In re Avianzah R.

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In re Avianzah R.
IN RE AVIANZAH R. ET AL.*
(AC 49396)
Suarez, Seeley and Palmer, Js.
Syllabus
The respondent mother appealed from the trial court’s judgments terminat-
ing her parental rights as to two of her minor children, who previously had
been adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. The mother claimed
that the court improperly determined that she had failed to achieve a suf-
ficient degree of personal rehabilitation, as required by statute (§ 17a-112 (j)
(3) (B) (i)), as would encourage the belief that she could assume a responsible
position in the children’s lives within a reasonable period of time. Held:
The record contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s deter-
mination that the petitioner had proven by clear and convincing evidence
that the respondent mother failed to rehabilitate, as the court’s findings
regarding her lack of consistent engagement in individual counseling, her
inability to meet her children’s specialized needs and her failure to engage
with their therapists, which would have provided her with insight into the
children’s behavior and mental health, were amply supported by evidence
in the record, and, even if the court’s findings concerning her housing and
employment status were clearly erroneous, those findings were harmless in
light of the cumulative evidence in the record that supported the court’s
determination that she had failed to rehabilitate.
This court rejected the respondent mother’s claim that she should have been
reunited with her children once it was determined that she had not been
responsible for the death of another of her minor children, as the trial court
was bound by its prior findings in the neglect proceeding, and, as the mother
did not file an appeal challenging the adjudication of neglect, she could not
collaterally attack it in the termination of parental rights proceeding.
The respondent mother’s participation in required therapeutic and other
services did not demonstrate, as she claimed, that she had rehabilitated,
as substantial or even complete compliance with the court-ordered specific
steps aimed at reuniting her with her children did not necessitate a conclu-
sion that she had rehabilitated.
Argued May 21—officially released July 15, 2026**
*In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in
this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall
be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein
and upon order of the court.
**July 15, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opin-
ion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

In re Avianzah R.
Procedural History
Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents' parental rights with
respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, Juvenile
Matters, and tried to the court, Torres, J.; judgments
terminating the respondents' parental rights, from which
the respondent mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, for the
appellant (respondent mother).
Matthew J. Parenti, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general,
for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. The respondent mother, Jessica R.,
appeals from the judgments of the trial court, rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, terminating her parental rights as to her
minor children, Avianzah R. (Avianzah) and Amyaliese
R. (Amyaliese).1 On appeal, the respondent claims that
the court incorrectly determined that she had failed to
achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation
within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112 (j)
(3) (B) (i).2 We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The following facts, which were found by the trial court
by clear and convincing evidence or are otherwise undis-
puted in the record, and procedural history are relevant
to this appeal. The respondent is married to Antonio R.,
and they have three children together: Amyaliese, who
1The court also terminated the parental rights of Antonio R., the
respondent father of the children. He has not appealed from the termina-
tion of his parental rights. Accordingly, all references in this opinion
to the respondent are to Jessica R. only.
2The attorney for the minor children filed a statement adopting the
brief of the petitioner in this appeal pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13
and 79a-6 (c).

In re Avianzah R.
was born in 2015; Avianzah, who was born in 2019; and
Amateo, who was born in 2021.3
The Department of Children and Families (department)
became involved with Amyaliese and Avianzah in October
2022, after Amateo had been taken to Yale-New Haven
Hospital with severe injuries that were determined to
have been caused by inflicted trauma. On October 7,
2022, the petitioner filed ex parte motions for orders of
temporary custody as to Amyaliese and Avianzah, and
neglect petitions alleging neglect and physical abuse
because, at that time, it could not be determined who had
caused Amateo’s injuries. The court granted the motions
for orders of temporary custody. Amateo died as a result
of his injuries three days later, on October 10, 2022.4
On December 8, 2022, the respondent pleaded nolo
contendere with regard to the neglect petitions, but
only as to the neglect allegations that Amyaliese and
Avianzah were “being denied proper care and atten-
tion, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally
. . . .” After a thorough canvass, the court, Torres, J.,
accepted the pleas, adjudicated Amyaliese and Avianzah
neglected and committed them to the care and custody of
the petitioner. The court also canvassed the respondent
as to the court-ordered specific steps she was required
to undertake in order to regain custody of her children
and ordered that they be made final.5
On June 4, 2024, the court approved a permanency
plan of termination of parental rights and adoption with
3The respondent has three other children from previous relationships
who do not reside with her and are not subjects of this appeal.
4Prior to being taken to the hospital, Amateo had been found unrespon-
sive while in the care of a babysitter, who subsequently was arrested in
connection with Amateo’s death. It is not disputed that the respondent
and Antonio R. have not been charged in connection with Amateo’s death.
5The Judicial Branch form detailing the specific steps that the court
ordered directed the respondent to take part in counseling and to make
progress toward the identified treatment goals on the form. Below that
directive, three boxes, labeled parenting, individual, and family were
checked. In that same section, the specific steps form also contained a box
titled “Goals (specify),” which was not checked; however, immediately
next to that box, the specific steps form indicated, “see attached goals.”

In re Avianzah R.
a concurrent plan of reunification as to both children. On
August 26, 2024, the petitioner filed petitions for the
termination of the respondent’s parental rights as to both
children. As to each child, the petitioner alleged, as the
ground for termination, that the children had been found
in a prior proceeding to have been neglected, abused
or uncared for, and that the respondent had “failed to
achieve [such] degree of personal rehabilitation [as] would
encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time,
considering the age[s] and needs of the [children], [she]
could assume a responsible position in [their lives] . . . .”
The petitioner further alleged that the department had
made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent and
to reunify her with the children but that reasonable
efforts to reunify were not required because the court
had previously approved a permanency plan other than
reunification.
At trial on the petitions over several nonconsecutive
days beginning on March 27, 2025, during which the
respondent was represented by counsel, multiple wit-
nesses testified and voluminous exhibits were admitted
into evidence. On October 3, 2025, following the trial,
the court, Torres, J., issued a memorandum of deci-
sion terminating the respondent’s parental rights as to
Amyaliese and Avianzah. The court found by clear and
convincing evidence that the children had previously
been adjudicated neglected and that the respondent had
failed to rehabilitate sufficiently to satisfy the require-
ments of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). The court also found
The file in the present case contains a copy of the respondent’s specific
steps form with an attachment that lists specified treatment goals. The
respondent, however, as discussed in part II of this opinion, claims that
she did not receive any such attachment with her specific steps.
The specific steps form further ordered the respondent, inter alia,
to “[t]ake care of the child(ren)’s physical, educational, medical, or
emotional needs, including keeping the child(ren)’s appointments with
his/her/their medical, psychological, psychiatric, or educational pro-
viders,” to “[c]ooperate with the child(ren)’s therapy, including but
not limited to Birth to Three,” and to “[c]ooperate with the service
providers recommended for parenting/individual/family counseling,
in-home support services, substance abuse assessment/treatment, and/
or intimate partner violence/domestic violence services.”

In re Avianzah R.
by clear and convincing evidence that the department
had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent
with the children, and that she was unable or unwilling
to benefit from the reunification services.
In its memorandum of decision, the court made the
following findings with respect to Amyaliese. “When
Amyaliese . . . was an infant, she suffered an intracranial
hemorrhage of unknown etiology. She had abnormal
eye movement and vomiting when she was admitted to
the hospital. While hospitalized, she suffered seizures.
When she was released, she [was] required to follow up
with neurology. She is diagnosed with cortical visual
impairment due to a stroke of the occipital lobe. She
has weak eye muscles and uses glasses to help keep her
eyes focused. Amyaliese . . . meets the criteria for a . . .
diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder with a severity
rating of 2 [under the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders].
“Amyaliese . . . works with a therapist at Family and
Children’s Aid and started with the agency on June 26,
2024. She is currently in third grade and has an individu-
alized education plan . . . . By the time of trial, Amyaliese
. . . had made great improvements in her interactions
with peers at school and was more verbal. Her progress
was noted to be remarkable. . . .
“Amyaliese . . . is diagnosed with autism, post-trau-
matic stress disorder and [attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder]. Amyaliese . . . is working on expressing her
emotions and working through her trauma. The modal-
ity of treatment is play therapy. They use art as a form
of expression. It is [a] modality that is often used with
children of Amyaliese’s age. The goals of therapy were
to assist her in expressing her emotion[s] and processing
events that [she has] been through. This therapy permits
children who may not have complete verbal capacity . . .
to express their emotions and process events in nonverbal
ways . . . [and] [i]n [Amyaliese’s] case, to allow her to
process her trauma and help her develop coping mecha-
nisms to better address her emotions. . . .

