In re P. M.

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In re P. M.

IN RE P. M.*
(AC 47076)
Alvord, Cradle and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial
court adjudicating his minor child, P, neglected and ordering a six month
period of protective supervision. Held:
1. Contrary to the assertion of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, that the respondent father’s claim was moot, this court
concluded that his claim was reviewable under the collateral conse-
quences exception to the mootness doctrine; although the period of
protective supervision had expired, there was a reasonable possibility
that P’s neglect adjudication would have prejudicial collateral conse-
quences, as the Superior Court could, at some time in the future, rely
on the neglect adjudication, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 17a-
112 (j) (3) (B) (i)), in granting a petition to terminate the father’s parental
rights as to P.
2. The respondent father could not prevail on his claim that there was
insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that P
was neglected; the court’s factual findings, which were supported by
sufficient evidence in the record, demonstrated that the homemade
infant formula that the father had been feeding P caused P’s severe
malnutrition and his failure to thrive, and the father’s failure to follow
medical recommendations to regularly take P to a medical provider for
well-baby checkups prevented detection of P’s failure to thrive.
Argued April 8—officially released June 18, 2024**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child
neglected, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Fairfield, Juvenile Matters, and tried to the
court, McLaughlin, J.; judgment adjudicating the minor
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** June 18, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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child neglected, from which the respondent father
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent father).
Albert J. Oneto IV, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, and Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).
Catherine L. Williams, assigned counsel, for the
minor child.
Opinion

CRADLE, J. The respondent father, I. M. (respon-
dent), appeals from the judgment of the trial court adju-
dicating his minor child, P. M. (P), neglected.1 On
appeal, the respondent claims that the court erred in
adjudicating P neglected because the evidence relied
upon by the court is not sufficient to support its determi-
nation that P was denied proper care and attention and
was permitted to live under conditions and circum-
stances injurious to his well-being. We affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. P was born healthy and without complications
in August, 2022, to T. T. (mother) and the respondent
(collectively, parents). P’s parents believe in an alkaline,
plant-based diet for their family, so they created a home-
made infant formula when their first child, C. M. (C),
was born in May, 2021. Neha Kaushik, a naturopathic
doctor, first met the family and became C’s primary
care provider when C was approximately six months
old. Kaushik had no information about C’s growth
1
The respondent mother, T. T., also was named in the neglect petition
and appeared in the trial court, but she did not file an appeal. We therefore
refer in this opinion to the respondent father as the respondent.
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before that time but subsequently worked with the
respondent to help him alter the homemade infant for-
mula to ensure that C received necessary nutrients.
About six days after P was born, his parents took
him to see Kaushik for his first well-baby visit. At his
initial visit in August, 2022, Kaushik spoke to P’s parents
about their homemade infant formula, and they pro-
vided her with a list of ingredients in the formula. Kaus-
hik reviewed the list and made a recommendation to
add certain nutrients to the formula. Although P is the
youngest patient Kaushik had treated in her career and
she did not have experience or specialized training in
treating infants, Kaushik indicated that she had no con-
cerns that the homemade infant formula would provide
P with the nutrients that he, as an infant, needed in
order to develop.
Kaushik followed up with P’s parents about the need
to bring him in for monthly infant wellness checkups,
but they failed to do so. Kaushik did not see P again
until December, 2022, when he was ill and present for
a virtual appointment during which she diagnosed him
with respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) and provided his
parents with some naturopathic treatments.
Kaushik next saw P virtually on January 27, 2023. At
that visit, P’s parents told Kaushik that he had been
having breathing difficulties starting on January 25,
2023, and that he was not eating. His parents also indi-
cated that they had provided him with ginger and
cucumber water along with other naturopathic treat-
ments. Kaushik gave the parents treatment advice and
further explained that they would need to bring him to
an urgent care facility if his breathing did not improve
in the following two to three hours. When she called
P’s parents a few hours later, his condition had not
improved, and they had not taken him to urgent care.
