2025 CO 53, 24SA178, MetroPCS California, LLC v. City of Lakewood

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
September 8, 2025

2025 CO 53

# No. 24SA178, MetroPCS v. Lakewood-Colorado Taxpayer's Bill of Rights- Business and Occupation Tax.

In this direct appeal, the supreme court considers whether two municipal
ordinances, City of Lakewood, Colo., Ordinance O-96-43, § 1 (1996) (the "1996
Ordinance"), and City of Lakewood, Colo., Ordinance O-2015-3, § 13 (2015) (the
"2015 Ordinance"), imposed "new taxes" for purposes of Colorado's Taxpayer's
Bill of Rights, Colo. Const. art. X, § 20 ("TABOR"), such that the City of Lakewood
was required to obtain voter approval before enacting those Ordinances.

The court now concludes that both the 1996 Ordinance and the 2015
Ordinance imposed new taxes within the meaning of TABOR. Accordingly,
TABOR required Lakewood to obtain voter approval before enacting them.
Because Lakewood did not do so, both Ordinances violated TABOR.

The court therefore affirms the district court's judgment.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2025 CO 53

Supreme Court Case No. 24SA178
Appeal from the District Court
Jefferson County District Court Case No. 22CV30412
Honorable Chantel Contiguglia, Judge

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant:
MetroPCS California, LLC,

V.

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee:
City of Lakewood, Colorado.

Judgment Affirmed
en banc
September 8, 2025

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant:
Silverstein & Pomerantz LLP
Neil I. Pomerantz
Mark E. Medina
Michelle Bush
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee:
Butler Snow LLP
David G. Mayhan
Sarah Smyth O'Brien
Dalton Kelley
Denver, Colorado

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Butler Snow LLP
Amanda G. Taylor
Melissa A. Lorber
Austin, Texas

City Attorney's Office, City of Lakewood, Colorado
Alison McKenney Brown
John Allen VanLandschoot
Patrick Theodore Freeman
Lakewood, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Chamber of Commerce:
Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP
Ted W. Friedman
Eric S. Tresh
Elizabeth S. Cha
New York, New York

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Department of Revenue:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Emma Garrison, Senior Assistant Attorney General
Kevin Chen, Assistant Attorney General
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Municipal League:
Robert D. Sheesley
Rachel Bender
Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE
HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

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JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 This case requires us to decide whether two municipal ordinances imposed
"new taxes" for purposes of Colorado's Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, Colo. Const.
art. X, § 20 ("TABOR"). In 1969, the City of Lakewood enacted a business and
occupation tax on certain telecommunications services, City of Lakewood, Colo.,
Ordinance O-69-5, § 1 (1969) (the "1969 Ordinance"). Then, in 1996, it amended
that Ordinance, City of Lakewood, Colo., Ordinance O-96-43, § 1 (1996) (the "1996
Ordinance"), and it did so again in 2015, City of Lakewood, Colo., Ordinance
O-2015-3, § 13 (2015) (the "2015 Ordinance"). Lakewood did not obtain voter
approval before enacting either the 1996 Ordinance or the 2015 Ordinance. After
a district court concluded that both the 1996 Ordinance and the 2015 Ordinance
violated TABOR, Lakewood appealed to this court pursuant to section
13-4-102(1)(b), C.R.S. (2024), contending that it did not need to obtain voter
approval because neither Ordinance imposed a new tax.1 MetroPCS California,

1 Specifically, Lakewood raised the following issues on appeal:

1\. Whether the District Court erred in declaring Lakewood,
Colorado's 1996 and 2015 business and occupation tax Ordinances
unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt" under the
Taxpayer's Bill of Rights ("TABOR") because they allegedly were
"new taxes," even though:

A. These Ordinances did not enact a new charge but merely
clarified the application of a 55-year-old telecommunications
business and occupation tax; and

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LLC, which had successfully challenged the Ordinances in the district court,
cross-appealed.2

T2
2 We now conclude that both the 1996 Ordinance and the 2015 Ordinance
imposed new taxes within the meaning of TABOR. Accordingly, TABOR required
Lakewood to obtain voter approval before enacting them. Because Lakewood did
not do so, both Ordinances violated TABOR.