In re Avianzah R.
“When Amyaliese . . . first worked with . . . [therapist
Nancy] Solberg, she appeared insulated [and] would talk
to herself quite a bit. Amyaliese . . . would use different
voices, almost as if she were playing different characters.
She would repeat phrases that were not relevant to the
situation that was currently happening, often talking
to herself using her own name and different voices. The
clinician noted that Amyaliese . . . appeared to be dem-
onstrating a history of trauma.
“On October 31, 2024 . . . Solberg wrote a letter to
the department raising concerns about statements and
actions by Amyaliese . . . during her sessions. . . . Solberg
noted that, during therapy, Amyaliese . . . would act out
scenarios where she was using a different voice and would
use swear words. She would often use a deep male voice
and say things such as, ‘[d]on’t ever tell me what to do, I
could break your hand,’ and, shut the ‘F up.’ She would
also use the mother toy to say, ‘[g]uess what, Avi, guess
what, Amaya, I will never forgive you,’ ‘[w]hat’s wrong
with you?’ and, ‘[s]top it, Amaya.’ . . .
“Solberg was able to observe [Amyaliese’s] behavior
while the parents were having visits and during a period
of time when they ceased. She noted [that] during the
period of ceased visits,6 Amyaliese . . . would appear
calmer for sessions, she would not run into other rooms,
[and] she would be less aggressive in the therapeutic
space. . . . Solberg saw an increase in engagement with
Amyaliese . . . during that time. She would make eye
contact and, at times, respond to direct questions. She
6We note that, after Amyaliese and Avianzah were committed to the
care and custody of the petitioner, the respondent initially participated
in weekly supervised visits with the children. In February 2024, the chil-
dren’s attorney filed a motion for modification of the visitation orders.
In July 2024, the parties reached an agreement to temporarily pause
visitation, and the department referred the respondent to Therapeutic
Family Time for supervised visitation services. On November 14, 2024,
the petitioner filed an emergency motion to cease visitation as to both
children, and the court held a contested hearing on the issue of visita-
tion on November 26, 2024, and on several dates thereafter. On March
21, 2025, the court ordered that supervised visits with Amyaliese be
suspended but that supervised visits with Avianzah could continue.

In re Avianzah R.
saw a decrease in negative self-talk. . . . Her drawings
evolved into pictures of fictional characters instead of
real-life individuals. Her play between figurines became
less aggressive. . . . This indicated to the clinician that
Amyaliese . . . did not need the therapeutic space to pro-
cess her trauma that had been her focus. . . .
“Once visits resumed, Solberg began to see the reverse
happening. Amyaliese . . . began to escalate her nega-
tive behaviors. . . . The clinician made a direct correla-
tion between the increase in negative reactions and the
resumption of visits with [Amyaliese’s] parents. She
assessed that the visits between Amyaliese . . . and her
biological family were retraumatizing her, leading to
decreased emotional stability.
“[Amyaliese’s] schoolteacher noticed a regression in
[her] behavior once visits were reinstated. She noted in
August of 2024 that Amyaliese . . . was happy, ready to
learn and was able to make friends. During the month
of August, visits were paused due [to] the escalating
behavior of the children. Once visits were reinstituted,
her teacher noted [that] Amyaliese . . . would bang her
head, swear and at times scream profanities. She lost
valuable education time during this period. Her behav-
ior subsided in December of 2024. This calmer behavior
coincided with the visits between the parents and children
in November of 2024 being suspended.
“Similar behavior was observed by forensic psycholo-
gist [Jessica] Biren Caverly. During an [interaction]
between Amyaliese . . . and [Antonio R.], she walked
around with her fingers in her ears, scripting the entire
time. During the interaction, [Antonio R.] was noted
to have raised his voice and become loud. Amyaliese . . .
was talking and talking the entire time. The psycholo-
gist noted that Amyaliese . . . was attempting to soothe
herself, and it became more concerning that the source
of trauma was from exposure to [Antonio R.].” (Footnote
added.)

In re Avianzah R.
The court made the following relevant findings with
respect to Avianzah. “[Avianzah] worked with Child First
due to some aggressive behaviors displayed while in the
foster home. While working with Child First, she would
engage in several play scenarios. Avianzah . . . would act
out herself or her sister getting in trouble with daddy.
She had a doll she called her brother that she would hang
. . . upside down. She would play with the toy ambulance
frequently and would make a noise that may have been
her brother’s name. Avianzah . . . would bring up her
brother almost every session, but, near the end of their
work, the brother doll turned into the foster sister and the
brother play diminished. Avianzah . . . would engage in
doctor play and would scold the therapist, and say things
like, ‘no talking, sit down, be quiet.’ During her sessions,
she would put a Band-Aid on a bear, [which] would be
representative of her brother. She would report that her
brother had hurt his head. She worked with the service
for seven months and was successfully discharged. She
is currently placed with . . . Amyaliese . . . .”
The court also made the following findings regarding
the respondent. “[The respondent] has a history with
the department as a child due to sexual abuse, having
been placed in the department’s care two to three times.
[The respondent] had a distressing time while in foster
care. . . . [The respondent] was referred to [Midwestern
Connecticut Council of Alcoholism, Inc.] for a substance
abuse evaluation several times by the department. [The
respondent] eventually attended an intake at Wellmore,
and the agency did not recommend any treatment for
substance abuse. They recommended [that the respon-
dent] continue with her individual counseling at Stokes
Counseling. She participated in visits via the [Quality
Parenting] Center. [The respondent] completed the Circle
of Security Program and the [Developing Options for
Victim Education (DOVE)] program through Safe Haven.
[The respondent] had intermittently attended therapy
but was unsuccessfully discharged in November of 2024
due to too many no-call, no-shows to her appointments.
The department offered parenting education through

In re Avianzah R.
[Parenting Support Services] and [Therapeutic Family
Time]. [The respondent] was offered weekly visitation
until November of 2024, when the court suspended visits
between the children and both parents. Although pro-
vided with the contact information for the children’s
providers, [the respondent] failed to maintain com-
munication with them to obtain updates regarding the
children.”
In light of the foregoing findings, the court concluded,
in the adjudicatory phase of the termination of parental
rights proceeding, that the petitioner had demonstrated
by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent
was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification
efforts of the department. The court stated that, follow-
ing the respondent’s psychological evaluation, “it was
clear that she needed to work with an individual therapist
to process her historical trauma in order to be a resource
for her children. However, she was unable to maintain
the consistency in therapy necessary to achieve those
goals. Further, she did not appear to have the capacity to
understand the children’s needs. Evidence of her visits
demonstrated someone detached from her children and
unable to work and interact with them in a meaningful
way. She was inconsistent with services, with visits, and
even had irregularities in her housing and employment.
This does not begin to assess whether she has the ability
to digest the information needed to successfully reunify,
as she is disengaged from treatment.” The court further
found that a permanency plan other than reunification
was approved by the court in June 2024 for termination
of parental rights and adoption.
The court also found that the respondent had failed
to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation
as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable
time, considering the ages and needs of the children,
she could assume a responsible position in her children’s
lives. The court noted that the basis for the removal of
Amyaliese and Avianzah “emanated from the injury and
subsequent death of their younger sibling. An order of

