Majkut v. Majkut

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Majkut v. Majkut
BONNIE M. MAJKUT v. PAUL S. MAJKUT
(AC 48812)
(AC 48835)
Elgo, Seeley and DiPentima, Js.
Syllabus
The parties separately appealed from certain of the trial court’s postjudgment
orders, in which the court granted the defendant’s motion for contempt,
finding that the plaintiff had violated a nondisparagement clause in the
parties’ parenting plan that was incorporated into the dissolution judgment,
and made various modifications to the parties’ postdissolution custody and
visitation orders regarding their minor children. On appeal, the plaintiff
claimed that the nondisparagement clause violated her right to freedom of
speech pursuant to the federal and state constitutions, and the defendant
claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in granting sole legal custody of the
parties’ minor children to the plaintiff. Held:
The plaintiff’s claim that the nondisparagement clause in the parties’ par-
enting plan, as incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, constituted
an invalid prior restraint on her right to free speech pursuant to the first
amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 4 and 5, of
the Connecticut constitution was unavailing, as the plaintiff validly waived
her free speech rights pursuant to the nondisparagement clause because she
was represented by counsel and agreed to be bound by the parenting plan,
and the court’s subsequent enforcement of that contractual provision did
not violate the plaintiff’s right to free speech pursuant to either the federal
or state constitution.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff sole legal
custody of the parties’ minor children, as the defendant had voluntarily
relocated to Ukraine, a country that was actively at war, which the court
considered to be a material change in circumstances, and the defendant
retained the right to be present for various appointments and to access his
minor children’s medical, academic and personal records.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning its visitation sched-
ule order, which granted visitation by agreement of the parties, as the order
reflected its broad discretion to fashion flexible and individualized visitation
orders, the visitation order on appeal was similar to a prior visitation order
that the court entered pursuant to the parties’ separation agreement, and
the court’s order was related to scheduling only and did not restrict the
defendant’s right to visitation with his minor children or improperly delegate
to the plaintiff the authority to suspend the defendant’s right to visitation.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the defendant reason-
able attorney’s fees for his successful motion for contempt, as the court made
specific findings as to the amount of attorney’s fees incurred in relation to

Majkut v. Majkut
the motion for contempt and explicitly declined to award the defendant any
additional fees, which was within the court’s broad discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees.
Argued April 20—officially released August 4, 2026
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Tolland and tried to the court, Nascimento,
J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting cer-
tain other relief in accordance with the parties’ separa-
tion agreement; thereafter, the court, Carrasquilla, J.,
granted the plaintiff’s motion to modify the settlement
agreement and the defendant’s motion for contempt, and
the parties filed separate appeals to this court. Affirmed.
Bonnie M. Majkut, self-represented, the appellant in
Docket No. AC 48835 and the appellee in Docket No. AC
48812 (plaintiff).
Paul S. Majkut, self-represented, the appellant in
Docket No. AC 48812 and the appellee in Docket No. AC
48835 (defendant).
Opinion
ELGO, J. In these two related appeals, the plaintiff,
Bonnie M. Majkut, and the defendant, Paul S. Majkut,
each appeal from the trial court’s May 21, 2025 postjudg-
ment orders, in which the court granted the defendant’s
motion for contempt and made various modifications
to the parties’ postdissolution custody and visitation
orders regarding their minor children.1 In Docket No.
AC 48835, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
found her in contempt for violating a nondisparagement
clause in the parties’ parenting plan that was incorpo-
rated into the dissolution judgment. Specifically, the
1The plaintiff’s appeal is docketed before this court as AC 48835, and
the defendant’s appeal is docketed as AC 48812. We address the claims

Majkut v. Majkut
plaintiff claims that the nondisparagement clause (1)
violated her right to freedom of speech, pursuant to
the first amendment to the constitution of the United
States, because it constituted an impermissible prior
restraint on speech and (2) violated her right to freedom
of speech, pursuant to article first, §§ 4 and 5, of the
constitution of Connecticut, because it constituted an
impermissible prior restraint on speech.2 The plaintiff
also challenges the award of attorney’s fees to the defen-
dant.3 In Docket No. AC 48812, the defendant claims
that (1) the court erred in granting sole legal custody
of the parties’ minor children to the plaintiff, (2) the
visitation schedule ordered by the court constituted an
impermissible delegation of judicial decision-making,
of these related appeals together. See, e.g., In re Amani O., 221 Conn.
App. 59, 62 n.1, 301 A.3d 565 (2023).
2To the extent that the plaintiff argues for the first time on appeal
that she did not agree to the nondisparagement clause voluntarily and
intelligently, that defense was not raised before the trial court. More-
over, there is no dispute that the plaintiff was represented by counsel
during all applicable times in the divorce proceedings. We therefore
decline to review this unpreserved claim raised for the first time on
appeal. See, e.g., Martin v. Todd Arthurs Co., 225 Conn. App. 844,
854–55, 317 A.3d 98 (2024).
The plaintiff also claims that the court erred in holding her in con-
tempt of the nondisparagement clause because all of the statements she
had made in violation of that clause were true. Truth as a defense is
applicable to defamation, libel or slander actions, not to the defendant’s
motion for contempt in the present case. See, e.g., Mercer v. Cosley,
110 Conn. App. 283, 301, 955 A.2d 550 (2008) (“[t]ruth is an absolute
defense to an allegation of libel”). The plaintiff also argues that the
defendant, not her, had engaged in behavior that constitutes contempt
of the parties’ nondisparagement clause. The plaintiff did not file a
motion for contempt with the trial court. Thus, any arguments that
the plaintiff makes alleging that the defendant violated the parties’
nondisparagement clause is irrelevant to this appeal. The plaintiff’s
arguments regarding truth and the defendant’s alleged violation of the
nondisparagement clause, therefore, warrant no further consideration.
3Having thoroughly reviewed the plaintiff’s brief and the record, we
conclude that her claim regarding attorney’s fees is inadequately briefed.
We thus decline to address it. See, e.g., C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App.
628, 630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022). We nevertheless address the court’s
award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the defendant’s appeal. See part
II C of this opinion.

