State v. Lee

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Lee

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TIMOTHY A. LEE
(AC 46751)
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CLIFTON LABREC
(AC 46758)
Moll, Suarez and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

The state appealed in each case from the judgment of the trial court granting
the defendant’s motion to dismiss the underlying charges brought against
him on statute of limitations grounds. The state, which did not challenge the
dismissal of the charge of failure to appear brought against each defendant,
claimed that the court improperly applied statute of limitations principles
in dismissing the underlying timely filed charges brought against each defen-
dant. Held:

The trial court improperly granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss insofar
as it dismissed the underlying charges, as there was no basis on which this
court could conclude that the unreasonable delay in the service of certain
rearrest warrants for failure to appear should affect the prosecution of the
underlying charges, which were timely brought and which did not proceed
earlier because the defendants failed to appear in court, a circumstance of
the defendants’ own making.
Argued September 9—officially released November 19, 2024

Procedural History

Information, in the first case, charging the defendant
with the crimes of operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, possession of
cannabis, failure to drive in the proper lane, and failure
to appear in the second degree, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Tolland, geographical
area number nineteen, and information in a second case
charging the defendant with the crimes of operation of
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
or drugs, traveling unreasonably fast, and failure to
appear in the second degree, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Tolland, geographical
area number nineteen, where, in the first case, the count
charging the defendant with possession of cannabis
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
State v. Lee

was dismissed; thereafter, in each case, the court, Klatt,
J., granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and ren-
dered judgment thereon; subsequently, in each case,
the court, Klatt, J., granted the state’s motion for per-
mission to appeal, and the state filed separate appeals
to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.
Laurie N. Feldman, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Matthew C. Gedansky, state’s
attorney, and Jonathan M. Shaw and Ashely Sgro, assis-
tant state’s attorneys, for the appellant (state).
Cameron L. Atkinson, with whom, on the brief, was
Herman Woodard, for the appellee (defendant in
Docket No. AC 46751).
Nicole Van Lear, deputy assistant public defender,
for the appellee (defendant in Docket No. AC 46758).
Opinion

MOLL, J. These two appeals, although not consoli-
dated, involve an identical issue, namely, whether the
unreasonable delay in the execution of a rearrest war-
rant for failure to appear, which led to the dismissal of
the failure to appear charge on statute of limitations
grounds, also warranted, on statute of limitations
grounds, the dismissal of the otherwise timely filed
underlying charges. In Docket No. AC 46751, the state
appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing
the charges brought against the defendant Timothy A.
Lee. In Docket No. AC 46758, the state appeals from the
judgment of the court dismissing the charges brought
against the defendant Clifton Labrec. In both appeals,
the state asserts that, in connection with dismissing
the defendants’ respective failure to appear charges on
statute of limitations grounds, which the state does
not challenge, the court improperly applied statute of
limitations principles in dismissing the underlying
timely filed charges brought against each defendant.
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Lee

We agree with the state and, accordingly, reverse the
judgments of the trial court insofar as the court dis-
missed the defendants’ respective underlying charges.
I
A
AC 46751
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of the appeal in AC
46751. On February 26, 2017, Lee was arrested on site
and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of General
Statutes § 14-227a1 and failure to drive in the proper
lane in violation of General Statutes § 14-236.2 On April
3, 2017, Lee pleaded not guilty to those charges. On
November 20, 2018, Lee failed to appear for a scheduled
court date, whereupon a bail commissioner’s letter was
sent to him ordering his appearance. On December 10,
2018, after Lee again failed to appear in court, Lee’s
rearrest was ordered for failure to appear in the second
degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-173, with
a rearrest warrant being signed by the trial court, Sicil-
ian, J., on December 12, 2018. The rearrest warrant
was not served until February 20, 2023.
On April 3, 2023, pursuant to Practice Book § 41-8
(7)3 and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitu-
1
Section 14-227a was amended during a special session of the legislature
in June, 2021; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2021, No. 21-1, §§ 116 and
117; however, that amendment has no bearing on the merits of the appeal
in AC 46751. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision
of the statute.
2
Lee also was charged with the possession of less than one-half ounce
of cannabis in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 21a-279a, but
this charge was dismissed as a result of the decriminalization of the offense
subsequent to the date of the charge.
3
Practice Book § 41-8 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The following defenses
or objections, if capable of determination without a trial of the general issue,
shall, if made prior to trial, be raised by a motion to dismiss the information
. . . (7) [c]laim that the defendant has been denied a speedy trial . . . .’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
State v. Lee

