N. R. v. M. P.

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N. R. v. M. P.

N. R. v. M. P.*
(AC 45960)
Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff father appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial
court awarding the defendant mother sole legal and physical custody
of their two minor children. Held:
1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
awarded the defendant sole legal and physical custody of the children
because it failed to consider the test set forth in the statute (§ 46b-56d)
governing a parent’s postjudgment relocation with a child: § 46b-56d
was inapplicable to the facts of the case because it did not involve a
postjudgment relocation, as the plaintiff filed an application seeking
joint legal custody with a shared parenting plan, the defendant filed a
cross complaint seeking sole legal custody, and, before a trial was held
and a custody determination was made, the defendant relocated to South
Carolina with the children, and, thus, the court was not required to
perform the relocation analysis set forth in § 46b-56d; moreover, it was
undisputed that the court applied the standard of the best interest of
the child as set forth in the statute (§ 46b-56) governing the custody of
minor children, the standard that governs a relocation issue that arises
prior to the time a judgment is rendered awarding custody; furthermore,
it was clear on the basis of the record and the court’s factual findings,
which were not challenged on appeal, that the court considered the
impact of the children’s relocation in its best interest analysis.
2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
issued orders that required him to be current with his child support
obligation and to pay one half of the travel expenses for the minor
children in order to receive parenting time with the children in Connecti-
cut: this court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim is an inaccurate recita-
tion of the substance of the trial court’s parenting time orders, as this

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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N. R. v. M. P.
court construed the parenting time orders as providing that, if the plain-
tiff is not current on child support, then he would bear the entire cost
of the children’s travel to Connecticut and, if he was current on child
support, he and the defendant would share the costs equally, and the
only circumstance in which the defendant was allowed to cancel a visit
was if the plaintiff had not provided her with payment for his portion
of the travel expenses, not if the plaintiff was not current on child
support payments.
3. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
relied on the testimony of the guardian ad litem in its analysis of the
best interests of the minor children: the fact that the guardian ad litem
was unable to observe a visit between the plaintiff and his children,
despite clear efforts made to do so, did not render the guardian ad
litem unable to issue recommendations to the court, nor did it make it
improper for the court to rely on those recommendations; moreover,
the guardian ad litem investigated the facts necessary to make recom-
mendations to the court related to custody and parenting time and
received updates from a third-party supervisor who had observed the
plaintiff’s visits with the children; furthermore, given that the guardian
ad litem testified at a hearing and was subject to cross-examination by
the parties, the court was able to consider the basis for the guardian ad
litem’s observations and recommendations and to afford them whatever
weight it deemed appropriate.
Argued May 16—officially released September 3, 2024

Procedural History

Application for custody of the parties’ minor children,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Waterbury, where the defendant
filed a cross complaint; thereafter, the matter was tried
to the court, Parkinson, J.; judgment granting, inter
alia, sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ minor
children to the defendant, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
David V. DeRosa, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Justine Rakich-Kelly, guardian ad litem, for the
minor children.
Opinion

SEELEY, J. The plaintiff, N. R.,1 appeals from the
judgment of the trial court awarding the defendant, M.
1
Although N. R. is the plaintiff in the underlying matter in this appeal,
this opinion also discusses a previous custody application filed by M. P., in
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N. R. v. M. P.

P., sole legal and physical custody of their two minor
2

children. On appeal, N. R. claims that the court improp-
erly (1) awarded M. P. sole legal and physical custody
of the children, (2) issued an order that, if N. R. is not
current on child support, he must share one half of the
travel expenses for the minor children to visit him in
Connecticut, and (3) relied on the testimony of the
guardian ad litem in its analysis of the best interests of
the minor children. We disagree and, therefore, affirm
the judgment of the court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of the present appeal. N. R. and
M. P. began a romantic relationship in June, 2016. They
have two minor children, born in May, 2017, who are
twins. N. R. was incarcerated from the end of 2017
through March, 2020. The parties continued their rela-
tionship throughout the period during which N. R. was
incarcerated. After N. R. was released from prison, he
lived with M. P. and the children. The relationship,
however, became increasingly volatile, leading N. R.
and M. P. to end their relationship in September, 2020,
with the children continuing to reside with M. P.
On September 21, 2020, M. P. filed an application for
custody, seeking sole legal custody of the children. M.
P. also filed an application for an emergency ex parte
which she was the plaintiff and N. R. was the defendant. For ease of discus-
sion, we refer to each of the parties by their initials, instead of as the plaintiff
or the defendant.
2
M. P. did not file a brief in this appeal. Consequently, on January 19,
2024, this court issued an order stating that ‘‘the appeal shall be considered
on the basis of [N. R.’s] brief, the record, as defined by Practice Book [§]
60-4, and oral argument . . . .’’ On April 1, 2024, The Children’s Law Center
of Connecticut, Inc., the guardian ad litem in this case, filed a motion seeking
permission to file a late brief. The guardian ad litem stated that, ‘‘[u]pon
review, it appeared the best interest of the child standard as well as the
role of the guardian ad litem were implicated in the arguments put forth
by [N. R.].’’ On April 11, 2024, this court granted the guardian ad litem
permission to file a late brief by May 3, 2024. The guardian ad litem timely
filed its brief on that date and participated in oral argument before this court.
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N. R. v. M. P.

order of custody of the children pursuant to General
Statutes § 46b-56f.3 M. P. requested that N. R. have no
contact or visitation with the children.4 That same day,
the court, Ficeto, J., granted M. P.’s application for
an emergency ex parte order of custody and awarded
temporary custody of the children to M. P. The court
also scheduled a hearing on its ex parte order for Octo-
ber 1, 2020. Following the October 1, 2020 evidentiary
hearing, the court, Coleman, J., granted M. P.’s applica-
tion for an emergency ex parte order of custody. The
3
General Statutes § 46b-56f provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any person
seeking custody of a minor child pursuant to section 46b-56 or pursuant to
an action brought under section 46b-40 may make an application to the
Superior Court for an emergency ex parte order of custody when such
person believes an immediate and present risk of physical danger or psycho-
logical harm to the child exists.
‘‘(b) The application shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under
oath which includes a statement (1) of the conditions requiring an emergency
ex parte order, (2) that an emergency ex parte order is in the best interests
of the child, and (3) of the actions taken by the applicant or any other
person to inform the respondent of the request or, if no such actions to
inform the respondent were taken, the reasons why the court should consider
such application on an ex parte basis absent such actions.
‘‘(c) The court shall order a hearing on any application made pursuant
to this section. If, prior to or after such hearing, the court finds that an
immediate and present risk of physical danger or psychological harm to the
child exists, the court may, in its discretion, issue an emergency order for
the protection of the child and may inform the Department of Children and
Families of relevant information in the affidavit for investigation purposes.
The emergency order may provide temporary child custody or visitation
rights and may enjoin the respondent from: (1) Removing the child from
the state; (2) interfering with the applicant’s custody of the child; (3) interfer-
ing with the child’s educational program; or (4) taking any other specific
action if the court determines that prohibiting such action is in the best
interests of the child. If relief on the application is ordered ex parte, the
court shall schedule a hearing not later than fourteen days after the date
of such ex parte order. If a postponement of a hearing on the application
is requested by either party and granted, no ex parte order shall be granted
or continued except upon agreement of the parties or by order of the court
for good cause shown. . . .’’
4
The application for an emergency ex parte order of custody alleged that
N. R. had no stable place to live, was on parole, and was mentally and
verbally abusive to M. P. and to the children. It further alleged that he had
referred to M. P. with degrading and profane language and that he had
screamed at her in front of the children.
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court, in addition to awarding temporary custody of
the children to M. P., ordered that N. R. ‘‘have supervised
visitation with the minor children every Sunday from
3 p.m. to 5 p.m.’’ The court also ordered that N. R.
have phone contact and nightly FaceTime calls with
the children.

