Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

JAMES R. BRENNAN v. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS OF THE TOWN OF SEYMOUR
(AC 46258)
Elgo, Suarez and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
affirming the decision of the defendant board of assessment appeals,
which upheld the revaluation of the plaintiff’s residential dwelling and
the declassification of his nonresidential land as farmland by the town
tax assessor. During a trial to the court, the plaintiff presented testimony
from H, a licensed appraiser, that the residential portion of the plaintiff’s
property was valued at $105,000, a valuation which exceeded the asses-
sor’s allegedly excessive valuation. The court thereafter suggested that
it could rely on the $105,000 valuation given by H and issue a decision
only as to the plaintiff’s claim regarding the declassification of his nonres-
idential property, and counsel for both parties agreed. Following trial,
the court determined that the plaintiff had abandoned his claim regarding
the valuation of his residential dwelling during the trial and that the
nonresidential property was not currently being used as farmland in
accordance with the factors set forth in the applicable statute (§ 12-
107c). Held:
1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred
in determining that he had abandoned his claim regarding the proper
valuation of his residential dwelling; because the plaintiff’s counsel
agreed with the court at trial that it did not have to resolve the plaintiff’s
claim regarding the valuation of his residential dwelling and expressly
assented to the court’s suggestion that it needed to address only the claim
regarding the declassification of the plaintiff’s nonresidential property
as farmland, the plaintiff had abandoned his claim regarding the valua-
tion of his residential dwelling.
2. The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly considered the factors
set forth in § 12-107c (a) in determining whether the plaintiff’s nonresi-
dential property was still being used as a farm for purposes of the statute
(§ 12-504h) governing the termination of a farmland classification was
unavailing: this court determined that it was clear that, when §§ 12-107c
and 12-504h are read together, the declassification of property previously
classified as farmland occurs when the use of such land is changed or
when the property is sold by the record owner, and the fact that an
assessor makes no actual change in the classification of a property
previously classified as farmland for many years after the occurrence
of one of the triggering events in § 12-504h is irrelevant; moreover, in
the present case, the assessor was required to conduct a townwide
revaluation of all the properties for the town’s grand list and, during
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals
the course of his townwide revaluation, the assessor conducted a field
review of the plaintiff’s nonresidential property, determined that it was
not in actual use as farmland and declassified it as farmland, and the
plain language of §§ 12-107c and 12-504h, read within the context of the
overall statutory scheme affording favorable tax treatment to certain
undeveloped property and case law applying that scheme, makes clear
that it was proper for the trial court to consider the factors set forth
in § 12-107c when it affirmed the assessor’s determination.
3. The trial court’s finding concerning the current use of the plaintiff’s
nonresidential property was not clearly erroneous as there was ample
evidence in the record to support the court’s determination that the
current use of that property did not constitute farm use: in making its
determination, the court relied on the assessor’s examination of the
plaintiff’s nonresidential property and his testimony that, inter alia, he
had not seen any farming activity on the nonresidential property and
had seen sheep on such property on only one occasion when he observed
a few sheep run out of the plaintiff’s barn, and that he took into account
the factors set forth in § 12-107c (a), including the acreage of the land,
the portion of the land in actual use for farming or agricultural opera-
tions, the productivity of the land or lack thereof, the gross income
derived therefrom, or losses, as here, and the nature and value of the
equipment, or lack thereof, used in connection therewith; moreover,
although the plaintiff testified that his prior use of the nonresidential
property consisted of raising multiple species and breeds of livestock
and animals, he also testified that during the townwide revaluation he
only had four female sheep on his nonresidential property and that he
no longer had any farming equipment, such as a tractor or lifting equip-
ment, on the nonresidential property.