In re Avianzah R.
temporary custody was taken and, at a later date, the
children were adjudicated neglected by the court, where
they were found to have been denied proper care and
attention either morally, physically, or educationally.
Neither parent admitted to causing harm to [Amateo],
nor were the surviving children adjudicated by the court
on any charges of abuse. What stands before the court is
an allegation that [the respondent] failed to rehabilitate.
Specific steps were issued. A subsequent court-ordered
evaluation was conducted, and . . . recommendations
[were made] to [the respondent] to achieve reunification.
The issue of whether [the respondent] committed an act
that led to [Amateo’s] death is not before the court. The
issue, consistent with the statute, is whether the parents
are able to take a responsible position in the children’s
lives, considering their age[s] and needs.” (Emphasis
added.)
As to the respondent, the court stated that, “initially,
[she] made strides toward completing her specific steps.
Referrals were made for therapy in February of 2023.
[The respondent] began services in April of 2023 with
[therapist Tracy LaChapelle]. Her therapeutic goals were
to process the loss of [Amateo] and work through the grief
of having her other children removed. She was engaged
from April of 2023 through November of 2023, and then
[was] not engaged again until February of 2024 and [was]
unsuccessfully discharged in November of 2024. [The
respondent] claimed [that] there was an insurance issue;
however, it was resolved in December of 2023. The social
worker did send monthly texts to follow up on services
and met with both parents after visits to remind them
of the progress that needed to be made. Information was
provided to the parents regarding the children’s provid-
ers and educators. Neither parent engaged with them in
any meaningful way.
“[The respondent] was referred to the Safe Haven
DOVE program and successfully completed it. She was
discharged from therapy in November of 2024 for several
no-call, no-shows, despite expectation letters outlining

In re Avianzah R.
the need for individual counseling. She is not currently
engaged in therapy. Neither parent developed a relation-
ship with the children’s providers or educators. This was
an important step for them to better understand their
children’s needs and development. Family therapy could
not begin until each parent made meaningful progress
while in individual therapy to assure that each parent
was stable.
“At the time of the filing of the petition[s], [the respon-
dent] was engaged in therapy, but not consistently. Her
housing was an issue. [The respondent] was behind in her
rent and whether she could maintain her housing was
uncertain. Stable housing would have been a necessary
component to move toward rehabilitation. At the time,
[the respondent] did not have consistent employment.
The ability to financially meet [her needs] and her chil-
dren’s needs would have been critical prior to consider-
ing reunification. She had missed one [planning and
placement team meeting] for Amyaliese . . . a meeting to
understand and assist with her educational needs. She
missed a second meeting, arriving five minutes before
the meeting ended. Amyaliese . . . carries a diagnosis of
autism. She requires a specialized educational plan to
meet her needs. Understanding and being able to navigate
[Amyaliese’s] specialized needs would have been critical
for reunification. When [the respondent] failed to regu-
larly attend meetings, she was unable to demonstrate
her ability to take on a parenting role for Amyaliese . . . .
“[The respondent] had not engaged with the children’s
therapists, something the department encouraged both
parents to do. This was a critical piece to work through
the negative behaviors they had exhibited during visits.
This communication would have provided insight to the
parents on the behavior of the children and their current
state of mental health. [The respondent’s] failure to
engage and develop a relationship with the therapists did
not create a belief that she was ready to take on a parent-
ing role. During visits, [the respondent] had appeared
fifteen to twenty minutes late for some visits and had

In re Avianzah R.
missed several other visits. In February of 2024, the psy-
chologist raised concerns about the interaction between
parents and children, noting the need for therapy. This
was going to be a critical piece toward reunification.
Unfortunately, [the respondent] was unable to achieve
the movement necessary to meet the [children’s] needs.
Based on the concerns raised by the visiting supervisors,
the visits with the children needed to be paused until a
skilled supervisor could attend the visits to minimize
the negative impact parental visits were having on the
children. At the time of the filing of the [petitions], [the
respondent] had failed to rehabilitate, considering the
age[s] and needs of the children.”
In the dispositional phase of the termination of paren-
tal rights proceeding, the court made findings as to each
of the criteria set forth in § 17a-112 (k) and determined
that terminating the respondent’s parental rights was
in the children’s best interests.7 Accordingly, the court
rendered judgments terminating the respondent’s paren-
tal rights and appointing the petitioner as the statutory
parent for each child.8 This appeal followed. Additional
facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
On appeal, the respondent’s sole claim is that there was
insufficient evidence to support the court’s determina-
tion that she had failed to achieve the degree of personal
rehabilitation required to avoid a termination of her
parental rights. In making this claim, the respondent
also challenges some of the court’s subordinate factual
findings as clearly erroneous. The petitioner contends,
to the contrary, that the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to support the court’s determination that the
respondent failed to rehabilitate. The petitioner also
argues that the court’s subordinate factual findings were
7We note that the respondent does not challenge the court’s finding
that the termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of
the children.
8The court also denied the respondent’s motion for posttermination
visitation with the children.

In re Avianzah R.
not clearly erroneous and, even assuming that some of
the court’s findings were clearly erroneous, any error was
harmless. On the basis of our review of the evidentiary
record and the court’s findings, we conclude that the
cumulative evidence was sufficient to justify the court’s
conclusion that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate.
We begin by setting forth the established principles
of law and the applicable standard of review that govern
the resolution of this claim. “Section 17a-112 (j) provides
in relevant part: The Superior Court, upon notice and
hearing as provided in [General Statutes §§] 45a-716 and
45a-717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this sec-
tion if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1)
the [department] has made reasonable efforts to locate
the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in
accordance with subsection (a) of [General Statutes §]
17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that
the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reuni-
fication efforts, except that such finding is not required
if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to [§]
17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that
such efforts are not required, (2) termination is in the
best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has
been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court
to have been neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior
proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected, abused or
uncared for and has been in the custody of the [petitioner]
for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child
has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the
return of the child to the parent pursuant to [General
Statutes §] 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree
of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that within a reasonable time, considering the age and
needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible
position in the life of the child . . . .
“Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed
by § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provision], a hearing on
a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two
phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional

In re Avianzah R.
phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court
must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds
for termination of parental rights set forth in § 17a-112
[(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The [peti-
tioner] . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must
allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds. . . .
Subdivision (3) of § 17a-112 (j) carefully sets out . . .
[the] situations that, in the judgment of the legisla-
ture, constitute countervailing interests sufficiently
powerful to justify the termination of parental rights
in the absence of consent. . . . Because a respondent’s
fundamental right to parent his or her child is at stake,
[t]he statutory criteria must be strictly complied with
before termination can be accomplished and adoption
proceedings begun. . . .
“The trial court is required, pursuant to § 17a-112, to
analyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as it relates
to the needs of the particular child, and further . . . such
rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable
time. . . . The statute does not require [a parent] to prove
precisely when [she] will be able to assume a responsible
position in [her] child’s life. Nor does it require [her] to
prove that [she] will be able to assume full responsibility
for [her] child, unaided by available support systems. It
requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved,
if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encour-
age a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a
responsible position in [her] child’s life. . . . Personal
rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)] refers to the
restoration of a parent to [her] former constructive and
useful role as a parent. . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation,
the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved
[her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether
[she] has gained the ability to care for the particular
needs of the [children] at issue. . . .
“[The] completion or noncompletion [of the specific
steps], however, does not guarantee any outcome. . . .
Accordingly, successful completion of expressly articu-

In re Avianzah R.
lated expectations is not sufficient to defeat a depart-
ment claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient
rehabilitation. . . . Whereas, during the adjudicatory
phase of a termination proceeding, the court is gener-
ally limited to considering events that precede the date
of the filing of the petition or the latest amendment to
the petition, also known as the adjudicatory date, it may
rely on events occurring after the [adjudicatory] date . . .
when considering the issue of whether the degree of
rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may
resume a useful role in the child’s life within a reason-
able time. . . .
“A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from
both the trial court’s factual findings and from its weigh-
ing of the facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy
the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in § 17a-112
(j) (3) (B). Accordingly . . . the appropriate standard of
review is one of evidentiary sufficiency, that is, whether
the trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon the
facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence
was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . .
When applying this standard, we construe the evidence
in a manner most favorable to sustaining the judgment
of the trial court. . . . We will not disturb the court’s
subordinate factual findings unless they are clearly erro-
neous. . . . A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it
is not supported by any evidence in the record or when
there is evidence to support it, but the reviewing court is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted;
footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re Cameron H., 219 Conn. App. 149, 159–67, 294 A.3d
50, cert. denied, 347 Conn. 903, 296 A.3d 171 (2023).
Thus, “[i]f the [trial court] could reasonably have
reached its conclusion, the [judgment] must stand, even
if this court disagrees with it. . . . An important corollary
to these principles is that the mere existence in the record
of evidence that would support a different conclusion,

