Daniala Mohammadi v. Mark Kinslow

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
September 8, 2022

2022COA103

No. 21CA0109 Mohammadi v. Kinslow — Courts and Court
Procedure — Limitation of Actions — Limitations for Persons
Under Disability — When a Statute Begins to Run

Under section 13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021, a plaintiff who is a

“person under disability” when her cause of action accrues but

whose disability is later terminated may take action “within the

period fixed by the applicable statute of limitations or within two

years after the removal of the disability, whichever period expires

later.” As a matter of first impression in Colorado, a division of the

court of appeals is asked to determine the application of section

13-81-103(1)(c) to a situation in which the plaintiff’s disability is

terminated before the applicable statute of limitations expires. A

divided division concludes that it is bound by supreme court

precedent holding that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled
during the plaintiff’s period of disability and begins to run when the

disability is terminated. The division further concludes that the

supreme court has not recognized any exception to this rule when

the disability is terminated before the statute of limitations expires.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA103

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0109
Arapahoe County District Court No. 19CV32997
Honorable John L. Wheeler, Judge

Daniala Mohammadi,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Mark Kinslow,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Dunn, J., concurs
Welling, J., dissents

Announced September 8, 2022

The Viorst Law Offices, P.C., Anthony Viorst, David Chambers, Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Jeremy R. Maline & Associates, Kevin R. Kennedy, Andrew M. LaFontaine,
Westminster, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 In this car-bicycle accident case, the plaintiff, Daniala

Mohammadi, a minor at the time of the accident, appeals the

district court’s judgment dismissing her complaint against the

defendant, Mark Kinslow, as time barred.

¶2 Section 13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021, provides that when “the

disability of any person is terminated” — e.g., when, as here, a

minor turns eighteen — “such person shall be allowed to take

action within the period fixed by the applicable statute of

limitations or within two years after the removal of the disability,

whichever period expires later.” No published Colorado opinion has

addressed the application of section 13-81-103(1)(c) to the situation

presented here, in which Mohammadi turned eighteen before the

applicable statute of limitations expired.

¶3 The district court ruled that the three-year statute of

limitations was not tolled1 because Mohammadi’s disability was

terminated — because she turned eighteen — before the limitations

1“A tolling statute suspends the running of a time period that
otherwise would expire.” Cintron v. City of Colorado Springs,
886 P.2d 291, 294 (Colo. App. 1994). Throughout this opinion, we
use the word “toll” to mean suspend. See Thurman v. Tafoya,
895 P.2d 1050, 1054 n.5 (Colo. 1995).

1
period expired. Thus, the court explained, Mohammadi had either

three years from the date of the accident or two years from the date

she turned eighteen, whichever was later, to bring her lawsuit.

Because Mohammadi did not meet the later deadline, the district

court granted Kinslow’s motion to dismiss.

¶4 We reverse and remand for the district court to reinstate

Mohammadi’s complaint. We conclude that we are bound by

supreme court precedent holding that the applicable statute of

limitations is tolled during a plaintiff’s period of disability and

“begins to run when the minor reaches the age of eighteen.”

Rudnicki v. Bianco, 2021 CO 80, ¶ 16 (quoting Elgin v. Bartlett,

994 P.2d 411, 414 (Colo. 1999), overruled on other grounds by

Rudnicki, 2021 CO 80)). We further conclude that the supreme

court has not recognized any exception to this rule when the

disability ends before the statute of limitations expires.

I. Background

¶5 On November 6, 2015, Mohammadi, then sixteen years old,

was injured when Kinslow hit her bicycle with his car. At the time

of the accident, Kinslow was making a right turn while Mohammadi

was crossing the intersection. Mohammadi turned eighteen on

2
January 1, 2017, and sued Kinslow almost three years later, on

December 30, 2019, alleging negligence and negligence per se.

¶6 Kinslow moved to dismiss the lawsuit as untimely. He argued

that, because Mohammadi was a minor at the time of the accident,

section 13-81-103(1)(c) applied to her case. Under that section, he

argued, Mohammadi had to bring her action either within the

applicable three-year limitations period (that is, by November 6,

2018) or within two years after she turned eighteen (that is, by

January 1, 2019), whichever was later.