tion, Lee moved to dismiss all of the charges pending
4

against him on the basis that, notwithstanding that he
had resided at the same address for the past fifteen
years, ‘‘[t]he police made no reasonable effort to serve
the [rearrest] warrant from 2018 to 2023,’’ which ‘‘preju-
diced’’ him and ‘‘denied [him of] his right to a speedy
trial.’’ The state objected on the ground that the motion
to dismiss was ‘‘premature because [Lee] never filed a
motion asserting his right to a speedy trial [pursuant
to General Statutes § 54-82m].’’5 Moreover, the state
argued that (1) Lee also appeared to be asserting a
violation of the statute of limitations vis-à-vis the failure
to appear charge, and such assertion lacked merit
because (a) the signing of the rearrest warrant tolled
the applicable statute of limitations and (b) Lee failed
to demonstrate that the warrant was not executed with
due diligence, and (2) ‘‘[a]ny claim regarding the statute
4
Article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by articles
seventeen and twenty-nine of the amendments, provides in relevant part:
‘‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right . . . to a speedy,
public trial by an impartial jury. . . .’’
5
General Statutes § 54-82m provides: ‘‘In accordance with the provisions
of section 51-14, the judges of the Superior Court shall make such rules as
they deem necessary to provide a procedure to assure a speedy trial for
any person charged with a criminal offense on or after July 1, 1985. Such
rules shall provide that (1) in any case in which a plea of not guilty is
entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment
with the commission of a criminal offense shall commence within twelve
months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the
date of the arrest, whichever is later, except that when such defendant is
incarcerated in a correctional institution of this state pending such trial and
is not subject to the provisions of section 54-82c, the trial of such defendant
shall commence within eight months from the filing date of the information
or indictment or from the date of arrest, whichever is later; and (2) if a
defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit set forth in subdivision
(1) of this section and a trial is not commenced within thirty days of a
motion for a speedy trial made by the defendant at any time after such time
limit has passed, the information or indictment shall be dismissed. Such
rules shall include provisions to identify periods of delay caused by the
action of the defendant, or the defendant’s inability to stand trial, to be
excluded in computing the time limits set forth in subdivision (1) of this sec-
tion.’’
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Lee

of limitations for the [alleged] offenses that occurred
on February 26, 2017, [is] without merit because [Lee]
was arrested on site, on the date of the incident,’’
thereby necessarily satisfying the statute of limitations
that governed the underlying charges.
On July 19, 2023, the court, Klatt, J., held a hearing on
Lee’s motion to dismiss.6 After setting forth the factual
background of the case, which the parties did not dis-
pute, the court (1) found that Lee was not elusive follow-
ing the execution of the rearrest warrant and (2) con-
cluded there was an unreasonable delay in the service
of the rearrest warrant. The court then noted, and the
state confirmed, that the state was abandoning its objec-
tion to the dismissal of the failure to appear charge
against Lee, but it was maintaining that the unreason-
able delay in the execution of the rearrest warrant did
not justify also dismissing the underlying charges
against Lee.
The court proceeded to grant orally the motion to
dismiss as to all of the charges against Lee. In doing
so, the court discussed the purposes of statutes of limi-
tations, which included ‘‘protect[ing] the individual[s]
from having to defend themselves against charges when
the basic facts may have become obscured by [the]
passage of time and to minimize the danger of an official
punishment because of acts in the far distant past. It
also may have the salutary effect of encouraging law
enforcement officials to promptly investigate suspi-
cious criminal activity.’’ The court concluded that the
underlying charges against Lee were ‘‘equally [as] stale
[as the failure to appear charge against him] because
of the state’s failure to meet its burden’’ to serve the
6
The court held a preliminary hearing on June 2, 2023, during which the
court encouraged the parties to submit a factual stipulation and to prepare
for additional argument on July 19, 2023. The record does not reflect that
the parties submitted a stipulation prior to the court’s ruling on Lee’s motion
to dismiss.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
State v. Lee

