26 CO 35, 25SC220 In re Marriage of Dale

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
May 26, 2026

2026 CO 35

No. 25SC220, In re Marriage of Dale-Motion to Modify Parenting Time-
Motion to Restrict Parenting Time- Best Interests of the Child Standard -Child
Endanger/Impair Standard - § 14-10-129, C.R.S. (2025) - In re Marriage of West,
94 P.3d 1248 (Colo. App. 2004).

The supreme court concludes that a purely quantitative reduction in
parenting time-i.e., a reduction unaccompanied by qualitative constraints on the
manner, location, or environment in which a parent exercises parenting
time - cannot amount to a restriction of parenting time rights unless the reduction
eliminates parenting time altogether. The court further concludes that a restriction
of parenting time rights refers to the complete elimination of any quantity of
parenting time (i.e., zero parenting time) or to qualitative constraints on the
manner, location, or environment in which a parent exercises parenting time.
Thus, a restriction is either a quantitative reduction to zero parenting time or the
imposition of qualitative constraints on the manner, location, or environment in
which a parent exercises parenting time; any other adjustment is merely a
modification.

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Because the district court in this case did not eliminate or otherwise
qualitatively constrain Father's parenting time, it did not restrict it; instead, it
merely modified it. Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying the
best-interests standard rather than the endanger/impair standard. A division of
the court of appeals reached the same conclusion. Therefore, its judgment is
affirmed and the case is remanded with instructions to return it to the district
court.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 35

Supreme Court Case No. 25SC220

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Case No. 24CA1065

In re the Marriage of

Petitioner:

Nicholas Jay Dale,

and

Respondent:

Nicole Jehlicka Dale.

Judgment Affirmed

en banc

May 26, 2026

Attorney for Petitioner:

Henry L. Solano

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

KHM Attorneys at Law

Alexander Masterson

Colorado Springs, Colorado

Law Office of Joel M. Pratt

Joel M. Pratt

Colorado Springs, Colorado

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JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, and JUSTICE
BLANCO joined.

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by JUSTICE GABRIEL, concurred in the
judgment.

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JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 Not all adjustments to parenting time rights are cut from the same
cloth-some modify those rights while others restrict them. Colorado law
distinguishes between modifications and restrictions, and this case requires us to
explore where the difference lies.

12 The statute before us permits courts to "modify" parenting time
rights-including by reducing the quantity of parenting time-if such
modification is in "the best interests of the child." § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.
(2025). But there is a wrinkle: Courts may not "restrict" parenting time rights
unless they find "that the parenting time would endanger the child's physical
health or significantly impair the child's emotional development."
§ 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). Thus, in the realm of parenting time rights, the legislature
separated modification from restriction, assigning one standard to guide the former
and another to steer the latter - leaving no room for the two categories to merge.1
13 Nicholas Jay Dale ("Father") nevertheless argues that an order modifying
parenting time rights by substantially reducing the quantity of parenting time drifts
into the restriction zone and therefore triggers the heightened endanger/impair

1 For the sake of brevity, this opinion sometimes refers to the modification
standard as the "best-interests standard" and to the restriction standard as the
"endanger/impair standard."

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standard. But Father's contention runs headlong into a fundamental barrier - the
familiar principles of statutory construction.

14 Those principles carry the day here. We conclude that a purely quantitative
reduction in parenting time-i.e., a reduction unaccompanied by qualitative
constraints on the manner, location, or environment in which a parent exercises
parenting time -cannot amount to a restriction of parenting time rights unless the
reduction eliminates parenting time altogether.2 We further conclude that a
restriction of parenting time rights refers to the complete elimination of any
quantity of parenting time (i.e., zero parenting time) or to qualitative constraints on
the manner, location, or environment in which a parent exercises parenting time.
15

This is not to say that placing any qualitative term or condition on parenting
time-including a minor one-constitutes a restriction. To be clear, to constitute
a restriction, a qualitative adjustment must amount to a qualitative constraint -an
adjustment that circumscribes the manner, location, or environment in which a
parent exercises parenting time, including, for example, requiring that parenting

2 To avoid repetition, moving forward, unless we specify otherwise, when we refer
to reductions in the quantity of parenting time, we mean: reductions (1) that are
purely quantitative (i.e., free from qualitative constraints on the manner, location,
or environment in which a parent exercises parenting time); and (2) that do not
eliminate parenting time altogether (i.e., reductions to something other than zero
days).

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time be supervised, prohibiting overnight visits, or specifying the location where
parenting time may take place.

16 Thus, a restriction is either a quantitative reduction to zero parenting time
or the imposition of qualitative constraints on parenting time; any other
adjustment is merely a modification. This reading of modification and restriction
exposes one of the insurmountable flaws in Father's approach. Were we to agree
with Father-and accept that any substantial reduction in the quantity of
parenting time constitutes a restriction rather than a modification - we would be
required to find that the legislature meant to allow courts to award some parenting
time free from any qualitative constraints, even after a factual finding that such
parenting time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair
the child's emotional development. That would be absurd, and we must sidestep
interpretations that would lead a statutory provision into absurdity. When a court
makes a finding of endangerment or impairment, there is no scenario in which
even a single day of parenting time free from qualitative constraints is appropriate.
17 In this case, the district court reduced the quantity of Father's parenting time
by forty-five days, or 28.1%, which we assume without deciding constituted a
substantial reduction. But because the court did not eliminate or otherwise
qualitatively constrain Father's parenting time, it did not restrict it; instead, it

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merely modified it. Accordingly, the court did not err in applying the
best-interests standard rather than the endanger/impair standard.

