v. Dax Ace Anderson

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

April 2, 2020

2020COA56

No. 18CA0673, People v. Dax Ace Anderson — Constitutional
Law — Due Process; Criminal Law — Competency to Proceed

A division of the court of appeals considers whether a person

must be adjudged incompetent to proceed where the person has

made numerous statements and filings with the court that,

although appearing somewhat delusional on their face, are reflective

of a larger, yet atypical, anti-government system of beliefs shared by

others in the country.

The division concludes that an atypical system of beliefs

cannot alone be the basis upon which a defendant is incompetent

to stand trial.

The division also concludes that the trial court did not

misapprehend the competency standard, despite having made some
statements that the defendant was incompetent to waive his right to

counsel.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA56

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0673
Mesa County District Court No. 15CR487
Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Dax Ace Anderson,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE DAILEY
Navarro and Gomez, JJ., concur

Announced April 2, 2020

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Danielle C. Jefferis, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Under the law, a person is incompetent to proceed in a

criminal case if he or she lacks (1) a rational and factual

understanding of the criminal proceedings or (2) sufficient ability to

consult with his or her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding in order to assist in the defense. To be competent to

proceed, then, a person’s perceptions and understandings about

the criminal justice process and the charges must be rational and

grounded in reality.

¶2 In this case, we are called upon to determine whether a person

must be adjudged incompetent to proceed where the person has

made numerous statements that, although they may appear

somewhat delusional on their face, are reflective of a larger, yet

atypical, anti-government system of beliefs shared by others in the

country.

¶3 Because we conclude that such a person need not be adjudged

incompetent to proceed, we affirm the judgment of conviction of

defendant, Dax Ace Anderson, entered on jury verdicts finding him

guilty of (1) eleven counts related to sexual assaults on three

children and (2) various sentence enhancers.

1
I. Background

¶4 Anderson was charged in April of 2015 with the alleged

offenses in this case. He was eventually tried and convicted thirty-

one months later, in November 2017. Over the course of the case,

Anderson had nine attorneys appointed to represent him or to serve

as advisory counsel. The majority of these attorneys withdrew

because of Anderson’s refusal to work with them and lack of

communication.

¶5 Between the court’s multiple appointments of new counsel,

Anderson’s requests to proceed pro se, and Anderson’s generally

disruptive behavior during the proceedings, the preliminary hearing

was delayed almost two years until February of 2017. When

Anderson refused to appear at the preliminary hearing, the court

determined that he had waived his right to such a hearing, and the

case proceeded to trial.

¶6 Over the course of the case, there was continued consideration

given to Anderson’s competence to proceed. Three competency

evaluations were performed on Anderson by two different

psychologists at the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo.

(Anderson’s counsel had requested the first and third evaluations,

2
and the court had ordered the second one sua sponte based on the

nature of Anderson’s filings with the court.1) The result of each

evaluation was the same: Anderson did not have any mental

disability that would prevent him from interacting with counsel or

understanding the facts surrounding the charges against him.2

Based on these evaluations, along with its own questioning of

Anderson during the case, the court concluded that Anderson was

competent to proceed.

¶7 On the morning of trial, Anderson decided not to participate

because, he said, the court did not have jurisdiction over him.

When Anderson left the courtroom of his own accord, his appointed

counsel tried the case in his absence.3

1 For example, Anderson’s filings continuously referenced tax law,
the Uniform Commercial Code, and various inapplicable
constitutional provisions. The filings also stated often that “Dax
Anderson” was a fictitious entity subjected to the frauds of the
United States government.

2The second and third evaluations are contained in sealed portions
of the record on appeal, and the second evaluation quotes the first
evaluation.

3 Anderson decided not to participate in the remainder of the trial
too, leaving the courtroom each and every day of trial.

3
¶8 The defense presented at trial was that the three child victims’

testimony was not credible. After a seven-day trial, the jury found

Anderson guilty on all counts. Subsequently, the court sentenced

him to an indeterminate sentence of at least 240 years in the

custody of the Department of Corrections.

II. Anderson Was Properly Found Competent to Stand Trial

¶9 Anderson contends that the trial court erred in finding him

competent to stand trial, despite his incoherent filings, courtroom

statements, and inability to assist counsel. We disagree.