¶7 In response, Mohammadi agreed that section 13-81-103(1)(c)

applied but argued that, under that section, the three-year

limitations period was tolled and did not begin to run until her

eighteenth birthday. Accordingly, she argued, she did not need to

bring her action until three years after she turned eighteen (that is,

by January 1, 2020). Mohammadi further advised the district court

that a factually similar case was pending on appeal and asked the

court to stay this case “so that the dispositive issue [of the

interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c)] can be resolved by the

Colorado Court of Appeals.”

3
¶8 Later, in Roske v. Estate of Anderson, slip op. at ¶¶ 2, 20-21

(Colo. App. No. 19CA0484, Sept. 10, 2020) (not published pursuant

to C.A.R. 35(e)), a division of this court held that, because the

plaintiff was a minor at the time of her accident but turned eighteen

before the three-year limitations period expired, section

13-81-103(1)(c) required her to file suit “within three years from the

date of the collision, or two years from the date she turned eighteen,

whichever was later.”

¶9 While the district court noted that it could consider the

unpublished Roske decision for its “persuasive value,” see

Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 40, the court undertook its

own textual analysis of section 13-81-103(1)(c). It ruled that,

because Mohammadi turned eighteen before the three-year statute

of limitations expired, she had either three years from the date of

her accident or two years from the date she turned eighteen,

whichever was later, to bring her lawsuit. Because she did not

meet the later deadline, the court concluded that her suit was time

barred.

4
II. Analysis

¶ 10 Mohammadi contends that the district court’s interpretation of

section 13-81-103(1)(c) is inconsistent with supreme court

precedent. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 The district court’s judgment granting Kinslow’s C.R.C.P.

12(b)(5) motion to dismiss turns on its interpretation of section

13-81-103(1)(c). We review the court’s interpretation of that statute

de novo. Roberts v. Bruce, 2018 CO 58, ¶ 8.

B. Statutory Interpretation

¶ 12 When interpreting a statute, our task is to give effect to the

intent of the General Assembly. Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist.

No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo. 2006). In doing so, we look to

the plain language of the statute as a whole and give “consistent,

harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts.” Roberts, ¶ 8.

¶ 13 In general, a person injured in a motor vehicle accident must

bring suit within three years of the date of the accident. See

§§ 13-80-101(1)(n)(I), -108(1), C.R.S. 2021. At the time of her

accident, however, Mohammadi was a minor and, therefore, a

“person under disability.” See § 13-81-101(3), C.R.S. 2021 (defining

5
a minor under eighteen as a “[p]erson under disability”).

Accordingly, she was entitled to take advantage of the provisions of

section 13-81-103.

¶ 14 Section 13-81-103 states, in pertinent part:

(1) When . . . a limitation is fixed upon the time
within which a right of action . . . may be
asserted . . . and the true owner of said right is
a person under disability at the time such
right accrues, then:

(a) If such person under disability is
represented by a legal representative at the
time the right accrues, or if a legal
representative is appointed for such person
under disability at any time after the right
accrues and prior to the termination of such
disability, the applicable statute of limitations
shall run against such person under disability
in the same manner, for the same period, and
with the same effect as it runs against persons
not under disability. Such legal
representative, or his successor in trust, in
any event shall be allowed not less than two
years after his appointment within which to
take action on behalf of such person under
disability, even though the two-year period
expires after the expiration of the period fixed
by the applicable statute of limitations.

....

(c) If the disability of any person is terminated
before the expiration of the period of limitation
in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and no
legal representative has been appointed for

6
him, such person shall be allowed to take
action within the period fixed by the applicable
statute of limitations or within two years after
the removal of the disability, whichever period
expires later.

¶ 15 In interpreting section 13-81-103(1)(c), the district court

concluded the following:

 the phrase “before the expiration of the period of

limitation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1)” means

before the expiration of the applicable statute of

limitations;

 accordingly, section 13-81-103(1)(c) applies to someone

who is a “person under disability” when her cause of

action accrues but whose disability is “terminated” or

“remov[ed]” before the applicable statute of limitations

expires;

 because Mohammadi was a minor at the time of the

accident but turned eighteen before the expiration of the

three-year statute of limitations, section 13-81-103(1)(c)

applied to her case;

 section 13-81-103(1)(c) unambiguously requires the

calculation of two dates, and the later of the two

7
determines the last day on which a plaintiff’s claim may

be filed;

 the first date is “within the period fixed by the applicable

statute of limitations” — here, three years from the date

of the accident, or November 6, 2018;

 the second date is “within two years after the removal of

the disability” — here, two years from Mohammadi’s

eighteenth birthday, or January 1, 2019; and

 because Mohammadi did not bring her action on or

before January 1, 2019, the later of the two dates, it was

barred.