18 A division of the court of appeals navigated to the same pier. Accordingly,
we affirm its judgment and remand the case with instructions to return it to the
district court.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

19
Father and Nicole Jehlicka Dale ("Mother") executed a memorandum of
understanding allocating parental responsibilities for their young child. The
district court approved the memorandum and incorporated it into the decree
invalidating the parties' marriage. The decree allocated parenting time to Mother
during 205 overnights of the year and to Father during the remaining 160
overnights of the year. Thus, the decree designated Mother as the primary
residential parent.

110 Less than eighteen months later, Father's work responsibilities changed,
requiring him to stay overnight more than 100 miles away from the child's primary
residence several days a week. To accommodate his new schedule, Father filed a
motion to modify parenting time: He sought parenting time from Friday to
Monday during the first three weekends of every month plus an increase in his
summer parenting time. Father's proposed modification netted the same number
of overnights he already had with the child per year (i.e., 160).

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111 Mother objected to any modification. In the alternative, she suggested
adjustments to Father's parenting time during the school year: every other
weekend and a midweek overnight every week.

112 At the end of a hearing, the district court made oral findings applying the
best-interests standard. The court agreed with Father that a modification in
parenting time was necessary. It observed, however, that Father's distance from
the child during part of the workweek made its decision challenging.

113 In a written order issued after the hearing, the court changed Father's
parenting time to the following: during the school year, from Friday to Monday
on alternating weekends, from Friday to Monday on the fifth weekend of any
month with five weekends, and for the entire week of spring break; and during
the summer, on alternating weeks. The court kept Father's holiday parenting time
intact. Father's new parenting time schedule totaled approximately 115
overnights with the child per year - about forty-five fewer than the 160 originally
allocated to him, a reduction of 28.1%.3

3 The district court indicated that its modification of parenting time would give
Father 142 overnights with the child per year. Before us, counsel disagree with
that number but also with each other's math. "Innumerable are the lawyers who
explain that they picked law over a technical field because they have a 'math block'
.... " Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting David L. Faigman,
et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: Standards, Statistics, and Research Methods v
(student ed. 2008)); see also Owens v. Carlson, 2022 CO 33, 1 1, 511 P.3d 637, 639
("[T]here is no question that some lawyers and math just don't mix."). We need

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114 Father appealed, contending that such a substantial reduction in the
quantity of his parenting time constituted a restriction and required a more
exacting showing: a factual finding that parenting time would endanger the child's
physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional development.
Because the district court had applied the less rigorous best-interests standard
instead, Father urged that the judgment be reversed.

115 A division of the court of appeals affirmed in a published, unanimous
opinion. In re Marriage of Dale, 2025 COA 29, 1 36, 568 P.3d 1282, 1289. The
division rejected Father's position for several reasons.

116 First, the division determined that defining "restrict" in section 14-10-129 to
include substantial reductions in the quantity of parenting time would leave part
of subsection (2) in the same statute with little work to do, effectively turning it
into a dead letter. Id. at 120, 568 P.3d at 1287. As relevant here, section
14-10-129(2) states that a court may not modify an order granting parenting time
rights in a way that both "substantially changes the parenting time" and "changes
the [parent] with whom the child resides a majority of the time" unless it makes
one of four possible findings, including one requiring satisfaction of the
endanger/impair standard governing restrictions of parenting time rights.

not get in the middle of this arithmetic tug-of-war. Instead, we assume for
purposes of our analysis that Father's calculations are correct.

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§ 14-10-129(2)(d). The division reasoned there would be no need to include this
possible finding in subsection (2) if the endanger/impair standard already applies
whenever there is a substantial reduction in the quantity of parenting time. Dale,
T 21, 568 P.3d at 1287. Differently put, the division perceived that applying the
endanger/impair standard as Father suggested would turn part of subsection (2)
into surplusage - a statutory decoration.

117 Second, the division explained that treating some reductions in the quantity
of parenting time as restrictions would leave courts without a yardstick to
determine when a reduction becomes substantial enough to trigger the more
rigorous endanger/impair standard. Id. at 1 22, 568 P.3d at 1287. The division
noted that section 14-10-129 is mum on this point. Id.

118 Third, the division observed that most states draw the restriction line at
denying parenting time altogether or allowing only supervised parenting time.
Id. at 1 26, 568 P.3d at 1288. In this regard, the division underscored our
legislature's directive to construe section 14-10-129 with an eye toward staying in
step with other states that have also enacted the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage
Act. Id. at [ 23, 568 P.3d at 1287-88.

119 Lastly, the division discerned that when, as here, life happens and family
realities shift, a child's best interests may call for a recalibration of the quantity of
parenting time, and the division saw no indication that the legislature intended to

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freeze a court's discretion by prohibiting a substantial quantitative reduction in
parenting time without satisfying the endanger/impair standard. Id. at [1] 29-31,
568 P.3d at 1288-89.

120 The division ultimately concluded that a quantitative reduction in parenting
time is not a restriction on parenting time rights. Id. at [ 32, 568 P.3d at 1289.
Instead, explained the division, a restriction on parenting time rights concerns
qualitative constraints on parenting time-adjustments that circumscribe "the
manner, location, or environment in which the parent engages in parenting time,
such as a requirement that parenting time be supervised, a prohibition of
overnight visits with a particular parent, or a limitation on the location where a
parent may exercise parenting time." Id.

121 The division acknowledged that another division, in In re Marriage of West,
94 P.3d 1248, 1251 (Colo. App. 2004), had earlier implied in dicta that a quantitative
reduction-if sufficiently substantial-could amount to a restriction and thus
implicate the endanger/impair standard. Dale, 1 19, 568 P.3d at 1287. To the
extent West could be read to suggest as much, the division in this case plotted a
different course. Id. at 1 32, 568 P.3d at 1289.

