914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC

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914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC

914 NORTH COLONY, LLC v. 99 WEST, LLC
(AC 46943)
Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff landlord and the defendant tenant entered into a lease agree-
ment that required the defendant to pay base rent on a monthly basis,
as well as charges for real estate taxes and water and sewer assessments.
After the defendant failed to make its rent payment in April, 2020, the
plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit for nonpayment of
rent, which included a disclaimer stating that any payments tendered
after the service of the notice to quit would be accepted as use and
occupancy only. One day before the quit date on the notice, the defendant
tendered payment for the April and May, 2020, base rent. Shortly there-
after and for the next few months, the parties’ representatives had
discussions regarding the defendant’s tenancy at the premises. The plain-
tiff commenced the present action seeking to recover possession of the
premises in October, 2020, when it became apparent that the defendant
would not agree to a new lease. During the months when discussions
were taking place between the parties’ representatives, as well as after
the underlying action was commenced, the plaintiff continued to send
invoices to the defendant itemizing charges accruing under the lease,
including rent, attorney’s fees, real estate taxes, and late fees, while at
times also requesting use and occupancy payments. The defendant made
payments in response to each invoice. Following the plaintiff’s case-in-
chief at trial, the defendant’s counsel made an oral motion to dismiss
on the basis that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court
granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff’s conduct after
service of the notice to quit had rendered the notice to quit equivocal.
On the plaintiff’s appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly
found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the summary process
action: the plaintiff’s inconsistent characterization of what the lease
referred to as base rent, its requests for payment including additional
charges that were purportedly due under the terms of the lease, and
the delay in initiating the summary process action undermined the effec-
tiveness of the use and occupancy disclaimer; moreover, the plaintiff’s
actions created reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable tenant as
to whether the lease, in fact, remained terminated, and the trial court
therefore properly concluded that the notice to quit was rendered equivo-
cal by the plaintiff’s conduct.

Argued May 16—officially released July 16, 2024
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914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Housing
Session, and tried to the court, Spader, J.; thereafter,
the court, Spader, J., granted the defendant’s motion
to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
John A. Farnsworth, with whom, on the brief, was
Robert L. Rispoli, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Jonathan A. Kaplan, with whom was Sean M. McAu-
liffe, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The plaintiff, 914 North Colony, LLC,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing
its summary process action against the defendant, 99
West, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
improperly concluded that the plaintiff had reinstated
the tenancy by accepting the defendant’s tendered pay-
ments after service of the notice to quit, despite the
fact that the notice to quit included a use and occupancy
disclaimer. We disagree with the plaintiff’s characteriza-
tion of the court’s judgment and conclude that the court
properly found that the plaintiff’s actions rendered the
notice to quit equivocal, thereby depriving the court of
subject matter jurisdiction over the summary process
action. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The following undisputed facts are relevant to our
analysis.1 On December 1, 2017, the plaintiff purchased
a parcel of land located at 914 North Colony Road
in Wallingford and consented to the assignment and
assumption of a preexisting lease agreement (lease)
1
Prior to trial, the parties submitted a ‘‘joint statement of undisputed
material facts’’ for the court’s consideration.
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with the defendant, which operates a restaurant on the
premises.2 The initial term of the lease began on April
19, 1999, and expired on April 18, 2019, but the lease
allowed the defendant to exercise a series of four
options to extend the lease for additional five year
terms, and the defendant had exercised the first of these
four options to extend the lease until 2024. Under the
lease, the defendant is responsible for payment of the
base rent on the nineteenth day of each month and a
5 percent late fee for any late payments. The base rent
amount is subject to an increase at the start of each
five year term extension of the lease; throughout the
events at issue in this appeal, the monthly base rent
was $8078.34. The lease also requires the defendant to
pay charges for real estate taxes as ‘‘additional rent’’
and water and sewer assessments. Customarily, the
defendant pays the base rent on the first of each month
and pays the other charges when billed by the plaintiff.