¶ 16 The federal district court’s reading of the statute in

McKinney v. Armco Recreational Products, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 464,

465 (D. Colo. 1976), supports these conclusions. The McKinney

court concluded that, when a plaintiff’s disability is terminated

before the applicable statute of limitations expires, “[p]ursuant to

§ 13-81-103(1)(c)[,] the applicable statute of limitations is not tolled,

but rather continues to run. However, even if the period in which

suit may be brought expires[,] a plaintiff still has two years [after

8
the removal of the disability] in which to initiate an action.” Id. The

court then illustrated its interpretation of the statute as follows:

For example, if a cause of action accruing to a
minor arises under a six-year statute of
limitations, but the action is not actually
brought until seven years later which is three
years after the minor has reached the age of
majority[,] the action would be barred under
§ 13-81-103(1)(c) since it would be more than
six years after accrual and more than two
years after reaching the age of majority.

Id.

¶ 17 We acknowledge that both the plain language of the statute

and McKinney support the district court’s interpretation of the

statute. But while we might agree with the district court’s

interpretation “were we writing on a blank slate, we are not writing

on such a slate.” Harner v. Chapman, 2012 COA 218, ¶ 20, rev’d,

2014 CO 78. Rather, as we will discuss below, we are bound by the

decisions of our supreme court. Id.

C. Supreme Court Precedent

¶ 18 Since McKinney was decided in 1976, our supreme court has

made it clear that section 13-81-103(1)(c) operates as Mohammadi

says it does — that is, it tolls the applicable limitations period until

a minor plaintiff reaches the age of eighteen. Our supreme court,

9
not the federal district court, is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning

of a Colorado statute. See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson,

79 P.3d 1221, 1229 (Colo. 2003). And our supreme court has

interpreted section 13-81-103 multiple times over the years.

¶ 19 In In re Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71, 75 (Colo. 1981), the

court said,

Section 13-81-103(1), C.R.S. 1973, . . . creates
what is the equivalent of a statutory toll to
applicable statutes of limitations for persons
under disability, such as minors, at the time a
right of action accrues. Upon termination of
the disability, section 13-81-103(1)(c) allows
“such person . . . to take action within the
period fixed by the applicable statute of
limitations, or within two years after the
removal of the disability, whichever period
expires later.”

(Citations omitted.)

¶ 20 Similarly, in Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891, 897 (Colo. 1986),

the court concluded that “there can be no question that [section

13-81-103] is intended to toll the applicable statute of limitations

during the period of disability.” Specifically, “[t]he provisions of

section 13-81-103 . . . operate to suspend the running of the

applicable statute of limitations until either the disability is

10
removed or, as expressly provided in subsection (1)(a), a ‘legal

representative’ is appointed for the ‘person under disability.’” Id.

¶ 21 In Elgin, 994 P.2d at 414, the court recognized that

[a] person under disability, for whom the court
has not appointed a legal representative, is
protected by the statute of limitations’ tolling
provisions. See § 13-81-103(1)(c), 5 C.R.S.
(1999). The statute of limitations begins to
run when the minor reaches the age of
eighteen or when, if it does, a court appoints a
legal representative for the minor.

¶ 22 Most recently, in Rudnicki, the court reaffirmed that “we have

construed section 13-81-103(1)(c)” to mean that, unless a legal

representative is appointed, “the statute of limitations . . . ‘begins to

run when the minor reaches the age of eighteen.’” Rudnicki, ¶ 16

(quoting Elgin, 994 P.2d at 414). Although Rudnicki overruled Elgin

on other grounds, it explicitly adopted Elgin’s reading of section

13-81-103(1)(c).

¶ 23 The dissent says that these supreme court cases are not

binding because they do not address “what happens when a

disability terminates, if at all, after the expiration of the otherwise

applicable limitations period.” Infra ¶ 40. But that is precisely

what section 13-81-103(1)(c) addresses — when “the disability of

11
any person is terminated before the expiration of the period of

limitation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1).” And the supreme

court, interpreting the same provision as the dissent, broadly

concluded that section 13-81-103(1)(c) tolls the statute of

limitations and, most recently, explained that “the statute of

limitations . . . ‘begins to run when the minor reaches the age of

eighteen.’” Rudnicki, ¶ 16 (quoting Elgin, 994 P.2d at 414).