On December 3, 2020, M. P. filed an application for an
ex parte restraining order pursuant to General Statutes
(Rev. to 2019) § 46b-15.5 Specifically, M. P. first detailed
a history of physical and verbal altercations with N. R.
dating back to 2017, and then alleged that in the summer
of 2020, N. R. had driven by her house on a regular
basis and had parked outside on multiple occasions
and that, in September, 2020, ‘‘after breaking up, our
Google accounts were linked and he was searching for
‘Waterbury’s most gruesome murders.’ ’’ M. P. further
alleged that, in November, 2020, while she was dropping
the children off for their visit with N. R., ‘‘he smacked
me, pushed me to [the] ground . . . and was screaming
about how I do not respect him.’’ The court, Ficeto, J.,
granted the ex parte restraining order that same day
and ordered, inter alia, that N. R. ‘‘not assault, threaten,
abuse, harass, follow, interfere with, or stalk [M. P.],’’
and that he ‘‘[s]tay away from the home of [M. P.] and
wherever [she] shall reside.’’ The court also scheduled a
hearing for December 15, 2020. Following the December
15, 2020 hearing, the court, Coleman, J., granted the
application for a restraining order and continued the
ex parte orders. The restraining order had an expiration
date of June 15, 2021.
5
General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 46b-15 (a) provides in relevant part:
‘‘Any family or household member . . . who has been subjected to a contin-
uous threat of present physical pain or physical injury, stalking or a pattern
of threatening, including, but not limited to, a pattern of threatening, as
described in section 53a-62, by another family or household member may
make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section. . . .’’
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N. R. v. M. P.

In February, 2021, the court appointed The Children’s
Law Center of Connecticut, Inc. (Children’s Law Cen-
ter), as the guardian ad litem for the minor children.6
On June 9, 2021, following a case date7 with the parties,
the court ordered that the ‘‘[p]arties shall share joint
legal custody . . . .’’ On September 21, 2021, following
another case date, the court issued a new order, which
updated child support orders and provided that N. R.
was to schedule a meeting with the guardian ad litem
and ‘‘participate in the family program.’’ On November
3, 2021, M. P. filed another application for an emergency
ex parte order of custody,8 seeking temporary custody
and supervised visitation. On that same date, the court,
6
Children’s Law Center filed an appearance on February 16, 2021.
7
‘‘Case Dates are scheduled as interim hearing dates in new dissolution
of marriage, legal separation, custody, and visitation cases, for the court to
consider issues that should be addressed before a final trial date. A Case
Date is a hearing before a judge to address matters like motions for temporary
orders on custody, child support, or other subjects, to be in effect while
[a] case is pending. The judge may also hear reports on the progress of
services that have been ordered in [a] case and may schedule additional
future court dates. . . . Case Dates are not for the final trial of [a] case.
They are intended as checkpoints along the way to final resolution, to keep
[a] case on track and to conduct brief hearings on issues that need orders
in place before there is a final agreement or trial.’’ State of Connecticut,
Judicial Branch, The Pathways Process in Your Divorce, Custody or Visita-
tion Case, What Are Case Dates, available at https://jud.ct.gov/family/path-
waysprocess.htm (last visited on August 16, 2024).
8
The application alleged in relevant part: ‘‘This past Sunday, [October 31,
2021] at drop-off for his visit [with the children, N. R.] started to yell at me
and told [the children] that I am ‘nothing but a whore and all I do is smoke
crack and suck d**k’ in front of the girls. When I threatened to withhold
his visit he threatened to break my jaw if I did that. This all happened in
front of the [children]. He took [the children] and I contacted the Waterbury
Police and reported the threat. When the [children] came home they started
asking questions about what crack was and what sucking d**k means.
‘‘The family therapist, Dasha Spells, was at my home on [November 1,
2021] and observed [the children’s] behavior after the nightly phone call
with [N. R.]. He never contacted the family program as [previously ordered]
and the therapist is recommending the unsupervised contact cease until he
engages with the children in a therapeutic environment. She believes that
the children lack a connection to [N. R.] and wants to engage with him
[about] proper parenting methods.’’
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Ficeto, J., granted the ex parte application, ordered that
N. R. have no visitation with the children, and scheduled
a hearing on its ex parte order for November 16, 2021.
After the November 16, 2021 hearing, the court ordered
that M. P. ‘‘shall have sole legal custody’’ of the children
and that N. R. ‘‘shall have supervised visitation through
the Family Stokes Program until further court order.’’
The trial on M. P.’s custody application was scheduled
for November 30, 2021. That day, M. P., her counsel,
and the guardian ad litem appeared for the scheduled
trial, but the trial did not proceed because N. R. was
unavailable. The court ordered that the November 16,
2021 orders remain in full force and effect and that
the trial be rescheduled. The trial was rescheduled to
January 11. 2022.
On December 2, 2021, N. R. filed a motion for con-
tempt, alleging that he had not been able to see or
communicate with the children. No action was taken
on this motion until December 16, 2021, when the court,
Ficeto, J., scheduled a contempt hearing also for Janu-
ary 11, 2022. Also on December 16, 2021, N. R. filed his
own application for an emergency ex parte order of
custody, requesting that ‘‘all parties . . . obey court
orders to allow my court-ordered supervised visits [and]
phone calls. Stokes Program [refuses] to do visits with
me . . . .’’ That application was denied that same day
and was scheduled to be heard on January 11, 2022, as
well.9 The court, however, did not hold the combined
N. R. also alleged in his application: ‘‘I was to have [a] court-order[ed]
9

visit [with] Dasha (Stokes Agency) and my children, but was arrested and
[the] visit never happened. I called Dasha after [the] arrest and she told me
she refuses to do court-ordered visit[s]. I filed a contempt and tried to go
through another agency, but they cannot supervise the visit [without a]
court order in their name. I also have not been able to communicate [with]
my children over [the] phone due to [the] protective order against the mother
of my children. [The] [l]ast contact I [had] is [a] phone call [the week of]
Thanksgiving and [the] children [were] being mean and vengeful due to
mother [and] grandmother’s teachings. I have video evidence of proof of
interactions of phone calls. I believe my children are in ‘great danger’ of
psychological harm, due to parental [alienation].’’
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trial and hearing on January 11, 2022, and, instead, the
matter was continued to January 25, 2022, at which
the court heard testimony. Thereafter, the matter was
continued to March 2, 2022. Also on January 25, 2022,
the court, Nieves, J., issued an order providing that the
‘‘[g]uardian ad litem is to look into a family therapeutic
setting for [N. R.] to engage in weekly supervised visits
with [the children] via Wellmore and/or Behavioral
Health Consultants or equivalent. [N. R.] is to provide
the court upon completion proof he attended anger
management classes. Both parties [are] to engage in
individual support counseling. Neither party shall dis-
courage contact between the other party and the minor
child[ren] or use vulgar language while in the presence
of the minor child[ren].’’ Subsequently, on February 24,
2022, M. P. withdrew her application for custody prior
to the completion of the trial on her application for
custody and the hearing on N. R.’s motion and applica-
tion.