13
We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

14
In 1969, Lakewood enacted a business and occupation tax, which provided,
in pertinent part, "There is hereby levied on and against utility companies

B. The Plaintiff, MetroPCS California, LLC, did not establish the
subsequent revenue increases were not incidental to the
Ordinances' stated primary purposes and de minimis to
Lakewood's overall revenues and annual budgets.

2\. Whether the District Court erred in finding the Ordinances
enacted new taxes instead of tax policy changes, which could not
violate TABOR because Lakewood's voters waived revenue limits
when they chose to debruce.

2 MetroPCS raised the following issues on appeal:

1\. Whether, as independent or additional grounds for affirming the
district court's ruling, the 1996 Ordinance produced revenue
increases that were not de minimis.

2\. Whether, in addition to violating TABOR by enacting "new taxes"
without advance voter approval, the Ordinances violated TABOR
by enacting "tax rate increases" without advance voter approval.

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operating within [Lakewood] a tax on the occupation and business of maintaining
a telephone exchange and lines connected therewith in [Lakewood] and of
supplying local exchange telephone service to the inhabitants of the city." 1969
Ordinance, § 1. Between 1969 and 1996, Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph
Co. ("Mountain Bell") or its individual successors-in-interest were the only
telecommunications providers subject to this business and occupation tax.

15 Following the 1984 breakup of Mountain Bell's monopoly, Colorado
enacted a law that provided, "Any tax, fee, or charge imposed by a political
subdivision shall be competitively neutral among telecommunications providers."
Ch. 75, sec. 1, § 38-5.5-107(2)(a), 1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 298, 301-02. (This statute
was amended in 2014 to include "broadband providers." Ch. 149, sec. 5,
§ 38-5.5-107(2)(a), 2014 Colo. Sess. Laws 504, 507-08.) The federal government, in
turn, enacted a law that provided, "No State or local statute or regulation, or other
State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the
ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications
service." 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).

16
Shortly thereafter, partly in response to the foregoing legislation, Lakewood
amended its business and occupation tax by enacting the 1996 Ordinance. That
Ordinance amended certain portions of chapter 5.32 of the Lakewood Municipal
Code, in pertinent part, as follows:

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§ 5.32.015 Levy of tax.

There is hereby levied a tax on and against each person engaged in
the business or occupation of providing basic local
telecommunications service within the City of Lakewood.

§ 5.32.020 Definition of basic local telecommunications service.

Basic local telecommunications service is the electronic or optical
transmission of information between separate points by prearranged
means, which includes the provision of local dial tone line and local
usage necessary to place or receive a call. Basic local
telecommunications service does not include long distance service,
cellular service or mobile radio telephone service. However, the
provision of cellular or mobile radio service to any business or entity
as its primary local telecommunications service shall be deemed basic
telecommunication service for the purpose of determining the
applicability of this business and occupation tax.

1996 Ordinance, § 1. This Ordinance further stated, "A business and occupation
tax on providers of basic local telecommunications service should be uniform and
nondiscriminatory and should not create barriers to entry into the business of
providing basic local telecommunications service within Lakewood." Id.
(amending section 5.32.010(E) of the Lakewood Municipal Code). Lakewood
neither sought nor obtained voter approval before enacting the 1996 Ordinance.

17 Then, in 2015, Lakewood again amended the business and occupation tax
by enacting the 2015 Ordinance. That Ordinance further amended certain portions
of the Lakewood Municipal Code, this time, in pertinent part, as follows:

5.32.015 Levy of tax

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There is hereby levied a tax on and against each person engaged in
the business or occupation of providing basic local exchange service
within the City of Lakewood.

### 5.32.020 Definitions

....