Majkut v. Majkut
and (3) the court erred in its fee award pursuant to the
defendant’s successful motion for contempt.4 We affirm
4The defendant raises additional claims that require little discussion.
He contends that the court violated his due process rights when it entered
a temporary order for custody and visitation pursuant to the plaintiff’s
emergency ex parte motion for custody. Although the subsequent order,
which modified the parties’ custody and visitation rights, did not ren-
der the defendant’s due process claim moot; see Kyle S. v. Jayne K.,
182 Conn. App. 353, 364–65, 190 A.3d 68 (2018); the defendant did
not appeal from the court’s temporary ex parte order. The defendant’s
appeal encompasses only the court’s May 21, 2025 order that modified
the parties’ custody and visitation rights. Because the defendant failed
to appeal from the emergency ex parte order, it is not properly before
us, and we lack authority to consider it. See, e.g., Brennan v. Brennan,
85 Conn. App. 172, 179, 857 A.2d 927 (“[w]e conclude, therefore, that
the [party’s] collateral attack on the temporary custody order, made as
part of [the party’s] appeal of the permanent order, is a procedurally
impermissible substitute for a timely appeal from the temporary order
of custody, and we are without authority to consider this claim”), cert.
denied, 271 Conn. 944, 861 A.2d 1177 (2004).
The defendant also claims that the court’s May 21, 2025 order invali-
dated a portion of the parties’ parenting plan that requires the parties,
prior to amending any child related matters, to seek input from an agreed
upon coparenting coordinator and to accept their recommendation until
there is a final court order or written agreement. The parenting plan also
shifts the coparenting coordinator’s fees to the party who challenges
the coordinator’s recommendations in court but does not prevail. In
the present case, the defendant did not raise any claim regarding the
plaintiff’s violation of this portion of the parenting plan before the trial
court, and the court made no findings regarding any alleged violation
of that order. Because there was no claim regarding an alleged violation
of this portion of the parties’ parenting plan before the trial court, we
decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Martin v.
Todd Arthurs Co., 225 Conn. App. 844, 854–55, 317 A.3d 98 (2024).
In addition, the defendant claims that the court’s custody and visi-
tation order limits his religious engagement with his children. At the
March 31, 2025 hearing, the court explicitly stated that it would not
order anything regarding the religious upbringing of the parties’ minor
children. We note that the court’s May 21, 2025 order does not limit
the defendant’s ability to engage in religious studies with his children.
To the contrary, the order explicitly grants the defendant reasonable
communication with his children, with no restrictions as to the content
of those communications. We therefore conclude that the court’s order
modifying the parties’ custody and visitation arrangement does not
limit or direct the religious upbringing of the parties’ minor children.
To the extent the defendant argues that the plaintiff has engaged in
behavior that limits his ability to engage in religious studies with his
minor children and that such behavior violates a court order, that issue

Majkut v. Majkut
the judgment of the court.5
The following facts, as found by the court, and proce-
dural history are relevant to these appeals. On December
8, 2022, the court entered orders that dissolved the par-
ties’ marriage, divided the marital estate, and provided
was not before the trial court, and we decline to consider it for the first
time on appeal. See id.
The defendant further claims that the court incorrectly weighed evi-
dence in the record to substantiate its order. We decline the defendant’s
invitation to reweigh the evidence. See, e.g., Cuneo v. Cuneo, 12 Conn.
App. 702, 705, 533 A.2d 1226 (1987). To the extent that the defendant
claims that the trial court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous to
support its ruling, we note that the defendant has provided this court
with several transcripts that are excerpted from presumably longer
proceedings. Those self-selected excerpts do not provide this court
with a complete record to evaluate the factual findings made by the
trial court. We therefore conclude that the defendant has not met his
burden to provide us with an adequate record to review whether the
court’s findings were clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Practice Book § 63-8;
Krausman v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 236 Conn. App. 109, 126–28,
347 A.3d 198 (2025). Furthermore, on the basis of our careful review
of the record, we find support for the court’s factual findings and are
not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. See, e.g., Karaoke Heroes NH, LLC v. RVRM Enterprises,
LLC, 237 Conn. App. 762, 772–73, 354 A.3d 250 (2026).
The defendant also claims that the holiday rotation schedule ordered
by the court was improper. The record indicates that the defendant
filed a motion to modify that holiday plan on November 12, 2025, and
that, following a hearing, the court modified the holiday rotation plan
on February 18, 2026. Neither party has amended his or her appeal to
reflect the court’s subsequent order, which has superseded the order the
defendant challenges on appeal. Because there is no practical relief this
court can afford the defendant as to that order, the defendant’s claim
regarding the holiday rotation plan is therefore moot. See, e.g., Dempsey
v. Cappuccino, 200 Conn. App. 653, 657–59, 240 A.3d 1072 (2020).
Finally, the defendant claims that the court erred in awarding the
plaintiff the Internal Revenue Service child tax credits pursuant to
an October 16, 2024 order. That order is not at issue on appeal, and we
decline to consider the propriety of it.
5On the basis of our careful review of the record in both related appeals,
we note that certain portions of the parties’ briefs and appendices in
both appeals do not comply with our rules of practice insofar as they
contain and refer to certain documents that were not part of the record
before the trial court. We therefore disregard those portions of the
parties’ briefs and appendices that contain improper matter. See, e.g.,
In re Hunter T., 239 Conn. App. 58, 59–60 n.3, ___ A.3d ___ (2026).

