M.G. Dyess v. MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Resources

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
September 15, 2022

2022COA108

No. 20CA1742, M.G. Dyess, Inc. v. MarkWest Liberty Midstream
& Resources, L.L.C. — Civil Procedure — Right to Trial by Jury
— Trial by Jury or By the Court — Findings by the Court —
Advisory Jury and Trial by Consent; Contracts — Quantum
Meruit

As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of

appeals considers whether quantum meruit claims are legal or

equitable for purposes of determining whether a party has a right to

a jury trial on such a claim. The division concludes that, where the

claimant has requested monetary damages, the quantum meruit

claim is legal, and the claimant is entitled to a jury trial under

C.R.C.P. 38(a).

The division further considers whether, pursuant to C.R.C.P.

52, a trial court may unilaterally reduce the amount of damages

awarded in a binding jury verdict. It concludes that C.R.C.P. 52
does not provide that authority. Because the trial court did so here,

it erred. Accordingly, the division reverses the judgment insofar as

the trial court reduced the damages, but it affirms the judgment

insofar as the court accepted the jury’s verdict on liability.

The division also rejects the appellant’s contention that the

trial court erred by denying its motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict on the appellee’s counterclaim,

concluding there was evidence upon which a verdict against the

appellant could be sustained.

It remands the case for entry of an amended judgment and an

award of pre- and post-judgment interest to both parties.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA108

Court of Appeals No. 20CA1742
City and County of Denver District Court No. 18CV34745
Honorable Michael J. Vallejos, Judge

M.G. Dyess, Inc., a Mississippi corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Resources, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability
corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN
Pawar and Brown, JJ., concur

Announced September 15, 2022

Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP, Edward C. Stewart, Frederick R. Yarger, Denver,
Colorado; Moore Williams PLLC, Marie E. Williams, Golden, Colorado;
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Adam H. Charnes, Dallas, Texas, for
Plaintiff-Appellant

Snell & Willmer L.L.P., Michael E. Lindsay, James Kilroy, Ellie Lockwood,
Denver, Colorado; Snell & Willmer L.L.P., Kelly H. Dove, Las Vegas, Nevada for
Defendant-Appellee
¶1 In this construction contract dispute, plaintiff, M.G. Dyess,

Inc. (Dyess), appeals post-trial orders reducing the amount of

damages awarded on its quantum meruit claim and denying its

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on

defendant’s counterclaim. Defendant, MarkWest Liberty Midstream

& Resources, L.L.C. (MarkWest), and Dyess both appeal the trial

court’s denial of their motions for pre- and post-judgment interest.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case with

directions.

I. Background

¶2 MarkWest, a corporation that processes and transports

natural gas, entered into three contracts with Dyess, a pipeline

construction company, to install thousands of feet of pipeline. Each

of the three contracts concerned a particular length of pipeline,

called a “spread,” and each spread was assigned a lump sum

payment amount and a “mechanical completion date” after which

liquidated damages would accrue if the spread remained

incomplete.

¶3 According to Dyess, MarkWest materially hindered its work,

increasing the costs and duration of the project. Dyess sued

1
MarkWest, asserting claims for breach of contract, negligent

misrepresentation, fraudulent nondisclosure, fraud, promissory

estoppel, and quantum meruit. MarkWest countered that it had

not hindered Dyess’s work, and Dyess failed to achieve mechanical

completion by the contractual deadlines. MarkWest brought

counterclaims for liquidated damages under the contract and

declaratory judgment. Per jury demands by both parties, the case

was set for a jury trial, which began on February 3, 2020.

¶4 During the trial, however, MarkWest asserted that Dyess’s

promissory estoppel and quantum meruit claims were not triable to

the jury because they are equitable claims. Dyess argued that its

claims were legal and contended that, in any case, MarkWest had

waived any objection to a jury trial.

¶5 The trial court concluded that Dyess had brought “a mix of

legal and equitable claims,” but the court did not specify which

claims were equitable. It stated an intention to submit all the

claims to the jury under C.R.C.P. 39(c), which permits courts to “try

any issue with an advisory jury” in “all actions not triable by a

jury.” The court also noted that, if the jury returned a verdict

2
awarding relief on an “arguably equitable claim,” it could permit

further briefing.