In re Avianzah R.
without more, is not sufficient to undermine the finding
of the trial court. Our focus in conducting a review for
evidentiary sufficiency is not on the question of whether
there exists support for a different finding—the proper
inquiry is whether there is enough evidence in the record
to support the finding that the trial court made.” (Cita-
tion omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Yolanda V., 195 Conn. App. 334,
345, 224 A.3d 182 (2020).
II
After considering the record in a manner most favor-
able to sustaining the judgments, we conclude that the
evidence reasonably supports the court’s determination
that the respondent failed to rehabilitate within the
meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), considering the ages
and needs of the children. First, although “[a] finding of
rehabilitation is not based on a mechanistic tabulation of
whether a parent has undertaken specific steps ordered”;
(internal quotation marks omitted) In re Anthony S.,
218 Conn. App. 127, 149, 290 A.3d 901 (2023); the
court appropriately relied on the respondent’s lack of
consistent engagement in individual counseling in find-
ing that she failed to rehabilitate. In so concluding, the
court recognized that, initially, the respondent “made
strides toward completing her specific steps.” Ultimately,
however, the respondent did not maintain consistent
engagement in individual therapy, which was one of
her court-ordered specific steps. She was referred for
individual therapy in February 2023 and began therapy
with LaChapelle, a therapist, in April 2023, during which
time the respondent was engaged until November 2023.
The respondent was then not engaged in therapy until
February 20249 and was unsuccessfully discharged from
9The record reveals that this gap in treatment from November 2023
until January 2024 was due in part to the therapist’s taking a leave
of absence. The record, however, also contains evidence that, during
this time period, the respondent missed an appointment with another
therapist in the same office as LaChapelle in December 2023 and a
medication management appointment. The respondent also asserted
that she had an insurance issue during this time period; however, the

In re Avianzah R.
therapy in November 2024. The court found, and the
record reflects,10 that the respondent was discharged
from individual therapy for having several no-call,
no-shows, and that, as of the time of trial, she was not
engaged in therapy. The court found that family ther-
apy could not be commenced until the respondent made
meaningful progress in individual therapy. This finding
is supported by the testimony of Monique McNally, a
department social worker, who testified that, “in order
to participate in family therapy, everyone needed to be
engaged and making progress in their own individual
therapies before the family therapy could start.” Accord-
ingly, the court’s findings concerning the respondent’s
inconsistent engagement with individual therapy are
supported by evidence in the record.
We disagree with the respondent that the department
did not adequately inform her about the specific goals she
was supposed to complete in therapy.11 As noted previ-
court found that the insurance issue was resolved in December 2023.
This finding is consistent with the testimony of Monique McNally, a
department social worker.
Furthermore, the record contains a written record of phone corre-
spondence from McNally to the respondent dated February 2, 2024, in
which McNally gave her a list of services the department wanted her to
engage in, noted the respondent’s inconsistent engagement in therapy
and missed appointments, and “strongly recommended” that she reen-
gage in individual therapy. McNally sent a letter to the respondent in
January 2025, stating that the respondent needed to reengage in men-
tal health treatment to continue “working through [her] traumas and
current situation.” Nonetheless, it is not disputed that the respondent
did not reengage in therapy after she was unsuccessfully discharged.
The court reasonably could have relied on this evidence in concluding
that the respondent was “engaged in therapy, but not consistently.”
10A February 2025 department social study in support of the per-
manency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption, which
was admitted as a full exhibit at trial, notes that the respondent was
discharged by LaChapelle in November 2024 due to “too many no-call/no-
shows.” The study stated: “It was also reported that [the respondent] was
not being honest about her situation with her therapist, [and] therefore
. . . LaChapelle was not able to help her work through things going on.”
11In making this argument, the respondent also claims, in conclusory
fashion and without any meaningful analysis, that her specific steps
were unconstitutionally vague as applied to her because they were not
adequately explained or articulated by the department. We conclude that,

In re Avianzah R.
ously in this opinion, the court file in the present case con-
tains a copy of the respondent’s specific steps form with
an additional attachment that lists specified treatment
goals. The respondent claims that she did not receive this
attachment with her specific steps. The respondent does
not dispute, however, that she was ordered to participate
in individual therapy, and the record reflects that she was
unsuccessfully discharged by her therapist for lack of
engagement. Moreover, even if we assume arguendo that
the respondent did not receive the additional attachment
that contained specific treatment goals, the respondent
was canvassed by the court concerning her specific steps
at the time they were ordered to be made final, which
was the same day that she pleaded nolo contendere to the
allegations of neglect in the underlying neglect petitions.
At that time, the respondent did not express any confu-
sion to the court concerning her individual therapeutic
treatment goals.12
The court in the present case found that the respon-
dent’s therapeutic goals were to process the loss of her
to the extent the respondent intended to raise this issue as a separate
claim, it was inadequately briefed, and, therefore, we decline to address
it. See, e.g., State v. Sidiropoulos, 237 Conn. App. 262, 341 n.44,
351 A.3d 871 (“Claims are inadequately briefed when they are merely
mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare assertion. . . . Claims are also
inadequately briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . .
with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from
the record . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 354
Conn. 923, 353 A.3d 842 (2026).
12At the December 8, 2022 hearing, the following colloquy occurred
between the respondent and the court:
“The Court: . . . I do need to go over the specific steps with the respon-
dent . . . . I have before me a copy of the specific steps. Did you have a
chance to review that with your attorney?
“[The Respondent]: Yes.
“The Court: Do you understand that these will be court-ordered spe-
cific steps?
“[The Respondent]: Yes.
“The Court: And that, in order to assist with your reunification, you
need to comply with these court-ordered steps.
“[The Respondent]: Yes.”
The respondent then asked the court why an intimate partner violence
assessment was made a part of her specific steps. The court explained to

In re Avianzah R.
son and to work through the grief of having her children
removed. This finding is consistent with McNally’s testi-
mony that her understanding of the respondent’s thera-
peutic goals with LaChapelle, as of her initial engagement
in April 2023, was that she would be working to “process
the loss of her son and work through the grief surround-
ing that and having her other children removed.” As
noted previously, the record also reveals that the depart-
ment sent the respondent expectation letters indicating
that she needed to participate in individual therapy to
work through her trauma and current situation. See
footnote 9 of this opinion. A department social study
in support of the permanency plan of termination of
parental rights, which was admitted into evidence at
trial, also stated that the respondent had been diagnosed
with chronic post-traumatic stress disorder and that the
respondent herself reported that she was “depressed due
to the death of her child as well as having her surviving
children placed into foster care.”13 McNally testified that
LaChapelle had reported that, at the time the respon-
dent was discharged, LaChapelle was “having trouble
coming up with goals for [the respondent] and that [the
respondent] was reporting that she was there because
[the department] was telling her to be there. [LaCha-
pelle] also reported she didn’t think [the respondent]
was being honest regarding . . . the current situation
with [the children] and . . . [Antonio R.].” On the basis
of our review of the record, we reject the respondent’s
argument that she was not adequately informed of her
therapeutic treatment goals.
the respondent that the petitioner had requested an intimate partner
violence assessment to determine “what, if any, level of care you need
to address that in order to help with reunification.” The respondent
then indicated her understanding of that specific step.
13In addition to the respondent’s reports of depression, the record also
reflects that the respondent informed McNally in May 2023 that she
had post-traumatic stress disorder due to the removal of her children
from her care. The respondent also reported to McNally in March 2024
that she was taking Trazodone to help her sleep, as well as two anxiety
medications.