On March 2, 2022, N. R. filed a custody application,
commencing the underlying matter in the current
appeal, seeking joint legal custody of the children and
a parenting responsibility plan.10 When M. P. was served
with the custody application, she also was served with
automatic orders, which provided in relevant part: ‘‘In
all cases involving a child or children, whether or not
the parties are married or in a civil union: (1) Neither
party shall permanently remove the minor child or chil-
dren from the state of Connecticut, without written
consent of the other or order of a judicial authority.’’
On March 31, 2022, the court again appointed Children’s
10
In his application, N. R. also checked the box to request visitation,
underneath which he wrote: ‘‘Allowed to see my children.’’ At subsequent
hearings on his application, N. R. clarified that he was seeking joint legal
custody of the minor children and a shared parenting plan in which he had
regular overnight parenting time.
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Law Center as the guardian ad litem and issued a list
of duties for the guardian ad litem.11
On April 25, 2022, M. P. filed a cross complaint seek-
ing sole legal custody, after which she moved to South
Carolina with the children. On May 18, 2022, N. R. filed
an application for an emergency ex parte order of cus-
tody seeking orders of temporary legal and physical
custody of the children and that M. P. may not remove
the children from the state of Connecticut or interfere
with his custody of the children. In his application, N.
R. wrote: ‘‘[M. P.] has taken [the children] out of state
during custody battle. [The guardian ad litem] has not
informed me where my children are. At times I’ve wit-
nessed my children telling me that I will never find
them and that they are moving far away from daddy.
I’ve informed the [guardian ad litem] with no help. I’ve
informed the court that [M. P.] was planning on moving
and still nothing.’’ The ex parte application was denied
that same day by the court, Ficeto, J., and a hearing
date was set for June 28, 2022. Following the June 28
hearing, the court entered an order concerning, inter
alia, visitation between N. R. and the children.12
11
On the form for the list of duties for the guardian ad litem, the court
checked the box next to ‘‘All duties listed in this section,’’ which included
the following: ‘‘[i]nvestigate facts necessary to make recommendations to
the court regarding the . . . children’s best interests’’; ‘‘[c]ommunicate with
parties’’; ‘‘[c]ommunicate with the . . . children’’; ‘‘[c]onduct home visits’’;
‘‘[c]onfer with family services’’; ‘‘[r]eview all files and records . . .’’; ‘‘[c]on-
fer with teachers and other school authorities’’; ‘‘[c]onfer with profession-
als’’; ‘‘[p]articipate in the creation of a parenting plan’’; ‘‘[r]eport to the
court as requested or as deemed necessary’’; and ‘‘[f]acilitate settlement
of disputes.’’
12
Specifically, the order provided: ‘‘[M. P.] currently resides in South
Carolina with the minor children. [N. R.] resides in Connecticut. [M. P.]
shall make every effort to arrange for an in person visitation of the minor
children with [N. R.] by a third-party person within . . . six weeks from
the date of this order. In addition, commencing next week, [N. R.] shall
have phone call visits with the minor children by a third-party person on
Monday, Wednesday and Fridays at 7 p.m. for a minimum of . . . five
minutes with each phone call visit. [M. P.] is not to be involved in the phone
call visits with [N. R.] and the minor children. . . . [N. R.] shall have at
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On October 4, 2022, the court, Parkinson, J., held a
trial on N. R.’s custody application. During that trial,
N. R., M. P., and the guardian ad litem all testified. On
October 17, 2022, the court issued its memorandum of
decision in which it made the following factual findings.
‘‘[N. R.] is forty-three years old and in good health.
He is currently employed as [a] landscaper and has a
flexible work schedule. . . . [M. P.] is thirty-two years
old and in good health. She is currently employed . . .
as a salesperson in South Carolina. The minor children
are five years old and currently enrolled in kindergarten
in South Carolina. . . .
‘‘[T]here were allegations of domestic violence and
stalking by [N. R.] against [M. P.]. In one such incident
[N. R.] did say, in front of his children, that [M. P.],
their mother, was a ‘whore,’ and used other profanities
to describe [M. P.] and her personal activities. The
minor children were four . . . years old at the time of
this incident. As a result of the alleged domestic vio-
lence and verbal altercations between the parties, crimi-
nal charges were filed against [N. R.] and orders of
least . . . one in person visit with the guardian ad litem and the Behavior
Health Center both involving [N. R.] with the minor children within [six]
weeks from the date of this order.’’
On August 29, 2022, the court entered a subsequent order, which provides:
‘‘[N. R.] shall provide an updated financial affidavit to the court, forthwith.
Upon completion of anger management classes, [N. R.] shall provide to the
court a copy of the certification of completion. [M. P.] shall provide both
to the court and to the [guardian ad litem] a copy of the itinerary of travel
[arrangements] showing costs to travel from South Carolina to Connecticut.
In addition, [M. P.] shall provide a letter from [her] employer with regard
to employment status of the probationary period and work schedule to both
the court and the [guardian ad litem]. Based on the child support guidelines,
the presumptive weekly amount of child support payable by [N. R.] is $0.
[N. R.] has not filed an updated financial affidavit to date and states he is
unemployed at this time. [N. R.] reports to the court he is making money
performing side jobs such as landscaping. The court finds under all the facts
and circumstances of the case that the strict application of the child support
guidelines would be inappropriate and order[s] [N. R.] to pay to [M. P.]
weekly child support payments in the amount of $154 for the two . . .
minor children.’’
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N. R. v. M. P.