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122 Father's petition for certiorari flagged this question for our attention, and
we responded by placing the case on our docket.4

## II. Analysis

123 We embark on our analytical voyage by identifying the standard of review
and revisiting familiar principles of statutory interpretation. From there, we sail
to section 14-10-129, whose relevant provisions -properly construed -compel us
to reject Father's interpretation. We determine that a quantitative reduction in
parenting time-however substantial-remains a modification and cannot be
recast as a restriction. In so doing, we reason that our General Assembly carved
two distinct channels - modifications governed by the best-interests standard, and
restrictions governed by the more demanding endanger/impair standard - and
just as two channels cannot merge without losing their boundaries, quantitative
reductions cannot flow into the territory reserved for restrictions. Accordingly,
we ultimately hold that a restriction arises only when a court either zeros out

4 We agreed to review two issues:

1\. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that quantitative
reductions in parenting time regardless of amount are not
restrictions on parenting time rights under section
14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2024).

2\. Whether a forty-five-day (28.1%) reduction in previously ordered
parenting time is a restriction on parenting time rights absent
endangerment to the child.

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parenting time altogether or places qualitative constraints on how parenting time
is exercised -constraints on the manner, location, or environment of parenting
time, such as supervision requirements, prohibitions on overnight visits, or limits
on where parenting time may occur.

124 Applying this holding here, we conclude that, since the district court neither
eliminated nor qualitatively constrained Father's parenting time, it did not restrict
his parenting time-it simply modified it. Therefore, the district court properly
applied the best-interests standard rather than the endanger/impair standard.
And because the division sailed to the same harbor, we affirm.

## A. Standard of Review and Familiar Principles of Statutory Interpretation

125 At bottom, this case rises or falls on our interpretation of section 14-10-129.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that is subject to de novo
review. In re Marriage of Wollert & Joseph, 2020 CO 47, 1 20, 464 P.3d 703, 709.
126 When construing a statute, we strive to effectuate the legislature's intent. Id.
To discern that intent, we examine "the entire statutory scheme," giving
"consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts" and attributing the words
and phrases "their plain and ordinary meaning." Vallagio at Inverness Residential
Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, 1 16, 395 P.3d 788, 792 (quoting Pulte
Home Corp. v. Countryside Cmty. Ass'n, 2016 CO 64, 1 24, 382 P.3d 821, 826). If a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the cardinal rule regarding plain and ordinary

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meaning is our first and final step-there is no need to resort to additional
interpretive instruments in the toolkit. Wollert, 1 20, 464 P.3d at 709; see also
Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, 1 18, 449 P.3d 725, 729 (explaining that when we are
able to give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, we "look no
further" because "nothing more is required of the judicial inquiry").

127 Still, there are companion principles in the statutory-construction atlas that
ferry alongside the rule of plain and ordinary meaning. A couple of those are
relevant here. First, we will not adopt an interpretation that renders any portion
of a statute superfluous or meaningless. Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 162
(Colo. 2005). And second, we will not construe a statute in a manner that yields
absurd results. In re Marriage of Roosa, 89 P.3d 524, 528 (Colo. App. 2004) ("We
presume that the legislature intends a just and reasonable result when it enacts a
statute .... ").

## B. Our Interpretation of the Relevant Provisions of Section 14-10-129 Requires Us to Reject Father's Interpretation

128 Section 14-10-129(1)(a)(I) ("subsection (1)(a)(I)") states that, "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in subsection (1)(b)(I) ... , the court may ... modify an order
granting or denying parenting time rights whenever such . . . modification would
serve the best interests of the child." In turn, section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) ("subsection
(1)(b)(I)") provides that "[t]he court shall not restrict a parent's parenting time

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rights unless it finds that the parenting time would endanger the child's physical
health or significantly impair the child's emotional development."

129 Father maintains that a modification that substantially reduces the quantity
of parenting time spills over into territory reserved for restrictions, thereby
triggering the stricter of the two standards-the endanger/impair standard. In
other words, Father posits that, in the quantitative dimension of parenting time,
there is no such thing as a substantial modification because every substantial
modification crystalizes into a restriction. According to Father, trial courts have
two courses to choose from when altering the quantity of parenting time: an
insubstantial reduction, which would count as a modification; or a substantial
reduction, which would count as a restriction. Not so. As we demonstrate,
Father's argument cannot remain afloat.

130 Neither "modify" nor "restrict" is defined in section 14-10-129, and
consulting their dictionary definitions doesn't move the needle. But that doesn't
leave us at a loss. We are able to discern the legislature's intent by looking at the
statutory scheme as a whole and applying three interpretative commandments
that operate in tandem - thou shalt give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning
of words, thou shalt not render any term superfluous, and thou shalt avoid absurd
results.

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131 Subsection (1)(a)(I) authorizes the court to modify parenting time rights
when doing so is in the child's best interests, and subsection (1)(b)(I) empowers
the court to restrict those rights only upon finding that parenting time would
physically endanger the child or emotionally impair the child's development.
Giving the words in these subsections their plain and ordinary meaning, it
becomes clear that the legislature laid out two different pathways -modification
and restriction - the former governed by the best-interests standard and the latter
governed by the endanger/impair standard. A trial court must therefore choose
which pathway to take; it may not travel both at once.

132 Importantly, the statutory text telegraphs the legislature's intent to permit
substantial modifications of parenting time, which necessarily include substantial
reductions in the quantity of parenting time. Section 14-10-129(1.5) expressly
refers to a party's filing of "a motion for a substantial modification of parenting time
which also changes the party with whom the child resides a majority of the time."
(Emphasis added.) Likewise, section 14-10-129(2) (“subsection (2)") prohibits the
court from modifying parenting time in a way that "substantially changes the
parenting time as well as changes the party with whom the child resides a majority
of the time" unless the court makes one of four possible findings. (Emphasis
added.) These provisions show that the legislature not only contemplated
substantial modifications but expressly labeled them as such. Father is therefore

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wrong in suggesting that substantial modifications to the quantity of parenting
time stand erased by virtue of supposedly coalescing into restrictions. If the
legislature had meant to collapse all substantial reductions in the quantity of
parenting time from the domain of modifications to that of restrictions, as Father
urges, it would have drafted the statute accordingly. It did not.