Majkut v. Majkut
for certain custody and visitation arrangements. The
judgment of dissolution incorporated by reference the
parties’ marital settlement agreement (separation agree-
ment), which in turn incorporated the parties’ parenting
plan (parenting plan). Both the parenting plan and the
separation agreement were signed by both parties. The
parenting plan provided for joint legal custody of the
parties’ minor children.6
The parenting plan contains a nondisparagement
clause, which states that “[n]either parent shall do any-
thing which may estrange the children from the other
nor injure the opinion of the children as to his [m]other or
[f]ather, nor act in such a way as to hamper the free and
natural development of the children’s love and respect
for the other parent.”
On April 9, 2024, the plaintiff filed an emergency
ex parte order of custody, stating that the defendant
intended to relocate to Ukraine sometime in May 2024.
On that same day, the plaintiff filed a motion for modi-
fication of the child custody agreement, requesting that
the court ban international travel for the children. The
court granted the plaintiff’s emergency ex parte motion
and scheduled a hearing thereon.
On April 19, 2024, the court held a hearing on the
plaintiff’s emergency ex parte motion. The defendant
did not attend. At that time, the court found that the
defendant had been served by certified mail and that the
court had received a copy of the supplemental return,
signed by the defendant. The court further found that
the defendant was aware of the hearing on the basis of the
plaintiff’s testimony, which it credited, describing the
communications between them regarding the hearing.
The court thereafter upheld the ex parte order and modi-
fied the custody and visitation orders. The court entered
an order that (1) granted the plaintiff sole legal custody
and primary residence of the minor children, (2) barred
6Of the parties’ six children, five were minors at the time of judg-
ment. Of those five, four were minors at the time of the court’s May
21, 2025 order.

Majkut v. Majkut
the defendant from having access, visitation, or contact
with the minor children, and (3) required the defendant to
provide the plaintiff with ninety days’ notice regarding
his intent to return to the United States. The court also
barred the defendant from removing the children from
the state, interfering with the plaintiff’s custody, and
interfering with the educational programming of the
minor children. The defendant relocated to Ukraine on
or about May 3, 2024.
Thereafter, both parties engaged in extensive motions
practice. Relevant to these appeals, on May 2, 2024, the
defendant filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the
plaintiff violated the nondisparagement clause in the
parenting plan by posting various publications regard-
ing the plaintiff’s experiences throughout the parties’
marriage and divorce on a personal website, So Much
My Heart (SMMH), and her social media accounts. The
defendant also alleged that the plaintiff “disparages
and disrespects the defendant in the presence of [their]
minor children.” The defendant requested attorney’s
fees for prosecuting the contempt motion. On April 22,
2025, the defendant filed an affidavit of fees, which
requested approximately $38,000 in attorney’s fees for
costs incurred “throughout the duration of the pending
postjudgment motions.” That affidavit did not itemize
the fees requested.
On July 1, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to modify
the separation agreement and parenting plan, request-
ing full legal custody of the minor children, increased
child support, increased support for medical insurance
costs, travel restrictions, and notice requirements for
visitation.7
The court held several hearings regarding the plain-
tiff’s motion for modification and the defendant’s motion
for contempt, among other motions, on October 9 and
7Many of the plaintiff’s requests in her July 1, 2024 motion for modi-
fication were duplicative of the plaintiff’s various prior motions for
modification, some of which the court resolved pursuant to its various
orders on October 16, 2024.

Majkut v. Majkut
16 and December 9, 2024, and March 31 and April 14,
2025. The court also ordered supplemental briefing on
the issue of whether the nondisparagement clause in the
parenting plan violated the plaintiff’s freedom of speech
rights. Both parties submitted supplemental briefing on
the free speech issue.
On May 21, 2025, the court issued a memorandum of
decision in which it found the plaintiff in contempt and
modified the custody and visitation orders regarding
the parties’ minor children. Regarding the defendant’s
motion for contempt, the court found that the “plaintiff
has openly shared her personal opinions with the children
and that, in so doing, she may have tainted the children’s
outlook on the defendant. She has not demonstrated any
support for the children maintaining some relationship
with their father. It is apparent to the court that her
actions are punitive in nature. Also, the plaintiff feels
that the children are mature enough and capable of mak-
ing their own decisions as to contact and access with their
father. While the older child is almost seventeen years
old and may be better equipped to determine and voice
his opinions about these issues, the other minor children,
at ages fourteen and eleven, are not able to appropriately
consider their own best interests.” The court found that
“[t]he evidence supports the defendant’s claims that the
plaintiff was telling him that the children were making
their decisions regarding visitation and that she was not
supporting his visitation with the children.”
Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff admit-
ted “to having created the [SMMH] website in February
2023. She presents it as ‘[o]ne woman’s journey of healing
from narcissistic abuse and trauma.’ She testified that
she never named the defendant in any of her writings,
nor did she post any photos of him. She also claims that
her writings are the ‘truth from her experiences.’ She
claims that her writings on SMMH are her personal
journey of healing in the hopes of helping others. As of
the date of the last hearing, the website was deactivated
and was no longer available. . . . The court has reviewed