¶6 The jury rejected all of Dyess’s claims except its quantum

meruit claim, for which it awarded $26,039,641 in damages. It also

awarded MarkWest $4,500,000 in liquidated damages based on its

breach of contract counterclaim. When the verdict was read,

MarkWest immediately made an oral motion to treat the jury’s

quantum meruit verdict as advisory, asking the court to “decide this

issue.” The court ordered additional briefing.

¶7 In response, MarkWest filed a motion, captioned as a motion

under C.R.C.P. 52, asking the court to make findings of fact and

conclusions of law regarding the quantum meruit claim. It urged

the court to conclude that MarkWest was not liable to Dyess for the

quantum meruit claim, and in the alternative, that Dyess could

only recover $934,436, the approximate amount Dyess claimed for

the items listed in Instruction 60 (the quantum meruit jury

instruction). Dyess countered that its expert had testified to overall

losses equal to or greater than the amount awarded and, therefore,

the $26,039,641 verdict was supported by evidence.

3
¶8 The trial court concluded, in a written order titled “Order

Regarding Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion Pursuant to

C.R.C.P. 52,” that (1) MarkWest did not waive its objection to a jury

trial; and (2) quantum meruit is “an equitable theory of recovery . . .

triable by the court and not by a jury, subject to the right of the

court to impanel an advisory jury under C.R.C.P. 39(c).” It accepted

the jury’s “advisory verdict” insofar as the jury found that MarkWest

was liable under a quantum meruit theory, but the court concluded

that the amount awarded was not supported by the evidence. It

reduced the amount of damages to $934,436. On the same day, it

entered judgment on the jury verdict as modified by its C.R.C.P. 52

order.

¶9 Dyess subsequently filed a motion for JNOV on MarkWest’s

breach of contract counterclaim, asserting that it had achieved

mechanical completion before the final mechanical completion

dates, which it claimed MarkWest had extended. The trial court did

not rule on the motion, and it was therefore deemed denied by rule.

See C.R.C.P. 59(j).

¶ 10 Dyess did not file any other post-trial motions challenging the

jury’s verdict, although the jury had denied Dyess’s other claims.

4
MarkWest did not seek post-trial relief on any claim. However, both

parties filed C.R.C.P. 59(c)(4) motions to amend the judgment to

include pre- and post-judgment interest. These motions were also

deemed denied. See C.R.C.P. 59(j).

¶ 11 Dyess now appeals (1) the order treating the verdict in its favor

as advisory and reducing the damages award; (2) the denial of its

motion for JNOV with respect to MarkWest’s counterclaim; and (3)

the denial of its motion for pre- and post-judgment interest.

MarkWest cross-appeals the denial of its motion for pre- and post-

judgment interest.

II. Quantum Meruit Claim

A. Standard of Review and Law

¶ 12 Dyess asks us to decide whether the trial court erred when it

partially rejected the jury’s verdict under C.R.C.P. 52, ultimately

reducing the amount of damages awarded. This question turns, in

part, on whether Dyess had a right to a jury trial because, as

relevant here, Rule 52 only applies in “actions tried . . . with an

advisory jury.”

¶ 13 We review a party’s right to a jury trial in a civil case de novo.

People v. Shifrin, 2014 COA 14, ¶ 14. To the extent the issues

5
raised require us to construe the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure,

we also employ a de novo standard of review. See Mason v. Farm

Credit of S. Colo., 2018 CO 46, ¶ 7.

¶ 14 There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases in

Colorado. Id. at ¶ 9. To the extent the right exists, it is derived

from C.R.C.P. 38(a). Rule 38(a) provides for a jury trial only in

“proceedings that are legal in nature, not equitable.” Mason, ¶ 10.

¶ 15 There are two methods for determining whether an action is

legal or equitable. Id. at ¶ 27. The first method is to examine the

nature of the remedy sought. Id. Actions seeking an award of

monetary damages are generally legal, while actions seeking to

employ the coercive powers of the court are generally equitable. Id.

The second method is to look to the historical nature of the right to

be enforced. Id. “If the plaintiff is seeking to enforce a right

historically decided by equity courts, the claim is equitable. If the

right was historically enforced by a court of law, the claim is legal.”

Id. (citation omitted). Of the two methods, the remedial method is

generally preferred. Peterson v. McMahon, 99 P.3d 594, 598-99

(Colo. 2004) (noting that because the plaintiff in this trust action

sought the immediate and unconditional payment of money, the

6
action was legal despite the “overwhelmingly equitable history of

trusts”).

