Pro's Closet v. City of Boulder

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
August 22, 2019

2019COA128

No. 18CA1275, Pro’s Closet v. City of Boulder — Local
Government — Pawnbrokers

A division of the court of appeals interprets the definition of

“pawnbroker” in section 29-11.9-101(7), C.R.S. 2018, and holds

that it includes persons regularly engaged in making “purchase

transactions,” as that term is defined in section 29-11.9-101(8), and

not just persons regularly engaged in making “contracts for

purchase,” as that term is defined in section 29-11.9-101(1), who

also make purchase transactions.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA128

Court of Appeals No. 18CA1275
Boulder County District Court No. 17CV30652
Honorable Patrick Butler, Judge

The Pro’s Closet, Inc., a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

City of Boulder, Colorado, and Michael Dougherty, in his official capacity as the
District Attorney for the 20th Judicial District of Colorado,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Román and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

Announced August 22, 2019

LaszloLaw, Theodore E. Laszlo, Jr., Michael J. Laszlo, Boulder, Colorado; Sean
Connelly, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Thomas A. Carr, City Attorney, Luis Toro, Senior Assistant City Attorney,
Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee City of Boulder

Ben Perlman, County Attorney, David Hughes, Deputy County Attorney,
Catherine R. Ruhland, Assistant County Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee Michael Dougherty
¶1 Plaintiff, The Pro’s Closet, Inc., appeals the district court’s

summary judgment in favor of defendant, the City of Boulder. The

court ruled that Pro’s Closet is a “pawnbroker” as defined in section

29-11.9-101, C.R.S. 2018, and is therefore subject to the

requirements, restrictions, and potential sanctions of the state

pawnbroker laws, sections 29-11.9-101 to -104, C.R.S. 2018.

Because we conclude that the district court didn’t err in

interpreting the pawnbroker statutes, we affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 Pro’s Closet is licensed in Boulder as a secondhand dealer

under the Boulder Revised Code. It sells used bicycles, bicycle

parts, and bicycle gear. Though it has a warehouse in Boulder,

Pro’s Closet does most of its business online.

¶3 In 2016, the Twentieth Judicial District’s District Attorney’s

Office told the Boulder Police Department to treat Pro’s Closet as a

“pawnbroker” under state law, meaning, among other things, that

Pro’s Closet must hold used goods it buys for thirty days before

reselling them instead of ninety-six hours as required by the

Boulder Revised Code’s secondhand dealer ordinances. See § 29-

11.9-103(6), C.R.S. 2018; Boulder Rev. Code 4-17-10. Pro’s Closet

1
filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that it isn’t subject to

state pawnbroker laws.

¶4 Both Pro’s Closet and the City moved for summary judgment.

The district court granted the City’s motion, concluding that, since

Pro’s Closet regularly makes “purchase transaction[s]” as defined by

section 29-11.9-101(8), it is a pawnbroker under state law.

II. Discussion

¶5 Pro’s Closet argues on appeal that (1) the district court erred

in ruling that it is a pawnbroker under section 29-11.9-101; and (2)

because Colorado’s and the City’s secondhand dealer laws are more

specific to its business, it isn’t subject to state pawnbroker laws. 1

We reject both arguments.

A. Pro’s Closet is a Pawnbroker Under State Law

¶6 Pro’s Closet argues first that the district court incorrectly

interpreted section 29-11.9-101 in concluding that it is a

“pawnbroker.”

1Pro’s Closet asserted four more arguments in its opening and reply
briefs, but later withdrew them.

2
1. Standard of Review and Interpretive Principles

¶7 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Colo. Oil

& Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 2019 CO 3, ¶ 19.

¶8 In construing a statute, we look to the entire statutory scheme

to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts,

and we apply words and phrases in accordance with their plain and

ordinary meanings. Id.; Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083,

1088-89 (Colo. 2011). When the statutory language is clear, we

apply it as written, without resorting to other principles of statutory

interpretation. Martinez, ¶ 19; Denver Post Corp., 255 P.3d at 1088.