Majkut v. Majkut
the defendant’s [exhibits], which [include] the plaintiff’s
SMMH writings as well as the plaintiff’s social media
posts. The writings contain references to her marriage,
ex-husband, her broken marriage to an abusive partner,
[and] her claims of years of emotional, psychological,
financial, spiritual, and sometimes physical abuse. She
alleges lies and deceit by this person. She states in one
writing that ‘he didn’t really love me or us, or our family.’
These statements do not expressly name the defendant,
but his identity can be inferred by those familiar with the
family and easily discoverable by interested or curious
readers.” The court further found that “[t]he plaintiff
agreed to the [separation agreement] and had the benefit
of advice of counsel. Any objection to it at this late date
is untimely and considered waived. The language [of the
nondisparagement clause] is narrowly tailored to the best
interests of the minor children. Contrary to her claim, the
plaintiff is by no means precluded from seeking medical
treatment or mental health treatment and discussing
her claims in that setting. There has been no evidence
presented that the minor children have seen SMMH
or the social media posts. However, the minor children
have access to the Internet. While the younger children
do not have social media accounts themselves, access is
available. The possibility of them (or their peers) coming
across the website or the plaintiff’s social media accounts
is not remote. Fortunately, they have not seen these,
and the website is now deactivated. The court cautions
the plaintiff to review the language in the agreement/
order [dated] December 8, 2022, and act accordingly.”
The court thereafter found that the nondisparagement
clause in the parties’ parenting plan, as incorporated by
the judgment of dissolution, was clear and unambiguous
and that the evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff
wilfully violated that order. The court subsequently
found her in contempt of that order.
On the basis of the court’s finding the plaintiff in con-
tempt, it awarded the defendant “reasonable attorney’s
fees for the successful motion for contempt only . . . in the

Majkut v. Majkut
amount of $2425. Reasonable attorney’s fees are found
to be five hours of attorney’s fees at $485 per hour.” The
court denied all other claims for attorney’s fees.
Regarding the plaintiff’s motion to modify the parties’
custody and visitation, the court found that the defen-
dant had voluntarily moved to Ukraine and the plaintiff
had safety concerns regarding the children traveling to
Ukraine.8 The court found that it was incumbent upon
the defendant to maintain a relationship with his minor
children, but that his efforts “should not be thwarted
by the plaintiff.” The court found that it would be in
the children’s best interests for the parties to improve
their communication with each other to avoid unneces-
sary conflict.
The court thereafter found it to be in the children’s best
interests to modify the custody and visitation schedule.
The court ordered, inter alia, that (1) “[t]he plaintiff shall
have sole legal custody of the minor children,” (2) “[t]he
plaintiff shall continue to have primary residence,” (3)
the defendant shall have rights to access the children’s
academic, medical, and other personal records notwith-
standing the court’s order awarding the plaintiff sole
legal custody, (4) “[n]either parent shall do anything
which may estrange the children from the other nor
injure the opinion of the children as to their mother or
father, nor act in such a way as to hamper the free and
natural development of the children’s love and respect
for the other parent,” (5) “[t]he defendant shall have
reasonable . . . contact with the minor children” through
various digital means, (6) the plaintiff shall notify the
defendant of serious illness or injury and the defendant
shall have reasonable visitation rights, and (7) “[v]isita-
8It is well established that the courts of this state may take judicial
notice of undisputed events that are capable of ready and unquestionable
demonstration. Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66,
84–85 n.18, 700 A.2d 655 (1997). In this case, we take judicial notice
of the undisputed fact that, at all relevant times, a war was ongoing
in Ukraine. See generally Yuriiovych v. Hryhorivna, 760 F. Supp. 3d
1119, 1126–27 (D. Mont. 2024), appeal dismissed, Docket No. 25-305,
2025 WL 1132832 (9th Cir. March 4, 2025).

Majkut v. Majkut
tion shall be agreed upon by the parties” with thirty days’
written notice. This appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, we note that we are mindful
of the parties’ self-represented status on appeal. “This
court has always been solicitous of the rights of [self-rep-
resented] litigants and, like the trial court, will endeavor
to see that such a litigant shall have the opportunity
to have his case fully and fairly heard so far as such
latitude is consistent with the just rights of any adverse
party. . . . Although we will not entirely disregard our
rules of practice, we do give great latitude to [self-repre-
sented] litigants in order that justice may both be done
and be seen to be done. . . . For justice to be done, however,
any latitude given to [self-represented] litigants cannot
interfere with the rights of other parties, nor can we
disregard completely our rules of practice.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Marlow v. Starkweather, 113
Conn. App. 469, 473, 966 A.2d 770 (2009).
I
AC 48835
A
The plaintiff first claims that the nondisparagement
clause in the parties’ parenting plan, as incorporated
into the judgment of dissolution, constitutes an invalid
prior restraint on her right to free speech pursuant to
the first amendment to the United States constitution.9
We disagree.
We begin with the standard of review and relevant legal
principles. “Whether a waiver of the first amendment’s
prohibition on prior restraints on speech constitution-
9To the extent that the plaintiff claims that the fourteenth amendment
to the United States constitution independently protects her rights to
freedom of speech and thus invalidates the parties’ nondisparagement
clause, we consider that claim to be subsumed by her claim that the first
amendment to the United States constitution, as made applicable to the
states pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, invalidates the parties’
nondisparagement clause. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Ambrose, 223 Conn.
App. 609, 627–28, 309 A.3d 305 (2024).