protection issued where [M. P.] was the protected party.
As a result of the protective order(s) and filings in this
and [the prior custody action initiated by M. P.], [N. R.]
was permitted to have weekly Sunday supervised visits.
[M. P.] called the Department of Children and Families
[department] . . . after one of the minor children
reported to her that [N. R.] bit the minor child during one
of his visits with the minor children. [The department]
investigated and concluded that the allegation was
‘unfounded.’
‘‘In April, 2022, after the initiation of the instant mat-
ter, [M. P.] moved to South Carolina with the minor
children. [M. P.’s] mother, with whom she had been
residing, sold her home in Connecticut and moved to
South Carolina. [M. P.] could not afford to find accom-
modations for herself and the minor children and thus
moved with her mother to South Carolina, where she
and the children currently reside.
‘‘[N. R.] currently resides in Waterbury alone in a
studio apartment.
‘‘[M. P.] testified that she is working full-time on a
rotating schedule but her mother, with whom she and
the minor children reside, supports and helps care for
the children whilst [M. P.] is at work. [N. R.] believes
that the minor children should never have been moved
to South Carolina and that as a result he should not
have to travel to South Carolina to see them. Instead,
he insists, they should come to live with him for six
months every year.
‘‘[N. R.] has not seen the minor children since Febru-
ary, 2022. Behavior Health Consulting, Inc., hosted
supervised visitation between [N. R.] and the minor
children in Connecticut between May, 2021, and Febru-
ary, 2022. The supervised visits were largely a success,
and the interactions between [N. R.] and the minor
children were found to be appropriate. The court
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believes that the visits would have been switched to
unsupervised visitation should the minor children have
remained in Connecticut. Nevertheless, the children did
move to South Carolina and video chats/phone calls
ensued. [N. R.] complains that [M.P.] interferes with
these calls with the minor children and that, at times,
there are other men around his daughters, which is
distracting and interfering with his phone calls.
‘‘[N. R.] testified at length that he has been wronged
by the legal system. Specifically, he feels that because
he is not the mother but, instead, the father, he is being
treated differently. He shared that he believes that if
he had taken the children out of state without a court
order that there would have been Amber Alerts and he
would be incarcerated as a result. He is upset that he
was forced to have supervised visits with his children,
yet he takes no ownership for any of his own possible
wrongdoings. The court is concerned that [N. R.’s] foul
language and angry outbursts13 are the cause of his
strained relationship with [M. P.] and, by extension, his
minor children. The court notes that [N. R.] recently
underwent a course on anger management in relation
to a criminal order for him to undergo such training. The
court believes he would benefit from both individual
therapy and the parenting education course as well.
‘‘[N. R.] testified that [M. P.] has no support in South
Carolina, has random men around his children, and has
guns. The court does not find [his] testimony in this
regard particularly compelling due to [M. P.’s] credible
testimony to the contrary. Specifically, [M. P.] testified
that [N. R.] began stalking her while she was in Connect-
icut, and she was informed that he was looking at or
inquiring about serial killers in Waterbury. This made
[M. P.] understandably afraid and she began taking steps
toward gun ownership. She does not currently possess
13
‘‘Some angry outbursts were displayed during the hearing.’’
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any firearms despite this. Further, [M. P.] testified that
her mother is her support system, and even [N. R.]
admitted that the grandmother facilitates the evening
phone calls between him and the minor children. . . .
‘‘[N. R.] is seeking an order of joint legal custody. [M.
P.] objects to this and seeks an order of sole legal
custody. The court accepts the parties’ uncontroverted
testimony that they have had a tumultuous, volatile,
and at times violent relationship. The court is disturbed
by the vulgar language [N. R.] used in front of the minor
children to describe [M. P.], for which he appeared
unapologetic. The court is also concerned that the chil-
dren have not seen [N. R.] in person since February,
2022, and have not spent an overnight with him since
the couple split in 2020. [N. R.] has thus never had the
children overnight without the presence of [M. P.] The
court also notes that [N. R.] has a studio apartment that
could temporarily accommodate an overnight visit but
notes [N. R.] has no immediate family or support system
in the area. . . .
‘‘[N. R.] admits that he has not complied with [the
August 29, 2022] order that he pay weekly child support
to [M. P.]. He went further to testify that he should not
be paying to see his children in South Carolina. What
[N. R.] is overlooking is that his own disappointment
in the situation is not what is of the utmost importance
to the court. Instead, the court is guided by what is in
the best interests of the minor children. [M. P.] has
been the caregiver of the children their entire [lives]
consistently. The stability of the home provided with
[M. P.] has never been credibly called into question. [N.
R.] on the other hand has shown that his anger and
hurt can, and does at times, direct his actions toward
[M. P.], which in turn affects his relationship with his
children. The court is convinced that, at the present
time, the best interests of the children will be served
by [M. P.] having sole legal and physical custody of the
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children with generous visitation rights given to [N.
R.].’’ (Citations omitted; footnote in original; footnote
omitted.)
After the court made these factual findings, it stated
that it had ‘‘carefully considered all of the factors listed
in General Statutes § 46b-56’’ and issued its ruling. The
court ordered that M. P. ‘‘shall have sole legal and physi-
cal custody of the minor children’’ and that their primary
residence would be in South Carolina; however, both
parents would ‘‘have unrestricted access to the chil-
dren’s providers and the children’s records.’’ With
respect to parenting time, the court ordered that there
shall be video calls between N. R. and the children on
Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays after school but
before bedtime. The court also issued orders regarding
visitation in both South Carolina and Connecticut. Spe-
cifically, the court ordered that M. P. shall bring the
children to Connecticut to see N. R. at least twice per
year, with visits lasting at least four days each. The
court provided the following instructions relevant to
visitation in Connecticut: ‘‘[M. P.] shall inform [N. R.]
of the travel dates at least forty-five . . . days in
advance and shall provide him with the itinerary itemiz-
ing the costs for the trip. . . . If [N. R.] is up to date
in child support payments, then the parents shall equally
share the costs for the children’s travel. . . . [N. R.]
shall provide [M. P.] with payment for his portion of
the children’s expenses at least twenty-one . . . days
prior to the scheduled trip, so that [M. P.] may purchase
tickets and make appropriate reservations. . . . If
funds are not provided at least twenty-one . . . days
prior to the scheduled trip, then the trip may be can-
celled by [M. P.] without penalty in court. . . . When
the children are in Connecticut, they shall enjoy time
with [N. R.] each day from 10 a.m. until 6 p.m. . . .
The transitions shall take place at the Waterbury Police
Department.’’
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The court provided the following instructions rele-
vant to visitation in South Carolina. ‘‘[N. R.] may enjoy
parenting time with the children in South Carolina as
[often as] he is able to make the trip, but no more than
once per month. . . . [N. R.] shall inform [M. P.] (or
her designee if the protective order is still in place) of
the dates and times of his travel to see the children in
South Carolina at least thirty . . . days in advance.
. . . When [N. R.] is in South Carolina, he may see the
children daily from 10 a.m. until 6 p.m. if they are not
in school, or from after school until 6 p.m. if they are
in school, not to exceed five consecutive days.’’
Finally, the court ordered that both N. R. and M. P.
engage in individual therapy, that the minor children
engage in therapy, and that both parents complete the
required parenting education program as prescribed by
General Statutes § 46b-69b within six months from the
date of the order, refrain from threatening, harassing,
or stalking each other, and ‘‘encourage and foster the
maximum relations of love, affection, and respect
between the children and the other parent.’’ This appeal
followed. Additional facts shall be set forth as neces-
sary.
We first set forth our well established standard of
review applicable to child custody and family matters.
‘‘An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders
in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused
its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably
conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . .
In determining whether a trial court has abused its
broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we
allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the
correctness of its action. . . . Appellate review of a
trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the clearly
erroneous standard of review. . . . A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the
record to support it . . . or when although there is
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evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. . . . Our deferen-
tial standard of review, however, does not extend to
the court’s interpretation of and application of the law
to the facts. It is axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled
to plenary review on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Coleman v. Bembridge, 207 Conn. App. 28,
33–34, 263 A.3d 403 (2021). ‘‘As has often been
explained, the foundation for [our deferential] standard
is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous posi-
tion to assess the personal factors significant to a
domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) F. S. v. J. S., 223 Conn. App. 763, 785,
310 A.3d 961 (2024).
I
N. R.’s first claim on appeal is that the court improp-
erly awarded sole legal and physical custody of the
minor children to M. P. Specifically, N. R. argues that
the court should have taken into account M. P.’s reloca-
tion to South Carolina, in violation of the automatic
orders, and included a relocation analysis in making its
best interests determination as to custody.14 We dis-
agree.
We first set forth the legal principles regarding a trial
court’s custody determination. ‘‘Orders regarding the
14
N. R. also argues, in support of this claim, that M. P. should not have
been allowed to withdraw her previous custody application. We note, how-
ever, that N. R. appealed only from the judgment of the court awarding M.
P. sole legal and physical custody, not from the withdrawal of the previous
action. Furthermore, in response to N. R.’s application for custody, M. P.
filed a cross complaint seeking sole legal custody, which effectively negated
her prior withdrawal. Moreover, to the extent that N. R. is attempting to
assert a separate claim that the court erred in awarding M. P. sole legal and
physical custody because she improperly was permitted to withdraw her
previous action, we conclude that the claim is ‘‘superficial and conclusory’’
and is inadequately briefed. See Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protec-
tion, 337 Conn. 781, 793 n.9, 256 A.3d 655 (2021). We, therefore, decline to
review it.
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custody and care of minor children . . . are governed
by . . . § 46b-56, which grants the court broad discre-
tion in crafting such orders.’’ Id., 785–86. ‘‘[Section] 46b-
56 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘In any controversy
before the Superior Court as to the custody or care of
minor children . . . the court may make . . . any
proper order regarding the custody, care, education,
visitation and support of the children if it has jurisdic-
tion . . . . Subject to the provisions of section 46b-
56a, the court may assign parental responsibility for
raising the child to the parents jointly, or may award
custody to either parent or to a third party, according
to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and
subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems
equitable. . . . (b) In making . . . any order as pro-
vided in subsection (a) of this section, the rights and
responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and
the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the
best interests of the child and provide the child with