133 Moreover, had the legislature intended a substantial reduction in parenting
time to automatically harden from a modification into a restriction, it presumably
would have provided a clear benchmark indicating where that shift occurs. In the
absence of such direction, Father's construction would force courts to traverse in
the dark, guessing how substantial a reduction must be before it crosses the unseen
line into a restriction. Relatedly, how would the substantial nature of a reduction
be measured -by the number of overnights lost, the percentage of the reduction,
or some other metric? Again, courts would be left to fill the statutory gaps
themselves. In any event, this loosey-goosey approach would all but guarantee a
patchwork of outcomes among different judges, undermining the uniformity the
law generally strives to achieve.

134 The statutory architecture reveals yet another defect in Father's
interpretation. As the division observed, Father's reading hollows out part of the
language in subsection (2). One of the four findings that can justify the type of
substantial modification set out in subsection (2) is that "[t]he child's present

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environment endangers the child's physical health or significantly impairs the
child's emotional development and the harm likely to be caused" by the change is
outweighed by its benefits. § 14-10-129(2)(d). But if, as Father suggests, the
endanger/impair standard already governs any substantial modification, what
role is the reference to that standard in subsection (2)(d) left to play? None.
Father's construction would drain that language in subsection (2)(d) of operative
force, leaving it as an ornament on the statutory tree rather than a branch carrying
weight. We, however, may not adopt an interpretation that strips any statutory
words of meaning or leaves them without a purpose to serve. See Spahmer,
113 P.3d at 162.

135 Perhaps most concerning, Father's interpretation would steer the statute
into truly absurd waters. And, as we observed earlier, we may not embrace an
interpretation of a statutory provision that produces outcomes no rational
legislature could have intended. See Roosa, 89 P.3d at 528.

136 Father theorizes that the district court could have charted the very course it
did -reducing his parenting time by about forty-five overnights - so long as it had
first found that the endanger/impair standard was satisfied. In other words, he
asserts that the court could have substantially reduced the quantity of his
parenting time by treating his request to modify as a request to restrict. But this
would mean the court could have awarded Father parenting time free of any

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qualitative constraints even after finding that such parenting time would physically
endanger the child or emotionally impair the child's development. That is a bridge
too far. When a court finds that parenting time would physically endanger the
child or seriously stunt the child's emotional development, no amount of
parenting time unburdened by qualitative constraints is appropriate-not even a
single day. And no sensible legislature could have intended otherwise.

137 Notably, subsection 14-10-129(4) gives us a peek into the legislature's
concern with allowing parenting time without qualitative constraints when the
child's physical or emotional well-being is at risk. Under that subsection, even
when a party moves to restrict by merely alleging that the child faces "imminent
physical or emotional danger" from the parenting time at issue, the court must
order that, pending resolution of the motion, the parenting time must be
"supervised by an unrelated third party deemed suitable by the court or by a
licensed mental health professional." § 14-10-129(4). Although the imminent
nature of the danger addressed in this subsection is not present in the
endanger/impair standard at play here, the subsection still underscores a key
legislative judgment: parenting time that threatens to harm a child should not
proceed unchecked -i.e., without qualitative constraints. And Father's reading of
section 14-10-129 cannot be reconciled with that judgment.

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## C. The Framework That Emerges - and How It Resolves This Case

138 Informed by the rule of plain and ordinary meaning and its kindred
principles of statutory construction, we conclude that even a dramatic reduction
in the quantity of parenting time cannot prompt a modification to metamorphose
into a restriction. The General Assembly charted two distinct navigational routes
within the statutory scheme of parenting time rights: modifications, governed by
the best-interests standard; and restrictions, governed by the endanger/impair
standard. And the two routes are designed to remain separate at all times. Thus,
contrary to Father's contention, a quantitative reduction in parenting
time-regardless of how substantial-cannot be carried across the line into the
category the legislature marked as a restriction.

139 We now hold that a restriction materializes only when a court either brings
parenting time to a full stop or installs qualitative constraints on the manner,
location, or environment of parenting time, including requiring supervised
parenting time, bans on overnight visits, or limits on where parenting time may
occur.5 It scarcely bears stating-let alone substantiating with legal

5 The division reached a similar holding. We observe, however, that it did not
address the possibility of reducing the quantity of parenting time by snuffing it
out altogether. Its reasoning suggests that such a reduction would constitute a
restriction, but it stopped short of saying so explicitly. Today, we make express
that which the division merely implied.

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authority -that depriving a parent of all parenting time is a restriction on
parenting time rights.6 And, unsurprisingly, there is no dispute in this case - and
courts in other states have likewise recognized-that placing qualitative
constraints on the manner, location, or environment in which parenting time
occurs is also a restriction.7

140 It follows that changes in parenting time constitute modifications, not
restrictions, so long as they do not eradicate parenting time or otherwise impose
qualitative constraints on parenting time. For example, had the district court
adopted Father's suggestion, which would have netted him the same number of
overnights per year he was already entitled to with the child, it still would have
modified rather than restricted his parenting time rights. Similarly, had the court
simply changed the location of the parenting time exchange from one parent's
house to the other-a qualitative term or condition-it would have modified,
rather than restricted, the parents' parenting time rights, because such an

6 Zero days of parenting time marks the only defensible line of demarcation. Recall
that the legislature furnished no barometer because it did not contemplate that
substantial quantitative reductions would morph into restrictions in the first place.