Majkut v. Majkut
ally can be enforced is a question of law over which we
exercise plenary review.” Perricone v. Perricone, 292
Conn. 187, 199, 972 A.2d 666 (2009). “The first step
in our analysis is to address the threshold question of
whether judicial enforcement of a private confidentiality
agreement constitutes state action, thereby triggering
first amendment protections.” Id. The second step is to
address whether the judicial enforcement of a voluntary
waiver restricting speech constitutes a violation of the
first amendment. Id., 204.
The United States Supreme Court held that a plain-
tiff, who provided newspapers with information on the
promised condition of anonymity, could sue the news-
papers who published his name as the source of that
information under a promissory estoppel theory. Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665–66, 668–70,
111 S. Ct. 2513, 115 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1991). Although
the United States Supreme Court concluded that the
judicial enforcement of that promise would constitute
state action; id., 668; it nevertheless concluded that
“the [f]irst [a]mendment does not confer on the press a
constitutional right to disregard promises that would
otherwise be enforced under state law . . . .” Id., 672.
Our Supreme Court, in applying Cohen and its prog-
eny, has concluded that it need not decide “whether the
enforcement of state law in state courts constitutes state
action under the fourteenth amendment” because, “even
if we assume that the judicial enforcement of a confidenti-
ality agreement between private parties constitutes state
action, the United States Supreme Court held in Cohen
that private parties who voluntarily enter into an agree-
ment to restrict their own speech thereby waive their first
amendment rights.” Perricone v. Perricone, supra, 292
Conn. 201–202. Our Supreme Court therefore upheld a
nondisparagement clause in a marital settlement agree-
ment, concluding that, “when private parties—and not
the government—voluntarily have defined the scope of
the disclosures that would trigger sanctions, the parties
cannot complain if the court merely holds them to their

Majkut v. Majkut
promises. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that a party’s
contractual waiver of the first amendment’s prohibition
on prior restraints on speech constitutionally may be
enforced by the courts even if the contract is not nar-
rowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.”
(Citations omitted.) Id., 204–205.
In the present case, there is no dispute that, at all rel-
evant times during the divorce proceedings, the plaintiff
was represented by counsel. Moreover, the plaintiff
agreed to be bound by the parenting plan, which included
the nondisparagement clause at issue in the present
appeal. That parenting plan was incorporated into the
separation agreement, which was incorporated into the
court’s judgment of dissolution. We therefore conclude
that the plaintiff validly waived her first amendment
rights pursuant to the nondisparagement clause and
the court’s subsequent enforcement of that contractual
provision does not violate the plaintiff’s first amend-
ment rights.
B
The plaintiff next claims that the nondisparagement
clause in the parties’ parenting plan, as incorporated
into the judgment of dissolution, violated her rights to
free speech pursuant to article first, §§ 4 and 5, of the
constitution of Connecticut. We disagree.
The plaintiff’s claim presents a question of state con-
stitutional law over which our review is plenary. See Per-
ricone v. Perricone, supra, 292 Conn. 212. Our Supreme
Court has concluded that a party’s free speech rights
pursuant to article first, §§ 4 and 5, of the constitution
of Connecticut, like those under its federal counterpart,
can be waived. See id., 216–17 (“[N]one of the six [fac-
tors set forth in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86,
610 A.2d 1225 (1992)] supports the [party’s] claim that
her speech rights under article first, §§ 4 and 5, of the
constitution of Connecticut cannot be waived and one

Majkut v. Majkut
consideration—federal precedent—weighs against it.
Accordingly, we reject this claim.”).10
In the present case, there is no dispute that the plain-
tiff was represented by counsel at all relevant times and
signed the parenting plan, which included the nondispar-
agement clause at issue in the present appeal. Relying on
Perricone, we conclude that the Connecticut constitution
does not facially invalidate the parties’ nondisparage-
ment clause.11 We therefore conclude that the plaintiff
10To the extent that the plaintiff asks us to reconsider our Supreme
Court’s decision in Perricone by arguing that article first, §§ 4 and 5,
of our state constitution invalidates nondisparagement agreements in
divorce proceedings as invalid prior restraints on speech, we refuse to
do so. It is axiomatic that, as an intermediate appellate tribunal, we
are not at liberty to modify, reconsider or overrule the precedent of our
Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Siler, 204 Conn. App. 171, 177–78,
253 A.3d 995, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 912, 273 A.3d 694 (2021).
11In Perricone, our Supreme Court adopted a two step inquiry into the
constitutionality of contractual confidentiality agreements: “[M]any
courts have taken a two step approach to claims involving contractual
waivers of constitutional rights. They first consider whether the waiver
violates the constitution. If it does not, they then consider whether there
are, nevertheless, compelling public policy reasons not to enforce the
waiver. These reasons frequently involve interests beyond the private
interests of the parties. Because these interests might otherwise be
ignored, we find this to be a sensible approach.” Perricone v. Perricone,
supra, 292 Conn. 217 n.29. Thus, a confidentiality or nondisparagement
agreement that validly waives a party’s free speech rights may still
be considered unenforceable if that agreement is contrary to public
policy. Id., 219.
Our Supreme Court discussed several factors that weigh in favor of
enforcing contractual waivers of constitutional free speech rights,
including “the public policy favoring freedom of contract . . . the interest
in encouraging settlement of disputes . . . protecting the fundamental
principle of personal autonomy . . . and the fact that the agreement
involves private litigants, and concerns matters of little legitimate
public interest.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 219–20.
Our Supreme Court also discussed several factors that weigh against
the enforcement of contractual waivers, including “the critical impor-
tance of the right to speak on matters of public concern . . . the fact
that the agreement restricts a party from communicating with a public
agency regarding the enforcement of civil rights laws . . . the fact that
the agreement requires the suppression of criminal behavior . . . the
fact that the information being suppressed is important to protecting
the public health and safety . . . and the fact that the party benefiting
from the confidentiality provision is a public entity or official. . . .

