Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Travelers Indemnity Co.

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COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND OPPORTUNITIES v. THE
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY
COMPANY ET AL.
(AC 46677)
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
OPPORTUNITIES v. YALE
UNIVERSITY ET AL.
(AC 46678)
Elgo, Moll and Suarez, Js.
Syllabus
In each of two cases, the plaintiff Commission on Human Rights and Opportu-
nities filed an administrative appeal in the Superior Court from a decision
of its human rights referee dismissing a complaint for age discrimination
per se in violation of statute (§ 46a-60 (b) (6)) against each defendant, an
insurance company and a university. The complainant, who was in his
fifties, had alleged that each defendant’s use of the phrase ‘‘recent college
graduates’’ or ‘‘recent graduate’’ in published job advertisements were writ-
ten so as to discriminate against individuals on the basis of age. The trial
court found that those phrases were not a proxy for age because a recent
college graduate can be of any age and rendered judgment in each case
dismissing the appeal. In separate appeals to this court, the plaintiff claimed
that the trial court improperly concluded that each defendant had not
engaged in age discrimination per se in violation of § 46a-60 (b) (6). Held:
The defendant in each case could not prevail on its claims that the trial
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s administra-
tive appeal, as the matter was not moot because the insurance company
no longer used the phrase ‘‘recent college graduates’’ in its advertisements,
the plaintiff’s standing to bring the administrative appeal was not dependent
on the complainant’s standing, despite the latter having abandoned his failure
to hire claim and his failure to participate in these appeals, and the plaintiff
had statutory (§ 46a-82 (b)) standing, having made a colorable claim that
each defendant had engaged in a discriminatory practice that affected the
interests of the complainant and others.
The trial court did not err in resolving the plaintiff’s claim that the referee
had improperly decided the case, as it properly analyzed and resolved the
plaintiff’s claim that the job posting amounted to age discrimination per se,
having properly concluded that the phrases ‘‘recent college graduate’’ and
‘‘recent graduate’’ did not express a preference for a younger class of appli-
cants and the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the referee acted unreason-
ably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of her discretion.
Argued May 28—officially released October 29, 2024
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Procedural History

Appeal, in each case, from a decision of a human
rights referee for the plaintiff dismissing a complaint
alleging age discrimination by the named defendant,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New Britain and tried to the court, Budzik, J.; judgment
in each case dismissing the appeal, from which the
plaintiff filed separate appeals to this court. Affirmed.

Michael E. Roberts, for the appellants (plaintiff in
each case).
Allison P. Dearington, with whom, on the brief, was
Jessica L. Chamberlin, for the appellee in AC 46677
(named defendant).
Kevin C. Shea, with whom, on the brief, was Jordan
J. Kowalski, for the appellee in AC 46678 (named defen-
dant).

Opinion

SUAREZ, J. These two appeals, although not consoli-
dated, involve closely related claims. In Docket No. AC
46677, the plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights
and Opportunities (CHRO), appeals from the judgment
of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal
brought against the defendant Travelers Indemnity
Company (Travelers).1 The plaintiff claims that the trial
court erred in concluding that Travelers had not
engaged in age discrimination per se, in violation of
1
The CHRO brought the administrative appeal to the Superior Court in
its own capacity. The CHRO was named as a defendant in its capacity as
the agency under which the human rights referee issued the decision from
which the commission appealed. See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance, 322 Conn. 154, 157 n.1, 140 A.3d
190 (2016). Glenn Liou, the complainant in the underlying action, was named
as a defendant for the purpose of making him a party to the appeal pursuant
to General Statutes § 4-183. Liou, however, is not participating in this appeal.
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General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (6),2 by means of posting
a job advertisement that contained the phrase ‘‘recent
college graduate.’’ In Docket No. AC 46678, the CHRO
appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing
its administrative appeal brought against the defendant
Yale University (Yale).3 The plaintiff claims that the
court erred in rejecting its claim that Yale had engaged
in age discrimination per se, in violation of § 46a-60
(b) (6), by means of posting a job advertisement that
contained the phrase ‘‘recent graduate.’’ We affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

AC 46677

The following undisputed facts, as set forth by the
trial court, and procedural history are relevant to this
appeal. ‘‘In November of 2015, Travelers publicly posted
a job notice for an entry level systems engineer. The
job description stated, inter alia, that Travelers was
‘[s]eeking upcoming and/or recent college graduates
with one or less years of experience in this job area
for the IT Early Career Area.’ On November 3, 2015,
Glenn Liou viewed Travelers’ job description on job
search websites, which may have included the websites
Indeed.com and Careerbuilder.com. [Liou] applied for
the Travelers job. In his application, [Liou] indicated
2
Section 46a-60 is part of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices
Act, which is codified at General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. Although § 46a-
60 has been amended several times since the events underlying these two
appeals; see, e.g., Public Acts 2017, No. 17-118; those amendments have no
bearing on the merits of these appeals. In the interest of simplicity, we refer
to the current revision of the statute.
3
Similar to the procedural history in AC 46677; see footnote 1 of this
opinion; in AC 46678, the CHRO was named as a defendant in its capacity
as the agency under which the human rights referee issued the decision
from which the commission appealed, and Glenn Liou, the complainant in
the underlying action, was named as a defendant for the purpose of making
him a party to the appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. Liou is not
participating in this appeal.
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that he had a bachelor’s degree and experience in vari-
ous computer and programming areas. [Liou] never
heard back from Travelers.’’