the active and consistent involvement of both parents
commensurate with their abilities and interests. Such
orders may include . . . (3) the award of sole custody
to one parent with appropriate parenting time for the
noncustodial parent where sole custody is in the best
interests of the child . . . .’ ’’ Collins v. Collins, 117
Conn. App. 380, 395, 979 A.2d 543 (2009). ‘‘[Section]
46b-56 (c) directs the court, when making any order
regarding the custody, care, education, visitation and
support of children, to consider the best interests of
the child, and in doing so [the court] may consider,
but shall not be limited to, one or more of [seventeen
enumerated] factors15. . . . The court is not required to
15
In determining the best interests of the child, the court looks to the
factors enumerated in § 46b-56 (c): ‘‘(1) The physical and emotional safety
of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental needs of the child; (3)
the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the
needs of the child; (4) any relevant and material information obtained from
the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (5) the wishes
of the child’s parents as to custody; (6) the past and current interaction and
relationship of the child with each parent, the child’s siblings and any other
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assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers.’’
(Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Anketell v. Kulldorff, 207 Conn. App. 807, 847, 263 A.3d
972, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 905, 263 A.3d 821 (2021).
‘‘In reaching a decision as to what is in the best
interests of a child, the court is vested with broad discre-
tion and its ruling will be reversed only upon a showing
that some legal principle or right has been violated or
that the discretion has been abused. . . . As our
Supreme Court recently reiterated, [t]he authority to
exercise the judicial discretion [authorized by § 46b-56]
. . . is not conferred [on] [the state’s appellate courts],
but [on] the trial court, and . . . we are not privileged
to usurp that authority or to substitute ourselves for
the trial court. . . . A mere difference of opinion or
judgment cannot justify our intervention. Nothing short
of a conviction that the action of the trial court is one
person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (7)
the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such
continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent
as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (8) any manip-
ulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the
child in the parents’ dispute; (9) the ability of each parent to be actively
involved in the life of the child; (10) the child’s adjustment to his or her
home, school and community environments; (11) the length of time that the
child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability
of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may
consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s family home
pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (12) the stability
of the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both; (13) the mental and
physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a
proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be
determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not
in the best interests of the child; (14) the child’s cultural background; (15)
the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence,
as defined in section 46b-1, has occurred between the parents or between
a parent and another individual or the child; (16) whether the child or a
sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively
in section 46b-120; and (17) whether the party satisfactorily completed
participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to sec-
tion 46b-69b.’’ General Statutes § 46b-56 (c).
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[that] discloses a clear abuse of discretion can warrant
our interference. . . . Zhou v. Zhang, 334 Conn. 601,
632–33, 223 A.3d 775 (2020); see also Yontef v. Yontef,
185 Conn. 275, 279, 440 A.2d 899 (1981) ([i]t is a rare
case in which a disappointed litigant will be able to
demonstrate abuse of a trial court’s broad discretion
in [child custody] matters).’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) F. S. v. J. S., supra, 223 Conn.
App. 786–88.
The primary basis of N. R.’s claim on appeal is that the
court, in considering the best interests of the children
in making its custody determination, erred in failing to
consider the test set forth in General Statutes § 46b-
56d, which relates to a parent’s postjudgment relocation
with a child.16 N. R. acknowledges that § 46b-56d applies
to postjudgment relocation matters but argues, none-
theless, that the test set forth in § 46b-56d ‘‘should be
considered in determining the children’s best interests
in the context of establishing custody orders.’’ Thus,
according to N. R., the court ‘‘abused its discretion in
this case by not considering at all the impact relocation
would have on N. R. as a father . . . [and] the benefit
16
General Statutes § 46b-56d provides: ‘‘(a) In any proceeding before the
Superior Court arising after the entry of a judgment awarding custody of
a minor child and involving the relocation of either parent with the child,
where such relocation would have a significant impact on an existing parent-
ing plan, the relocating parent shall bear the burden of proving, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that (1) the relocation is for a legitimate purpose,
(2) the proposed location is reasonable in light of such purpose, and (3)
the relocation is in the best interests of the child.
‘‘(b) In determining whether to approve the relocation of the child under
subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider, but such consider-
ation shall not be limited to: (1) Each parent’s reasons for seeking or oppos-
ing the relocation; (2) the quality of the relationships between the child and
each parent; (3) the impact of the relocation on the quantity and the quality
of the child’s future contact with the nonrelocating parent; (4) the degree
to which the relocating parent’s and the child’s life may be enhanced econom-
ically, emotionally and educationally by the relocation; and (5) the feasibility
of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating parent and the
child through suitable visitation arrangements.’’ (Emphasis added.)
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N. R. would add for the children’s lives by being present
every week [with] them.’’ We do not agree that the test
set forth in § 46b-56d is applicable to the present case.
Furthermore, N. R.’s claim that the court did not con-
sider M. P.’s relocation with the children to South Caro-
lina when conducting its best interest analysis is with-
out merit.
We now set forth the case law relevant to N. R.’s
claim relating to M. P.’s relocation with the children.
In Ireland v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413, 414–15, 717 A.2d
676 (1998), our Supreme Court addressed the issue of
a custodial parent seeking permission to relocate out
of state with a minor child. In its decision, our Supreme
Court held ‘‘that a custodial parent seeking permission
to relocate bears the initial burden of demonstrating,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the reloca-
tion is for a legitimate purpose, and (2) the proposed
location is reasonable in light of that purpose. Once
the custodial parent has made such a prima facie show-
ing, the burden shifts to the noncustodial parent to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
relocation would not be in the best interests of the
child.’’ Id., 428. The court also set forth factors that
must be considered in determining the best interests
of the child in future relocation cases. Id., 431–32.17 Our
17
Those factors include: ‘‘[E]ach parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing
the move, the quality of the relationships between the child and the custodial
and noncustodial parents, the impact of the move on the quantity and quality
of the child’s future contact with the noncustodial parent, the degree to
which the custodial parent’s and child’s life may be enhanced economically,
emotionally and educationally by the move, and the feasibility of preserving
the relationship between the noncustodial parent and child through suitable
visitation arrangements. . . . [Also relevant is] . . . the negative impact,
if any, from continued or exacerbated hostility between the custodial and
noncustodial parents, and the effect that the move may have on any extended
family relationships.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Ireland v. Ireland, supra, 246 Conn. 431–32; see also Brennan v. Brennan,
85 Conn. App. 172, 180–81, 857 A.2d 927, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 944, 861
A.2d 1177 (2004).
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legislature adopted the factors set forth by our Supreme
Court in Ireland and enacted No. 06-168 of the 2006
Public Acts, codified at § 46b-56d, which is limited to
‘‘any proceeding before the Superior Court arising after
the entry of a judgment awarding custody of a minor
child . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes
§ 46b-56d; see also Taylor v. Taylor, 119 Conn. App.
817, 821–22, 990 A.2d 882 (2010). In the present case, by
contrast, M. P.’s relocation with the children occurred
before the court rendered judgment awarding her cus-
tody.
In Ford v. Ford, 68 Conn. App. 173, 176, 789 A.2d
1104, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 910, 796 A.2d 556 (2002),
this court addressed the question of ‘‘whether Ireland
applies to relocation issues that arise when the initial
custody determination is made . . . .’’ In concluding
that Ireland does not extend to such situations, we
held ‘‘that Ireland is limited to postjudgment relocation
cases. We conclude[d] that because the Ireland court
did not expand its holding to affect all relocation mat-
ters, relocation issues that arise at the initial judgment
for the dissolution of marriage continue to be governed
by the standard of the best interest of the child as set
forth in § 46b-56. While the Ireland factors may be
considered as ‘best interest factors’ and give guidance
to the trial court, they are not mandatory or exclusive
in the judgment context.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 184.
Accordingly, pursuant to Ford, it is within a trial court’s
discretion whether to consider the Ireland factors, now
set forth in § 46b-56d, in making its determination of
the best interests of a child for purposes of a custody
decision made after a parent already has relocated with
a child. See also O’Neill v. O’Neill, 209 Conn. App. 165,
183, 268 A.3d 79 (2021) (‘‘By its plain language, § 46b-
56d applies when the relocation issue arises after the
entry of a judgment awarding custody of a minor child.
Accordingly, § 46b-56d does not apply in the present
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case because the relocation issue was decided in the
initial judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage at the
same time that the court was establishing the parenting
plan. See, e.g., Lederle v. Spivey, 113 Conn. App. 177,
187 n.11, 965 A.2d 621 ([t]he enactment of . . . § 46b-
56d clearly changed the analysis and the burden alloca-
tion in postjudgment relocation cases, but there is no
indication that the legislature intended it to apply to
relocation matters resolved at the time of the initial
judgment for the dissolution of a marriage . . . ), cert.
denied, 291 Conn. 916, 970 A.2d 728 (2009). Indeed, this
court has held that relocation issues that arise at the
initial judgment for the dissolution of marriage continue
to be governed by the standard of the best interest of
the child as set forth in . . . § 46b-56. Id., 187.’’
(Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.)).
In the present case, the court noted that it was guided
by § 46b-56 (a) and (c) in making its determination
regarding custody, and that its focus must be ‘‘the best
interests of the minor children.’’ The court made spe-
cific findings relating to the parties, the nature of their
relationship and their behaviors with each other and
in front of the children, including ‘‘that they have had
a tumultuous, volatile, and at times violent relation-
ship.’’ N. R. has not challenged those findings on appeal.
Furthermore, the present case does not involve a
postjudgment relocation; N. R. filed an application seek-
ing joint legal custody with a shared parenting plan,
and M. P. filed a cross complaint seeking sole legal
custody. Before a custody determination was made and
a trial was held on the matter, M. P. relocated to South
Carolina. Pursuant to Ford and § 46b-56d, the court was
not required to perform the relocation analysis set forth
in the statute. Instead, the court was required to deter-
mine whether granting joint custody to N. R. and M.
P., or sole custody to M. P., was in the best interests
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N. R. v. M. P.