In re Avianzah R.
We also disagree with the respondent’s contention that
the department did not establish that the respondent’s
failure to continue in therapy interfered with her ability
to care for her children. The respondent was required
to engage in individual therapy as part of her court-
ordered specific steps to facilitate reunification, which
she signed after being canvassed by the court. “Specific
steps provide notice . . . to a parent as to what should be
done to facilitate reunification and prevent termination
of rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Marie J., 219 Conn. App. 792, 808, 296 A.3d 308 (2023).
McNally testified that the respondent’s therapeutic
goals, as of the time of her initial engagement in therapy
in April 2023, included processing the death of her son;
however, due to the respondent’s lack of engagement in
therapy, she was unsuccessfully discharged. After the
respondent was discharged, McNally provided written
notice to her that she needed to reengage in therapy
to continue working through her trauma and current
situation. Moreover, Biren Caverly noted in her report
that reengagement in therapy was critical to reunifica-
tion, stating: “At this time, it is not recommended for
Amyaliese or Avianzah to live with [the respondent].
[The respondent] must [reengage] in consistent mental
health treatment, including therapy and medication
management. It is particularly concerning that [the
respondent] is likely not currently taking her prescribed
medications.”
The respondent’s failure to reengage in therapy
rendered it impossible to begin family therapy, which
also was included in her specific steps. The respondent
argues that “McNally admitted that the [respondent] was
not presenting with any symptoms of [post-traumatic
stress disorder] and that there was no indication that
the [respondent’s] purported failure to continue with
therapy indefinitely had interfered in any way with her
ability to care for herself or the children . . . .” This argu-
ment mischaracterizes McNally’s testimony concerning
her understanding of the respondent’s post-traumatic
stress disorder symptoms: McNally testified that the

In re Avianzah R.
respondent did not exhibit symptoms of post-traumatic
stress disorder “when [she] saw her,” not that she never
had exhibited those symptoms at all. Further, McNally
testified that the respondent’s functioning would have
been “up to the therapist to . . . inform [her] of.” McNally
testified that, although she had not seen “direct” evidence
of an impact on the respondent’s parenting, she also tes-
tified that, “if [the respondent] hasn’t worked through
what happened, and she’s not using the medication to
work through it, then it could impact her parenting if
she’s not sleeping, or if she’s having, you know, night-
mares.” In addition to the testimony of McNally, who
is a department social worker and not a psychologist,
the record in the present case includes Biren Caverly’s
observation that, in order for reunification to take place,
she believed that the respondent “must [reengage] in
consistent mental health treatment . . . .” Biren Caverly
referred in her report, dated January 22, 2024, to areas
of concern vis-à-vis the respondent’s mental health,
including her history of anxiety, post-traumatic stress
disorder, the fact that the respondent reported utilizing
marijuana to sleep, and the fact that she had not been
engaged in therapy for months prior to her evaluation.14
In addition, the court grounded its determination
not only on the fact that the respondent had failed to
14Biren Caverly testified similarly at trial. The respondent’s counsel
cross-examined Biren Caverly at length as to how the respondent’s
mental health conditions affected her ability to parent her children.
Biren Caverly testified in response that she had indicated in her report
“various symptoms that [the respondent] was experiencing that could
have been alleviated or worked on had she engaged in treatment.” The
respondent’s counsel asked Biren Caverly: “[I]f a parent is able to func-
tion on a day-to-day basis without therapy or without medication, how
can you say that their ability to parent is compromised or impacted?”
In response, Biren Caverly testified: “I think you’re assuming I stated
that [the respondent] was functioning on a day-to-day basis. There were
many things that . . . [weren’t] working. I had concerns about what her
functioning really looked like, that I wanted her to be evaluated for. A
provider had already come in and stated that she needed medication on
a daily basis to function. So, I’m recommending that she be evaluated
to take that medication so that she could function better. As well as
engage in services, mental health services.”

In re Avianzah R.
complete her individual therapy, but also on the basis
of her inability to meet her children’s specialized needs.
This determination is amply supported by evidence in
the record. See, e.g., In re Judah B., 221 Conn. App.
387, 399, 300 A.3d 1253 (2023) (The “completion or
noncompletion [of a respondent’s specific steps] does not
guarantee any outcome. . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation,
the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved
[her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether
[she] has gained the ability to care for the particular
needs of the child at issue.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)).
For example, the court found that “[i]nformation was
provided to the [respondent] regarding the children’s
providers and educators. [The respondent did not engage]
with them in any meaningful way.”15 The court noted
that developing a relationship with the children’s pro-
viders and educators was “an important step for [the
respondent] to better understand [her] children’s needs
and development.” The court further found that the
respondent also missed a planning and placement team
meeting for Amyaliese, and missed a second meeting,
arriving five minutes before the meeting ended.16 As
15The department provided information to the respondent regarding
upcoming appointments for the children in May 2023. In August 2023,
McNally sent the respondent an email that listed her children’s providers
and educators. Then, in February 2025, McNally emailed the respon-
dent, stating: “You are expected to be checking in with the children’s
providers. You have been sent their list of providers multiple times
and have not been checking in.” A department social study in support
of termination of parental rights indicated that the respondent had
“sporadically” reached out to her children’s providers.
16The respondent does not appear to dispute that she missed these plan-
ning and placement team meetings. She argues, however, that the court
“suggest[ed]” in relying on these missed meetings that she therefore
“neglected all of her school and other meetings regarding the children’s
services . . . .” We decline to read such a broad conclusion into the court’s
memorandum of decision. Moreover, although McNally acknowledged
at trial that the respondent had attended “some” of Amyaliese’s plan-
ning and placement team meetings, the fact that the respondent had
attended some of the meetings did not preclude the court from relying
on evidence of the missed meetings in concluding that she had failed to
rehabilitate. This argument essentially asks this court to reweigh the

In re Avianzah R.
Amyaliese had a diagnosis of autism, the court found
that she “require[d] a specialized educational plan to
meet her needs. Understanding and being able to navigate
[Amyaliese’s] specialized needs would have been critical
for reunification.”
As to the children’s providers, the court found that
the respondent did not engage with the children’s thera-
pists, although the department encouraged her to do
so. The court found that communicating with the chil-
dren’s therapists would have been a “critical piece to
work through the negative behaviors [the children] had
exhibit[ed] during visits,” and would have provided the
evidence before the trial court and to draw a different conclusion from
that evidence, which we decline to do. See, e.g., In re Mariana A., 181
Conn. App. 415, 429, 186 A.3d 83 (2018).
We also disagree with the respondent’s related argument that the
court improperly shifted the burden of proof to her when it stated that,
by failing to attend the planning and placement team meetings, “she
was unable to demonstrate her ability to take on a parenting role for
Amyaliese . . . .” First, to the extent that the respondent intended to
raise a separate claim concerning the court’s allocation of the burden of
proof, we conclude that it is inadequately briefed, as only one paragraph
of analysis is dedicated to this issue in her brief, which does not contain
the appropriate standard of review or any meaningful analysis. “We
repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that
have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate
brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Javonte B., 226 Conn. App.
651, 653 n.2, 318 A.3d 1095 (2024).
Second, even if we were to consider this claim, we would reject it.
Construing the court’s memorandum of decision as a whole, we are
convinced that the court did not improperly shift the burden of proof
to the respondent. The court stated that it found “by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the petitioner has met her burden” of demonstrating
that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate. (Emphasis added.) The
court also stated that, in the initial adjudicatory phase of a termination
of parental rights proceeding, “the petitioner must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that there is a ground for termination as alleged in
[the] petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment.”
(Emphasis added.) In context, we interpret the court’s statement that
the respondent did not “demonstrate” her ability to take on a parenting
role for Amyaliese not as a statement that she did not meet her burden
of proof but, rather, as a conclusion, on the basis of the evidence, that
she had failed to rehabilitate.

In re Avianzah R.
respondent with insight into her children’s behavior and
current state of mental health. The court also noted that
the respondent appeared late for some visits and missed
other visits.17 Regarding the supervised visits, the court
noted that, on the basis of concerns expressed by the
visiting supervisors, the visits had to be paused until a
skilled supervisor could attend the visits to minimize the
negative impact parental visits were having on the chil-
dren. Furthermore, the court relied on Biren Caverly’s
concerns regarding the interactional evaluation that
she had conducted. See footnote 17 of this opinion. The
court also noted Biren Caverly’s opinion that the family
needed therapy and stated that therapy was a “critical
piece toward reunification” in ultimately concluding that
the respondent was “unable to achieve the movement
necessary to meet the [children’s needs].” Accordingly,
the court concluded that the petitioner had proven, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent had
failed to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).
The record contains ample evidence from which the
court reasonably could have concluded that the respon-
dent was unable to achieve the level of rehabilitation
required to meet her children’s specialized needs. See,
e.g., In re Cameron H., supra, 219 Conn. App. 169–70
(sufficient evidence supported conclusion that respon-
dent failed to rehabilitate when children had special needs
and, although respondent was provided with contact
information for children’s service providers to help her
understand and accept their needs, respondent never
contacted children’s service providers); In re Yolanda V.,
supra, 195 Conn. App. 351 (in evaluating respondent’s
17Biren Caverly noted in her report that the respondent’s foster
mother had informed her that the respondent had missed one visit in
November 2023 and another in December 2023. A department social
study in support of termination of parental rights also noted that the
respondent had missed visits in April and May 2024. Written summa-
ries of the supervised visits between the respondent and the children,
which were admitted into evidence, reveal that the respondent arrived
late for several visits.