7 Courts outside Colorado addressing restrictions on parenting time have focused
on the constraints placed on the exercise of parenting time rights, such as requiring
supervised parenting time, limiting parenting time to a prescribed location, or
outright denying parenting time. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Gunter v. Gunter, 471 P.3d 1024,
1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020); Fulton v. Fulton, 918 So. 2d 877, 881 (Miss. Ct. App.
2006).

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adjustment would not have added qualitative constraints on parenting time. On
the other hand, if the court had required Father to exercise parenting time only in
a public space or only in a therapeutic setting, that would have imposed a
qualitative constraint on his parenting time.8

141 We understand that the division in West came to rest in an entirely different
port. There, the division held that whether to apply the best-interests standard or
the endanger/impair standard "may involve inquiry into both the quantitative
and the qualitative aspects of the proposed change to parenting time, as well as
the reason or reasons advanced for the change." 94 P.3d at 1251. Because the
record did not reflect either a qualitative constraint on parenting time or a reason
for the change that implicated the children's safety, that division confined its
analysis to "which standard applies to a purely quantitative change, and one of
relatively limited magnitude." Id. The West division determined that the
reduction in parenting time from eight to six weeks did not constitute a restriction
and thus did not implicate the endanger/impair standard. Id. As the division in
this case noted, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the division in West was

8 It is not feasible to exhaustively catalogue all qualitative constraints on parenting
time. In assessing whether an adjustment qualifies as such a constraint, trial courts
should ask whether it circumscribes the manner, location, or environment in
which parenting time is exercised. Judicial officers must be mindful that
qualitative constraints are adjustments that can be justified only by meeting the
endanger/impair standard.

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of the view that a quantitative reduction in parenting time could amount to a
restriction. Dale, TT 17-18, 568 P.3d at 1286-87 (citing West, 94 P.3d at 1251).

142 Father encourages us to follow in West's footsteps. We, of course, are not
bound by West. We would be remiss, however, if we failed to note that the
division's analysis in that case suffers from the same shortcomings as Father's
contentions here.9 For the same reasons we have already rejected Father's
position, we now decline to adopt West's rationale. Accordingly, to the extent West
is inconsistent with today's decision, it is overruled.

143 Here, the district court reduced the quantity of Father's parenting time from
160 nights to approximately 115 nights. Because the court neither extinguished
the quantity of parenting time nor placed qualitative constraints on the exercise of
parenting time, it did not restrict Father's parenting time rights.10 And because

9 By way of example, the West division did not explain how trial courts are to
determine when a reduction in the quantity of parenting time becomes so
substantial that it is transformed into a restriction. West's loosely constructed
approach is as shapeless as fog and amounts to a line drawn in water -impossible
to discern and incapable of uniform application. It would place our trial courts in
an untenable position and lead to disparate results.

10 We recognize, as did the division, that a court could all but terminate a party's
parenting time without applying the endanger/impair standard by reducing the
quantity of parenting time to a single overnight per year. But such a court would
still have to apply the best-interests standard, and it is difficult to conceive of
circumstances in which a single overnight of parenting time would serve the
child's best interests. Even so, we trust our trial courts and have no reason to
believe they will act in bad faith. And it goes without saying that parties are
obviously free to appeal an order imposing such a reduction.

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the court simply modified Father's parenting time rights, it correctly applied the
best-interests standard rather than the endanger/impair standard.

144 The division reached the same determination. We therefore leave its
judgment undisturbed.

## III. Conclusion

145 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the division's judgment. We remand
the case to the division with instructions to return it to the district court.

146 To the extent anyone reading this opinion offers an apocalyptic forecast, we
note that the division's decision, which we affirm, has been on the books for over
a year, and the sky has yet to fall. We are unmoved by prognostications of dire
consequences and see no basis to expect havoc. We have full confidence in our
trial court judges; we have no doubt that they are capable of applying the
framework we endorse today in a balanced, common-sense manner that ensures
both consistency and fairness.

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by JUSTICE GABRIEL, concurred in the
judgment.

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JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by JUSTICE GABRIEL, concurring in the
judgment.

147 Today, the majority announces a rule that is as consequential as it is absurd:
A purely quantitative reduction in parenting time, "however substantial," can never
constitute a restriction on parenting time under section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S.
(2025) ("subsection (1)(b)(I)"). Maj. op. 1 23 (emphasis added). The majority then
"clarifies" that under its rule, if a mother's or father's parenting time is reduced,
for instance, from 270 overnights each year to zero overnights, that is a restriction.
See id. But if a parent's overnights are reduced from 270 to one overnight, it is a
modification, not a restriction. See id. The majority never really engages with the
obvious question of why a 99.6% reduction in parenting time would not amount
to a restriction. On the face of it, the majority's math isn't mathing. More
problematically, by declaring that the best interests of the child standard applies
to all quantitative constraints on parenting time, however substantial, id., the
majority lowers the bar needed to restrict parenting time under
subsection (1)(b)(I).

148 Its interpretation also fails to square with common sense and the practical
and complex realities of family relationships. Who wouldn't describe a 99.6%
reduction in parenting time as a restriction?

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149 The majority's interpretation of section 14-10-129(1)(a)(I)
("subsection (1)(a)(I)") and subsection (1)(b)(I) is also contrary to the plain
language of these provisions and to the General Assembly's intent in adopting the
Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act ("UDMA"), §§ 14-10-101 to -133, C.R.S.
(2025). I am additionally concerned that in attempting to simplify what can be
very challenging decisions for our courts, the majority sows havoc in those same
courts. Why? Beyond failing to account for the complex dynamics in domestic
relations cases- particularly in fractious ones-the majority doesn't consider or
explain how its new rule will work going forward in the real world. I see a lot of
problems on the horizon.