"Basic local exchange service" is the service that provides: (a) A local
dial tone; (b) local usage necessary to place or receive a call within an
exchange area; and (c) access to emergency, operator and
interexchange telecommunications services .... The provision of
cellular, mobile radio or any wireless voice service to any business,
person or entity shall be deemed basic local exchange service for the
purpose of determining the applicability of this business and
occupation tax.

2015 Ordinance, § 13. This Ordinance also stated:

The business and occupation tax set forth in this chapter is not a new
tax, the extension of an existing tax or an increase in a tax, but is the
reduction of an existing tax to new entrants in order to eliminate a
potential barrier to the entry of new providers into the business of
providing basic local exchange service within Lakewood ....

Id. (amending section 5.32.010(G) of the Lakewood Municipal Code). Lakewood
neither sought nor obtained voter approval before enacting the 2015 Ordinance.

18
Subsequently, Lakewood conducted a business and occupation tax audit of
MetroPCS, a subsidiary of T-Mobile US, Inc. that operates in Lakewood, and
concluded that MetroPCS owed Lakewood unpaid business and occupation taxes
totaling in excess of $1.6 million. After being advised of the results of this audit,
MetroPCS sued Lakewood in district court, alleging that both the 1996 Ordinance

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and the 2015 Ordinance constituted new taxes, tax rate increases, and tax policy
changes directly causing a net tax revenue gain, thereby violating TABOR.

19 Following discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and
the district court ultimately denied Lakewood's motion and granted MetroPCS's
motion. MetroPCS Cal., LLC v. City of Lakewood, No. 22CV30412, at 10 (Dist. Ct.,
Jefferson Cnty., Apr. 16, 2024).

110 The district court first considered the 1996 Ordinance and concluded that it
constituted a new tax. Id. at 22. The court reasoned that the 1969 Ordinance
contained narrow language to limit application of the business and occupation tax,
and the 1996 Ordinance expanded the scope of that tax to previously untaxed
services such that Lakewood collected tax revenue that it otherwise would not
have been entitled to collect. Id.

111 In so concluding, the court rejected Lakewood's argument that the 1996
Ordinance did not constitute a new tax because it caused only an incidental and
de minimis increase in revenue. Id. at 11-12. The court found that although
harmonizing the business and occupation tax with state and federal law requiring
competitive neutrality may have been one purpose of the Ordinance, the
Ordinance was also intended to generate tax revenue by expanding the tax to
previously untaxed services. Id. Thus, in the court's view, raising taxes was not
merely an incidental outcome of the 1996 Ordinance. Id. at 12. The court then

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observed that erratic increases and decreases in revenue generated from this
Ordinance in the years it was in effect precluded the court from determining
whether the Ordinance had a de minimis effect on revenue. Id. at 16-17. The court
determined, however, that it need not answer that question because it had already
concluded that the generation of tax revenue was not an incidental effect of the
Ordinance. Id. at 17.

112 Turning to the 2015 Ordinance, the court concluded that that Ordinance also
constituted a new tax because it further expanded the scope of the business and
occupation tax, causing providers to incur tax obligations that they did not have
previously. Id. at 26. And the court again rejected Lakewood's argument that
raising revenue was only an incidental effect of the 2015 Ordinance. Id. at 18-19.
The court determined that although this Ordinance served multiple purposes, at
least one of its purposes was to expand the business and occupation tax base such
that Lakewood could collect revenues from new sources. Id. at 18. The court
further concluded that the revenue increase resulting from the 2015 Ordinance
was substantial when viewed either through the lens of the business and
occupation tax itself or through the broader lens of Lakewood's overall operating
budget. Id. at 19.

113 Finally, the court rejected MetroPCS's arguments that the 1996 Ordinance
and the 2015 Ordinance also comprised tax rate increases and tax policy changes

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in violation of TABOR. Id. at 24, 26. Because the court had concluded that both
Ordinances constituted new taxes and were enacted without advance voter
approval, however, the court declared that the Ordinances were unlawful,
unenforceable, and void under TABOR. Id. at 28.