B. Analysis

¶ 16 In its complaint, Dyess sought to recover, under a quantum

meruit theory, the reasonable market value of labor and materials it

provided on an extracontractual basis. In other words, Dyess asked

for a simple money judgment. See Mason, ¶ 11 (stating that

whether an action is legal or equitable is dictated only by the claims

in a plaintiff’s complaint). Given our supreme court’s preference for

the remedial method of deciding this issue, the remedy that Dyess

sought strongly favors the conclusion that the claim is legal. Stuart

v. N. Shore Water & Sanitation Dist., 211 P.3d 59, 62 (Colo. App.

2009) (noting that actions for money damages are legal).

Nonetheless, the fact that a plaintiff sought monetary relief does

not, by itself, necessarily determine if a claim is legal or equitable.

State ex rel. Weiser v. Ctr. for Excellence in Higher Educ., Inc., 2021

COA 117, ¶ 65; Shifrin, ¶ 17 (stating that, even if a plaintiff seeks

money damages, a jury trial is not required if the action is

equitable). We must therefore examine the nature and history of

quantum meruit claims.

7
¶ 17 In Colorado, a plaintiff may bring a quantum meruit claim

when substantial changes have occurred that are “not covered by

the contract and are not within the contemplation of the parties,”

and those changes have required extra work or caused substantial

loss to one party. Specialized Grading Enters., Inc. v. Goodland

Constr., Inc., 181 P.3d 352, 354 (Colo. App. 2007). The purpose of

the claim is to avoid unjust enrichment despite the absence of an

express agreement to pay. Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v.

Hannon L. Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 19.

¶ 18 Because a quantum meruit claim is grounded on principles of

fairness, our supreme court and some divisions of this court have

called it, or its related claims, an “equitable doctrine,” an “equitable

theory,” or an “equitable remedy.” Id. (“equitable theory of

recovery”); Dudding v. Norton Frickey & Assocs., 11 P.3d 441, 445

(Colo. 2000) (“equitable doctrine”); Jorgensen v. Colo. Rural Props.,

LLC, 226 P.3d 1255, 1259 (Colo. App. 2010) (unjust enrichment

claim an “equitable remedy”); see also Jones v. Crestview S. Baptist

Church, 192 P.3d 571, 573 (Colo. App. 2008) (unjust enrichment

and quantum meruit are “equitable claims”); 26 Richard A. Lord,

Williston on Contracts § 68:1, Westlaw (4th ed. database updated

8
May 2022) (“It has also been said that quantum meruit, quasi-

contract, and an implied at law contract are equivalent terms for an

equitable remedy.”). Even so, we have found no Colorado case, and

MarkWest has cited none, holding that quantum meruit claims are

equitable for purposes of determining whether a party is entitled to

a jury trial. The “equitable doctrine” language cited above, while

correctly describing the fairness concerns central to the claim, does

not address whether quantum meruit claims have historically been

enforced by courts of equity. 26 Lord, § 68:1 (noting that, although

equitable considerations influence whether recovery is warranted,

the quantum meruit claim “was developed as part of the common

law of contracts”).

¶ 19 Our review of the history and theoretical underpinnings of

quantum meruit claims in Colorado reveals that these actions were

traditionally enforced by courts of law, based on the existence of an

implied contract to pay. See Hansen v. Jones, 115 Colo. 1, 7, 168

P.2d 263, 265 (1946) (noting that a plaintiff who had no express

contract with the defendant could sue on a theory of implied

contract or quantum meruit). Such payments were historically

sought through a writ of assumpsit, a legal writ. See, e.g., Schleier

9
v. Bonella, 77 Colo. 603, 604-06, 237 P. 1113, 1113-14 (1925)

(seeking recovery in quantum meruit based on an implied promise

to pay for services); Snowden v. Clemons, 5 Colo. App. 251, 255, 38

P. 475, 477 (1894) (finding a valid “assumpsit upon a quantum

meruit” claim for services rendered under an implied contract); cf.

