Norwich v. Brenton Family Trust

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Norwich v. Brenton Family Trust

CITY OF NORWICH v. THE BRENTON
FAMILY TRUST ET AL.
(AC 46858)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Cradle, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been granted permission to be made a party defen-
dant, appealed from the trial court’s denial of her motion to open the judg-
ment of foreclosure by sale rendered in favor of the plaintiff city in a
municipal tax lien foreclosure action. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that
the court abused its discretion in denying her motion without a hearing. Held:

This court dismissed the defendant’s appeal as moot because it could not
afford her any practical relief and, accordingly, lacked subject matter juris-
diction over her claims, as the defendant, during the pendency of the appeal,
conveyed the property to a third party, leaving her with no legal or equitable
interest in the property in her individual capacity.

The appeal was not saved by the collateral consequences doctrine, as the
defendant’s proposed collateral consequences were inadequately briefed
and asserted nothing more than abstract, purely speculative injuries.
Submitted on briefs September 20—officially released November 12, 2024

Procedural History

Action to foreclose municipal tax liens on certain
real property owned by the named defendant, and for
other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New London, where the named defendant
was defaulted for failure to appear; thereafter, the court,
Calmar, J., rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale,
and Sheri Speer appealed to this court, Prescott, Cradle
and DiPentima, Js., which affirmed the judgment of
the trial court and remanded the case for the purpose
of setting new law days; subsequently, the court,
Calmar, J., approved the committee’s motion for
approval of the sale, and Sheri Speer appealed to this
court, which dismissed the appeal; thereafter, the court,
Hon. Emmet L. Cosgrove, judge trial referee, granted
Sheri Speer’s motion to be made a party defendant;
subsequently, the court, Hon. Emmet L. Cosgrove,
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Norwich v. Brenton Family Trust

judge trial referee, granted the plaintiff’s motion to reset
the sale date; thereafter, the defendant Sheri Speer
appealed from, inter alia, the judgment of foreclosure
by sale to this court, Alvord, Cradle and Clark, Js.,
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court; subse-
quently, our Supreme Court denied the defendant Sheri
Speer’s petition for certification to appeal; thereafter,
the court, Goodrow, J., denied the defendant Sheri
Speer’s motion to open the judgment of foreclosure by
sale, and the defendant Sheri Speer appealed to this
court. Appeal dismissed.