A. Preservation, Standard of Review, and General Law

¶ 10 Initially, we reject the People’s assertion that Anderson failed

to properly preserve this issue for appeal because neither he nor his

counsel ever objected to the court’s findings of competency.

¶ 11 To properly preserve an issue for appeal, a party’s objection or

request must be specific enough to (1) draw the court’s attention to

the asserted error, Martinez v. People, 2015 CO 16, ¶ 14; (2) provide

the court with a meaningful opportunity to focus on the issue,

People v. Coughlin, 304 P.3d 575, 582 (Colo. App. 2011); and (3)

prevent or correct the error, People v. Moore, 226 P.3d 1076, 1082

(Colo. App. 2009).

4
¶ 12 Here, the issue of Anderson’s competency to stand trial

saturated the proceedings: defense counsel twice asked for and was

granted competency evaluations, and the court was concerned

enough about Anderson’s competency to order yet another

evaluation sua sponte. Not only was the court given a chance to

rule on the issue, it did rule on the issue. Consequently, we

consider the issue properly preserved for appellate review.

¶ 13 Where the issue has been raised, we review a trial court’s

competency determination for an abuse of discretion. People v.

Price, 240 P.3d 557, 561-62 (Colo. App. 2010). A court abuses its

discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, id. at 561, or if it applies an incorrect legal standard, People

v. Mondragon, 217 P.3d 936, 939 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 14 Due process prohibits the trial of an incompetent defendant.

People v. Wingfield, 2014 COA 173, ¶ 32. “In Colorado, a

defendant’s due process rights in regard to competency are

protected by statute.” Price, 240 P.3d at 561. Under the statute, a

defendant is incompetent to proceed if “as a result of a mental

disability or developmental disability,” he lacks “sufficient present

ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a reasonable degree of

5
rational understanding in order to assist in the defense,” or “a

rational and factual understanding of the criminal proceedings.”

§ 16-8.5-101(12), C.R.S. 2019; cf. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.

402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (Under the Due Process Clause, the

competence to stand trial inquiry focuses on whether the defendant

“has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has

a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings

against him.”).

B. The Trial Court’s Determination is Supported by the Record

¶ 15 The trial court, without any objection from the parties,

determined that Anderson was competent to proceed. Its

determination is supported by the competency evaluations. In the

competency evaluations, the psychologists concluded that Anderson

was competent to proceed because he did not have a mental

disability or developmental disability and he had sufficient ability to

consult with a lawyer with a rational and factual understanding of

the criminal proceedings he faced.

¶ 16 The first two competency evaluations, as well as other parts of

the record, reflected the following:

6
 Anderson sustained a traumatic brain injury in

approximately October of 2008, leaving Anderson with

some reported memory problems;

 although Anderson was evaluated for malingering early in

the case because he claimed he could not recognize his

counsel, he later recognized counsel and recalled

previous conversations when he and counsel had met

with the psychologist;

 the psychologist noted, during the conversations, that

Anderson logically connected his ideas;

 Anderson’s initial, incomplete understanding of the legal

process had improved over the course of his case because

he had “bought many law books” and was studying

because he had decided to represent himself;

 Anderson was generally familiar with terminology, the

trial process, plea options, and the relationship between

attorney and client;

 Anderson was aware he had been charged with multiple

counts of sexual abuse on children and understood the

general facts regarding the charges: where he was, who

7
the alleged victims were, and the possibility of spending

life in prison if convicted;

 the psychologist was not concerned with Anderson’s

understanding of general legal principles and the facts

surrounding the charges;

 the psychologist (1) noted the lengthy list of appointed

defense counsel that had withdrawn from the case and

(2) was concerned with Anderson’s inability either to

work with an attorney to plan a defense or to represent

himself; and

 the psychologist noted that “[m]aking what seems to be

an ill-informed choice as to whom he wants to help him

proceed pro se does not preclude him from having a

rational and factual understanding of the criminal

charges he faces.”