2. Analysis

¶9 Article 11.9 of title 29 of the Colorado Revised Statutes

regulates certain activities of “pawnbrokers.” §§ 29-11.9-101

to -104. It both requires and prohibits specified acts by

pawnbrokers, §§ 29-11.9-103, -104, and it creates criminal

penalties for noncompliance, § 29-11.9-104(3)(b), (4).2 The required

2 The pawnbroker statutes also allow for local licensing and
regulation of pawnbrokers, subject to limitations, § 29-11.9-102,
C.R.S. 2018, and dictate a criminal penalty for any customer who
knowingly gives certain kinds of false information to a pawnbroker,
§ 29-11.9-104(5), C.R.S. 2018.

3
act that Pro’s Closet apparently considers the most onerous is the

requirement to “hold all property purchased by [the pawnbroker]

through a purchase transaction for thirty days following the date of

purchase . . . .” § 29-11.9-103(6).

¶ 10 Section 29-11.9-101(7) defines a “pawnbroker” as “a person

regularly engaged in the business of making contracts for purchase

or purchase transactions in the course of his or her business.”

(Emphasis added.) Section 29-11.9-101(1) defines a “contract for

purchase” as

a contract entered into between a pawnbroker
and a customer pursuant to which money is
advanced to the customer by the pawnbroker
on the delivery of tangible personal property by
the customer on the condition that the
customer, for a fixed price and within a fixed
period of time, to be no less than thirty days,
has the option to cancel said contract.

And section 29-11.9-101(8) defines a “purchase transaction” as

the purchase by a pawnbroker in the course of
his or her business of tangible personal
property for resale, other than newly
manufactured tangible personal property that
has not previously been sold at retail, when
the purchase does not constitute a contract for
purchase.

4
¶ 11 The City doesn’t claim that Pro’s Closet makes “contracts for

purchase”; it claims that Pro’s Closet regularly engages in the

business of making “purchase transactions,” as that term is

statutorily defined. For its part, Pro’s Closet doesn’t dispute that it

regularly makes purchase transactions. Instead, it argues that to

be a “pawnbroker” under the state statutes, a person or business

must regularly make contracts for purchase. A business that

makes purchase transactions only counts as a “pawnbroker,” Pro’s

Closet says, if its primary business is making contracts for

purchase.

¶ 12 Pro’s Closet’s reading of the definitional statute is untenable.

Giving the language in that statute its plain and ordinary meaning

— that is, applying well-established rules of grammar and the

common understanding of the words’ usage — we conclude that

section 29-11.9-101(7) expressly provides two alternative means of

qualifying as a “pawnbroker.” See § 2-4-101, C.R.S. 2018 (“Words

and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to

the rules of grammar and common usage,” unless they have

otherwise “acquired a technical or particular meaning.”). It does so

by articulating those means — regularly making contracts for

5
purchase or regularly making purchase transactions — in the

disjunctive by use of the word “or.” See Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor

Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo. 2008) (“Generally, we

presume the disjunctive use of the word ‘or’ marks distinctive

categories.”); Bloomer v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 799 P.2d 942, 946

(Colo. 1990) (“The legislature’s use of the disjunctive ‘or’ demarcates

different categories.”), overruled on other grounds by Bertrand v. Bd.

of Cty. Comm’rs, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994). A “pawnbroker” within

the meaning of section 29-11.9-101(1), (7), (8) is therefore an entity

that regularly engages either in the business of making contracts for

purchase or in the business of making purchase transactions.

¶ 13 It is undisputed that Pro’s Closet regularly engages in the

business of making purchase transactions. It is therefore a

“pawnbroker” under state law.