of the children in accordance with § 46b-56. The court
concluded, on the basis of its factual findings which
are not challenged on appeal, that it was in the best
interests of the children for M. P. to have sole legal and
physical custody.
In addition, although the court did not apply the test
set forth in § 46b-56d, it is clear that the court consid-
ered the impact of the children’s relocation in its best
interests analysis. The court found that M. P. relocated
with the children to South Carolina because her mother,
with whom M. P. and the children lived in Connecticut,
sold her home and moved to South Carolina. The court
found that M. P. ‘‘could not afford to find accommoda-
tions for herself and the minor children and thus moved
with her mother to South Carolina where she and the
children currently reside.’’ In rejecting N. R.’s assertion
that M. P. has no support in South Carolina, the court
noted M. P.’s testimony that ‘‘her mother is her support
system’’ and that N. R. admitted that M. P.’s mother
‘‘facilitates the evening phone calls between him and
the minor children.’’ With respect to N. R.’s complaint
that he should not have to pay to see his children in
South Carolina, the court specifically stated that, what
N. R. ‘‘is overlooking is that his own disappointment in
the situation is not what is of the utmost importance
to the court. Instead, the court is guided by what is in
the best interests of the minor children. [M. P.] has
been the caregiver of their children for their entire life
consistently. The stability of the home provided with
[M. P.] has never been credibly called into question. [N.
R.], on the other hand, has shown that his anger and
hurt can, and does at times, direct his actions toward
[M. P.], which in turn affects his relationship with his
children. The court is convinced that at the present
time, the best interests of the children will be served
by [M. P.] having sole legal and physical custody of the
children with generous visitation rights given to [N.
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R.].’’ The court then crafted a detailed parenting plan
18