Argued November 13, 2023—officially released June 11, 2024

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the defendant affirming
the decision of its tax assessor to, inter alia, declassify
the plaintiff’s nonresidential land as farmland, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-
Milford and tried to the court, Hon. Arthur A. Hiller,
judge trial referee; judgment for the defendant, from
which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Steven P. Kulas, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Raymond J. Rigat, for the appellee (defendant).
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

Opinion

SUAREZ, J. In this administrative tax appeal, the
plaintiff, James R. Brennan, appeals from the judgment
of the trial court affirming the decision of the defendant,
the Board of Assessment Appeals of the Town of Sey-
mour (board), which upheld the revaluation of his resi-
dential dwelling and the declassification of his 7.26
acres of nonresidential land (excess property) as farm-
land by the Seymour tax assessor (assessor). On appeal,
the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) deter-
mined that he had abandoned his claim regarding the
proper value of his residential dwelling, (2) considered
the factors set forth in General Statutes § 12-107c (a)
in determining whether the excess property was no
longer being used as a farm for purposes of General
Statutes § 12-504h, and (3) determined that the plaintiff
changed the use of the excess property so as to have lost
the entitlement to the farmland designation previously
granted to him by the assessor. We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the court or which
are undisputed by the parties, and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plain-
tiff owns approximately eight acres of real property
located in Seymour (town). Of this land, 40,000 square
feet are devoted to residential use, with a residential
dwelling located thereon. Previously, the assessor had
classified the excess property as farmland for tax pur-
poses. On October 1, 2020, as a result of a townwide
reassessment, the assessor terminated the classifica-
tion of the plaintiff’s excess property as farmland and
assessed the plaintiff’s property, in its entirety, as fol-
lows: ‘‘Dwelling—$90,100; Outbuildings—$10,400; and
Land—$122,000, for a total assessment of $222,500.’’
The plaintiff appealed the assessor’s valuation of his
residential dwelling and the assessor’s declassification
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

of his excess property to the board, which upheld the
assessor’s determinations.
On April 28, 2021, the plaintiff filed an appeal from the
board’s decision in the Superior Court. The plaintiff’s
administrative tax appeal consisted of a two count com-
plaint. In count one of his complaint, the plaintiff alleged
that, on October 1, 2020, he was the record owner of
the subject property and that the valuation of his prop-
erty ‘‘by the assessor was not its true and actual value
on that assessment date but was grossly excessive, dis-
proportionate and unlawful.’’ He further alleged that
‘‘the board failed to reduce the value of the dwelling
. . . .’’ In count two of his complaint, the plaintiff
alleged that the ‘‘assessor of the town reduced the farm
acreage from 7.26 acres to 0 acres.’’ He also alleged
that ‘‘the board failed to restore the farm acreage to
7.26 acres.’’
The court, Hon. Arthur A. Hiller, judge trial referee,
held a trial de novo that was conducted remotely over
the course of four days.1 On January 26, 2023, the court
issued a memorandum of decision, rendering judgment
in favor of the defendant. In its memorandum of deci-
sion, the court determined that the plaintiff had aban-
doned count one of his administrative tax appeal. With
respect to count two, the court found that the excess
property was not currently being used as a farm in
accordance with the factors set forth in § 12-107c (a).
This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
1
On September 12, 2022, the court heard testimony from the plaintiff, the
plaintiff’s appraiser, the plaintiff’s neighbors, the assessor, and an advocate
from the Connecticut Farm Bureau Association. At the conclusion of evi-
dence that day, the court asked the parties if they wanted to have an
opportunity to introduce additional evidence as to the plaintiff’s farm activ-
ity. On October 3, 2022, the court held a hearing, and the plaintiff offered
into evidence his 2017–2021 tax records, which the court admitted into
evidence without objection. On November 21, 2022, and January 19, 2023,
the court held two additional hearings where it heard arguments by counsel.
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Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims,
we begin by setting forth the applicable legal principles
underlying municipal tax appeals, as well as our applica-
ble standard of review. ‘‘We review a court’s determina-
tion in a tax appeal pursuant to the clearly erroneous
standard of review. Under this deferential standard,
[w]e do not examine the record to determine whether
the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other
than the one reached. Rather, we focus on the conclu-
sion of the trial court, as well as the method by which
it arrived at that conclusion, to determine whether it
is legally correct and factually supported. . . . A find-
ing of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evi-
dence in the record to support it . . . or when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . In
making this determination, every reasonable presump-
tion must be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.
. . .
‘‘We afford wide discretion to the court’s determina-
tion of the value of property in a property tax appeal.
. . . When the court acts as the fact finder, it may
accept or reject evidence regarding valuation as it
deems appropriate. . . . Because a tax appeal is heard
de novo, a trial court judge is privileged to adopt what-
ever testimony he reasonably believes to be credible.
. . . Thus, credibility determinations are within the
exclusive province of the court.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Digital 60 & 80 Mer-
ritt, LLC v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 211 Conn.
App. 559, 577–78, 274 A.3d 952, cert. denied, 343 Conn.
926, 275 A.3d 1212 (2022).
‘‘[General Statutes §] 12-117a,2 which allows taxpay-
ers to appeal the decisions of municipal boards of tax
2
General Statutes § 12-117a provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person . . .
claiming to be aggrieved by the action of . . . the board of assessment
appeals . . . in any town or city may . . . make application, in the nature
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review to the Superior Court, provide[s] a method by
which an owner of property may directly call in question
the valuation placed by assessors upon his property
. . . . In a § 12-117a appeal, the trial court performs a
two step function. The burden, in the first instance, is
upon the plaintiff to show that he has, in fact, been
aggrieved by the action of the board in that his property
has been overassessed. . . . In this regard, [m]ere
overvaluation is sufficient to justify redress under [§ 12-
117a], and the court is not limited to a review of whether
an assessment has been unreasonable or discriminatory
or has resulted in substantial overvaluation. . . .
Whether a property has been overvalued for tax assess-
ment purposes is a question of fact for the trier. . . .
The trier arrives at his own conclusions as to the value
of land by weighing the opinion of the appraisers, the
claims of the parties in light of all the circumstances
in evidence bearing on value, and his own general
knowledge of the elements going to establish value
including his own view of the property. . . .

