v. Vanderpauye

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
September 9, 2021

2021COA121

No. 18CA0792, People v. Vanderpauye — Evidence — Hearsay
— Self-Serving Hearsay — Hearsay Exceptions — Excited
Utterance — Relevancy — Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on
Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time

A division of the court of appeals holds that neither the

Colorado Rules of Evidence nor the precedents of the Colorado

Supreme Court establish a per se rule prohibiting the admission of

self-serving hearsay by a criminal defendant. Instead, a criminal

defendant’s self-serving hearsay is admissible, subject to the

principles contained in CRE 403, if, but only if, the statement

satisfies a hearsay-rule exception recognized in the Colorado Rules

of Evidence.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA121

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0792
Boulder County District Court No. 16CR425
Honorable Bruce Langer, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jacob Vanderpauye,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER
Richman and Welling, JJ., concur

Announced September 9, 2021

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Brian Sedaka, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 The dispositive question raised in this appeal is whether

Colorado law contains a rule that prohibits the admission of

self-serving hearsay statements by a criminal defendant.

¶2 Defendant, Jacob Vanderpauye, appeals his conviction for

sexual assault (victim physically helpless). During the alleged

sexual assault, and immediately after the victim accused him of

rape, Vanderpauye said to the victim: “I thought you said I could do

anything to you.” The trial court excluded this statement based on

its belief that Colorado law prohibits the admission of self-serving

hearsay by criminal defendants, irrespective of whether the hearsay

meets one or more of the exceptions contained in the Colorado

Rules of Evidence. The trial court alternatively ruled that the

statement was neither an excited utterance nor a statement of

Vanderpauye’s then-existing state of mind.

¶3 We hold that neither the Colorado Rules of Evidence nor the

precedents of the Colorado Supreme Court establish a per se rule

prohibiting the admission of self-serving hearsay by a criminal

defendant. Instead, a criminal defendant’s self-serving hearsay is

admissible, subject to the principles contained in CRE 403, if, but

1
only if, the statement satisfies a hearsay-rule exception recognized

in the Colorado Rules of Evidence.

¶4 Because Vanderpauye’s statement was admissible under one

of the established hearsay exceptions contained in the Colorado

Rules of Evidence, the trial court erred. This error was not

harmless, so we reverse the conviction and remand the case for a

new trial. We address some of Vanderpauye’s other claims of error

because they are likely to recur on retrial.

I. Background

¶5 Evidence admitted at trial permitted the jury to find the

following facts. After a night of heavy drinking with friends, the

victim went home with Vanderpauye, engaged in affectionate

kissing, and fell asleep on Vanderpauye’s bed. When the victim

woke up, Vanderpauye was on top of her, having sexual intercourse

with her. The victim yelled, “[W]hat are you doing? You’re raping

me.” The parties agree that, in response to this accusation,

Vanderpauye said, “I thought you said I could do anything to you.”

The victim pushed Vanderpauye off her, ran out of the apartment,

and returned home.

2
¶6 After she returned home, the victim told her friend that she

had been raped. The victim slept for a few hours, and the next

morning she told several other friends, her mother, and her aunt

that she had been raped. Shortly afterward, she was examined by a

sexual assault nurse examiner and she reported the alleged assault

to the police.

¶7 The prosecution charged Vanderpauye with three counts:

 sexual assault (causing submission of the victim) under

section 18-3-402(1)(a), C.R.S. 2020;

 sexual assault (incapable of appraising) under

section 18-3-402(1)(b); and

 sexual assault (victim physically helpless) under

section 18-3-402(1)(h).

¶8 The prosecution dismissed the sexual assault (causing

submission of the victim) charge. The jury was unable to reach a

verdict on the sexual assault (incapable of appraising) charge, and

the prosecution dismissed it. The jury convicted Vanderpauye of

sexual assault (victim physically helpless). The court sentenced

Vanderpauye to sex offender intensive supervised probation for a

term of twenty years to life.