In 2016, Liou filed an affidavit of alleged discrimina-
tory practice with the CHRO claiming to be aggrieved
by Travelers’ failure to hire him. He averred that he
was fifty-five years of age and that, by seeking to hire
‘‘recent college graduates,’’ Travelers was ‘‘trying to
discourage old candidates age [forty] and above from
applying’’ for the posted position. Liou’s original com-
plaint was amended to add the CHRO as a prosecuting
party pursuant to § 46a-54-40a (a) (2) of the Regulations
of Connecticut State Agencies, thereby purporting to
expand the scope of the original complaint for the pur-
pose of seeking relief on behalf of other persons
aggrieved by the job posting. The amended complaint
alleged that ‘‘the advertisements published by [Travel-
ers] were written in such a manner as to have the
purpose or effect of restricting employment opportuni-
ties so as to discriminate against individuals on the
basis of age’’ and had ‘‘the purpose or effect of indicating
a preference or specification so as to discriminate against
individuals on the basis of age.’’ The amended complaint
expressly alleged age discrimination in violation of
§ 46a-60.
On February 13, 2019, a human rights referee (ref-
eree) held a public hearing. Thereafter, the CHRO and
Travelers submitted posthearing briefs.4 In her memo-
randum of decision, the referee noted that the CHRO
contended that the language of the job posting was
inherently unlawful per se under § 46a-60 (b) (6) and
that it need not present proof of discriminatory effects.
The referee noted that Travelers argued that neither
the CHRO nor Liou had standing because of the lack
4
Liou joined in the CHRO’s posthearing brief. By the time of the hearing,
Liou abandoned his individual failure to hire claim.
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of any demonstrated injury to Liou, or persons other
than Liou, caused by the job posting at issue. Alterna-
tively, Travelers argued that the job posting did not
violate § 46a-60 (b) (6), as argued, because it did not
reflect a preference for workers of a certain age and
there was no proof that it restricted the employment
opportunities of any allegedly aggrieved person.
In her memorandum of decision, the referee con-
cluded that ‘‘there is a complete lack of evidence to
support the charge of discriminatory practice in viola-
tion of § 46a-60 (b) (6). The [CHRO], as a complaining
party in its own name, and the individual complainant
[Liou], have proved no set of facts that would entitle
them to relief under the direct or inferential allegations
in the compliant. There is no evidence, let alone ample
evidence, to support a finding that the inclusion of
‘recent college graduates’ in [Travelers’] job notice was
intended to, and did, have the discriminatory effect [of]
imposing an age restriction segregating or separating
employees because of their age or expressing a prefer-
ence for a younger class of applicants [or] erecting
a barrier restricting and limiting job opportunities of
applicants because of their age.’’ Thus, the referee dis-
missed the amended complaint.
The CHRO appealed from the referee’s decision to
the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-
94a and in accordance with General Statutes § 4-183.
In its memorandum of decision dismissing the CHRO’s
administrative appeal, the court, after summarizing the
findings of the referee, stated: ‘‘The basic issue in this
appeal is whether Travelers’ advertisement of a job
seeking ‘recent college graduates’ is, by itself, per se
age discrimination. The court concludes that it is not.
As an initial matter, the court observes that there is no
evidence in the record as to the age characteristics of
recent college graduates. Therefore, there is no factual
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basis upon which the referee can make the factual con-
clusion that ‘recent college graduates’ is a proxy for
age. The court recognizes that some courts have held
that advertising for ‘recent college graduates’ is per se
age discrimination. . . .
‘‘Nevertheless, this court agrees with those courts
holding that the phrase ‘recent college graduates’ is
not per se discriminatory. . . . The court reaches the
conclusion that the phrase ‘recent college graduates’ is
not per se discriminatory both because this court views
[cases supporting that conclusion] to be better reasoned
and also because, on the factual record before the ref-
eree in this case, there was no factual basis to conclude
that ‘recent college graduates’ evidences a preference
for younger applicants.
‘‘Finally, this court holds that CHRO’s reliance on
Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women,
168 Conn. 26, 357 A.2d 498 (1975), is misplaced. The
court in Evening Sentinel held that newspaper job
advertisements published under the headings ‘Help
Wanted Male’ and ‘Help Wanted Female’ were per se
sex discrimination and that the newspapers publishing
such advertisements may be prohibited from publishing
such facially discriminatory advertisements. . . . The
court in Evening Sentinel said nothing about age dis-
crimination generally, or whether the phrase ‘recent
college graduates’ constituted per se age discrimina-
tion. As relevant to the case at bar, Evening Sentinel
stands only for the proposition that an entity may be
prohibited from publishing facially discriminatory job
advertisements. Evening Sentinel offers no assistance
in determining whether the phrase ‘recent college grad-
uates’ is, in fact, discriminatory or, more accurately, is
a proxy for age. As set forth above, this court concludes
that, standing by itself, the phrase ‘recent college gradu-
ate’ is not a proxy for age because a recent college
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graduate can be of any age.’’ (Citations omitted.) This
appeal followed.
A
Before reaching the merits of the claim raised by the
CHRO in this appeal, we will address three distinct
arguments raised by Travelers by which it challenges
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the
administrative appeal brought by the CHRO. ‘‘Subject
matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to
adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the
action before it. . . . A court does not truly lack sub-
ject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain
the action before it. . . . Once it is determined that a
tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class
of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining
the action. . . . It is well established that, in determin-
ing whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction,
every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be
indulged.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hepburn
v. Brill, 348 Conn. 827, 838–39, 312 A.3d 1 (2024).