Sheri Speer, self-represented, filed a brief as the
appellant (defendant).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. In this municipal tax lien foreclosure
action, the defendant Sheri Speer1 appeals from the
judgment of the trial court denying (1) her July 20, 2023
motion to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale
rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the city of Norwich,
and (2) her motion to reargue that denial. On appeal,
the defendant claims that the court (1) abused its discre-
tion in denying the motion to open without a hearing,
(2) misinterpreted this court’s decision in Norwich v.
Brenton Family Trust, 218 Conn. App. 905, 291 A.3d
650, cert. denied, 347 Conn. 906, 297 A.3d 567 (2023),
and (3) committed plain error in denying the motion
to open. We do not reach the merits of the defendant’s
claims because, during the pendency of this appeal, the
defendant conveyed the property by way of a quitclaim
1
The Brenton Family Trust and Danjon Capital, Inc., were named as
defendants in the complaint. Approximately three years after the complaint
had been filed, the trial court granted Speer’s motion to be made a party
defendant. The Brenton Family Trust, which was defaulted for failure to
appear, is not participating in this appeal. Danjon Capital, Inc., also is not
participating in this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to Speer as the defendant.
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deed to a third party, and, accordingly, we dismiss this
appeal as moot.2
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. In 2019, the plaintiff com-
menced this foreclosure action with respect to property
located at 110 McKinley Avenue in Norwich (property)
against The Brenton Family Trust and Danjon Capital,
Inc. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that BMW, LLC,
was the record owner of the property on October 1,
2015, October 1, 2016, and October 1, 2017, and that
taxes in the amounts of $1650.88, $3280.22, and
$3256.66, respectively, were duly assessed upon the
property, became due and payable, and remained
unpaid. The complaint further alleged that The Brenton
Family Trust had become the owner of the property by
virtue of a quitclaim deed dated and recorded January
12, 2018.
The Brenton Family Trust was defaulted for failure
to appear and, on January 17, 2020, the defendant, then
a nonparty, filed a motion to be made a party defendant,
claiming that she had recently acquired title to the prop-
erty. On February 3, 2020, the court denied the motion
without prejudice to the defendant filing a copy of the
recorded deed with the court, which she did not do.
On February 18, 2020, the court rendered a judgment of
foreclosure by sale. On February 28, 2020, the defendant
filed an appeal from the denial of her motion to be
made a party defendant and from the judgment of fore-
closure by sale. This court summarily affirmed the trial
court’s judgment and remanded the case for the purpose
of setting a new sale date. See Norwich v. Brenton
Family Trust, 202 Conn. App. 905, 244 A.3d 186 (2021).
2
The plaintiff did not file a brief in this court. On May 15, 2024, this court
ordered that this appeal shall be considered on the basis of the defendant’s
brief and appendix, the record, as defined by Practice Book § 60-4, and
oral argument by the defendant, if not waived. The defendant subsequently
waived oral argument before this court.
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On remand, the sale took place on September 18,
2021, and resulted in the sale of the property to two
nonparties. On September 27, 2021, the committee of
sale filed a motion for approval of the sale, which the
court granted on October 13, 2021. On October 25, 2021,
the defendant filed an appeal from the court’s order
granting the motion for approval. On November 18,
2021, this court dismissed that appeal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction as a result of the defendant’s then
status as a nonparty.
On May 10, 2022, the defendant filed another motion
to be made a party defendant, appending thereto a copy
of a January 2, 2020 recorded quitclaim deed showing
a transfer of the property from The Brenton Family
Trust to the defendant. On June 21, 2022, the court
granted that motion, without objection. The defendant
did not file a motion to open the judgment at that time.
On June 28, 2022, the defendant filed an answer and a
special defense, alleging that ‘‘BMW, LLC, was not in
legal existence and was not the owner of the property
subject to this action at the times alleged in the com-
plaint and therefore the plaintiff cannot recover as a
matter of law per Practice Book § 10-70.’’3 The success-
ful bidders ultimately did not consummate the sale, and,
on June 30, 2022, the trial court rendered a judgment
of foreclosure by sale and reset the sale date to Septem-
ber 10, 2022. Meanwhile, on July 5, 2022, the defendant
3
Practice Book § 10-70 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) In any action to
foreclose a municipal tax or assessment lien the plaintiff need only allege
and prove: (1) the ownership of the liened premises on the date when the
same went into the tax list, or when said assessment was made; (2) that
thereafter a tax in the amount specified in the list, or such assessment in
the amount made, was duly and properly assessed upon the property and
became due and payable; (3) (to be used only in cases where the lien has
been continued by certificate) that thereafter a certificate of lien for the
amount thereof was duly and properly filed and recorded in the land records
of the said town on the date stated; (4) that no part of the same has been
paid; and (5) other encumbrances as required by the preceding section. . . .’’
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filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that she
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect
to her special defense. This motion was not adjudicated.
On July 11, 2022, the court rendered a corrected judg-
ment of foreclosure by sale, which corrected a typo-
graphical error.
On July 11, 2022, the defendant filed a motion to
reargue the June 30, 2022 foreclosure judgment. On July
25, 2022, the court denied that motion. On August 1,
2022, the defendant filed an appeal from the June 30,
2022 foreclosure judgment, the July 11, 2022 corrected
foreclosure judgment, and the July 25, 2022 denial of
her motion to reargue the foreclosure judgment. This
court summarily affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
See Norwich v. Brenton Family Trust, supra, 218 Conn.
App. 905. On June 27, 2023, our Supreme Court denied
the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal. See
Norwich v. Brenton Family Trust, 347 Conn. 906, 297
A.3d 567 (2023).
On July 20, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to open
the foreclosure judgment, arguing that the trial court
should open the judgment and consider her motion for
summary judgment. On August 7, 2023, the court denied
the defendant’s motion to open,4 and, on August 21,
2023, the court denied the defendant’s August 14, 2023
4
On February 8, 2024, pursuant to an order of this court, the trial court
filed a memorandum of decision setting forth the factual and legal basis for
its August 7, 2023 order. The court reasoned in part: ‘‘[The defendant] did
not file the motion to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale until August
7, 2023 ([docket entry] #212), well over a year after she obtained party