rearrest warrant without unreasonable delay. The court
further stated: ‘‘The case law in this case . . . and the
statute [refer] to the prosecution, not to individual
charges. [The underlying charges against Lee] are in
the same situation as [Lee’s] failure to appear [charge],
if not worse. They are equally stale, if not more so.
Evidence and witnesses’ memories are now six years
old. There is no case law that I see or found that suggests
different [charges] should be treated differently, and
both the statute and case law, again, refer to the prose-
cution, which is all three [charges]. The [rearrest] war-
rant did not begin a new prosecution. It was . . . only
the means of bringing [Lee] to court. It is all one prose-
cution. . . . On that basis, the court finds that the
unreasonable delay extends to all of the [charges], and
accordingly, I will grant [Lee’s] motion regarding the
remaining three [charges] . . . .’’ Thereafter, the state
moved for permission to appeal, which the court
granted. The appeal in AC 46751 followed.
B
AC 46758
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of the appeal in AC
46758. On June 16, 2012, Labrec was arrested on site
and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of § 14-
227a7 and traveling unreasonably fast in violation of
General Statutes § 14-218a.8 On July 17, 2012, Labrec
first appeared in court. Following Labrec’s subsequent
7
Since the events underlying Labrec’s arrest in 2012, the legislature has
amended § 14-227a in ways that have no bearing on the merits of the appeal
in AC 46758. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision
of the statute.
8
Since the events underlying Labrec’s arrest in 2012, the legislature has
amended § 14-218a in ways that have no bearing on the merits of the appeal
in AC 46758. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision
of the statute.
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Lee

failure to appear in court on October 1, 2012, Labrec
was sent a bail commissioner’s letter to appear on Octo-
ber 15, 2012, on which date he again failed to appear.
Accordingly, Labrec’s rearrest was ordered on October
15, 2012, for failure to appear in the second degree in
violation of § 53a-173, with a rearrest warrant being
signed by the court, Graham, J., on October 18, 2012. On
September 1, 2022, Labrec was arrested for his failure
to appear.
On July 14, 2023, pursuant to Practice Book § 41-8
(3),9 Labrec filed a motion to dismiss all of the charges
pending against him, arguing that the period of time
between the issuance of the rearrest warrant in Octo-
ber, 2012, and the execution of the warrant in Septem-
ber, 2022, constituted ‘‘a lengthy and unreasonable
delay in service’’ and that, during such time period,
‘‘[h]e was neither elusive nor unavailable.’’ The state
opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that Labrec (1)
‘‘elud[ed] the authorities and was difficult to appre-
hend’’ with respect to the rearrest warrant and (2) failed
to demonstrate prejudice caused by the alleged delay
in the execution of the rearrest warrant.
On July 26, 2023, one week following the hearing
held on Lee’s motion to dismiss, the court, Klatt, J.,
conducted a hearing on Labrec’s motion to dismiss.
During the hearing, the court heard testimony regarding
the availability of Labrec and whether it was unreason-
able for the state to have served the rearrest warrant
ten years after Labrec’s failure to appear. On the basis
9
Practice Book § 41-8 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The following defenses
or objections, if capable of determination without a trial of the general issue,
shall, if made prior to trial, be raised by a motion to dismiss the information
. . . (3) [s]tatute of limitations . . . .’’
In support of his motion to dismiss, Labrec also cited unspecified federal
and state constitutional rights, the statute of limitations set forth in General
Statutes § 54-193 (d), and our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Swebilius,
325 Conn. 793, 159 A.3d 1099 (2017).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
State v. Lee

of the evidence adduced, the court (1) found that Labrec
was not unavailable or elusive during that time frame
and (2) concluded that the ten year delay by the state
in serving the rearrest warrant was unreasonable. The
court then considered whether to grant Labrec’s motion
to dismiss in toto or as to Labrec’s failure to appear
charge only, with the state arguing that the ‘‘failure to
appear [charge] should be the only charge that would
be eligible for a dismissal under the circumstances.’’
The court proceeded to grant orally the motion to dis-
miss as to all of the charges against Labrec. Insofar as
the court dismissed Labrec’s underlying charges, the
court relied on its reasoning from its decision granting
Lee’s motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court stated:
‘‘I had a full argument regarding that issue last week
with another member of the state’s attorney’s office
. . . . And the court’s reasoning then, and it’s the same
now—to begin with, the statute and case law [refer] to
one prosecution, not several, not separate offenses, but
one prosecution. And they also refer to the purpose of
the statute of limitations. Why we have that is [to] pre-
vent stale prosecutions. The original offense[s] [are]
now equally even more stale, and [they have] been made
more so by . . . the state’s failure [in] creating this
unreasonable delay in the execution of the [rearrest]
warrant. . . . If [the state] had served the failure to
appear [warrant] in [a] timely fashion or made some effort
[to serve the rearrest warrant], then [Labrec] could’ve
answered to the charges in a timely fashion. He’s been
unable to do so, and it’s been—and that’s at the hands
of the state. So, I will grant the motion as to all counts.’’
Thereafter, the state moved for permission to appeal,
which the court granted. The appeal in AC 46758 fol-
lowed. Additional facts and procedural history will be
provided as necessary.
II
Before addressing the merits of the state’s claims in
these appeals, we set forth the applicable standard of
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Lee