Kaushik told them that she would call the authorities
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if they did not take him. Later that evening, P’s parents
brought him to St. Vincent’s Medical Center (St. Vin-
cent’s). By the time P arrived at St. Vincent’s, he was
critically ill, and St. Vincent’s transferred him to Yale
New Haven Children’s Hospital (Yale), where the Yale
medical team admitted him and diagnosed him with
croup, COVID-19, anemia, and severe metabolic acido-
sis. The Yale medical team also noted that, despite being
five and one-half months old, he presented, in weight,
length, and head circumference, as a two month old.
The Yale medical team worked diligently and urgently
to stabilize him. On January 28, 2023, the Yale medical
team intubated P to treat acute hypoxemia. The Yale
medical team later told P’s parents that a blood transfu-
sion would be medically necessary to save his life. At
first, P’s parents would not consent. Even after P’s
mother consented, the respondent, who was disruptive
and aggressive at the hospital, refused to consent. The
Yale medical team notified P’s parents that they were
initiating legal action to obtain a court order to allow
the blood transfusion, and the respondent eventually
consented to the blood transfusion without a court
order being issued. Following the blood transfusion, P
started to stabilize.
On January 29, 2023, the petitioner, the Commis-
sioner of Children and Families, invoked a ninety-six
hour hold on P and C due to concerns regarding the
children’s nutritional status.2 On January 30, 2023, addi-
tional members of the Yale medical team became
involved with P as it related to his growth and nutrition.
Sharon Bertrand, a registered, board-certified dietician
2
The petitioner released the ninety-six hour hold on C when it was deter-
mined that he was not malnourished. The petitioner also filed a neglect
petition on behalf of C, but the court later granted the respondent’s motion
to strike the neglect petition. Because the petitioner did not file an amended
petition after the court granted the motion to strike, the court dismissed
the neglect petition relating to C.
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with a specialty certification in pediatric critical care
nutrition, diagnosed P as severely malnourished based
on his ‘‘ ‘z-scores,’ ’’3 which were considerably below
the standard and placed him barely at the first percentile
for growth. In addition, P’s lab results revealed that he
was deficient in vitamin A, carnitine, and seven essential
amino acids.
Bertrand met with the respondent to discuss the
ingredients in the homemade infant formula. Although
the respondent had given the Yale medical team a list
of the formula’s ingredients, the list did not provide the
measurement of each ingredient or the sources that
produced the ingredients. It was also unclear to the
Yale medical team how the respondent was making
the formula, so there was no way of knowing if the
homemade infant formula was contaminated. It was
later determined that the homemade infant formula was
nutritionally deficient. Bertrand, who found that P’s
homemade infant formula lacked amino acids, fatty
acids, and vitamins, attempted to speak to the respon-
dent about her concerns, but he refused to engage in
conversation, talked over her, and was combative. The
Yale medical team made the decision to stop using the
homemade infant formula and switched to Neocate, a
commercially made, vegan, non-soy formula.4
On February 2, 2023, the petitioner filed the present
neglect petition, alleging that P was neglected in that he
3
Z-scores, which ‘‘measure the growth and nutritional status of infants
and children based on weight, length, and head circumference,’’ are ‘‘plotted
on a standard growth chart provided by the [World Health Organization]
and/or the [Centers for Disease Control].’’ P’s z-scores upon his admission
to Yale were -3 or -3.4 for weight, -3.45 for length, and -2.6 for head circumfer-
ence.
4
At first, the Yale medical team provided P with the homemade infant
formula, but it was too thick to pass through the feeding tube once P was
intubated. They consulted with Kaushik about possible ways to dilute the
formula. The Yale medical team then began feeding P both Neocate and the
homemade infant formula but switched exclusively to Neocate in light of
their increasing concerns about the homemade infant formula.
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had been denied proper care and attention, physically,
educationally, emotionally or morally, or that he had
been permitted to live under conditions, circumstances
or associations injurious to his well-being.5 On the same
day, the court, Maronich, J., granted the petitioner’s
motion for an ex parte order of temporary custody
(OTC), vesting temporary custody of P in the petitioner,
and vacated the ninety-six hour hold. On February 22,
2023, the court, Hon. William Holden, judge trial ref-
eree, sustained the OTC until further order of the court.