3
II. The Trial Court Reversibly Erred by Excluding Vanderpauye’s
Self-Serving Hearsay Statement

¶9 Vanderpauye argues that the trial court reversibly erred by

refusing to admit his hearsay statement, “I thought you said I could

do anything to you.” We agree.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 10 The victim told the police that, immediately after she woke up

and realized that Vanderpauye was having sexual intercourse with

her, she accused him of raping her. She admitted that

Vanderpauye immediately responded to her accusation by saying, “I

thought you said I could do anything to you.”

¶ 11 Vanderpauye moved for an order permitting the jury to hear

his statement. He argued that his statement was admissible

because, although it was hearsay, it met two exceptions to the

hearsay rule — the excited utterance exception in CRE 803(2) and

the then-existing state of mind exception in CRE 803(3).

Vanderpauye further argued that the second layer of his hearsay

statement — the victim’s alleged statement “[you can] do anything

to [me],” upon which his denial rested — was not being offered for

the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, he argued that it was

4
admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of its effect on the listener to

show his belief that the victim consented to sexual intercourse.

¶ 12 The trial court first ruled that the statement was inadmissible

because it was self-serving hearsay:

[T]he first threshold that I think I have to cross
is whether or not it’s self-serving hearsay.

....

And, obviously the concern is that defendants
sometimes make things up and paint things in
a color that’s more beneficial to them. And
there’s abundant case law that self-serving
hearsay is not admissible. It strikes me that
this statement falls squarely within that area
of concern.

¶ 13 Alternatively, the trial court ruled that the statement was

neither an excited utterance nor a statement of Vanderpauye’s

then-existing state of mind.

If anything was startling to Mr. Vanderpauye,
it was [the victim] either waking up and
stopping him or for some other reason
stopping him, but what was startling to him, it
was not that statement. It was some other
event that happened.

Similarly, the state of mind that’s relevant to
this case is not a state of mind at the time that
he made that statement. It would be his state
of mind at the time that he engaged in – began,
I guess, engaging in this alleged sex act. . . .

5
So for all of those reasons, I’m going to find
that the statement is not admissible.

¶ 14 At trial, the victim testified on direct examination that when

she woke up, she “immediately said to [Vanderpauye], what are you

doing? You’re raping me. I was passed out. You’re raping me.”

She also testified that Vanderpauye “seemed very startled that I

woke up” and that “[b]ased off his body language, he seemed

surprised.” After this testimony, Vanderpauye renewed his proffer

of his hearsay statement.

¶ 15 The trial court adhered to its prior ruling, stating that

regardless of whether it’s an excited utterance
or not, I still find it’s self-serving hearsay. . . .
[T]he analysis that because it’s self-serving
hearsay, it’s not inherently reliable, I think
that that trumps the excited utterance
exception if it is an excited utterance, but I’m
not finding it is an excited utterance, so my
ruling stands.

B. Preservation and Standard of Review

¶ 16 The parties agree that Vanderpauye preserved this claim. “We

review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.”

Campbell v. People, 2019 CO 66, ¶ 21. A court abuses its discretion

when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,

or if it misapplies the law. People v. Baker, 2021 CO 29, ¶ 29.

6
C. The Colorado Rules of Evidence Govern the Admissibility of
Self-Serving Hearsay

¶ 17 Hearsay is a “statement other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). Hearsay is not

admissible “except as provided by [the Colorado Rules of Evidence]

or by the civil and criminal procedural rules applicable to the courts

of Colorado or by any statutes of the State of Colorado.” CRE 802.

¶ 18 In People v. Cunningham, the Colorado Supreme Court held, in

the context of an admission against interest, that “[h]earsay

declarations made by a defendant in his own favor are generally not

admissible for the defense. ‘A self-serving declaration is excluded

because there is nothing to guarantee its testimonial

trustworthiness.’” 194 Colo. 198, 202-03, 570 P.2d 1086, 1089

(1977) (quoting 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence

§ 303, at 97-98 (13th ed. 1972)).