review and legal principles. ‘‘A motion to dismiss . . .
properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially
asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law
and fact state a cause of action that should be heard
by the court. . . . [O]ur review of the trial court’s ulti-
mate legal conclusion and resulting [denial] of the
motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . . Factual find-
ings underlying the court’s decision, however, will not
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. . . .
The applicable standard of review for the denial of a
motion to dismiss, therefore, generally turns on whether
the appellant seeks to challenge the legal conclusions
of the trial court or its factual determinations.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 178 Conn.
App. 715, 721, 177 A.3d 593 (2017), cert. denied, 328
Conn. 906, 177 A.3d 564 (2018). The question of whether
a prosecution for a particular charge is barred by the
statute of limitations is primarily a question of law,
which this court reviews de novo. See State v. Freeman,
344 Conn. 503, 512, 281 A.3d 397 (2022).
The parties agree that the underlying charges brought
against each defendant, respectively, are governed by
the one year statute of limitations set forth in General
Statutes § 54-193 (d)10 which provides that ‘‘[n]o person
10
General Statutes § 54-193 provides: ‘‘(a) There shall be no limitation of
time within which a person may be prosecuted for (1) (A) a capital felony
under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a
class A felony or a violation of section 53a-54d or 53a-169, or (B) any other
offense involving sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault if the
victim of the offense was a minor at the time of the offense, including, but
not limited to, a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-
21, (2) a violation of section 53a-165aa or 53a-166 in which such person
renders criminal assistance to another person who has committed an offense
set forth in subdivision (1) of this subsection, (3) a violation of section 53a-
156 committed during a proceeding that results in the conviction of another
person subsequently determined to be actually innocent of the offense or
offenses of which such other person was convicted, or (4) a motor vehicle
violation or offense that resulted in the death of another person and involved
a violation of subsection (a) of section 14-224.
‘‘(b) (1) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section or subdivision
(2) of this subsection, no person may be prosecuted for a violation of a (A)
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
State v. Lee

may be prosecuted for any offense, other than an
offense set forth in subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this
section, except within one year next after the offense
has been committed.’’ ‘‘[T]he purpose of a statute of
limitations is to [assure] a timely commencement of
prosecution . . . .’’ State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443,
447–48, 521 A.2d 1034 (1987). It is well settled that ‘‘a
warrantless arrest constitutes the commencement of a
criminal prosecution against an arrestee for statute of
limitation[s] purposes. . . . Accordingly, [a] defen-
dant’s warrantless arrest on the same day as the
class B felony violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a or 53a-70b, (B) class C
felony violation of section 53a-71 or 53a-72b, or (C) class D felony violation
of section 53a-72a, except within twenty years next after the offense has
been committed.
‘‘(2) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, no person may
be prosecuted for any offense involving sexual abuse, sexual exploitation
or sexual assault of a victim if the victim was eighteen, nineteen or twenty
years of age at the time of the offense, except not later than thirty years
next after such victim attains the age of twenty-one years.
‘‘(3) No person may be prosecuted for a class A misdemeanor violation
of section 53a-73a if the victim at the time of the offense was twenty-one
years of age or older, except within ten years next after the offense has
been committed.
‘‘(c) No person may be prosecuted for any offense, other than an offense
set forth in subsection (a) or (b) of this section, for which the punishment
is or may be imprisonment in excess of one year, except within five years
next after the offense has been committed.
‘‘(d) No person may be prosecuted for any offense, other than an offense
set forth in subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section, except within one year
next after the offense has been committed.
‘‘(e) If the person against whom an indictment, information or complaint
for any of said offenses is brought has fled from and resided out of this
state during the period so limited, it may be brought against such person
at any time within such period, during which such person resides in this
state, after the commission of the offense.
‘‘(f) When any suit, indictment, information or complaint for any crime
may be brought within any other time than is limited by this section, it shall
be brought within such time.’’
We note that, although the legislature has amended § 54-193 since the
date of the incident underlying each appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2019, No. 19-
16, § 17; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of these appeals.
Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 54-193 in this
opinion are to the current revision of the statute.
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Lee