[50 The majority's interpretation will wreak further havoc because it necessarily
suggests that if a party seeks to impose a qualitative constraint in a motion to
modify, the district court must treat the motion as one seeking to restrict parenting
time, no matter how the motion is denominated or the reason for it. To the extent
the majority means that trial courts may no longer impose "qualitative
constraint[s]," unless they are "qualitative term[s] or condition[s]" when modifying
parenting time, Maj. op. 15 (emphases in original), this simply trades one
line-drawing problem (the numerical cutoff between a modification and a
restriction) for another (the difference between a qualitative constraint, a
qualitative term, and a qualitative condition). This is especially so because none

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of these terms-qualitative constraint, qualitative term, or qualitative
condition-are mentioned, let alone defined, in the UDMA. This just seems to
compound the problem the majority is trying to solve in the first place.

151 What's worse, the majority's approach represents a deeply troubling sea
change in the law. In so holding, it takes a critical tool away from courts charged
with crafting parenting plans that are in children's best interests. I can't imagine
this is what the General Assembly had in mind, and I don't see how this will make
the difficult decisions judges have to make regarding parenting time any easier.

152 I would instead adopt the more nuanced test articulated in In re Marriage of
West, 94 P.3d 1248, 1251 (Colo. App. 2004). It provides, "determining whether to
apply the best interests standard or the endangerment standard may involve
inquiry into both the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of the proposed
change to parenting time, as well as the reason or reasons advanced for the
change." Id. True, this test is not mechanical. See id. Nor should it be. Instead, it
aligns with the plain meaning of the UDMA, which firmly put the focus on
children, and it recognizes the sometimes complex and endlessly varied
circumstances that judges face in making parenting time decisions and in
resolving parenting time disputes. Because the factual circumstances underlying
every parenting time decision are unique and must be decided on a case-by-case

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basis, the reasons advanced by parties for changes to parenting time-not
math - should also guide the court's analysis.

153 That said, here, petitioner Nicholas Jay Dale's ("Father's") change in
employment required him to work in-person four days a week more than 100
miles away from the child's primary residence. Applying West, I would conclude
that the district court's decision-which reduced Father's parenting time by
forty-five days and imposed no qualitative constraints-did not amount to a
restriction and thus did not require the court to find endangerment under
subsection (1)(b)(I).

154 Because I disagree with the majority's interpretation of subsections (1)(a)(I)
and (1)(b)(I) but agree that the district court did not err in modifying the parties'
parenting time, I concur in the judgment only.

## I. Analysis

155 First, I address the standard of review and discuss the principles of statutory
interpretation before turning to subsection (1)(b)(I). By drawing upon statutory
context, common dictionary definitions, and relevant case law, see Roup v. Com.
Rsch., LLC, 2015 CO 38, 1 14, 349 P.3d 273, 277, I conclude that the plain and
ordinary meaning of the words "restriction" and "modify" may involve an
evaluation of quantitative time. Therefore, determining whether to apply the best
interests standard or the endangerment standard under subsection (1)(b)(I) may

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involve inquiry into both the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of the
proposed change to parenting time, as well as the reason or reasons advanced for
the change. This test - and not the majority's rule -aligns with the plain meaning
of subsection (1)(b)(I), ensures that the proper legal standard applies to restrictions
(i.e., it doesn't lower the bar), more closely aligns with the General Assembly's
legislative intent, does not create a new line-drawing problem for the courts, and
avoids absurd results.

### A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction

156 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that this court reviews
de novo. Colo. Med. Bd. v. Mclaughlin, 2019 CO 93, 1 22, 451 P.3d 841, 845. When
interpreting a statute, we seek to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General
Assembly. Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, 1 12, 431 P.3d 215, 218. When a term
remains statutorily undefined, we assume the legislature "intended to give the
term its usual and ordinary meaning." Roup, 1 8, 349 P.3d at 276. We may consult
a recognized dictionary to further discern a term's plain meaning. In re Marriage
of Zander, 2021 CO 12, 1 13, 480 P.3d 676, 680.

157 In interpreting the plain meaning of statutory language, we must also give
consistent effect to all parts of the statute. Cowen, [ 13, 431 P.3d at 218. This means
the various provisions of the UDMA must be construed together and harmonized
with its overall legislative design. Zander, 1 14, 480 P.3d at 680. Because there is a

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presumption that the General Assembly intends a just and reasonable result when
enacting a statute, a statutory construction that defeats the legislative intent or
leads to an absurd result will not be followed. Ingram v. Cooper, 698 P.2d 1314, 1315
(Colo. 1985); § 2-4-201(1)(c), C.R.S. (2025). If the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, the statute is applied as written. Cowen, [ 12, 431 P.3d at 218.

### B. The Plain Meaning of "Restrict" and "Modify"

158 As with any issue of statutory interpretation, the starting point is the text
itself. Subsection (1)(a)(I), which governs a party's request to modify parenting
time, provides in part: "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)(b)(I) of this
section, the court may make or modify an order granting or denying parenting time
rights whenever such order or modification would serve the best interests of the
child." § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I) (emphasis added).

159 Subsection (1)(b)(I), which addresses a party's request to restrict parenting
time, states:

The court shall not restrict a parent's parenting time rights unless it
finds that the parenting time would endanger the child's physical
health or significantly impair the child's emotional development. In
addition to a finding that parenting time would endanger the child's
physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional
development, in any order imposing or continuing a parenting time
restriction, the court shall enumerate the specific factual findings
supporting the restriction.

§ 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) (emphasis added).

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160 The legislature has not defined the term "modify," nor has it defined the
term "restrict." So I first turn to the dictionary to further discern the plain and
ordinary meaning of these terms. See Zander, [ 13, 480 P.3d at 680. "Modify" can
mean "to make minor changes." Modify, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/modify
[https://perma.cc/UB3P-
2PMJ]. "Restrict" can mean limit. See Restriction, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed.
2024). I agree with the majority that a parent's time with their child may be
changed or limited by either (1) duration or (2) the manner, location, or
environment in which the parent may exercise parenting time, or both. See Maj. op.
1 40. A common sense reading of these statutes thus indicates that courts may
evaluate the quantitative and qualitative impact of a proposed change to parenting
time when determining whether to apply the best interests of the child standard
or the endangerment standard to a requested change in parenting time.