On March 10, 2020, Governor Ned Lamont declared a
state of emergency because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Following this declaration, Governor Lamont issued
Executive Order No. 7D, which prohibited restaurants
from serving food or drink for on premises consump-
tion. Following this restriction, the defendant started
to offer takeout food but still suffered financially. On
March 27, 2020, the defendant’s corporate affiliate, 99
Restaurants, LLC, sent a letter to the plaintiff stating
that, due to the financial impact of the pandemic and
related restrictions, the defendant was excused from
performance under the lease and would ‘‘not be paying
the rent and other amounts due under the lease for the
month of April, 2020.’’ The plaintiff did not reply to this
2
The plaintiff and the defendant are successors in interest to the original
parties to the lease, which was executed on or about October 6, 1998. On
December 1, 2017, the plaintiff became the successor in interest to the
original landlord, pursuant to a warranty deed and an assignment and
assumption agreement. As of December 4, 2001, the defendant became the
successor in interest to the original tenant.
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letter. After the defendant did not pay the base rent
when due on April 19, 2020, the plaintiff served the
defendant with a notice to quit for nonpayment of rent
on May 4, 2020, directing the defendant to vacate the
premises on or before May 12, 2020. The notice to quit
included a disclaimer stating that ‘‘[a]ny payments ten-
dered after the service of this notice to quit will be
accepted as use and occupancy only and not as rent,
with full reservation of rights to continue the eviction
action.’’
On May 8, 2020, the defendant tendered $16,156.68
for the April and May base rent, which the plaintiff
received on May 11, 2020, one day prior to the quit date
on the notice. Shortly after this payment, Peter DiNardo,
a representative of the plaintiff, and Chad Corrigan, a
representative of the defendant, discussed the status
of the lease. At trial, DiNardo testified that, during this
conversation, he stated, ‘‘[Y]ou will not be reinstated
on your lease. The lease is terminated.’’ On May 12, 2020,
DiNardo emailed Corrigan an offering memorandum
for an adjacent property to demonstrate that the defen-
dant’s base rent was lower than the market rate. The
offering memorandum included a lease summary that
reflected a base rent for the adjacent property that was
more than double the amount of the defendant’s base
rent. Over the next few months, DiNardo and Corrigan
continued to have discussions regarding the defendant’s
tenancy at the premises, and DiNardo testified that, at
some point, he offered to let the defendant stay at the
premises under a new lease agreement with a higher
base rent. DiNardo also explained that the plaintiff com-
menced this action seeking to recover possession of
the premises in October, 2020, only when it became
apparent that the defendant would not agree to a
new lease.
During the months when discussions were taking
place between DiNardo and Corrigan, as well as after
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the underlying action was commenced, the plaintiff con-
tinued to send invoices to the defendant itemizing
charges accruing under the lease, while also at times
requesting use and occupancy payments. Specifically,
on May 20, 2020, the plaintiff sent an invoice for ‘‘Rent
(06/2020)’’ and ‘‘Water (05/2020).’’ On June 19, 2020, the
plaintiff sent an invoice for ‘‘Use & Occupancy (07/
2020),’’ ‘‘Legal (06/2020),’’ and ‘‘Late Fees (06/2020).’’
On July 13, 2020, the plaintiff sent a letter requesting
that the defendant pay real estate taxes. On August 20,
2020, the plaintiff sent an invoice for ‘‘Use & Occupancy
(09/2020)’’ and ‘‘Water (08/2020).’’ On September 18,
2020, the plaintiff sent an invoice for ‘‘Use & Occupancy
(10/2020)’’ and ‘‘Late Fees (09/2020).’’ On October 21,
2020, the plaintiff sent an invoice for ‘‘Use & Occupancy
(11/2020).’’ On November 20, 2020, the plaintiff sent an
invoice for ‘‘Use & Occupancy (12/2020)’’ and ‘‘Water
(11/2020).’’ On December 31, 2020, the plaintiff sent an
invoice for ‘‘Rent (01/2021)’’ and ‘‘Real Estate Taxes (01/
2021).’’ From January, 2021, to July, 2022, the plaintiff
continued to send invoices for ‘‘Rent,’’ late fees, water,
and real estate taxes. The defendant made payments
in response to each invoice and remains in possession
of the premises.