¶ 19 In Cunningham, the defendant was charged with murder and

kidnapping. Id. at 200, 570 P.2d at 1087. He sought to admit his

hearsay statement that admitted involvement in the kidnapping but

denied involvement in the murder. Id. at 203, 570 P.2d at 1089.

7
The supreme court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the

statement, concluding that “its primary purpose, both when made

and when offered on the defendant’s behalf at trial, was to attempt

to shift blame to others, and to deny any involvement in the

murder.” Id.

¶ 20 Based on Cunningham and later court of appeals decisions

following it, the Attorney General argues that “a defendant’s

self-serving hearsay declarations should be excluded when there is

nothing to guarantee trustworthiness.” We reject the Attorney

General’s position for several reasons.

¶ 21 First, the Colorado Rules of Evidence, promulgated by the

supreme court after it decided Cunningham, do not contain any rule

against the admission of self-serving hearsay by a criminal

defendant.1 “When the Colorado Supreme Court exercises its

constitutional authority and adopts a rule of procedure or evidence

that conflicts with an earlier opinion of that court, the later

1Cunningham was decided in 1977. The Colorado Rules of
Evidence became effective on January 1, 1980. See People v.
Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 375 (Colo. 2007).

8
precedent or rule controls, not the former.” People v. Gonzales,

2019 COA 30, ¶ 19, aff’d, 2020 CO 71.

¶ 22 Second, in a case decided after both Cunningham and the

effective date of the Colorado Rules of Evidence, the supreme court

authorized the admission of a self-serving hearsay statement by a

criminal defendant, without subjecting the statement to the

purported rule against the admission of self-serving hearsay. King

v. People, 785 P.2d 596, 600-03 (Colo. 1990).

¶ 23 In King, the defendant moved to admit hearsay statements

that he made to his psychiatrist. Id. at 599. The trial court did not

consider whether the statements were admissible under CRE 803(4)

as statements for the purposes of diagnosis and treatment, instead

ruling that the statements were inadmissible because they were

self-serving. Id. Without addressing the purported rule against the

admission of self-serving hearsay, the supreme court held that the

proffered statement met the requirements of CRE 803(4) and was

therefore admissible. Id. at 603. The court reasoned that the

hearsay exceptions in CRE 803 were themselves predicated on

considerations of trustworthiness, so if a hearsay statement met the

9
requirements of the exception, it was admissible “without regard to

any independent demonstration of trustworthiness.” Id.

¶ 24 This court’s opinion in People v. Pack, 797 P.2d 774, 775-76

(Colo. App. 1990), is consistent both with King and with our

analysis here. There, a division of this court held that a criminal

defendant’s excited utterance was admissible under CRE 803(2)

notwithstanding that it was a self-serving statement. Pack, 797

P.2d at 776. It distinguished Cunningham on the basis that the

defendant there did not argue that his statement was admissible as

an excited utterance under CRE 803(2).2 Pack, 797 P.2d at 775.

¶ 25 We acknowledge that supreme court case law explains that the

self-serving nature of a statement against interest is relevant to the

admissibility analysis under CRE 804(b)(3).3 See Nicholls v. People,

2 To the extent that other divisions of this court have cited
Cunningham for the proposition that self-serving hearsay is
inadmissible even if it fits within an exception recognized by the
Colorado Rules of Evidence, they have done so without much
analysis. See, e.g., People v. Abeyta, 728 P.2d 327, 331 (Colo. App.
1986). More importantly, those cases are inconsistent with the
most recent supreme court case law, and we decline to follow them.
We are not bound by the decision of another division of this court.
Campbell v. People, 2020 CO 49, ¶ 41.
3 An inculpatory statement by a criminal defendant is not hearsay

at all under CRE 801(d).

10
2017 CO 71, ¶¶ 44-45. But nothing in Nicholls, or other supreme

court precedent decided after the promulgation of the Colorado

Rules of Evidence, creates an independent impediment to the

admission of self-serving hearsay. See King, 785 P.2d at 603.