In re Avianzah R.
rehabilitation efforts, “the court understandably was
mindful of [the] specialized needs of the minor children”).
As noted previously, although the record reveals that
the respondent participated in several supervised vis-
its, the record also supports the court’s finding that
the respondent arrived late to several visits and missed
others. See footnotes 16, 17 and 24 of this opinion. The
record also supports the court’s finding that, during
visits, she appeared “detached from her children and
unable to work and interact with them in a meaningful
way.”18 See, e.g., In re Yolanda V., supra, 195 Conn.
App. 350–51 (despite completing visitation program,
evidence substantiated court’s finding that respondent
missed three supervised visits with her children and
had difficulty managing minor children during visits).
As to Amyaliese, McNally testified that she has autism
and developmental delays, and that a neuropsychological
evaluation indicated that she functioned at the level of a
three and one-half year old. In addition, Amyaliese was
diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
18In the department’s August 2, 2024 social study in support of ter-
mination of parental rights, it was noted that the respondent had been
consistent with her visits. During visits, however, it was “observed
that more attention [was] paid to Avianzah than Amyaliese. Amyaliese
is often seen on her tablet minimally interacting with her parents. . . .
The [Quality Parenting Center] worker reported that [the] parents
often brought fun things for the children to do but had a difficult time
managing Avianzah’s behavior and cleaning up . . . .” A summary from
Therapeutic Family Time dated November 15, 2024, which was admit-
ted into evidence, indicated that the respondent was “not appropriately
responsive to the children when concerns occurred during visitation”
and that it did “not appear that [the respondent] underst[ood] the com-
plexities of [her] children’s unique developmental and emotional needs.”
Biren Caverly also noted after her interactional evaluation that,
“[w]hile previous documentation had indicated that [the respondent]
[was] bonded with the children, [she] did not appear bonded during the
current evaluation. During the interactionals, there were concerns
about the [respondent’s] ability to manage the children. For instance,
[the respondent did not intervene] when the children were screaming
and stomping their feet. [She] struggled with following the children’s
cues. [The respondent] did not observe when Amyaliese hit herself in
the head. The children did not appear to be comfortable turning to [the
respondent] to meet their needs.”

In re Avianzah R.
and post-traumatic stress disorder. Amyaliese also had
a history of an intracranial hemorrhage of unknown
etiology when she was two months old. In her report,
Biren Caverly indicated that she had “significant con-
cerns about Amyaliese’s psychological functioning.”
She noted that Amyaliese was functioning at about the
level of a prekindergarten pupil, although she was in
the third grade, and stated that she “scripts” or repeats
words that she has heard repeatedly throughout the
day at school. Biren Caverly expressed concern about
Amyaliese’s scripting, stating that it “often seems to
relate to abuse she witnessed and experienced.” She
opined that Amyaliese needed a consistent, structured
placement to make progress and needed to “continue
to engage in intensive in-home services . . . .” At trial,
Biren Caverly testified that the respondent exhibited
inconsistent engagement in the services that she was
offered. Biren Caverly also testified that she had “sig-
nificant concerns about [the respondent’s] ability to
manage the children” and that the respondent had a
“pretty poor understanding of [Amyaliese’s] needs. I
think that she was not getting [Amyaliese] the services
she needed early on.”
As noted previously, on November 26, 2024, the court
held a contested hearing on visitation, a transcript of
which was admitted into evidence. See footnote 6 of
this opinion. During that proceeding, Solberg testified
that she had not met with the respondent, although she
had been treating Amyaliese weekly since June 2024.19
During her initial intake, Solberg testified, Amyaliese
appeared “very insulated” and would talk to herself, using
different voices, and “appeared to be repeating phrases
that were not relevant to the situation in the room . . . .”
Solberg interpreted Amyaliese’s behavior as a means of
self-protection and indicative of a history of trauma. She
also testified that she observed aggressive play with a “toy
19Concerning the ability of the respondent to contact Solberg, Solberg
testified: “I was made aware that [the respondent was] aware of me and
had my contact information and that [she] could reach out and I could
speak with [her].”

In re Avianzah R.
family having a father and sometimes mother, making
angry, aggressive comments to the children, threaten-
ing them with physical harm and sometimes hitting the
children.” She also observed Amyaliese occasionally curse
while using different voices and using critical language
directed at herself. She noted that she had observed
Amyaliese use the mother toy to say, “[g]uess what, Avi,
guess what, Amaya, I will never forgive you,” “[w]hat’s
wrong with you?” and, “[s]top it, Amaya.” Solberg noted
a decrease in these negative behaviors when visits with
the respondent were suspended. Solberg testified, on
the basis of her observations, that the visits with the
respondent were retraumatizing Amyaliese,20 leading
to a decrease in emotional stability and functioning.21
At school, as stated previously in this opinion, Amy-
aliese has an individualized education plan and receives
occupational therapy, speech therapy, and interven-
tions with reading, writing, and math. Her fourth grade
teacher, Danielle Piri Catanese, testified at trial. She
testified that she had reached out to McNally in October
2024 due to increased negative behaviors exhibited by
Amyaliese, which was the time period when supervised
visits with the respondent had resumed. Specifically, Cat-
anese testified that Amyaliese started to cry and would
draw pictures, including one of a baby with wings. In
November 2024, Catanese observed Amyaliese banging
her head on a desk, cursing, and crawling under tables.
These behaviors decreased in December 2024, and, as of
20Solberg’s testimony was consistent with a letter she had written,
dated October 31, 2024, that was admitted into evidence. The letter was
also submitted into evidence during the contested hearing on visitation,
at which time Solberg testified that the letter had been written to the
department. In that letter, Solberg stated that, “[a]s a result of [her]
observations, as well as the communication [she has] had with other
providers, it is evident that these visits with her biological family are
retraumatizing [Amyaliese], leading to a decrease in emotional stability
and functioning, and making it more difficult for her to trust in and
engage in [much needed] therapeutic services.”
21During the termination of parental rights trial, Solberg testified
that she continued to be Amyaliese’s therapist and that she did not
have any changes to make with respect to her prior testimony at the
contested visitation hearing.

In re Avianzah R.
January 2025, her self-injurious behaviors had subsided.
Catanese testified that, as of the time of trial, Amyaliese
was performing better in the classroom but still needed
assistance and continued services.
With respect to Avianzah, the evidence reflects that she
had exhibited aggressive behaviors toward Amyaliese, for
which she was referred to Child First for play therapy.
Avianzah also has a history of needing speech therapy,
which was expected at the time of trial to continue in
the future, and she was also found to be delayed with
respect to her social and emotional skills. Deborah Tault,
a clinician with Child First, testified that she had treated
Avianzah, who had been referred for “possible trauma,”
including the death of Amateo, and that it was “unknown
. . . what she experienced in the home.” During play
therapy, Avianzah was observed acting out scenarios in
which she imitated Antonio R. and getting into trouble
“by daddy.” Tault also observed Avianzah playing with
a doll she called brother, which she would hang upside
down. Avianzah was discharged by Tault in December
2023, upon improvement in her aggressive behaviors.
Avianzah attended the Danbury Readiness Center Pro-
gram from May 2023 to June 2024, where she received
speech services at school for a speech delay. In July 2024,
Avianzah was enrolled in Growing Seeds Academy, and
was noted to have shown hyperactive behaviors and to
have struggled with impulse control and attention in day
care, although those behaviors had improved. Avianzah
also began individual therapy with Family and Children’s
Aid in October 2024 to address her issues with impulse
control. During therapy, Avianzah was observed drawing
people she identified as her biological parents and then
taking her marker and “hitting the people on the paper
very hard with it and [using] the word die while doing
so.” In a March 2025 addendum to the department’s
social study in support of termination of parental rights,
Avianzah’s teacher noted that she was making progress