Cree v. Lewis, 49 Colo. 186, 189-92, 112 P. 326, 327-28 (1910)

(noting that although the plaintiff could have brought an action in

assumpsit in a court of law to recover money, he instead brought

an equitable suit asking the court to declare that certain real estate

was held in trust for him); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies

§ 4.1(3), at 565 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that restitution in money was

afforded at law through quasi-contract actions).

¶ 20 Because quantum meruit, quasi-contract, and assumpsit

claims were generally enforced by courts of law, numerous federal

and state courts have concluded that such claims are legal, not

equitable. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at

Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 717 (1999) (noting that an action

premised on the existence of a quasi-contract is an action at law);

Austin v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1170, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Because

general assumpsit was a legal action at common law, a suit in

10
quasi-contract requires a jury trial.”); Jogani v. Superior Ct., 81 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 503, 508 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that quantum

meruit was recognized as a form of the common law writ of

assumpsit . . . and that the parties to a quantum meruit action

consequently have a right to a jury trial.”); Nehi Beverage Co. of

Indianapolis v. Petri, 537 N.E.2d 78, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (stating

that quantum meruit claims are triable to a jury because they are

based on “legal fictions created by courts of law”).

¶ 21 Here, Dyess asked for simple money damages via a quantum

meruit claim, which courts of law have historically enforced. We

conclude that, under applicable Colorado precedent and persuasive

precedent from other jurisdictions, Dyess’s claim was legal, not

equitable. The trial court erred by deeming the claim equitable and

treating the jury’s verdict as advisory.

C. Reversal

¶ 22 The denial of a party’s right to a jury trial in a civil case is

reversible error where, as here, the error is preserved and the trial

court has made a ruling that affects a substantial right of a party.

C.R.C.P. 61; see also Mason, ¶¶ 1, 32 (reversing where the court

erroneously denied a civil defendant a jury trial, finding him liable).

11
However, in this case, the trial court did not deny Dyess the right to

a jury trial; rather, it treated the jury verdict as advisory. Under

these circumstances, a new jury trial is not required because the

jury rendered a verdict in favor of Dyess on its quantum meruit

claim. We can affirm the judgment insofar as the trial court

accepted the jury’s verdict that MarkWest is liable for quantum

meruit damages. In that regard, Dyess was not denied the benefit

of its jury demand, and any error is harmless.1

¶ 23 Nonetheless, we must examine whether the trial court’s

reduction of damages under C.R.C.P. 52 is supportable. We

conclude it is not. A trial court may not alter the substance of a

binding jury verdict pursuant to Rule 52, which grants such powers

only with respect to bench trials or advisory verdicts. See Leo

Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 178 Colo. 361, 365, 497 P.2d 997,

1 We note that, after the trial court entered judgment, MarkWest did
not file a C.R.C.P. 59 motion for a new trial asking the court to alter
the conclusion that it was liable to Dyess. It also did not cross-
appeal the jury’s liability finding or the court’s entry of judgment in
favor of Dyess on its quantum meruit claim. Moreover, at oral
arguments, MarkWest conceded that it was bound on the issue of
liability. Therefore, no new trial on MarkWest’s liability for Dyess’s
quantum meruit claim is available.

12
998-99 (1972) (noting that the trial court erred when it reduced

damages on its own motion after a binding jury verdict). The court

did so here, and in doing so, it erred. Further, the court’s error was

not harmless because Dyess was deprived of the right to have a

judgment in the amount of $26,039,641 entered in its favor.

¶ 24 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment insofar as the trial court

reduced the amount of damages awarded from $26,039,641 to

$934,436. We remand with directions to enter an amended

judgment in favor of Dyess on the quantum meruit claim in the

amount of $26,039,641 and to permit the parties to file post-trial

motions regarding the amended judgment. Such motions, however,

may only address the amount of quantum meruit damages. They

may not challenge the liability verdict.2

2 A court may order a new trial solely on the issue of damages if
liability and damages are distinct issues. See Gerrity Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 934 (Colo. 1997) (“Whenever a new
trial must be held on one issue, a new trial must also be held with
respect to other issues unless ‘the issue to be retried is entirely
distinct and separable from the other issues involved in the case
and . . . a partial retrial can be had without injustice to any party.’”
(quoting Bassett v. O’Dell, 178 Colo. 425, 427, 498 P.2d 1134, 1135
(1972))). Where, as here, liability has been clearly established,
“partial retrial may be held solely on the issue of damages.” Id.