On February 10, 2023, the Yale medical team extu-
bated P, but he remained in critical condition, in part,
due to his malnutrition. He was steadily gaining weight
on the Neocate and his iron and vitamin numbers were
stabilizing. On February 27, 2023, the Yale medical team
discharged P from the hospital, and the petitioner
placed him in the care of his paternal grandmother.

During the neglect trial, which took place on Septem-
ber 21, 25 and 27, 2023, the court, McLaughlin, J., admit-
ted into evidence, inter alia, Yale medical records dated
January 28 and February 27, 2023, the affidavits of Chel-
sea Lepus, an attending physician at the Department
of Pediatric Gastroenterology, Hepatology and Nutri-
tion at Yale, and Lisa Pavlovic, the attending pediatri-
cian with the child abuse program at Yale, and a chart
made by Kaushik comparing the nutritional content of
infant formulas, including the homemade infant formula
and Neocate. The petitioner offered the testimony of,
among others, Bertrand, Lepus, and Pavlovic. P’s
mother offered the testimony of Kaushik, and the
5
The petitioner also alleged that P had been abused in that he had physical
injuries inflicted by other than accidental means or that he was in a condition
that was the result of maltreatment including but not limited to malnutrition,
sexual molestation or exploitation, deprivation of necessities, emotional
maltreatment or cruel punishment. The court did not find that P was abused
or maltreated, and the abuse allegation is not at issue in this appeal.
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respondent offered the testimony of P’s paternal grand-
mother. The court issued a memorandum of decision,
dated September 29, 2023, in which it held that ‘‘[t]he
overwhelming credible evidence established by more
than a fair preponderance that, as of the filing of the
neglect petition on February 2, 2023, [P] was neglected
in that he was denied proper care and attention physi-
cally and medically and in that he was permitted to
live under conditions or circumstances injurious to his
well-being.’’
In so holding, the court credited the testimony of
Bertrand, Lepus, and Pavlovic. Specifically, the court
credited their testimony that, based on the severity of
P’s condition when he was admitted to Yale, he had
been malnourished for at least three months prior to
his hospitalization. Moreover, the court found Kaushik’s
testimony unpersuasive and unreliable as to the ade-
quacy of P’s growth and found equally unreliable her
comparison of the respondent’s homemade infant for-
mula with Neocate. The court further found that P was
critically ill when he arrived at Yale, had been malnour-
ished well before his admission, and was failing to
thrive. The court then concluded that the petitioner had
established by more than a fair preponderance of the
evidence that P was malnourished because he was not
receiving necessary nutrients from the homemade
infant formula supplied by his parents.
The court also found that P’s parents failed to comply
with Kaushik’s recommendation of monthly visits as a
part of a well-baby care plan. It found that P’s parents
‘‘simply did not follow up. No doctor saw [P] during
the early months of his life. It was not until [P] was
sick with RSV that [his] parents reached out to . . .
Kaushik. Thereafter, [P’s] parents did not seek out medi-
cal care for [him] until he was so critically ill that he
stayed in the hospital for a month after being intubated
and received a blood transfusion.’’ The court concluded
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that the evidence established ‘‘by more than a fair pre-
ponderance that, as of the filing of the neglect petition,
[P] had not seen a doctor for at least three months
despite repeated attempts by . . . Kaushik to have
[his] parents bring [him] in for a required visit.’’ On
the basis of these conclusions, the court adjudicated P
neglected in that he was denied proper care and atten-
tion physically and medically and in that he was permit-
ted to live under conditions or circumstances injurious
to his well-being. The court then found, by a fair prepon-
derance of the evidence, that it was ‘‘in [P’s] best interest
to return to his parents’ care under a period of six
months of protective supervision.’’ This appeal fol-
lowed.6
On appeal, the respondent claims that, in light of the
record as a whole, the evidence relied upon by the trial
court is not sufficient to support the court’s adjudica-
tion of neglect.7 As a preliminary matter, the petitioner
6
The attorney for the minor child, P, filed a statement adopting the peti-
tioner’s brief.