¶ 14 Pro’s Closet’s proposed interpretation of “pawnbroker” — that

only businesses that regularly make contracts for purchase qualify

— fails for two main reasons. First, accepting it would require us to

contravene the principle that a court must give sensible effect to all

parts of a statute. § 2-4-201(1)(b), C.R.S. 2018 (court must

presume the General Assembly intended all parts of a statute to be

6
effective); Martinez, ¶ 19. After all, if, as Pro’s Closet argues, a

business must regularly make contracts for purchase to be a

“pawnbroker,” then the General Assembly would have had no

reason to include the phrase “or purchase transactions” in

subsection 101(7)’s definition of a “pawnbroker”: businesses

regularly engaged in making contracts for purchase but that also

regularly make purchase transactions would be a mere subset of

businesses regularly engaged in making contracts for purchase. 3

Put a bit differently, every business that regularly makes contracts

for purchase qualifies as a “pawnbroker” under subsection 101(1),

regardless of whether it also makes purchase transactions: saying,

as Pro’s Closet proposes, that “pawnbroker” only includes

businesses that regularly make contracts for purchase, including

those that also make purchase transactions, is no different, in

3 Pro’s Closet’s position can be expressed in an algebraic form as
follows: a (regularly making contracts for purchase, see § 29-11.9-
101(1), C.R.S. 2018) = x (pawnbroker); and a (regularly making
contracts for purchase, see § 29-11.9-101(1)) + b (regularly making
purchase transactions, see § 29-11.9-101(8)) = x (pawnbroker); but
b (regularly making purchase transactions, see § 29-11.9-101(8)) ≠
x (pawnbroker). Another way to conceptualize Pro’s Closet’s
position as contrasted with our interpretation — in terms of sets
and subsets — is shown in Appendix A to this opinion.

7
terms of defining covered entities, from saying “pawnbroker”

includes only businesses that regularly make contracts for

purchase. So Pro’s Closet’s proposed interpretation impermissibly

renders the last phrase of subsection 101(7) — “or purchase

transactions in the course of his or her business” — and all of

subsection 101(8) — defining a “purchase transaction” —

superfluous. Kinder Morgan CO2 Co., L.P. v. Montezuma Cty. Bd. of

Comm’rs, 2017 CO 72, ¶ 24 (we must strive to avoid any

interpretation that would render words or phrases superfluous).

¶ 15 Second, Pro’s Closet’s position is inconsistent with and would

undermine certain purposes of the pawnbroker statutes, as

reflected in the entire statutory scheme. Martinez, ¶ 19 (we must

consider the entire statutory scheme when discerning legislative

intent). Those purposes include enabling law enforcement to track

and recover stolen tangible personal property and assisting law

enforcement officials in apprehending those trafficking in stolen

tangible personal property. To those ends, the statutes imposing

record-keeping, holding, and other related requirements apply

expressly, and largely to the same extent, to both property held via

contracts for purchase and property obtained via purchase

8
transactions. § 29-11.9-103(1)-(7); § 29-11.9-104(1). Pro’s Closet

hasn’t explained why the General Assembly would want to exempt

from this scheme that category of persons regularly engaged in

making purchase transactions who aren’t primarily in the business

of making contracts for purchase. See Metal Mgmt. W., Inc. v. State,

251 P.3d 1164, 1173 (Colo. App. 2010) (rejecting a proposed

limitation on the meaning of a statutory term because doing so

would “undermine the legislature’s intent and defeat the purpose of

the statute”).

¶ 16 Our interpretation of the definitional statute also finds support

in its history, particularly when considered in light of other states’

pawnbroker laws. The General Assembly enacted the first version

of Colorado’s pawnbroker-regulating statutes in 1897. See Ch. 66,

1897 Colo. Sess. Laws 250. It initially defined “pawnbroker” as

“[a]ny person or persons loaning money on personal property and

charging as much as the maximum rate of interest herein

provided . . . .” Ch. 66, sec. 16, 1897 Colo. Sess. Laws 254. Save

for the interest rate aspect, that definition tracked in substance the

traditional understanding of pawnbroker, as now reflected in

subsection 101(1)’s definition of “contract for purchase.” And that

9
definition remained unchanged, see § 12-56-101, C.R.S. 1978, until

1984 when the General Assembly repealed the existing statutes and

replaced them with the substantially amended versions applicable

today. See §§ 12-56-101 to -104, C.R.S. 1984; Ch. 246, sec. 3,

2017 Colo. Sess. Laws 1038-41 (relocating the statutes to title 29,

article 11.9). In doing so, the General Assembly abandoned the old

unitary definition of a pawnbroker, which, again, was in line with

the traditional understanding of the term, and replaced it with a

plainly more expansive, disjunctively phrased definition. Had the

General Assembly wished to keep the traditional understanding, its

amendment to the definition, if any, would have looked much

different.