¶ 26 A review of case law from other jurisdictions supports our

analysis. A majority of other state courts have concluded that “no

general rule of evidence excludes statements merely because they

are self[-]serving.” State v. Vandenburg, No. M2017-01882-CCA-R3-

CD, 2019 WL 3720892, at *46 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2019)

(citation omitted) (appeal denied Jan. 15, 2020); see also Williams v.

State, 915 P.2d 371, 378-79 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996); Swain v.

Citizens & S. Bank of Albany, 372 S.E.2d 423, 425 (Ga. 1988)

(“‘[S]elf-serving’ does not describe an independent ground of

objection.”) (citation omitted). But see Calloway v. State, 210 So. 3d

1160, 1183 (Fla. 2017) (holding that self-serving hearsay

statements are generally inadmissible subject to the rule of

completeness).

¶ 27 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has

further explained that “a flat rule of exclusion of declarations of a

party on the grounds that they may be described as ‘self-serving’

11
even though otherwise free from objection under the hearsay rule

and its exceptions, detracts from the fund of relevant information

which should be available to the jury.” United States v. Dellinger,

472 F.2d 340, 381 (7th Cir. 1972).

¶ 28 Learned treatises also support our analysis. One treatise has

recognized that “[i]f a statement with a self-serving aspect falls

within an exception to the hearsay rule, the judgment underlying

the exception that the assurances of trustworthiness outweigh the

dangers inherent in hearsay should be taken as controlling, and the

declaration should be admitted despite its self-serving aspects.” 2

Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 270, Westlaw

(8th ed. database updated Jan. 2020). Discussing self-serving

statements that meet the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 803(3),

another treatise explains that concerns about candor alone do not

justify excluding such statements because “the possibility that

factfinders will be misled, or fail to appreciate the possibility that

they are false or exaggerated, seems remote.” 4 Christopher B.

Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence §§ 8:70-8:71,

Westlaw (4th ed. database updated May 2021).

12
¶ 29 For these reasons, we conclude that Colorado law does not

contain any bar, separate from the provisions of the Colorado Rules

of Evidence, to the admission of self-serving hearsay statements by

a criminal defendant. Accordingly, if the proffered statement meets

an exception to the hearsay rule, it may be admitted, subject to the

provisions of CRE 403.4 It follows that the trial court erred as a

matter of law when it relied on this nonexistent evidentiary rule to

exclude Vanderpauye’s self-serving statement.

¶ 30 That conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry. The

question remains whether Vanderpauye’s statement was admissible

under the Colorado Rules of Evidence. On this record, the answer

is yes.

4 The substance of the statement, including any self-serving nature,
could be a proper factor for a trial court to consider in exercising its
discretion to exclude such a statement under CRE 403. But the
self-serving nature of the hearsay statement is not sufficient, by
itself, to justify exclusion. Cf. People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315,
322 (Colo. 2004) (recognizing that the exclusion of cumulative
evidence that would have “materially assisted” the defendant’s case
could violate the defendant’s constitutional right to present a
defense).

13
D. Vanderpauye’s Hearsay Statement was Admissible as an
Excited Utterance Under CRE 803(2)

¶ 31 An excited utterance is a “statement relating to a startling

event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of

excitement caused by the event or condition.” CRE 803(2). There

are three requirements for admissibility under this exception:

(1) the event must be sufficiently startling to
render normal reflective thought processes of
the observer inoperative; (2) the statement
must be a spontaneous reaction to the
occurrence; and (3) direct or circumstantial
evidence must exist to allow the jury to infer
that the declarant had the opportunity to
observe the startling event.

People v. Martinez, 83 P.3d 1174, 1177 (Colo. App. 2003).

¶ 32 Under the first requirement for the admission of an excited

utterance, the event that triggers the hearsay statement — not the

statement itself — must be startling. The trial court ruled that

Vanderpauye’s statement was not an excited utterance because “[i]f

anything was startling to Mr. Vanderpauye, it was [the victim] either

waking up and stopping him or for some other reason stopping him,

but what was startling to him, it was not that statement.” To the

extent the trial court ruled that Vanderpauye’s statement was not

an excited utterance because the statement itself was not startling,

14
the trial court misapplied the law. A trial court necessarily abuses

its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law.