7
The respondent also cites, in his principal appellate brief, cases that he
contends stand for the proposition that parents have a constitutional right
to maintain the integrity of their family without state interference. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599
(1982); In re Teagan K.-O., 335 Conn. 745, 755–56, 242 A.3d 59 (2020); In
re Delilah G., 214 Conn. App. 604, 613–14, 280 A.3d 1168, cert. denied, 345
Conn. 911, 282 A.3d 1277 (2022). Because the respondent does not engage
in any substantive discussion or clearly set forth any argument as to a
constitutional violation, we decline to review any such claim. See C. B. v.
S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022) (‘‘[f]or a reviewing court
to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal
. . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). The respondent’s efforts, in his
reply brief and at oral argument before this court, to further address a
potential constitutional claim do not remedy his failure to raise the claim
in his principal appellate brief. Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protection,
337 Conn. 781, 797 n.12, 256 A.3d 655 (2021) (‘‘[i]t is well settled that a claim
cannot be raised for the first time at oral argument’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Keating, 72 Conn. App. 310,
316, 805 A.2d 120 (2002) (‘‘a reply brief is not the proper vehicle for curing an
omission in the appellant’s brief’’), aff’d, 266 Conn. 851, 836 A.2d 412 (2003).
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challenges this court’s subject matter jurisdiction by
asserting that the respondent’s claim is moot now that
the period of protective supervision has expired. The
respondent counters that the court’s adjudication of
neglect has prejudicial collateral consequences that
nonetheless entitle his claim to appellate review. We
agree with the respondent that his claim is reviewable
under the collateral consequences exception to the
mootness doctrine, but we nonetheless conclude that
the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s neglect
adjudication.
‘‘Mootness is an exception to the general rule that
jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost by the occurrence
of subsequent events. . . . Because mootness goes to
the power of this court to entertain an appeal, we
address the issue as a threshold matter.’’ (Citation omit-
ted.) In re Alba P.-V., 135 Conn. App. 744, 747, 42 A.3d
393, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 917, 46 A.3d 170 (2012).
‘‘Since mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction
. . . [and] raises a question of law . . . our review of
that issue is plenary. . . .
‘‘When, during the pendency of an appeal, events
have occurred that preclude an appellate court from
granting any practical relief through its disposition of
the merits, a case has become moot. . . . It is a well-
settled general rule that the existence of an actual con-
troversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdic-
tion; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide
moot questions, disconnected from the granting of
actual relief or from the determination of which no
practical relief can follow. . . . Nevertheless, the court
may retain jurisdiction when a litigant shows that there
is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral
consequences will occur. . . . Accordingly, the litigant
must establish these consequences by more than mere
conjecture, but need not demonstrate that these conse-
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In re P. M.

quences are more probable than not. This standard pro-
vides the necessary limitations on justiciability underly-
ing the mootness doctrine itself. Whe[n] there is no
direct practical relief available from the reversal of the
judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine
acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether
a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practi-
cal relief in the future.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Claudia F., 93 Conn.
App. 343, 345–46, 888 A.2d 1138, cert. denied, 277 Conn.
924, 895 A.2d 796 (2006); see also Williams v. Ragaglia,
261 Conn. 219, 226–27, 802 A.2d 778 (2002).
In the present case, there is a reasonable possibility
that P’s neglect adjudication will have prejudicial collat-
eral consequences. Specifically, the Superior Court, at
some time in the future, could rely on the present adjudi-
cation of neglect in granting a petition to terminate the
respondent’s parental rights as to P. See In re Alba P.-
V., supra, 135 Conn. App. 750 (‘‘[General Statutes § 17a-
112 (j) (3) (B) (i)] requires only a single prior adjudica-
tion of neglect as to the child who is the subject of a
termination of parental rights petition’’); see also Gen-
eral Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).