‘‘Only after the court determines that the taxpayer
has met his burden of proving that the assessor’s valua-
tion was excessive and that the refusal of the board
of tax review to alter the assessment was improper,
however, may the court then proceed to the second
step in a § 12-117a appeal and exercise its equitable
power to grant such relief as to justice and equity apper-
tains . . . . If a taxpayer is found to be aggrieved by
the decision of the board of tax review, the court tries
the matter de novo and the ultimate question is the
ascertainment of the true and actual value of the appli-
cant’s property. . . . If the court finds that the property
has been in fact overvalued, it has the power to, and
should, correct the valuation. . . .
of an appeal therefrom to the superior court for the judicial district in which
such town or city is situated . . . .’’
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

‘‘Section 12-117a provides a remedy only for an
aggrieved taxpayer seeking to reduce his tax assess-
ment. It provides no remedy for a municipality claiming
to have undervalued a taxpayer’s property.’’ (Citations
omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Konover v. West Hartford, 242 Conn. 727, 734–36,
699 A.2d 158 (1997).
‘‘In contrast to § 12-117a . . . which allows a tax-
payer to challenge the assessor’s valuation of his prop-
erty, [General Statutes] § 12-1193 allows a taxpayer to
bring a claim that the tax was imposed by a town that
had no authority to tax the subject property, or that
the assessment was manifestly excessive and could not
have been arrived at except by disregarding the provi-
sions of the statutes for determining the valuation of
[the real] property . . . . Our case law makes clear
that a claim that an assessment is excessive is not
enough to support an action under this statute. Instead,
§ 12-119 requires an allegation that something more
than mere valuation is at issue. . . . The first category
in § 12-119 embraces situations where a tax has been
laid on a property not taxable in the municipality where
it is situated. . . . This category is not applicable to
the facts of this case and, thus, will not be addressed.
‘‘The second category [in § 12-119] consists of claims
that assessments are (a) manifestly excessive and (b)
. . . could not have been arrived at except by disre-
garding the provisions of the statutes for determining
the valuation of the property. . . . Cases in this cate-
gory must contain allegations beyond the mere claim
3
General Statutes § 12-119 provides in relevant part: ‘‘When it is claimed
that . . . a tax laid on property was computed on an assessment which,
under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and could not have
been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for
determining the valuation of such property, the owner thereof . . . may,
in addition to the other remedies provided by law, make application for
relief to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or
city is situated. . . .’’
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that the assessor overvalued the property. [The] plain-
tiff . . . must satisfy the trier that [a] far more exacting
test has been met: either there was misfeasance or
nonfeasance by the taxing authorities, or the assess-
ment was arbitrary or so excessive or discriminatory
as in itself to show a disregard of duty on their part.
. . . Only if the plaintiff is able to meet this exacting
test by establishing that the action of the assessors
would result in illegality can the plaintiff prevail in an
action under § 12-119. The focus of § 12-119 is whether
the assessment is illegal. . . . The statute applies only
to an assessment that establishes a disregard of duty
by the assessors.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Tyler’s Cove Assn.,
Inc. v. Middlebury, 44 Conn. App. 517, 526–27, 690 A.2d
412 (1997). We address the plaintiff’s claims in turn.4
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in
determining that he had abandoned his claim regarding
the proper valuation of his residential dwelling. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff argues that ‘‘the record does not show
that his counsel waived or abandoned his claim under
count one of the complaint. Counsel’s acknowledge-