‘‘[B]ecause [a] determination regarding a trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our
review is plenary. . . . Moreover, [i]t is a fundamental
rule that a court may raise and review the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction at any time. . . . Subject
matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court
to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the
action before it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to con-
sider the merits of a case over which it is without
jurisdiction . . . . The subject matter jurisdiction
requirement may not be waived by any party, and also
may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte,
at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonzalez v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 107 Conn. App. 507, 511, 946
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A.2d 252, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 902, 957 A.2d 870
(2008).
1
First, Travelers argues that ‘‘this case [was] moot and
should [have been] dismissed’’ because it ‘‘long ago
agreed to stop using the phrase ‘recent college graduate’
in its Connecticut job postings.’’5 Travelers relies on
the fact that the CHRO made clear in the trial brief that
it submitted to the referee that it sought the issuance
of an order causing Travelers to ‘‘cease and desist from
publishing, or causing to be published, job postings with
language indicating a preference directed to upcoming
or recent college graduates.’’ Travelers notes that, dur-
ing the 2019 public hearing before the referee, its coun-
sel represented that Travelers had voluntarily stopped
using the language at issue and that it would not use
similar language in the future. Travelers argues that,
because it had already implemented the primary relief
sought by the CHRO, the record reflects that there was
no longer a controversy between the parties. The CHRO
argues that Travelers’ bare assurances that it has volun-
tarily ceased the conduct at issue does not give rise to
mootness because there exists a possibility that Travel-
ers may once more engage in the conduct at issue in
the future.
‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be
determined as a threshold matter because it implicates
[a] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . Because
courts are established to resolve actual controversies,
before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution
on the merits it must be justiciable. . . . Justiciability
requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between
or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the
5
Before the referee, Travelers argued that the case was moot because it
had already implemented the primary relief requested by the CHRO. Before
the trial court, Travelers likewise argued that the case had become moot.
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interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the
matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated
by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination
of the controversy will result in practical relief to the
complainant. . . . A case is considered moot if [the
trial] court cannot grant . . . any practical relief
through its disposition of the merits . . . . [I]t is not
the province of [the] courts to decide moot questions,
disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from
the determination of which no practical relief can fol-
low. . . . When . . . events have occurred that pre-
clude [the] court from granting any practical relief
through its disposition of the merits, a case has become
moot.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kemon v.
Boudreau, 205 Conn. App. 448, 467, 258 A.3d 755 (2021).
‘‘It is well settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessa-
tion of a challenged practice does not deprive a . . .
court of its power to determine the legality of the prac-
tice, because, [i]f it did, the courts would be compelled
to leave [t]he defendant . . . free to return to his old
ways. . . . The voluntary cessation exception to the
mootness doctrine is founded on the principle that a
party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to
defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable
behavior. . . . Thus, the standard for determining
whether a case has been mooted by the defendant’s
voluntary conduct is stringent, and a case becomes
moot only if subsequent events [make] it absolutely
clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur. . . . The heavy bur-
den of persua[ding] the court that the challenged con-
duct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again
lies with the party asserting mootness.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Boisvert v.
Gavis, 332 Conn. 115, 139–40, 210 A.3d 1 (2019).
Here, Travelers has asserted that it has ceased using
the allegedly discriminatory job posting and that it will
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not use similar language in future job postings. The
voluntary cessation by Travelers occurred in the con-
text of the public hearing before the referee in this
action and not because external factors make the job
posting at issue in this case unnecessary. Nor is there
undisputed evidence to support a conclusion that it is
absolutely clear that similar language could not reason-
ably be expected to be used by Travelers in the future.
Without passing on the veracity of its representation,
we nonetheless observe that there is also nothing in the
record to undermine a belief that Travelers strategically
altered its conduct in an attempt to evade review of its
posting. Nothing in the record suggests that Travelers
would not be free to resume its practice of using similar
language in a job posting in the future. Only the repre-
sentations of public officials or official governmental
actors are accorded some amount of deference with
respect to the voluntary cessation exception. See, e.g.,
CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of Education, 346
Conn. 1, 21, 287 A.3d 557 (2023) (‘‘[w]hen governmental
actors have voluntarily ceased the conduct alleged to
have been unlawful . . . we have determined that
some deference is appropriate’’); Sullivan v. McDonald,
281 Conn. 122, 127, 913 A.2d 403 (2007) (‘‘[w]hen the
parties are public officials, the court may place greater
stock in their representations than the court otherwise
might’’). In the present case, it is undisputed that Travel-
ers is a private entity.
Here, beyond its representations during the context
of this administrative appeal, nothing in the record
makes it absolutely clear that Travelers will not resume
using job postings that contain the same or similar
language at issue in this case—language that Travelers
continually insists was proper in the first place. We
cannot say that there is any reasonable expectation that
the conduct will not reoccur in the future. Accordingly,
we are not persuaded in light of the facts of the present
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case that Travelers’ voluntary cessation of using the
challenged language should have permitted it to evade
judicial review of the referee’s decision in this case.
2
Second, Travelers argues that the trial court’s judg-
ment of dismissal should be affirmed on the ground
that Liou lacked standing to bring the complaint.6
According to Travelers, it is undisputed that Liou was
a recent college graduate and, thus, ‘‘he claims to be a
part of the group to which Travelers’ posting referred
. . . .’’ Also, Travelers relies on the fact that Liou, in
fact, applied for the position at issue. Moreover, Travel-
ers argues that nothing in Liou’s application demon-
strated that he possessed the technical skills required
of the position. Travelers argues that Liou did not meet
the legitimate nondiscriminatory criteria set forth in
the job posting. Travelers argues that, in light of these
undisputed facts in the record, Liou could not demon-
strate that Travelers restricted his employment oppor-
tunities.