A trial on the plaintiff’s summary process complaint
was held on September 21, 2023. Following the plain-
tiff’s case-in-chief, the defendant’s counsel made an oral
motion to dismiss, arguing that the evidence showed
that the plaintiff, through its actions, had equivocated
the notice to quit it had served on the defendant, thereby
depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. In
particular, the defendant’s counsel argued that any ter-
mination of the lease was equivocated by the plaintiff’s
offers to reinstate the lease and its requests for payment
of items such as the water bill, real estate taxes, and
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late fees, which arise solely under the lease. In response,
the plaintiff’s counsel argued that DiNardo explicitly
stated that the lease was terminated and would not be
reinstated; the discussions following the notice to quit
did not evidence an intent to reinstate; and the pay-
ments following the notice to quit were accepted for
use and occupancy only, per the disclaimer in the notice
to quit.

After hearing from the parties, the court granted the
motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff’s conduct
after service of the notice to quit had rendered the
notice to quit equivocal. In its oral decision, the court
explained that ‘‘[t]he fact that the complaint wasn’t
brought for another five, six months [after service of
the notice to quit] while these communications were
going on, while statements went out asking for rent,
while the items that went for taxes, water, sewer, which
are items on the rent, while late fees are still showing
up on invoices, and a complaint got served five, six
months later as a negotiation tactic probably, but I think
by that point this lease was reinstated by the actions
of the parties by the acceptance of the payment. . . .
[B]ased on the testimony before the court, I can’t find
that this was not equivocated. The intent, the waiting
the five months . . . during a global pandemic, the
motion to dismiss is granted. The notice to quit was
equivocated. The lease was reinstated as of the accep-
tance of that payment.’’ This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly concluded that the plaintiff had reinstated the ten-
ancy by accepting the defendant’s tendered payments
after service of the notice to quit despite the fact that
the notice to quit included a use and occupancy dis-
claimer. It argues that the court’s conclusion is ‘‘unsup-
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914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC

ported by applicable law and [is] not supported by facts
in the record.’’3 We are not persuaded.4
We begin our analysis by setting forth the applicable
standard of review and relevant legal principles regard-
ing summary process. Whether the court properly con-
cluded that the plaintiff reinstated the defendant’s ten-
ancy through its course of conduct following the service
of an unequivocal notice to quit ‘‘presents a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact to which we apply plenary review.
. . . We must therefore decide whether the court’s con-
clusions are legally and logically correct and find sup-
port in the facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Centrix Management Co.,
LLC v. Valencia, 132 Conn. App. 582, 586–87, 33 A.3d
802 (2011).
3
The plaintiff also claims that the court ‘‘erroneously found that [the]
notice to quit was equivocal and thereafter improperly granted the defen-
dant’s oral motion to dismiss because the plaintiff established its prima
facie case’’ pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8. Although the plaintiff dedicates
much of its brief to this point, we decline to address this claim because the
basis for the judgment of dismissal, and the only issue before us in this
appeal, is whether the notice to quit was made equivocal by the plaintiff’s
actions. Whether the plaintiff established its prima facie case is a separate
issue that the trial court did not address in its ruling.
4
We note that the defendant claims that this appeal is moot because the
plaintiff failed ‘‘to challenge all of the factual findings and legal conclusions
that led to the trial court granting [the defendant’s] motion to dismiss on
the basis of equivocation of the notice to quit.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) The
defendant argues that, because the plaintiff’s brief focuses solely on events
from May 4 to 12, 2020, including payment of the April and May rent and
conversations between the parties’ representatives, and does not address
the other evidence on which the trial court relied, including the invoices
that the plaintiff sent to the defendant, the plaintiff failed to challenge all
the bases for the trial court’s decision. This argument fails. Although an
appellant must challenge all the independent bases for a trial court’s adverse
ruling to avoid rendering an appeal moot; see, e.g., State v. Marsala, 204
Conn. App. 571, 575, 254 A.3d 358, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 951, 251 A.3d
617 (2021); the late rent payments, the conversations between the parties’
representatives, and the invoices are not independent bases for the court’s
judgment. Rather, they are simply separate pieces of evidence that support
the only basis for the court’s judgment—that is, that the plaintiff’s conduct
rendered the notice to quit equivocal. Consequently, this appeal is not moot.