Majkut v. Majkut
validly waived her right to free speech pursuant to article
first, §§ 4 and 5, of the state constitution by agreeing to
the parenting plan containing the nondisparagement
clause and that the court’s subsequent enforcement of
that contractual provision does not violate the plaintiff’s
right to free speech.
Finally, the plaintiff claims that her actions were not
wilful and, hence, it was error to find her in contempt
and to order her to pay attorney’s fees. Little discussion
is needed as to this issue. The plaintiff does not challenge
the calculation or amount of attorney’s fees awarded but
repeats arguments that we have previously addressed
in this opinion.
For the foregoing reasons, we decline to reverse the
court’s finding of contempt and award of attorney’s fees.
II
AC 48812
A
In challenging the court’s May 21, 2025 postjudg-
ment orders, the defendant first claims that the court
improperly granted sole legal custody of the parties’
minor children to the plaintiff, arguing that the court
was required to order some form of joint legal custody.
We disagree.
Courts also have considered whether the contractual restriction on
speech was tailored to advance the primary purpose of the contract.”
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 220–21.
In the present case, the plaintiff argues that, generally, this state
has a public policy to protect free speech and that the nondisparage-
ment clause is not narrowly tailored to the best interests of the parties’
minor children. Mindful of the plaintiff’s status as a self-represented
litigant, we construe that as an argument that certain public poli-
cies favor invalidating the parties’ nondisparagement clause. On the
basis of our careful review of the record, we conclude that the factors
articulated in Perricone weigh in favor of enforcing the nondisparage-
ment clause, specifically, public policy favors freedom of contract and
settling disputes, the agreement involves private parties, and nothing
in the record suggests that the nondisparagement clause violates some
other public policy of the state.

Majkut v. Majkut
General Statutes § 46b-56 confers broad discretion
on the trial court to make or modify child custody and
visitation orders in the best interest of the child. Spe-
cifically, it provides that, in modifying a custody order,
“the court shall consider the best interests of the child,
and in doing so, may consider, but shall not be limited
to, one or more of [the listed factors]. The court is not
required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it
considers, but shall articulate the basis for its decision.”
General Statutes § 46b-56 (c).
“In reaching a decision as to what is in the best inter-
ests of a child, the court is vested with broad discretion
and its ruling will be reversed only upon a showing that
some legal principle or right has been violated or that the
discretion has been abused.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Morrone v. Morrone, 142 Conn. App. 345,
351, 64 A.3d 803 (2013). “This court has consistently
held in matters involving child custody . . . that while
the rights, wishes and desires of the parents must be
considered it is nevertheless the ultimate welfare of the
child [that] must control the decision of the court. . . . In
making this determination, the trial court is vested with
broad discretion which can . . . be interfered with [only]
upon a clear showing that that discretion was abused. .
. . Thus, a trial court’s decision regarding child custody
must be allowed to stand if it is reasonably supported by
the relevant subordinate facts found and does not violate
law, logic or reason. . . . Under § 46b-56 (c), the court, in
determining custody, must consider the best interests
of the child and, in doing so, may consider, among other
factors, one or more of the . . . factors enumerated in
the provision.
“[T]he authority to exercise the judicial discretion
[authorized by § 46b-56] . . . is not conferred [on] this
court, but [on] the trial court, and . . . we are not privi-
leged to usurp that authority or to substitute ourselves
for the trial court. . . . A mere difference of opinion or
judgment cannot justify our intervention. Nothing short
of a conviction that the action of the trial court is one

Majkut v. Majkut
[that] discloses a clear abuse of discretion can warrant
our interference.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Zhou v. Zhang, 334 Conn. 601, 632–33,
223 A.3d 775 (2020).
In the present case, the court based its custody related
best interest findings largely on the defendant’s volun-
tary relocation to Ukraine, which it found to be a material
change in circumstances. Specifically, the court found
that “[t]he defendant made the choice to move to Ukraine.
It is his responsibility to maintain and grow his relation-
ships with his children, if that is what he intends to do.”
We note that, although the court awarded the plaintiff
sole legal custody, the court granted the defendant the
“right to access the [minor] children’s academic, medical,
hospital, and other personal records and to communicate
with such providers.” The court’s order further requires
the plaintiff to keep the defendant informed about the
minor children’s “educational, medical, therapeutic and
other providers and . . . [to] keep the defendant updated
regarding the children’s medical appointments and aca-
demic, extracurricular and other organized activities.
The defendant shall have the right to attend any such
appointments and activities.” The order also protects
the defendant’s rights to communicate with his minor
children and to visitation. Thus, although the court
awarded the plaintiff sole legal custody, the defendant
retained the right to be present for various appointments
and to access his minor children’s medical, academic and
personal records.
Although the defendant highlights portions of the
record that purportedly contradict the court’s determina-
tion, we disagree that the court abused its discretion in
granting the plaintiff sole legal custody of the parties’
minor children, considering the change in circumstances
due to the defendant’s voluntary relocation out of the
country and the extensive rights the defendant retained
to participate in the parenting of his minor children. We
therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its dis-