As we have explained previously in this opinion,
although Liou filed the complaint before the CHRO, the
CHRO became a party in its own right independent of
Liou, who abandoned his failure to hire claim. The
CHRO brought the administrative appeal from the deci-
sion of the referee to vindicate its own interests, not
necessarily those of Liou. Likewise, Liou is not partici-
pating in the present appeal. Travelers has not cited
any authority to support the proposition that the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the administra-
tive appeal brought by the CHRO was in any way depen-
dent on whether Liou had standing to bring the appeal
6
Before the referee, Travelers argued that ‘‘a justiciable controversy’’ did
not exist because Liou did not present any evidence of a compensable injury.
Before the trial court, Travelers argued that the administrative appeal should
be dismissed because Liou did not suffer a direct injury and, thus, lacked
standing.
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in his own right. Because the CHRO has standing in its
own right, any issue as to Liou’s standing did not deprive
the Superior Court and does not deprive this court of
subject matter jurisdiction.
3
Third, Travelers argues that the judgment of dismissal
should be affirmed on the ground that the CHRO lacked
standing to bring the complaint.7 Travelers argues that
‘‘[t]he CHRO failed to establish standing in the matter
before the referee as there is no demonstrated injury
to the public merely because Travelers posted the job
position in question (and where the CHRO’s claim is
based on a complaint filed by [Liou] who suffered no
injury). CHRO’s general invocation of the public interest
is no substitute for evidence of a demonstrated alleged
injury to the public.’’ Travelers argues that § 46a-60 (b)
(6) obligated the CHRO to prove that its job posting
discriminated against more than one individual, but it
failed to demonstrate that it had caused any harm to
Liou, let alone others. Travelers also argues that, to
demonstrate that an actual controversy existed, it was
insufficient for the CHRO to raise merely ‘‘symbolic
interests on behalf of others who may not have applied
[for] the job because of the posting’s language . . . .’’
Our Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘[s]tanding is
not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties
out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather
it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts
and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate
nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions
which may affect the rights of others are forged in
7
Before the referee, Travelers argued that the CHRO lacked standing
because it had not proven a direct injury capable of redress. Likewise, before
the trial court, Travelers argued that the CHRO lacked standing and the
administrative appeal should be dismissed because it failed to present any
evidence that Travelers, by means of the job posting at issue, had discrimi-
nated against or harmed any individual.
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hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously
represented. . . . These two objectives are ordinarily
held to have been met when a complainant makes a
colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is
likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capac-
ity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy . . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete
adverseness and diligent advocacy. . . . The require-
ment of directness between the injuries claimed by the
plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also is
expressed, in our standing jurisprudence, by the focus
on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert
the claim at issue. . . .
‘‘Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement
exist, classical and statutory. . . . Classical aggrieve-
ment requires a two part showing. First, a party must
demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in
the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to
a general interest that all members of the community
share. . . . Second, the party must also show that the
[alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected
that specific personal or legal interest. . . .
‘‘Statutory aggrievement [however] exists by legisla-
tive fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts
of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory
aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to
those who claim injury to an interest protected by that
legislation. . . .
‘‘In order to determine whether a party has standing
to make a claim under a statute, a court must determine
the interests and the parties that the statute was
designed to protect. . . . Essentially the standing ques-
tion in such cases is whether the . . . statutory provi-
sion on which the claim rests properly can be under-
stood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a
right to judicial relief. . . . The plaintiff must be within
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the zone of interests protected by the statute.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
McWeeny v. Hartford, 287 Conn. 56, 64–65, 946 A.2d
862 (2008).
As we have explained previously in this opinion, the
CHRO joined Liou’s individual complaint brought
against Travelers and sought an order of general appli-
cability enjoining Travelers from using the job posting
at issue. In its amended complaint, the CHRO alleged
that, upon information and belief, Travelers had pub-
lished job advertisements seeking ‘‘recent college grad-
uates . . . .’’ The CHRO further alleged that the adver-
tisements discriminated on the basis of age in violation
of federal and state law and that they ‘‘adversely
affect[ed] the legal rights of persons other than and in
addition to [Liou].’’ Contrary to Travelers’ arguments,
the CHRO thus made a colorable claim that Travelers
had engaged in a discriminatory practice that adversely
affected the interests of Liou and others.
General Statutes § 46a-82 (b) provides: ‘‘The commis-
sion, whenever it has reason to believe that any person
has been engaged or is engaged in a discriminatory
practice, may issue a complaint, except for a violation
of subsection (a) of section 46a-80 [pertaining to certain
types of employment discrimination cases].’’ The stat-
ute unambiguously places the CHRO within the zone
of interests safeguarded by the statute. The right of
the CHRO to file a complaint in this matter was not
dependent on a showing of classical aggrievement, as
Travelers’ arguments seem to suggest, but upon a show-
ing of statutory aggrievement, which it readily satisfied
by means of the colorable claim set forth in its amended
complaint on behalf of the public interest. ‘‘The commis-
sion clearly is empowered by statute to prosecute com-
plaints on issues of public interest but it must strictly
comply with the governing statutes and the regulations
it has caused to be issued.’’ Groton v. Commission on
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Human Rights & Opportunities, 169 Conn. 89, 100, 362
A.2d 1359 (1975). Pursuant to § 46a-82 and § 46a-54-40a
(a) (2) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agen-
cies,8 the CHRO was empowered to prosecute a com-
plaint on an issue of public interest based upon its
colorable claim of a discriminatory job posting that
affected the rights of Liou and others. For the foregoing
reasons, we reject Travelers’ argument that the CHRO
lacked standing.