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When determining whether a landlord’s conduct ren-
dered a notice to quit equivocal, courts apply an objec-
tive standard that evaluates whether the words and
actions of the landlord ‘‘could create reasonable doubt
in the mind of a reasonable tenant as to whether the
lease, in fact, remained terminated.’’ Id., 589. In the
present case, the facts are undisputed, and the court
credited the testimony of DiNardo, the only witness
who testified at trial. Accordingly, our review is limited
to whether the court’s legal conclusion that the actions
of the plaintiff created reasonable doubt in the mind
of the defendant as to the status of its tenancy was
legally and logically correct and finds support in the
undisputed facts that appear in the record. Id., 586–87.
‘‘Summary process is a special statutory procedure
designed to provide an expeditious remedy. . . . It
enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased prem-
ises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to
which, under the common-law actions, they might be
subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their
terms. . . . Service of a valid notice to quit, which ter-
minates the lease and creates a tenancy at sufferance
. . . is a condition precedent to a summary process
action under [General Statutes] § 47a-23 that implicates
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over that
action.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Waterbury Twin, LLC v.
Renal Treatment Centers–Northeast, Inc., 292 Conn.
459, 466, 974 A.2d 626 (2009). Due to the expeditious
nature of summary process, the relevant statutes ‘‘must
be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘The failure to comply
with the statutory requirements deprives a court of
jurisdiction to hear the summary process action.’’
Bridgeport v. Barbour-Daniel Electronics, Inc., 16
Conn. App. 574, 582, 548 A.2d 744, cert. denied, 209
Conn. 826, 552 A.2d 432 (1988).
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In order to comply with § 47a-23, a notice to quit
must be unequivocal. See Getty Properties Corp. v.
ATKR, LLC, 315 Conn. 387, 407, 107 A.3d 931 (2015)
(‘‘[i]n order to effect a termination, the lessor must
perform some unequivocal act which clearly demon-
strates his intent to terminate the lease’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Centrix Management Co., LLC v.
Valencia, supra, 132 Conn. App. 589–90 (‘‘a paramount
consideration is the goal of insulating the tenant from
confusion and uncertainty’’). Furthermore, despite the
service of an unequivocal notice to quit, a landlord’s
subsequent conduct ‘‘can render the landlord’s intent
to terminate the tenancy equivocal, repudiate the intent
to terminate set forth in the notice to quit, and reinstate
the lease.’’ J. M. v. E. M., 216 Conn. App. 814, 820, 286
A.3d 929 (2022); see also Centrix Management Co., LLC
v. Valencia, supra, 589–90 (concluding that unequivocal
notice to quit was rendered equivocal by landlord’s
later written and spoken statements inconsistent with
termination of tenant’s lease). If the notice to quit is
rendered equivocal by the landlord’s actions and the
lease is deemed to be reinstated, the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the summary process action.
See generally J. M. v. E. M., supra, 820 (‘‘[a] notice to
quit is a condition precedent to a summary process
action and, if defective, deprives the court of subject
matter jurisdiction’’).
The plaintiff’s primary claim on appeal is that the
court improperly concluded that its acceptance of pay-
ments from the defendant after service of the notice to
quit rendered the notice to quit equivocal. It argues
that, because the notice to quit included a use and
occupancy disclaimer and, considering that DiNardo
expressly told Corrigan that the lease was terminated
and would not be reinstated, any payments the plaintiff
accepted after service of the notice constituted use and
occupancy and, therefore, did not equivocate the notice
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to quit. In response, the defendant argues that the plain-
tiff mischaracterizes the court’s reasoning. According to
the defendant, the court relied not only on the plaintiff’s
acceptance of payments from the defendant, but also
on the entirety of the plaintiff’s conduct after it served
the notice to quit, including its sending of invoices seek-
ing the payment of sums due under the lease, its negotia-
tions with the defendant on new lease terms, and its
delay in instituting the underlying action.