status. Although the defendant argued that the Appellate Court agreed with
her that the appropriate remedy was a motion to open judgment, rather
than an appeal, [no] such decision was articulated by the Appellate Court.
The motion to open the judgment was denied, in the court’s discretion,
finding that the request to open the judgment was not reasonable given the
passage of time that had elapsed since [the defendant] was made a party
defendant, and that it was unreasonable to open the judgment, under the
circumstances.’’
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motion to reargue the August 7, 2023 denial. On August
25, 2023, the defendant filed this appeal.
On August 30, 2023, pursuant to Practice Book § 61-
11 (d) and (e), the plaintiff filed a motion to terminate
the automatic appellate stay set forth in § 61-11 (a). On
September 6, 2023, the defendant filed an opposition
to the motion to terminate stay. On November 2, 2023,
following a hearing held that same day, the court
granted the motion to terminate stay. On November 8,
2023, the defendant filed a motion for review of the
November 2, 2023 order. See Practice Book § 61-14. On
February 7, 2024, this court granted review but denied
the relief requested.
During the pendency of this appeal, by virtue of a
July 12, 2024 motion to intervene filed in the trial court
by 110 McKinley Avenue, LLC, this court became aware
of a July 5, 2024 quitclaim deed, which was appended
to the motion to intervene, reflecting the defendant’s
conveyance of the property to 110 McKinley Avenue,
LLC.5 Accordingly, on September 4, 2024, we ordered,
sua sponte, the defendant ‘‘to file a supplemental memo-
randum of no more than 2000 words on or before Sep-
tember 16, 2024, addressing whether this appeal by the
defendant has been rendered moot; see, e.g., Rocco v.
Shaikh, 184 Conn. App. 786, 798–806, [196 A.3d 366]
(2018); by virtue of a July 5, 2024 quitclaim deed con-
veying the subject property from the defendant to a
third party, as documented in the July 12, 2024 motion
to intervene filed in the trial court.’’ On September 16,
2024, the defendant filed a supplemental memorandum
in accordance with our order. For the reasons that
follow, we conclude that this appeal is moot and is not
saved by the collateral consequences doctrine. Accord-
ingly, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain
the defendant’s claims.
5
The defendant is the managing member of 110 McKinley Avenue, LLC.
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‘‘Mootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to
resolve. . . . It is a [well settled] general rule that the
existence of an actual controversy is an essential requi-
site to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of
appellate courts to decide moot questions, discon-
nected from the granting of actual relief or from the
determination of which no practical relief can follow.
. . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the
time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pen-
dency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency
of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an
appellate court from granting any practical relief
through its disposition of the merits, a case has become
moot. . . . [A] subject matter jurisdictional defect may
not be waived . . . [or jurisdiction] conferred by the
parties, explicitly or implicitly. . . . [T]he question of
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . .
and, once raised, either by a party or by the court itself,
the question must be answered before the court may
decide the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Brookstone Homes, LLC v. Merco Holdings, LLC, 208
Conn. App. 789, 798–99, 266 A.3d 921 (2021).
The collateral consequences doctrine provides an
exception to the mootness doctrine. ‘‘[F]or a litigant to
invoke successfully the collateral consequences doc-
trine, the litigant must show that there is a reasonable
possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will
occur. Accordingly, the litigant must establish these
consequences by more than mere conjecture, but need
not demonstrate that these consequences are more
probable than not. This standard provides the necessary
limitations on justiciability underlying the mootness
doctrine itself. Where there is no direct practical relief
available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the
collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate,
calling for a determination whether a decision in the
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case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the
future. The reviewing court therefore determines, based
upon the particular situation, whether the prejudicial
collateral consequences are reasonably possible.’’ State
v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 208, 802 A.2d 74 (2002).
In her supplemental memorandum, the defendant
relies on the collateral consequences doctrine and main-
tains that this appeal has not been rendered moot as a
result of her conveyance of the property to a third party.
Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court’s
denial of her motion to open entails the following
adverse collateral consequences: ‘‘(1) to deny [her] due
process as protected by the fifth amendment [to the
United States constitution], for which she could later
seek a remedy; (2) preclusion of her ability to prosecute
her cross claim against appellee Danjon Capital [Inc.]
and to receive those proceeds; (3) entry of a judgment
against [her] without due process, which would stand
as of public record and impair [her] credit; (4) an effect
that would require future adjustments of the closing
relative to the buyer that acquired the property subject
to this action; and (5) ratifying the motion to open
would ratify the associated committee fees incurred
that otherwise would not have [been] had the motion
been denied.’’
These proposed collateral consequences lend the
defendant no support because, at a minimum, they are
not only inadequately briefed, but they also assert noth-
ing more than abstract, purely speculative injuries. See
Robb v. Connecticut Board of Veterinary Medicine, 204
Conn. App. 595, 611, 254 A.3d 915 (‘‘We repeatedly have
stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that
have been improperly presented to this court through
an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere
abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid aban-
doning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.
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. . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to con-
sider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties
must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs. . . . The parties may not merely cite a legal
principle without analyzing the relationship between
the facts of the case and the law cited.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 338 Conn. 911, 259
A.3d 654 (2021).
In sum, the defendant acknowledges that she trans-
ferred the property to a third party during the pendency
of this appeal. As a third party presently has legal title
to the property, the defendant no longer has any legal
or equitable interest in the property in her individual
capacity. Accordingly, because there is no practical
relief that we could afford the defendant, this court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the defendant’s claims
on appeal. See Rocco v. Shaikh, supra, 184 Conn. App.
805–806.
The appeal is dismissed.