B
Next, we address the CHRO’s claim that the court
improperly concluded that Travelers had not engaged
in age discrimination per se, in violation of § 46a-60
(b) (6), by means of posting a job advertisement that
8
Section 46a-54-40a of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
provides: ‘‘(a) The commission may amend any complaint filed under section
46a-82 (a) of the Connecticut General Statutes to substitute or add itself as
a complaining party whenever:
‘‘(1) A complainant wishes to withdraw her or his complaint, but the
commission believes that the practices complained of raise issues of public
policy or affect the legal rights of persons similarly situated to the complain-
ant;
‘‘(2) A complainant wishes to pursue her or his complaint, and the commis-
sion believes that the practices complained of adversely affect the legal
rights of persons other than the complainant; or
‘‘(3) A complainant dies and the commission believes that the practices
complained of raise issues of public policy or affect the legal rights of
persons similarly situated to the complainant. Alternatively, or additionally,
the complaint may be amended pursuant to section 46a-54-38a of the Regula-
tions of Connecticut State Agencies to allow a representative of the complain-
ant’s estate to pursue the complaint.
‘‘(b) The commission may amend a complaint to substitute or add itself
as the complaining party under subsection (a) of this section at any time
after a complaint has been filed under section 46a-82 of the Connecticut
General Statutes but prior to appointment of the presiding officer in accor-
dance with section 46a-84 (b) of the Connecticut General Statutes. Any such
amendment shall relate back to the date the original complaint was filed
with the commission. Any amendment to substitute or add the commission
shall be by a majority vote of the members present and voting at a commis-
sion meeting and shall be signed by a commissioner authorized by the
commission to sign.’’
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contained the phrase ‘‘recent college graduates.’’ We
are not persuaded.
The CHRO argues that, before the referee, it litigated
its claim ‘‘under a ‘per se’ theory of discrimination rely-
ing primarily on our Supreme Court’s decision in Eve-
ning Sentinel v. National Organization for Women,
[supra, 168 Conn. 26]. The referee noted the [CHRO’s]
choice of theory multiple times in her final decision
but ultimately elected to apply a different theory, doing
so based on her own reading of the operative complaints
and an overly limited reading of Evening Sentinel, and
only after the parties had tried the case and submitted
it for decision.’’
The CHRO argues that, before the court, its primary
claim of error was that ‘‘the referee erred in applying
a different theory of discrimination than the [CHRO]
had chosen, thereby altering the burden of proof after
the case had been tried and briefed, without any prior
notice to the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) According to the CHRO, before the court, it ‘‘sec-
ondarily argued that if the court were to agree as to
the primary claim, it should further conclude that only
one action by the referee was appropriate as a matter
of law: finding that the use of ‘upcoming and/or recent
college graduates’ by Travelers in advertising an
employment opportunity was discrimination per se.’’
(Emphasis omitted.) Thus, the CHRO argues, by means
of its administrative appeal, it sought a judgment modi-
fying the agency’s decision in its favor rather than a
judgment remanding the case to the agency for further
proceedings, namely, a determination of whether Trav-
elers had engaged in age discrimination per se.
The CHRO claims that the court improperly ‘‘reframed
the appeal’’ by distilling the appeal to one issue, namely,
whether Travelers had engaged in age discrimination
per se in light of Evening Sentinel. The CHRO argues
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that the court thereby bypassed the primary claim that
it had raised in its appeal, namely, whether the referee
had improperly decided the case on the basis of an
improper legal theory on which the CHRO had not
relied. Moreover, the CHRO argues that the court mis-
takenly stated in its memorandum of decision that the
CHRO claimed that the referee ‘‘did not address’’ its
claim that per se discrimination had occurred. The
CHRO argues that the court’s statement was inaccurate
because it expressly argued before the court that the
referee had correctly acknowledged more than once in
her decision the CHRO’s argument that discrimination
per se had occurred, but that the referee had nonethe-
less erroneously applied a different legal theory to its
claim. According to the CHRO, for the trial court to
have ‘‘bypass[ed]’’ its primary claim and merely to have
resolved the issue of whether Travelers had engaged
in discrimination per se amounted to an abuse of the
trial court’s discretion and is a basis for this court to
reverse its judgment dismissing the appeal.
‘‘Judicial review of an administrative decision is gov-
erned by [§] 4-183 (a) of the [Uniform Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et
seq.], which provides that [a] person who has exhausted
all administrative remedies . . . and who is aggrieved
by a final decision may appeal to the [S]uperior
[C]ourt . . . .
‘‘Review of an appeal taken from the order of an
administrative agency such as the [CHRO] is limited to
determining whether the agency’s findings are sup-
ported by substantial and competent evidence and
whether the agency’s decision exceeds its statutory
authority or constitutes an abuse of discretion. . . .
[E]vidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if
it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact
in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . In determin-
ing whether an administrative finding is supported by
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substantial evidence, the reviewing court must defer to
the agency’s assessment of the credibility of the wit-
nesses and to the agency’s right to believe or disbelieve
the evidence presented by any witness . . . . As with
any administrative appeal, our role is not to reexamine
the evidence presented to the [CHRO] or to substitute
our judgment for the agency’s expertise, but, rather, to
determine whether there was substantial evidence to
support its conclusions. . . . If the decision of the
agency is reasonably supported by the evidence in the
record, it must be sustained.’’ (Citations omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v.
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 212
Conn. App. 578, 586–87, 276 A.3d 447, cert. denied, 345
Conn. 901, 282 A.3d 466 (2022).