We, therefore, begin with a review of the court’s
judgment. ‘‘The interpretation of a trial court’s judgment
presents a question of law over which our review is
plenary. . . . As a general rule, judgments are to be
construed in the same fashion as other written instru-
ments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention
of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment.
. . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly
implied as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The
judgment should admit of a consistent construction as
a whole. . . . [W]e are mindful that an opinion must
be read as a whole, without particular portions read in
isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding. . . .
Furthermore, [w]e read an ambiguous trial court record
so as to support, rather than contradict, its judgment.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re November H.,
202 Conn. App. 106, 118, 243 A.3d 839 (2020). Although
the court in the present case referenced the plaintiff’s
acceptance of the May payment as supporting its con-
clusion that the plaintiff’s conduct equivocated the
lease, it also referred to the plaintiff’s other conduct,
including the invoices sent by the plaintiff following
the notice to quit and the delayed commencement of the
summary process action. Consequently, we consider,
as did the trial court, the entirety of the plaintiff’s con-
duct after it served the notice to quit.
As previously noted, the plaintiff’s primary argument
on appeal is that, because it included a use and occu-
pancy disclaimer in the notice to quit, the defendant
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914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC

was on notice that all payments made after service
of the notice to quit would be accepted for use and
occupancy only, and not for rent. As support for its
argument, the plaintiff relies on this court’s decision in
O & P Realty v. Santana, 17 Conn. App. 314, 551 A.2d
1287, cert. denied, 210 Conn. 812, 556 A.2d 610 (1989),
in which we held that a landlord may accept rent and
characterize it as use and occupancy if the landlord has
notified the tenant that any payments made after service
of the notice to quit would be accepted only as use and
occupancy payments. Id., 318. The plaintiff’s reliance
on O & P Realty is misplaced considering the record
before the trial court in the present case.
To be sure, use and occupancy disclaimers are both
permitted and encouraged in a notice to quit, as they
‘‘[avoid] misleading tenants who tender late payments
and . . . [insulate] the summary process action from
being flawed by the acceptance of [payment] after com-
mencement of the summary process.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 318–19. The inclusion of a use
and occupancy disclaimer, however, does not preclude
a determination that the tenancy was reinstated by way
of subsequent conduct, especially when, as here, the
conduct included sending regular invoices that specifi-
cally identified the amounts due as rent or other
amounts due pursuant to the lease.
Indeed, in the present case, the plaintiff’s inconsistent
characterization of what the lease referred to as base
rent, sometimes as ‘‘Rent’’ and sometimes as ‘‘Use &
Occupancy,’’ undermines the effectiveness of the use
and occupancy disclaimer in avoiding confusion. Spe-
cifically, shortly after the notice to quit was served, the
defendant tendered $16,156.68, representing the base
rent due under the lease for April and May, 2020. There-
after, on May 20, 2020, just a little more than one week
after DiNardo and Corrigan spoke, the plaintiff sent
the defendant an invoice for June, 2020, requesting the
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payment of ‘‘Rent.’’ Given that the defendant had just
paid its outstanding balance to the plaintiff on May 8,
2020, the plaintiff’s May 20 invoice for ‘‘Rent’’ certainly
‘‘could create reasonable doubt in the mind of a reason-
able tenant as to whether the lease, in fact, remained
terminated.’’ Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valen-
cia, supra, 132 Conn. App. 589. Although the plaintiff
subsequently charged the defendant for ‘‘Use & Occu-
pancy’’ from June to November, 2020, that same charge
again was referred to as ‘‘Rent’’ in the invoices from
December, 2020, through August, 2022, which could
further cause a reasonable tenant to question whether
the lease, in fact, had been terminated.
Further, the plaintiff ignores the fact that, although its
invoices between June and November, 2020, requested
‘‘Use & Occupancy’’ payments equivalent to the base
rent due under the lease, it also requested payment of
additional charges, including water, real estate taxes,
late fees, and attorney’s fees that were purportedly due
under the terms of the lease. Those additional charges
suggest that the lease remained in effect because ‘‘after
a notice to quit possession has been served, a tenant’s
fixed tenancy is converted into a tenancy at sufferance.