¶ 17 This latter point is further borne out by comparing the current

definition of “pawnbroker” in subsection 101(7) with those that

appear in other states’ pawnbroker statutes, most of which have

been on the books for many decades. Almost every state, as well as

the District of Columbia, has laws regulating pawnbrokers. Their

definitions of pawnbroker can be sorted into three broad categories.

First, a few states’ statutes limit their definitions to the traditional

understanding — a person who lends money in exchange for a

10
pledge of personal property. E.g., Alaska Stat. § 08.76.590(21)-(23)

(2018); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 646.010 (2017); R.I. Gen. Laws § 19-26-1

(2018). Second, many states’ statutes, perhaps in the service of

loophole closing, include not just persons who lend money secured

by personal property, but also persons who buy personal property

on the condition that the seller may buy back the property for a

stipulated price within a fixed or variable period of time. E.g., Ala.

Code § 5-19A-2(4) (2019); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1621 (2019);

205 Ill. Comp. Stat. 510/1 (2019); Minn. Stat. § 325J.01 (2018);

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 367.011(3) (2018); Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-4000

(2019). 4 Third, some states’ statutes, in addition to covering those

who lend money on pledged personal property, or sometimes also in

addition to covering those who buy personal property subject to the

seller’s right to buy it back, also cover other specific persons, such

as those who hold themselves out as pawnbrokers (usually via

signage) or who warehouse furniture and lend money on pledge of

4 For those wondering whether this category might track “purchase
transactions” under Colorado law, we observe that Colorado’s
definition of “purchase transaction” isn’t limited to transactions
where the seller has the right to buy back the property for a
stipulated price within a fixed or variable period of time. We think
the lack of any such limitation is significant.

11
goods. E.g., Fla. Stat. § 539.001(2)(h), (i) (2018); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 45:22-1 (West 2019); Utah Code Ann. § 13-32a-102(22), (23) (West

2019); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 3861 (2018).

¶ 18 Colorado’s definition of “pawnbroker” is unlike any of those: it

is unique. The General Assembly certainly had a lot of material

from other jurisdictions from which it could have drawn in 1984,

but it decided to go its own way.

¶ 19 Undaunted, Pro’s Closet’s argues that its interpretation is

warranted for two reasons, both of which we reject.

¶ 20 Pro’s Closet asserts that the language “when the purchase

does not constitute a contract for purchase” in subsection 101(8)’s

definition of “purchase transaction” evinces an intent to limit

“pawnbrokers” to those primarily engaged in the business of

making contracts for purchase. But that phrase obviously serves to

further distinguish contracts for purchase and purchase

transactions: if a transaction meets the definition of contract for

purchase, then that’s what it is; if it doesn’t, then it may be a

purchase transaction.

¶ 21 Pro’s Closet also points to the use of the term “pawnbroker” in

subsection 101(8). It argues that to cure a circularity in the

12
definition of “pawnbroker” created when subsections 101(7) and

101(8) are read together, “pawnbroker,” as used in subsection

101(8), must be given its commonly understood meaning — that is,

the one reflected in subsection 101(1). See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v.

Dep’t of Revenue, 397 P.3d 1111, 1117 (Colo. App. 2011) (“When a

definition uses the term being defined, or a synonym, as the

definition it is circular and provides little guidance.”), rev’d on other

grounds, 2014 CO 59. But, as discussed, doing that would in turn

render subsection 101(8), as well as the last phrase of subsection

101(7), meaningless. Again, if only persons who qualify as

“pawnbrokers” under subsection 101(1) are “pawnbrokers” under

subsection 101(7), the last phrase of subsection 101(7) and all of

subsection 101(8) do no work.