In re Avianzah R.
in school but “does speak very loudly and can get aggres-
sive with other children . . . .”
Biren Caverly’s report highlighted both children’s
specialized needs and expressed her concerns with the
respondent’s ability to meet those needs.22 Biren Caverly
noted that Tault, at Child First, had indicated that Avi-
anzah had trouble staying on task, which could stem
from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, trauma,
or anxiety. Tault informed Biren Caverly that, if her
foster mother is present, Avianzah can stay on task.
Biren Caverly stated that the respondent had a limited
22In her reply brief, the respondent argues that the court “did not
make any findings based upon [Biren Caverly’s] testimony or report
in support of its erroneous finding that the [respondent] failed to
rehabilitate.” It is true that the court did not make an explicit cred-
ibility determination concerning Biren Caverly in its memorandum of
decision. The court, however, did note Biren Caverly’s observations
in its memorandum of decision. Furthermore, we disagree with the
respondent’s argument that, because the trial court did not make an
express credibility determination concerning Biren Caverly, this court
would be engaging in improper fact-finding by referring to her report.
It is not the function of this court to find facts or to pass on the cred-
ibility of witnesses. See, e.g., In re Nevaeh G.-M., 217 Conn. App. 854,
882, 290 A.3d 867 (“[b]ecause it is the trial court's function to weigh
the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its
findings” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 346 Conn.
925, 295 A.3d 418 (2023). We may refer to Biren Caverly’s report in
our analysis, however, because it constitutes evidence in the record on
which the trial court reasonably could have relied in concluding that
the respondent had failed to rehabilitate.
The respondent also argues that the court should not have relied on
Biren Caverly’s observations because they were “outdated” and her
opinions were “exposed during cross-examination as unreliable.” The
respondent argues that Biren Caverly’s report contained an inaccurate
recitation of the respondent’s criminal history and that she had recom-
mended that the respondent complete the Circle of Security parenting
program, even though the respondent had already done so. We note
that it is the trial court’s exclusive function to credit all, some, or none
of any witness’ testimony and to afford it appropriate weight within
its discretion. See, e.g., In re Nevaeh G.-M., supra, 217 Conn. App.
882. As the respondent acknowledges, Biren Caverly was subjected to
extensive, rigorous cross-examination concerning these issues. More-
over, on cross-examination, Biren Caverly testified that she would not
change her opinions if she learned that the criminal history noted in her
report concerning the respondent was not accurate. We conclude that

In re Avianzah R.
understanding of her children’s needs. She also noted
that she observed that the respondent struggled with the
children, “failing to appreciate the children’s atypical
behaviors, including Avianzah’s lack of language and
Amyaliese’s self-harming behaviors.” Biren Caverly
opined that Avianzah needed a consistent, structured
home environment, and that she required continued
speech therapy and ongoing assessment. Biren Caverly’s
report also noted that communicating with the chil-
dren’s providers and therapists was important to reuni-
fication; however, the respondent failed to do so. See,
e.g., In re Phoenix A., 202 Conn. App. 827, 844–45,
246 A.3d 1096 (respondent failed to rehabilitate when,
although he underwent individual therapy, he ceased
taking prescribed medications and continued to have
problems with emotional regulation and demonstrated
unpredictability during visits with minor child, which
delayed reunification process), cert. denied, 336 Conn.
932, 248 A.3d 1 (2021).
We disagree with the respondent’s contention that
the court should have reunited her with her children
once it was determined that she was not responsible for
Amateo’s death. Proceedings on a neglect petition and
proceedings on a petition to terminate parental rights,
however, are separate and distinct proceedings. See,
e.g., In re Ja’maire M., 201 Conn. App. 498, 506, 242
A.3d 747 (2020) (“[a] neglect petition and a petition for
the termination of parental rights present distinct and
separate claims” (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 336 Conn. 911, 244 A.3d 563 (2021); see
also In re Cesar G., 56 Conn. App. 289, 294, 742 A.2d
428 (2000) (trial court, in determining whether cause
for commitment no longer exists, may consider not only
original cause for commitment but also may consider
“if any cause for commitment still exists” (emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed,
the trial court adjudicating the termination of parental
rights is bound by the findings made in the prior neglect
the respondent’s arguments are simply an invitation for this court to
reweigh the evidence, which we decline to do.

In re Avianzah R.
proceeding, and, if no appeal is filed in a timely fashion,
a respondent may not collaterally attack those findings.23
See In re Ja’maire M., supra, 506. Moreover, “[a]n adju-
dication of neglect relates to the status of the child and
is not necessarily premised on parental fault. A finding
that the child is neglected is different from finding who
is responsible for the child’s condition of neglect. . . .
[T]he adjudication of neglect is not a judgment that runs
against a person or persons so named in the petition; [i]t
is not directed against them as parents, but rather is a
finding that the children are neglected . . . .” (Emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ste-
phen M., 109 Conn. App. 644, 657–58 n.21, 953 A.2d
668 (2008); see also In re Ja’maire M., supra, 508 (“[a]
finding that a child is neglected is not a finding of fault
against the parent but a fact relating to the status of the
child”). We therefore reject the respondent’s attempt in
the present appeal from the judgments terminating her
parental rights to essentially challenge the underlying
neglect adjudication, which she had never challenged
previously. See, e.g., In re Ja’maire M., supra, 511–12
(rejecting respondent’s attempt to collaterally attack
adjudication of neglect after his parental rights were
terminated and noting that respondent failed to fully
meet criteria in his court-ordered specific steps, and never
took any action previously to challenge adjudication of
neglect and therefore acquiesced in that judgment).
As the trial court in the present case aptly stated, the
“issue of whether [the respondent] committed an act that
led to [Amateo’s] death is not before the court. The issue,
consistent with the statute, is whether the [respondent
is] able to take a responsible position in the children’s
lives considering their age[s] and needs.” (Emphasis
added.) See, e.g., In re Marie J., supra, 219 Conn. App.
23We agree with the petitioner that the respondent could have filed
a motion to revoke the children’s commitment pursuant to General
Statutes § 46b-129 (m) had the respondent thought that the court was
obligated to return the children to her care. Indeed, the respondent
filed a motion to revoke commitment in September 2023 on the ground
that she had been cleared as a suspect in Amateo’s death, but she later
withdrew that motion.

In re Avianzah R.
809 (concluding that respondent failed to rehabilitate
when, although children were removed after he was
incarcerated for alleged sexual misconduct involving
minor child and his conviction was reversed on appeal,
other issues remained unaddressed that affected his
ability to parent minor child).
Furthermore, we do not agree with the respondent
that her participation in required services demonstrated
that she had rehabilitated. She also points to the lack of
intimate partner violence in the home, lack of substance
use, and the fact that she does not use physical disci-
pline as sufficient evidence that she had rehabilitated.
The respondent ignores our well established case law,
however, that states that substantial, or even complete,
compliance with court-ordered specific steps does not
necessitate a conclusion that she rehabilitated. “A par-
ent may complete all of the specific steps and still be
found to have failed to rehabilitate.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 808; see also, e.g., In re Omar I.,
197 Conn. App. 499, 575, 231 A.3d 1196 (“[A] finding
of rehabilitation is not based on a mechanistic tabula-
tion of whether a parent has undertaken specific steps
ordered. The ultimate issue the court must evaluate is
whether the parent has gained the insight and ability
to care for his or her child given the age and needs of
the child within a reasonable time.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 924, 233 A.3d
1091, cert. denied sub nom. Ammar I. v. Connecticut,
592 U.S. 1150, 141 S. Ct. 956, 208 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2020).
Indeed, although the trial court acknowledged that the
respondent had made “strides,” this does not undermine
the court’s determination that she failed to rehabilitate.
See, e.g., In re Ryder M., 211 Conn. App. 793, 817, 274
A.3d 218 (evidence of respondent’s progress, which
court acknowledged, did not undermine determination
that respondent failed to rehabilitate), cert. denied, 343
Conn. 931, 276 A.3d 433 (2022).
The respondent also argues that the court made its
decision to terminate her parental rights on the ground

In re Avianzah R.
that she failed to rehabilitate on the basis of a number
of clearly erroneous findings. We are not persuaded.
First, the respondent challenges the court’s statement
that she was “detached” from her children as clearly
erroneous. Specifically, the respondent points to sev-
eral exhibits in the record that summarize the super-
vised visits she had with her children to argue that she
was attentive and engaged with them during visits. We
recognize that visitation supervisors had character-
ized several visits as positive and noted that the respon-
dent was engaged. The respondent, however, ignores
that there was evidence in the record demonstrating
that several of the supervised visits were not positive.
For example, records from Therapeutic Family Time
indicated that it had supervised a visit on October 9,
2024, during which Amyaliese was observed engaging
in negative self-talk and profanity.24 Then, on October
23, 2024, it was noted that there were “[m]any concerns
. . . especially in regards to [the respondent’s] ability to
manage the children’s behaviors and emotions.” During
this visit, Amyaliese again engaged in self-injurious
behavior after which the respondent spoke to the child
in a loud, stern tone. Amyaliese then began sobbing
and stated that “they were going to kill her.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) The respondent’s argument
appears to be an attempt to ask this court to reweigh the
evidence concerning her ability to meet her children’s
needs, which we decline to do. See, e.g., In re Mariana
A., 181 Conn. App. 415, 429, 186 A.3d 83 (2018) (“We
cannot reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credibility
of witnesses to determine whether, in our own view, the
evidence could have warranted granting the petition.
Every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of
the trial court's ruling denying the petition.”). Because
24Similarly, in a department supervised visit on October 2, 2023,
the respondent arrived late. During that visit, a department social
worker observed Amyaliese state, “[y]ou’re a bad girl. Bad, Amya, bad.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The social worker also observed the
children playing alone and heard Avianzah call out “ ‘mommy’ ” repeat-
edly while the respondent continued to look at her phone.