. . . A tenant at sufferance is released from his obliga-
tions under a lease. . . . His only obligations are to
pay the reasonable rental value of the property which
he occupied in the form of use and occupancy payments
. . . and to fulfill all statutory obligations.’’ (Citations
omitted; footnote omitted.) Sproviero v. J.M. Scott
Associates, Inc., 108 Conn. App. 454, 462–63, 948 A.2d
379, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 906, 957 A.2d 873 (2008).
We recognize that ‘‘[u]se and occupancy payments
encompass a fair rental value of the property, which
necessarily accounts for obligations that are assumed
by a landlord in renting the property, such as septic
system maintenance. . . . Although, in many
instances, use and occupancy payments are equal to
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914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC

the parties’ previously agreed upon rent, a landlord may
be entitled to a larger use and occupancy payment when
it is forced to assume obligations that were once the
responsibility of a tenant under a lease.’’ (Citation omit-
ted.) Id., 465. Nevertheless, where the landlord identi-
fies those charges, which have their foundation solely
in the terms of the lease, separate from the use and
occupancy payment it is seeking, it creates uncertainty
as to the status of the lease and equivocates its notice
to quit. This is particularly true in the present case,
where the plaintiff invoiced the defendant separately
for late fees and attorney’s fees, which are only required
pursuant to the lease and cannot be an element of use
and occupancy due from a tenant at sufferance. See,
e.g., Milano v. Paladino, Superior Court, judicial district
of New Haven, Housing Sesson, Docket No. CVNH 9007-
3897 (April 3, 1991) (3 Conn. L. Rptr. 444, 445) (‘‘[t]he
landlord cannot recover late charges as provided for
in the lease for the months after the landlord terminated
the lease through the service of a notice to quit’’). In
fact, at oral argument before this court, counsel for the
plaintiff conceded that items such as real estate taxes
and late fees do not fall into the category of use and
occupancy.
The confusion created by the plaintiff’s invoices was
compounded by the fact that it waited months before
instituting the underlying action while it continued
negotiations with the defendant regarding its continued
tenancy at the premises. We have observed that ‘‘provid-
ing a tenant with a new lease agreement or with an
invitation to enter into a new rental agreement after a
notice to quit has been served is inconsistent with an
unequivocal notice to quit.’’ Centrix Management Co.,
LLC v. Valencia, supra, 132 Conn. App. 587. In Centrix
Management Co., LLC, the landlord served a notice to
quit on the tenants after they failed to pay rent for four
consecutive months. Id., 584. Following the notice to
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quit, the landlord expressed his preference to not evict
the tenants and instead sought to resolve the dispute.
Id. Over the one and one-half months between service
of the notice to quit and commencement of the summary
process action, the landlord took steps to assist the
tenants in staying on the premises, such as providing
them with contact information for an eviction preven-
tion program and agreeing in writing ‘‘to forgive two
months [of] use and occupancy payments and [to] work
with [them] to straighten out [the] arrearage.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. Even after the summary
process action was filed, the parties continued to dis-
cuss the tenants’ ongoing occupancy of the premises.
Id., 584–85.
One of the tenants moved to dismiss the summary
process action on the ground that the plaintiff had not
terminated the lease because the notice to quit was
equivocal. Id., 584. Concluding that the notice to quit
had been equivocated, the trial court dismissed the case.
Id., 585–86. The landlord appealed, claiming that his
subsequent communications constituted settlement
negotiations that did not contradict the pending sum-
mary process action that was not being withdrawn. Id.,
586. Affirming the judgment of the trial court, this court
held that the subsequent actions by the landlord during
settlement negotiations and the lack of communication
to the tenants ‘‘that the summary process action was
proceeding to conclusion unless they successfully nego-
tiated a pretrial settlement’’ created reasonable doubt
as to whether the lease was terminated. Id., 590.
The plaintiff argues that the facts in the present case
are distinguishable from Centrix Management Co.,
LLC, and more akin to the facts in Cheshire Land Trust,
LLC v. Casey, 156 Conn. App. 833, 115 A.3d 497 (2015).