offenses are alleged to have been committed by him
[is] a timely prosecution of the defendant within the
[applicable] statute of limitations.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nelson, 144
Conn. App. 678, 686, 73 A.3d 811, cert. denied, 310 Conn.
935, 79 A.3d 888 (2013).
‘‘[T]he primary purpose of statutes of limitations is
to encourage law enforcement officials promptly to
investigate suspected criminal activity . . . so as to
ensure that a defendant receives notice, within a pre-
scribed time, of the acts with which he is charged
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) State v. A. B., 341 Conn. 47,
68–69, 266 A.3d 849 (2021); State v. Almeda, 211 Conn.
441, 446, 560 A.2d 389 (1989) (‘‘[a]t the core of the
limitations doctrine is notice to the defendant’’). Stat-
utes of limitations exist for ‘‘[t]he purpose of . . . lim-
it[ing] exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain
fixed period of time following the occurrence of those
acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal
sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect indi-
viduals from having to defend themselves against charges
when the basic facts may have become obscured by the
passage of time and to minimize the danger of official
punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such
a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encour-
aging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate
suspected criminal activity.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. A. B., supra, 56.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 41-8 (3), a criminal defen-
dant may assert a statute of limitations defense by way
of a motion to dismiss. When asserting this defense in
the context of the state’s failure to serve an arrest war-
rant within the limitation period, the defendant has the
burden of ‘‘present[ing] evidence of his availability for
arrest during the limitation period, [whereupon] the
burden shifts to the state to present evidence of its due
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
State v. Lee

diligence in executing the warrant.’’ State v. Swebilius,
325 Conn. 793, 803, 159 A.3d 1099 (2017). There is no
per se rule regarding what is reasonable but, rather,
this ‘‘determination must be made on a case-by-case
basis in light of the particular facts and circumstances
presented.’’ Id., 809–10.

With these legal principles in mind, we turn to the
merits of the state’s claims on appeal. At the outset, we
iterate that the state does not challenge the respective
dismissals of the failure to appear charges brought
against the defendants. Instead, the state argues that
the court improperly dismissed the underlying charges
in connection with its dismissal of the failure to appear
charges on statute of limitations grounds. In connection
with this claim, the state asserts that (1) the statute of
limitations was satisfied for the underlying charges, as
both defendants were arrested on site, and (2) the court
incorrectly applied the principles underlying statutes
of limitations to conclude that the unreasonable delay
in the execution of the rearrest warrants in both cases
justified the dismissal of the underlying charges. In
response, the defendants argue that the court properly
applied statute of limitations principles in dismissing
the underlying charges. We agree with the state.

Lee was arrested on site on February 26, 2017, for
driving under the influence and for failure to drive in
the proper lane, putting him on notice of the underlying
charges against him on the same date of these alleged
offenses. Similarly, Labrec was put on notice of the
underlying charges against him on June 16, 2012, when
he was arrested on site for driving under the influence
and for driving unreasonably fast. These two ‘‘war-
rantless arrest[s] constitute[d] the commencement of
. . . criminal prosecution[s] against [the defendants]
for statute of limitation[s] purposes’’; State v. Nelson,
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Lee

supra, 144 Conn. App. 686; and, therefore, the underly-
ing charges were timely brought within the one year
limitation period.
As an initial matter, we observe that the ‘‘burden
shifting framework’’ for a statute of limitations defense
in the context of the state’s failure to serve an arrest
warrant within the limitation period; State v. Swebilius,
supra, 325 Conn. 804; as imported by the trial court,
simply does not apply to the underlying charges, as
such defense applies only if there is a ‘‘delay between
the issuance and the service of an arrest warrant’’; id.,
809; for a particular charge, which did not occur in
connection with the defendants’ underlying charges.
The state argues, and we agree, that the court improp-
erly applied statute of limitations principles, including
concerns regarding staleness and loss of evidence, to
justify the dismissal of the timely filed underlying
charges. It is well settled that statutes of limitations
are intended to mitigate prearrest delay. See State v.
Daren Y., 350 Conn. 393, 410, A.3d (2024) (citing
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322, 92 S. Ct.
455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971), for proposition that ‘‘statute
of limitations provide[s] . . . [mechanism] to guard
against . . . prejudice resulting from the passage of
time between crime and arrest or charge’’ (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). Although issues of staleness
and the risk of loss of evidence caused by the state’s
unreasonable delay in executing an arrest warrant are
important concerns underlying statutes of limitations
in general, such concerns do not apply when the statute
of limitations has been satisfied with respect to initial
charges and a defendant subsequently fails to appear.
In that case, it is the defendant’s conduct, and not the
state’s conduct, that is the principal cause of any nega-
tive impact from the delay in prosecution.
The state also argues, and we again agree, that the
court incorrectly reasoned, for statute of limitations
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
State v. Lee