ment of the trial court’s finding as to the value of the
residential property is no more than that and should
not be construed as a waiver or an abandonment of the
plaintiff’s claim in count one of the complaint.’’ We are
not persuaded.
The following additional facts are relevant to the
resolution of this claim. In count one of his complaint,
the plaintiff alleged that the assessor valued the residen-
tial dwelling at $90,100. He further alleged that the valu-
ation of the residential dwelling was ‘‘not its true and
4
Although the plaintiff did not explicitly set forth the statutory basis for
this administrative tax appeal in his complaint, we note that such actions
are brought pursuant to § 12-117a or § 12-119.
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

actual value on [October 1, 2020] but was grossly exces-
sive, disproportionate and unlawful.’’ During the Sep-
tember 12, 2022 trial, the plaintiff presented testimony
from Susan Homiski, a licensed appraiser, that the resi-
dential portion of the property, which included both the
residential dwelling and the 40,000 square foot parcel
on which it was situated, was valued at $105,000. It was
not clear from Homiski’s testimony, however, whether
her valuation included the plaintiff’s dwelling because
her written appraisal stated that the house was unmar-
ketable. On January 19, 2023, the court held a hearing
to clarify whether Homiski’s $105,000 valuation consid-
ered the dwelling in its current condition or whether
it considered that the dwelling had to be demolished.
At the January 19, 2023 hearing, the following colloquy
between the court, the plaintiff’s counsel, and the defen-
dant’s counsel took place:
‘‘The Court: So, how do I get a value for the house?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Well, I think, if you look
at our appraisal, [Homiski] values the lot with the house
as it’s currently existing on it. So . . . the only thing
I could surmise is she valued that particular piece of
property, knowing that the house may be taken down,
and that’s what it’s worth.
‘‘The Court: Oh, boy. She doesn’t say that at all.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I know but—
‘‘The Court: Can we agree, [Defendant’s Counsel]
. . . that I don’t have to worry about the assessment
of the house? We’ll buy $105,000, and I don’t have to
worry about that. I don’t have to worry about count
one, is that fair?
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: I would agree, Your
Honor. Because if you look at the assessed value of the
house, it was close to that.
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‘‘The Court: Good. So, [Plaintiff’s Counsel]?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: That’s fine, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: So, I only have to do count two?
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Correct. Whether it’s a
farm or not.
‘‘The Court: Oh, much better.
***
‘‘The Court: So, I only have to decide whether the use
[of the plaintiff’s excess property] changed. That’s it.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: That’s it. So, I can do this—I don’t have
to write the law. I just have to decide whether the use
[of the plaintiff’s excess property] changed.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: I appreciate that. That should make it
much easier for me, either it did, or it didn’t.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: That’s absolutely I think
what the statute requires and that’s the basis of our
appeal on that.’’ (Emphasis added.)
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that
the plaintiff had abandoned count one of his complaint
and that the parties had ‘‘agreed that the only decision
for the court to make’’ concerned the declassification
of the plaintiff’s excess property. ‘‘Both our Supreme
Court and this court have stated the principle that, when
a party abandons a claim or argument before the trial
court, that party waives the right to appellate review
of such claim because a contrary conclusion would
result in an ambush of the trial court . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. McLaughlin, 135
Conn. App. 193, 198, 41 A.3d 694, cert. denied, 307 Conn.
904, 53 A.3d 219 (2012).
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