13
¶ 25 Moreover, since no other post-trial motions were timely filed as

to any of Dyess’s claims, and Dyess did not appeal the judgment

with respect to those claims, such motions may not be filed on

remand.

III. Counterclaim for Breach of Contract

¶ 26 We next address whether the trial court erred by denying

Dyess’s motion for JNOV on MarkWest’s counterclaim for breach of

contract. The crux of Dyess’s argument is that there was no

reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that Dyess did not achieve

mechanical completion on all three spreads by the final mechanical

completion dates, which Dyess alleges MarkWest extended.

A. Standard of Review and Law

¶ 27 We review de novo a trial court’s rulings on motions for

directed verdicts and for JNOV. Vaccaro v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 2012

COA 9M, ¶ 40. Where, as here, the motion is based on a factual

dispute, we view the evidence in “the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the

evidence in that party’s favor.” Int’l Network, Inc. v. Woodard, 2017

COA 44, ¶ 8. Motions for JNOV should only be granted when, from

the standpoint of a reasonable juror, there was no evidence, or

14
inference therefrom, upon which a verdict against the movant could

be sustained. Id. If the facts are sufficiently in dispute such that

reasonable people could reach different conclusions, it is the

function of the jury to resolve those disputes. Cox v. Johnston, 139

Colo. 376, 380, 339 P.2d 989, 991 (1959). As stated in Thorpe v.

Durango School District No. 9-R, 41 Colo. App. 473, 475, 591 P.2d

1329, 1331 (1978), aff’d, 200 Colo. 268, 614 P.2d 880 (1980),

“[w]here there exists two inferences that the trier of fact can draw

from the evidence, it is error for the trial court to select one not

chosen by the jury.”

B. Analysis

¶ 28 These facts were not disputed at trial:

• The spread 1A contract set a mechanical completion date

of January 15, 2018, and provided for “late completion

payments” of $30,000 per day, up to $3,000,000.

• The spread 1B contract set a mechanical completion date

of October 1, 2017 (using slightly different parameters),

and provided for “late completion payments” of $10,000

per day, up to $500,000.

15
• The spread 2 contract set a mechanical completion date

of January 15, 2018, and provided for “late completion

payments” of $10,000 per day, up to $1,000,000.

• In December 2017, the parties signed written agreements

extending the mechanical completion dates for spreads

1A and 2 to March 22, 2018.3

• Dyess did not achieve mechanical completion on spread

1B until February 2018, and it did not achieve

mechanical completion on spreads 1A and 2 until, at the

earliest, July 13, 2018.

¶ 29 Thus, if the liquidated damages clauses applied as originally

written or as extended in writing, Dyess was liable for the full

amount of the liquidated damages available.

¶ 30 However at trial, Patrick Rudy, MarkWest’s director of pipeline

construction, testified that he had authority to extend, and did

orally extend, the mechanical completion dates to July 15, 2018, for

3 MarkWest argues that any additional extension was required to be
in writing. Dyess claims that no writing was necessary. We need
not decide this issue because the jury verdict indicates the jury
concluded no additional binding extensions were given, whether
oral or written.

16
spreads 1A and 2. He also testified he was “just fine” with the date

that Dyess completed spread 1B. Dyess argues that this testimony

was not contradicted or limited by any other evidence. Thus, the

jury had no reasonable basis for its conclusion that Dyess missed

the final mechanical completion dates. We disagree.

¶ 31 Dyess’s project manager, Bryan McRaney, testified that the

mechanical completion dates for spreads 1A and 2 were extended to

March 28, 2018,4 but Dyess did not achieve mechanical completion

by that date. He further testified that the mechanical completion

date for spread 1B “never changed.” McRaney did not testify, as

Rudy did, that MarkWest extended the final mechanical completion

dates for spreads 1A and 2 to July 15, 2018, or that the late

completion of spread 1B was acceptable to MarkWest.

¶ 32 Dyess argues that these omissions are meaningless because

McRaney was only testifying about the initial extension of the

mechanical completion dates, and he wasn’t directly asked about

4Although the parties did not dispute there was a written
agreement extending the mechanical completion dates for spreads
1A and 2 to March 22, 2018, it is not clear both parties agreed that
a subsequent extension to March 28, 2018, was granted.