114 Lakewood then appealed the district court's order directly to this court
pursuant to section 13-4-102(1)(b), and MetroPCS cross-appealed.

## II. Analysis

115 We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. We then
describe the TABOR principles that are pertinent to this case. Finally, we apply
those principles to the Ordinances at issue here.

### A. Standard of Review

116 We review matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation de novo.
Griswold v. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 2019 CO 79, 1 30, 449 P.3d 373, 380. Statutes
are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, rooted in the separation of
powers doctrine, that requires courts to respect the roles of the legislative and
executive branches in enacting laws. Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 2020 CO
66, 1 30, 467 P.3d 314, 322. As a result, declaring a legislative enactment
unconstitutional is one of the gravest duties imposed on a court. People v. Graves,
2016 CO 15, 1 9, 368 P.3d 317, 322.

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117 We also review a trial court's order granting or denying a motion for
summary judgment de novo. Griswold, 1 22, 449 P.3d at 378. Summary judgment
is appropriate if the pleadings and supporting documents show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. C.R.C.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment,
a court must afford the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from the undisputed facts and must resolve all doubts against
the moving party. Griswold, 1 24, 449 P.3d at 379.

## B. TABOR

118 Subject to exceptions not applicable here, TABOR provides, in pertinent
part, "Starting November 4, 1992, districts must have voter approval in advance
for ... any new tax." Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(4)(a). Although TABOR does not
define what constitutes a "new tax," we have provided some guidance. In
particular, we have opined that the word "new" in "new tax" suggests creation,
rather than alteration. TABOR Found. v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 2018 CO 29, 1 24,
416 P.3d 101, 106. Accordingly, the expansion of a tax to a new class of goods or
activity may constitute a new tax. See HCA-Healthone, LLC v. City of Lone Tree,
197 P.3d 236, 242 (Colo. App. 2008) (concluding that the expansion of a use tax
from covering only construction and building materials to covering all tangible
personal property constituted a new tax).

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119 A legislative change that causes only an incidental and de minimis revenue
increase, however, does not constitute a new tax for TABOR purposes. TABOR
Found., 1 26, 416 P.3d at 106. To determine if a legislative change causes only an
incidental and de minimis revenue increase, we consider whether any revenue
increase projected to be generated by a legislative change is incidental to the
legislation's purpose, "both as expressed and as effected," and whether that
increase in revenue is de minimis as a percentage of the taxing authority's overall
tax revenue and budget. Id. at [[ 28-29, 416 P.3d at 106-07.

## C. Application

120 Applying the foregoing principles to the facts before us, we conclude that
both the 1996 Ordinance and the 2015 Ordinance constituted new taxes that
required advance voter approval.

121 The plain language of the 1969 Ordinance expressly limited its application
to a narrow class of providers, namely, utility companies that maintained a
telephone exchange and lines connected therewith and that supplied local
exchange telephone service in Lakewood. 1969 Ordinance, § 1. The 1996
Ordinance expanded the class of providers subject to the tax to all persons,
including non-utilities, who provided cellular service to any business or entity as
its primary local telecommunications service. 1996 Ordinance, § 1 (amending
sections 5.32.015 and 5.32.020 of the Lakewood Municipal Code). A provider thus

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no longer had to be a utility company, maintain an exchange, or provide exchange
service to be subject to the tax. The 2015 Ordinance then further expanded the
business and occupation tax to cover the provision of all cellular service to any
business, person, or entity. 2015 Ordinance, § 13 (again amending sections
5.32.015 and 5.32.020 of the Lakewood Municipal Code). As a result, the 2015
Ordinance brought within the tax's scope, for the first time, providers that supply
cellular service to any person (rather than only to a business or entity) and to those
providing cellular service when the service is not the recipient's primary local
telecommunications service. Id.