‘‘Under the UAPA, it is [not] the function . . . of this
court to retry the case or to substitute its judgment
for that of the administrative agency. . . . Even for
conclusions of law, [t]he court’s ultimate duty is only
to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency]
has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse
of its discretion. . . . Cases that present pure ques-
tions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of
review . . . . For pure questions of law, plenary
review should be applied . . . [if] the issue of law ha[s]
not been time-tested by the [agency] or previously con-
sidered by the courts.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) O’Reggio v. Commission on
Human Rights & Opportunities, 219 Conn. App. 1, 11,
293 A.3d 955 (2023), aff’d, 350 Conn. 182, A.3d
(2024).
The CHRO’s primary argument is that the court
decided the appeal on the basis of an issue that it raised
sua sponte rather than addressing the claim that the
CHRO had advanced. A review of the court’s memoran-
dum of decision unmistakably contradicts the CHRO’s
contention that the court did not consider whether the
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referee had applied a different legal theory to its claim
of age discrimination than that on which the CHRO had
relied. In footnote 1 of its decision, the court stated:
‘‘[A]fter reviewing the parties’ memoranda of law, the
court concludes that CHRO is only claiming that Travel-
ers’ advertisement is illegal per se under the holding of
[Evening Sentinel]. . . . CHRO claims that the deci-
sion below did not address this claim. . . . [In its brief,
the CHRO argues that ‘the referee erred in applying a
different theory of discrimination than the [CHRO] had
chosen’]. The court disagrees.’’ (Citations omitted.) The
court then cited to two portions of the referee’s decision
in which the referee specifically referred to the CHRO’s
claim that the job advertisement at issue constituted
age discrimination per se.9
Focusing on the court’s use of the word ‘‘address,’’
the CHRO argues that the court misconstrued its claim
to be that the referee simply had failed to address or
acknowledge the per se theory on which it had relied.
Viewing the court’s decision in its entirety, however, we
disagree with this interpretation of the court’s decision.
‘‘As a general rule, [orders and] judgments are to be
construed in the same fashion as other written instru-
ments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention
of the court as gathered from all parts of the [order
or] judgment. . . . The interpretation of [an order or]
judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding
[its] making . . . . Effect must be given to that which
9
Specifically, the court referred to the portion of the referee’s decision
in which she stated, ‘‘[t]he [CHRO] contends that [Travelers’] advertisement
of an employment opportunity indicating, inter alia, that it was seeking
upcoming and/or recent college graduates with one or less years of experi-
ence in this job area for the IT Early Career area is illegal per se, or inherently
unlawful in and of itself, under . . . § 46a-60 (b) (6) without the need for
extrinsic proof . . . .’’ The court also referred to the portion of the referee’s
decision in which she stated: ‘‘The term recent college graduate in a job
advertisement does not in and of itself establish any employment restriction
against the prohibited factor of age.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed.
. . . The [order or] judgment should admit of a consis-
tent construction as a whole.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Sessa v. Reale, 213 Conn. App. 151, 161–62,
278 A.3d 44 (2022). We are persuaded that the court
clearly recognized the nature of the CHRO’s claim of
error and that the issue before it was whether the ref-
eree had failed to apply the per se theory to the facts
of the present case. The court referred to portions of
the referee’s decision in which she plainly had identified
and rejected the per se discrimination claim raised by
the CHRO. The court also unambiguously rejected this
claim. Our review of the referee’s decision amply sup-
ports the court’s conclusion in this regard. For these
reasons, we conclude that the CHRO has failed to dem-
onstrate that the court did not resolve this aspect of
its appeal.
The CHRO also argues that it was improper for the
court to have reached the merits of the legal conclusion
that had been reached by the referee, namely, that the
CHRO had failed to prove its claim that the job adver-
tisement constituted age discrimination per se. The
CHRO argues that the court could not properly reach
the merits of this argument unless it first concluded
that the referee had improperly failed to resolve the
claim of age discrimination per se. The CHRO has not
set forth any persuasive authority in support of this
contention. The CHRO recognizes that it invited the
court to consider whether, as a matter of law, Travelers’
job advertisement constituted age discrimination per
se. Contrary to the CHRO’s arguments, the court did
not consider this claim sua sponte but was guided by
authority submitted to it by both parties. Moreover,
the fact that the CHRO argued that the court should
consider the merits of this issue only after first conclud-
ing that the referee had failed to reach the merits of
the issue did not as a matter of law dictate the proper
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analytical path that the court should follow in
addressing the appeal. Even if the court deemed it
appropriate to have reached the merits of the disposi-
tive discrimination per se claim without first consider-
ing what the CHRO deems to have been its ‘‘primary’’
claim of error, it was the prerogative of the court to
do so in light of the fact that the discrimination per se
claim had been adequately briefed by the parties and,
in light of the claim raised by the CHRO, was squarely
before it. Although the court was limited to the claims
properly before it, the CHRO has not demonstrated that
the court’s analytical path was either an abuse of its
discretion or legally incorrect.
Lastly, beyond arguing that the referee applied the
‘‘wrong theory’’ to its age discrimination claim and that
the court erred in failing to resolve this ‘‘primary claim’’
of error, the CHRO argues that, in consideration of the
analysis and conclusion in Evening Sentinel, Travelers
engaged in age discrimination per se in violation of
§ 46a-60 (b) (6). There is no dispute as to the referee’s
findings with respect to the substance of the job adver-
tisement at issue. The referee concluded that the refer-
ence to ‘‘recent college graduates’’ in Travelers’ job
advertisement did not indicate a preference or specifi-
cation so as to discriminate on the basis of age. The
referee also concluded that Evening Sentinel, which
involved a gender segregated advertising scheme and
a claim of discrimination in hiring on the basis of gen-
der, was factually distinguishable from the present case.