Majkut v. Majkut
cretion when it awarded the plaintiff sole legal custody
of the parties’ minor children.
B
The defendant next claims that the court’s visitation
schedule order is invalid. Specifically, the defendant
argues that the order, which grants visitation by agree-
ment of the parties, constitutes an improper delegation of
judicial decision-making to one parent because visitation
is “contingent on one parent’s consent rather than on a
court-ordered, self-executing schedule.”12 We disagree.
“Whether the trial court improperly delegated its
judicial authority is a legal question over which we have
plenary review. . . . It is well settled . . . that [n]o court
in this state can delegate its judicial authority to any
person serving the court in a nonjudicial function. . . .
A court improperly delegates its judicial authority to [a
nonjudicial entity] when that person is given authority to
issue orders that affect the parties or the children. Such
orders are part of a judicial function that can be done
only by one clothed with judicial authority.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) R. H. v. M.
H., 350 Conn. 432, 440, 324 A.3d 720 (2024).
We are also mindful that the trial court has broad
discretion to modify visitation orders in the best inter-
est of the child. See General Statutes § 46b-56; Zhou v.
Zhang, supra, 334 Conn. 632–33; Morrone v. Morrone,
supra, 142 Conn. App. 351.
Our Supreme Court has observed that, pursuant to §
46b-56, “a trial court cannot remove itself entirely from
the decision-making process, and, although a court order
may authorize a parent to modify the other parent’s
visitation schedule, it may not . . . modify [the other
parent’s] right to visitation. . . . For example, it would
12To the extent that the defendant also challenges the court’s October
16, 2024 order barring international travel except by written agreement
of the parties, the defendant has only appealed the court’s May 21, 2025
order. The court’s October 16, 2024 order is not at issue on appeal, and
we therefore decline to consider the propriety of it.

Majkut v. Majkut
not be an improper delegation of judicial authority if
a trial court permitted a custodial parent the ability
to, within reason, change one day of visitation from
Monday to Tuesday because of a legitimate conflict. It
would, however, be an improper delegation of judicial
authority to authorize the custodial parent to refuse to
allow the noncustodial parent who has visitation rights
to visit the child . . . .” (Citation omitted; emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) R. H. v.
M. H., supra, 350 Conn. 444. Our Supreme Court also
has “recognized the nuances that arise in the context of
orders addressing child custody and visitation”; id., 442;
and “that decision-making in family disputes requires
flexible, individualized adjudication of the particular
facts of each case without the constraint of objective
guidelines. . . . It is critically important that our trial
judges be afforded broad discretion when crafting visita-
tion orders in order to best account for the interests of the
parties and the children in often highly contentious and
ever evolving situations.” (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 451.
The visitation order at issue in R. H. allowed the cus-
todial parent, in consultation with the minor child’s
therapist, to restrict or suspend the noncustodial par-
ent’s right to visitation. Id., 437. Our Supreme Court
concluded that the custodial parent’s ability to modify
the noncustodial parent’s right to visitation constituted
an improper delegation of judicial authority. Id., 444–45.
Similarly, in applying R. H., this court concluded that
a visitation order that granted the noncustodial parent
visitation “at the sole [discretion] of the [custodial par-
ent] with all arrangements approved by the [custodial
parent]” constituted an improper delegation of judicial
authority to the custodial parent. Milot v. Milot, 234
Conn. App. 473, 479, 344 A.3d 320 (2025). Specifically,
this court concluded that the order “place[d] the decision-
making authority in the hands of a party to the litiga-
tion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the defendant challenges the
court’s visitation order, which provides in relevant part

Majkut v. Majkut
that “[v]isitation shall be agreed upon by the parties. The
defendant shall provide the plaintiff with a minimum of
thirty days’ written notice as to his requested visitation
time. . . . Visitation should take the children’s schedules
into consideration and shall not interfere with their
schooling or extracurricular activities. The intent of the
visitation access is to foster a meaningful relationship
between the defendant and the minor children.”
The defendant never requested specific dates or times
for visitation before the trial court. The defendant, like-
wise, presented no evidence regarding his availability
in the country or state. Given the particular facts and
circumstances of this case, we disagree that the court’s
visitation order constitutes an impermissible delegation
of its authority. The court’s “by agreement” visitation
order is related to scheduling only and does not restrict
the defendant’s right to visitation with his minor chil-
dren or improperly delegate to the plaintiff the authority
to suspend the defendant’s right to visitation. See R. H.
v. M. H., supra, 350 Conn. 448–51. Similarly, visitation
is ordered to be scheduled collaboratively by the parties.
We do not read the court’s visitation order to grant the
plaintiff unilateral discretion to restrict or deny visita-
tion, nor do we read the order to grant the plaintiff the
decision-making authority for visitation, unlike the order
at issue in Milot. See Milot v. Milot, supra, 234 Conn.
App. 476–77. Rather, the court’s order in the present
case reflects the broad discretion afforded to it to fashion
visitation orders considering the particular facts of the
case, notably the defendant’s voluntary relocation to
a country actively at war and the lack of clarity for his
return visits to the United States. Moreover, the court’s
order made clear that the defendant has the right to
visitation to foster meaningful relationships with his
minor children.
We also note that the court’s visitation order includes
additional provisions. The order grants the defendant one
week of summer vacation with the minor children, with
priority over the week of his choosing in odd numbered