In the present case, with respect to count one, the
court questioned the parties during the January 19, 2023
hearing as to how it should arrive at a value for the
plaintiff’s dwelling. The court asked the parties whether
it had to ‘‘worry about the assessment of the house.’’
The court suggested that it could rely on the $105,000
valuation given by Homiski and counsel for both parties
agreed. Upon further inquiry, the court stated, ‘‘I don’t
have to worry about count one, is that fair?’’ Counsel
for both parties agreed. At the conclusion of the January
19, 2023 hearing, the court, once again, confirmed that
it only needed to address count two, stating: ‘‘So, I only
have to decide whether the use [of the plaintiff’s excess
property] changed. That’s it.’’ The plaintiff’s counsel
replied, ‘‘[y]es, Your Honor.’’ Therefore, by agreeing
with the court that it did not have to resolve the claim
set forth in count one, and by expressly assenting to
the court’s suggestion that all it had to address was
count two, the plaintiff abandoned the claim alleged in
count one of his complaint. Accordingly, we decline to
afford the plaintiff any relief with respect to this claim.
II
Next, the plaintiff claims that, in determining whether
the plaintiff’s excess property was still being used as
a farm for purposes of § 12-504h, the court improperly
considered the factors set forth in § 12-107c (a).5 He
asserts that the only ‘‘task for the assessor and for the
trial court on appeal was to determine if there had been
a change of ownership of the [excess] property or a
change of use for the [excess] property as provided
for in [§ 12-504h].’’ The defendant, on the other hand,
argues that the court properly considered the factors
enumerated in § 12-107c (a) in determining that the
5
We interpret this claim as being brought under § 12-119 because the
plaintiff asserts that the assessment of his excess property was manifestly
excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the
provisions of § 12-504h.
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

plaintiff’s excess property was no longer entitled to
retain its classification as farmland. We agree with the
defendant.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review and
relevant legal principles that govern the resolution of
this claim. ‘‘Because this issue raises a question of statu-
tory interpretation, our review is plenary. . . . A funda-
mental tenet of statutory construction is that statutes
are to be considered to give effect to the apparent
intention of the lawmaking body. . . . The meaning of
a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from
the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. . . . In the present
case, the defendant relies on § 12-504h, a provision con-
tained in the real estate conveyance tax scheme. . . .
The provisions that govern our resolution of the issue,
however, are contained in the property tax assessment
scheme, specifically, General Statutes §§ 12-107a
through 12-107e, which pertain to the assessment and
classification of property as farm land, forest land and
open space land.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Carmel Hollow
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, 269 Conn.
120, 129–30, 848 A.2d 451 (2004). Our Supreme Court
has stated that, when ‘‘more than one [statutory provi-
sion] is involved, we presume that the legislature
intended [those provisions] to be read together to create
a harmonious body of law . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Cardenas v. Mixcus, 264 Conn. 314,
326, 823 A.2d 321 (2003). We conclude that the plain
language of §§ 12-107c and 12-504h, read within the
context of the overall statutory scheme affording favor-
able tax treatment to certain undeveloped property and
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