17
additional extensions. This argument misconstrues the import of

McRaney’s testimony. While McRaney was never directly asked

about additional extensions, he unconditionally confirmed that

Dyess missed the March 2018 mechanical completion dates, and he

never clarified that further extensions were given with respect to

any of the spreads. This testimony, or lack thereof, along with his

additional testimony that, as late as July 13, 2018, he and Dyess’s

president were asking for a full release of liquidated damages as

part of settlement negotiations, is evidence from which the jury

could have reasonably inferred that any extension to July 15, 2018,

was conditional on the completion of settlement negotiations.

¶ 33 MarkWest’s project manager, Michael Hoy, testified that

MarkWest’s liquidated damages claim would have been waived if

settlement negotiations had yielded an effective agreement, but it

was not waived because no such agreement was made.

Documentary evidence created during the negotiations also

supported McRaney’s and Hoy’s testimony that the enforcement of

liquidated damages was still a possibility in July 2018, a fact that

militates against the conclusion that both parties understood the

relevant dates had been unconditionally extended to July 15, 2018.

18
Further, Dyess’s position at trial was that the parties never settled

their disputes, and the jury’s special verdict agreed there was no

settlement. Therefore, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that

MarkWest never extended the mechanical completion dates for

spreads 1A and 2 to July 15, 2018, that Dyess did not achieve

mechanical completion of any spread by the agreed-upon

mechanical completion dates, and that MarkWest did not waive

liquidated damages.

¶ 34 The jury was instructed on breach of contract, waiver, and the

proper measure of damages. We presume the jury followed the

instructions and rejected Dyess’s waiver defense. See Harris Grp.,

Inc. v. Robinson, 209 P.3d 1188, 1202 (Colo. App. 2009). Given the

conflicting evidence, we cannot conclude that no reasonable person

could have reached the same conclusion as the jury. We perceive

no error in the trial court’s denial of Dyess’s motion for JNOV.

IV. Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest

¶ 35 Both parties assert that the trial court erred by denying them

pre- and post-judgment interest. Because a party’s entitlement to

such interest is a question of statutory interpretation, we review de

19
novo. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Holmes, 193 P.3d 821, 825

(Colo. 2008) (prejudgment interest).

¶ 36 Section 5-12-102, C.R.S. 2021, controls an award of

prejudgment interest on claims that do not involve personal injury.

Beaver Creek Ranch, L.P. v. Gordman Leverich Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P’ship,

226 P.3d 1155, 1164 (Colo. App. 2009); Murdock v. Cohen, 762 P.2d

691, 693 (Colo. App. 1998) (quantum meruit claim). It permits

recovery of “eight percent per annum compounded annually for all

moneys . . . after they are wrongfully withheld or after they become

due to the date of payment or to the date judgment is entered,

whichever first occurs.” § 5-12-102(1)(b). Sections 5-12-102(4) and

5-12-106(1), C.R.S. 2021, permit recovery of postjudgment interest

of eight percent per annum on judgments that are appealed.

¶ 37 The parties agree that all monetary amounts awarded in this

case are subject to statutory pre- and post-judgment interest, and,

based on the plain language of the applicable statutes, we agree.

See Bainbridge, Inc. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 973 P.2d 684,

686 (Colo. App. 1998) (“A judgment creditor whose claim falls

within the clearly expressed wording of the above statutes is

entitled to [postjudgment] interest.”); Fasing v. LaFond, 944 P.2d

20
608, 615 (Colo. App. 1997) (“Section 5-12-102 is to be liberally

construed to permit recovery of prejudgment interest on money . . .

wrongfully withheld.”). The parties disagree about when

prejudgment interest began accruing on MarkWest’s claim for

liquidated damages, but not about the date when prejudgment

interest began accruing on Dyess’s quantum meruit claim. We

remand this case to the trial court with directions to award pre- and

post-judgment interest to both parties and to determine when

prejudgment interest began to accrue on MarkWest’s breach of

contract claim. The court may do so when it is able to make a final

calculation.

V. Conclusion

¶ 38 We reverse the judgment insofar as the trial court reduced the

amount of damages awarded to Dyess on its quantum meruit claim

and failed to award pre- and post-judgment interest. We affirm the

judgment insofar as the trial court accepted the jury’s liability

verdict on the quantum meruit claim and denied Dyess’s motion for

JNOV as to MarkWest’s counterclaim. The case is remanded for

further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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