that gives N. R. significant unsupervised in person visita-
tion in both South Carolina and Connecticut. Thus, the
court’s findings and orders show that the court consid-
ered the impact of M. P.’s relocation to South Carolina
18
We note that N. R.’s argument—that the court failed to consider M. P.’s
relocation in violation of the automatic orders in analyzing what would be
in the best interests of the children—does not challenge any of the factual
findings underlying the court’s best interest analysis. Whether M. P. should
have been sanctioned for violating the automatic orders is a separate ques-
tion from what was in the best interests of the children. The court was
tasked with resolving the latter issue. N. R. never filed a motion for contempt
seeking sanctions against M. P. for violating the automatic orders. See
footnote 19 of this opinion. The court having concluded that it is in the best
interests of the children that they live with M. P. in South Carolina, ordering
their return to Connecticut because M. P. violated the automatic orders
would effectively sanction the children for the violation. We see no basis
in our law for such a result.
Furthermore, to the extent that N. R. challenges the court’s conclusion
that sole custody in one of the parents was in the best interests of the
children in the present case, we note that our courts have consistently
recognized ongoing acrimony and conflict between parents, which was well
established in the present case, as a basis for awarding one party sole
custody. See, e.g., Daddio v. O’Bara, 97 Conn. App. 286, 297, 904 A.2d 259
(‘‘ample evidence before the court pertaining to the parties’ inability to
cooperate and communicate with respect to the decisions regarding the
minor child . . . supported the court’s conclusion that joint legal custody,
which requires a level of cooperation between parents, was not in the child’s
best interest’’), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 932, 909 A.2d 957 (2006); see also
Lugo v. Lugo, 176 Conn. App. 149, 153, 168 A.3d 592 (2017) (in affirming
trial court decision to award sole custody, this court noted that trial court
had found ‘‘it was abundantly clear that the parties were unable to coparent’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Ge v. Liu, Superior Court, judicial
district of New Britain, Docket No. FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S (October 23, 2023)
(award of sole custody was appropriate given ‘‘that the parents have an
inability to cooperate and communicate with respect to the decisions regard-
ing the minor child, and . . . that requiring a level of cooperation between
the parents would not be in the child’s best interest’’); Adams v. Adams,
Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S
(September 7, 2018) (award of sole custody to mother was due to ‘‘unhealthy
and acrimonious’’ communication between parents, which was ‘‘severely
damag[ing]’’ to children); Mondello v. Mondello, Superior Court, judicial
district of New London, Docket No. FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 10, 2009) (joint
custody was no longer appropriate due to ‘‘friction between the parents
[that] led to at least three referrals to the Department of Children and
Families’’). The well-documented and persistent conflict between N. R. and
M. P., therefore, supported the court’s conclusion that joint legal custody
would not be in the children’s best interests.
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when it constructed a custody and visitation order that
it believed was in the best interests of the children. On
the basis of this record and allowing ‘‘every reasonable
presumption in favor of the correctness of its action’’;
(internal quotation marks omitted) Pencheva-Hasse v.
Hasse, 221 Conn. App. 113, 122, 300 A.3d 1175 (2023);
we cannot conclude that the court abused its wide
discretion in making its custody determination and, in
doing so, not applying the statutory test of § 46b-56d.
Finally, to the extent that N. R., in claiming that the
court improperly failed to apply the test set forth in
§ 46b-56d, is essentially asserting that the court applied
an improper legal standard in making its custody deter-
mination, that issue involves a question of law over
which we exercise plenary review. See Ford v. Ford,
supra, 68 Conn. App. 176–77; see also Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak, 346 Conn. 216, 227, 288
A.3d 615 (2023) (analysis of whether trial court applied
correct legal standard involves question of law subject
to plenary review); Crews v. Crews, 295 Conn. 153, 164,
989 A.2d 1060 (2010) (even in family matters, ‘‘the abuse
of discretion standard applies only to decisions based
solely on factual determinations made by the trial
court’’); Princess Q. H. v. Robert H., 150 Conn. App.
105, 112, 89 A.3d 896 (2014) (plenary review, not abuse
of discretion, is correct standard for question of law in
family matter).
Our resolution of this issue requires little discussion.
As we stated previously, relocation issues that arise
before a judgment is rendered awarding custody and
before a court establishes a parenting plan ‘‘continue
to be governed by the standard of the best interest of
the child as set forth in . . . § 46b-56.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) O’Neill v. O’Neill, supra, 209 Conn.
App. 183. It is not disputed that the court applied that
standard in making its custody determination in the
present case. The court was not required to apply the
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test set forth in § 46b-56d, which applies to postjudg-
ment relocation matters, and, thus, its failure to do so
does not provide a legal basis for challenging its custody
determination. See Ford v. Ford, supra, 68 Conn. App.
184 (factors in Ireland, now codified at § 46b-56d, are
limited to postjudgment relocation cases). Because the
court’s failure to apply that test was not improper and
the court appropriately made its custody orders pursu-
ant to the best interests of the children standard set
forth in § 46b-56, N. R.’s claim is unavailing.19
II
N. R.’s next claim is that the court improperly issued
orders that require N. R. to be current with his child
19
N. R. also asserts in his appellate brief that his ‘‘primary problem through-
out the litigation in this case was that [M. P.] would blatantly violate court
orders and there would be no consequences to [M. P.] . . . .’’ N. R. concedes,
however, that he did not file a motion for contempt regarding the plaintiff’s
relocation to South Carolina, which is the proper vehicle to challenge a
violation of the automatic orders. Practice Book § 25-5 (d) provides in
relevant part: ‘‘The automatic orders of a judicial authority . . . shall be
set forth immediately following the party’s requested relief . . . in any appli-
cation for custody or visitation, and shall set forth the following language
in bold letters: Failure to obey these orders may be punishable by
contempt of court. . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.); see also Belluci v. Dunn,
Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
S (October 30, 2023) (‘‘[i]f, hypothetically, the defendant violated the pen-
dente lite orders, the appropriate approach would be to notify the court
issuing the orders of the alleged violation and seek an enforcement of such
orders’’). After N. R. learned that M. P. had moved to South Carolina, he
could have filed a motion for contempt, but he chose not to do so, and,
therefore, he cannot now complain that the court never imposed any conse-
quences on M. P.
To the extent that N. R., who was self-represented in the underlying action
but is represented by counsel in this appeal, is arguing that, as a self-
represented litigant, he should have been granted leeway in not following
the proper procedure and filing a motion for contempt, we note that he
filed multiple motions for contempt while self-represented in the previous
custody action initiated by M. P. Therefore, any argument that he lacked
the knowledge or ability to do so is unpersuasive. Moreover, this court
consistently has held that, ‘‘[a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants
some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license
not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pollard,
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support obligation and to pay one half of the travel
expenses in order to receive parenting time with the
children in Connecticut. We reject this claim and con-
clude that it is an inaccurate recitation of the substance
of the court’s parenting time orders.
‘‘As we previously set forth in this opinion, [o]ur
deferential standard of review [in domestic relations
cases] . . . does not extend to the court’s interpreta-
tion of and application of the law to the facts. It is
axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled to plenary
review on appeal. . . . Moreover, [t]he construction of
[an order or] judgment is a question of law for the court
. . . [and] our review . . . is plenary. As a general rule,
[orders and] judgments are to be construed in the same
fashion as other written instruments. . . . The deter-
minative factor is the intention of the court as gathered
from all parts of the [order or] judgment.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Coleman v. Bembridge,
supra, 207 Conn. App. 34–35. Furthermore, ‘‘[e]ffect
must be given to that which is clearly implied as well
as that which is expressed. . . . [W]e are mindful that
an opinion must be read as a whole, without particular
portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of
its holding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
November H., 202 Conn. App. 106, 118, 243 A.3d 839
(2020). In the present case, because N. R.’s claim
requires us to construe the visitation order, our review
is plenary.
The court’s parenting time order in its memorandum
of decision provides for a parenting schedule in which
M. P. is required to bring the children to Connecticut
at least twice per year. She is required to inform N. R.
of the dates for travel at least forty-five days in advance
182 Conn. App. 483, 488, 189 A.3d 1232 (2018). We cannot afford N. R. relief
on appeal, however, given his failure to properly pursue the issue in the
trial court by filing a motion for contempt.
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and to provide him with an itinerary itemizing the costs
of the trip. The order specifically provides that, ‘‘[i]f
[N. R.] is up to date [on] child support payments, then
the parents shall equally share the costs for the chil-
dren’s travel.’’ Further, if N. R. fails to pay for his portion
of the children’s expenses for travel at least twenty-
one days prior to a scheduled trip, the trip may be
cancelled by M. P.
We note that N. R. is correct that the right to visitation
cannot be conditioned on whether a party is current
with his or her child support obligation. See Raymond
v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 742, 345 A.2d 48 (1974)
(‘‘It has never been our law that support payments were
conditioned on the ability to exercise rights of visitation
or vice versa. The duty to support is wholly independent
of the right of visitation.’’ (Footnote omitted.)); see also
D’Amato v. Hart-D’Amato, 169 Conn. App. 669, 685
n.12, 152 A.3d 546 (2016).
In the present case, the court did not require N. R.
to be current on child support to receive parenting time
in Connecticut; rather, the order provides that ‘‘[i]f [N.
R.] is up to date in child support payments, then the
parents shall equally share the costs for the children’s
travel.’’ (Emphasis added.) Although N. R. argues that
the order allows the trip to be cancelled if he is not
current on child support, the order does not condition
N. R.’s visitation on whether he is current on child
support. Instead, we construe the order as providing
that, if N. R. is not current on child support, then he
will bear the entire cost of the children’s travel to Con-
necticut. If he is current on child support, he and M.
P. will share the costs equally. The only circumstance
in which M. P. is allowed to cancel a visit is if N. R.
has not provided her with payment for his portion of
the travel expenses, whether that payment is one half
of the shared expenses or the entire portion, by twenty-
one days before the visitation date. The order does not
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allow the cancellation of a visit because N. R. is not
current on child support payments. Accordingly, N. R.’s
claim necessarily fails.20
III
N. R.’s final claim is that the court improperly relied
on the testimony of the guardian ad litem in conducting
its assessment of the best interests of the children.
Specifically, N. R. argues that M. P. prevented the guard-
ian ad litem from observing him interact with the chil-
dren and that, therefore, the guardian ad litem was
‘‘never in a position to give recommendations on cus-
tody . . . .’’ The guardian ad litem in the present case
argues that a guardian ad litem ‘‘is not required to per-
form all conceivable actions to make a credible recom-
mendation, nor should [it] be,’’ and that the recommen-
dations of the guardian ad litem are just one factor for
the court to consider in issuing its orders. We agree
with the guardian ad litem.
The following additional facts are relevant to our
resolution of this claim. In appointing Children’s Law
Center as the guardian ad litem for the children, the
20
N. R. also argues that it was an abuse of the court’s discretion to order
N. R. to pay one half of the travel expenses for parenting time in Connecticut
when it was M. P. who removed the children to South Carolina in violation
of the automatic orders. N. R. cites no authority to support his argument
that it is an abuse of a court’s discretion to order a parent to pay part of
the travel expenses for parenting time. Moreover, ‘‘[i]n determining whether
a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters,
we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its
action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265,
282–83, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999); see id., 283–84 (not only is ‘‘the matter of
travel expenses incurred in order to see one’s children . . . listed explicitly
as a factor for a trial court properly to consider when awarding child support’’
but ‘‘it can also be a consideration in determining alimony’’). Given the wide
discretion afforded to courts relating to child support, parenting time, and
other custodial considerations, and that travel expenses are a proper consid-
eration in an award of child support, N. R. has failed to demonstrate that
the order requiring him to share in the travel costs related to his parenting
time with the children in Connecticut was an abuse of the court’s discretion.
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court ordered that its duties included the following:
21