¶ 17 As to the third competency evaluation:

 it was very brief;

8
 Anderson largely refused to participate in the evaluation,

as well as other programs within the jail, citing

“Sovereign Citizenship” beliefs;4

 Anderson was described as being behaviorally stable and

“his thought processes were coherent, logical, and goal-

directed,” and “although he endorsed beliefs related to

the Sovereign Citizen movement, his thought content was

not disturbed by a delusional belief system”;

4 Those who affiliate with “Sovereign Citizenship” believe in a
particular interpretation of the common law and believe they are
not subject to governmental statutes, proceedings, or jurisdictions.
They believe the individual, a “flesh and blood” man (denoted in
lowercase letters) is separate from a legally fictitious commercial
entity imposed upon them by issuance of a birth certificate and
other official documents (as governmental documents usually
denote names in all capital letters). Through this fictitious entity,
they believe, the United States government perpetrates fraud,
making the individual a “creditor” of the fictitious entity. Caesar
Kalinowski IV, A Legal Response to the Sovereign Citizen Movement,
80 Mont. L. Rev. 153, 158, 163, 166, 175 (2019) (discussing the
finer details of the Sovereign Citizenship movement); see, e.g.,
Kilgore-Bey v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Civ. A. No. RDB-17-1751,
2017 WL 3500398, at *2 (D. Md. Aug 14, 2017) (“Sovereign citizens
are a loosely affiliated group who believe that the state and federal
governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no
authority to regulate their behavior.”) (citation omitted).

9
 Anderson was able to describe the evidence in the case,

his awareness of the role of the district attorney, and the

roles of witnesses; and

 Anderson was also aware of the appointed advisory

counsel but was still set on representing himself,

suggesting that Anderson had the ability to make

decisions about his case.

¶ 18 Given the contents of the evaluations, the lack of any objection

by Anderson or his counsel to the conclusions stated therein, and

the court’s ability to observe Anderson,5 we perceive no abuse of the

court’s discretion in determining him competent to stand trial.

C. Anderson’s Arguments Otherwise Are Unpersuasive

¶ 19 In so concluding, we necessarily reject Anderson’s assertions

that the court’s determination was in error because, according to

him, the record reflects that (1) he was delusional (i.e., his

perceptions and understandings were not rational and grounded in

5 See People v. Morino, 743 P.2d 49, 52 (Colo. App. 1987) (“The trial
judge who . . . has had the opportunity of observing the defendant,
his actions and general demeanor, has substantial discretion in
determining whether an issue respecting his competency has been
raised.”).

10
reality); and (2) the court misapprehended the governing law, as

demonstrated by its determination that Anderson was competent to

proceed but not competent to waive his right to a lawyer and

represent himself.

1. Anderson’s Beliefs

¶ 20 In legal support of his first assertion, Anderson relies on the

following pronouncement from another division of this court:

[A] defendant’s factual understanding of the
proceedings, proper orientation as to time,
place, and person, and his ability to furnish
accurately information as to his past history
and the events at issue are not alone sufficient
to establish the defendant’s competence.
Rather, the defendant’s perceptions and
understandings must also be rational and
grounded in reality.

Mondragon, 217 P.3d at 940 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

¶ 21 As pertinent here, Anderson points to various statements he

made in documents or in court. The following are examples of

those statements:

 In a motion for writ of habeas corpus, Anderson wrote,

I Anderson: Dax Ace: the Natural Living-born
man of God, to implore, motion, and direct this
court, to take the following actions without any
further sale, denial, delay, or obstruction.

11
....

Be it further noted that on & for the private &
and public records of this case, that,
Anderson: Dax Ace is the Authorized Agent for
the corporate artifice & fiction known as “DAX
ACE ANDERSON, ET AL,” and that Natural,
Living-born man CANNOT under any measure,
or means, be used as “collateral” for the
alleged “Debt Obligation,” and under the
Colorado Constitution’s Bill of Rights, Sections
#12 and 20, “no person shall be imprisoned for
debt,” and that, “No excessive bail, or cruel &
unusual punishment shall be imposed, or
inflicted.”

 Anderson filed a “Notification of reservation of rights UCC 1-

308/1-207.”

 Anderson mailed documents to the court and district attorney

titled “Notice of Acceptance of dishonor and default,” “Notice of

dishonor,” and “Non-Negotiable Notice of Acceptance,” for

payments Anderson felt were owed to him under Uniform

Commercial Code rules.