The present case is distinguishable from cases in
which this court has concluded that a challenge to a
neglect adjudication was moot where the parent or
guardian of the neglected or uncared for child argued
that the adjudication would have collateral conse-
quences for the status of other children. See, e.g., In
re Tiarra O., 160 Conn. App. 807, 812–13, 125 A.3d 1094
(2015); In re Claudia F., supra, 93 Conn. App. 348.
Here, the neglect adjudication could reasonably have
collateral consequences for the respondent’s parental
rights as to the neglected child himself. The present
case is also distinguishable from cases in which the
neglected child soon would reach the age of majority.
See, e.g., In re Rabia K., 212 Conn. App. 556, 562, 275
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In re P. M.

A.3d 249 (2022) (‘‘the respondent fails to address why
there is a reasonable possibility that a future child pro-
tection proceeding would be initiated’’ given that child
would turn eighteen in matter of months). Here, P is a
toddler, so there exists a reasonable possibility that the
neglect adjudication would yield prejudicial conse-
quences before he reaches the age of majority. Last,
the present case is distinguishable from cases in which
there had been a previous adjudication of neglect of
the same child. See, e.g., In re Alba P.-V., supra, 135
Conn. App. 750 (‘‘review of the present [neglect adjudi-
cation] would provide the respondent with no practical
relief’’ from collateral consequences for future proceed-
ings because neglected children ‘‘would be exposed to
a subsequent termination of parental rights proceeding
predicated on [earlier neglect adjudications]’’). Before
September 29, 2023, P had not been adjudicated neglected.8
Because a court may grant a petition for the termination
of parental rights if it finds, among other things, that
‘‘the child . . . has been found by the Superior Court
or the Probate Court to have been neglected . . . in a
prior proceeding’’; General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3)
(B);9 the present adjudication constitutes a step toward
8
There is evidence in the record of two previous reports of medical neglect
involving this family: one related to C in 2021, and another related to P in
August, 2022. Both reports raised medical and nutritional concerns, but
the petitioner closed its case in September, 2022, and neither child was
adjudicated neglected.
9
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a-
717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families
has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child
with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless
the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to
benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required
if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b, or
determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, (2)
termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child
(i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been
neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . .’’
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the termination of the respondent’s parental rights as
to P that had not previously been taken. Accordingly,
we conclude that the respondent’s claim is reviewable.10
To support his claim on appeal that the evidence was
not sufficient to support the court’s neglect adjudica-
tion, the respondent argues that (1) P did, in fact, receive
medical care between the time of his birth and his
admission to Yale,(2) the respondent’s behavior at Yale
reflected his concern for P’s treatment and did not
interfere with the implementation of medical proce-
dures, (3) P’s condition upon admission to Yale was
due to ‘‘an unfortunate confluence of events starting
with the RSV, leading into the COVID-19 and croup
infections, and the consequent lack of eating by the
child,’’; (4) P’s family has a history of ‘‘small growth’’
and P’s older brother, C, was found to be healthy despite
living in the same home and sharing the same diet, and
(5) P is progressing well in his overall development.
We are not persuaded.
‘‘Neglect proceedings, under . . . [General Statutes]
§ 46b-129, are comprised of two parts, adjudication and
disposition. . . . The standard of proof applicable to
nonpermanent custody proceedings, such as neglect
proceedings, is a fair preponderance of the evidence.
. . .
10
In addition to raising the mootness issue in her appellate brief, the
petitioner filed, with this court, a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot.
The respondent filed an opposing memorandum in which he argued, inter
alia, that his claim is reviewable under the ‘‘capable of repetition, yet evading
review’’ exception to the mootness doctrine. This court issued an order for
the parties to argue the issue of mootness before this court during oral
argument. Counsel for the respondent argued, during oral argument before
this court, that the respondent’s claim was not moot under the ‘‘capable of
repetition, yet evading review’’ exception. Because we determine that the
respondent’s claim is reviewable under the collateral consequences excep-
tion to mootness, we need not address the respondent’s ‘‘capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review’’ argument. Accordingly, we deny the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss.