Because the supreme court has not excepted from its broad

interpretation situations in which the minor turns eighteen before

the statute of limitations expires, neither may we.

¶ 24 We therefore conclude that the district court erred by finding

that Mohammadi’s lawsuit was time barred. Mohammadi was

sixteen when the accident occurred on November 6, 2015. Under

the supreme court’s interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c),

because no legal representative was appointed, the applicable

three-year limitations period was tolled and did not begin to run

until she turned eighteen on January 1, 2017. Consequently, as

she argued, Mohammadi had until January 1, 2020 — three years

from her eighteenth birthday — to file her action.

12
¶ 25 We are not persuaded otherwise by Kinslow’s argument that

section 13-81-106, C.R.S. 2021, confirms the district court’s

interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c). Section 13-81-106 is

titled “Removal of disability — effect,” and provides as follows:

If before the expiration of the period fixed by
the applicable statute of limitations the
disability of any person under disability is
removed, the fact of such removal shall not in
any way affect or stop the running of the
applicable statute of limitations, except as
provided in section 13-81-103(1)(c).

¶ 26 Kinslow argues that, “[u]nder this provision, once the

disability is removed, the concept of tolling is wholly inapplicable.”

But the operation of this provision is limited by the phrase, “except

as provided in section 13-81-103(1)(c).” And the supreme court has

interpreted section 13-81-103(1)(c) to mean that the statute of

limitations is tolled until the minor turns eighteen. We are not at

liberty to disregard a rule announced in prior supreme court

decisions absent “some clear indication” that the supreme court has

overruled its earlier decisions. Harner, ¶ 20 (quoting Silver v. Colo.

Cas. Ins. Co., 219 P.3d 324, 330 (Colo. App. 2009)). Thus, any

tension between section 13-81-106 and the supreme court’s

13
interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c) must be resolved by that

court or by the legislature.

¶ 27 Nor are we persuaded by Kinslow’s alternative argument that,

because Mohammadi asked the district court to stay this case “so

that the dispositive issue [of the interpretation of section

13-81-103(1)(c)] can be resolved” in Roske, she is bound by the

unpublished decision of the Roske division. As the district court

correctly noted, unpublished decisions of the court of appeals are

not binding. See Patterson, ¶ 40 (“[O]ur supreme court has made

it . . . clear that unpublished opinions ‘have no value as precedent.’”

(quoting Welby Gardens v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d

992, 999 (Colo. 2003))). And in any event, we are not obligated to

follow another division’s decision. People v. Johnson, 2020 COA

124, ¶ 12, aff’d, 2021 CO 79.

¶ 28 Further, we are unpersuaded by Kinslow’s argument that the

doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Mohammadi from taking a

position contrary to Roske. “Judicial estoppel is a narrow doctrine

that precludes a party from taking a position in a proceeding that is

totally inconsistent with a position the party took earlier in the

same or related proceeding in an intentional effort to mislead the

14
court.” Tuscany Custom Homes, LLC v. Westover, 2020 COA 178,

¶ 35. For three reasons, judicial estoppel does not apply here.

First, this doctrine “normally applies to inconsistent factual

positions rather than legal positions,” Arko v. People, 183 P.3d 555,

560 (Colo. 2008), and this case involves the latter. Second,

Mohammadi did not mislead, much less intentionally mislead, the

district court when she stated that the court of appeals in Roske

was considering the dispositive issue in this case. And third,

Mohammadi’s position on appeal is not “totally inconsistent” with

her position in the district court because she never agreed to be

bound by an unpublished decision.

¶ 29 For all these reasons, Mohammadi’s filing of the action on

December 30, 2019, fell within the time allowed by law, and the

district court therefore erred by dismissing her case against

Kinslow.

III. Request for Attorney Fees

¶ 30 Kinslow requests attorney fees under section 13-17-201,

C.R.S. 2021. That statute provides that an award of attorney fees is

mandatory when a district court dismisses a tort action under

C.R.C.P. 12(b). Crandall v. City of Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 663 (Colo.