T22 Both the 1996 Ordinance and the 2015 Ordinance thus created new tax
liabilities for previously untaxed types of providers and types of services.
Accordingly, each Ordinance generated new revenue not only because new
providers entered the market, but also because some providers were subject to the
tax when they would not have been before each Ordinance's enactment.

123 We view this set of facts as analogous to that in HCA-Healthone. There,
voters had approved a use tax that was "expressly limited" to construction and
building materials purchased at retail. HCA-Healthone, 197 P.3d at 238, 241.
Several years later, the City of Lone Tree amended this use tax to cover "any article
of tangible personal property, purchased at retail." Id. at 238. A division of the

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court of appeals concluded that such an "expansion" of the use tax constituted a
new tax. Id. at 242.

124 Just as the original use tax in HCA-Healthone was expressly limited to a
specific type of good, the business and occupation tax enacted in the 1969
Ordinance was expressly limited to a specific type of telecommunications provider
and a specific type of telecommunications service. And just as the amended use
tax in HCA-Healthone expanded the use tax's scope to reach a broader class of
goods, both the 1996 Ordinance and the 2015 Ordinance expanded the scope of the
business and occupation tax to reach a broader class of telecommunications
providers and services.

125 We are unpersuaded by Lakewood's argument that neither the 1996
Ordinance nor the 2015 Ordinance created new taxes because Lakewood's
business and occupation tax has always functioned as a tax on the business and
occupation of providing telecommunications services. The Lakewood City
Council could have drafted the 1969 Ordinance to enact a tax on the business and
occupation of providing telecommunications services, but it did not do so. Rather,
it used specific language to enact a tax "against utility companies" on the business
and occupation of "maintaining a telephone exchange and lines connected
therewith in [Lakewood] and of supplying local exchange telephone service to the
inhabitants of the city." 1969 Ordinance, § 1. Confining the tax in this way to

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utilities that maintained physical infrastructure was consistent with the intent to
"compensate the public for the utilities' use of the public right-of-way," as
recognized in the minutes of a January 30, 1978 Lakewood Finance and Operations
Committee meeting, in which the Committee reviewed the history of the business
and occupation tax for utilities in general and Mountain Bell in particular. In
contrast, since before the adoption of the 1996 Ordinance, Lakewood has imposed
a sales or use tax on "telecommunication services," City of Lakewood, Colo., Mun.
Code, ch. 3.01.120(3)(a) (June 30, 1990) (predecessor to what is now City of
Lakewood, Colo., Mun. Code, ch. 3.01.420(S)(1)), an indication that the City
Council knows how to tax telecommunications services broadly when it wishes to
do so.

126 Concluding that the 1996 Ordinance and 2015 Ordinance raised new
revenues from the imposition of the amended business and occupation tax does
not, however, end our inquiry. We must next decide whether the legislative
changes reflected in these Ordinances caused only incidental and de minimis
revenue increases because, if they did, then the Ordinances would not constitute
new taxes for TABOR purposes. See TABOR Found., 1 26, 416 P.3d at 106. We thus
first consider whether the revenue generated by each Ordinance was incidental to
its purpose "both as expressed and as effected." Id. at | 28, 416 P.3d at 106.

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127 We acknowledge that neither Ordinance expressed revenue generation as a
purpose. To the contrary, the 1996 Ordinance recognized the newly competitive
nature of basic local telecommunications service and expressed that "[a] business
and occupation tax on providers of basic local telecommunications service should
be uniform and nondiscriminatory and should not create barriers to entry." 1996
Ordinance, § 1 (amending section 5.32.010(E) of the Lakewood Municipal Code).
Likewise, the 2015 Ordinance expressed an intent to "eliminate a potential barrier
to the entry of new providers into the business of providing basic local exchange
service within Lakewood." 2015 Ordinance, § 13 (amending section 5.32.010(G) of
the Lakewood Municipal Code). These expressed purposes are not alone
dispositive, however, because a taxing district cannot exempt itself from TABOR's
restrictions and requirements simply by declaring that a legislative change has a
purpose other than revenue generation. See Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 250 n.15
(Colo. 2008) (acknowledging that a statutory charge may be labeled a fee but in
effect be a tax); Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 38
(Colo. 2000) (noting that a legislative pronouncement regarding a legal question is
instructive but not dispositive); People v. Becker, 413 P.2d 185, 186 (Colo. 1966) ("It
is a familiar and well documented rule of law that taxation is concerned with
realities and that, in considering tax matters, substance and not form should
govern."); see also Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012) (“It

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is true that Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for
constitutional purposes simply by describing it as one or the other.").