People v. Voth, 2013 CO 61, ¶ 15.

¶ 33 If, instead, the court was referring to the victim’s statement,

we reject the court’s conclusion that the victim’s accusation of rape

was not startling. The Attorney General argues that Vanderpauye’s

word choice suggests a considered and self-serving planned

response. However, the victim herself testified that Vanderpauye

seemed startled and surprised when she woke up and accused him

of raping her. This established that the event was sufficiently

startling to render inoperative Vanderpauye’s normal reflective

thought process for purposes of admission under CRE 803(2). (Of

course, whether Vanderpauye’s statement was credible or was made

solely to exculpate himself was exclusively for the jury to determine.

See People v. Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123, 128 (Colo. 1983).)

¶ 34 The victim’s own statement to the police that Vanderpauye

immediately responded to her accusation by saying, “I thought you

said I could do anything to you” established that the statement was

a spontaneous reaction to the event. Finally, the undisputed

evidence established that Vanderpauye observed the startling event

15
of the victim waking up and accusing him of rape. Accordingly, the

record establishes that all requirements for the admission of an

excited utterance were satisfied.5 The trial court abused its

discretion by concluding otherwise.6

E. The Victim’s Alleged Statement Contained Within
Vanderpauye’s Excited Utterance Was Not Hearsay

¶ 35 The Attorney General argues that Vanderpauye’s statement

was nonetheless inadmissible because it contained a second layer

of hearsay — the victim’s alleged statement “[you can] do anything

to [me].” We reject this argument because the victim’s alleged

statement was not hearsay.

¶ 36 Words that carry legal consequences or logical significance

independent of the assertive content of the words are not hearsay.

4 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, § 8:18. In a related context, the United

5 Because we conclude that this statement met the requirements for
admission as an excited utterance under CRE 803(2), it is
unnecessary for us to analyze whether it also was admissible as a
statement of Vanderpauye’s then-existing state of mind under CRE
803(3).
6 The rule of completeness codified in CRE 106 might provide an

independent basis for the admission of Vanderpauye’s statement.
But Vanderpauye did not, either in the trial court or here, make
that argument. Respecting the party presentation principle, we do
not further address the rule of completeness. See Galvan v. People,
2020 CO 82, ¶ 45.

16
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that statements

that a defendant consented to a search of her person or belongings

were admissible nonhearsay because the statements had legal

significance independent of the assertive content of the words.

United States v. Moreno, 233 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 2000); see also

State v. Cotton, 353 P.3d 472 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015) (per curiam)

(unpublished table decision).

¶ 37 We likewise conclude that in a prosecution for sexual assault,

at least under section 18-3-402(1)(h) where one of the elements of

the offense is that the victim did not consent, statements that grant

or withhold consent to sexual intercourse are legally significant

independent of the assertive content of the words.7 Accordingly, the

victim’s alleged statement “[you can] do anything to [me]” was

admissible as nonhearsay because it had independent legal

significance apart from the truth of the matter asserted.

7 We note that lack of consent is not an element of other types of
sexual assault. See § 18-3-402(1)(a), (b), C.R.S. 2020. But under
the plain language of section 18-3-402(1)(h), lack of consent is an
element that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt.

17
F. The Error was Not Harmless

¶ 38 We next address whether the error requires reversal. On this

record, we hold that it does.

¶ 39 We review nonconstitutional trial errors that were preserved by

objection for harmless error. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12.

On harmless error review, we “will reverse the judgment of

conviction if there is a reasonable probability that any error by the

trial court contributed to [the defendant’s] conviction.” People v.