15
2010). Further, “[a] party who successfully defends a dismissal

order is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees incurred on

appeal.” Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276, 284 (Colo. App. 2005).

However, because we reverse the district court’s dismissal order, we

deny Kinslow’s request for attorney fees.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 31 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the

district court with directions to reinstate Mohammadi’s complaint.

Kinslow’s request for attorney fees is denied.

JUDGE DUNN concurs.

JUDGE WELLING dissents.

16
JUDGE WELLING, dissenting.

¶ 32 In my view, the clear and unambiguous language of section

13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021, dictates the outcome in this case. It

is undisputed that Daniala Mohammadi turned eighteen years

old — and her age-related disability terminated — before the

expiration of the three-year limitations period that would have

otherwise governed her claim. Under such circumstances, section

13-81-103(1)(c) required Mohammadi to file suit within three years

from the date of her injury, or two years from the date she turned

eighteen, whichever was later. Because she didn’t file her

complaint before this deadline, the district court properly dismissed

her case.

¶ 33 Where I depart from the majority is in its interpretation and

application of Rudnicki v. Bianco, 2021 CO 80, and Elgin v. Bartlett,

994 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Rudnicki,

2021 CO 80. The majority concludes that Rudnicki and Elgin are

controlling in the circumstances presented here. Because I

disagree, I respectfully dissent.

17
I. The Unambiguous Language of the Statute Bars Mohammadi’s
Claim

¶ 34 “If the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as

written and go no further.” Ford Motor Co. v. Forrest Walker, 2022

CO 32, ¶ 19 (citing Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 12).

Only if the statutory language is ambiguous — “meaning that it is

susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation” — may we

turn to other interpretive aids to discern the legislature’s intent. Id.

(citing Nieto, ¶ 13). And in no event do the tools at our disposal

“include adding our own words or deleting any the legislature has

chosen.” Id. (citing Nieto, ¶ 12); see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Agilent

Techs., Inc., 2019 CO 41, ¶ 16 (“[W]e must respect the legislature’s

choice of language, and we will not add words to a statute or

subtract words from it.”).

A. Applying the Statute as Written

¶ 35 Article 81 of title 13 treats a minor — someone “under

eighteen years of age” — as a “person under disability” for the

purpose of the running of a statute of limitations. See

§ 13-81-101(3), C.R.S. 2021. And section 13-81-103 governs when

and how a statute of limitations runs against certain persons who

18
are or were under disability. Specifically, section 13-81-103(1) is

divided into three subsections, each governing a different scenario:

(a) when a “legal representative” represents or is appointed to

represent a person under disability; (b) when a person dies while

still under disability; and (c) when the disability “terminate[s]”

before the expiration of the limitations period. Here, we are faced

with the third of the three circumstances contemplated by section

103(1). The pertinent paragraph provides as follows:

If the disability of any person is terminated
before the expiration of the period of limitation
in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and no
legal representative has been appointed for
him, such person shall be allowed to take
action within the period fixed by the applicable
statute of limitations or within two years after
the removal of the disability, whichever period
expires later.

§ 13-81-103(1)(c) (emphasis added).

¶ 36 The statutory language couldn’t be clearer: if (1) the disability

“terminate[s]” before the expiration of the limitations period and

(2) no legal representative has been appointed for the person, then

the person must bring suit before the expiration of the longer of

(A) what remains in the limitations period or (B) two years after the

“removal of the disability.” Id.

19
¶ 37 The application of this rule to the facts of this case is equally

straightforward. Mohammadi was just under two months shy of

her seventeenth birthday when she was hit by a car driven by Mark

Kinslow and her cause of action against him accrued. A three-year

statute of limitations applies to Mohammadi’s claim against

Kinslow. See § 13-80-101(1)(n)(I), C.R.S. 2021. Because she was

under eighteen when she was injured, at the time her claim accrued

she was “a person under disability” for the purpose of the running

of the statute of limitations. The three-year limitations period had

not yet expired when Mohammadi reached her eighteenth birthday

and her “disability” was removed; there were approximately

twenty-two months remaining in the limitations period at that time.

Because less than two years remained on the statute of limitations

when Mohammadi turned eighteen (and the disability was

removed), she had two years from her eighteenth birthday (i.e., until

her twentieth birthday) to file her complaint. § 13-81-103(1)(c).

The complaint wasn’t filed until two days before her twenty-first

birthday, so it was untimely. § 13-81-103(2).