128 Turning, then, to the effected purpose of the Ordinances, we conclude that
it was obvious when each Ordinance was enacted that it would have the effect of
raising revenue. Each Ordinance expanded the business and occupation tax to
previously untaxed telecommunications services. In fact, Lakewood explicitly
recognized in each Ordinance the likelihood that new providers would be subject
to the tax. For example, the 1996 Ordinance included the finding, "The City
expects that in the future numerous companies may provide basic local
telecommunications service within Lakewood." 1996 Ordinance, § 1 (amending
section 5.32.010(C) of the Lakewood Municipal Code). And the 2015 Ordinance
included the finding, "The City recognizes that multiple companies now provide
basic local exchange service within Lakewood and more are likely to do so in the
future." 2015 Ordinance, § 13 (amending section 5.32.010(C) of the Lakewood
Municipal Code).

129 We further note that Lakewood could have achieved the expressed
purposes of having a uniform and nondiscriminatory tax structure and
eliminating barriers to entry by rescinding the pertinent business and occupation
tax altogether, relying solely on the existing and indisputably applicable sales tax
to generate revenue. Lakewood chose instead, however, to expand the reach of its

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business and occupation tax. In making this observation, we, of course, do not
suggest that any law required Lakewood to eliminate its business and occupation
tax. We note only that Lakewood's decision to expand that tax as it did weighs
against the conclusion that raising revenue was merely an incidental effect of its
legislative changes.

130 In so concluding, we view the scenario before us as materially distinct from
that in TABOR Foundation. There, the General Assembly passed a bill adding some
exemptions and removing other exemptions from the sales taxes of two taxing
districts, in order to make the exemptions consistent with state sales tax
exemptions. TABOR Found., 11, 416 P.3d at 102. We concluded that because the
bill both started taxing some items and stopped taxing others, its function was
consistent with the legislature's goal of simplifying the collection and
administration of taxes for the districts, and thus, increasing revenue was only an
incidental effect of the bill. Id. at 1 28, 416 P.3d at 106. In contrast, here, the
Ordinances at issue changed Lakewood's business and occupation tax in only one
direction: both Ordinances added new tax liability but did not remove any tax
liability.

131 For these reasons, we conclude that although revenue generation may not
have been the only purpose for which Lakewood enacted the Ordinances at issue,
revenue generation was not merely incidental to their enactment. And because

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we have concluded that the Ordinances caused more than incidental increases in
revenue, we need not address whether these increases were also more than de
minimis. See id. at ] 26, 416 P.3d at 106 (noting that a legislative change that causes
both an incidental and a de minimis revenue increase is not a new tax for TABOR
purposes).

132 Accordingly, we conclude that both the 1996 Ordinance and the 2015
Ordinance constituted new taxes that required advance voter approval under
TABOR. Because Lakewood did not obtain such approval before enacting either
Ordinance, both Ordinances violate TABOR and therefore are void.

133 In light of our foregoing conclusion, we need not address the remaining
questions raised on appeal regarding whether the Ordinances also constituted tax
rate increases or tax policy changes resulting in net revenue gains.

## III. Conclusion

134 For these reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment concluding that
the 1996 Ordinance and the 2015 Ordinance were enacted in violation of TABOR
and therefore are void and unenforceable. Pursuant to C.A.R. 39.1, we exercise
our discretion to remand this case to the district court to address MetroPCS's
request for appellate fees and costs under TABOR, Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(1).