case law applying that scheme, makes clear that it was
proper for the court to consider the factors in § 12-107c
in determining whether the excess property was still
being used as a farm for purposes of § 12-504h.
The statutory scheme relating to the designation and
classification of farmland for tax assessment purposes
is contained in chapter 203 of the General Statutes,
entitled ‘‘Property Tax Assessment,’’ and begins with a
declaration of policy. As our Supreme Court has articu-
lated, ‘‘General Statutes [(Rev. to 2003)] § 12-107a pro-
vides in relevant part: It is hereby declared (a) that it
is in the public interest to encourage the preservation
of farm land, forest land, and open space land in order
to maintain a readily available source of food and farm
products . . . to conserve the state’s natural resources
and to provide for the welfare and happiness of the
inhabitants of the state, (b) that it is in the public interest
to prevent the forced conversion of farm land, forest
land and open space land to more intensive uses as the
result of economic pressures caused by the assessment
thereof for purposes of property taxation at values
incompatible with their preservation as such farm land,
forest land and open space land, and (c) that the neces-
sity in the public interest of the enactment of the provi-
sions of sections 12-107b to 12-107e, inclusive, is a mat-
ter of legislative determination. Thus, the purpose of
§§ 12-107a through 12-107e is to encourage the preser-
vation of property designated as farm land . . . by
ensuring against the conversion of such land to more
intensive uses as the result of higher property tax
assessments.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Car-
mel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem,
supra, 269 Conn. 130–31.
General Statutes § 12-107b (1) provides in relevant
part: ‘‘The term ‘farm land’ means any tract or tracts
of land, including woodland and wasteland . . . con-
stituting a farm unit . . . .’’ Section 12-107c sets forth
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the procedure by which an owner of land may request
that their property be classified as farmland. Section
12-107c (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘An owner of land
may apply for its classification as farm land on any
grand list6 of a municipality by filing a written applica-
tion for such classification with the assessor thereof
. . . . The assessor shall determine whether such land
is farm land and, if such assessor determines that it is
farm land, he or she shall classify and include it as such
on the grand list. In determining whether such land is
farm land, such assessor shall take into account, among
other things, the acreage of such land, the portion
thereof in actual use for farming or agricultural opera-
tions, the productivity of such land, the gross income
derived therefrom, the nature and value of the equip-
ment used in connection therewith, and the extent to
which the tracts comprising such land are contiguous.
The assessor shall not deny the application of an owner
of land for classification of such land as farm land if
such land meets the criteria for classification as farm
land pursuant to this subsection. . . .’’ (Footnote
added.)
Section 12-504h is contained in chapter 223 of the
General Statutes, entitled ‘‘Real Estate Conveyance
Tax,’’ and provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any such classifi-
cation of farm land pursuant to section 12-107c . . .
shall be deemed personal to the particular owner who
requests and receives such classification and shall not
run with the land. Any such land which has been classi-
fied by a record owner shall remain so classified without
6
A grand list is the aggregate list of assessed values of all property in a
given municipality. See General Statutes § 12-55 (a). The contents of a town’s
grand list is defined by § 12-55 (a), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘Each
[town’s] grand list shall contain the assessed values of all property in the
town, reflecting the statutory exemption or exemptions to which each prop-
erty or property owner is entitled, and including, where applicable, any
assessment penalty added . . . for the assessment year commencing on
the October first immediately preceding. . . .’’
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