 In a document seeking a “Right of Master,” Anderson wrote:

I, dax-ace: anderson, a living and breathing
man of the land. Do hereby give right of
master to all who work with The Bear’s law
and Forensics Team located at [a Florida
address]. If my rights are violated and/or I am
incapacitated due to an unlawful arrest or
abduction caused by any officer or official

12
working outside the color of law and/or not
following their oath of office. The Bear’s Law
and Forensics Team is granted full rights by
me to fight my case to the fullest extent of the
true law.

 In another document, Anderson wrote, “From the beginning as

god is my witness, I dax, a true man of God acknowledge all

blessings given by God; repent all transgressions against God;

and waive all claims without God[.]”

 In another document, Anderson wrote, “I Do Not ‘Consent’ to

any Force or Physical Abuse . . . this is not a Criminal Issue.

This is a Tax Issue. . . I Do Not ‘Consent’ and Do Not

‘Contract.’”

 Anderson filed documents titled “Hell has No fury Like a

Woman Scorned” and “LEGAL NOTICE AND DEMAND, FIAT

JUSTITIA, RUAT COELUM, Let right be done, though the

heavens should fall.”

 In court Anderson made statements such as (1) “Okay,

another thing in here, it says without my consent you cannot

proceed, federal Rules Title 28, Civil Procedures, Section 636,

cannot proceed without my consent here”; (2) “Like I said

before judge, I’m not that person. I’m an authorized

13
representative for that person. I do not argue facts. I want

full disclosure in settling his account, period”; (3) “I am doing

a forgiveness of indebtedness and I’m instructing you to file a

1099-C within 72 hours. If you do not do this, I am filing a

criminal complaint with the Comptroller of the currency that

you and everyone involved are guilty of tax evasion because

you are qualified heir to receive property from defendant’s

estate and you haven’t paid the tax on property . . . .”; and (4)

“I’m the secured party creditor and I demand you provide of

jurisdiction over me, the secured party creditor.”

¶ 22 On the surface, these statements might appear, as Anderson

argues, to depict a person who is not in touch with reality. Digging

deeper, however, these statements do not undermine the trial

court’s competency determination.

¶ 23 Anderson’s statements indicate that he shares some common

beliefs with people who identify with the “Sovereign Citizenship”

movement.6

6The record reflects that at times Anderson denied that he was a
“Sovereign Citizen,” and at other times, he acknowledged that he
was one. Whether or not Anderson was a “Sovereign Citizen” is of

14
¶ 24 In one of the competency evaluations, a psychologist noted

that beliefs akin to those held by “Sovereign Citizens” are not alone

sufficient for a DSM-5 diagnosis of a mental disorder and not

relevant to the competency issue.

¶ 25 We agree that such beliefs are not, in and of themselves,

indicative of a mental disorder. Nor are they dispositive of a

competency determination. In addressing a similar situation, the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said:

It is not disputed that Neal made numerous
comments and filed a variety of documents
disputing jurisdiction and other “nonsensical”
issues (e.g., [the] United States is a
corporation. . . . as a corporation it cannot
interact with human beings; “the sale of bonds
based on Petitioners [sic] conviction by the
court creates a financial conflict of interest”.).
However, Neal also professed a “sovereign
citizen” belief system. His comments and
conduct were indicative of that belief, not a lack
of competence. Neal cannot now use those
beliefs as an expression of incompetency. “In
the absence of any mental illness or
uncontrollable behavior, [Neal] had the right to
present [his] unorthodox defenses and argue
[his] theories to the bitter end.”

no consequence to us. What is of consequence is that Anderson
shares many beliefs with people who espouse that cause and who,
as indicated below, have been found competent to proceed.