Monroe, 2020 CO 67, ¶ 17. Whether an error is harmless depends

on “the overall strength of the state’s case, the impact of the

improperly admitted or excluded evidence on the trier of fact,

whether the proffered evidence was cumulative, and the presence of

other evidence corroborating or contradicting the point for which

the evidence was offered.” People v. Casias, 2012 COA 117, ¶ 64

(quoting State v. Martin V., 926 A.2d 49, 54 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007)).

1. The Prosecution was Required to Prove Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt that the Victim Had Not Consented

¶ 40 The Attorney General argues that any error in refusing to

admit this evidence was harmless because Vanderpauye’s

“statement that [the victim] said he could do whatever he wanted to

18
her at some point before she fell asleep, did not, on its own terms,

establish that she consented to intercourse when she was asleep.”

This argument misses the mark.

¶ 41 Vanderpauye was convicted of sexual assault (victim

physically helpless) under section 18-3-402(1)(h). To convict a

defendant of sexual assault under this subsection, the prosecution

must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

 “The victim is physically helpless”; and

 “the actor knows the victim is physically helpless”; and

 “the victim has not consented.”

Id.

¶ 42 Because the victim’s lack of consent is an element of the

charge for which Vanderpauye was convicted, whether the victim

consented to sexual intercourse, the extent and substance of that

consent, and whether the victim was, in fact, asleep during the

incident were all critical factual determinations for the jury. See

Dunton v. People, 898 P.2d 571, 573 (Colo. 1995). Vanderpauye’s

statement was directly relevant to these factual determinations.

19
2. Misleading Silence

¶ 43 The exclusion of Vanderpauye’s statement was harmful for an

additional and independent reason. The trial court permitted the

victim to testify that she accused Vanderpauye of raping her but

prohibited the jury from hearing that Vanderpauye immediately

denied the accusation. This omission created the misleading

impression that Vanderpauye was silent in the face of an

accusation of criminal conduct and was therefore guilty.

¶ 44 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that

“[s]ilence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of

accusation, since it is assumed in such circumstances that the

accused would be more likely than not to dispute an untrue

accusation.” United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975). The

Colorado Supreme Court likewise has recognized that the “failure to

deny an accusation, when the statement is heard and understood

by an accused and could have been denied by him without

emotional or physical impediment, is admissible as an adoptive

admission.” People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 610 (Colo. 1983).

¶ 45 In People v. Short, this court recognized that the exclusion of a

defendant’s denial of wrongdoing allowed the prosecution to present

20
a misleading picture and could warrant reversal for a new trial.

2018 COA 47, ¶¶ 58-59.

¶ 46 Despite this misleading impression, the Attorney General

argues that any error was harmless because Vanderpauye’s

statement, “I thought you said I could do anything to you,” was

cumulative of the evidence that the victim had abrasions on her

knees. This argument distorts the definition of cumulative.

¶ 47 Evidence that is “decidedly different in character and impact”

is not cumulative. People v. Genrich, 2019 COA 132M, ¶ 117

(Berger, J., specially concurring).

¶ 48 True, Vanderpauye argued that the physical evidence of the

abrasions to the victim’s knees supported his defense of consent

because that type of injury was more consistent with consensual

sexual behavior. However, this circumstantial evidence of consent

was “decidedly different in character and impact” than

Vanderpauye’s statement, which was direct evidence of consent.

Accordingly, the omitted evidence was not cumulative. Even if this

evidence were cumulative, the supreme court has held that

evidence, even cumulative evidence, that “may corroborate the

21
defendant’s own statement should ordinarily be admitted.” People

v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 320 (Colo. 2004).

¶ 49 We also reject the Attorney General’s argument that the “jury

would not have credited [Vanderpauye’s] self-serving hearsay

statement.” Maybe so. But the “determination of the credibility of

witnesses is solely within the province of the jury.” Gonzales, 666

P.2d at 128. We cannot say what weight the jury would have given

the evidence. Viewing the evidence as a whole, there is a

reasonable probability that Vanderpauye’s statement could have

affected the jury’s verdict.

¶ 50 For all these reasons, we reverse the judgment of conviction

and remand for a new trial.