The court, in its review of the referee’s decision, like-
wise concluded that the phrase ‘‘recent college gradu-
ates’’ did not express a preference for a younger class
of applicants and that Evening Sentinel did not support
the CHRO’s claim. We agree with the court’s analysis
and likewise conclude that the CHRO did not demon-
strate that the referee acted unreasonably, arbitrarily,
illegally, or in abuse of her discretion.
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II
AC 46678
We now turn our attention to the CHRO’s appeal from
the judgment of the trial court dismissing the adminis-
trative appeal that it brought against Yale. The following
undisputed facts, as set forth by the court, and proce-
dural history are relevant to this appeal. ‘‘On or about
September 11, 2017, [Yale] publicly posted a job notice
for a Social Entrepreneurship Fellow. The job descrip-
tion for the position stated, inter alia, that the ‘fellow-
ship is designed to provide a recent graduate with an
opportunity to deepen their knowledge of how [s]ocial
[e]ntrepreneurship at [Yale] functions at an operational
level while broadening communication and networking
skills.’ . . . The job posting further describes the
advertised ‘Social Entrepreneurship Fellow position as
a one year position under the supervision of [Yale’s]
School of Public Health with a focus and central role
in Yale’s mission to be a home for those at Yale inter-
ested in creating innovative solutions to challenges in
health and education and . . . to inspire and support
students from diverse backgrounds and disciplines to
seek innovative ways to address real-work problems.’
. . .
‘‘The Social Entrepreneurship Fellow job posting
included a statement that Yale is an equal opportunity
employer, and that Yale does not discriminate on the
basis of, inter alia, age. The job posting required a bache-
lor’s degree, was not limited to recent graduates, and
did not include an age requirement.
‘‘[Liou] applied for the Social Entrepreneurship Fel-
low position. At the time of his application for the Social
Entrepreneurship Fellow, [Liou] was fifty-seven years
old. [Liou] was not selected to be interviewed for the
Social Entrepreneurship Fellow and was not hired for
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the position. [Liou] has a bachelor’s degree in electrical
engineering.
‘‘[Katherine] Suits did an initial review of applications
received by Yale for the Social Entrepreneurship Fel-
low.10 [Suits] did not review an applicant’s age, or when
an applicant graduated from college when selecting
those applicants who might be interviewed. [Suits]
never became aware of [Liou’s] age, or when he had
graduated from college. [Suits] forwarded what she con-
sidered to be qualified applicants to [Martin] Klein for
review.11 [Suits] did not forward [Liou’s] application for
further review because [Suits] did not consider [Liou’s]
degree in electrical engineering, and his work experi-
ence at the United States Postal Service and as an insur-
ance agent, among other positions, to be a good fit for
the Social Entrepreneurship Fellow. [Klein] was never
aware of [Liou’s] application for the Social Entrepre-
neurship Fellow.

‘‘No factual evidence was presented with respect to
the demographics or age characteristics of recent grad-
uates.’’ (Footnotes added.)

In 2017, Liou filed an affidavit of alleged discrimina-
tory practice with the CHRO claiming to be aggrieved
by Yale’s failure to hire him for the fellowship. Although
he had raised other claims initially before the referee,
Liou ultimately claimed that, in violation of § 46a-60 (b)
(6), Yale had engaged in age discrimination by way of
its advertising. Liou focused on the fact that Yale’s job
advertisement included the phrase ‘‘recent graduate.’’
The CHRO appeared before the referee in support of
Liou’s complaint. On November 13, 2019, the referee
held a public hearing with respect to the issue of liability
10
The record reflects that Suits is a recruiter employed by Yale.
11
The record reflects that Klein was the Senior Advisor to the Dean of
Yale’s School of Public Health.
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only. Following the hearing, the CHRO and Yale filed
posthearing briefs.
The referee thereafter issued a memorandum of deci-
sion in which she considered and rejected the CHRO’s
argument that the reference to ‘‘recent college gradu-
ate’’ in Yale’s posting ‘‘is facially discriminatory and a
violation of § 46a-60 (b) (6) in and of itself . . . .’’ The
referee noted Liou’s reliance on Evening Sentinel but
concluded that the decision was distinguishable and,
thus, not persuasive authority. The referee concluded
that Liou ‘‘failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that [Yale] posted the Social Entrepreneurship
Fellow position in such a manner as to restrict employ-
ment . . . or indicate a preference or specification, so
as to discriminate against individuals on the basis of
age. . . .
‘‘Under any analysis, the Social Entrepreneurship Fel-
low job posting did not restrict employment at all. And
the Evening Sentinel decision, on which the complain-
ant relies, held newspapers, which were nonemployer
entities, liable for aiding and abetting unlawful employ-
ment advertising practices of others involving facial
gender based classifications, and is inapposite. Evening
Sentinel is materially distinguishable and does not
change this conclusion.’’ The referee, therefore, dis-
missed the complaint.
In August, 2022, the CHRO appealed from the refer-
ee’s decision to the Superior Court. In its memorandum
of decision dismissing the CHRO’s administrative
appeal, the court, after summarizing the findings of the
referee, stated that ‘‘the phrase ‘recent graduate’ is not
per se discriminatory . . . because, on the factual
record before the referee in this case, there was no
factual basis to conclude that ‘recent graduate’ evi-
dences a preference for younger applicants. Indeed,
here, the referee found that the Yale job advertisement
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was not restricted by age, [the advertisement] was not
restricted to recent graduates, [Yale] specifically stated
[in the job advertisement] that [it] did not discriminate
on the basis of age, and that Yale officials did not know
[Liou’s] age. These facts provide a substantial basis for
[the referee’s] conclusion that Yale did not discriminate
on the basis of age.