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In re P. M.

‘‘During the adjudicatory phase, the court determines
if the child was neglected. Practice Book § 35a-7 (a)
provides in relevant part: In the adjudicatory phase,
the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events
preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amend-
ment. . . . [General Statutes § 46b-120 (4)] provides
that a child may be found neglected if the child is being
denied proper care and attention, physically, education-
ally, emotionally or morally, or is being permitted to
live under conditions, circumstances, or associations
injurious to the well-being of the child or youth . . . .
‘‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, the function of an appellate court is to
review the findings of the trial court, not to retry the
case. . . . [W]e must determine whether the facts set
out in the memorandum of decision are supported by
the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and
the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly
erroneous. . . . We also must determine whether
those facts correctly found are, as a matter of law,
sufficient to support the judgment. . . . [W]e give great
deference to the findings of the trial court because of
its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before
it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses . . . .’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Olivia W., 223 Conn. App. 173, 183–84, 308 A.3d
571 (2024).
We conclude that the court’s factual findings with
regard to its neglect determination were supported by
sufficient evidence in the record, including, but not
limited to, the testimony of witnesses that the court
found credible. Contrary to the respondent’s assertion
that P’s malnutrition was related to his RSV, COVID-
19, and croup infections, the court credited the testi-
mony of Bertrand, Lepus, and Pavlovic that P’s malnour-
ishment began well before his illnesses and credited
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Bertrand’s assessment that the homemade infant for-
mula that P’s parents had been feeding him prior to his
admission to Yale was nutritionally deficient. The Yale
medical records in evidence support the court’s findings
that P’s weight, height, and head circumference at the
time of the filing of the neglect petition were consider-
ably below the standard for an infant of his age, in
contrast with Kaushik’s testimony that P’s growth was
adequate in the early months of his life, which the court
explicitly discredited. Moreover, the respondent’s
assertion that P’s older brother, C, had been healthy
when being fed a similar diet is belied by the court’s
discrediting of Kaushik’s testimony to that end. The
court did, however, credit Kaushik’s testimony that she
repeatedly recommended to P’s parents that they bring
him to her office for medical care, and her testimony
supports the court’s finding that, nonetheless, P had
not seen a doctor for months prior to his admission to
Yale. Because this court does not retry the facts or pass
upon the credibility of witnesses; In re Niya B., 223
Conn. App. 471, 499, 308 A.3d 604, cert. denied, 348
Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024); we conclude that there
was sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings
of fact.
Finally, to the extent that the respondent claims that
the court’s findings were insufficient to support an adju-
dication of neglect, we disagree. We conclude that the
facts properly found by the court, which demonstrate
that (1) the homemade infant formula that P’s parents
had been feeding him was the cause of his severe malnu-
trition and his failure to thrive and (2) the respondent’s
failure to follow medical recommendations prevented
the detection of P’s failure to thrive, were sufficient to
support the court’s neglect determination. See, e.g., In
re Amber B., Docket Nos. CP-16-016537-A, CP-16-
6016538-A, 2017 WL 1239470, *6 (Conn. Super. February
8, 2017) (adjudicating child neglected on basis of, in
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16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
In re P. M.

part, findings that child was diagnosed with failure to
thrive due to malnutrition and that parent failed to
follow through with medical recommendations); see
also 2 Dept. of Children & Families, Policy Manual
(effective April 12, 2023) § 22-3 (‘‘[e]vidence of physical
neglect includes . . . malnutrition . . . [or] action/
inaction resulting in the child’s failure to thrive’’). The
respondent’s arguments regarding his own behavior at
Yale and P’s progress after being discharged from Yale
are of no moment to the court’s adjudication determina-
tion, given that ‘‘[a] judgment of neglect is not directed
at the respondent as a parent, but rather is directed at
the condition of the [child]’’; In re Claudia F., supra,
93 Conn. App. 347; and that the court considered only
‘‘evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition,’’
as it was required to do. Practice Book § 35a-7 (a).
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.