III. Errors Likely to Recur on Retrial

¶ 51 Although we reverse based upon the trial court’s erroneous

exclusion of Vanderpauye’s hearsay statement, we address

Vanderpauye’s other claims of error to the extent they are likely to

arise on retrial.8

8We don’t address whether the trial court erred by excluding blood
alcohol extrapolation testimony because the principal basis for its
exclusion — that Vanderpauye violated Crim. P. 16’s expert

22
A. Cold Expert Testimony9

¶ 52 Vanderpauye challenges the trial court’s admission of cold

expert testimony about sexual assault dynamics.

1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Denying
Vanderpauye’s Request for a Shreck Hearing

¶ 53 Vanderpauye argues that he was entitled to a Shreck hearing

to determine whether Jean McAllister’s proposed testimony was

reliable. We disagree.

¶ 54 Vanderpauye requested a hearing under People v. Shreck, 22

P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001), regarding the endorsed cold expert. The

trial court made the necessary CRE 702 findings without a hearing.

disclosure requirements — presumably will not recur at a retrial.
We likewise decline to address Vanderpauye’s argument that the
trial court reversibly erred by allowing multiple witnesses to recount
the victim’s account of the incident and emotional reaction because
on retrial Vanderpauye’s hearsay statement will likely be admitted,
and we are confident that the trial court will properly exercise its
discretion under CRE 403.
9 In People v. Cooper, 2019 COA 21, ¶ 2 (cert. granted Mar. 2, 2020),

a division of this court defined the term “blind expert” as
synonymous with the term “cold expert.” Most of the published
cases addressing this concept and virtually all law review articles
addressing the concept use the term “blind expert.” However, the
term “blind expert” is neither particularly nor accurately descriptive
of the concept. Some may find the term to be offensive. As a result,
we use the term “cold expert” throughout this opinion.

23
¶ 55 The trial court’s decision to hold or dispense with a Shreck

hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Rector, 248

P.3d 1196, 1201 (Colo. 2011). A court abuses its discretion when

its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it

misapplies the law. Baker, ¶ 29. A trial court need not hold a

Shreck hearing “provided it has before it sufficient information to

make specific findings under CRE 403 and CRE 702 about the

reliability of the scientific principles involved, the expert’s

qualification to testify to such matters, the helpfulness to the jury,

and potential prejudice.” Rector, 248 P.3d at 1201.

¶ 56 The trial court’s denial of Vanderpauye’s request for a Shreck

hearing was based on Vanderpauye’s motion, the prosecution’s

response, and an amended expert endorsement (which included the

expert’s curriculum vitae and an amended summary expert report).

¶ 57 Numerous Colorado appellate courts have recognized the value

and upheld the reliability of cold expert testimony regarding the

nonintuitive reactions of victims in sexual assault cases. See, e.g.,

Venalonzo v. People, 2017 CO 9, ¶¶ 32-34. Therefore, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a Shreck hearing on

the question of whether such evidence was sufficiently reliable.

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2. Cold Expert Testimony that Sexual Assault is Not a Mistake or
a Miscommunication Must be Excluded on Retrial

¶ 58 Vanderpauye also argues that the entirety of McAllister’s

testimony was irrelevant, was unfairly prejudicial, and should have

been excluded.

¶ 59 Relevant cold expert testimony gives jurors information

necessary to understand what might otherwise seem to be

counterintuitive actions by the victims of sexual assaults. People v.

Relaford, 2016 COA 99, ¶ 30. But there are two substantial risks

associated with the admission of cold expert testimony. People v.

Cooper, 2019 COA 21, ¶ 19 (cert. granted Mar. 2, 2020).

¶ 60 The first is that “most, if not all, expert testimony has the

tendency to bolster the credibility of one or more witnesses.” Id.;

Venalonzo, ¶¶ 32, 36. While expert testimony “may incidentally give

rise to an inference that a victim is or is not telling the truth about

the specific incident,” “this fact alone is insufficient to deny

admission of the evidence, because expert testimony generally tends

to bolster or attack the credibility of another witness.” People v.