In that case, the landlord sent a letter to the tenants
informing them that the lease was terminated and that
the landlord was in the process of contracting with a
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914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC

prospective new tenant for the premises. Id., 840. It
included an ultimatum for the tenants either to vacate
the premises or to negotiate separately with the new
tenant by a specified deadline. Id., 840–41. Following
the notice to quit, one of the tenants attempted to nego-
tiate with the prospective new tenant but they could
not come to agreeable terms. Id., 842–43. When
informing the landlord’s agent of this impasse, the agent
told the tenant to either sign the proposed sublease
with the prospective tenant within thirty-five minutes
or the landlord would continue with the eviction action.
Id., 843. Thereafter, the tenant, the prospective tenant,
and the landlord’s agent met. Id. During the meeting,
the prospective tenant promised to accommodate the
tenant in the proposed lease documents; however, no
agreement was reached. Id. The trial court rendered a
judgment of possession in favor of the landlord, con-
cluding that the notice to quit was unequivocal. Id.,
837–38. The tenants appealed, claiming that the notice
to quit was equivocal, as the options presented in the
notice to quit suggested that a new agreement could
be negotiated and, in the alternative, that the landlord’s
subsequent actions equivocated the notice to quit. Id.,
838. This court rejected the tenants’ claim, holding that,
‘‘even if we assume that the [statements in the notice
to quit] could be construed as inviting the [tenants] to
enter into a new lease, that invitation would not have
rendered the [landlord’s] notice equivocal because it
was accompanied by language clearly communicating
that eviction would occur in the absence of an agree-
ment to the contrary.’’ Id., 841–42. Addressing the ten-
ants’ alternative argument, this court held that the trial
court’s conclusion that the subsequent comments by
the landlord’s agent constituted a clear and unequivocal
warning that the eviction action would proceed in the
absence of a new agreement with the new tenant was
consistent with our holding in Centrix Management
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914 North Colony, LLC v. 99 West, LLC

Co., LLC. Id., 843–44. We further observed that the
approach in both Centrix Management Co., LLC, and
Cheshire Land Trust, LLC, ‘‘strikes the appropriate
balance between allowing settlement discussions to
continue and helping to ensure that the tenant is not
unsure as to whether he or she still may be evicted
pursuant to the pending action.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 842.

The plaintiff’s reliance on Cheshire Land Trust, LLC,
is misplaced. In its attempt to analogize the facts in the
present case to those in Cheshire Land Trust, LLC, the
plaintiff focuses on DiNardo’s statement to Corrigan
that the lease was terminated and would not be rein-
stated. When viewed in the context of all the subsequent
actions by the plaintiff, however, this statement is not
the same unequivocal ultimatum given in Cheshire
Land Trust, LLC. The subsequent communications fol-
lowing the ultimatum in Cheshire Land Trust, LLC,
were not inconsistent with the termination of the lease;
rather, they reinforced the inevitability of an eviction
action in the absence of an agreement. In the present
case, in contrast, the plaintiff’s actions following
DiNardo’s statement, namely, continuing to charge the
defendant for obligations that arose only under the lease
separately from the charges for ‘‘Use & Occupancy’’
and sending numerous invoices for ‘‘Rent’’ between May
20, 2020, and July 21, 2022, were inconsistent with a
‘‘clear intention to terminate the lease and to proceed
with judicial process to secure possession.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Centrix Management Co.,
LLC v. Valencia, supra, 132 Conn. App. 589. As in Cen-
trix Management Co., LLC, the plaintiff’s conduct, not
only over the more than five months between the notice
to quit and the commencement of the summary process
action but also during the almost three years that the
action was pending, created uncertainty as to whether
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the landlord would proceed to conclusion with the evic-
tion action. In other words, these communications
would create reasonable doubt in the mind of a tenant
as to whether the lease, in fact, remained terminated.
See id. Accordingly, the court properly concluded that
the notice to quit was rendered equivocal by the plain-
tiff’s conduct.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion, the other judges concurred.