In re Avianzah R.
there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the
court’s determination, we cannot conclude that its find-
ing that the respondent was detached from her children
was clearly erroneous.25
The respondent next takes issue with the court’s find-
ings that, at the time of the filing of the termination of
parental rights petitions, her housing was an issue, as she
had been behind on her rent and had inconsistent employ-
ment. The respondent argues that McNally conceded that
the respondent had stable housing at all relevant times.
McNally testified that, as of the filing of the termination
of parental rights petitions, the respondent’s housing
was an issue and that, “[f]or a while, she was behind on
her rent, and she [did not have] a consistent job up to
that point.” McNally admitted, however, that, after the
filing of the termination of parental rights petitions,
the respondent’s housing and employment situation
had changed. She also testified on cross-examination
that, at the time the present cases were commenced,
the respondent had stable housing and that she con-
tinued to have stable housing thereafter. To the extent
McNally may have testified inconsistently concerning
the respondent’s housing and/or employment status as
of the time of the filing of the termination of parental
rights petitions, “[i]t is well established that in cases
tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of
the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine
25Because we reject the respondent’s contention that the court’s find-
ing that she had appeared “detached from her children and unable to
work [with] and interact with them in a meaningful way” was clearly
erroneous, we also reject her related argument that the court’s finding
that she therefore lacked the cognitive ability to recognize and under-
stand her children’s needs also was clearly erroneous. We further note
that the court did not ground its finding that she lacked the capacity
to understand her children’s needs solely on her detachment during
visits. In making this determination, the court also considered her
inconsistency with services, visits, and, at the time of the filing of the
petitions, irregularities in her housing and employment, as well as her
disengagement from her own mental health treatment. All of these
facts reasonably could have been relied on by the court in concluding
that the respondent did not have the requisite capacity to meet her
children’s needs.

In re Avianzah R.
the weight to be given specific testimony.” In re Antonio
M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). We
note that, generally, the court is limited to considering
evidence that occurred before the filing of a petition to
terminate parental rights; however, it may also, but is
not required to, consider evidence occurring after the
adjudicatory date in determining whether the respon-
dent failed to rehabilitate. See Practice Book § 35a-7 (a);
see also In re Nevaeh G.-M., 217 Conn. App. 854, 880,
290 A.3d 867 (“[a]lthough a court may rely on events
occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to
terminate parental rights when considering the issue
of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to
foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the
child’s life in a reasonable time . . . it is not required to do
so” (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
ted)), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 925, 295 A.3d 418 (2023).
In the present case, we agree with the petitioner that,
even if the court’s findings concerning the respondent’s
housing and employment status were clearly erroneous,
they were harmless. The court also concluded that the
respondent had failed to rehabilitate based on her lack of
engagement in individual therapy and inability to meet
her children’s specialized needs, and, as we explained
previously in this opinion, this conclusion was supported
by sufficient evidence in the record.26 Biren Caverly also
testified that, even if the respondent had stable hous-
ing and income, this did not address the respondent’s
ongoing lack of engagement with her mental health
26The respondent also takes issue with the court’s statement regard-
ing her financial stability and argues that the court terminated her
parental rights based on her economic status. Specifically, the court
stated that the respondent’s “ability to financially meet [her needs] and
her children’s needs . . . would have been critical prior to considering
reunification.” We do not agree with this characterization of the court’s
memorandum of decision. The court made this statement in finding that
the respondent, at the time of the filing of the termination of parental
rights petitions, did not have stable housing and employment. The
court’s memorandum of decision thoroughly outlined its reasoning,
including the respondent’s failure to fully engage in required individual
therapy and lack of capacity to meet her children’s specialized needs.

In re Avianzah R.
providers. Accordingly, even if the court’s findings that
the respondent lacked stable housing and employment
were clearly erroneous, we are convinced, on the basis of
the cumulative evidence in the record, that these find-
ings were harmless.
Finally, the respondent challenges the court’s finding
that she did not develop a relationship with the children’s
providers or educators, which the court found was an
“important step for [her] to better understand [her]
children’s needs and development.” The respondent does
not appear to challenge this finding as clearly erroneous
but, rather, asserts that it does not support the court’s
conclusion that she had failed to rehabilitate. Specifi-
cally, the respondent argues that “this was not a step
on [her] specific steps.” (Emphasis omitted.) We first
note, as stated previously in this opinion, that the court
“need not base its determination [concerning a respon-
dent’s failure to rehabilitate] purely on the respondent’s
compliance with the specific steps.” In re Shane M., 148
Conn. App. 308, 329, 84 A.3d 1265 (2014), aff’d, 318
Conn. 569, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015); see also In re Bianca
K., 188 Conn. App. 259, 271, 203 A.3d 1280 (2019)
(courts are “not strictly bound by the enumerated spe-
cific steps when determining whether a parent has failed
to rehabilitate”). Although it is true that this precise
language was not explicitly stated on the respondent’s
specific steps form, the form did require her to “[t]ake
care of the child(ren’s) physical, educational, medical,
or emotional needs, including keeping the child(ren’s)
appointments with his/her/their medical, psychological,
psychiatric, or educational providers,” to “[c]ooperate
with the child(ren’s) therapy, including but not limited
to Birth to Three,” and to “[c]ooperate with the service
providers recommended for parenting/individual/family
counseling, in-home support services, substance abuse
assessment/treatment, and/or intimate partner vio-
lence/domestic violence services . . . .” Moreover, the
respondent concedes that the department encouraged

In re Avianzah R.
her to communicate with her children’s providers.27
Finally, we note that the court did not rely on its find-
ing concerning the respondent’s lack of a relationship
with her children’s providers and educators merely to
conclude that she did not complete her specific steps.
The court, instead, relied on this finding to conclude
that she did not take an important step toward “better
understand[ing] [her] children’s needs and development.”
This finding was appropriately made under its failure to
rehabilitate analysis, pursuant to which the court must
determine whether the respondent has achieved such
“degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage
the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the
age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a
responsible position in the life of the child . . . .” General
Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).
Construing the record in the manner most favorable
to sustaining the judgments of the trial court, as we
must; see, e.g., In re Yolanda V., supra, 195 Conn. App.
352; we conclude that the record contains sufficient evi-
dence to support the court’s finding that the petitioner
had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent failed to rehabilitate such that, considering
the ages and needs of the children, she could assume a
responsible position in their lives within a reasonable
27We reject the respondent’s argument that, even if her failure to
communicate with the children’s providers was a part of her specific
steps, her failure to complete the specific steps, standing alone, was
not a sufficient basis on which to justify terminating her parental
rights. We agree, as stated previously in this opinion, that it is well
established that the completion or noncompletion of specific steps does
not guarantee any outcome. See, e.g., In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569,
587, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015). It is equally well established, however, that
the specific steps are a “benchmark by which the court will measure the
respondent’s conduct to determine whether termination is appropriate
pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Shane M., supra, 148 Conn. App. 329. Accordingly, the court
properly could rely on this evidence in concluding that the respondent
had failed to rehabilitate.

In re Avianzah R.
time. Accordingly, the court properly concluded that
the respondent had failed to rehabilitate.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.