Koon, 724 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Colo. App. 1986). Nonetheless,

witnesses may not directly or indirectly testify about the

25
truthfulness of another witness. See People v. Wittrein, 221 P.3d

1076, 1081 (Colo. 2009).

¶ 61 The second risk is that “the jury may find or infer that

historical facts existed based solely on the expert’s testimony,

rather than on the historical evidence presented to the jury.”

Cooper, ¶ 21. Accordingly, “expert testimony is only admissible

when the proffered testimony ‘fits’ the factual issues involved in the

case.” Id. at ¶ 25 (quoting People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 323

(Colo. 2003)).

¶ 62 Here, the cold expert testified that it was a “myth” that “sexual

assault is somehow a mistake or miscommunication.” This

testimony went well beyond opinions regarding the typical

responses of sexual assault victims.

¶ 63 This opinion must be excluded if again offered on retrial for

two reasons. First, the statement appears to be demonstrably

untrue. There are obvious circumstances when a defendant is

criminally liable for sexual assault resulting from a

miscommunication. For example, sexual intercourse with a person

under the age of consent constitutes a crime regardless of whether

26
the defendant knew that the victim was under the age of consent.

See § 18-3-402(1)(d).

¶ 64 Second, as we see it, the only purpose of the expert’s opinion

in this regard was to buttress the credibility of the victim, an

improper basis for the admission of expert testimony. See Wittrein,

221 P.3d at 1081.

¶ 65 On retrial, the court must, on timely objection, limit the expert

testimony to opinions that do not improperly bolster the credibility

of any witness and that “fit” the facts supported by evidence

admitted at trial.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Refusing
Vanderpauye’s Tendered Intoxication Instruction

¶ 66 Vanderpauye argues that the trial court reversibly erred by

refusing to give his tendered intoxication instruction. We disagree.

¶ 67 Defense counsel tendered the following instruction:

The court admitted certain evidence for a
limited purpose.

In this case evidence of [the victim]’s
intoxication has been admitted for the purpose
of her credibility and ability to make
observations.

The prosecution has not and is not alleging
that [the victim] was physically helpless or

27
incapable of appraising the nature of her own
conduct due to intoxication.

You are instructed that you cannot consider
evidence of [the victim]’s intoxication except for
the limited purpose described above.

The trial court refused to give the tendered instruction.

¶ 68 A trial court has substantial discretion in formulating jury

instructions if “they are correct statements of the law and fairly and

adequately cover the issues presented.” People v. Nerud, 2015 COA

27, ¶ 35 (quoting People v. Gallegos, 226 P.3d 1112, 1115 (Colo.

App. 2009)). “[A] trial court may refuse an instruction if it is

argumentative, unduly emphasizes particular evidence, or contains

statements not supported by the evidence.” People v. Baird, 66 P.3d

183, 194 (Colo. App. 2002). We review a trial court’s decision to

give, or not to give, a particular jury instruction for an abuse of

discretion. Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 69 The trial court correctly instructed the jury on the elements of

the offenses. Moreover, the tendered instruction was argumentative

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and confusing. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by refusing Vanderpauye’s tendered instruction.10

C. Evidence that Vanderpauye Lied About His Age

¶ 70 Vanderpauye contends that evidence that he lied about his age

was irrelevant. We don’t address this contention because on retrial

Vanderpauye’s hearsay statement will likely be admitted, bringing

CRE 806 into play regarding impeachment.

IV. Cumulative Error

¶ 71 Because we have determined that the exclusion of

Vanderpauye’s statement constituted reversible error, we need not

and do not consider his argument of cumulative error.

V. Conclusion

¶ 72 The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the case is

remanded for a new trial.

JUDGE RICHMAN and JUDGE WELLING concur.

10Vanderpauye’s argument that this instruction was a theory of the
case instruction was raised for the first time in the reply brief. We
do not address issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.
People v. Plemmons, 2021 COA 10, ¶ 9 n.1. Accordingly, we do not
address this argument.

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