the filing of any new application subsequent to such
classification, notwithstanding the provision of sections
12-107c, 12-107d, 12-107e and 12-107g, until either of
the following shall occur: (1) The use of such land
is changed to a use other than that described in the
application for the existing classification by said record
owner, or (2) such land is sold or transferred by said
record owner. . . .’’7
‘‘Section 12-504h was enacted in 1974 . . . to elimi-
nate the necessity of applying annually for the classifica-
tion of property as farm land, forest land or open space
land. . . . The statute thus provides that property may
retain its classified status until the occurrence of certain
events that terminate the classification and require the
filing of a new application, these events being the sale
of the property or a change in its use. . . .
‘‘[A]lthough § 12-504h is part of the real estate convey-
ance tax scheme, there is nothing in its language to
suggest that it does not apply to the termination of a
classification for the purpose of property tax assess-
ments as well. Indeed, [§ 12-504h] directly refers to land
that has been classified pursuant to §§ 12-107c, 12-107d
or 12-107e of the property tax assessment scheme. . . .
Furthermore, [§ 12-504h] provides that those classifica-
tions remain valid until the occurrence of the disqualify-
ing events described therein. . . . Moreover, it would
make no sense to construe § 12-504h as requiring the
termination of a classification for the purpose of impos-
ing a real estate conveyance tax, but not for the purpose
of revaluing property on the grand list of a municipal-
ity.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis altered; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Bethlehem, supra, 269 Conn. 140–41.8
7
We note that, after the court decided Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd.
Partnership, §§ 12-107a and 12-504h were amended, effective July 1, 2007,
to include maritime heritage land. See Public Acts 2007, No. 07-127, §§ 3
and 10.
8
Our Supreme Court, in Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership,
addressed the issue of whether a tax assessor is authorized to declassify
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

Under the property tax assessment scheme, each
town is required to periodically revalue property on its
grand list. General Statutes § 12-62 is entitled ‘‘Revalua-
tion of real property’’ and provides in relevant part:
‘‘(b) (1) (A) Commencing October 1, 2006, and until
September 30, 2023, each town shall implement a reval-
uation not later than the first day of October that fol-
lows, by five years, the October first assessment date on
which the town’s previous revaluation became effective
. . . .’’ Section 12-62 (b) (2) further provides in relevant
part: ‘‘When conducting a revaluation, an assessor shall
use generally accepted mass appraisal methods which
may include, but need not be limited to, the market
sales comparison approach to value, the cost approach
to value and the income approach to value. Prior to
the completion of each revaluation, the assessor shall
conduct a field review. . . .’’ Moreover, General Stat-
utes § 12-63, which is part of the property tax assess-
ment scheme, governs the rule of valuation and pro-
vides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) The present true and actual
value of land classified as farm land pursuant to section
12-107c . . . shall be based upon its current use with-
out regard to neighborhood land use . . . .’’
When the foregoing provisions are read together, it
is clear that the declassification of property previously
classified as farmland occurs in two alternative ways.
First, when the use of such land is changed; or second,
when the property is sold by the record owner. See
General Statutes § 12-504h. The fact that an assessor
forest land. Our Supreme Court held that, under the tax assessment scheme
for forest land, pursuant to § 12-107d, ‘‘the state forester is the only official
to whom authority is expressly granted to determine whether property
qualifies as forest land.’’ Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v.
Bethlehem, supra, 269 Conn. 141. Therefore, for the purposes of § 12-504h,
property previously classified as forest land cannot be deemed to have
changed its use until the state forester determines the land no longer qualifies
as forest land. Under § 12-107c, the classification statute for farmland, it is
only the tax assessor that makes that determination.
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