161 By drawing from the statutory context and common dictionary definitions,
see Roup, [ 14, 349 P.3d at 277, the plain and ordinary meaning of "restrict" and
"modify" can be resolved with reasonable certainty. Simply put, a "restriction"
under subsection (1)(b)(I) allows consideration of quantity or quality, or both.
Concluding otherwise lowers the bar so a restriction on parenting time may be
ordered based on the best interests of the child rather than on the correct legal
standard: endangerment.

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# C. The Majority's Rule Defeats Legislative Intent and Leads to Absurd Results

162 As noted, we will not interpret a statute in a manner that defeats its
legislative intent or leads to an absurd result. See Ingram, 698 P.2d at 1315; see also
§ 2-4-201(1)(c). The majority's new rule, unfortunately, does just that.

163 Section 14-10-102, C.R.S. (2025), and section 14-10-104.5, C.R.S. (2025),
expressly declare the UDMA's purposes and policy goals. Section 14-10-102(1)
provides that the purposes underlying the UDMA must be "liberally construed."
Section 14-10-102(2)(b), meanwhile, explains one of the UDMA's purposes: "[t]o
mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the process
of legal dissolution of marriage." Section 14-10-104.5 provides additional insight.
It states that "it is in the best interests of the children of the marriage to have a
relationship with both parents . . . and that, in most cases, it is the parents' right to
have a relationship with their children." § 14-10-104.5. This provision squares
with the repeated recognition by the United States Supreme Court that the
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected. See Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).

164 Despite the legislature's declaration, the majority interprets
subsection (1)(b)(I) so narrowly that a quantitative reduction in parenting
time-no matter how substantial -can never amount to a "restriction" requiring a

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finding of endangerment unless it results in zero days of parenting time. See Maj.
op. 1 23.

65 This makes no sense.

166 What if a father seeks to modify the parties' existing parenting plan so the
mother's parenting time with the parties' eleven-month-old son, who is still
nursing, is reduced from 270 overnights to one overnight. According to the
majority, the father is not seeking to restrict the mother's parenting time. But if he
asks the court to reduce her parenting time to zero overnights, the trial court must
treat his motion to modify as a motion to restrict. That logic doesn't add up. A
99.6% decrease in parenting time would profoundly impact the child's
relationship with his mother. No worries, the majority suggests: A party seeking
this substantial a reduction in parenting time will always ask the court to impose
a qualitative constraint. See id. at 136. Given the extraordinary number of
self-represented litigants in domestic relations cases in Colorado, this seems like a
very unrealistic expectation. See Colo. Jud. Branch, Cases and Parties Without
Attorney Representation in Civil Cases: Fiscal Year 2025, at 4 (July 8, 2025), https://
www.coloradojudicial.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/FY2025-Cases-and-
Parties-without-Attorney-Representation.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2BA-3SJY].

167 And what if the father's motion to modify doesn't seek to reduce the number
of the mother's overnights, but instead asks the court to impose a qualitative

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constraint? Under the majority's apparent reasoning, the court is required to treat
the father's motion as a motion to restrict regardless of the nature of the qualitative
constraint and even though the father is not seeking to reduce the mother's
parenting time. See Maj. op. 1 40. The majority's reading of these statutes leads to
absurd results because it lacks the nuance and discretion that the UDMA
contemplates-nuance which allows courts to consider and craft orders on a
case-by-case basis that focus on the needs of the children in the cases before them.
168 The majority's rigid interpretation treats all qualitative constraints the same.
But in reality, there are a multitude of reasons one parent may seek to impose a
qualitive constraint on the other parent. Some of the reasons may arise out of
concerns about endangerment, but many are necessary to simply facilitate a
parenting time schedule that is in the best interests of the parties' children. For
instance, a mother may be concerned that the father's serious health condition has
advanced to the point that he needs some additional help caring for the parties'
children in the evening after he has undergone treatment. The mother doesn't
want to reduce the father's parenting time. To the contrary, she wants to support
their children's relationship with their father, but she wants him to have some
additional help from a family member of the father's choosing. He, however,
doesn't think he needs help. Under the majority's interpretation, because this is a
qualitative constraint, the mother would have to wait until the children are

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physically endangered or emotionally impaired before seeking relief through a
motion to restrict, even though-if she is correct -the constraint would be in the
best interests of the children.

169 Finally, what are courts to make of the majority's interpretation when it
comes to motions to modify that seek to increase parenting time quantitatively, but
with a qualitative constraint. Often these motions are filed by a parent who,
having achieved a consistent, sustained level of sobriety, seeks to increase their
parenting time while submitting to periodic urinalysis. Or this type of motion may
be filed by a sixteen-year-old parent of an infant who seeks to increase their
parenting time while offering to have their parent present during that time. Under
the majority's reasoning, it appears that these motions -because they include a
qualitative constraint -must be treated as motions to restrict even though they are
motions to increase parenting time. Again, this makes no sense.

170 I readily acknowledge that West does not provide the bright-line rule that
the majority seeks. Its test cannot be mechanically or mathematically applied, but
that is the point. Put differently, the statutes' lack of bright lines are a feature, not
a bug. Formulaic rulings are not what the UDMA requires, and they are not what
children and their parents need, particularly in high-conflict cases.