investigate facts necessary to make recommendations
to the court regarding the children’s best interests, com-
municate with the parties and the children, conduct
home visits, confer with family services, review all files
and records, confer with school authorities and relevant
professionals, participate in the creation of a parenting
plan, report to the court as requested, and facilitate
settlement of disputes. Consistent with those duties,
the guardian ad litem reviewed reports from a third-
party supervisor about N. R.’s visitation with the chil-
dren, conducted a home visit with N. R., made recom-
mendations regarding visitation and custody to the
court, attempted to facilitate disputes between N. R.
and M. P., and attempted to observe N. R. interacting
with the children but was unable to do so. The guardian
ad litem testified,22 and N. R. did not dispute, that on
two occasions the guardian ad litem had scheduled a
visit to observe N. R. and the children. The first visit
was cancelled due to an ex parte order that was issued,
which ordered that visitation between N. R. and the
children cease at that time. Once visitation was subse-
quently restored, the guardian ad litem scheduled
another visit to observe N. R. with the children at the
library, but N. R. was arrested before the visit and the
visit did not take place.
We begin with the legal principles relevant to the role
of a guardian ad litem. ‘‘As a general rule, the role of
21
The duties, as ordered by the court, are set forth on form 227, a Judicial
Branch form, and the court’s order was issued pursuant to General Statutes
§ 46b-12 (c), which provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[n]ot later than twenty-
one days following the date on which the court enters an initial order
appointing counsel or a guardian ad litem for any minor child pursuant to
this section, the court shall enter a subsequent order that includes the
following information: (1) The specific nature of the work that is to be
undertaken by such counsel or guardian ad litem . . . .’’
22
Attorney Randa Hojaiban appeared and testified at the hearing on behalf
of Children’s Law Center.
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a guardian ad litem is to represent the best interest of
the child.’’ In re William H., 88 Conn. App. 511, 520,
870 A.2d 1102 (2005); see also V. V. v. V. V., 218 Conn.
App. 157, 169, 291 A.3d 109 (2023) (‘‘[i]t is well estab-
lished that the role of the guardian ad litem is to speak
on behalf of the best interest of the child’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). ‘‘Although the term best
interest is elusive to precise definition, one commission
study aptly observed that [t]he best interests of the
child has been generally defined as a measure of a
child’s well-being, which includes [the child’s] physical
(and material) needs, [the child’s] emotional (and psy-
chological) needs, [and the child’s] intellectual and . . .
moral needs. . . .
‘‘Further illumination of the role of the guardian ad
litem can be found in a publication of the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (Academy) regarding
standards for the representation of children in family
proceedings. Although those standards focus primarily
on the role of counsel for a minor child, in its discussion
of guardians ad litem, the Academy espouses the view
that the primary task for the guardian ad litem, at trial,
is to make the decision maker aware of all the facts
and to offer evidence as a sworn witness, subject to
cross-examination. Those standards also recommend
that the guardian ad litem engage in frequent communi-
cation with the child, and generally help to expedite
the process and to encourage settlement of disputes.
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Represent-
ing Children (1995) p. 4.’’ (Citation omitted; footnotes
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Tay-
quon H., 76 Conn. App. 693, 704–706, 821 A.2d 796
(2003).
Our Supreme Court ‘‘has consistently held in matters
involving child custody . . . that while the rights,
wishes and desires of the parents must be considered
it is nevertheless the ultimate welfare of the child [that]
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must control the decision of the court. . . . In making
this determination, the trial court is vested with broad
discretion which can . . . be interfered with [only]
upon a clear showing that that discretion was abused.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zhou v. Zhang,
supra, 334 Conn. 632. A trial court properly may rely
on testimony from a guardian ad litem in determining
the best interests of the children regarding custody. See
id., 628–30; see also In re Paulo T., 213 Conn. App. 858,
887 n.18, 279 A.3d 766 (2022) (same), aff’d, 347 Conn.
311, 297 A.3d 194 (2023); Zilkha v. Zilkha, 180 Conn.
App. 143, 177, 183 A.3d 64 (in making custody determi-
nation, court may seek advice and accept recommenda-
tions from guardian ad litem, who must act as represen-
tative of children’s best interests), cert. denied, 328
Conn. 937, 183 A.3d 1175 (2018). A trial court is ‘‘well
within its discretion to credit the testimony of the guard-
ian ad litem because a guardian ad litem, who is not a
parent, is appointed specifically for the reason that [the
guardian ad litem] is disinterested, so that [the guardian
ad litem] may make recommendations to the court
regarding the best interests of the children. The fact
that the guardian ad litem is a disinterested or neutral
witness does not require the court to adopt the guardian
ad litem’s recommendation.’’ Brown v. Brown, 132
Conn. App. 30, 40, 31 A.3d 55 (2011). ‘‘In pursuit of its
fact-finding function, [i]t is within the province of the
trial court . . . to weigh the evidence presented and
determine the credibility and effect to be given the
evidence. . . . Credibility must be assessed . . . not
by reading the cold printed record, but by observing
firsthand the witness’ conduct, demeanor and attitude.
. . . An appellate court must defer to the trier of fact’s
assessment of credibility because [i]t is the [fact finder]
. . . [who has] an opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses and the parties; thus [the fact finder]
is best able to judge the credibility of the witnesses
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and to draw necessary inferences therefrom.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Blum v. Blum,
109 Conn. App. 316, 329, 951 A.2d 587, cert. denied, 289
Conn. 929, 958 A.2d 157 (2008). As our Supreme Court
has explained, any issue pertaining to the basis for
the guardian ad litem’s testimony regarding the best
interests of the children ‘‘affects the weight of [the]
testimony rather than its admissibility.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Zhou v. Zhang, supra, 634.
In the present case, the fact that the guardian ad
litem was unable to observe a visit between N. R. and
his children, despite the clear efforts made by the guard-
ian ad litem to do so, did not render the guardian ad
litem unable to issue recommendations to the court,
nor did it make it improper for the court to rely on
those recommendations. First, we note that the order
delineating the duties of the guardian ad litem did not
mandate that the guardian ad litem personally observe
the children interacting with each parent. Although it
required that the guardian ad litem investigate the facts
necessary to make recommendations to the court
related to custody and parenting time, the guardian ad
litem in the present case received updates from the
third-party supervisor who had observed N. R.’s visits
with the children. The record shows that the guardian
ad litem considered and relied in part on those reports
in making recommendations to the court regarding N.
R.’s ability to have parenting time with his children.23
Second, it is unclear from the court’s memorandum of
decision to what extent, if indeed at all, the court relied
on or credited the observations and recommendations
of the guardian ad litem. Additionally, as the guardian
ad litem succinctly stated in its appellate brief, ‘‘[w]hile
23
The guardian ad litem testified that ‘‘all of the positive reports of the
interactions between the father and the children are part of my recommenda-
tion. . . . [Y]ou know, my recommendation doesn’t ask for supervised con-
tact. It’s saying that he can have the children during the day.’’
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personally observing the children with the father would
have been a useful piece of the mosaic, it would have
been just that, one piece; a piece that was fulfilled by
the professional visitation supervisors who did, indeed,
observe interactions between N. R. and the children
and [reported their findings] back to the guardian ad
litem.’’ Furthermore, given that the guardian ad litem
testified at the hearing and was subject to cross-exami-
nation24 by both N. R. and M. P., the court was able to
consider the basis for the guardian ad litem’s observa-
tions and recommendations, and to afford them what-
ever weight it deemed appropriate.25 It was for the trial
court to make that determination, which this court can-
not second-guess on appeal. Under these circum-
stances, N. R. has failed to demonstrate any abuse of
discretion by the court in relying, to whatever extent
it may have, on the testimony of the guardian ad litem
in making its determination of the best interests of the
children.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
24
Furthermore, we note that the guardian ad litem testified that the visits
between N. R. and the children had gone well, and had previously recom-
mended to the court that, based on the reports received from the third-
party visitation supervisor, N. R. receive more, and unsupervised, visitation
time with the children.
25
We note that N. R. cross-examined the guardian ad litem about the fact
that the guardian ad litem had not personally observed him interacting with
the children. The following exchange ensued:
‘‘Q. Um, have you ever seen me in those [eighteen] months [of the guardian
ad litem’s involvement] with my kids?
‘‘A. No.
‘‘Q. Okay. So, why do you even take the supervised visits if your recommen-
dations . . . are going against what the supervised visits say?
‘‘A. My—actually my recommendations are supported by what the super-
vised visits say, which is that the interaction between you and the children
is appropriate. . . .
‘‘Q. Do you find it strange that I was arrested at a supervised visit? Do
you find that . . . startling?
‘‘A. I think it could’ve probably happened any time. There was a warrant
out for your arrest.’’