makes no actual change in the classification of a prop-
erty previously classified as farmland for many years
after the occurrence of one of the triggering events in
§ 12-504h is irrelevant. An assessor, during a townwide
revaluation pursuant to § 12-62, must determine the true
and actual value of the land based upon its current use.
In doing so, an assessor must conduct a field review
to determine the current use of the property. In
determining whether a property is currently being used
as a farm, an assessor, pursuant to § 12-107c, ‘‘shall
take into account, among other things, the acreage of
such land, the portion thereof in actual use for farming
or agricultural operation, the productivity of such land,
the gross income derived therefrom, the nature and
value of the equipment used in connection therewith,
and the extent to which the tracts comprising such land
are contiguous.’’ General Statutes § 12-107c (a).
In the present case, the assessor was required to
conduct a townwide revaluation of all the properties
for the October 1, 2020 grand list. During the course of
his townwide revaluation, the assessor conducted a
field review of the plaintiff’s excess property, deter-
mined that it was not in actual use as farmland and
declassified it. On appeal to the Superior Court, the
court concluded that, on the basis of the factors set
forth in § 12-107c, the plaintiff’s excess property was
not being used as a farm and affirmed the assessor’s
determination. We conclude that the court properly
relied on the factors set forth in § 12-107c when it deter-
mined that the plaintiff’s excess property was not cur-
rently being used as a farm.
III
Finally, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in
determining that the plaintiff had changed the use of
the excess property so as to have lost the entitlement
to the farmland designation previously granted to him
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Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

by the assessor. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that
there was no evidence in the record to support a finding
that he had begun to use his excess property as some-
thing other than a farm. We are not persuaded.
As we have previously stated in this opinion, we
review the court’s factual determinations in a tax appeal
pursuant to the clearly erroneous standard. See Digital
60 & 80 Merritt, LLC v. Board of Assessment Appeals,
supra, 211 Conn. App. 577. ‘‘[W]e do not examine the
record to determine whether the trier of fact could
have reached a conclusion other than the one reached.
Rather, we focus on the conclusion of the trial court,
as well as the method by which it arrived at that conclu-
sion, to determine whether it is legally correct and factu-
ally supported. . . . A finding of fact is clearly errone-
ous when there is no evidence in the record to support
it . . . or when although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed. . . . In making this determination,
every reasonable presumption must be given in favor
of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the court concluded that ‘‘it
would be in direct conflict with the statutory scheme
to retain a farmland classification on land that no longer
qualifies as such and then assess it based on its non-
farm current use.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In making this determination, the court relied on the
assessor’s examination of the plaintiff’s excess prop-
erty. At trial, the assessor testified that he took into
account the factors set forth in § 12-107c (a). In its
memorandum of decision, the court noted that the
assessor looked at ‘‘the acreage of the land, the portion
of the land in actual use for farming or agricultural
operations, the productivity of the land or lack thereof,
the gross income derived therefrom, or losses, as here,
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20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals

and the nature and value of the equipment, or lack
thereof, used in connection therewith.’’ As we con-
cluded in part II of this opinion, the court properly
considered the § 12-107c (a) factors in determining
whether there had been a change in use of the plaintiff’s
excess property.
Our careful review of the record reveals that there
is sufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s
determination that there was in fact a change in the
current use of the plaintiff’s excess property. During
the September 12, 2022 trial, the plaintiff testified that
his prior use of the excess property consisted of raising
multiple species and breeds of livestock and animals.
Specifically, the plaintiff stated that he previously had
raised pigs, goats, rabbits, sheep, and steer on the
excess property. As to his current use of the excess
property, the plaintiff testified that he now uses it to
breed sheep and sell the lambs. The plaintiff also testi-
fied, however, that during the 2020 townwide revalua-
tion, he only had four female sheep on the excess prop-
erty and did not own any male sheep. The plaintiff
further testified that, in contrast with his past practice,
he no longer had any farming equipment, such as a
tractor or lifting equipment, on the excess property.
The assessor testified that the last time he was on the
plaintiff’s excess property was during the 2015 town-
wide revaluation, and thereafter he would drive by the
plaintiff’s premises and observe some of the activities
taking place on his excess property. The assessor fur-
ther testified that he had not seen any farming activity
on the excess property and had seen sheep on the
plaintiff’s excess property on only one occasion, when
he observed a few sheep run out of the plaintiff’s barn.
On the basis of our careful review of the record, we
conclude that there is ample evidence in it to support
the court’s determination that the current use of the
plaintiff’s excess property did not constitute farm use.
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Accordingly, the court’s finding concerning the current
use of the excess property was not clearly erroneous.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.