¶ 22 As well, Pro’s Closet’s proposed fix for the potential partial

circularity merely substitutes one oddity for another. For if the

commonly understood meaning of pawnbroker (as opposed to the

statutory definition) must be given to “pawnbroker” in subsection

101(8), it follows that it must also be given to “pawnbroker” in

subsection 101(1). And that would render the definition of

“contract for purchase” in that subsection internally repetitive. As

13
Pro’s Closet concedes, subsection 101(1), as written, describes

transactions ordinarily considered pawnbroker transactions —

those where a person lends money in exchange for personal

property that is deposited as security by the borrower, and which

property the lender may sell if the borrower fails to repay the loan

by a certain time. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1362 (11th ed. 2019);

see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1658 (2002).

To superimpose that commonly understood meaning of pawnbroker

on the term “pawnbroker” in that subsection would result in the

following reading of subsection 101(1):

“Contract for purchase” means a contract
entered into between [one who lends money in
exchange for personal property that is
deposited as security by the borrower, and
which the lender may sell if the borrower fails
to repay the loan by a certain time] and a
customer pursuant to which money is
advanced to the customer by the [one who
lends money in exchange for personal property
that is deposited as a security by the borrower,
and which the lender may sell if the borrower
fails to repay the loan by a certain time] on the
delivery of tangible personal property by the
customer on the condition that the customer,
for a fixed price and within a fixed period of

14
time, to be no less than thirty days, 5 has the
option to cancel said contract.

¶ 23 The definition would therefore end with one description of a

pawnbroker transaction on top of a virtually identical description.

We see no reason to believe the General Assembly intended such

redundancy, nor, as previously discussed, do we see any reason the

General Assembly would have intended to use “pawnbroker” in

subsection 101(8) in a way that, considered in connection with

subsections 101(7) and 101(1), renders subsection 101(8) and the

last phrase of subsection 101(7) of no effect. A more sensible

reading of “pawnbroker” in subsections 101(1) and 101(8) is a

“person” who regularly enters into the described transactions. This

is so because (1) subsection 101(7) — defining “pawnbroker” —

defines a “pawnbroker” as “a person” who regularly makes either of

two types of transactions; and (2) reading the term as Pro’s Closet

proposes creates the problems identified above. See Martinez, ¶ 19

5 The phrase “to be no less than thirty days” is seemingly intended
to limit the definition to be consistent with the holding requirement
of section 29-11.9-103(6), C.R.S. 2018. It doesn’t pertain to the
nature of the covered transactions.

15
(we must strive to give harmonious and sensible effect to all parts of

a statute).

¶ 24 Lastly, we reject Pro’s Closet’s argument that our

interpretation will lead to absurd results. Pro’s Closet says this is

so because the statutes will have very broad application. But it is a

mistake to equate breadth with absurdity. To be sure, reading a

term broadly may, in a particular situation, lead to an absurd

result. But such a result isn’t the inevitable result of any

interpretation that can be characterized as broad. Because breadth

is a relative concept, whether a broad construction of a statute

would lead to an absurd result necessarily depends on an analysis

of the particular circumstances in which it could apply in light of

the statutory objectives. Undertaking such an analysis here, we see

no absurdity arising from our enforcement of the unambiguous

definition of “pawnbroker.” See Oracle Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue,

2017 COA 152, ¶ 40 (“An absurd result is one ‘so irrational,

unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been

within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and

discretion.’” (quoting Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc.,

159 P.3d 547, 550 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006))), aff’d, 2019 CO 42; see

16
also Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186, 1191 (Colo.

2010) (“The rule that we will deviate from the plain language of a

statute to avoid an absurd result must be reserved for those

instances where a literal interpretation of a statute would produce a

result contrary to the expressed intent of the legislature.”).

¶ 25 To be sure, the potential scope of the statutes’ application

gives us some pause. But we must enforce the statutes as written.