20
B. Supreme Court Cases

¶ 38 Up to this point I don’t think there is much daylight between

my view and that adopted by the majority.

¶ 39 Where I part ways with the majority is the effect to accord a

line of supreme court cases addressing how courts are to treat legal

disability under circumstances not explicitly covered by section

13-81-103(1). (Indeed, section 13-81-103 is silent as to what

happens when a limitations period expires while a plaintiff is still

under a disability.)

¶ 40 The cases that Mohammadi and the majority rely on address a

scenario not covered by section 13-81-103: what happens when a

disability terminates, if at all, after the expiration of the otherwise

applicable limitations period. See Rudnicki, ¶ 16; Elgin, 994 P.2d at

414; cf. Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891, 897 (Colo. 1986); In re

Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71, 75 (Colo. 1981).

¶ 41 Rudnicki and Elgin are medical malpractice cases involving

children who were injured at birth and at nine years old,

respectively, and the applicable two-year statute of limitations,

therefore, expired long before they turned eighteen. Rudnicki, ¶ 1;

Elgin, 994 P.2d at 413.

21
¶ 42 Southard and Estate of Daigle aren’t any more on point.

Southard involved a plaintiff who contended that he was under an

ongoing disability when he attempted to amend his complaint to

include a claim against an additional defendant after the underlying

statute of limitations would have expired but for the alleged

disability. 714 P.2d at 895. And Estate of Daigle involved wrongful

death claims brought by three children who were still under the age

of majority at the time the claims were filed on their behalf.

634 P.2d at 73.

¶ 43 Simply put, none of the cases relied on by the majority involve

the application of any provision of section 13-81-103. Instead,

those cases involve the supreme court filling a gap not explicitly

addressed by section 13-81-103 (or any other statutory

provision) — namely, how is a limitations period affected when it

expires while a plaintiff is still under a disability.

¶ 44 To be sure, the cases cited by the majority speak broadly of

the statute of limitations being “tolled” while a plaintiff is under

eighteen. See, e.g., Rudnicki, ¶¶ 16-17; Elgin, 994 P.2d at 413-14.

The majority concludes that because the supreme court has not

excepted situations in which the minor turns eighteen before the

22
statute of limitations expires from its broad interpretation, neither

may we. Supra ¶ 23. I disagree. Instead, because the supreme

court hasn’t addressed what happens when a plaintiff’s disability is

terminated before the applicable statute of limitations expires, we

must look to the plain language of the statute and not extend a

supreme court ruling to where the supreme court itself hasn’t said

it applies.

¶ 45 And I am not persuaded that the supreme court’s use of

sweeping language to address circumstances outside the reach of

the statute at issue circumscribes the operation of the statute

under circumstances actually covered by the statute. More to the

point, the cases cited by the majority don’t alter the plain meaning

of section 13-81-103(1)(c); in my view, that slate remains blank.

II. Application

¶ 46 The timeline below illustrates section 13-81-103(1)(c)’s

application to the facts of this case. The red line represents the

period that Mohammadi was under a disability due to her age; the

green line represents the three-year period after the claim accrued.

As shown by the red and green lines together, Mohammedi’s

disability terminated (she reached the age of majority) before the

23
three-year limitations period expired. The solid orange line

represents the two-year period following the termination of the

disability (the period between her eighteenth and twentieth

birthdays). That period expired on January 1, 2019 (Mohammedi’s

twentieth birthday); the complaint wasn’t filed until December 30,

2019 (the vertical blue line). Accordingly, I would conclude that

Mohammadi’s complaint is time barred.

¶ 47 The limitations period urged by Mohammadi and adopted by

the majority is the one shown by the dashed orange line, which is

the three-year period following the termination of disability. Only

this interpretation saves Mohammadi’s complaint. Because this

interpretation is inconsistent with section 13-81-103(1)(c) and


Although Mohammadi’s birthday falls on a legal holiday, see
C.R.C.P. 6(a)(2), her deadline to file her negligence complaint would
still have been the second anniversary of the termination of her
disability, see Morin v. ISS Facility Servs., Inc., 2021 COA 55, ¶¶ 14,
19; Williams v. Crop Prod. Servs., Inc., 2015 COA 64, ¶ 2.

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because, in my view, it isn’t required by any binding authority, I

reject it and, therefore, respectfully dissent.

25