purposes, the defendant’s cases each involved a single
prosecution such that the underlying charges could not
be separated from the failure to appear charges. The
language of § 54-193 (d), however, concerns the respec-
tive timing of the prosecution of individual offenses:
‘‘No person may be prosecuted for any offense . . .
except within one year next after the offense has been
committed.’’ The statute does not make any reference
to the prosecution of multiple charges against the defen-
dant as being a single unit. This conclusion is further
bolstered by this court’s history of affirming the dis-
missal of certain charges within a prosecution due to
the expiration of the limitation period, while allowing
the prosecution to continue with respect to other
charges that were brought in a timely manner. See, e.g.,
State v. Greer, 213 Conn. App. 757, 774–75, 279 A.3d
268, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 916, 284 A.3d 299 (2022),
cert. denied, U.S. , 143 S. Ct. 1061, 215 L. Ed.
2d 282 (2023); State v. Menzies, 26 Conn. App. 674,
678–82, 603 A.2d 419, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 924, 608
A.2d 690 (1992).
The defendants rely on multiple cases that discuss
the ‘‘burden shifting framework’’ and stand for the prop-
osition that arrest warrants must be executed with due
diligence, with the state’s failure to do so warranting
dismissal of the charges. It is true that the circum-
stances surrounding the rearrest warrants that were
issued for the failure to appear charges would fall into
the line of cases cited by the defendants. See, e.g., State
v. Swebilius, supra, 325 Conn. 802 (holding that arrest
warrant must be executed without unreasonable delay);
State v. Crawford, supra, 202 Conn. 450–51 (‘‘an arrest
warrant, when issued within the time limitations of
[the applicable statute of limitations], must be executed
without unreasonable delay’’). The problem with the
defendants’ assertion as it pertains to the present cases,
however, is that the underlying charges did not result
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Lee

from warrants that were executed with a lack of due
diligence. Cf. State v. Soldi, 92 Conn. App. 849, 851,
860, 887 A.2d 436 (holding that trial court improperly
denied motion to dismiss because ‘‘warrant was not
executed with due diligence in that it was not served
on her until more than five years after it had been
issued’’), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 913, 895 A.2d 792
(2006). Stated simply, the fact that the statute of limita-
tions was not satisfied with respect to the defendants’
failure to appear charges does not affect, let alone undo,
the state’s compliance with the statute of limitations
for the underlying charges.
In short, there is no basis on which this court can
conclude that the unreasonable delay in the service of
the rearrest warrants for failure to appear should affect
the prosecution of the underlying charges, which were
timely brought and which did not proceed earlier
because the defendants failed to appear in court. In
other words, this is a circumstance of the defendants’
own making. Indeed, reaching a contrary conclusion
would yield an absurd result and would incentivize
defendants to avoid appearing in court.11 Accordingly,
we conclude that the court improperly granted the
defendants’ respective motions to dismiss insofar as
the court dismissed the underlying charges.
III
We briefly turn our attention to the alternative
grounds for affirmance raised by Lee and/or Labrec.
First, both defendants argue that the judgments of dis-
missal in their respective cases can be affirmed on the
alternative ground that there was insufficient cause for
11
Although a defendant risks incurring additional criminal liability by
failing to appear in court, a defendant may believe that the risk of additional
criminal liability is justified depending on the severity of the underlying
charges and the possibility that the state will not serve the rearrest warrant
on a timely basis.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
State v. Lee