‘‘Finally, this court holds that CHRO’s reliance on
Evening Sentinel . . . is misplaced. . . . The court in
Evening Sentinel said nothing about age discrimination
generally, or whether the phrase ‘recent graduate’ con-
stituted per se age discrimination. As relevant to the
case at bar, Evening Sentinel stands only for the propo-
sition that an entity may be prohibited from publishing
facially discriminatory job advertisements. Evening
Sentinel offers no assistance in determining whether
the phrase ‘recent graduate’ is, in fact, discriminatory,
or more accurately, is a proxy for age. As set forth
[previously], this court concludes that, standing by
itself, the phrase ‘recent graduate’ is not a proxy for
age because a recent graduate can be of any age.’’ Thus,
the court dismissed the appeal. This appeal followed.
A
Before reaching the merits of the CHRO’s appeal, we
address a question of subject matter jurisdiction raised
by Yale. Yale appears to argue that the CHRO lacked
standing to bring the underlying administrative appeal
before the trial court. Yale argues that, although the trial
court did not consider this issue, this court nonetheless
may sustain the trial court’s judgment after concluding
that the CHRO did not have standing to challenge the
referee’s decision. Yale also argues that the CHRO lacks
standing to bring the present appeal before this court
and that this court should dismiss the appeal.
These distinct jurisdictional challenges are grounded
in Yale’s argument that ‘‘[t]he [CHRO] must establish
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that it suffered some direct injury because of [Yale’s]
job posting to seek redress through the judicial process.
. . . [T]he [CHRO] has failed to do so . . . .’’ Yale rec-
ognizes that, in its administrative appeal, the CHRO
alleged that it brought the appeal ‘‘on behalf [of] and
in the interest of the people of the state of Connecticut
. . . .’’ The CHRO also alleged that it ‘‘is aggrieved by
the final decision of the [referee], in that the improper
application of the law to this complaint will, if not
corrected, thwart the [CHRO’s] statutory mandate of
enforcing Connecticut’s civil rights and antidiscrimina-
tion statutes, in this [case] as well as in cases to come.’’
Yale maintains, however, that, ‘‘[i]n this case, the
[CHRO] has raised hypothetical interests on behalf of
others who may have not applied to the [Social Entre-
preneurship] Fellow advertisement because of the
advertisement’s language . . . without any evidence
that others did indeed not apply because of the ‘recent
graduate’ language.’’ According to Yale, ‘‘[t]he [CHRO]
has not demonstrated how, if at all, it has been aggrieved
by the referee’s and the Superior Court’s dismissal of
its claims. It has not identified a legitimate injury to
the public solely due to [Yale’s] posting in question;
nor can it, particularly given that the [CHRO’s] claim
remains tethered to a complaint filed by [Liou], who
also suffered no injury. Put differently, the [CHRO’s]
general reference to the public interest does not negate
its need to show tangible evidence of an actual injury
to the public.’’
The arguments raised by Yale with respect to the
CHRO’s standing to participate in the proceedings
before the referee and to bring the underlying adminis-
trative appeal are legally indistinguishable from those
raised by Travelers in the appeal in AC 46677. Accord-
ingly, for the reasons set forth in part I A 3 of this
opinion, we reject Yale’s claim that the CHRO lacked
standing before the trial court. To the extent that Yale
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also argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the present appeal, not because the CHRO was
not aggrieved by the judgment from which it appeals
but because the CHRO lacked standing before the trial
court, that argument likewise fails.
B
We now turn to the CHRO’s claim that the court
improperly concluded that Yale had not engaged in age
discrimination per se, in violation of § 46a-60 (b) (6),
by means of posting a job advertisement that contained
the phrase ‘‘recent college graduate.’’ We are not per-
suaded.
The CHRO’s arguments are indistinguishable from
the arguments that it raised in connection with its
appeal in AC 46677, which involved a nearly identical
claim of age discrimination based on similar language
in a job advertisement, was brought by the same parties,
and was adjudicated by the same referee. The referee’s
decisions in both underlying cases follow the same ana-
lytical path. The same trial court judge rendered the
judgments at issue in both appeals, and the court’s
decisions follow the same analytical path and are based
on the same authority. The CHRO’s brief in each appeal
raises similar legal arguments. As it did in AC 46677,
the CHRO argues, primarily, that the referee failed to
evaluate the case under the legal theory under which
it was brought, as a claim of age discrimination per se
under Evening Sentinel. The CHRO also argues that
the court failed to resolve this primary claim and abused
its discretion by reaching the merits of the secondary
question raised in its administrative appeal, namely,
whether Yale’s job advertisement amounted to discrimi-
nation per se. Finally, the CHRO argues that, ‘‘[i]f this
court finds that the [trial court] erred in not deciding
the primary claim before it, and that the referee erred
in applying a different theory than the [CHRO] had
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chosen, it may then address the ultimate question:
whether the use of ‘recent graduate’ in a job advertise-
ment by Yale was discriminatory per se.’’
It would serve no useful purpose for this court to
repeat the analysis set forth in part I B of this opinion,
which governs our resolution of the CHRO’s arguments.
Having carefully reviewed the referee’s decision and
the decision of the trial court, we conclude that the
referee carefully addressed and properly rejected the
CHRO’s claim of discrimination per se and that the
court did not err in resolving the CHRO’s claim that
the referee had improperly decided the case on a differ-
ent legal theory. We likewise conclude that the court
properly analyzed and resolved the CHRO’s claim that
the job posting amounted to age discrimination per se
and rejected its reliance on Evening Sentinel.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.