15
United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 657 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis

added) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 610

F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010)). Other courts have reached a

similar conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 871 F.3d

470, 478 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[S]imply espousing sovereign citizen and

other fringe views does not necessarily demonstrate lack of

competence . . . .”); United States v. Gooch, 595 F. App’x 524, 527-

28 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[M]erely believing in fringe views does not mean

someone cannot cooperate with his lawyer or understand the

judicial proceedings around him. . . . [T]he question is not whether

a defendant has tax-protester or other fringe beliefs but whether

possessing those beliefs establishes, without more, a deeper

breakdown in communicative ability (i.e., ability to communicate

with one’s lawyers) or cognitive ability (i.e., ability to understand the

ongoing legal proceedings). We answer that question as several of

our sister circuits have: with a resounding ‘no.’”); United States v.

James, 328 F.3d 953, 955-56 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Many litigants

articulate beliefs that have no legal support . . . . Sometimes these

beliefs are sincerely held, sometimes they are advanced only to

annoy the other side, but in neither event do they imply mental

16
instability or concrete intellect so deficient that trial is impossible. .

. . One person with a fantastic view may be suspected of delusions;

two people with the identical view are just oddballs.”) (citation

omitted); State v. Tucker, 62 N.E.3d 893, 898 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016)

(“Other courts, when faced with similar circumstances, have

consistently concluded that while such behavior may reflect

unusual beliefs and may go so far as to obstruct trial court

proceedings, they are not indicia of incompetency . . . .”).

¶ 26 In line with these authorities, courts have uniformly rejected

the notion that people are incompetent to proceed simply because

they espouse or evidence a belief system similar to Anderson’s. See,

e.g., Gooch, 595 F. App’x at 526-27 (that a person was governed

only “by God’s law,” presented tax arguments to combat criminal

charges, and refused to speak to defense counsel “does not mean

[he] cannot . . . understand the judicial proceedings around him”);

United States v. Landers, 564 F.3d 1217, 1219 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009)

(holding a criminal defendant, who believed in an alternative

version of commercial law and planned to file liens and Uniform

Commercial Code documents against prison wardens to recoup

payment owed for unauthorized use of the defendant’s name, was

17
not incompetent to stand trial); United States v. Oehler, 116 F. App’x

43, 44 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that “performing

incantations of the tax protest movement” and making legally

frivolous arguments were not evidence of mental incompetence);

James, 328 F.3d at 954-55 (holding the defendant’s exclamations

that he was a “secured party” in a criminal case was insufficient to

undermine a finding of competency).

¶ 27 Because Anderson’s unconventional beliefs do not necessarily

reflect that he is delusional or out of touch with reality, they are not

sufficient, in and of themselves, to undermine the court’s

competency determination.

2. Misapprehending the Competency Standard

¶ 28 Anderson asserts that he was not competent to stand trial

because the trial court concluded that he was not competent to

waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Because the

standard for determining competency to proceed is the same as that

for determining competency to waive counsel,7 Anderson argues

7 See People v. Davis, 2015 CO 36M, ¶ 16 (“A defendant is
competent to waive the right to counsel if he meets the threshold
standard for competence to stand trial articulated by the United

18
that the court should have recognized that he was as incompetent

to proceed as he was to waive counsel.

¶ 29 True, on occasion, the court did say that Anderson was not

“competent” to represent himself. But read in context, the court’s

“competence” concern was not that Anderson lacked sufficient

acumen or touch with reality to be capable of deciding whether to

proceed (with or without counsel). Rather, the court’s concerns were

that (1) Anderson was ill-equipped or sorely lacking in the legal

skills to represent himself and (2) Anderson was being obstinate

toward the progression of the case. Indeed, just over a year and a

half before trial, the court allowed Anderson to waive counsel and

proceed pro se with the help of advisory counsel, which

demonstrates that the court did not misunderstand or misapply the

applicable “competency” standard.8

States Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402
(1960) (per curiam).”).

8 The court subsequently determined that Anderson “waived the
right to represent [himself] based on [his] behavior, . . . [his]
disruptions, . . . [his] delaying tactics, . . . [his] inability to proceed
with this case in a just and appropriate manner,” and his hindrance
of “the administration of justice over and over and over again.” It
was not, the court noted, that Anderson did not understand the

19
III. Disposition

¶ 30 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

proceedings, it was that he “refuse[d] to adhere to the rules of this
courtroom.” See People v. Mogul, 812 P.2d 705, 708 (Colo. App.
1991) (The right of self-representation “may not be used to impede
the efficient administration of justice.”).

20