the continuation of their respective prosecutions pursu-
ant to General Statutes § 54-56.12 See State v. Corchado,
200 Conn. 453, 460, 512 A.2d 183 (1986) (§ 54-56 acts
as safeguard against prosecutorial overreach by giving
statutory authority to trial courts to dismiss charges
‘‘where the circumstances are compelling’’). Second,
Lee argues that the judgment of dismissal rendered in
his favor can be affirmed on the alternative grounds
that (1) the court’s dismissal of the charges against him
constituted a proper exercise of its inherent authority
to manage its docket and (2) the state’s unreasonable
delay in executing the rearrest warrant on him violated
his right to a speedy trial pursuant to article first, § 8,
of the state constitution. The state contends that these
alternative grounds for affirmance are unpreserved and,
in addition, lack an adequate record for review. For
the reasons that follow, we decline to review these
alternative grounds for affirmance.
‘‘[O]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can
and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or
otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the
trial court. . . . This rule applies equally to alterna-
t[ive] grounds for affirmance.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Juan J., 344 Conn. 1, 12–13,
276 A.3d 935 (2022); see also Practice Book § 60-5
(‘‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim
unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subse-
quent to the trial’’).
The defendants’ claims based on the ‘‘insufficient
cause’’ prong of § 54-56, as well as Lee’s claim based
12
General Statutes § 54-56 provides: ‘‘All courts having jurisdiction of
criminal cases shall at all times have jurisdiction and control over informa-
tions and criminal cases pending therein and may, at any time, upon motion
by the defendant, dismiss any information and order such defendant dis-
charged if, in the opinion of the court, there is not sufficient evidence or
cause to justify the bringing or continuing of such information or the placing
of the person accused therein on trial.’’
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Lee

on the trial court’s inherent authority to control its
docket, were not distinctly raised before the trial court.
Thus, these unpreserved claims are not properly before
us. Moreover, even if preserved, we would decline to
review them due to the lack of an adequate record. In
neither case did the court make factual findings regard-
ing the factors required for a § 54-56 analysis. See State
v. Dills, 19 Conn. App. 495, 503–504, 563 A.2d 733 (1989)
(‘‘Dismissal under § 54-56 for insufficient cause to jus-
tify the prosecution requires the court explicitly to
weigh all the competing factors and considerations of
fundamental fairness to both sides—the defendant, the
state and society, and presumably the victim. This must
be done with great caution, and a dismissal ordered
only when the circumstances are compelling. . . . This
difficult and delicate process necessarily involves a
careful consideration by the court of such factors as
the strength of the state’s case, the likelihood of convic-
tion, the severity of the crime, its effect on the victim,
the strength of the defendant’s defense, the defendant’s
personal situation, and all the other myriad factors that
underlie a judgment regarding fundamental fairness.’’
(Citation omitted.)). Likewise, in Lee’s case, even
assuming arguendo that the court had the inherent
authority in this context, the court made no factual
findings concerning any exercise of such authority.
With respect to Lee’s state constitutional claim that
his right to a speedy trial was violated, we note that Lee,
only in a cursory fashion, referenced this constitutional
right in his motion to dismiss. We need not resolve
whether Lee adequately preserved this constitutional
claim because, whether preserved or unpreserved, the
record is inadequate for us to address the merits of this
claim.13 The court made no mention of Lee’s right to a
13
Pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989),
as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), a
party can prevail on an unpreserved constitutional claim on appeal only if
four conditions are met, the first of which requires the record to be adequate
to review the alleged claim of error.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
State v. Lee

speedy trial in granting his motion to dismiss and did
not make any of the requisite factual findings inherent
in an analysis of whether his right to a speedy trial had
been violated in this particular case. See State v. Griffin,
220 Conn. App. 225, 234, 297 A.3d 1056 (2023) (‘‘[r]esolu-
tion of the defendant’s claim [that the trial court violated
his constitutional right to a speedy trial] requires us to
apply the balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972),
which involves a consideration of the following four
factors to determine whether a defendant’s constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial has been violated: the
length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant’’).
Without a sufficient factual record, we deem this claim
to be unreviewable.
In sum, we conclude that the court improperly dis-
missed the underlying charges. Accordingly, the respec-
tive judgments of dismissal in AC 46751 and AC 46758
must be reversed insofar as the underlying charges were
dismissed and we remand the cases with direction to
restore the underlying charges and for further proceed-
ings on those charges according to law.
The judgments are reversed with respect to the dis-
missal of the charges against Timothy A. Lee and Clifton
Labrec other than the charge of failure to appear as
to both defendants and the charge of possession of
cannabis as to Labrec, and the cases are remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion; the
judgments are affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.