses approximately one and one-half pages
to set forth the legal framework for determining
whether a civil penalty is an excessive fine in violation
of the eighth amendment to the United States constitu-
tion or article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution.
See Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Hamden, 202 Conn.
App. 467, 481, 246 A.3d 513 (2021) (‘‘to determine
whether a financial penalty is unconstitutional under
the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment to
the federal constitution, courts rely on [a] two step
inquiry’’), aff’d, 345 Conn. 76, 282 A.3d 1253 (2022).
Then, without engaging in legal analysis, the plaintiff
concludes that, ‘‘[h]ere, the remedies are excessive fines
under the federal and state tests.’’ Not only does the
plaintiff fail to discuss the facts of the case, but it also
fails to specify which penalties the commissioner
imposed and analyze how the legal authorities cited
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support its argument that such penalties are excessive.
Because the plaintiff makes no effort to employ the
governing ‘‘grossly disproportional test’’; see Sera-
monte Associates, LLC v. Hamden, supra, 481–86; the
plaintiff’s claim that the commissioner ordered uncon-
stitutionally excessive penalties is inadequately briefed.
VII
Last, the plaintiff claims that if any of the commission-
er’s findings of violation were made in error, we must
remand the matter for a new penalty hearing because
the commissioner failed to specify which violations sup-
port the imposition of each penalty. As we have pre-
viously concluded in this opinion, the commissioner’s
challenged findings are supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record. Therefore, remand is unwarranted.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.