To the extent the result of doing so may be perceived by some as

undesirable, “the legislature must determine the remedy. Courts

may not rewrite statutes to improve them.” Dep’t of Transp. v. City

of Idaho Springs, 192 P.3d 490, 494 (Colo. App. 2008) (citation

omitted); accord Smith, 230 P.3d at 1191 (“Where a statute leads to

undesirable results, it is up to the General Assembly, not the

courts, to determine the remedy.”). 6

6 At oral argument, Pro’s Closet’s counsel sought to argue, for the
first time in this case, that the phrase “in the course of his or her
business” in subsections 101(7) and 101(8) somehow indicates that
the General Assembly intended that only businesses that are
primarily engaged in making contracts for purchase, see § 29-11.9-
101(1), be regarded as pawnbrokers. We don’t address arguments
raised for the first time at oral argument. McGihon v. Cave, 2016
COA 78, ¶ 10 n.1. But even if we are wrong about whether Pro’s
Closet preserved this argument, we reject it. We don’t see anything

17
B. The Secondhand Dealer Statutes Do Not Prevail Over the
Pawnbroker Statutes

¶ 26 Pro’s Closet also contends that Colorado’s secondhand dealer

statutes, sections 18-13-114 and -118, C.R.S. 2018, trump the

pawnbroker statutes because they are more specifically applicable

to Pro’s Closet’s business.

1. Standard of Review and Governing Law

¶ 27 Again, we review issues of statutory construction de novo.

Martinez, ¶ 19.

¶ 28 “[I]n the event of irreconcilable conflict, specific provisions

trump general provisions.” Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Bd. of Cty.

Comm’rs, 199 P.3d 718, 733 (Colo. 2009); see also § 2-4-205, C.R.S.

2018; Delta Sales Yard v. Patten, 892 P.2d 297, 298 (Colo. 1995) (“It

is a well-accepted principle of statutory construction that in the

case of conflict, a more specific statute controls over a more general

one.”).

in that language, considered in the context of the other relevant
parts of section 101, that affects our analysis. The natural reading
of that phrase is that it distinguishes transactions entered into in
the course of a person’s business from those entered into by a
person (who may be a pawnbroker) acting in his personal capacity.

18
2. Analysis

¶ 29 The secondhand dealer statutes that Pro’s Closet cites

criminalize certain conduct with respect to the sale of secondhand

property in Colorado. A secondhand dealer 7 must record certain

sales or trades it makes. § 18-13-114(1). It must then provide that

record to local law enforcement officials and keep a copy of the

record for inspection. Id. A first-time violation of these

requirements is a class 1 misdemeanor; a subsequent violation

within three years of the conviction for the first offense is

punishable as a class 5 felony. § 18-13-114(6)(a).

¶ 30 We see no conflict between the record-keeping requirements

for secondhand dealers in the criminal code and the record-keeping

and holding requirements for pawnbrokers in title 29. Nor has

Pro’s Closet shown how following one set of laws impacts a

7 A “secondhand dealer” is “any person whose principal business is
that of engaging in selling or trading secondhand property.” § 18-
13-114(5)(c), C.R.S. 2018. That definition doesn’t exclude persons
who may also be pawnbrokers. Cf. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21-39a(3)
(2019) (defining “secondhand dealer” expressly to exclude
pawnbrokers); Utah Code Ann. § 13-32a-102(29) (West 2019)
(same).

19
business’s ability to follow the other. 8 We therefore see no conflict

that would trigger the canon of statutory construction on which

Pro’s Closet relies.

III. Conclusion

¶ 31 We affirm the district court’s judgment.

JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.

8 Pro’s Closet also argues that the pawnbroker statutes conflict with
the City’s secondhand dealer ordinances. But it cites no authority
for the proposition that such a conflict renders a state statute a
nullity, either generally or as applied to particular persons.

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APPENDIX A

Pro’s Closet’s Proposed Interpretation

Regularly makes Regularly makes
contracts for purchase purchase transactions
(§ 29-11.9-101(1)) (§ 29-11.9-101(8))

The shaded area represents Pro’s Closet’s position as to who
qualifies as a “pawnbroker” under subsection 101(7).

Our Interpretation

Regularly makes Regularly makes
contracts for purchase purchase transactions
(§ 29-11.9-101(1)) (§ 29-11.9-101(8))

The shaded area represents our interpretation of the meaning
of “pawnbroker” under subsection 101(7).

21