171 The majority declares that its interpretation will help district court judges
and avoid a patchwork of outcomes. Id. at 1 33. Not so. We trust courts to make

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these tailored decisions all the time and understand that outcomes will necessarily
and appropriately vary because no two cases are exactly alike. But courts need the
tools the General Assembly has given them to craft orders that put the best
interests of children first when modification is sought and to protect children via
parenting time restrictions only when parenting time endangers a child's physical
health or significantly impairs the child's emotional development. The majority's
opinion strips those tools out of the hands of our courts and lowers the bar to
restrict parenting time. What's more, in trying to address one line-drawing
problem, it creates a new one that seems likely to spawn much future litigation:
What is the difference between a qualitative constraint, a qualitative term, and a
qualitative condition? Id. at 15. I'm not sure, in part because none of these terms
are used in the UDMA. But it seems -ironically - that the reason a constraint,
term, or condition is sought is likely relevant to answering whether the best
interests or endangerment standard is triggered, meaning that the test in West is
well-suited to helping draw these lines. Not mechanically, but on a case-by-case
basis.

# D. The West Test Appropriately Considers the Reason or Reasons for Changes to Parenting Time

[72 The test articulated in West aligns with the UDMA's policy goals and its
constitutional underpinnings and does not lead to absurd results. By focusing on
the reason or reasons for the proposed change, the West test avoids predetermined

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calculations and conclusions and, instead, considers the circumstances unique to
each family - an analytical framework common in family law jurisprudence. See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Short, 698 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Colo. 1985) (determining that child
custody requires "a broad inquiry into all relevant factors bearing on the welfare
of the child"); In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, 1 9, 561 P.3d 417, 421
(concluding that the equitable distribution of martial property involves a
consideration of a "variety of factors"); In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205,
T 23, 292 P.3d 1214, 1219 (noting that determining maintenance entails a
"discretionary balancing of factors").

173 The wisdom of the test set forth in West is illustrated in two cases decided
by the Minnesota Court of Appeals-applying a provision that is similar to
subsection (1)(b)(I). See Clark v. Clark, 346 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984);
Anderson v. Archer, 510 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).

174 In Clark, 346 N.W.2d at 384-85, the court considered whether a gradual
reduction of "reasonable and liberal visitation" from fourteen weeks per year to
5.5 weeks per year was a restriction. The court held that "the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the slow erosion of [the] appellant's rights without any
showing pursuant to the statute that reduced visitation would endanger [the
child's] emotional health or impair [the child's] emotional development." Id. at
386.

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175 In Anderson, 510 N.W.2d at 3, 5, the court considered whether a modification
to a parenting time plan, which reduced the appellant's total visitation, amounted
to a restriction. Due to the appellant's out-of-state employment, the original
parenting time plan provided him with visitation when he was "in Minnesota."
Id. at 2-3. However, the appellant later returned to reside in Minnesota, which in
combination with the appellee's work schedule and the children's school schedule,
resulted in unbalanced parenting time. See id. at 3. The trial court subsequently
modified the parenting time schedule and reduced the appellant's time with the
children. Id. at 3-4.

176 On appeal, the court held that the reduction was not a restriction. Id. at 4.
The court reasoned that changed circumstances warranted the reduction in the
appellant's parenting time so the children's relationships with both parents could
be maintained. See id. at 4-5. It added, "Even if the modification reduced [the]
appellant's visitation time from what the parties intended when they entered the
stipulation, in light of the reason for the modification and the substantial amount of
visitation granted to [the] appellant, the modification did not constitute a
restriction of visitation." Id. at 5 (emphasis added).

177 As Clark and Anderson both illustrate, the reason or reasons for a proposed
change in parenting time are important considerations when determining whether
a quantitative reduction in parenting time constitutes a restriction.

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178 For these reasons, and because the majority's rule disregards the plain
meaning of subsection (1)(b)(I), lowers the bar to restrict parenting time, conflicts
with the express policy goals of the UDMA, creates a whole new line-drawing
problem regarding the difference between a qualitative constraint and a
qualitative term, and leads to absurd results, I would adopt the test as articulated
in West. That is, "determining whether to apply the best interests standard or the
endangerment standard may involve inquiry into both the quantitative and the
qualitative aspects of the proposed change to parenting time, as well as the reason
or reasons advanced for the change." West, 94 P.3d at 1251.

## II. Application of the West Test

179 Despite my disagreement with the majority's interpretation of
section 14-10-129, I agree that the court below did not "restrict" Father's rights
pursuant to subsection (1)(b)(I), and thus properly applied the best interests of the
child standard, but I do so by applying the West test. Consistent with West, 94 P.3d
at 1250, I start with the reasons for Father's request and the court's order.

180 Father accepted a new job that requires him to work in-person more than
100 miles away from the child's primary residence. He then sought to adjust the
parties' parenting time schedule to accommodate his new schedule. While the
proposed schedule would have better suited Father's needs, the district court was
not persuaded that it was in the best interests of the parties' child.

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181 In its ruling, the court acknowledged that the decision to modify the original
parenting schedule was "not an easy [one]" and would "likely disappoint both
parties." In its order, the court found, "[T]he distance between the parties based
on [F]ather's employment does impact the court's ability to fashion an appropriate
parenting plan. Likewise, the court finds the lengthy travel does impact the child."
In re Marriage of Dale, No. 21DR32791, at 3 (Dist. Ct., El Paso Cnty., Apr. 26, 2024)
(unpublished order).

182 The district court further explained that the change would reduce the
number of parenting time exchanges-an important consideration, it noted,
because the child showed signs of separation anxiety when parting with either
parent. Id. at 2. So, even though the court reduced Father's parenting time, the
reduction did not-in light of the reasons for the modification and the otherwise
substantial parenting time granted to Father-constitute a restriction under
subsection (1)(b)(I).

## III. Conclusion

183 Because the majority's interpretation disregards the plain meaning of
subsection (1)(b)(I), lowers the restriction bar, conflicts with the express policy
goals of the UDMA, creates a new line-drawing problem, and leads to absurd
results, I respectfully concur in the judgment only.