Majkut v. Majkut
years. The court further stated that the defendant’s
efforts in maintaining and fostering his relationships
with his children “should not be thwarted by the plain-
tiff.” When viewed as a whole, the court’s visitation order
includes numerous provisions to allow the defendant
to visit and to communicate with his minor children.
The order likewise expressly requires the parties, and
specifically the plaintiff, to reasonably accommodate
the defendant’s visits to the United States in order to
foster his relationship with his minor children.
Moreover, the visitation order on appeal is similar to
a prior visitation order that the court entered pursuant
to the parties’ separation agreement.13 Although not
controlling, our analysis is informed by the principles
of induced error. It is well established that a party can-
not encourage or prompt the trial court to commit an
error and, on appeal, complain of that error. See, e.g.,
Ciarleglio v. Martin, 228 Conn. App. 241, 263 n.16, 325
A.3d 219, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 920, 325 A.3d 218
(2024). Our careful review of the record demonstrates
that the defendant consented to a prior order that sub-
stantially mirrors the order he now challenges on appeal.
The defendant’s prior consent to a substantially similar
order suggests that the court did not abuse its discretion
in fashioning its visitation order but, rather, considered
the parties’ wishes and desires when making this visita-
tion order, as it was required to do. See Zhou v. Zhang,
supra, 334 Conn. 632–33.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the court
did not abuse its discretion in fashioning the visitation
order at issue on appeal. Rather, the court’s order reflects
13The court entered an order on October 16, 2024, that modified the
parties’ visitation rights. That order was made pursuant to the defen-
dant’s motion for modification, in which he had requested flexibility and
the ability to unilaterally determine the visitation schedule whenever
he visited the United States. Following a hearing on that motion, the
court modified the visitation order to one by agreement of the parties
so that “visitation shall be agreed to with confirmation and thirty days’
notice from the defendant . . . .” This visitation schedule mirrors the one
the defendant now challenges on appeal, which states that “[v]isitation
shall be agreed upon by the parties” with thirty days’ written notice.

Majkut v. Majkut
its broad discretion to fashion flexible and individualized
visitation orders. We therefore conclude, on the basis
of the particular facts and circumstances of the present
case, that the court did not impermissibly delegate its
decision-making authority to the plaintiff.
C
The defendant also claims that the court erred in its fee
award pursuant to his successful motion for contempt.14
Specifically, the defendant argues that he is entitled
to all the attorney’s fees incurred in adjudicating all
the parties’ postdissolution motions, in addition to the
fees accrued prosecuting his motion for contempt.15 We
disagree.
A trial court has discretion to “award to the petitioner
a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . such sums to be paid by
the person found in contempt . . . .” General Statutes §
46b-87. As this court has observed, “[§] 46b-87 grants
the court the discretion to award attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party in a contempt proceeding. The award
14“Although the court rendered judgment on the complaint in favor
of the plaintiff, it is aggrieved for the purposes of this appeal because
the court did not grant all of the damages and attorney’s fees that the
plaintiff sought.” WiFiLand, LLP v. Hudson, 153 Conn. App. 87, 90
n.3, 100 A.3d 450 (2014).
15The defendant also claims that he is entitled to additional fees because
the plaintiff failed to follow the procedures for modifying child custody
arrangements as articulated in the parties’ parenting plan. The defen-
dant did not raise any claim regarding the plaintiff’s violation of this
portion of the parenting plan before the trial court. Because there was
no claim regarding this portion of the parties’ parenting plan before the
court, we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Todd Arthurs Co., 225 Conn. App. 844, 854–55, 317 A.3d
98 (2024); see also footnote 4 of this opinion.
The defendant also argues that the court did not fully resolve his
motion for contempt by failing to also find the plaintiff in contempt
for allowing their minor children to dictate visitation schedules. We
disagree. The court explicitly found that the plaintiff “believes that
the minor children are all capable of making their own decisions regard-
ing the defendant’s parenting access. . . . The evidence supports the
defendant’s claims that the plaintiff was telling him that the children
were making their decisions regarding visitations and that she was not
supporting his visitation with the children.” That finding substantiated
the court’s determination that the plaintiff wilfully had violated the

Majkut v. Majkut
of attorney’s fees in contempt proceedings is within the
discretion of the court. . . . An abuse of discretion in
granting the counsel fees will be found only if this court
determines that the trial court could not reasonably have
concluded as it did. . . . Importantly, where contempt is
established, the concomitant award of attorney’s fees
properly is awarded pursuant to § 46b-87 and is restricted
to efforts related to the contempt action.” (Emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Y. H. v.
J. B., 224 Conn. App. 793, 811, 313 A.3d 1245 (2024).
Although the party requesting attorney’s fees has the
burden of making an appropriate evidentiary showing,
“[t]he court properly may rely on a financial affidavit,
as well as its own knowledge and involvement with the
trial, to ascertain reasonable attorney’s fees.” Stamford
Hospital v. Schwartz, 190 Conn. App. 63, 96, 209 A.3d
1243, cert. denied, 332 Conn. 911, 209 A.3d 644 (2019).
In the present case, the court found both that the non-
disparagement clause, as incorporated by the court’s
dissolution order, was a “clear and unambiguous” order
and that the plaintiff wilfully had violated that order
by clear and convincing evidence. The court thus held
the plaintiff in contempt of that order. The court, in
exercising its discretion, awarded the defendant $2425
in reasonable attorney’s fees, specifically finding fees
“to be five hours of attorney’s fees at $485 per hour.”16
The court explicitly declined to award the defendant any
additional fees. In light of the fee affidavit presented to
the court, the court’s own knowledge and involvement in
the several hearings concerning the defendant’s motion
for contempt, and the court’s broad discretion in award-
ing attorney’s fees, we conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in fashioning its fee award.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
parties’ nondisparagement clause. The defendant’s argument is belied
by the record and therefore without merit.
16We note that the hourly rate awarded by the court is the same as the
hourly rate of the primary attorney on the defendant’s case according
to the defendant’s affidavit of fees.